OPERATIONS IN SHAKARGARH BULGE : 1971

Col RAA Raj Kumar, VSM

INTRODUCTION

1. The Indo Pakistan conflict of 1971 is an important milestone in the history of the Indian sub
continent. It carved out an independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh by a finely orchestrated
performance by the Indian Nation. It brought honour and glory to our Armed Forces and resurrected its
pride after the Himalayan blunder of 1962 and the not so decisive 1965 war. The charisma of our the
then Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and the dynamic leadership of our beloved Sam Bahadur
enthused in the nation a sense of deep patriotism that remains unparalleled.

2. For a soldier, military history is an essential facet to draw lessons and this war is of special
significance. A war fought and won by us with a decisive finality. But this war has not been won by us
on numerical superiority, which infact was considerable, but because of superior tactics and strategy
and above all because of superior fighting qualities of the Indian soldiers. The Indian Armed Forces,
put in its place the arrogant Pakistan Army, an Army debauched, corrupted by politics and drunk with
power.

3. With this as a prelude, I welcome you to a presentation on ‘1 Corps Operations in Shakargarh

Bulge During 1971 War’. The 1971 Operations were fought on two fronts. It would take nearly a week
to do justice to all aspects of the war. We have therefore restricted ourselves to what is of greater
relevance to us i.e. the Operations of 1 Corps in Shakargarh Bulge. In this war, 1 Corps launched
an offensive, in similar trn as in 1965, which involved a mass of mech forces, who were to fight in close
concert with infantry formations.

Col S G Chavan

4. The presentation will be covered in the following manner:-

(a) Force Levels and Deployment. We will then take a brief look at the force levels,
available to the Shakargarh Bulge.

(b) 1 Corps Operations. The major part of our presentation will be describing and
analysing the operations of 1 Corps in the Shakargarh Bulge. This we shall do in three time
zones, i.e 5th to 8th Dec, 8th to 11 Dec and 11th to 15th Dec.

(c) Lessons. We shall finally draw relevant lessons from this operation. These shall
encompass the more important ones, in the hope that we will achieve from these experiences,
greater success in any future battle that may be ours to fight.

(d) Other Side of the Hill. Both the 1 Corps operations and the lessons shall also draw on
views from the Pakistan side sourced from various books.

PART I

Preparation

5. Build up for the war began quite early in Mar 1971 as it became clear that a political solution to
the problem was not likely to be forthcoming. In the Western Theatre there were many a gap in our
defences. The International Border/Cease Fire Line was held only by four Divisions and two
independent brigades which were already deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. This left a large
undefended gap Between Gurdaspur and Jammu and had Pakistan launched a preemptive in those
critical days it could have had a tactical success on its hands. 1 Corps was mov by the end of Oct to
fill this gap and the crisis was resolved. It should be noted that the positioning of 1 Corps had seriously
limited the options available for its emp later. By 01 Dec 71 the tps were ready in battle stations,
waiting for the war to start.
 2

ORIENTATION TO THE SHAKARGARH BULGE

6. 1 Corps conducted its operations in the Shakargarh Bulge, between Degh Nadi and Ravi River
in the South. Due to the proximity of the salient to our National Highway 1A, Pakistan could easily
interdict own road and rail communication thereby cutting off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of the
country. It also provided a vital defensive cushion to the network of road and rail communication that
linked Sialkot and Lahore.

7. Rivers and Nalas. There are numerous rivers and nalas flow in South West direction and
divide the area into segments. Important rivers and nalas are Basantar or Degh Nadi as it is called in
Pakistan, Basantar Nala, Karir Nala, Cho Nala, Hodla Nala, Bein river and Ravi river. Ujh river joins
Ravi river before it enters Pakistan. All rivers / nalas except Ravi river were mostly dry in Dec with
patches of water at places. Karir Nadi, Hodla Nala and Bein River had relatively bad going for armr.
Karir Nadi had sandy and soft bed. Crossing of Hodla Nala required detailed reconnaissance. Bein
River had steep banks and boggy bed at several places. Boggy patches in other rivers and nalas also
existed, hence reconnaissance was required for finding suitable crossing places.

8. Town and Villages.

(a) Pakistan. Sialkot, Pasrur, Zafarwal, Chak Amru, Shakargarh, Nainakot, Nurkot, Narowal
and Dhamthal.

(b) India. Jammu, Ramgarh, Samba, Madhopur, Kathua, Pathankot and Gurdaspur. Own side
also had Lasian and Kasowal enclaves.

9. Important Roads.

(a) Pakistan.
(i) Road Sialkot – Zafarwal – Shakargarh.
(ii) Road Pasrur – Dhamthal - Nurkot - Shakargarh – Chak Amru.
(iii) Road Pasrur – Narowal - Nurkot.

(b) Own.
(i) National Highway – 1A.
(ii) Dhar – Udhampur road.

10. Artificial Obstacles. Pakistan had three belts of mine fields in this area. First and second belt
of obstacles, which were approx, 7-8 kms apart had a depth of 600-800 m and Anti tank density of 1.
They ran almost parallel to the International Border, East to West. The third belt ran North of the road
Zafarwal – Shakargah and had a depth of 1200 m and Anti tank density of 1.5. In addition Pakistan
had constructed Anti tank ditches like the Supwal Anti tank ditch between Degh Nadi and Basantar
Nala.

FORCE LEVELS AND DEPLOYMENT

11. Deployment. India had at that time, the Western and Southern Commands only. 15 Corps
was responsible for Jammu and Kashmir. 1 Corps was responsible for Samba, Pathankot and
Gurdaspur. Amritsar- Ganganagar sector was the responsibility of 11 Corps. In the 11 Corps Z, 1 Armd
Division, 14 Infantry Division and 14 (I) Armd Brigade were also located. This was the only strategic
reserve available to India. Southern Command was responsible for Rajasthan and Rann of Kutch. Own
12 Infantry Division was deployed in the Jaisalmer sector and 11 Infantry Division deployed in the
Barmer sector. On the other side Pakistan 1 Corps was responsible for area in the North which
included Shakargarh Bulge. 4 Corps was responsible for the Lahore- Kasur sector. 2 Corps with 1
Armd Division and 33 Infantry Division was located in general Area Multan – Okara as the Southern
reserve. 18 Infantry Division was deployed in Sind.
 3

12. In Shakargarh Bulge area of Pakistan 1 Corps, 15 Infantry Division was holding Sialkot sector
and 8 Infantry Division was deployed in Shakargarh sector. Area east of the Bein River was held
primarily by Para Military Forces. Pakistan army had created an adhoc force designated as Changez
Force comprising 20 Lancers equipped with Shermans, 33 Cavillary with Pattons and 13 PUNJAB.
This Changez Force performed commendably as covering troops in this sector. 8 (I) Armd Brigade with
three armd Regiments was located in the area North of Zafarwal - Dhamtal for defensive tasks.
Strategic reserve of 6 Armd Division and 17 Infantry Division was located in gen area of Pasrur.

1 CORPS OPERATIONS

13. Having seen the overall deploy on the Western Front in general and deployment and terrain in
Shakargarh Bulge in particular, we shall now focus upon conduct of operations by 1 Corps in this
sector.

Tasks In General

14. (a) Defensive Operations. Defend area between Aik Nala in the North and Thakurpur in
the South.

(b) Offensive Operations. Launch an offensive in the Shakargarh Bulge with a view to
capture maximum territory and draw in en res.

Aim Of Corps Offensive

15. The aim of 1 Corps, was to launch an offensive in the Shakargarh Bulge, to secure area up to,
and, including the towns of Zafarwal, Damtal and Shakargarh, with a view to capture maximum territory
and draw in enemy strategic reserves. At this juncture, it would be relevant to mention that this aim laid
down finally was a diluted version of what was intended previously, wherein it was envisaged to capture
Pasrur and secure territory up to the Marala-Ravi Link Canal (MRLC). The same could not be executed
on account of dilution of force levels available for the offensive, this aspect will be covered in the
presentation later.

Operational Imperatives

16. Since the Corps had a dual defensive/offensive task, the operational imperatives that had a
bearing on the planned offensive in the Shakargarh Bulge were to ensure security of:-

(a) The Ramgarh gap.

(b) Jammu-Pathankot Line of Communication.
(c) Corps firm base in Samba - Madhopur.
(d) Area Thakurpur – Gurdaspur.
Resources and Deployment : 1 Corps

17. It would be germane at this point to scrutinize the resources at hand to 1 Corps for it’s planned
offensive:-

(a) Armr. Two independent armd brigades i.e. 2 and 16 ere available for operation.

(b) Infantry. Three Infantry Division, 54, 39 and 36 Division were available for
operations, of which only 54 Infantry Division was operating with its integral Infantry Brigades.
36 Infantry Division had shed 72 Infantry Brigade plus an infantry battalion to 39 Infantry
Division and had deployed its 18 Infantry Brigade in a defensive role for holding a firm base in
Gurdaspur - Dinanagar area. 39 Infantry Division had detached two of its integral Brigades for
tasks elsewhere. 33 Infantry Brigade had moved to Poonch Sector in end Nov and 323 Infantry
Brigade was tasked to hold the Ramgarh gap. The third Infantry Brigade of this Division, 87
Infantry Brigade, was tasked to hold the firm base in area Parol - Bamial. Thus in the offensive,
39 Infantry Division faced a peculiar sit wherein it conducted operations with 72 Infantry Brigade
ex 36 Infantry Division.
 4

Final Deployment of 1 Corps Prior To Offensive

18. (a) X Ray Sector. Ad-hoc sector of 323 and 168 Infantry Brigades, under command 323
Infantry Brigade to cover Ramgarh Gap.

(b) 54 Infantry Division. With16 (I) Armd Brigade, less one Regiment under command, it was
deployed between Degh River and Bein River.

(c) 39 Infantry Division. With under command 2(I) Armd Brigade less one Regiment, and
72 Infantry Brigade from 36 Infantry Division, the Division was deployed between Bein River and
Ravi River.

(d) 36 Infantry Division. Was deployed in area South of Ravi River. It had 14 Horse ex 2 (I)
Armd Brigade under command. (PAUSE)

Corps Outline Plan

19. The corps outline plan that consequently evolved was that:-

(a) 54 Infantry Division, to advance between Degh River and Karir River along axis Galar –
Darman and capture the Zafarwal – Dhamtal complex.

(b) 39 Infantry Division less two Infantry Brigades, to adv between Karir River and Bein River
along axis Mawa - Delhra to capture Shakargarh.

(c) 36 Infantry Division with its 115 Infantry Brigade and 14 HORSE under command, to adv
across Ravi River on axis Thakurpur– Nainakot and capture Nurkot.

(d) 18 Infantry Brigade ex 36 Infantry Division to hold area South of Ravi River. Two Infantry
brigades, 323 Infantry Brigade of 39 Infantry Division and 168 Infantry Brigade ex 26 Infantry
Division along with 16 Cavillary less a sqn were tasked to hold the Corps firm base and the
Ramgarh gap. 87 Infantry Brigade ex 39 Infantry Division along with sqn of 16 Cavillary to hold
Parol – Bamial. (PAUSE)

PART I

Maj Anil Kumar

Tasks, Resources and Phases: 54 Infantry Division

20. Tasks. The tasks assigned to 54 Infantry Division were to:-

(a) Launch an offensive between Degh River and Karir River along axis Galar - Darman with
a view to capture Zafarwal – Dhamtal complex.

(b) Open corps axis of maint.

21. Resources. The resources available to 54 Infantry Division were:-

(a) 47 Infantry Brigade.

(b) 74 Infantry Brigade.

(c) 91 Infantry Brigade.

(d) 16 (I) Armd Brigade.

(f) Arty. In addn to the Division Integral Arty Brigade, 41 (I) Arty Brigade was also allotted in
addn, giving this Division a total of 25 fire units for its operations.
(g) Engrs. The Division apart from its integral 5 Engr Regiment was allotted one addl
 Regiment, 267 Engr Regiment. (PAUSE)
5

22. Phases. Operations were to be conducted in 10 Phases :

(a) Phase 1. Elimination of BOP’s and initial break in upto the line Bhaironath - Badala
Gujran.
(b) Phase 2. Est Bridge head across Thakurdwara minefd .

(c) Phase 3. Est Bridge head across Barkhaniya minefd.

(d) Phase 4. Break out from Barkhaniya minefd and attempt encounter crossing across
Basantar Nala in gen Area Pindori.

(e) Phase 5. In case encounter crossing fails, est deliberate crossing over Basantar Nala.

(f) Phase 6. Capture Supwal ditch.

(g) Phase 7. Regroup for capture of Zafarwal - Dhamtal.

(h) Phase 8 - 10. Capture Zafarwal – Dhamtal for which orders were to be issued later.

Tasks Resources and Phases : 39 Infantry Division

23. Tasks.

(a) To launch an offensive between Karir River and Bein River to capture Shakargarh.

(b) Provide firm base in area Parol – Bamial with 87 Infantry Brigade and sqn ex 16 Cavillary.

24. Resources 39 Infantry Division.

(a) Infantry. The Division was allotted only one Infantry Brigade 72 Infantry Brigade. This
Brigade too was not an integral part of the Division. Moreover, 72 Infantry Brigade was placed
under command of the Division just prior to the offensive operations. 72 Infantry Brigade had
four Infantry Battalions, three of its own and one from 115 Infantry Brigade.

(b) Armr. The armr with the Division was 2 (I) Armd Brigade less 14 HORSE.

(c) Arty. In addition to its integral, 39 Arty Brigade less a Regiment, two btys ex corps
resources were also allotted giving this Division a total of 10 fire units for its operations.

(d) Engrs. Apart from its integral 7 Engr Regiment, the Division was allotted 110 Engr
Regiment ex corps resources. (PAUSE)

25. Phase. The operations of 39 Infantry Division were to be conducted in six Phases:-

(a) Phase 1. Elimination of BOPs and establishment of Bridge head across minefd in
gen area Harar Khurd.

(b) Phase 2. Capture Harar Kalan.

(c) Phase 3. Capture Dehlra.

(d) Phase 4. Breakout and destroy enemy covering troops South of line Dehlra – Chak
Amru.

(e) Phase 5. Isolation of Shakargarh from West and North West, and establish pivots
at Sohawara and Dusri.

(f) Phase 6. Capture Shakargarh.

 6

Tasks, Resources and Phases : 36 Infantry Division.

26. Tasks.
(a) Hold firm base in area South of Ravi River.
(b) Capture Nainakot and Nurkot.

27. Resources.

(a) Infantry. The two integral Infantry Brigades with the Division were:-
(i) 18 Infantry Brigade which was in the holding role.
(ii) 115 Infantry Brigade having only two infantry battalions.

(b) Armr. 14 HORSE was the armd Regiment with the Division.

(c) Arty. In addition to its integral Arty Brigade, four btys ex corps resources were also
allotted giving a total of 17 fire units.

(d) Engrs. Apart from its integral engr Regiment, the Division was allotted 416 Engr Brigade
(minus). (PAUSE)

28. Phases. 36 Infantry Division was to conduct its operations in six Phases :-

(a) Phase 1. Induct into Lasian Enclave.

(b) Phase 2. Est Bridge head across Ujh River.
(c) Phase 3. Capture Nainakot.
(d) Phase 4. Secure Eastern bank of Bein River between Shakargarh and Nurkot.
(e) Phase 5. Secure Crossing over Bein River.
(f) Phase 6. Capture Nurkot.

29. Tasks of 87 Infantry Brigade. The brigade with a sqn of 16 Cavillary under command and
supported by three Fire units was to initially hold defended sector in area Parol -Bamial and was to
subsequently op in conjunction with the operations of 36 Infantry Division to capture Inaitpur and Khan
Lawari.

PART I
Maj H K Dhankhar

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS : 1 CORPS

30. Conduct of operations is being covered in three Phases, delineated by different time zones. These
time zones are :-

(a) 05 to 11 Dec.
(b) 12 to first light 15 Dec.
(c) 15 to 17 Dec.

Time Zone 05 – 11 Dec

First we will take

31. 54 Infantry Division from 05 to 08 Dec.

(a) Formations of 54 Infantry Division, mov into their Forward Assembly Area on 05 Dec. The
enemy sensed that something was afoot and engaged the area with arty and air, fortunately
with little effect.
 7

(b) On the night of 05/06 Dec, the aslt troops of 74 and 91 Infantry Brigades crossed the IB at
2000 h, captured the BOPs and secured the line upto Bhaironath – Badala Gujeran. Thereafter
47 Infantry Brigade along with 4 HORSE was pushed through to secure the area of Sapwal,
Bhagor Khurd and Kohlian Katlan.

(c) By first light of 06 Dec, 47 Infantry Brigade led by 4 HORSE, had contacted the first minefd
in gen area of Thakurdwara. A Bridge head was secured by 1745 h on the same day and 4
HORSE Gp inducted through the Thakurdwara minefd. The Combat Group bypassed Bari and
contacted the Barkhaniya minefd in the gen area of Sadwal at 1200 h on 07 Dec.

(d) On night of 07/08 Dec, 47 Infantry Brigade mov across the Thakurdwara minefd and
secured Ghamrola, Bari and Dodwan Kalan.

(e) During this period, 91 Infantry Brigade had stg fwd to Bairi Kalan. This was in anticipation of
their impending task of establish a Bridge head across the Barkhania minefd. The third Brigade
of the Division, 74 Infantry Brigade along with 17 HORSE, was in the process of bldg up at Bhoi
Brahmanan in order to protect the Western flk of the Division.

(f) An interesting pt to note here. The assessed minefd along the border was non-existent and
this fact confirmed by the leading elements. In spite of this the Brigades went ahead with the
planned deliberate Crossing of this so called minefd.

32. The disposn of 54 Infantry Division at first light 08 Dec is displayed on the slide. (Pause 10
Sec).

33 Till now, the operations of 54 Infantry Division had progressed as per plan. However, the
operations of 39 Infantry Division on the Eastern flk, had not pressed fwd in consonance. 39 Infantry
Division was held up, 3-4 Kms from the IB, North of the first minefd on account of enemy resistance,
thus, laying bare the Eastern flk of 54 Infantry Division. At this juncture, the corps cdr decided to halt
further advance of 54 Infantry Division and focus on progressing the operations of 39 Infantry Division
which involved the capture of enemy strong points of Chakra and Dehlra.

34 39 Infantry Division from 05 to 08 Dec. To understand the reasons for pause in the operations
of 54 Infantry Division let us now take a look at the operations of 39 Infantry Division from 05 to 08 Dec.

(a) The Division, crossed the IB on night 05/06 Dec and adv along two thrust lines each led
by an infantry battalion with sqns of 7 Cavillary under command.

(b) The BOPs were captured by 2130 hrs on 05 Dec. However further adv by 7 Cavillary
group (less a sqn), and 3 SIKH LI was held up due to enemy opposition, which was
encountered from Tugialpur and Giddarpur. Thus the advance troops could not est contact with
the minefd till late AN of 07 Dec.

(c) On night of 07-08 Dec, 1 DOGRA with a sqn 7 Cavillary was ordered to cross the minefd
and capture Harhar Kalan but was beaten back, with heavy Casualty inflicted on 1 DOGRA.

(d) On 08 Dec, yet another attempt was made to cross the minefd in gen A Shahbazpur by 1
Horse. Trawls breached the minefd under cover of arty. Two tanks crossed but the third blew its
track while trying to pass through the lane. As it was getting dark and in view of threat of tank
hunting teams of the enemy, own tanks were abandoned and trawls ordered to trawl their way
back.

(e) Since all attempts to cross the first minefd till now had failed, the Division cdr decided to
launch a deliberate attack on Harhar Kalan on the night of 09 - 10 Dec. As 54 Infantry Division
was tasked to capture Dehlra, deliberate attack planned on 9/10 Dec was rescheduled on 10/11
Dec to coincide with attack on Dehlra.
 8

35 Battle of Chakra Dehlra : 54 Infantry Division ( 09 – 11 Dec).

(a) On 09 Dec GOC 1 Corps assigned 54 Infantry Division the task to capture Dehlra. The
attack was planned for night 10-11 Dec. Accordingly 39 Infantry Division also amended it’s date
for capture of Harar Kalan.

(b) It was appreciated that capture of Chakra would be an essential prelude to the capture of
Dehlra, since the positions were mutually supporting. It therefore was planned to first capture
Chakra from West or North West across Karir River, followed by capture of Dehlra, and
subsequently expl towards South and East to relieve pressure on 39 Infantry Division.

(c) Chakra was a well devp strong point held by a coy of infantry support by tanks with
elements of recce and support. Deep minefds interspersed with nallahs added to the defensive
potential of the posn. Dehlra, was a vitally imp posn as various trs converged on it. Dehlra in
turn derived its strength from the fortified Chakra defenses.

(d) 74 Infantry Brigade was tasked to capture Chakra and Dehlra. Operations were to be
conducted in two Phase. In Phase 1 Chakra was to be captured, and in Phase 2 of the
operations, Dehlra was to be captured.

(e) The force crossed Karir River during the night of 10 - 11 Dec and 8 GRENADIERS
attacked Chakra from the rear. Gentleman here I would like to info you that Brig G S Jairam,
Cdr of this Bde is from 8 Grenadiers. Enemy offered stout resistance and fierce hand to hand
fighting ensued. The position was captured by 0100 h on 11 Dec. Trawls commenced breaching
the minefd but the leading trawl tank and the one following behind were damaged halfway
across the minefd. Rest of the minefd was breached by hand and Vehicle Safe Line (VSL) est
by 0300 h on 11 Dec.

(f) Enemy counter attacked Chakra, twice at first light of 11 Dec with a sqn armr and coy of
infantry. Both Counter Attacks were beaten back effectively by 8 GRENADIERS and 4 HORSE.
(g) The loss of Chakra seemed to have upset en cdrs and threw them off bal so much so that
Dehlra was captured without opposition in a matter of two and a half hrs. 6 KUMAON secured
Dehlra by 0500 h on 11 Dec.
(h) 8 GRENADIERS expl Southwards and captured more posts thereby turning partially and
unhinging the def East of Karir River.

36 The disposn of 54 Infantry Division as on 11 Dec is show on slide (Pause 10 sec).

Experiences of Ex Gren Jodha Ram,SM 8 Gren.

PART I

Lt Gaurav Bhatnagar

37 39 Infantry Division ( 09 – 11 Dec).

(a) 72 Infantry Brigade attacked Harhar Kalan – Munan, on night 10 -11 Dec. The attack was
bitterly contested by the enemy. Sow Mohd Hussain, of 20 Lancers was awarded the Nishan-E-
Haider for gallantry in this battle. Munan and Shahbazpur were secured by midday on 11 Dec.
However, due to a reported minefd the Brigade could not expl southwards from Harhar Kalan.
(b) Phases 2 of the operations was thus complete albeit with a delay of four days covering a
dist of just four kms. On 11 Dec the Division was holding the line of Harhar Kalan, Shahbazpur
and Munan. Disposn of 39 Inf Div as on 11 of Dec is shown on the slide.
 9

38. 36 Infantry Division (05-11 Dec)

(a) While the operations of 36 Infantry Division only began by 08 Dec a firm base in the
Lasian Bulge was est by 18 Infantry Brigade on the night 05/06 Dec. It was on the night of 08/09
that 115 Infantry Brigade led by 14 HORSE inducted into the Lasian Bulge. This Brigade
captured the assigned BOP’s by 1000h on 09 Dec. Thereafter Nainakot, which was an
important communication centre from where trs were emanating to Nurkot and Shakargarh, was
captured by 6 MARATHA LI by mid day on 10 Dec. While the capture of Nainakot was in
progress, the defenses at Malakpur and Lallu Chak were vacated by the enemy. The same
were occupied by 115 Infantry Brigade by last light 10 Dec. Thereafter, no further advance was
carried out on account of the slow build up of own forces.

(b) The disposn of 36 Infantry Division as on 11 Dec was:-

(i) 115 Infantry Brigade was in general Area Malakpur – Lalluchak – Nainakot.
(ii) 18 Infantry Brigade was still holding the firm base in Lasian Bulge.
(iii) 14 HORSE was located at Malakpur and Mastpur.

39 7 Infantry Brigade (08 – 11 Dec).

(a) 87 Infantry Brigade with a sqn of 16 Cavillary was to operate in conjunction with 36
Infantry Division. The Brigade commenced its operations on the night of 08/09 Dec and by first
light of 10 Dec it had captured Dinpanah, Iniatpur and Khan Lawari. There after the sqn of 16
Cavillary was tasked to secure area Track Junction, which it did by 1000h on 11 Dec The
commencement of this op was delayed by a day due to failure of sqn 16 Cavillary to link up in
time with 87 Infantry Brigade.

(b) Disposn of 87 Infantry Brigade on 11 Dec is displayed on the slide.

40 The overall sit in the 1 Corps Z as on 11 Dec is as shown on slide.

(a) 54 Infantry Division was holding area of Ghamrola – Lagwal – Dhanwal.

(b) 39 Infantry Division was holding area Munan – Harar Kalan.
(c) 36 Infantry Division had mov upto the Eastern bank of Bein River.
(d) 87 Infantry Brigade was in the area of Track Junction.

41 Review of the Sit . Based on the progress of operations the sit was reviewed by the corps cdr,
on 11 Dec. On account of slow progress of operations of 39 Infantry Division, 36 Infantry Division was
given the resp of the capture of Shakargarh. Accordingly, reallottment of resources was carried out. 87
Infantry Brigade, Headquarter 2 (I) Armd Brigade and 1 HORSE came under command 36 Infantry
Division, and 7 Cavillary remained with 72 Infantry Brigade. The objective of 36 Infantry Division was
now changed from Nurkot to Shakargarh. Certain other changes were also ordered, Headquarter 39
Infantry Division was tasked to assume command of X-Ray Sector, and 72 Infantry Brigade was placed
under command of 54 Infantry Division. The inter formation boundary between 54 Inf Div and 36 Inf Div
was changed to Bein River.

Other Side of the Hill

42 Gentleman, It would be worth while to take a look from the other side of the hill, i.e that is the
Pakistan version of happenings up till now.

43 Pakistan 8 Infantry Division was responsible for defenses in the general Area of Shakargarh
Bulge. It had three Brigades of its own, viz 24, 14 and 115 Infantry Brigade. The area East of the Bein
River was lightly held by some para military forces, which explains to some extent, the speedy
operations of own 36 Infantry Division , resulting in progress of operations of upto nine kms in three
days of operations.
 10

44 The Changez Force comprising of 20 Lancers, 33 Cavillary and 13 Punjab was tasked to act as
covering troops in the area bounded by Basantar Nala and Bein River upto road Zafarwal –
Shakargarh. The aim of Changez Force was to impose a delay of 24h on the first minefield, and
thereafter a delay of 48 h till the Indian forces contacted the line of main defenses, thus making a total
delay of 72 h.

45 The initial deploy of this force was 20 Lancers, the Corps Recce Regiment based on Shermans
deploy on the first minefd, while 33 Cavillary, the Division integral Regiment equipped with Pattons, was
deploy along the sec minefd. 13 PUNJAB was deployed in a covering posn at Tola.

46. Conduct of Operations of Changez Force. 20 Lancers established contact with Indian forces
on the night of 05/06 Dec. Heavy tank engagement took place ahead up the first minefd till last light of
06 Dec. After last light 06 Dec this Regiment withdrew to second minefd. On 07 Dec elements of 20
Lancers and a coy of 13 PUNJAB reinforced Chakra. It was only on 11 Dec, when the own forces had
captured Chakra, Dehlra and Harar Kalan, that the covering force abandoned the second minefd and
fell back behind the line of main defenses in counter penetration positions. Thus the Changez Force
tasked to achieve delay of 72 h, had in fact delayed own adv for seven days, by reinforcing Chakra and
Harar Kalan and constantly interfering in the Indian advance.

PART II

Maj Anil Kumar

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS – 1 CORPS (12-15 Dec) (IInd time frame)

47. 54 Infantry Division . The operations of 54 Infantry Division from 12 Dec to first light of 15 Dec
are as follows :-

(a) A bridge head on Barkhaniya minefd was established by 91 Infantry Brigade on the night
of 13/14 Dec.

(b) By first light 14 Dec , the Brigade had secured the areas as shown on the slide (Pause 5
sec)

(c) Combat Group 17 HORSE inducted through the Barkhaniya Bridge head on first light of
14 Dec. Attempts to secure crossing over Basantar N failed in gen A Pindori and by last light
had secured the areas of Sadgal, Shahzadpur and Ramri.

(d) 72 Infantry Brigade establish a Bridge head in area of Nathu Kalan - Shahbazpur on the
night of 12/13 Dec.

(e) Area upto Sohawara and Channi Brahmana was secured by 1630 h on 13 Dec.

(f) Dusri was secured by 1200 h on 14 Dec.

48. Disposn. Disposn of 54 Infantry Division on 15 Dec is displayed on the slide (Pause 10 sec).

Operations of 36 Infantry Division (12-15 Dec)

49. During this period 36 Infantry Division secured a firm base on the Bein River. The areas secured
are shown on the slide. (Pause 5 Sec). However the attempts of 14 HORSE to cross the Bein River
on 12 and 13 Dec were aborted in the face of en opposition from the Western bank of Bein River.

50 36 Infantry Division now planned to capture Shakargarh on the night of 13/14 Dec. However the
attack was rescheduled for the night of 14/15 Dec. This was due to the requirement of additional recce
and more deliberate planning. The plan for attack on Shakargarh was:-

(a) Chatrana, loc North of Shakargarh, was to be captured by 87 Infantry Brigade and a Sqn
 of 16 Cavilary from the North East.

11

(b) 115 Infantry Brigade with 14 HORSE under command was to capture Dinpur Khurd from
the South East.

(c) 72 Infantry Brigade with 7 Cavilary under command was to pose a threat to Shakargarh
from the North West.

(d) 1 HORSE was to secure crossing across Bein River West of Fatehpur Afghanan.

51. Battle for Shakargarh.

(a) 3/9 GR of 87 Infantry Brigade captured part of Chatrana but the sqn 16 Cavilary failed to
link up and the attack was beaten back.

(b) 115 Infantry Brigade attacked Dinpur Khurd with 4 GRENADIERS. The attack failed in the
FUP due to hy en arty shelling.
(c) On night 13/14 Dec, 4 GRENADIERS launched a recce in force with one infantry coy. The
coy captured Dinpur Khurd by 0400 h on 14 Dec. It was GRENADIERS who reported that engrs
had checked for mines and found none. However, when 14 HORSE was crossing the Bein
River, the leading tank hit a mine and was immoblised. The balance of the bn and sqn armr did
not therefore cross the minefield, resulting in the coy which had captured Dinpur Khurd, being
encircled and 1 offr, 3 JCOs and 75 ORs were captured. In spite of this 4 GRENADIERS, was
tasked to capture Dinpur Khurd the next evening from the same direction. The attack naturally
failed.

(d) Attempts of 1 HORSE to cross Bein River were not successful.

(e) The entire operations were called off by midnight of 14/15 Dec.

52. The disposn of 36 Infantry Division on 15 Dec is shown on the slide (Pause 5 sec).

53. The overall sit in 1 Corps Z in the Shakargarh Bulge on 15 Dec was:-

(a) 54 Infantry Division had secured the area between Basantar Nala and Bein River upto
road Zafarwal - Shakargarh.

(b) 36 Infantry Division had secured the area upto Eastern bank of Bein River.

The Other Side of the Hill

54. Let us have a look at the Pakistan version of the conduct of operations between 12 and 15 Dec.

(a) By first light of 12 Dec Changez Force fell back behind the main defenses and deployed
astride road Zafarwal - Shakargarh to prevent enemy break in.

(b) Enemy Counter attack reserve of 8(I) Armd Brigade was on the mov catering for various
operational contingencies. On night 12-13 Dec the Brigade moved to Fattowal. On 14 Dec
orders were recd to launch a raid in the area of Thakurdwara but this was subsequently called
off.

(c) At this stg 8 Infantry Division was disposed as follows:-

(i) 24 Infantry Brigade was in general Area of Zafarwal with its Infantry Battalions as
shown on slide.

(ii) 14 Infantry Brigade was in general Area of Shakargarh with its bns as shown on
the slide.

(iii) 115 Infantry Brigade was holding the area of Narowal.

 12

(iv) 124 Infantry Brigade, ex 33 Infantry Division. of GHQ Reserve South was
ordered to mov to Pak pattan on ni 04/05 Dec . From 09 to 13 Dec, the Brigade was mov
half a dozen times. On 13 Dec it reached Pasrur and was placed under command of
Pakistan 1 Corps.
(v) On 14 Dec, 124 Infantry Brigade stg fwd to the area of Dhamtal and was placed
under command of 8 Infantry Division. 35 FF of this Brigade was placed under
command 115 Infantry Brigade, while the other two bns had occupied defenses in the
general Area Nurkot.

PART II

Maj H K Dhankhar

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS – 1 CORPS (15-17 Dec) (III Time Frame)

55. 54 Infantry Division. On 15 Dec, 54 Infantry Division stood poised on the Pakistan main
defence line in the Shakargarh Bulge. The area of contact extended from Basantar Nala to the West of
Bein River & in south along the road Zafarwal - Shakargarh . In it’s next Phases of operations, 54
Infantry Division had plans for a deliberate Crossing across the Basantar Nala in order to facilitate
operations for capture of Zafarwal-Damtal complex.

56. The Outline Plan. The Division operations were to be conducted in two Phases: -

(a) In Phase 1. 47 Infantry Brigade was to est a Bridge head to incl Jarpal, Saraj Chak and
the South Eastern shoulder of Supwal Ditch.

(b) In Phase 2. 74 Infantry Brigade was to capture the remainder of Supwal Ditch.

57. Resources: 47 Infantry Brigade. Resources available to 47 Infantry Brigade for the op were as
follows: -

(a) 17 HORSE.
(b) 18 RAJ RIF (mech) less two coys.
(c) 6 MADRAS (ex 91 Infantry Brigade).
(d) 3 x integral Infantry Battalions.
(e) 54 Arty Brigade and two med Regiments.
(f) Three fd coys with three trawls.

58. The Outline Plan 47 Infantry Brigade. The outline plan of 47 Infantry Brigade for the est of
Bridge head on Basantar Nala was: -

(a) Phase 1. One infantry battalion was to capture the Northern portion of Lalial RF and
Saraj Chak.
(b) Phase 2. The second infantry battalion was to capture Jarpal and Lohal.
(c) Enlargement of the Bridge head in Phase 3..
(d) Capture of South Eastern portion of Supwal Ditch in Phase 4.
(e) H hr for the operations was 1930 h on 15 Dec.

59. Establishment of Bridge head.

(a) 16 MADRAS was launched at the H hr and by 2030h 15 Dec had secured a portion of Lalial RF. It
however, could not secure Saraj Chak which was to pose problems later. Immediately thereafter, at
2100h the engrs commenced trawling a safe lane through the minefield. The trawling process was
laborious and time consuming owing to the boggy bed of the Basantar Nala, which had to be hand
breached at several places.
(b) In the meanwhile, second Phase of the Brigade op went in as planned with 3
GRENADIERS capturing Jarpal – Lohal by 2330h on 15 Dec.
 13

60 Battle of Basantar

(a) Numerous reports were at Headquarter 47 Infantry Brigade particularly from 16

MADRAS regarding build up of enemy CA force. At 0200h on 16 Dec, CO 16 MADRAS
reported hearing tk noises and requested for immediate armr sp.

(b) Commandant 17 HORSE, considering the gravity of the sit, ordered the Regiment 2IC
and OC C Sqn, Maj Ajai Singh, to commence induction. At the mouth of the Vehicle Safe Line
the tank coln was stopped by engr reps and Maj Ajai Singh reported that induction was not
being permitted, as the lane had not been breached as yet. This was the first and only occasion
that the bash through drill was adopted by a tk Regiment in war. As the Regiment cleared the
minefield it came under tk fire at very short rg from village Saraj Chak. At this point in time it was
not known that 16 MADRAS had not secured Saraj Chak. The leading tanks leveled their 20
pdr guns opened fire in the gen direction of en. Fortunately one of the opposing tank
destroyers was hit and brewed up, enabling the Centurions to engage with greater accuracy.
The firefight lasted for half an hour. On interrogation of prisoners later, it was revealed that the
Regiment had run into a posn occupied by an infantry coy, supported by a tp of tank destroyers
and RCLs. By 0430h the Regiment had reached the far side of Lalial RF and deploy in the
Bridge head between Lalial and Jarpal.

61. Enemy Counter Attack on Basantar Bridge head.

(a) At 0800h on 16 Dec, smoke salvos started landing in front of 17 HORSE positions in the
Reserve Forest area. As the smoke cleared, en tanks were obs to have taken up positions in
and around Gazipur village at a distance of 600-800m. A terrific cannonade ensued as tks
commenced engagements. Simultaneously, en tps of 11 BALUCH deployed in the uncleared
areas of the RF commenced engaging own tks with RCLs, inflicting some casualties. They
were finally cleared by troops of 18 RAJ RIF. More enemy tanks were obs joining in the battle
and the firefight grew in intensity. By around 1100h the fd in front of lalial Reserve Forest was
littered with destroyed Pattons.

(b) While the firefight at Lalial Reserve Force was on, the sqn at Jarpal reported a heavy
build up of armr opposite it. A fast and furious tank vs tank battle ensued. En tks pressed home
their attack with great vigor and determination and a fierce to tank battle ensued.

(c) By around 1100h the fields in front of Lalial Reserve Force and Jarpal were littered with
burning hulls of Pattons spewing black smoke. 48 enemy hulls were counted, of which 30 were
in front of Jarpal and 18 in front of Lalial Reserve Force.

(d) At 0600h on 17 Dec, in a rather desperate gambit the enemy launched an infantry
Counter Attack (CA) against our defences held by 3 GRENADIERS. The attack proved suicidal
as it was unsupported by tks and ran straight into inf Machine Gun and tank fire. 80 Pakistanis
were killed which included the CO, 2IC and Adjt of 35 FF. Earlier 3 GRENADIERS had secured
Jarpal in a spirited attack on night 15/16 Dec and had been under constant pressure from 24
PUNJAB, holding Barapind beating back numerous Counter Attacks launched from that loc. Maj
Hoshiar Singh and his coy had held out despite severe attrition.

62. Sit of 54 Infantary Division as on 17 Dec was as follows:-

(a) 47 Infantry Brigade had est a Bridge head across Basantar Nala incl the area Jarpal –
Lalial Reserve Forest.

(b) 74 Infantry Brigade was preparing for an attack on the Supwal Ditch.

(c) 91 Infantry Brigade was providing a firm base East of Basantar Nala.

(d) 72 Infantry Brigade was loc at Dusri and was preparing to attack Shakargarh from North
West.
 14

63. 36 Infantry Division : Plan for Capture of Shakargarh.

(a) The attack on Shakargarh had failed on 14/15 Dec as the obj was found to be strongly
held by the en.

(b) A fresh attack was therefore planned on night 17/18 Dec, having been reinforced with 18
Infantry Brigade. The same however, could not be carried out as the cease fire was declared on
17 Dec.
64. Disposn of 1 Corps on 17 Dec. The disposn of 1 Corps as on 17 Dec was as follows:-

(a) 54 Infantry Division with 16 (I) Armd Brigade under command was holding the area
between Basantar Nala and Bein River with a Bridge head across the Basantar Nala and
leaning onto Road Zafarwal – Shakargarh in the South.

(b) 36 Infantry Division with 2 (I) Armd Brigade minus was in the area between Bein River
and Ravi River and in contact with defenses of Shakargarh from the East.

65. Other Side of the Hill – Counter Attack on Basantar Bridge head (15-17 Dec)

(a) On 16 Dec at 0430, info was recd from Headquarter 24 Infantry Brigade that en had
breached the defenses on Basantar Nala. The information received was fragmentary, since
troops op ahead of Saraj Chak had pulled back without coord with the tps deploy there. At
0515h, Headquarter 8 (I) Armed Brigade issued a warning order indicating an en sqn and an
infantry battalion had mov into the Bridge head. 13 Lancers was asked to conc at Mehla for
launching Counter Attack.

(b) At 0745 h, 13 Lancers reached the conc Area at Mehla and the CO tasked A sqn to est a
counter penetration posn at Pindi Chanian. As the sqn mov, it was ordered to turn North, form
up in area Sikanderpur and attack what it was told were a few en tks and inf attempting to break
out from Lalial. The sqn formed up and attacked Lalial Reserve forest as ordered and was
destroyed in tank fire from the Bridge head losing 08 tanks.

(c) At 0830h, when A sqn was going into action at Lalial, CO 13 L instructed B and C sqns
to proceed to Bara Pind and attack six to seven en tks at Jarpal. In the ensuing attack, the sqns
lost 20 tanks .

(d) At 1200h h, the armd Brigade ordered 31 CAVILLARY to attack from the direction of
Marara Wazirpur through the remnants of 13 L.The sqns of 13 L had no info of this fresh attack.
The 02 Pakistan Sqns lost 20 tks and by 1400h all tk engagements had ceased.

(e) On night 16/17 Dec it was decided to launch an attack on Jarpal by an inf bn sp by armr
at first light 17 Dec. Since 35 FF the attacking bn, was late in arrival, the armd Brigade cdr
called off the attack. Cdr 124 Infantry Brigade decided to still go ahead with the attack, which
resulted in 80 casualties to 35 FF, including its CO.

(f) In the Battle of Shakargarh bulge, the following pers were awarded the highest awards
for gallantry:-

(i) Maj Hoshiar Singh , 3 GRENADIERS. ParamVir Chakra.(in Battle of Basantar)

(ii) 2/Lt Arun Khetrapal , 17 HORSE. Param Vir Chakra. (Posthumous) .(in Battle of
Basantar)

(iii) Lt Col R M Akram, Nishan-e – Haider.

(iv) Swr Mohd Hussain 20L (part of changez force) Nishan-e – Haider.(Battle of
Harar Kalan).

Experiences of Ex Hony Capt Pritam Singh (Retd) of 4 HORSE.

Experiences of Ex Hony Capt Nathu Singh (Retd) of 17 HORSE.

15

PART II

Col S G Chavan
LESSONS

66. For men in uniform, mil history is an essential facet from which to draw lessons, which hopefully
we will consider for future battles. At the outset, I must admit that drawing such lessons are much
easier done when out of it, than during battle.

67. Strategy and Aim.

(a) 1 Corps had been given two aims – to ensure protection of own territory from Ramgarh
to Gurdaspur and, to launch an offensive between Basantar and Ravi. Such duality of aim,
weakened the punch of the offensive, more so as the def criteria, at times, unnecessarily
assumed ominous proportions. This also resulted in little or no reserve with the offensive fmns.
Defending every inch of the border makes no sense in military terms and risks have to be taken
to create sizeable res. This, in itself would impose caution on the enemy. Out of total of 08
Infantry Brigades 03 were deployed for defence of firm base and only 05 used for offensive in
spite of considerable progress of Operations. In this respect, it is pertinent to quote Fredrick the
Great, who said, “He who defends all, defends nothing. Little minds want to defend everything -
sensible men concentrate on essentials.”

(c) Further, even the initial aim of 1 Corps, to capture Pasrur, was far-fetched. Keeping the
duality of tasks in mind, and the force levels available, this aim was a mite too ambitious. Here
it must be remembered, that in areas of valuable real estate, battles will be bitterly contested.
Add to this the limited duration of future wars, and the nuclear dimension, obtaining today. In
such a scenario, objectives of any offensive should in future, centre around limited but important
gains in terms of value and impact on en, as also destruction of his war fighting and war making
capability.

(d) As events later unraveled, even the revised aim i.e., (capture of Zafarwal-Dhamtal-
Shakargarh – Nurkot) was not achievable, in spite of having to undertake a major change in
plans, midway through the op. Such a maj change in plans obviously detracted from the
principle of selection and maint of aim.

68. Planning and Execution. Both the planning stage, and its subsequent execution, had their
share of failings.

(i) 1 Corps plan envisaged bringing Pakistan armr to battle on ground of own
choosing. However, till as late as 15 Dec, while 1 Corps had committed all its armr
planned for the Bulge, Pakistan had used only a little over two armd Regiments.

(ii) The utilisation of the three Infantry Divisions employed in the 1 Corps offensive,
could also have, in hindsight, been better managed. 39 Infantry Division was the holding
formation in this area, prior to arr of 1 Corps. It would have made better sense to allow
39 Infantry Division to continue looking after the defenses, and utilised a stronger 36
Infantry Division for the offensive, in conjunction with 54 Infantry Division. 39 Infantry
Division, with just one Infantry Brigade, could also obviously, not create conditions for
the meaningful employment of 2 (I) Armd Brigade, placed under its command. The
outcome of such a plan was that 1 Corps or its subordinate formations had no
meaningful res, nor could they be easily created without a corresponding effect on the
timings of various Phases of the operations.

(iii) Frequent Grouping & Regrouping. From just prior to the operation, till
11 Dec, 72 Infantry Brigade moved from 36 Infantry Division to be placed under
command 39 Infantry Division and then, was again placed under command 54 Infantry
Division. 2(I) Armd Brigade also changed from 39 Infantry Division to 36 Infantry
Division. Even worse was the case of First HORSE, which, on night of 13 / 14 Dec
underwent three changes of command, between 115 Infantry Brigade and 2 (I) Armd
 Brigade.
16

(iv) Dispersed Nature of Corps Offensive. With resources available to them at

that point of time, the Corps offensive was planned on a dispersed frontage of nearly 80
km, with 36 Infantry Division attacking well away from the others. Thus the three
Divisions, two of which were, as it is weak Divisions, were not in any posn to support
each other. The corps, by so attacking on a number of thrust lines, could not
concentrate, in time, at any one decisive pt. It instead, got bogged down at each line of
defense, where at most thrust lines, it found itself more or less evenly balanced with an
enemy prepared for defence. This wide frontage of operations, also meant that effective
use could not be made of the available arty resources. This also resulted in splitting of
resources in armr and engrs, which were not plentiful to start with.
(b) Exec. While there were many errors in execution at various levels, I will only be
touching on a few important ones, as some more will be highlighted in the other lessons.

(i) 54 Infantry Division. Instead of attempting to outflank the hub of the defensive
strength at Zafarwal - Narowal, their thrust lines led to these areas.
(ii) 39 Infantry Division. The failure to capture Harar Kalan, in spite of repeated
attack, was aptly summed up by Light Gen KK Singh as a “Singularly ill conceived
action, sadly wanting in recce, coordination and fire planning”.
(iii) 36 Infantry Division. The glaring failure in execution by this Division, was vividly
brought out in the battle of Shakargarh. Instead of trying to initially bypass it from the
North or South, and thereafter attack it from an unexpected direction, Shakargarh was
attacked along expected apchs.
(iv) All Divisions were also guilty for the manner in which they employed the armd
Brigades placed under their command at various stages of this operation. Partly
because they were all without an integral armd Regiment. In both the 36 and 39 Infantry
Division sectors, 2 (I) Armd Brigade had numerical superiority during its advance. At no
pt was any attempt made to concentrate this superior force and employ it boldly to
exploit fleeting opportunities. Lack of exposure of Infantry Formation Cdrs regarding
emp of armr also contributed to this aspect.

(c) Here one must acknowledge the planning and execution by the adhoc Changez Force of
Pakistan. It played the role of covering tps with aplomb, skillfully op between the three minefds.
While it was tasked to delay own forces for 72h, in actual fact, it managed to delay the
operations of 1 Corps by seven days.
69. Security Vs Caution. While security is and will remain an imp principle of war, in this op, it
often got translated into over-cautiousness or safety, on both sides. In the words of the Pakistan
analyst, Ali Amin, “The average sub-continental Corps Cdr’s first priority was security and safety rather
than speed and dynamism”. While on the Indian side, it resulted in a total adv of the Corps by just 13
kms in 12 days, In Pakistan’s case, the strat res of 6 Armd Division and 17 Infantry Division, sat out of
the war. Some glaring examples of the overcautious apch are :-
(a) It was initially appre that Pakistan had the capability of mtg an offensive in the area of 1
Corps or areas North and South of it. However, once the Pakistan offensive in Poonch and
Chhamb had been launched, this possibility was greatly reduced, more so, as 1 Corps
operations progressed. This further reduced on 11 Dec, when 33 Infantry Division of the
Southern Strike Corps was denuded of two Brigades. In battle, risks have to be taken, Instead
safety and caution prevailed, and 1 Corps continued to cater for a maj thrust into the Ramgarh
sector, as also to Gurdaspur, almost right through this op.

(b) Own 1 Corps plg was rather cautious. The concept of operations was based on est a
series of pivots to draw out the en armr. This put a large No of tps on grnd as the adv
proceeded. Here I would like to quote Gen Patton, “Also I don’t want any msgs saying, I am
holding my positions. We are not holding anything! Let the Hun do that. We are adv constantly
and are not interested in holding anything except the en”. Emphasis was also laid on
synchronizing the speed of adv of one Division with another. A weak Division like 39 Infantry
Division could expectedly, not keep up with the adv of the much stronger 54 Infantry Division,
and such synchronization grnds the operations to a halt for a long period. This also naturally
 had its effects on the momentum of operations which slowed down just when it needed to be
speeded up , as till then 54 Infantry Division had been progressing well.
17

(c) The undue emphasis on the holding role, almost right through the op, resulted in the
initial adv of the Corps commencing with less than one and a half Infantry Divisions and two
weakened armd Brigades. Even subsequently, as the operations progressed, very little was
pulled out from the holding forces, be they part of 1 Corps, or from the Northern Corps. This
also, indirectly though , highlights an imp issue. It must be mandatory for all holding fmns
through which an offensive has progressed, to plan for and, at the earliest, redeploy in en
territory which has been secured, or even been run through , by offensive fmns, as part of their
extn of their attack Z. This will , to a large extent remove the ‘ crik in the neck ’ syndrome
offensive fmns are often afflicted with , in having to constantly ‘look back’ in worry over what
they have left behind!

(d) The concern for flk protection not only saw two Brigades guarding the Ramgarh Sector,
but also halted the adv of 54 Infantry Division for a period of 4 days. This, because Chakra-
Dehlra could not be captured as planned by 39 Infantry Division, and 54 Infantry Division was
worried about the security of its Eastern flk. Here, I would like to quote Gen Patton once again,
“There’s one thing I want you to remember. Forget this goddamn business of worrying about
our flks. We must guard our flks, but not to the extent that we don’t do anything else. Some
goddamn fool once said that flks must be secured, and since then, sons of bitches all over the
world have been going crazy guarding their flks. Flks are something for the en to worry about,
not us”.

(e) This same caution syndrome, was to an extent resp for 36 Infantry Division and 2 (I)
Armd Brigade barely making contact with the Pakistan main defenses during operations
spanning three days.

(f) Pakistan analyst, Ali Amin, has also gone on record to state that the plan of Pakistan 1
Corps was dominated by a defensive mindset.

Maj Anil Kumar

70. Int. Poor int remained the bane of all maj operations in the Western Theatre in 1971. Lack
of info regarding Pakistan’s 6 Armd Division and 17 Infantry Divisions forced GOC 1 Corps to tie down
more tps on defensive tasks. The fact that elements of the both the fmns were utilised in the Chhamb
offensive, was also not known. A few glaring examples of poor int are :-

(a) Initial attack on Harar Kalan, by 39 Infantry Division, failed due to faulty appre of en
str and disposn.

(b) 36 Infantry Division’s failure to capture Shakargarh was based on faulty assessment of
info recd.

(c) 2 (I) Armd Brigade cold not effect a crossing over Bein R over distance of 15 Kms from
12-17 Dec, as there was little knowledge of this obstacle, as also inadequate effort to gain the
same.

(d) The futile operations of 8 (I) Armd Brigade prior to and during the Battle of Basantar was
largely due to poor int and an equally poor appre.

(e) Unfortunately this aspect of inadequate int continues to haunt us even today. While the
No of agencies and systems to acquire the same has increased considerably, we still need to
perfect the art of arr at sound assessments and getting it to the right place at the right time.

71. Armr Operations

(a) The Shakargarh sect, in 1971, saw the most significant encounter between Pakistan and
Indian armr. It must be remembered here, that the balance of such forces was in favour of
Pakistan, which by itself is the wrong premise, on which to commence any Corps offensive. On
final judgment, on neither side was armr employed meaningfully, nor, except on few occations,
were they instrumental in turning the tide of war. Due to the large Nos of Built up areas and
rivers and nullahs armr could not be employed in traditional mvre concepts. It was involved
 18

more in a attritional battle. However, at no stage did it appear that plans existed to conc both
the armd Brigades particularly at a stage prior to meeting with the Pakistan Northern res. At
that time i.e as on 17 Dec the armd Brigades were widely separated with an obst in between
and had the Northern res been emp at this stg the sit would have turned very grave. Even in
devp trn the attritional strat need not always be the law, and mvres though limited must be
attempted by mech forces.

(b) On the positive side, Pakistan armr functioned well in the covering troop’s role, while our
tks did us proud in the Battle of Basantar. This battle also proved the much repeated adage of
the advantages of a static gun over the mov gun. Almost everywhere else, the performance of
armr was distinguished neither by tactics nor tech brilliance. Armr continued to be emp in a
conventional manner for sp infantry operations. This resulted in the dishing out of Regiments to
various inf fmns, leaving the armd Brigade Headquarters almost ‘left out of battle’.
Consequently, little effort was made to conc, at any stg, the armr, as a larger and more viable
force. No efforts were made to even use it boldly. The casualty of own armr in this operation
bear testimony to this fact. In 16 (I) Armd Brigade there were only 12 tanks destroyed, one of
which was due to fratricide, of these 8 tanks were lost in the battle of Basantar. Similarly 2 (I)
Armd Brigade had only 4 tanks destroyed amounting to a total of 16 for the entire Corps
offensive. Even the charge of Pakistan 8 (I) Armd Brigade was more foolhardy, than bold.

(c) It can truthfully be said that our tank cdrs were suffering from a mine phobia. This,
coupled with the trn, the intimate support reqd by the Infantry Divisions which did not have
integral armr, and the actions of Changez force, did not allow for any conc of such forces.
Instead, it slowed down the operations considerably. To quote Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh, “
effort at very step was to match the pace of armr with the foot soldier or vice-versa. Their
respective degrees of mob being different, they impeded each others progress.”

(d) Rigidity in Emp. There was a certain amount of rigidity in emp of armr, which resulted in
the inherent flexibility of this arm, not being expl. For instance, in the battle of Shakargarh, 3/9
GR had valiantly attacked and secured a foothold on Chatrana, and needed armr sp to hold on,
beat back the enemy counter attack (CA), and progress operations further. Sqn 16 Cavillary,
located East of Bein could not get across to link up, and this battalion had to pull back with hy
Casualties. At that time 7 CAVILLARY, under 72 Infantry Brigade, was reasonably close, and on
the West of Bein. 72 Brigade was then in the process of isolating Shakargarh from the West and
NW. For some unfathomable reason, it was not called upon to assist 3/9 GR. Had the
Regiment, or even part of it been employed, the sit could have been restored.

(e) A few facts, also speak for themselves:-

(i) Not a single tank was lost due to enemy action, in attempts at crossing the Bein,
or, in the battle of Shakargarh.

(ii) The average consumption of ammunition in battle was just three rds per tank
gun.

(f) These experiences are what we have perhaps, learnt from. The raising of more armd
Regiments/ fmns, the birth of the RAPID, fulfilling the voids in integral Regiments, more trawls
and tank ploughs, have been steps in the right direction. In all these the greater emphasis so
far, has however been in Nos and eqpt. We now need to conc more on the manner of optimally
emp this formidable machine. Armr has to be bolder in use, we need to think of simultaneity of
operations with this arm, and we need to improve our coord with other arms, including air.

Infantry. While inf battle at unit and sub-unit level were fought with the courage and determination that
this arm is known for, lack of infantry - tank coop training was evident in the sluggishness of operations.
A part of this was due to the lack of integral armr in the Divisions. While since then, we have
progressed on this front, we still need a much better understanding between ourselves.
 19

(a) RECCE & PLG. It was observed that whenever a Bn attack with out proper plg and
recce the attack usually failed with hy causalities we have seen in the battle of Harar Khalan.
Whereas an attack launched with proper planning and recce were successful.

(b) Directions of attack. One of the draw back of the Inf op in this sector was the
tendency to attack from most likely direction. The same could be seen during the attack on
Dinpur Khurd by 4 GRENADIERS, However attack from unexpected direction paid rich
dividends like 8 GRENADIERS attack on strong pt of Chakra from rear.

(c) Digging In. The Inf is vulnerable from Air and Arty immediately after capture of objectives.
There is a need for inf to dig down on capture of an objective. The hy casualty suffered by 16 MADRAS in
the bridge head on Basantar river bear testimony to this fact.

Maj H K Dhankhar

73. Arty. There was rarely a stg when arty sp called for, was not forthcoming. However, what
needs to be noted is that at no stg was the arty called to sp more than one Brigade attack, nor did the
expected encounter with the Northern res take place. Had these happened, we would have found
ourselves woefully short of this sp. In terms of eqpt, we were also hampered by a lack of med Self
Propelled Guns , no long range arty and very limited means of loc hostile btys. In terms of emp, we
suffered whenever there was little coord with arty and consequently inadequate conc of fire. This was
noticeable in the first battles of Harar Kalan and Shakargarh and during the attempted link up of 4
GRENADIERS with its coy at Dinpur Khurd . On the other hand, where such coord and conc was
planned for, the en was overwhelmed as in the Crossing of Thakurdwara minefd , the sec battle of
Harar Kalan, the capture of Chakra – Dehlra, capture of Laisar Kalan and in the Battle of Basantar. Bn
attack sp by 15 or more FUs, were usually successful. Paucity of arty was also, to some extent,
compensated by excellent arty sig communication which enabled prompt conc of arty fire. The Air OP,
though limited in Nos proved very useful, particularly in the operations of 36 Infantry Division. The
lessons that therefore emerge from this arm in the 71 operations , are the need for SP arty, long rg and
hy caliber guns, efficient sig communications, reqmts of detailed coord by attacking units and fmns, and
more emphasis on the ‘punch and crunch’ ie. on a greater No of guns being employed and heavier
concentration.

74. Surprise and Deception. Other than being deceived time and again by Pak obsts, both
natural and artificial, at no stage did 1 Corps achieve surprise by place, time or technique. As per Gen
Gul Hasan, Pakistan had appreciated the Indian thrust into the Bulge, which happily coincided with their
aim of drawing 1 Corps here. Another useful suggestion made by the same General – “ For an
elaborate deception plan, there was no dearth of old derelict tanks and vehs causing congestion within
and outside our depots, and these could be put to good use”.

The Fourth Rd

75. Finally, in the light of our knowledge of the Shakargarh operations, and the lessons that can be
derived there from, let us analyze what a future war with this adversary, may hold for us, in particular
for the operations of a Strike Corps.

76. Undoubtedly, capabilities on both sides have increased, but we still hold an edge in mech
forces, air, and arty. With this in view:-

(a) The pre – emptive option will continue to figure as part of Pakistan’s overall strategy – an
issue we needed to address and we believe it has already been addsd.

(b) Pakistan will be willing to accept loss of territory in areas of lesser importance. This
should be a pointer to selection of areas of employment of own Strike Corps.
 20

(c) While in the battle of Shakargarh, Pakistan chose not to emp the Strike Corps (6 Armd
Division and 17 Infantry Division) against ours by accident, this time he may choose to do so by
design, at least till a particular stg of battle is reached. Fully realizing that this time the bal of
such forces is not in its favour, Pakistan would attempt to so deploy the bal mech forces, to
achieve near parity in areas of operations of own Strike Corps, without denuding the main
reserve. For this, Pakistan will also relay considerably on the large armory of other a tk wpn
systems (HAT and LAT bns) possessed. Hence, drawing out the strat reserve will not be an
easy task. It is less likely to venture into direct battle with own Strike Corps and would instead
prefer to create, for its action, a time and place of its own choosing, such as a counter –
offensive.
(d) The limited areas of success achieved by Pakistan in this op, will be built upon. Thus we
can expect strong delaying forces, an intensive, unorthodox and int minefd plan, int depiction of
false frontages, and adequate and accurate arty fire when reqd. We therefore have to device
means of getting over these. We must realize that Pakistan delaying positions are primarily to
delay and, with a little more vigor, can be pushed back more easily than was done in this op.
Their minefds should no longer deter us – our present equipment and the ability to suffer a few
M kills must spur us on, while our CB will have a greater role to play.

77. These are just some of what we should expect, drawing purely from the op being presented.
While open to interpretation, they definitely merit consideration.
 21

Col RAA Raj Kumar, VSM

CONCLUSION

“ Battle is the most magnificent competition in which a human being can indulge. It brings out
all that is best, it removes all that is base.”
Patton

78. Any war is deserving of study by a professional soldier. The 1971 war, while widely discussed,
invariably focuses on the Eastern front, where the Indian Army had resurrected the pride it had lost in
the ‘ 62 debacle. The Western front, consequently, has not recd the due attention it deserved, from the
point of view of lessons learnt, and leadership in action. The war on this front is an invaluable study in
terms of strategy, operational leadership and battle tactics. The reorganization of both, Pakistan and
Indian Army, was done largely based on this experience. This is why, an operation such as this,
assumes added significance.

79. It has rightly been said, that, “It is axiomatic that those who fail to heed the lessons of history,
are doomed to repeat its follies.” This was unfortunately true of 1 Corps Operations in some respects. It
did not learn fully from that experience. The same mistakes of an overcautious apch with undue
emphasis on safety and security, and too frequent regrouping of forces continued in this op also. In the
’65 war, we complained of little or no air support. Here, we could not even utilize the limited sorties
allotted!

80. To be fair to the participants of this operation, they functioned under several restraints. Nor can
we draw parallels with the Strike Corps of today, whose structure is much more powerful and
advanced. The soldier however, remains the same. This is why, in the overall analysis, what cannot be
denied is that, even with the resources it possessed for the offensive, 1 Corps should have made a
significant dent. It barely made an impression!
1971 WAR : OPERATIONS IN
SHAKARGARH BULGE

1971 WAR : OPERATIONS IN

SHAKARGARH BULGE