Department of International Relations

Master Program in IR
An essay on: “The Helsinki Compromise in 1999 and its impact on
Greek-Turkish relations and on the future of Turkey’s application
of accession to the EU”

Master Student: Dimitra Ntatou

Professors: Dr. M. Kontos, Dr. A. Theophanous

Course: MIREL 570

~May 2018~

1
 Table of contents
Introduction

Part A

1. The historical context:

a. The Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974.
b. 1980’s – first application and rejection.
c. The Imia Crisis in 1996.
d. The Madrid Declaration in 1997.
e. The Kurdish issue and Ocalan’s case in 1999.

Part B

1. The Helsinki Summit in 1999:

a. Greece towards Turkey.
b. EU towards Turkey.
c. The compromise at the microscope.

Part C

1. The Post-Helsinki Phase or in the European direction: The events that

followed Helsinki Compromise.

Conclusion/ Critique of the Compromise.

Bibliography
~In the cover photo: C. Simitis gives hands with B. Ecevit in Helsinki. Behind Simitis: G.Papandreou.
~

Introduction

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1. The present essay is an academic attempt to examine the alteration of the

Greco-Turkish relations during the nineties, focusing on the Helsinki

agreement in 1999. In the twilight of the new Millennium, Turkey had come

closer to its European dream, managing to overcome its main reef: Greece.

Literally near enough to its target, Turkey was announced as a candidate

state for European membership. The European road was at last open for the

country of Eurasia. But every coin has two sides and Turkey needs to

understand that sometimes it needs courage to see you in the mirror and

change anything that needs to be changed.

Part A

a. Turkey and Greece were always been in a position of rivalry. After a long

and tough period of occupation from the Ottoman Turks, Greece managed to

be an independent state in 1830, bordering today with its former holder by

the sea at the Aegean, as well as by land at Thrace. After many skirmishes

and conflicts, Greece faced Turkey again in the war of 1974, during the

illegal Turkish invasion in Cyprus, an independent island state since 1960,

despite having the vast majority of its population to be Greek. This invasion

was transformed into a permanent illegal occupation of the northern part

3
 of Cyprus and was going to become one of the factors that hold Turkey out

of the European Union until now. [CITATION Aar18 \l 1033 ]

b. In 1987, Turkey, after forming the pseudo-state of TRNC in Cyprus in 1983,

finally decided to submit its application for candidacy in EU. The

application was officially rejected in 1989, when EU declared that it would

not accept any more members, at least in short-term. [CITATION Aar18 \l 1033 ] In

the meantime, Greece and Turkey were driven in a further crisis in March

1987, because of the dispute on the continental shelf issue. Fortunately,

the crisis was overcome and the two leaders of Greece and Turkey, A.

Papandreou and Turgut Ozal, met each other in the meeting of Davos in

January 1988. The mutual agreements of “non-war” led to the Greek

signature of the Protocol of 1988, an official paper of acceptance of more

open economic relations with the neighbors, without further improvement of

relations. [CITATION Μπε13 \p 31-35 \l 1033 ]

c. Undoubtedly, the richest decade in conflict and open hostility in the recent

years was the 90’s. Greece, achieving approval in the Customs Union of

EU in 1995, earned actually the right to put its terms in the “European

game”, promoting the plan of future entrance of Cyprus in the EU but

4
 blocking the entrance of Turkey, at least as an excuse for the rest of EU.
[CITATION Öni01 \l 1033 ]

The most dramatic point of clash was the approval of the International

Law of Sea from Greece in May 1995, which gave it the right to maximize

its territorial sea (=αιγιαλιτιδα ζωνη) from 6 miles to 12. At the same year,

Turkey made an action of revenge and declared Imia, two small

uninhabited islands in the Dodecanese, to be Turkish territories,

trampling the Protocol of 1932 between Turkey and Italy (the latter was a

former possessor of Dodecanese) and also the peace treaty of Paris of 1947,

which officially guaranteed all the complex of Dodecanese to be of Greek

sovereignty. In the 29-1-1996, the crisis entered its final part with mutual

actions from the Military Navy and the Military Aviation of both countries.

After the valuable interference of USA in the issue with the doctrine “no

ships, no men, no flags” on the islands, the risk of war was avoided but

neither Greece nor Turkey came out as a winner. [CITATION Vas11 \l 1033 ]

[CITATION Pao17 \l 1033 ]

d. In 9 July 1997, the two countries made a step forward due to the Madrid

meeting of NATO allies and after pressures for the improvement of the

Greek-Turkish relations. During this meeting, common declarations and

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 engagements of respecting international law and avoiding threat or use of

violence took place. It has although to be underlined that there was no

reference to the Cyprus problem but on the other there was an implicit

declaration of Greece not to expand over 6 miles in the Aegean! Despite the

arguments stating that the Madrid meeting was a Turkish diplomatic victory,

for others that vis a vis policy started in Madrid, also started to change the

core of Greek policy towards Turkey and to enhance the stabilization of the

relations. But unfortunately, the role of B.Ecevit in the new coalition

government, the rejection of Turkey from EU and the issue of missiles of

Cyprus were some of the factors that harshened once again the policies of

Turkey towards Greece. [ CITATION Eka97 \l 1033 ]

e. Suddenly, a new incident came to crack the rapprochement attempts. The

interference of Greece in the Kurdish issue and the Öcalan’s protection

given from Greek diplomats in 1999 (: Öcalan was the founder and leader

of PKK and found refuge from the Turkish authorities in Kenya’s Greek

embassy) aggravated the relations between the two countries and reached the

limits of non-communication and hostility. [CITATION Öni01 \l 1033 ]

Part B

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a. Despite the low point reached on diplomatic affairs between the two

countries, the last year before the millennium was about to be a landmark in

history. Real life and real people determined the route of the affairs. In

August 1999, an earthquake in Turkey shook not only the ground but also

people’s mentality, making the two nations to show empathy to each other

for the physical disaster. Also, at the political field, Georgios Papandreou,

a more temperate Greek politician, replaced hard-core Theodoros Pangalos

at the ministry of foreign affairs. The alteration of Greek foreign policy was

visible and Greece understood that it would have more interests to gain on

the disputable issues if Turkey entered the EU. In addition, one should not

underestimate the role of the American pressure to Greece and EU, for

the benefit of Turkey. Moreover, Greece felt that it could not define the

route of the game anymore, due to its weak economic situation and the

distance that this brought between the country and the center of political

decisions in EU. [CITATION Öni01 \p 38-39 \l 1033 ]

In such a situation, C. Simitis and G.Papandreou took advantage of the

revulsion of the masses on the Turkish issue and sat on the table to draw the

plan of Turkey’s accession to EU. Of course their planning was designed on

the terms of the certain accession of Cyprus in EU and also to receive a

written confirmation for resolution of the dispute by their Turkish

7
 counterparts with the criteria of Copenhagen also mentioned by G.

Papandreou as a term. Another significant factor of the positive

transformation of the political atmosphere of Greece was the huge amount

needed for the military equipment per year. With a peaceful coexistence

of the two countries under the European umbrella, it would be unnecessary

to bother themselves with military expenditures. Also, in the dawn of

Eurozone, Greece had as primary goal to equilibrate its financial sector and

more military weapons “disturbed” the equilibrium wanted. [CITATION Κυν13 \p

48-49 \l 1032 ]

b. After the tough rejection of Turkey’s application to EU in 1987 and the

further failure of the Turkish plans in Luxemburg Summit of 1997, Turkey

appeared to be isolated from the Europeans. Things changed in Helsinki

Summit of 1999, when the EU finally accepted Turkey as a candidate-

member state, moving in the difficult road of reforms and political

convention with EU. Motives for this European shift could be the U.S

influence which promoted the idea of embracing Turkey to EU, the Berlin

group which also seemed friendly to the country and also the common target

of the improvement of Greek- Turkish relations. [CITATION Arc05 \p 4 \l 1033 ]

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 Although Turkey had already signed a customs union with EU, it would be

very difficult to continue the connection with Europe with no further

common obligations and interests. In fact, European security was emerging

as the most crucial challenge of the new era, with the Kosovo and Bosnian

conflict to raise questions. EU then straight connected with NATO’s

strategic conception, embraced the idea of a “European Turkey”, a state that

did and would do the difference in the Balkans along with Greece. At the

Summit of Helsinki, Turkey was officially announced as a candidate state

and it was offered the precious economic and technical aid as every other

state was. Turkey achieved to gain much more than from past summits and

mainly the status of a European candidate! The shift of political thinking of

EU was based on the self-criticism practiced by its own voices, the shift at

the political arena in Germany, the instability in the Balkans and the

physical disasters in Turkey and Greece. Geopolitical interests were placed

in the center of attention of EU and Greece and Turkey had to protect them,

in a sense of peaceful cooperation. [CITATION Κυν13 \p 50-52 \l 1033 ]

c. The Summit of Helsinki gave to Turkey not only the opportunity for future

accession to the EU, but also the opportunity for economic cooperation with

Greece. Trade was a fundamental tie that could help to connect the

9
economies of these two neighboring countries and to form interdependent

parsimony policies. At Helsinki Summit, economy was interpreted as the

bridge connecting the two shores of the Aegean Sea. [CITATION Μπε13 \p 77 \l

1032 ]

The Summit in 10-11 December 1999, organized mostly for the European

Enlargement issue, concluded and confirmed that Turkey was an equal

candidate-state to the others and was in the right road for fulfilling the

reforms needed. Also, Turkey would receive the necessary support from EU

to put into dialogue its problematic issues, as the human rights issue. Every

candidate-country is obliged to obey the Charter of UN and the treaties of

EU. For any other dispute, they have the right to appeal to the respected

International Court. It has to be mentioned that in Helsinki was also

underlined the positive recognition of the political dialogue with UN for the

Cyprus issue in New York, promoting its future accession to EU with or

without the resolution of the Cyprus problem! [CITATION Προ \l 1032 ]

Also, the Summit revealed the weakness of EU in front of the American

factor. The candidacy of Turkey was promoted by the USA, as an already

significant partner-country, which would be upgraded strategically, through

the enhancement and the status given from Europe. [ CITATION Βοσ \l 1032 ]

Part C

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The long-term outcomes of the Helsinki Compromise are issues for

discussion until our days. Many scholars have contributed to the analysis of

the compromise, being divided in the same time into supporters and

adversaries of the value of its nature.

First of all, Greece managed to overcome its limits as a member-state

which was seen only as a border of the Union and widened its European

targets. In the Cyprus issue also, Greece argued the accession of Cyprus

as a whole and validated it at the Treaty of Athens in 2003. Cyprus

officially gained its European “gift” in 2004. Helsinki also tied Turkey with

the obligation to solve the problematic status quo of the occupied

Cyprus, before its own accession!

Finally, after the Helsinki doctrine, Turkey was engaged to come to

negotiations with the neighbor country for the issue of the continental

shelf, and at the worst-case scenario, to submit its appeal to the

International Court of Justice! [ CITATION Παπ04 \l 1032 ]

On the other hand, the following government, after Simitis’ prime ministry,

announced its will to stay away from the Doctrine, presenting it as

problematic. More specifically, Costas Karamanlis, accepting the positive

policies practiced on the Cyprus issue and the removing of political

11
obstacles from the European way of Turkey, was also arguing that the

Helsinki Compromise left Greece unprotected from the increasing

“appetite” of Turkey. From his perspective, Helsinki made clear to Europe

that Greece was silently admitting the existence of bordering disputes

with Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Greece did not manage to accomplish a

dialogue with Turkey, making the latter to withdraw any claims on the

territorial sovereignty of Greece. Moreover, Karamanlis noticed another

disadvantage of the compromise, that of the appealing to the

International Court. In case of such appealing, Greece may not be the

“winner” as the decision of the Court might lean to the side of Turkey,

minimizing the “effect” of the Greek small islands of the Aegean (as Imia)

on the Greek continental shelf. For all of the above, Karamanlis decided to

design a new policy, focusing on the present status quo and not being

involved in political traps. Many diplomats suggest that this is a more

reasonable policy, informing that the current Greek government with

Alexis Tsipras as P.M and Nikos Kontzias as Minister of Foreign Affairs

also follow Karamanlis’ policy. [ CITATION Παύ18 \l 1033 ]

After 1999, Greek-Turkish relations entered into a phase of redefining. From

the law politics prism, the two countries have enhanced their cooperation

since the year-landmark. In 2000-2002, we had a boom of bilateral

12
agreements, almost in any field, such as tourism and sciences. In 2009, a

new attempt of good will with the foundation of the Supreme Council of

Cooperation also gave hopes to the involved countries.

The main question that remains of vital importance is how Turkey reacted

from that period and beyond. In fact, after the election of the new

government in Turkey in 2002, the so-called Erdogan Era, Turkey started

to move away from the International Law and not to show respect to it

and its treaties. The revisionism of Turkey is built on the skepticism,

rethinking and reconstructing of international treaties already signed in the

past, pointing out many of the islands of Greece, Cyprus, Greek Western

Thrace and territories of Middle East as stolen lands, officially belonging

to Turkey. Dr. Diakantonis believes that the sharpness of bilateral relation is

a very possible evolution of the present problematic situation. Economic

crisis, refugee issues, the Turkish coup d’etat of 2016, the gradual

islamization of Turkey and the interior problem of the country aggravate

its relations with the EU and make it more hostile to the eternal

neighbor, Greece.

[CITATION htt \l 1033 ]

As far as the Euro-Turkish relationship is concerned, the Helsinki

Summit opened the path for future extended Europeanization of Turkey. In

13
real, it guided EU and Turkey to the Copenhagen Summit in December

2002, where the most serious reformations were put into practice (such as

the forbiddance of the death penalty, religious freedoms, and educational

rights in more languages except of the Turkish). After that summit, Turkey

got out more empowered and full of hopes, produced mostly from the

German and American influence to EU.

In Brussels Summit in 2004, it was indirectly mad clear to Turkey, that

Europe would be a very hard target for it. EU set many rules and

regulations for Turkey’s accession, in a sense of not believing the Turkish

story of improvement.

In 2006, Turkey entered in the most difficult period of the Euro-Turkish

relations. The country showed publicly its hostility against Cyprus,

which had already been a European member in 2004, and made the Cypriot

case the Sword of Damocles for Turkey’s accession. Turkey continued to

deny the opening of its airports and seaports for Cyprus, despite the customs

union, promoting the economic isolation of the Turk-Cypriots as the excuse.

Oli Renn warned Turkey for the repercussions of its actions. Indeed, in

November 2006, European Commission was pro-freezing the 8 chapters of

Turkish accession of Turkey’s pre-accession. But the deterioration of

relations was avoided from the European Council, which decided not to

14
open or close any of them, until the confirmation of the improvement,

setting also a deadline for Turkey up to December 2009. After the

deadline, France, the European Commission, Cyprus and the European

Parliament were openly opposed to a fast accession of the country. Since the

second half of 2012, bilateral relations really go into the most severe

period of them, due to the temporary assumption of European power from

Cyprus. For the atonement of the situation, Europe proposed a series of

special concessions, such as the free transportation/ free visas of students

and employees in the EU, all included in a “positive agenda”.

In 2013, when EU made its last attempt in a new tough period of

negotiations, the incidents of the Turkish violence in the Gezi Park in

Constantinople made the two partners to reach a stalemate and a

decline of the negotiations to follow. [CITATION Κυν13 \p 53-79 \l 1033 ]

After a period of mutual political suspiciousness, the Meeting in

Brussels in 2017 brought out some discussions on the possibility of

reducing the European funds given in Turkey. Despite the anti-Turkish

feelings of some states and especially Germany, it was understood that EU

cannot press thing harder, at least for now. Instead of that, the amounts

given to Turkey for the dealing of the refugee crisis may have to be

increased. That is a view that Alexis Tsipras also shares, underlining also

15
that Greece remains a supporter of the Turkish accession, as well as the

majority of EU members. [ CITATION Άγγ17 \l 1032 ]

In 2018, maybe the most significant Euro-Turkish meeting took place in

the city of Varna. At the meeting the partners Donald Tusk, Jean-Claud

Juncker and Tayyip Erdogan discussed on the refugee issue, the state of

law, the Syrian conflict and the involvement of Turkey in the Middle East.

Donald Tusk officially declared the European support to Cyprus but

also the European will to continue to cooperate with Turkey, under the

term of respect of the European laws and the improvement of its relations

with all the other European states. [ CITATION con18 \l 1033 ]

Unfortunately, for the majority of people and scholars, the Meeting in Varna

revealed a permanent rift between EU and Turkey.

CONCLUSION

Examining the total route of Greco-Turkish relations until 1990’s, somebody

is faced with a permanent axis: conflict of ideas and interests. In 1999,

Greece took an abrupt turn, with the initiative to suggest Turkey into

the EU and promote its Western future! Since then, verbal or armed

conflict, as a scenario of power, was kept away for Greece. On the opposite,

the country managed to be enhanced through its European identity after

its accession to EU and to follow strictly the lines of International Law

16
with its participation to almost every association and organization of

common values such as NATO, the Council of Europe and UN. After the

Helsinki Compromise and the political movements of rapprochement,

Greece is depicted and recognized from the vast majority as a country which

is willing to practice peaceful dialogue and stay away from any harmful

dispute. [CITATION Αντ17 \p 89 \l 1032 ]

The main difference of the movement of 1999 with any other before that is

the active participation of the business world the social groups to the

direction of rapprochement and connection of interests. Low politics never

played so important role and the European Union was also for the first

time a significant link between the neighboring countries. Despite the

already signed Customs Union, the Helsinki Compromise was that political

action that determined the common economic transactions of Greece and

Turkey. Investments also weight positively in the bilateral relations. Simitis’

vision to stabilize the Greek-Turkish relations through the

Europeanization of the dispute was a rational and revolutionary choice of

those times. The bad side of the coin is the democratic deficit that stops

Turkey for the fulfilling of the project. Helsinki Compromise was a vivid

example of theories of international relations and especially theory of

interdependence in practice. Studying the evidence, it is proved that high

17
politics can really define low politics. The main question that still

remains unanswered is if low politics could redefine high politics…

Rethinking also the Euro-Turkish relations, a possible permanent clash

between them could give Turkey the excuse searched to break down the

mutual tries of improvement on relations with Greece. [CITATION Μπε13 \p 223-

235 \l 1033 ] It has to be underlying that the speed of Europeanization of

Turkey is mostly fixed based on its political rightness and good will.

Helsinki made the start but on the way to EU Turkey needs to fulfill the

criteria of Copenhagen, to respect the International Law and the Law of

the Sea Convention and mostly to remove itself from any threat or use

of violence. The resolution of the Cyprus issue is also a key-policy that

Turkey needs to stop postponing if it remains focused on Europe. [ CITATION

mfa16 \l 1033 ]

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