SWP Research Paper

Daniel Voelsen

Internet from Space

How New Satellite Connections Could Affect
Global Internet Governance

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

German Institute for
International and Security Affairs

SWP Research Paper 3

April 2021, Berlin
Abstract

∎ A number of companies from the US and China plan to build networks

of several thousand satellites each to enable access to the Internet from
any point on Earth. These satellites will be stationed in low Earth orbit.
∎ If these plans are put into practice, the global Internet infrastructure
will acquire a whole new dimension. This would have far-reaching conse-
quences for Internet access, the security and resilience of Internet infra-
structure, and power relations in global Internet governance.
∎ The home countries of the leading companies – above all the US,
followed by China – would have extensive potential for political influ-
ence. They would be able to control, at the level of the Internet’s global
infrastructure, the worldwide flows of information.
∎ This research paper draws two scenarios to illustrate the range of possible
developments and the corresponding potential responses: one describes
the development of global oligopolies, the other a form of politically
regulated global competition.
∎ German and European political decision-makers should use regulations
and public funding to work towards a future Internet infrastructure that
is secure and reliable. The basis for this is the redundancy and diversity
of the underlying technology. To this end, the new satellite constellations
can be an important part of an appropriate mix of technologies.
∎ It would be both politically and economically desirable for Europe to
build its own constellation.
SWP Research Paper

Daniel Voelsen

Internet from Space

How New Satellite Connections Could Affect Global Internet Governance

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

German Institute for
International and Security Affairs

SWP Research Paper 3

April 2021, Berlin
All rights reserved.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, 2021

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SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute
for International
and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin
Germany
Phone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-200
www.swp-berlin.org
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ISSN (Print) 2747-5123

ISSN (Online) 1863-1053
doi: 10.18449/2021RP03

Translation by Tom Genrich

(English version of
SWP-Studie 2/2021)
 Table of Contents

5 Issues and Recommendations

7 On the Political Significance of

Global Communications Infrastructure
7 Countries’ Strategic Interests
8 The Role of Private Companies
9 Germany’s Policy Objectives

11 Internet by Satellite
11 The Technology
13 The Most Important Companies
16 Political Choices

19 Possible Futures: The Global Internet in 2035

19 Scenario 1: Global Oligopolies
24 Scenario 2: Regulated Competition

28 Recommendations for Germany and

the European Union
28 Promoting Technological Redundancy and Diversity
29 Creating Leeway through a European Constellation
30 Deepening Strategic Partnerships
30 Protecting Multilateral Institutions
30 Supporting Open Standards

31 Abbreviations
Dr Daniel Voelsen is a Senior Associate in the Global Issues
Research Division at SWP.
Issues and Recommendations

Internet from Space

How New Satellite Connections Could
Affect Global Internet Governance

It may sound like science fiction but could soon be

reality: a number of companies invest heavily in new
satellite constellations to provide high-speed Internet
access anywhere on Earth. The plan is to use satellites
in low Earth orbit, that is, in relatively close proximity
to the Earth’s surface. A world-spanning network
of thousands of such satellites is supposed to enable
quick data connections and the transfer of large
quantities of data. The leading company is the US’s
Starlink, which has already stationed the first satel-
lites for a planned network of tens of thousands of
satellites, a so-called “mega constellation”. Several
other US companies pursue similar plans. Like Star-
link, they can count on the support of the US govern-
ment. Their competition comes from China: its large
state-owned companies in the space technology sector
have announced that they too will be building their
own constellations.
These plans for new satellite networks reflect the
ever-increasing demands placed on the global Inter-
net infrastructure – and the growing awareness of
its political significance. Today, access to the global
Internet is a key factor for a country’s economic devel-
opment. But it also has a political dimension: more
and more countries are attempting to tighten their
control over the Internet’s infrastructure and the flow
of information. As with the construction of the first
telegraph networks from the late 19th century onwards,
they want to expand their own communication possi-
bilities. They also want to exert influence at the inter-
face of technology and politics on the conditions
under which information is exchanged worldwide.
For now, it remains an open question whether the
highly ambitious plans for satellite mega constella-
tions can be put into practice. All the companies in-
volved are facing a multitude of technical and eco-
nomic challenges. If they overcome these challenges,
however, the consequences would be far-reaching
for Internet access, for the security and resilience of
Internet infrastructure, and for power relations in
global Internet governance.
To illustrate the range of possible developments
and potential responses, this research paper considers

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5
Issues and Recommendations
two scenarios. In the first scenario, titled “Global
Oligopolies”, three satellite mega constellations be-
come operational, two under UK-US control and one
Chinese project as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
The enormous concentration of economic power
in this scenario also has political consequences: the
availability of the constellations’ services is defined
by political lines of conflict. As a result, the Internet
further fragments. The operators of the mega con-
stellations and the countries behind them have fine-
grained control over exactly how data within the
respective systems, and between them, is exchanged.
In this scenario, European countries, including Ger-
many, find themselves virtually powerless to shape
the use of digital infrastructures according to their
own political interests and values.
The second scenario is titled “Regulated Competi-
tion” and describes a world in which the new satellite
constellations are regulated to ensure a certain level
of competition. In particular, new World Trade Orga-
nisation (WTO) agreements stipulate that – with only
a few exceptions – the operators of the constellations
may not themselves offer services for end users on
Earth, but must instead cooperate with local com-
panies for this. Targeted public investment and a
close technological partnership with Japan also make
it possible to build a European constellation. For
Europe itself, but also for many other countries in
the world, this produces an alternative to the US
and Chinese systems. Close cooperation between the
European Union and the African Union for the first
time allows a large number of people in developing
countries to access the Internet cheaply and reliably.
This scenario sees the constellations partly become
an instrument of vested geopolitical interests. But it
does preserve the common global foundation of the
Internet.
It is unlikely that one of these two scenarios will
become reality its entirety. However, the purpose
of exploring them is not to provide prognoses for a
probable future. Rather they illustrate the far-reach-
ing political consequences that developments in
the Internet satellite sector could have – and what
possibilities exist for shaping these developments
politically.
In the past few years, the German government and
parliament have repeatedly committed themselves
to the goal of an open, free and truly global Internet.
Thus, the plans for new Internet satellite mega con-
stellations are both an opportunity and a challenge.
They offer the prospect of a more efficient and much
SWP Berlin
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6
more inclusive Internet. Simultaneously, they carry
the risk of an enormous concentration of economic
and therefore also of political power.
To meet this challenge, German and EU policy-
makers should use targeted regulations and public
funding to work towards a European and global Inter-
net infrastructure that is secure and reliable thanks to
technological redundancy and diversity. As part of a
balanced mix of technologies, the new satellite mega
constellations could be an important complement
to digital infrastructure without creating political
dependencies.
Furthermore, Europe should aim to build its own
European mega constellation. This would enable it
to remain economically and politically independent,
and be involved in the debate over the future of the
global Internet with a specific technological alterna-
tive. Here it will be important to deepen strategic
partnerships, strengthen relevant multilateral insti-
tutions such as the WTO and the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU), and preserve the struc-
tures of Internet governance. This is particularly
important where those structures are most produc-
tive, namely when developing open standards using
the established forms of voluntary cooperation.
There is still time to participate in shaping devel-
opments in the Internet satellite sector in Germany’s
and Europe’s “enlightened self-interest” (de Tocque-
ville). Even if current plans turn out to be impossible
to implement, a more proactive approach would be
an important contribution to the debates over the
future of the global Internet infrastructure that will
take place in the coming years, irrespective of indi-
vidual technologies.

On the Political Significance
of Global Communications
Infrastructure
In many ways, the planned new mega constellations
of Internet satellites build on genuinely new techno-
logical developments. The underlying political
dynamics, however, are anything but new. To under-
stand these dynamics, it is helpful to revisit the politi-
cal history of world-spanning communications sys-
tems from the early telegraphs in the 19th century to
the global spread of the Internet since the late 20th
century.
Countries’ Strategic Interests
The introduction of new communications technol-
ogies creates opportunities for new forms of social
interaction. Social scientists have long emphasised
that technology does not pre-determine social
developments. A lot depends on how societies adopt
new technologies. 1 In the case of international
communications systems, moreover, their transform-
ative influence is not limited to individual societies.
They also have the potential to significantly affect
power relations between countries.
First, having access to a global communications
system expands a government’s administrative and
military capabilities. The creation of the first world-
spanning telegraph systems was driven, to a large
extent, by the needs of colonial powers. They sought
the ability to get information about developments
in their colonies and to respond quickly by sending
1 Sandra K. Evans et al., “Explicating Affordances: A Con-
ceptual Framework for Understanding Affordances in Com-
munication Research”, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communi-
cation 22, no. 1 (2017): 35–52.
Countries’ Strategic Interests
orders to their local representatives. 2 Ever since, the
security and reliability of communications systems
for military and diplomatic purposes has been of
the utmost importance. Historically, the military sig-
nificance of global communications became evident
when, at the outset of World War I, one of the first
steps of the British forces was to cut the German
cables, thus severely limiting Germany’s ability to
communicate internationally. More recently, the pub-
lication of confidential US diplomatic cables in 2010
emphasised the high stakes of secure diplomatic com-
munication.
Second, access to global communications networks
has enormous economic significance. When the first
transatlantic cable connected Great Britain and the
United States in 1866, the amount of information it
could submit was very limited. And yet, even basic
information on commodity prices and the develop-
ments on the stock markets were of huge value to pri-
vate companies. 3 This explains why privately oper-
ated communications systems in this period matched
the paths of the global trade system – which more
often than not overlapped with the structures of
colonial rule.
2 Nicole Starosielski, The Undersea Network (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 2015), 31ff.; Daya K. Thussu,
International Communication. Continuity and Change, 3rd ed.
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 3–9.
3 Heidi J. Tworek, News from Germany. The Competition to
Control World Communications, 1900–1945 (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2019), chapter 4.
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7
On the Political Significance of Global Communications Infrastructure
We still face a global digital divide
between those who can enjoy the
many opportunities that the Internet
has to offer and the 3.6 billion people
who do not have any access to the
Internet at all.
The Internet adds a new element to this part of
the story: today, information is not only important
relative to other economic activities, but information
itself in the form of various digital services has
become a product. Despite the enormous success of
the Internet, however, we still face a global digital
divide between those who can enjoy the many oppor-
tunities that the Internet has to offer and the 3.6 bil-
lion people who do not have any access to the Inter-
net at all. 4 It is a bitter twist of history that this
problem particularly affects countries that suffered
through colonialism. The kind of global connectivity
that once served colonial rulers well is now missing,
thus depriving these states of an important tool for
their economic and societal development.
Third, control over global communications infra-
structures is seen by many countries as a means to
project power internationally. As Heidi Tworek
recounts in her book News from Germany, in the early
20th century many states, including Germany, began
to realise the political potential of controlling the
international flow of information. They already saw
that this kind of control would serve their political
goals by allowing them to prioritise information,
manipulate unwanted information or simply block
access to their networks. 5 It was also already clear
that any global communications system would
require a minimum of international coordination –
and that the terms of that coordination could have
enormous political consequences. Given the strategic
thinking in Germany at the time, it is not too sur-
prising that in 1906 the German Reich decided to host
the first World Radio Communication Conference in
Berlin. 6
4 See https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/
default.aspx.
5 Ibid.
6 “International Radiotelegraph Conference (Berlin, 1906)”,
International Telecommunication Union (online), https://www.
itu.int/en/history/Pages/RadioConferences.aspx?conf=4.36
(accessed 11 December 2020).
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8
The Role of Private Companies
Large parts of the Internet’s global infrastructure
are owned and operated by private companies. For
instance, around 95 percent of all submarine Internet
cables are owned by private companies. 7 Likewise, the
majority of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are oper-
ated by private entities, among them almost all the
IXPs with the largest data traffic volumes. 8 Historically,
again, this is not too surprising. The first telegraph
cables were built and operated by private companies;
the creation of the first world-spanning communica-
tions systems a few decades later, likewise, lay in the
hands of private companies. 9
The relationship between states, private compa-
nies and wider society was already uneasy back then.
States prefer to see “national” companies as exten-
sions of state power; the latter like to support that
perception if it leads to state support for their com-
mercial endeavours. Simultaneously, they pursue
their own business interests and are unwilling to
align their commercial operations with considera-
tions of the “national interest”. Supposedly, civil
society is the beneficiary of all these activities. How-
ever, it is often controversial whether the services
provided fit the needs of society.
Stationing and operating global communications
systems is a lucrative enterprise in itself. For many
companies, however, these activities are also a means
to serve other goals. They seek to expand their control
over the communications infrastructure necessary for
producing goods and providing services. Recently, this
thinking has spread beyond the traditional actors in
this field: Some of the biggest companies providing
new digital services – Google, Apple, Facebook, Ama-
zon, Microsoft, in short: GAFAM – now increasingly
turn to expanding their own physical communica-
tions infrastructure. This is evident in these compa-
nies growing global networks of data centres. It also
shows in their substantial investments in new sub-
7 Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy, ed.
Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman and Tara D. Daven-
port (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 9.
8 “Internet Exchange Directory”, Packet Clearing House
(online), https://www.pch.net/ixp/dir (accessed 11 December
2020).
9 Dwayne Winseck, “The Geopolitical Economy of the
Global Internet Infrastructure”, Journal of Information Policy
7 (2017): 228–67 (232ff.); Thomas Lenschau, Das Weltkabel-
netz, Angewandte Geographie, ser. 1, no. 1 (Halle: Gebauer-
Schwetschke, 1903).

Figure 1
marine cables to allow for the transfer of the huge
amounts of data necessary for their services (see
Figure 1).
Germany’s Policy Objectives
Awareness of the strategic importance of Internet
infrastructure has been growing in Germany as well.
For instance, the debate over whether the Chinese
firm Huawei should participate in the construction
of the 5G network in Germany garnered much atten-
tion. The intensity of this controversy and the robust
behaviour of the US administration under Donald
Trump made visible to a larger public that seemingly
very technical issues in digital infrastructure are
linked to geopolitical confrontations over political
and commercial influence.
In 2019 the German parliament and government
took advantage of Germany’s role as host to the Inter-
net Governance Forum (IGF) to state their own prior-
ities in terms of global Internet governance. For ex-
ample, in her opening speech Chancellor Merkel
explicitly emphasised the value of the global Internet
Germany’s Policy Objectives
infrastructure: “This shared Internet infrastructure
has become a cornerstone of the global economy.” 10
The German Chancellor issued a
warning about the fragmentation of
the Internet, saying it was crucial to
“to protect the heart of the Internet
as a global public good”.
In the run-up to the IGF, a Bundestag resolution
also emphasised the goal of a free and truly global
Internet, and explicitly rejected its political fragmen-
tation: “it is vital to act to prevent countries or even
entire regions from breaking away from the central
infrastructure of the shared address system (DNS).” 11
10 “Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel open-
th
ing the 14 Annual Meeting of the Internet Governance
Forum in Berlin on 26 November 2019”, https://www.bundes
regierung.de/breg-en/news/speech-by-federal-chancellor-dr-
angela-merkel-opening-the-14th-annual-meeting-of-the-
internet-governance-forum-in-berlin-on-26-november-2019-
1701494 (accessed 6 April 2021).
th
11 German Bundestag, 19 legislative period, Antrag der
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD. One World. One Net. One Vision –
SWP Berlin
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9
On the Political Significance of Global Communications Infrastructure

In her speech at the IGF, the Chancellor also warned

that any fragmentation of the Internet would endanger
the stability of the global infrastructure and facilitate
surveillance and censorship. To prevent this, Merkel
said, it was crucial to “protect the heart of the Inter-
net as a global public good.” 12
In recent years, the German government has in-
creasingly adopted the idea of “digital sovereignty”.
This disputed expression is mostly used to link a
number of issues: these range from a proactive indus-
trial policy, to measures for growing digital compe-
tence in public administration, to individual data
sovereignty. In her IGF speech in 2019, Chancellor
Merkel differentiated sovereignty in the sense of
democratic self-determination from protectionist and
nationalist conceptions of sovereignty as isolation.
It is thus also not surprising that the programme for
Germany’s presidency of the EU Council in the sec-
ond half of 2020 put digital sovereignty centre-
stage. 13

Internet Governance Forum für ein offenes und freies globales Netz,
Drucksache 19/15059, 12 November 2019, point III.4,
https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/150/1915059.pdf.
12 “Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel open-
th
ing the 14 IGF” (see note 10).
13 German Foreign Ministry, Gemeinsam. Europa wieder stark
machen. Programm der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 1. Juli
bis 31. Dezember 2020 (Berlin, 2020), https://www.eu2020.de/
blob/2360246/d0e7b758973f0b1f56e74730bfdaf99d/pdf-
programm-de-data.pdf.

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10

Internet by Satellite
A number of companies are pursuing plans for sup-
plying fast and comprehensive Internet access via
satellites in low Earth orbit. A dense network of satel-
lites orbiting the Earth is supposed to provide cover-
age for the entire Earth’s surface. If the companies
involved manage to implement their projects and put
the satellite mega constellations into service, this
would create a whole new dimension of global Inter-
net infrastructure.
The Technology
Since the Soviet Union sent the first satellite, named
Sputnik, into space in 1957, the importance of satel-
lites has vastly increased. Today they are essentially
used for three purposes: for positioning and naviga-
tion systems on Earth, such as the US Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) or the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) used in shipping; for Earth observation
for civilian purposes, such as weather or environmen-
tal research, or for satellite-supported military recon-
naissance; and for communications and satellite
television.
As a first approximation, it is possible to distin-
guish between satellites in geostationary Earth orbit
(GEO) and those in low Earth orbit (LEO). GEO satel-
lites are 35,786 km above the Earth at the Equator
and move at the speed of the Earth’s rotation. Viewed
from the ground, they thus appear to be stationary
in the sky. By contrast, LEO satellites circle the Earth
at the relatively modest distance of 160 to 2,000 km.
They move faster than the Earth rotates, and are
therefore only ever accessible for a limited time from
any fixed point on the ground (see Figure 2, p. 12).
GEO satellites have so far been of only limited
use for Internet connections. Their greater distance
to Earth means that data transfers take longer. This
delay is barely noticeable when accessing websites.
However, it does make itself felt with real-time appli-
cations, such as video telephony.
The shorter delay (latency) in data transfer of LEO
satellites is one of the key reasons why the planned
The Technology
What we know about the bandwidth of
LEO satellites
In recent news reports, Starlink representatives claimed
that individual Starlink satellites can reach a data
throughout of 17 Gbit/s. If Starlink were to station 10,000
satellites, this would theoretically lead to an overall data
transfer capacity between the satellites and users on Earth
of 170,000 Gbit/s, or 170 Tbit/s. In the event of a full
deployment of the planned 48,000 satellites, this capacity
would rise to 816 Tbit/s. To put these numbers into per-
spective: the recently announced Facebook-owned sub-
marine cable “2Africa” that connects the entire African
continent with Europe is supposed to have a transfer
capacity of 180 Tbit/s. In March 2020, during the first
wave of the Covid-19 crisis in Europe, the Internet Ex-
change Point (IXP) DE-CIX in Frankfurt reported a new
a
world record of data throughput amounting to 9 Tbit/s.
a Eric Ralph, “SpaceX Says Upgraded Starlink Satellites
Have Better Bandwidth, Beams, and More”, Teslarati
(online), 12 November 2019, https://www.teslarati.com/
spacex-starlink-satellite-upgrade-more-bandwidth-more-
beams/; Bernd Mewes, “23 Länder, 37,000 Kilometer:
Neues Unterseekabel für stabiles Internet in Afrika”, heise
online, 16 May 2020, https://www.heise.de/newsticker/
meldung/23-Laender-37-000-Kilometer-Neues-Untersee
kabel-fuer-stabiles-Internet-in-Afrika-4722687.html;
“DE-CIX mit neuem Weltrekord: Mehr als 9 Terabit pro
Sekunde Datendurchsatz am Frankfurter Internet-
knoten”, de-cix.net, 27 July 2020, https://www.de-cix.net/
de/about-de-cix/media-center/press-releases/de-cix-sets-a-
new-world-record (all accessed 27 July 2020).
mega constellations want to use them. However,
the challenge here is that LEO satellites, as described
above, continuously orbit the Earth. They are there-
fore only ever accessible for a short period of time
from any one point on Earth. To provide lasting and
reliable Internet connections nevertheless, the plans
stipulate the construction of comprehensive webs of
LEO satellites. Despite the satellites being permanently
in motion, connecting to at least one satellite should
thus always be possible.
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11
Internet by Satellite
Figure 2
The designs of the planned constellations vary
greatly. Some companies want to station networks
of several tens of thousands of satellites while others
“only” aim for hundreds.
Many of the companies that are new to the market
of satellite-supported communications – for instance
SpaceX and Amazon, and some Chinese firms – have
declared that their goal is to offer users a direct con-
nection to the satellites. Users are supposed to be able
to link up with satellites directly via antennas spe-
cially designed for the purpose (so-called “phased
array antennas”). These antennas are currently about
the size of a pizza carton. They are designed to attach
to buildings or to mobile objects such as cars, trains
and boats. Other companies, including AST & Science,
aim to provide direct satellite access using standard
mobile phone technology. It is clear that a large
number of satellites will be required to offer a large
number of users fast reliable Internet access, what-
ever the technology used for the connection. Accord-
ingly, the companies plan constellations of several
tens of thousands of satellites.
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12
The company TeleSat, by contrast, represents a
totally different approach: it plans to station rela-
tively small constellations to act as a backbone pro-
vider for local Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The
initial thinking was for 300 satellites. By now, the
company aims for up to 1,671 satellites. In principle
its business model is similar to today’s submarine
cables. End users will be employing technology that
is common today to connect to the local ISP. The ISP
will then use special equipment to enable a link-up
with the global Internet – in this case via satellite.
Such a system can theoretically manage with a much
smaller number of satellites since local ISPs can use
much more efficient antennas than those that
SpaceX, for example, is planning for its end users,
and since local ISPs pool end user requests. 14
14 Jeff Foust, “Telesat Remains Optimistic about Prospects
for LEO Constellation”, SpaceNews (online), 11 November 2020,
https://spacenews.com/telesat-remains-optimistic-about-
prospects-for-leo-constellation/ (accessed 2 December 2020).

To offer Internet access via satellite, the satellite
systems have to be connected not only to end users
but also to the physical Internet infrastructure on
Earth. At the moment, most companies do not plan
for each LEO satellite to connect to these ground
stations. Rather, the satellites are meant to form
a network so that data can be directly transmitted
between them. It would thus be sufficient if certain
units within the network communicated with the
ground stations.
A number of companies are working on technical
solutions based on laser beams to make exchanging
data between satellites possible. These are called
Inter-Satellite Laser Links (ISLLs). In principle, this
technology has the potential to transfer data at the
speed of light. Unlike today’s underground and sub-
marine cables, it will require no elaborate or delicate
“cabling”. Some approaches aim to use this laser
technology also for the connection between satellites
and Earth. The Bavarian company Mynaric, among
others, works in this field. In a decision that became
public knowledge in July 2020, the German govern-
ment blocked Mynaric from exporting its products
to China. 15 This shows how crucial this technology is
believed to be.
Advances in rocket and satellite
technology have turned the
stationing of mega constellations into
a commercially viable project.
The Most Important Companies
Advances in rocket technology and the mass produc-
tion of satellites have reduced the expected costs of
stationing mega constellations in low Earth orbit to
such an extent that these projects have become eco-
nomically conceivable. With few exceptions, the busi-
ness model for satellite-supported communications
has so far been based on stationing a small number of
geostationary satellites. Manufacturing and stationing
costs for these satellites are very high, at approximately
US$150 to 500 million per satellite. 16
15 “DGAP-Adhoc: Mynaric AG: Mynaric gibt Einstellung
der Geschäftsaktivitäten auf dem chinesischen Markt be-
kannt (deutsch)”, Finanznachrichten (online), 30 July 2020,
http://bit.ly/3qSI1fP (accessed 31 July 2020).
16 Caleb Henry, “Geostationary Satellite Orders Bouncing
Back”, SpaceNews (online), 20 January 2020, https://space
The Most Important Companies
In contrast, the planned LEO mega constellations
will be using new launch vehicles such as those devel-
oped by SpaceX. A key factor in this context is that
SpaceX’s carrier systems can be reused, which sub-
stantially reduces the costs of launches. SpaceX CEO
Elon Musk has told the press that the cost of manu-
facturing and stationing the satellites currently stands
at US$500,000. 17 Based on these numbers, building a
constellation of 10,000 satellites would cost around
US$5 billion in total.
The high initial investments, however, are only
one of the economic challenges to be overcome if
the plans for new LEO constellations are to be imple-
mented. 18 Urban centres, for example, are attractive
markets with many solvent customers – but there is
also already a lot of fierce competition in these mar-
kets. Moreover, substantial additional investments
would be required to be able to provide reliable Inter-
net connections by satellite for large numbers of
people concentrated in relatively small areas. Another
challenge is the low purchasing power of end users
in developing countries. Billions of people there still
have no access to the Internet. One major reason for
this is that it has so far not seemed lucrative to tele-
communications companies to provide access. If the
operators of the mega constellations want to offer
their services in developing countries, they too will
have to confront the low purchasing power of poten-
tial customers.
This research paper focuses on companies whose
objective is to offer broadband Internet connectivity
using LEO constellations (see Figure 3, p. 14). Along-
side the big players, several smaller companies have
announced their plans to provide such connections
for the “Internet of Things” (IoT). For broadband-
connections, most of the companies plan to use radio
frequencies in the Ku and Ka bands; some are also
considering the V and Q bands.
news.com/geostationary-satellite-orders-bouncing-back/
(accessed 28 July 2020).
17 Brian Wang, “SpaceX Starlink Satellites Could Cost
$250,000 Each and Falcon 9 Costs Less than $30 Million”,
NextBigFuture.com (online), 10 December 2019, https://www.
nextbigfuture.com/2019/12/spacex-starlink-satellites-cost-
well-below-500000-each-and-falcon-9-launches-less-than-30-
million.html (accessed 6 August 2020).
18 Chris Daehnick et al., “Large LEO Satellite Constella-
tions: Will It Be Different this Time?” McKinsey & Company, 4
May 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-
and-defense/our-insights/large-leo-satellite-constellations-
will-it-be-different-this-time# (accessed 3 July 2020).
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Internet by Satellite
Figure 3
Other companies are banking on satellite connec-
tions with a more limited transmission capacity, as
Iridium Communications did as long ago as the late
1990s. Using VHF and UHF bands, the idea is to pro-
vide specialised IoT services, for which low trans-
mission capacity is sufficient.
The Market Leaders from the US, UK
and Canada
Starlink’s projects are currently garnering the most
attention. One reason is that Starlink is more ad-
vanced in implementing its plans than all other
companies in the sector. At the beginning of 2021,
Starlink had already stationed just over 1,000 satel-
lites, far more than all its competitors. It wants to
offer the first services for customers in southern
Canada and the northern US in early 2021. Another
reason is that Starlink is a subsidiary of the space
travel corporation SpaceX, founded by Elon Musk.
Notwithstanding Elon Musk’s ambivalent public per-
sona, this gives Starlink the advantage of reduced
prices when using SpaceX launch vehicles for build-
ing its LEO constellation. In turn, SpaceX benefits
from Starlink’s substantial competitive edge over
other companies and the revenues for its own carrier
systems.
Along with Starlink, Project Kuiper, an Amazon
subsidiary, is widely perceived to be among the most
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Data availabe (in German) at http://bit.ly/SWP21Satellit
promising US companies. Like Starlink, it is a new
arrival on the market for satellite communications.
Currently, Project Kuiper plans to build a constella-
tion of around 3,236 satellites. 19 As with Starlink, the
plans of the Amazon subsidiary build on the premise
that the stationing costs for Internet satellites will
drop in the future. Project Kuiper only received its
authorisation for operating a satellite constellation
over the United States in July 2020. At that time,
Amazon announced its intention to invest at least
US$10 billion in the project. 20
One advantage for Project Kuiper compared to Star-
link is that it can draw on the experience of Amazon
Web Services (AWS). This subsidiary of the online
mail order company runs data centres and data con-
nections. In fact, AWS is one of the largest cloud pro-
viders worldwide and has a correspondingly extensive
network of data centres. Moreover, Amazon has been
involved in installing new submarine cables in recent
years (see Figure 1, p. 9). It is therefore not surprising
19 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Application
of Kuiper Systems LLC for Authority to Launch and Operate a Non-
Geostationary Satellite Orbit System in Ka-band Frequencies – Tech-
nical Appendix (Washington, D.C., 4 July 2019).
20 “Amazon Receives FCC Approval for Project Kuiper
Satellite Constellation”, Amazon Company News (online), 30
July 2020, https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-
news/amazon-receives-fcc-approval-for-project-kuiper-
satellite-constellation (accessed 11 December 2020).

that Amazon is already jockeying for position as a
service provider in the telecommunications sector.
A third major actor alongside the two US compa-
nies is the British company OneWeb. OneWeb had to
file for bankruptcy in spring 2020. However, in July
of that year it was sold for US$1 billion to a consor-
tium consisting of the British government and the
Indian company Bharti Global. 21 So far, OneWeb has
stationed 74 satellites. To produce the required satel-
lites, OneWeb has founded a joint venture with Air-
bus and established production sites in Europe and
the US. 22
Finally, Canadian company TeleSat, unlike the
above companies, has been active in the satellite com-
munications sector for a long time. In 2018 TeleSat
stationed its first LEO satellite for testing, as part of its
TeleSat LEO project. The objective of TeleSat LEO is to
achieve worldwide coverage with a relatively small
number of satellites. For this, its satellites are to be
connected with its own ground stations. Alternative-
ly, the Canadian company also promotes its system
for mobile phone network providers. The idea is that
they can connect their local networks to the global
Internet via the TeleSat constellation. 23 TeleSat has
announced that it will be ready to commence com-
prehensive service as early as 2022. It has concluded a
contract for stationing the satellites with Jeff Bezos’s
company Blue Origin. 24
State-Owned Companies from China
According to media reports, Chinese companies also
have high ambitions for building LEO constellations.
It should be assumed that these activities are, to vary-
ing degrees, supported or even steered by the Chinese
government.
21 Jonathan Amos, “OneWeb Sale to UK-Bharti Group Gets
Court Approval”, BBC (online), 10 July 2020, https://www.
bbc.com/news/science-environment-53370930 (accessed
31 July 2020).
22 Caleb Henry, “How OneWeb Plans to Make Sure Its First
Satellites Aren’t Its Last”, SpaceNews (online), 18 March 2019,
https://spacenews.com/how-oneweb-plans-to-make-sure-its-
first-satellites-arent-its-last/ (accessed 23 July 2019).
23 “Telesat LEO”, Telesat.com, https://www.telesat.com/leo-
satellites/ (accessed 11 December 2020).
24 Caleb Henry, “Telesat Signs New Glenn Multi-launch
Agreement with Blue Origin for LEO Missions”, SpaceNews
(online), 31 January 2019, https://spacenews.com/telesat-
signs-new-glenn-multi-launch-agreement-with-blue-origin-
for-leo-missions/ (accessed 5 August 2020).
The Most Important Companies
The state-owned company China Aerospace Science
and Industry Corporation (CASIC) aims to build a world-
wide network of 156 LEO satellites: the Hongyun
Project. A first satellite was sent into space from China
in December 2018. 25 Another state-owned company
with an almost identical name, China Aerospace
Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), has also
stationed a satellite as a starting-point for an LEO con-
stellation project, called Hongyan. Yet another Chi-
nese firm, Galaxy Space, launched its first satellite in
January 2020. In the next five years, that number is
projected to rise to 144 and enable Internet access
via 5G. 26 It is not clear from publicly accessible infor-
mation whether the satellite constellation is intended
for direct connection of 5G end user devices, or for
connection to 5G ground stations. In late 2020 there
were reports of an additional Chinese LEO constella-
tion with the somewhat obscure name “GW”, with a
planned size of almost 13,000 satellites. 27
European Suppliers
Of the companies mentioned so far, at least one,
OneWeb, comes from Europe – though not from
within the EU. An interesting case is Munich-based
KLEO Connect. This start-up aims to build a constella-
tion of up to 300 satellites to offer data connections
for networked IoT-devices. 28 According to media re-
ports, however, a Chinese company has since become
the main investor, and is actively involved in the
operational management. 29
25 Echo Huang, “China Got on the Bandwagon to Provide
Global Satellite Internet”, Quartz (online), 24 December 2018,
https://qz.com/1506358/china-got-on-the-bandwagon-to-
provide-global-satellite-internet/ (accessed 17 July 2019).
26 Andrew Jones, “China Launches Yinhe-1 Commercial
Low Earth orbit 5G Satellite”, SpaceNews (online), 16 January
2020, https://spacenews.com/china-launches-yinhe-1-
commercial-low-earth-orbit-5g-satellite/ (accessed 20 March
2020).
27 Larry Press, “A New Chinese Broadband Satellite Con-
stellation”, CircleID (online), 2 October 2020, http://www.
circleid.com/posts/20201002-a-new-chinese-broadband-
satellite-constellation/ (accessed 8 December 2020).
28 “KLEO Constellation”, KLEO (online), https://kleo-
connect.com/constellation (accessed 11 December 2020).
29 Jeff Foust, “Space Industry Sees Growing Effects of
Coronavirus Outbreak”, SpaceNews (online), 9 March 2020,
https://spacenews.com/space-industry-sees-growing-effects-of-
coronavirus-outbreak/ (accessed 6 August 2020).
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Internet by Satellite
From a European perspective, however, it is more
important that certain European companies have
become crucial, even indispensable, suppliers of
crucial components. First place goes to Airbus with
its mass production of communications satellites.
In addition, there are also companies offering single
components or services. One example is OHB from
Bremen, which was the principal contractor for
developing the satellites for the European satellite
navigation system, Galileo. 30 Another example is
Munich-based Mynaric. Among other things, it is
working on systems for intra-satellite communica-
tions using laser.
Political Choices
The future development of the Internet satellite
sector will largely depend on whether remaining
technical issues can be solved and companies can
conceive viable business models. In addition, non-
foreseeable events, such as the Covid-19 pandemic
in 2020 can abruptly slow down or even terminate
progress on Internet satellite projects, or else give
them new momentum.
Alongside these factors, however, there is also
room for governments to deliberately exert influence.
As described in the first chapter, countries have
always tried to shape the development of global com-
munications systems to their benefit.
Such state activities take place within the frame-
work of international law. 31 Its pivot is the “Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” of 1967 – often
referred to simply as “The Outer Space Treaty”. 32 It
has been ratified by 107 nations, including Germany,
and lays out their fundamental rights and duties in
outer space. Importantly, Article VI clearly articulates
30 “KLEO Constellation”, KLEO (online), https://kleo-connect.
com/constellation (accessed 11 December 2020).
31 Frans von der Dunk, “International Satellite Law”, in
Oxford Research Encyclopedias, ed. Peter L. Read (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 2ff., https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/
9780190647926.013.39 (accessed 12 January 2021).
32 For the complete text, see the “Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, Europa-Uni-
versität Viadrina – Juristische Fakultät (online), https://www.
vilp.de/treaty_full;jsessionid=6F8797641CFA55A17BDE19A74
E47FC92?lid=en&cid=197 (accessed 12 January 2021).
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the responsibility, and liability, of states for all national
activities in outer space, “whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-gov-
ernmental entities” (Article VI). This article is likely to
gain greater significance in light of the ever-expand-
ing role of private companies in space.
Frequency Allocation
Since 1959, the ITU has had the mandate to coordi-
nate the international allocation of radio frequencies,
including those needed for satellite communications.
It also coordinates orbital positions of satellites. This
work is today carried out by ITU’s Radiocommunica-
tion sector (ITU-R). Major decisions are made at the
World Radio Conferences, which convene at least
every four years.
ITU-R’s function in coordinating radio frequencies
essentially consists of a rather elaborate procedure to
confirm whether a justified interest exists in using a
specific frequency range. 33 The basic principle guid-
ing this decision can be simplified as “first come, first
served”. Whoever files first has priority. All other
countries and companies that might subsequently
wish to use the same or neighbouring frequency
ranges will have to come to an arrangement.
Private businesses cannot represent themselves
in this procedure. Instead, governments act on their
behalf and notify the ITU of the use of certain fre-
quencies. Often, countries apply for frequency use by
companies from other nations. In 2015, for example,
Norway registered 4,527 satellites and the correspond-
ing need for frequencies on behalf of SpaceX. 34 Com-
panies seem to find it an attractive option to register
their interests with the ITU via a number of different
countries. This allows them to circumvent specific
rules of individual national regulatory bodies. Many
countries, for their part, deliberately do not distin-
guish between domestic and foreign companies. They
have an interest in receiving the relevant fees, and
hope for intensified economic relations with the com-
panies.
33 ITU, “Process Diagram Concerning Coordination and
Notification of Satellite Networks”, ITU (online), 14 January
2014, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/space/elearning/presen
tations/diagramFilingProceduresNonPlan.pdf (accessed
2 December 2020).
34 Peter B. de Selding, “Signs of a Satellite Internet Gold
Rush in Burst of ITU Filings”, SpaceNews (online), 23 January
2015, https://spacenews.com/signs-of-satellite-internet-gold-
rush/ (accessed 7 July 2020).

It is becoming increasingly problematic, however,
that the ITU’s coordinating function was originally
devised for a different practice. The enormously time-
consuming procedures date from a time when
the total number of satellites stationed in space was
manageable. The growing number of applications
for mega constellations risks overburdening this
allocation system. The size of the constellations
currently being planned also challenges the ITU’s
basic mechanism of frequency attribution. If finan-
cially powerful companies with plans for mega con-
stellations lay claim to large ranges of frequencies
that are attractive for data transmission, these fre-
quencies became a rare commodity. The “first come,
first served” principle then risks becoming a hurdle
for new arrivals. Back when there were fewer satel-
lites, the parties involved were, in most cases, per-
fectly able to reach a voluntary agreement. Now real
distribution conflicts are looming.
At the global level, the use of radio frequencies in
space is coordinated by the ITU. However, countries
reserve the right to regulate the use of radio frequen-
cies on their territory, including their airspace. They
can bring to bear security considerations, but also
efforts to protect existing forms of use against disrup-
tion. In Germany it is the Federal Network Agency
(Bundesnetzagentur) that is in charge of such matters.
Market Access
The activities of commercial satellite operators are
further regulated through the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO). The regulatory framework of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also applies to
telecommunications services. In addition, the GATS
contains an annex specifically dealing with these
services. As of today, 108 WTO member states have
made commitments concerning trade in these ser-
vices, which include “cross-border transmission of
telecoms services”. 35
The WTO’s broad definition of telecoms services
also applies to satellite communications and therefore
– at least in principle – also to the planned new
LEO constellations. That means that all states that
have made the relevant commitments will have to
grant companies operating these constellations access
to their telecommunications markets.
35 “Telecommunications Services”, WTO (online), https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.
htm (accessed 12 January 2021).
Political Choices
While one can subsume the planned new LEO
constellation under the existing GATS arrangements,
an alternative would be to negotiate new agreements
within the GATS framework to specifically regulate
the services provided through these constellations.
For instance, states could agree on rules that require
satellite communications providers to provide their
services in a non-discriminatory way. A broad inter-
pretation of this would be to apply the principle of
“net neutrality”, i.e. the idea that network operators
must treat all data equally, whatever the content and
whoever the sender/receiver may be. 36
Within the framework of the WTO, moreover,
states also can regulate services nationally. What is
important within the logic of the GATS agreement,
however, is that the same regulations apply for both
domestic and foreign companies. Within Europe, it
is the EU which sets the majority of these regulations.
Existing rules for telecommunications services pro-
viders, for example on data protection or net neu-
trality, would also be relevant for the planned LEO
constellations.
Finally, the WTO’s body of rules allows countries
to play a “trump card”, namely national security.
Thus there were media reports that in 2018 OneWeb
planned a joint venture with the Russian space orga-
nisation Roscosmos. This was blocked, the reports
claim, by an intervention by the Russian domestic in-
telligence service FSB, which considered the intended
cooperation a threat to national security. 37
Public Funding for Research and
Development
Nearly all companies that currently pursue plans for
LEO mega constellations claim that their systems will
allow the 3.6 billion people access to the Internet who
have so far found themselves on the wrong side of the
digital divide, without any Internet access at all. How-
ever, it seems unlikely at present that these potential
new customers will generate the kind of revenues
that the businesses require to build and operate the
constellations.
36 Volker Stocker, Georgios Smaragdakis and William
Lehr, “The State of Network Neutrality Regulation”, ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 50, no. 1 (2020):
45–59.
37 Maria Kolomychenko, “Exclusive: Russia Opposes U.S.
OneWeb Satellite Service, Cites Security Concerns”, Reuters,
24 October 2018, http://reut.rs/3p3S4ho (accessed 17 July
2019).
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Internet by Satellite
It is very likely that satellite
companies will attempt to obtain
financial support from international
development budgets.
We should therefore expect companies to attempt
to obtain financial support from international devel-
opment budgets. UNICEF and ITU, for instance, have
jointly founded the GIGA initiative, whose objectives
include providing every school on the planet with
access to the Internet. 38 Secretary-General António
Guterres explicitly referred to the initiative in his
opening speech for the 2019 Internet Governance
Forum. 39 GIGA’s initiators emphasise that it is a
technology-neutral campaign. But it seems very likely
indeed that at least a few companies from the Inter-
net satellite sector will bid for the upcoming tender.
Along with their commitment to international
development assistance, some countries systematically
support domestic businesses in building LEO con-
stellations. Evidently, this is the case for Chinese
state-owned companies, even though the details are
difficult to determine from the outside. The final
declaration of the 2019 World Internet Conference,
which takes place annually in Wuzhen, China, how-
ever, left no doubt that the Chinese leadership is
aware of the global importance of communications
infrastructure in space: “Countries should make joint
efforts to advance cross-border and international
submarine optical cables and improve information
infrastructure in space.” 40
The US and Canada proceed differently: their gov-
ernments act as customers, thus guaranteeing the
companies an income for a certain period of time,
and as financers of research and development. In
the US, the latter has so far mostly been for military
projects, but also for civilian programmes to fund
Internet access in sparsely populated parts of the
country. 41 In Canada, the government is supporting
38 ITU and UNICEF, Giga, https://www.gigaconnect.org/
(accessed 12 January 2021).
39 United Nations Secretary-General, “Remarks to the
Internet Governance Forum”, 26 November 2019, https://
www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-11-26/remarks-
internet-governance-forum (accessed 2 December 2020).
40 “Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in
Cyberspace”, China Daily, 17 October 2019, https://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/17/WS5da7d7b3a310cf3e355
7106a_3.html (accessed 12 January 2021).
41 Sandra Erwin, “Air Force Laying Groundwork for Future
Military Use of Commercial Megaconstellations”, SpaceNews
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TeleSat with public monies for building an LEO con-
stellation. 42
Development of Standards and Protocols
Data transmission within constellations of tens of
thousands of satellites that are constantly in motion,
as well as data transmission between the constella-
tions and users on Earth, will necessitate entirely new
software protocols, or at least the adaptation of exist-
ing protocols. Thus far, it is organisations such as the
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE),
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and, for
specific areas, the ITU, that have developed such
standards and protocols. 43
Discussions on this subject have in fact been opened
within the IETF. 44 In late 2019 China proposed at
the ITU that an entirely new Internet protocol, to be
known as “NewIP”, be developed. It has since dropped
the idea in the face of massive criticism. One aspect
is nevertheless interesting: China once again linked
its proposal with the plans for LEO mega constella-
tions. 45
(online), 28 February 2019, https://spacenews.com/air-force-
laying-groundwork-for-future-military-use-of-commercial-
megaconstellations/; Alan Boyle, “SpaceX’s Starlink Satellite
Network Wins $885M in Federal Aid for Rural Broadband”,
GeekWire (online), 7 December 2020, https://www.geekwire.
com/2020/spacexs-starlink-satellite-network-wins-885m-
federal-subsidies-rural-broadband/ (both accessed 12 January
2021).
42 Telesat Canada, “The Government of Canada and Telesat
Partner to Bridge Canada’s Digital Divide through Low Earth
Orbit (LEO) Satellite Technology, over $1 Billion in Revenue
for Telesat Expected”, Globe Newswire, 24 July 2019, http://
bit.ly/3p5Qn32 (accessed 25 July 2019).
43 Daniel Voelsen, Cracks in the Internet’s Foundation. The
Future of the Internet’s Infrastructure and Global Internet Govern-
ance, SWP Research Paper 14/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, November 2019), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/cracks-in-the-internets-foundation/
(accessed 12 January 2021).
44 See, e.g., Internet Engineering Task Force, N. Kuhn and
E. Lochin, “Network Coding and Satellites”, ietf.org, July 2018,
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kuhn-nwcrg-network-coding-
satellites-05 (accessed 12 January 2021).
45 See ITU, Telecommunication Standardization Sector,
“New IP, Shaping Future Network”: Propose to Initiate the Discussion
of Strategy Transformation for ITU-T (TSAG-C83) (September 2019),
https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/1653/ (accessed 12 January
2021).

Possible Futures:
The Global Internet in 2035
It is not possible to predict future developments in the
field of Internet satellites. Yet we can systematically
explore the range of possible, and plausible, future
scenarios. One entirely plausible scenario is that we
will never see a fully operational mega constellation
of Internet satellites. The technological, economic
and political challenges are huge, and may eventually
turn out to be insurmountable even for the most
ambitious actors in the field.
In what follows, however, I want to take a closer
look at how things might develop if these challenges
can be tackled (see Figure 4). Exploring two scenarios,
I will examine the implications for three key aspects
of global Internet governance: Internet access, the
security and resilience of the global Internet infra-
structure, and power relations in global Internet
governance. Related issues of space governance –
from the modifications that will need to be made to
space legislation to concerns over increasing space
debris – cannot be covered here.
It is unlikely that actual
developments will precisely follow
one of the scenarios developed below.
To structure the range of possible developments,
I sort them along a spectrum defined by the degree
of competition. This variable, in turn, has two compo-
nents (see Figure 4). First, it reflects how many opera-
tors of planetary mega-constellations compete in the
market for broadband satellite Internet connectivity.
Second, it captures the degree of vertical integration.
The question here is whether the mega constellations
“only” serve as backbone operators for terrestrial tele-
communication providers or, instead, turn into full-
service operators that directly service individual cus-
tomers. It is not very likely that the actual develop-
ment will neatly correspond to one of these scenarios.
Rather, we can expect to see a mix of elements from
both scenarios. Instead, the goal is to illuminate the
Scenario 1: Global Oligopolies
Table
Degree of competition in the two scenarios
Number of constellations
low high
low Scenario 2:
Regulated
Vertical Competition
Integration high Scenario 1:
Global
Oligopolies
range of possible developments – and their political
implications.
This heuristic approach also helps to inform up-
coming political decisions. Put simply, given the
objectives German policymakers have set themselves
for global Internet governance (see chapter 1, p. 7ff.),
the first is a worst case scenario that must be avoided.
Developments are not straightforwardly positive in
the second scenario either. Yet it at least clarifies the
building blocks and preconditions of a worthwhile
development.
To sketch a vivid picture of these two possible
futures, I use the names of specific companies and
countries. Although the results of my analyses in the
previous chapters feed into the scenarios, I want to
emphasise here that the narratives are fictional.
Scenario 1: Global Oligopolies
With some delays, in late 2021 Starlink extends its
LEO constellation to 3,000 satellites, covering 60 per-
cent of the Earth’s surface. The constellation focuses
on regions in the Northern hemisphere, with a par-
ticular emphasis on the US and Canada. At about the
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Possible Futures: The Global Internet in 2035
Figure 4
same time, Amazon subsidiary Project Kuiper and
OneWeb form a joint venture called KuiperOne. In
2022 KuiperOne commences regular operations of its
satellite constellation. Starlink and KuiperOne offer
backbone services, i.e. high-performance background
networks, for local Internet service providers and data
centres. They also enable direct connections for end
users. In rural parts of the US, they cooperate with
Verizon and AT&T, whose customers can resort to
satellite connections when local networks are insuf-
ficient. Starlink and KuiperOne are also targeting
the end user directly. For a starting price of US$99
a month, customers can book a data package of 100
Gigabyte (GB), for which they can connect directly
to the satellite constellation. The special antennas
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required for this resemble the first mobile phones
in their unwieldiness.
Domestically, the US government financially sup-
ports Starlink and KuiperOne through a programme
to expand broadband access in rural areas and as part
of defence ministry projects. In their international ac-
tivities, the two companies benefit from programmes
run by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) to support the construction of
Internet infrastructure in developing countries. US
foreign policy also backs them: on a State Department
initiative, a memorandum entitled “Internet Satellites
and National Security” is signed by the other four
members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – the
UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. They thus

commit to supporting the activities of Starlink and
Blue Origin. Other countries subsequently make the
same voluntary commitment, including Poland and
the Baltic states.
The Chinese government, for its part, organises
the deployment of a Chinese mega constellation. As
in the US, a number of Chinese companies initially
compete with each other but in 2021 the government
concentrates all these efforts. A new state-owned
enterprise named AliLink is founded to integrate all
previous efforts and the Chinese Communist Party
creates a new sub-committee to efficiently coordinate
its future development. Until 2025, the Russian gov-
ernment pursues plans for a Russian mega constella-
tion that is supposed to build on the GLONASS satel-
lite navigation systems. Due to ever greater economic
constraints, however, in 2025 President Putin nego-
tiates a strategic partnership with China. Russia’s
efforts up to that point are integrated into the AliLink
system, which is now available in Russia too.
As part of these consolidations, many European
suppliers are bought up by one of the three big opera-
tors. Only a few manage – with the support of their
respective governments – to retain their independ-
ence and assert themselves in a niche of the global
market.
The use of satellite Internet has a breakthrough
when, in 2026, a first generation of new “satellite-
ready” mobile devices reaches the market. They no
longer require special antennas to link to satellites.
Mobile phones and the now very common digital
“smart glasses” can directly connect to satellites,
using existing mobile telephone protocols as well
as new protocols that are custom-made for satellite
communications. Since the three big satellite opera-
tors employ different frequencies and are not tech-
nically compatible in further ways, connecting to the
satellite constellations from end user devices requires
specific hardware modules. These modules are
licensed by the operators of the constellations. Citing
fears of espionage and sabotage, the US and its allies
ban the use of the Chinese hardware modules. Like-
wise, China and Russia ban the use of the US-based
modules.
Data transfer between the three
constellations takes place at Planetary
Exchange Points (PXPs).
From 2024 on, within each of the three systems,
data is transferred between satellites via Inter-Satellite
Scenario 1: Global Oligopolies
Laser Links (ISLL). A growing number of satellites
serve as distributed data centres. Like earlier terres-
trial content-delivery networks (CDNs), these data-
satellites cache frequently requested content such as
video streams.
The transfer of data between the three constella-
tions takes place at Planetary Exchange Points (PXPs).
In an initial phase, these are operated on Earth. The
US and China informally agree that roughly half of
the PXPs are stationed in locations that are controlled
by one of the two states. By 2030, the US and China
publish plans for moving the PXPs into space, ex-
plaining that they want to avoid depending on the
host states of the locations where the PXPs were pre-
viously stationed.
The continuous expansion of the three constella-
tions also puts the operators in a position to compete
directly with local telecommunications providers.
Attempts by a few European countries to create new
WTO rules to avoid this competition between the
global satellite operators and local companies have
failed. As a consequence, in rural and sparsely popu-
lated areas, local ISPs increasingly find it difficult to
compete with the operators of the satellite constella-
tions. In densely populated areas, the operators use
local relay stations that simultaneously connect to
multiple satellites for more bandwidth. End users can
connect to the relay stations via different protocols,
e.g. 6G and WIFI6. The satellite operators thus grad-
ually turn into serious competition for local ISPs even
in urban spaces.
By 2035 this results in three fully operational mega
constellations. Two – Starlink and KuiperOne – are
owned by private enterprises subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the US and its closest allies. The third constel-
lation, AliLink, is run by a Chinese state-owned busi-
ness and actively supported by the Russian govern-
ment. The two Western constellations dispose of over
10,000 satellites each, the Chinese one has over 14,000.
Almost 60 percent of the world’s Internet data flow
passes through these three constellations. Around
two-thirds of the Earth’s population regularly use
them to access the Internet. However, distribution
is unequal: while rural areas almost exclusively use
satellite Internet, many cities increasingly turn to
fibre optic connections. What does it all mean for
global Internet governance in 2035?
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
21
Possible Futures: The Global Internet in 2035
The AliLink constellations can be
accessed from China, Russia and all
Belt and Road Initiative countries.
Access
In principle, all three systems can be configured to
cover every spot on Earth. In light of the intense
political controversies over these systems, however,
their actual coverage is shaped by political considera-
tions. The two Western constellations primarily cover
North and South America, allied states in Europe and
the Pacific, and parts of Africa. The AliLink constella-
tion can be accessed from China, Russia and all Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) countries. Since 2025 Hun-
gary, Turkey, India and a number of African countries
have joined the BRI. As promised by the operators,
the constellations offer connectivity in many rural
areas that, as recently as the 2010s, had no Internet
access whatsoever.
By 2035, 1 billion people in developing countries
have, for the first time in their lives, gained access to
the Internet via the new satellite constellations. More
than 70 percent of all schools in African states are
also connected to the Internet through them. Using
subsidies and credits, the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank and individual donor countries
supported the expansion of the satellite constellations
to give reliable coverage of the Southern Hemisphere
as well. In the early years, however, the expense of
the more specialised antennas and the still compara-
tively high user fees for satellite Internet were a sub-
stantial obstacle. The breakthrough came in the late
2020s when the first inexpensive mobile phones
arrived on the market with integrated hardware mod-
ules for connecting to the satellite constellations.
When the mega constellations were first being
built, the assumption was that developing countries
would undergo a process similar to Western nations,
which have connected to the Internet since the 1990s.
Unlike then, however, governments in the early
2020s were well-prepared. From the offset Internet
use was controlled by each country’s political rules.
Many Western companies rushed into the African
market from the mid-2020s onwards, drawn by the
millions of potential customers. Some countries,
including Ghana, nevertheless managed to promote
their own digital economy.
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
22
Security and Resilience
Since almost all essential network elements are in the
hands of the big three operators, they have more con-
trol over what happens on the networks. For instance,
they can rapidly install security updates for protocols
and individual software components.
The US and Chinese governments also view this
centralised structure as a security gain. Using the
respective operator’s special interfaces, they can com-
prehensively monitor the data flows within the net-
works. They can thus also decide in detail which data
enter or leave “their” networks at the PXPs. Finally,
both governments reserve certain capacities within
the constellations for military purposes, for both
themselves and their closest allies. By 2035 many
countries have their own satellite networks for “net-
work-centric warfare”. However, it is considered a
major strategic advantage to also be able to draw
on the gigantic civilian constellations.
Soon, however, a previously unknown issue
emerges. Since the constellations increasingly go
their own ways in terms of technology, targeted
attacks on individual constellations become possible
without endangering one’s own network.
Some observers had originally hoped that the mega
constellations would complement the network of sub-
marine cables and thus augment the resilience of the
system as a whole by adding redundancy. However,
after only a few years, the progress made in data trans-
mission in space via ISSL led to investors withdrawing
from plans for new submarine cables. While in 2025
90 percent of the intercontinental data flow still
passed through the submarine cables, that figure has
dropped to 20 percent by 2035.
The risks of increasingly relying only on the satel-
lite constellations became evident during a large-scale
outage in 2031. Starlink’s constellation suffered from
a serious and widespread malfunction, effectively
cutting off Internet access for almost all South Ameri-
can states. The few remaining submarine cable con-
nections were unable to fill the gap left by the mal-
functioning satellites.
It soon became clear that the outage was caused by
satellites that had been among the first to be deployed.
Their necessary software update of earlier that year
included a bug, which was triggered on 28 June 2031.
With the help of KuiperOne, basic coverage was
restored within a few days. For two weeks, however,
Internet access was limited to public institutions and
select private companies of strategic relevance. After

two weeks, Starlink found the bug and updated the
malfunctioning satellites. As soon as Internet access
in South America was restored, social media was
abuzz with mass criticism of Starlink and the govern-
ments of Latin America. In response to the protests,
in early 2032 the three big satellite operators agreed
on a Charter of Trust that contained measures to
prevent such outages.
In 2035 the operators of the three
satellite constellations combine
almost all elements of the Internet
infrastructure.
Power in Global Internet Governance
Many different actors used to operate the Earth’s
Internet infrastructure as it developed across the
world from the 1990s onwards. Above all, there were
a large number of private companies that managed
its different parts – from submarine cables to IXPs
to local ISPs. By contrast, in 2035 the operators of the
three satellite constellations are characterised by a
high degree of vertical integration: they combine
almost all elements of the Internet infrastructure.
The reduced number of entities involved in run-
ning major parts of the global Internet infrastructure
makes coordination between them much easier. The
three companies – Starlink, KuiperOne and AliLink –
jointly work on the standards necessary to enable the
data exchange between the three systems at the PXPs.
To formalise their cooperation on this issue, they
establish the Planetary Connectivity Organisation
(PCO).
In the early years, whenever they needed to agree
on the use of certain frequencies, the operators still
went through the procedure established by the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU). Soon,
however, it became abundantly clear that the ITU
allocation process was not suited to such enormous
constellations. In 2025, with the agreement of their
governments, the three companies therefore decided
to allocate frequencies within the PCO instead. While
the ITU procedures still exist in 2035, the organisa-
tion is now essentially reduced to accommodating the
PCO’s decisions.
Shortly thereafter, in 2026, the US government
under President Kamala Harris decided to transfer the
task of managing the Domain Name System (DNS) to
Starlink. It justified this as the next logical step in the
process that had begun in 2016 with the handover of
Scenario 1: Global Oligopolies
this responsibility to the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). In response,
China and Russia opted to build their own “sovereign
DNS”. This has been administered by AliLink since
2027. For some observers there was a certain irony in
the emergence of the first truly global communica-
tions systems being accompanied by the long-feared,
politically motivated fragmentation of the Internet.
The three big satellite companies quickly agreed stand-
ards within the PCO to enable exchange between con-
stellations, despite the two separate Domain Name
Systems. Since the operators now also control the re-
spective DNS, they have an added means of steering
data flow between the constellations. For example,
the Chinese system very quickly prohibited access to
the Taiwanese top level domain .tw, which continues
to be used in the West. All three systems also use DNS
to prevent crime.
The three operators host regular multi-stakeholder
conferences to discuss the future development of the
constellations. The PCO, too, has a multi-stakeholder
advisory board (MAB) that is open to governments,
private businesses and civil society. In 2029, a group
of Western civil societies jointly declares that they
will no longer attend these meetings, calling them a
mere façade meant to legitimise the extraordinary
power of the three companies operating the constel-
lations.
With the exception of the US, China and their
respective allies, the influence of individual states on
the operation and future development of the constel-
lations is limited. All three constellations, however,
offer special services for governments that allow them
to configure their services in line with local laws and
regulations (“Governance as a Service”). Many govern-
ments seize this opportunity, though some criticise
the lack of transparency about how exactly the three
operators implement their legal requirements.
As an additional service, all three operators offer
“global citizen” programmes. These make it possible
to apply certain regulations to citizens of a state
wherever they find themselves on Earth. When citi-
zens travel to other countries, their digital communi-
cations thus remain within the jurisdiction of their
home state. In 2035 two-thirds of all countries use
this programme. However, it also has its limits. To
preserve the freedom of the Internet, the US govern-
ment insists that, within the global citizen pro-
gramme, Starlink and KuiperOne must not restrict
freedom of expression or data protection more than
in the US. Similarly, in matters of freedom of expres-
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
23
Possible Futures: The Global Internet in 2035
sion the Chinese government commits AliLink to ad-
hering to the guidelines of the final declaration of the
2028 World Internet Conference in Wuzhen. In 2030
the EU decided to embed exceptions in its legislation
that allow the satellite constellation operators to
continue to offer their services legally in the EU. Its
decision was based on an extensive debate and past
experience with the Privacy Shield.
Scenario 2: Regulated Competition
In late 2021 Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos take the public
by surprise when they declare that they will hence-
forth combine their efforts to build a global LEO con-
stellation in a new company called BlueStar. Shortly
thereafter OneWeb also joins. At the turn of the year
2022-23, BlueStar puts into service a constellation
whose satellites cover the entire Northern hemisphere
as well as South America and parts of Africa.
To remain competitive against BlueStar, the Chi-
nese government decides in early 2022 to combine all
its previous initiatives in an LEO constellation called
FreeStars. In 2023 China and Russia announce that
they will closely coordinate their activities in space
as part of a strategic partnership. Russia then drops
its plans for its own LEO constellation and joins
FreeStars. The constellation comes on stream in late
2024 and provides satellite coverage for all of Asia,
Russia, Eastern Europe and large parts of Africa and
India.
Also in late 2021 the European Council agrees to
support the building of a European LEO constellation
through a special funding programme. Proponents of
the plan had pointed to the EU’s experience with the
satellite navigation system Galileo and the launcher
knowhow gained over decades by Arianespace. But
the project encounters resistance in Washington:
President Harris criticises it for unnecessarily splitting
the Western-liberal camp. Congress is even harsher,
suggesting Europe should honour its NATO obliga-
tions rather than hurt American firms through illegal
subsidies. The EU is not deterred and sticks to its
plans. In 2022 it signs a new agreement with Japan to
intensify cooperation in digital technology; this paves
the way for closer collaboration in satellite communi-
cations.
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
24
In 2023 European companies form a
joint venture called Cassini, with the
objective of building an independent
European LEO constellation.
The following year European companies form a
joint venture called Cassini, with the objective of
building an independent European LEO constellation.
The European Commission supports Cassini financially
for research and development. A number of EU mem-
ber states also commit to using the system to connect
public institutions in sparsely populated regions. It
soon becomes evident that Cassini can benefit from a
network of European subcontractors in the space
technology sector. The joint venture receives a further
boost in 2026 when Arianespace succeeds in produc-
ing a launch vehicle that, like the SpaceX systems,
can land on Earth and can thus be used several times.
The Cassini constellation begins operation in the
summer of 2028. As a latecomer to the scene, it has
to come to an arrangement with the already existing
constellations for using radio frequencies. This is not
a problem over Europe, but in some parts of the
world Cassini can only offer a limited service. In late
2028 the US, China and Russia ban the system from
operating on their territories with reference to national
security issues. President Harris expresses her regret
at being forced to take this step, pointing to NSA
findings that the Cassini system is not sufficiently
secure to operate in the US.
In the beginning, BlueStar, FreeStars and Cassini
provide both backbone services for local ISPs and an
end user service. For an average fee of US$100, users
can connect directly to the constellation. As of 2024,
however, new WTO rules change the market dynam-
ics. Member states agree that constellation operators
can henceforth only offer backbone services. In the
preceding WTO debate, a number of countries pointed
out that similar rules had proved very effective in
the electricity market. The new WTO regulations also
confirm that the GATS rules apply to satellite services
as well, and emphasise that countries are obliged to
treat domestic and foreign companies equally where
access to national markets is concerned.
The WTO regulations, however, contain two excep-
tions. In areas where no local ISP provides Internet
connectivity, the operators of the satellite constella-
tions may apply for a license to serve as ISP. All three
take advantage of this opportunity, especially in
developing countries. By 2028 FreeStars subsidiaries
have already built local ISPs in 50 countries; BlueStar

is represented in 40 countries; Cassini in only 12. The
second exception to the WTO rules is that the con-
stellation operators are allowed to offer direct access
to their constellation as a special service to certain
customers with specific needs. In many countries,
this service is initially limited to airplanes and ships.
However, some soon begin expanding the circle of
those eligible for the special service to officials and
law enforcement authorities. Singapore additionally
introduces an exception for “international business
agents”.
By 2035 three LEO constellations have developed:
BlueStar has 13,000 satellites, FreeStars 12,000 and
Cassini 6,000. Around 50 percent of global Internet
traffic passes through the constellations, with about
two-thirds of the world’s population using them
to access the Internet. In rural areas and developing
countries, the systems often provide the most im-
portant Internet access. Densely populated economic
centres, however, continue to rely primarily on fibre
optic connections.
In 2035 vast parts of the world are
divided into two digital spheres that
are largely separate from each other.
Access
All three systems are technically capable of providing
connectivity for every spot on Earth. As described
above, BlueStar and FreeStars were able to reserve for
themselves the most attractive radio frequencies. In
some places, this limits the availability of Cassini’s
services. Decisions over local licenses, moreover, are
often shaped by political considerations. As a result,
the technical configuration of the constellations in-
creasingly reflects political divisions. The US, China
and Russia prohibit satellite networks on their terri-
tory that are not at least in part operated by domestic
companies. Furthermore, the US and China emphati-
cally try to convince their respective allies to adopt
a similar policy. As a result, in 2035 vast areas of the
world are divided into two digital spheres that are
largely separate from each other. In each sphere, the
Internet can only be used via one of the constella-
tions.
The EU, however, is the centre of a group of coun-
tries that remains committed to the new WTO rules
of 2024. It allows all three operators access to their
markets. Within the EU, the decisions by the US,
China and Russia not to allow Cassini access to their
Scenario 2: Regulated Competition
markets lead to a heated debate about retaliating by
excluding the other two systems. In the end, however,
the EU member states re-affirmed their commitment
to the multilateral trade system and to free commu-
nication. In 2025 Brussels also tightens the rules on
data protection by reforming the ePrivacy act. Local
ISPs using one or the other of the non-European satel-
lite constellations now have to take extra measures
to protect their customers’ data, for instance through
appropriate forms of encryption or pseudonimisation,
or informed user consent to data processing outside
the EU. Finally, both FreeStars and BlueStar are
banned from offering their services near strategically
important sites such as military bases or energy
plants. To enforce this ban, the EU sets up technical
systems to locally block the frequencies used by these
two systems.
Also in 2024 the EU and African Union (AU) hold
a digital summit under the banner #Digital4All.
The final document contains a series of targets that
operators of satellite constellations must meet to be
able to receive financial support from international
development agencies. These include operators hav-
ing to provide publicly accessible information on the
real availability of their systems in developing coun-
tries and on costs for end users and local ISPs. Funds
will also be linked to an operator providing free
access for all schools in regions where the operator
receives financial aid for offering its services. A num-
ber of large donor states implement these guidelines
in the following years. The UN Secretary-General also
publicly endorses them.
The EU also supports the AU with technical exper-
tise in its application to the ITU for the use of radio fre-
quencies suited to provide broadband satellite-connec-
tivity over the entire African continent. The objective
is to ensure that African companies retain the oppor-
tunity to enter the market at a later stage. Many demo-
cratic governments in Africa decide to use the Euro-
pean Cassini system in the meantime, so as to connect
public institutions in remote areas to the Internet.
As a result, in 2035 all developing countries have
connectivity to at least one of the three constellations.
Following US and Chinese pressure, however, few
countries have access to all three. This comprehensive
availability, however, emphasises a problem to which
the AU-EU summit already referred in 2024. To be able
to actually use the new satellite constellations, many
regions first need to invest in mains electricity supply,
both for the necessary infrastructure on Earth and for
running end-user devices.
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
25
Possible Futures: The Global Internet in 2035
Security and Resilience
The constellation operators had to make it possible
to transfer large volumes of data within networks of
tens of thousands of satellites, which additionally
move continuously at high speeds and in different
orbits. To this end, they developed new protocols both
for directing the data flows (routing) and for identify-
ing end devices in the network. Many of the innova-
tions introduced here were subsequently also taken
up by the terrestrial Internet infrastructure. In devel-
oping these protocols, the constellation operators
were able to remove some weaknesses from the pre-
viously widespread protocols. At the same time, docu-
ments leaked in 2028 showed that BlueStar and
FreeStars had also created new, undisclosed forms of
“lawful access”. These provide the governments of the
US, China and Russia with powerful tools for moni-
toring the global data flows.
The introduction of the new protocols for the satel-
lite constellations initially caused cyber attacks to
drop slightly. From about 2026, however, the rate of
attacks increased again. In the interval, attackers had
apparently found flaws in the new protocols as well.
And while there is no proof yet, there are also con-
cerns that some hacker groups have succeeded in
exploiting the interfaces built into the systems to pro-
vide access for national law enforcement agencies.
A particularly devastating attack occurred in 2029.
Within just a few days, a virus spread globally through
all satellite constellations. Although the virus was
found on computer systems everywhere, the special
twist of this virus was that it only harmed the Euro-
pean satellite constellation Cassini. It corrupted a
standard setting in the transfer protocol used by
Cassini and thus effectively brought to a standstill all
data transfers within that network. Luckily, many
users of Cassini were able to switch to the two other
systems, use terrestrial networks or resort to emer-
gency mobile networks that had been established in
many European cities since 2027. After a week,
Cassini experts managed to resume operation of the
satellites and to update the system to protect it from
similar attacks in the future. The event led to a
heated debate, with many rumours circulating as to
who might have an interest in specifically damaging
the European satellite network. Since then, all three
constellation operators have worried about further
targeted attacks on one of their networks.
This new awareness of the satellite constellations’
vulnerability also had an impact on how the network
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
26
of submarine cables was viewed. With the activation
of the constellations and the technical progress being
made in Inter-Satellite Laser Links (ISSL), interconti-
nental data traffic had increasingly shifted into space.
Accordingly, plans for building new submarine cables
were stopped. After the 2029 attack on Cassini, how-
ever, priorities were revised. The EU organised a
World Cable Summit in 2030 in the hope of using
funding programmes to incite the private sector to
make new investments in submarine cables. These
initiatives turned out to be insufficient, however.
No new cable projects were attempted until 2035.
The EU Commission therefore had to find other
ways of raising the resilience of the Internet’s infra-
structure. In 2027 it started a public-private partner-
ship (PPP), with governments and business from
Europe and Africa working together on emergency
mobile phone networks. Among other things, the
PPP adopted technological ideas developed by Project
Loon, a subsidiary of the US holding company Alpha-
bet that was shut down in 2021. As with Project Loon,
the fundamental idea is to create networks of hot air
balloons that operate like traditional mobile phone
networks, at only a few kilometres above ground. In
the event of local outages of the terrestrial networks
or even the satellite constellations, these mobile
emergency networks can reach every spot in Europe
and Africa within a few hours. Since 2028 five such
networks have been on stand-by at any one time.
They can be put into service within two hours.
Finally, EU member states have benefited from the
massive investments in fibre optic connections that
the EU had decided on as part of its measures to over-
come the Covid-19 crisis. With the rise of the satellite
constellations, these efforts were initially derided. In
2035, however, they are seen as a fundamental reason
for the resilience of Europe’s Internet infrastructure.
Europe is the only part of the world that has blanket
coverage by all three constellations and access to an
extensive fibre optic network for 80 percent of all
households.
Power in Global Internet Governance
Much has changed by 2035. But the existence of three
independent constellations and the WTO rules from
2024 mean that it continues to be necessary for the
international community to communicate on data
transfer standards, including between the different
networks. In 2026 an altercation arose between
BlueStar and FreeStars after BlueStar announced its
 Scenario 2: Regulated Competition

intention to modify the global protocols unilaterally.

In response, the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), in cooperation with European scientists in-
volved in Cassini, offered to mediate. The proposal
was quickly backed by the EU and AU. Both BlueStar
and FreeStars subsequently declared themselves
willing to continue to leave the development of the
necessary standards and protocols in the hands of
open forums such as the IETF.
Under the new WTO rules, the satellite constella-
tions are in principle restricted to providing backbone
services and their operators can only exceptionally
apply for a licence as a local ISP. This strengthens the
position of countries to an extent. For many govern-
ments a fundamental reason for agreeing to the new
WTO regulations was the added possibilities it af-
forded them for enforcing national legislation. In
regions that only have access to BlueStar or FreeStars,
however, it quickly became obvious that countries’
influence over the operators was limited. For in-
stance, BlueStar only provides its backbone services
to local ISPs if they allow their users to access digital
services from the US, which are supposed to be
banned in the EU for data protection reasons. The
Chinese constellation FreeStars very widely blocks
access to news sources that are critical of the govern-
ment in Beijing.
In 2025, BlueStar, FreeStars and Cassini jointly
expressed their support for ICANN’s role in managing
the global DNS. However, at the same time all three
operators also began building their own addressing
systems. Therefore, by 2035 the DNS root zone system
has changed quite fundamentally: it no longer directly
links to the registries of top-level-domains (TLDs) but
to the registries of the three operators. The operators
coordinate the use of TLDs, but they also reserve the
right to block specific TLDs within their system.
This is not the only possibility for constellation
operators to control the data flows within and be-
tween their networks. To exchange data between the
constellations, Planetary Exchange Points (PXPs) have
been installed in Europe, China, Russia and the US –
as well as in space. Especially at these PXPs, the three
operators can decide in great detail which informa-
tion may leave or enter their network.

SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021

27
Recommendations for Germany and the European Union
Recommendations
for Germany and the
European Union
It remains an open question whether the highly
ambitious plans for providing Internet connectivity
via LEO satellite constellations can be realised. If they
can, we should expect a massive impact on the secu-
rity and resilience of the global Internet infrastruc-
ture, on access to that infrastructure – and on power
relations in global Internet governance. The risks are
substantial: a never-before-seen concentration of
economic might, and a previously unknown extent
of political control over global communication net-
works.
As a likely consequence, the trend towards the
fragmentation of the Internet will intensify. A new
world-spanning Internet infrastructure in the hands
of a few companies (and the countries behind them)
would make it possible to split the Internet along
political lines of conflict into two largely separate
spheres. Any exchange across the borders of these
spheres would then only be feasible if, and to the
extent that, the operators of the new infrastructure
allow it. This would very likely lead to substantial
restrictions on freedom of expression and the right
to privacy. Countries such as Germany would thus
be exposed to a situation in which self-determined
democratic control over their own digital infrastruc-
ture – in other words, democratic sovereignty in the
realm of technology – is increasingly limited. Simi-
larly, the aspiration of participating as an equal in
the global debate on the future of the Internet would
come to nothing in this scenario.
What needs to be weighed up against these risks is
the technically and socially fascinating prospect of
providing all humans with access to the vast potential
of digital communication via a “detour” into space –
and of strengthening the common foundation of the
global Internet by adding a new dimension to Inter-
net infrastructure.
SWP Berlin
Internet from Space
April 2021
28
With a view to these potentially far-reaching con-
sequences, it is politically imperative to start prepar-
ing for such a scenario: the time is now. Even though
efforts to build the planned mega constellations are
still in their infancy, a proactive policy of dealing
with these developments needs a head start.
A proactive policy is also advisable in the event
that the plans for the new mega constellations fail.
The issue of how the physical infrastructure of the
Internet can be adapted to new challenges will always
require a solution, even if a specific technology turns
out to be inadequate.
Promoting Technological Redundancy
and Diversity
It is almost commonplace to say that the security
and resilience of digital infrastructure can only be
boosted by redundancy. What this means is the
deliberate creation of excess capacities to ensure that
disruptions of individual entities do not cause the
entire system to collapse. The global Internet, for in-
stance, with its decentralised structure was designed
from the outset to generate resilience through redun-
dancy. During outages of partial Internet networks,
its basic protocols make sure that data flows are
redirected.
These adaptive mechanisms of the Internet’s basic
protocols are truly elegant. However, the Internet’s
physical infrastructure shows up their limitations.
Where the infrastructure is inexistent or inadequate,
even the smartest algorithm is useless. The more
we depend on the Internet, the more important it
becomes to ensure an appropriate level of redundancy
on the physical level as well.

Redundancy also has added value for security if it
is combined with technological diversity. Technologi-
cal monocultures are easier to hack since the attack-
er’s resources can all be concentrated on a single
system. Moreover, such monocultures are usually also
synonymous with economic dependencies, which can
be used as leverage for (geo)political influence. 46
With a view to Europe’s own Internet infrastruc-
ture and its connection to the global Internet, these
observations suggest that strong or one-sided depend-
encies should be avoided. Europe should therefore
push ahead with the widespread deployment of fibre
optic cables, both for direct connections for end users
and as the basis for future mobile phone networks. It
should also take care to further develop the function-
alities of strategically significant submarine cables –
for example, across the Atlantic or to Africa or Asia.
Here, continual technological renewal will be neces-
sary to expand transmission capacities so as to meet
growing demand and increase the security of landing
points. 47
In this context, the possible contribution of Inter-
net connectivity via LEO satellites would not be as a
replacement of terrestrial connections but as a com-
plement to them. The objective should be to create a
mix of technologies that reduces the dependence on
any one technology – and the companies and coun-
tries behind it – to such an extent that Europe can
safeguard its political autonomy.
This will require regulation, among other things.
The satellite operators will need licences from govern-
ments to be able to use the respective frequency
ranges on national territories. Issuing these licences
can be made subject to conditions. Here it would be
desirable to agree on a Europe-wide approach. This
would be in the operators’ interests, since they would
not have to deal with many different rules in a com-
paratively small area. It would also strengthen
Europe’s negotiating position. Large US and Chinese
corporations are also interested in accessing the Euro-
pean market. This is a leverage point for pushing
through European targets.
46 Matthias Schulze and Daniel Voelsen, “Digital Spheres
of Influence”, in Strategic Rivalry between United States and
China. Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe, ed. Barbara
Lippert and Volker Perthes, SWP Research Paper 4/2020 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020), 30–34.
47 Voelsen, Cracks in the Internet’s Foundation (see note 43).
Creating Leeway through a European Constellation
These targets could then be used to secure a bal-
ance between the use of attractive frequency ranges
by satellites and by terrestrial radio systems.
All of this would be an important contribution
to an appropriate technology mix. Additionally, the
targets could contain requirements for minimum
availability of services, protection of personal data
or security of satellite communications. 48
Creating Leeway through a
European Constellation
As described above, the US, China and Canada sys-
tematically use public funds to push ahead with the
construction of LEO satellite constellations. It would
be advisable for Europe to do likewise, and incentiv-
ise European companies through public investment
to build Europe’s own constellation. The necessary
expertise exists in Europe: at this very moment, Euro-
pean firms are supplying important components for
building LEO constellations. Europe can draw on past
experience with Galileo, the satellite navigation sys-
tem; with Copernicus, the satellite Earth observation
system; and with the work done by Arianespace in
developing launch vehicles. The EU Commission is
also already funding the expansion of broadband
access in rural areas and in regions and municipali-
ties that use data from GEO satellites for various pur-
poses. 49
However, a look at other countries makes it clear
that an infrastructure project of this magnitude re-
quires substantial public investment. The EU Com-
missioner in charge, Thierry Breton, unequivocally
advocated such EU investment in the summer of
2020. Since then the EU has taken the first preparatory
steps. The final political decision backing a European
constellation, however, is still pending. 50
Setting up a European constellation could serve
a number of objectives. First, Europe could use the
opportunities of satellite-based Internet connectivity
for its own purposes. Second, Europe could develop a
48 William Akoto, “Hackers Could Shut down Satellites –
or Turn Them into Weapons”, Scientific American, 22 February
2020, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hackers-
could-shut-down-satellites-or-turn-them-into-weapons/
(accessed 20 March 2020).
49 See “Network of European Regions Using Space Tech-
nologies”, https://www.nereus-regions.eu/.
50 Véronique Guillermard, “Thierry Breton: ‘Il faut assurer
la souveraineté numérique de l’Europe’”, Le Figaro, 2 July 2020.
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Recommendations for Germany and the European Union
concrete alternative to the US and Chinese systems.
This would enable it to demonstrate, not just in its
regulations but also in its practical implementation,
what the European vision for the future of the Inter-
net looks like. Europe could thus convey an impor-
tant message in the global debate and directly ad-
vocate preserving a free Internet based on a shared
global foundation. Third, Europe would secure and
deepen its own expertise at the interface of space
technology and digital communications infrastruc-
ture.
Considering the remaining technical issues, it may
seem risky to invest vast sums – several billion euros
would definitely be needed – to fund LEO Internet
satellites. However, even if the plans for mega con-
stellations cannot be realised as envisaged today, we
should expect significant technological progress to be
made in the field – with results that cannot yet be
gauged. Measured by what is at stake for Europe both
politically and economically, such investments are
therefore justified.
Deepening Strategic Partnerships
It is crucial for Germany and Europe to deepen stra-
tegic partnerships to adapt their own digital infra-
structure to new challenges, but also to have some
influence on the design of the global Internet infra-
structure. In the narrower sense, this is about build-
ing the required technological capacities. But beyond
that, it will also be increasingly important to seek out
allies for political debates over the Internet’s infra-
structure.
With a view to digital infrastructure in general,
and LEO mega constellations in particular, two lines
of thought suggest themselves. First, partnerships
should be intensified with countries that are obvious
partners for sophisticated technological cooperation.
Along with Japan, already mentioned as an example
in Scenario 2, South Korea or Canada could also be
considered. Second, Germany and Europe should use
their longstanding international-development con-
tacts. Developing countries are keenly aware of the
importance of obtaining digital infrastructure and
connecting the global Internet infrastructure. The
companies currently planning LEO constellations
know about this growing demand. Google’s and Face-
book’s projects for new submarine cables and China’s
manifold activities as part of its Belt and Road Initia-
tive also echo the increasing need for digital infra-
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30
structure. There is still an opportunity here for Ger-
many and Europe to offer a technological and
political alternative.
Protecting Multilateral Institutions
Deepening strategic partnerships also constitutes the
basis for strengthening the position of multilateral
institutions with a view to the planned mega constel-
lations.
Since the ITU only has a coordinating role for the
use of frequencies, it seems ill-suited to enforcing far-
reaching political goals. Its technically demanding
and protracted procedures elude direct political inter-
ference. Seeing that these procedures largely fulfilled
their purpose in the past, they should not needlessly
be drawn into political confrontations. Nevertheless,
countries’ strategic behaviour in this context should
be closely observed and checked for political impli-
cations. It is not in the hands of Germany and the EU
alone whether and in what manner political conflicts
are carried out in the radio communications depart-
ment of the ITU. Germany and Europe could, how-
ever, advocate within the ITU for reforms to prepare
the organisation better for the challenges that the
new mega constellations will bring. Failing this, the
ITU’s coordinating function risks being gradually
hollowed out.
In principle, the WTO really is the ideal forum for
avoiding any excessive concentration of economic
and political power. As explored in the second sce-
nario, new GATS rules could be used to specify that
the operators of the satellite constellations are not
allowed to offer services for end users as well.
However, the fact that multilateral institutions
like the WTO are increasingly coming under pressure
themselves is an obstacle to this potential of global
regulation for increasing competition. The dual task
for German and EU policymakers is therefore to fight
within these institutions for new rules on how to
deal with planetary communications systems – and
simultaneously preserve the institutions themselves,
their legal basis and procedures.
Supporting Open Standards
The current plans for LEO mega constellations risk
bringing about a previously unknown concentration
of economic power. Along with measures to promote
 Supporting Open Standards

technological diversity, Germany and the EU should Abbreviations

champion retaining open standards and protocols.
The fact that the Internet has so far been marked by AIS Automatic Identification System
such open standards is often interpreted as proof that AU African Union
AWS Amazon Web Services
it is inherently liberal. In fact, however, open stand-
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
ards and protocols were initially simply a technical BRI Belt and Road Initiative
necessity for maintaining sufficient interoperability CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology
between heterogeneous networks. However, this func- Corporation
tional need for open standards diminishes as soon as CASIC China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation
CDN Content Delivery Network
the Internet infrastructure forfeits this very hetero-
DNS Domain Name Service
geneity. If the infrastructure is in the hands of fewer EU European Union
and fewer actors, they will continue to need to coor- FCC Federal Communications Commission
dinate with each other. However, this does not neces- (Washington, D.C.)
sarily create a demand for open standards. Yet, retain- GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services
ing open standards and protocols can itself be an GB Gigabyte
Gbit Gigabit
instrument for preserving the possibility of diverse
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit
heterogeneous networks: open standards in particular GPS Global Positioning System
are the basis for perpetual innovation and “disrup- ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
tion”, even for the breaking-up of concentrations of Numbers
economic power. IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
The openness of standards can be directly supported
IGF Internet Governance Forum
through action, for instance by EU member states IoT Internet of Things
campaigning for them and making them legally bind- ISLLs Inter-Satellite Laser Links
ing. German and EU policymakers should also aim to ITU International Telecommunication Union
protect established processes of standard development ITU-R International Telecommunication Union,
(in forums such as the IETF) from usurpation by gov- Radiocommunication Sector
IXPs Internet Exchange Points
ernments. Finally, it is in this context that multistake-
LEO Low Earth orbit
holder formats in global Internet governance – which MAB Multistakeholder Advisory Board
German policy avowedly promotes – can show their NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
strengths. Institutions such as the Internet Govern- NSA National Security Agency
ance Forum (IGF) or the IETF offer the opportunity to PCO Planetary Connectivity Organisation
PXP Planetary Exchange Point
drive the development of open standards at the inter-
Tbit Terabit
face of technology and politics using transparent and UHF Ultra High Frequency
comparatively inclusive processes. UN United Nations
Global communications networks enable social ex- UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
change in the most diverse areas – from the economy USAID The United States Agency for International Devel-
to academia to culture. Since the first telegraph net- opment
VHF Very High Frequency
works of the 19th century, there have been countries
WTO World Trade Organisation
that try to gain control over the underlying infra-
structure. Germany and Europe should counter such
efforts with a view to the developments we might
expect in the Internet satellite sector. A proactive and
self-confident policy on global Internet governance
can prevent problematic concentrations of power and
so contribute to preserving the shared world-spanning
foundation of the Internet and its pluralistic nature.
As the two scenarios of this research paper have
shown, future developments are not yet decided –
to shape them politically, action must be taken now.

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