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Destroying People's Lives:: 1 The Impact of Land Grabbing On Communities in Myanmar
Destroying People's Lives:: 1 The Impact of Land Grabbing On Communities in Myanmar
Front cover photo: This photo taken by the local field focal person shows a villager’s farmland that was
confiscated by government for the Tavoy town development project. Beside the Kan Nar Road, Dawei
town, Tanintharyi Region. Date: August 22nd 2015
Summary
• The problem of land grabbing in Myanmar is widespread and longstanding. The data in this report
comes from more than 2000 individuals in 62 townships in six states (Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Chin, Shan
(North & South) and seven regions (Yangon, Bago, Ayeyarwady, Mandalay, Sagaing, Magway and
Thaninthayi). Three-quarters of the cases began in the 1990-2009 period, with many additional cases occurring
after 2010 as well. All are ongoing: none have been resolved in a way that provides justice and closure for the
farmers. The problem has simply accumulated and expanded over time.
• The patterns of land grabbing are varied, but have not changed over the decades. In some cases the
original farmer-occupants were thrown off the land entirely. In others their land was grabbed, but then they are
“allowed” to continue farming by making rent or share payments to the grabber (e.g., -- they lose control of the
land, and now have to pay the grabber for the “right” to use it). The pace of grabbing is varied too, bringing
different kinds of hardship. Some cases occur immediately, while others proceed slowly with twists and turns.
• The majority (76.4 percent) of respondents lost up to 10 acres of individual farmland. Many of them say
that had been able to fulfill their family’s basic needs (shelter, food, health, education, inheritance) before their
land was confiscated, but are facing serious difficulties now.
• Whether before or after 2010, the possession of legal documents did not provide any significant defense
or protection against land grabbing for farmers in the LIOH network: 1129 respondents (42.5 percent) said
they possessed legal documents issued by the government when their land was confiscated, while 1058
respondents (39.8 percent) said that they did not possess any such kind of document – almost even odds.
• Whether before or after 2010, confiscations experienced by LIOH members totally failed to meeting
international human rights standards. Comparing what people experienced with what is supposed to happen
before, during and after an eviction according to the UN Guidelines on Eviction and Displacement, our
findings show that the standard is routinely ignored.
• In almost half of the cases, confiscation directly involved either the military alone, or the military in
combination with other actors, including local authorities, government ministries and departments, and
domestic business elites and companies.
• The impacts of land grabbing are severe and ongoing, direct and indirect. They are not limited to one
aspect (e.g., livelihood), to one moment in time (e.g., during confiscation), to one place (e.g., the area
designated for confiscated), or even to just those people whose farmlands are taken. They are wide ranging
across the economic, social, cultural and political spheres, and encompassing the physical and psychological
dimensions of peoples’ lives too, and continue to haunt and undermine peoples life chances long after a confis-
cation is begun.
Forewords
Land is heritage transmitted to us by our forefathers, it is capital that carries many meanings, it is currency and
the economic system, and it is a precious and priceless commons system for future generations.
Land is the place not just where human beings are born and human societies are nurtured, but also where
biodiversity itself – including all biological and botanical species -- are born and conserved. It is the place
where food is produced, it is the place from which we learn our role in the social and natural environment, it
is the sanctuary for safety, it is the survival of human cultures and the commons system to build peace.
Land is the dignity of each individual, each family, each community and each society.
This report indicates that land grabbing through invented legal methods for political and economical pretexts
is destroying the peaceful and safe ecosystem for humans and biodiversity.
This report helps the farmers who have lost land and community members themselves highlight the impacts of
economic policies that look only at monetary benefits and that considers land only as a commodity, thus
ignoring its other values.
For us, the people living in Myanmar, what matters most is to address the issues of:
• Land
• Foreign investment
• Peace
Natural resources crosscut all three and will have the greatest impact on future generations. Without land
security, natural resources can be auctioned off to the highest bidder, extracted, and disappear before the local
communities can take the cases to court and get a ruling. Many of these natural resources are located in the
ethnic states where armed conflict has continued for so long, and, in places where armed conflict has
decreased, abuses such as land grabbing, rights violation, and environmental destruction have increased thus
conflicts between the ruling elites in the centre and the local people in the borderlands continue, not able to
give peace a chance.
Because we need good ideas as well as good will to improve our situation when it comes to governing the issues
of the State. Good thinking and good methods will come only from analyzing and discussing the on-going
context. That’s why we need findings that are oriented towards assessments of and engagement with the current
context.
The communities and civil society organizations involved in this study have collected as much as they can and
presented their analysis and recommendations. What should we do next to make much the needed changes a
reality? What needs to be done to discuss the research findings widely?
1) We now need to reach out widely, to different layers of the society and people from different
backgrounds, also using creative means and artistic forms of presentation.
2) Land issues, poverty reduction, upgrading the quality of education, human dignity and better living
conditions are all interrelated. Only when we see the linkages, will people become mobilized and we can move
ahead on this journey.
3) No matter how important the issue is, doing such a presentation only once will not reach the minds of
the people. We will need to reiterate this report and its findings and recommendations in different contexts on
different days in different formats. What will the authorities and policy makers think of it? Well, we can’t
say. But consider this: it is said that policies and decisions that don’t reflect the life of the communities will
damage their political legitimacy (right to govern), which is directly linked to the support of the people. So it
is impossible, or at least unwise, to ignore the research about the lives of the people.
Table of Contents
Summary -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Forewords ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
List of Tables, Figures and Boxes in the order that they appear ---------------------- 7
1. Introduction -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
2. Background --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
3. Methods ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10
5. Findings ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14
5.3 The people targeted for confiscation and their relationship to the land ----------19
5.5 Who is responsible for the confiscations and their associated injustices --------29
List of Tables, Figures and Boxes in the order that they appear
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Section 5.1
BOX 1. Myanmar Gold Star Company
BOX 2. Nam Tawng village, Pan Sai (Kyu Koke) sub-township village tract in Muse District, Shan State (North)
Section 5.2
Table 1. Aggregate amount of confiscated farmland per respondent
Table 2. Amount of confiscated farmland per respondent in each state/ region
Table 3. Year that land confiscation began per respondent
Figure 3. Accumulation of reported land confiscations over time
Table 4. Year that land confiscation began per respondent in each state/region
BOX 3. Daw So Shey village, Demoso Township, Kayah State
Section 5.3
Table 5. Basis of right to the land that was confiscated per respondent
Table 6. Basis of right to the land that was confiscated per respondent in each state/region
Table 7. Possession of written legal documents per respondent in each state/region
Figure 4. Legal documents possessed per respondent
Section 5.4
BOX 4. Establishing human rights compliance before confiscation begins
Figure 5. Was respondent informed that the land would be confiscated prior to confiscation?
BOX 5. Case: Tavoy Town Development Project, Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region
BOX 6. Case: Mone Hydropower Dam, Sidoktaya Township, Magway Region
Figure 6. Was the purpose of the confiscation disclosed prior to the confiscation?
Figure 7. Was the confiscation when it occurred take place in accordance with the law?
BOX 7. Confiscation of Chin Christian Cemetery
BOX 8. Establishing human rights compliance during confiscation
BOX 9. Establishing human rights compliance after confiscation
Figure 8. Number of respondents who received compensation
Section 5.5
Table 8. Who is responsible for the confiscation of their land according to respondents?
Figure 9. Who is responsible for the confiscation of their land according to respondents?
Table 9. Impact of land confiscation on ability to continue farming
BOX 10. Man Naung and Man Ton villages, En Man Ho Kyan village tract, Kutkai Township, Shan State (North)
BOX 11. Case of Yuzana land grab in Kachin State
2014, representatives of the network discussed the purpose of the research, the research design and the target
research areas. In the second workshop in August 2014, the LIOH management committee and the field
interviewers, along with two local research advisors, designed the research questionnaire and interview
procedure, studied the target research areas, and discussed potential limitations of the research and how to
mitigate them. This workshop included a pilot study. For the pilot study, the field researchers interviewed
thirty-two farmers from the six villages (Alwan Sut, Yaydwingone, Phalan ywa, Thida Myaing, Ayemyathida
and Myainthaya ywa) of Kyawktan, Thanlyn Township, Yangon Region who had lost their farms because of the
project of Thilawa Business zone. Based on the experience, we reflected on the limitations we had faced in
collecting the data and further revised the questionnaire. In the third workshop in October 2014, the same
group met again to finalize the questionnaire.
The questionnaire aimed to surface the following information: (i) whose land and farms were confiscated, how
much, and through what mechanisms (including whether or not they possessed written evidence of land
ownership); (ii) which parties did the confiscating and for what purposes; (iii) what the actual confiscation
process looked like (including to what extent there was free, prior and informed consent, and to what extent
the process involved compensation); (iv) what have been the impacts of confiscation on the individual and
their households; (v) what have been their responses to confiscation and its impacts; and (vi) what do the
respondents think is needed to resolve the problem.
Initially we aimed to survey 3-5 individuals affected by confiscations per day. But time limitations and difficult
field conditions (e.g., poor transportation and communication especially in upland areas) prevented the field
interviewers from reaching as many villages as originally planned, or forced them to stay in some villages
longer than planned (with a knock-on effect in the remaining schedule). We encountered many people affected
by land grabs in the field. But in many research areas, the field interviewers and their interviewees came under
tight military surveillance. They sometimes had to get permission from the government; they were
interrogated and their movements monitored; and they were watched during the interview process by
government staff. In such instances, both the interviewees and interviewers felt afraid to freely discuss the
research and to share accurate information. As one of the field researchers recalled, ‘While I was interviewing
the farmers in the farm, the government staff took photo record and we were threatened with arrest’ (female
data collector, Southern Shan state, interviewed 22 August 2015). In the end, 2657 individuals were
surveyed, although more could have participated under better conditions (Figure 1).
For data analysis, we used a two-step process. First, we We selected respondents based on existing contacts of
registered the survey questionnaire data in an Excel LIOH focal people and field focal people. We did not
file to create the centralized electronic dataset. The attempt to take a random sampling, or to fix the
local research team members supervised three data number of survey respondents per state/ region
processors during the data entry phase. The resulting according to population. Our findings are about
dataset was analyzed and organized into different experiences and perceptions of people who agreed to
presentation formats with the assistance of IT experts. participate in the study, nothing more – or less -- than
Second, we validated these findings in focus group that. In each area we identified people directly
discussions with the interviewers and where possible affected by land confiscation, and asked them when
some interviewees from the different research sites. In and how it happened, how much was taken and who
August 2015, we conducted six validation workshops, was involved, what impacts confiscation has had for
each with the participation of both the interviewers them, and if and how they tried to change the
and some of the interviewees from that specific state situation. Each experience is revealing – for what
or division. happened and for what did not happen.
-- but without specifying which land, when or how. confiscated the land between 1990 and 1994. Farmers
The implementation of “laws” that are made by and said that they were not informed ahead of time; the
for the company for its own benefit is not the same military just came and took over the land without any
thing as democratic “rule of law”. documents. Instead of implementing a project, the
confiscated land was leased back to the farmers who
Type 3: Mixture of Type 1 and Type 2 could pay rent, or leased out to new people who were
Sometimes confiscation blends together these not among the original farmer-occupants. Those who
different patterns. couldn’t afford to pay rent were forced leave; some
went to Kaw Thaung, others to the Thai border, and
In one case in southern Shan State (Area No.3 and 4 others went anywhere they could find work.
Myo Oo Kwet Thit, South ward Kalah Kone Area No.5
Section, Hopong Town, Hopong Township in In Nan See Village Tract in Taunggyi Township, local
Taunggyi District), what began as a land-and-labor villagers generally knew that the government
grab, later became a land grab. In 1992, 85 acres of authorities and a Russian company started the
villagers’ farmland were confiscated by the military. implementation of Pin Pat Steel factory in 2004. And
The confiscated area also includes the natural spring then the Government confiscated over 4000 acres of
where the villagers get their drinking water. The land in 2004, telling the villagers that they were going
military then “allowed” villagers to work on the land, to build a school and provide wells, as well as
but only by paying “rental” charges annually electricity, and they were told that there would be job
according to the military decision. Later, in March opportunities once a factory was built. However, in
2012, the Tatmadaw Computer and Technology reality, they built only two wells for 500 villagers and
school suddenly told the villagers that they are no the water was not clean, and provided just two Solar
longer allowed to work on the land anymore. panels for the whole area. In terms of new jobs, when
a farmer asked for them to give a job to his daughter,
In a case from northern Shan State, in 2001-2002, the they replied that in order to get the job she would have
military confiscated over 300 acres of hilly tea to graduate. But the people whose lands had been
plantations in Kutkai Township, Tarmoenye Town, confiscated could no long farm and so could not
Section No. 6, claiming it as military owned land. But support their children in education.
the villagers had been working on those plantations
long before the military arrived in the region. At first BOX 2. Nam Tawng Village, Pan Sai (Kyu Koke)
they allowed the confiscated farmers to remain, but Sub-township Village Tract in Muse District,
having them pay a share of the harvest. Later, the northern Shan State
military took control of the entire operation, throwing In 1996, 2006 and 2008 with the cooperation of local
out the confiscated farmers altogether and giving the authorities, four business cronies confiscated 338
work of plucking tea leaves instead to members of acres of land. Local ethnic people had lived on and
soldiers’ families. This new rule was enforced by farmed these lands since their ancestors’ time, and
threats and intimidation. As one villager recalled, “In farming was their main source of livelihood. The
2014, they threatened that do not come and pluck the reason given for the confiscation was that the land was
tea leaves anymore. We do not rent the plantation to be used for a government agricultural project. The
anymore. If you come and pluck the tea leaves, there confiscated areas included 50 percent of the villagers’
will be a conflict. If we mistakenly shoot at you, it will best farmland (good, fertile, flat), of which a portion
not be good. Now, the residents have to work odd was then rented out to Chinese workers for a
jobs” (A villager whose lands were being confiscated, sugarcane plantation. Other portions were rented out
Section No.(6), Tarmoenye Town, Kutkai Township, to the relatives of the four crony businessmen.
interviewed on 25 August 2015). Another forty-four acres of the confiscated land was
supposedly for a government cement factory, but was
Sometimes the confiscated farmers are able to stay on subsequently used just for agriculture and animal
the land by becoming renters. But those who cannot husbandry. These lands are connected to the water
afford to pay rent are forced to leave. This happened in source of the village, and villagers worry that the
Tha Pyay Chaung and Za Har Villages in Dawei water will be polluted because of the chemicals being
Township, Tanintharyi Region, when the military used in the crony farms. Moreover, the village water
source protection forest is disappearing due to expansion of the confiscated area, and the amount of water
coming from the source has decreased. Since the confiscation, some of the farmers who lost their land have had
to seek work on very difficult to reach plantations, while others have had to look for odd jobs in oppressive
conditions on the border with China. Currently, the villagers’ population and the area where villagers can do
plantations are not balanced and the villagers are becoming poorer and poorer.#
In all these different types of confiscations, the original injustice is clearly the land grab, with further injustices
closely linked to and made possible by having taken control of the land, flowing out from there.
5.2. Amount of confiscated farmland and timing of reported confiscations
The amount of land lost to confiscation ranged from 1 acre to 244 acres of individual farmland per respondent.
The majority (76.4 percent) of respondents lost up to 10 acres of individual farmland (see Table 1).
For all states/ regions except Yangon and Sagaing, confiscation of an individual farmland of less than 10 acres
was reported by the majority of respondents in that state/region (see Table 2). In Yangon and Sagaing, the size
of the confiscated farmland was relatively more evenly distributed across the respondents in that state/region.
Many of the reported confiscations began during the years 1990 to 2009 (see Table 3 below). Half of the
reported confiscations began between 1990 and 1999 (50.7 percent), with another 24.8 percent beginning
between 2000 and 2009. Confiscation began in the 1990-99 period for majority of respondents in Kachin,
Kayah, Kayin, Chin, southern and northern Shan States and in Yangon, Bago, Ayeyarwaddy, Sagaing, Manda-
lay and Tanintharyi Regions. Confiscation began in the 2000-09 period for majority of respondents in Mon
State and Magway Region. A total of 75.5 percent of the reported land confiscations began during this 20-year
period.
Figure 3 (below) shows how confiscation is an experience that accumulates over time in Myanmar. None of
these cases has ever gotten fully resolved in a way that provides real justice and therefore closure for the
farmers. The following quote -- from a farmer who became a land activist after her family’s farmland was
confiscated -- illustrates this point:
“…My father cleared the vacant land where nobody was working and did family farming on those lands. In
1996, the land was confiscated. The local authorities and police came to the farm and arrested my father. They
sued him on various charges and he was jailed for one year. While he was in jail the village leader demarcated
our land and sold it out. I pleaded with him not to do this, but they just confiscated it by force. As my father
was still jailed and the farm was confiscated, my sisters and I had to drop out from the school. We faced many
difficulties, and have had to struggle for our lives against different forms of oppression” (Ma---, Pyapon
Township, Ayeyarwaddy Region, interviewed 9 August 2015).
Injustices are left to fester, even as more injustices are committed and get added to the pile. In this way the
story of land confiscation in Myanmar can be seen as pile that grows ever larger as time wears on, where the
injustices continue to accumulate, and nothing is ever done to try to stop the pile from growing, much less
reduce its size.
But the pace of confiscation varies from one case to another. In some cases confiscation happens more or less
immediately. For example, in 2011-2012, the order letter of land confiscation from the military arrived to the
farmers of Mar Kha Yaw Shey Village Tract in Hpruso Township, Kayah State. The letter informed the villagers
that whether they agree or not, they have to remove from the plantation field and receive the compensation.
The villagers did not want to leave and refused to accept the compensation. But in 2012, during the harvest
time, the military told the villagers that their land was to be confiscated immediately in order to begin
construction. Then, the military came with machines, cleared the land and constructed military buildings and
fenced the land.
In another case, the process was even quicker, as one participant in the validation workshop recalled: “They
told us that they won’t rent the land anymore and asked us to remove from our land. Then, we went to the
police station. When we arrived at the police station, they told us to discuss with the army. When we went and
discussed with the military, they told us not to plough and if people entered into the farm, they will shoot the
foot with gun and the animal entered, they will plant landmine. Then, they asked us to remove. Therefore, as
we were afraid, we left the farm and left in three days” (A farmer whose land was being confiscated, Win Ka
Baw Village, Bago Township, Bago (East) Region (Interviewed 9 August 2015).
Sometimes the confiscation process unfolds more situation. This news gave the villagers some relief for
slowly with unexpected twists and turns. Here, the their everyday livelihood problem. But they worry
original injustice of being forcibly confiscated, and all everyday about the time when they will lose their land
the hardship which that brings, is further and will not be able to work on the plantation
compounded by the stress of having to deal with many anymore.
obstacles and uncertainties in trying to claim their
rights and trace the problem administratively,
including unhelpful government authorities. 5.3 The people targeted for confiscation and their
relationship to the land
In 2003 in Tarmoenye Town, Kutkai Township (Shan
State North), for example, the military confiscated More than half -- 57.4 percent -- of the respondents
over 300 acres that the villagers used as pasture and based their right to the confiscated land on customary
for shifting cultivation from five villages. After they law (Table 5 below). To illustrate, in 2002 in
confiscated the land, the military grew corn and Thandaunggyi Township (Kayin State), the Ananda
vegetables. The residents had to do odd jobs to Company confiscated 62 acres of land in Ywar Gyi
survive. Later, the military left the land vacant without Village Tract including Pyar Sakhan, Tha HtayGone
any plantation. Because the residents urged that they and Nga Pyaw Taw Outywar Villages. Villagers had
wanted their land back, the military gave back the been using this land for many years according to
land in 2013. But when the people asked the local customary practice. Although the land was
administrative and government staffs, they replied confiscated for an agriculture project, the villagers
that the military is still controlling the land and observed that only 6 acres was planted to cocoa for
haven’t given back yet. The resident farmers are facing producing chocolate. Seeing this, the villagers
difficulties with whether or not they have to work on re-entered their land. The company then offered to
their land. return part of the land (22 acres), but the villagers
want the entire 62 acres of village land returned.
Other cases are neither immediate nor meandering.
Rather, what weighs heavily on people is the threat of Another 30.3 percent based their right on long-term
confiscation and the uncertainty knowing when or occupation-usage. One example of this kind of
how it may happen. Take the case of the Hanthawaddy situation is in Ayeyarwaddy Region. In 1989, local
Airport construction project in Bago Region. In 2012, authorities allocated land from Thone Gwa Island to
the villagers learned that the government was villagers from Poe San Village, Maubin township to
confiscating 9400 acres of land for this airport. The farm. For ten years, the villagers farmed in their
administrator requested villages including War Ma respective areas without argument and recognized by
Yan Village and Ah Laing Ni Village to relocate. There the village leaders. Some got crop tax receipts from
is no discussion or compensation for the farmland of the government, while others did not. In 1999-2000,
the 70 villagers who had to relocate. Eventually, Myanmar Gold Star Company entered the area and
without any farmland to work on, the villagers went said that they had gotten authorization to use the land.
back to the confiscated area to work on the land. As In this case the villagers claim is based on the fact of
the villagers live in one place and the plantation is in their long-term occupation-usage of the land before
another place, some farmers went back and stay in the company came in and confiscated it.
their farmland. Until 2012, the government had been
giving out the land title for their farmland, but it has A total of 87.7 percent of the respondents thus based
been observed that they never do in 2013. For now, as their right to the land that has been the target of
there is no systematic implementation of the project, confiscation on pre-existing non-state regulatory
and the villagers are still working on their land. Even arrangements that were recognized by others up until
though the villagers heard that the government is the moment when the reported confiscation processes
giving back 900 acres of land (out of the total began.
confiscated 9,400 acres), they do not know which
lands are being returned. In mid-2015, the Most of the remaining respondents based their right
government announced that the airport project was on a purchase or lease agreement (combined 217
postponed for four years because of the budgeting respondents, or 8.2 percent).
A related finding has to do with the possession (or not) of relevant legal documents establishing some kind of
right to the land. On aggregate, 1129 respondents (42.5 percent) said that they possessed legal documents
၏issued by the government, while 1058 respondents (39.8 percent) said that they did not possess any such kind
of document. Table 7 shows the breakdown of responses by state/region.
For those who reported having legal documents, the most common types of legal documents possessed by the
respondents were: Crops tax receipts (718 respondents); Form 105 (80 respondents); Form 106 (32
respondents); and Form 7 (11 respondents) (see Figure 4 below). Other types included purchase contracts.
Some people did not respond to the question (470 or 17.7% of the respondents) for various reasons. In the
validation workshops, it emerged that many respondents who don't possess legal documents feared that
answering 'No' to the question would complicate and reduce or eliminate their chances of getting the land back.
Especially in ethnic areas, experience has fostered strong doubts about the legal process and the courts are not
perceived as a place that farmers can go to claim their rights.
Apart from whether or not people actually possess legal documents, is the question of whether or not they are
able to get such documents when they want them. What we found is that not everyone is able to get documents
even when they try to apply for them.
For example, in 1994-1995 the Southern Military Headquarters confiscated 700 acres of village land from Yay
Shan, Zee Phyu Kone, Seik Kyi and Pyin Gan Villages in Tantabin Township, Bago Region. While some of the
original owner-occupants were allowed to continue farming on their land, other parts were leased out to
farmers from other areas and also to some business people. 10 farmers from Seik Kyi Village, for instance, could
no longer work on their land. Some of the farmers who had been allowed to remain, however, went to various
government departments to report what had happened. In 2014 some of the farmers from Pyin Gan Village
were able to get official permits for 200 acres of the land. But others were not given permits, and when they
asked the land registration department about this, they were told it was because the land was owned by the
Defense Ministry owned land.
In Khaung Yan Village in Oak Twin Township, Bago Region, when the farmers wrote to the respective
government offices in order to get a permit for their farmland, some were given permits but others were not.
There seems to be no clear reason why some got the permit letter, while others did not, and there seems to be
no clear procedure for applying for the letter. As a result, they all fear being confiscated at anytime.
The importance of documents is undermined – first by the seemingly arbitrary manner in which legal
documents are issued if they are issued at all, and second by the fact that village and farmland is being
confiscated even when the farmer-occupants do possess such documents. In fact, among those whose lands
were confiscated, the proportion of those who possessed legal documents, versus those who did not, was
almost even: 42.5 percent (1129 respondents) said that they possessed legal documents issued by the
government, while 39.8 percent (1058 respondents) said that they did not possess such kinds of documents.
In sum, mere possession of legal documents was not a significant factor in determining whose lands would
NOT be confiscated, versus whose would. In other words, the possession of legal documents has not provided
any significant defense or protection against land confiscation to farmers in the LIOH network.
None of the confiscations reported by respondents met international human rights standards. According to the
UN Guidelines on Eviction and Displacement, three interlinked sets of criteria that must be met -- before,
during, and after – for an eviction or displacement to be human rights compliant.
The vast majority of land confiscations experienced directly by members of the LIOH network were
undertaken without them being informed ahead of time (see Figure 5 below). For example, when the Pa Thi
Dam was built in Thandaunggyi Township, Karen State in 1994, the government didn’t do any consultation; no
relocation sites were prepared for the villagers who had to be relocated; and no compensation was given. A
total of 102 households were displaced by the dam: 53 households of Ywa Gyi Village and 49 households of
Nant Tha Kone Village. Approximately 500 acres of villagers’ farmland was confiscated in the process. On their
own, the villagers were forced to look for vacant land in nearby villages. Meanwhile the Ministry of Industry
used some of the land to establish a rubber plantation, the military used some to expand their army bases, and
some crony businessmen reportedly also confiscated some of the villagers’ land as well. In 2015, in order to
survive, the villagers began to clear and plant on land that had previously been confiscated by the agriculture
department and subsequently abandoned.
But being informed by government authorities prior to a confiscation is even just a small part of the minimum
requirements for a confiscation to be eligible to become legitimate. If we compare what happened in these
cases in Myanmar with what the UN Guidelines say ought to happen before people get evicted (see Box 4
below), the degree of compliance is virtually nil, as the example above illustrates.
Figure 5. Was respondent informed that the land would be confiscated prior to confiscation?
BOX 5. Case: Tavoy Town Development Project, Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region
In 1990, without prior consultation or even explanation, the government launched a Tavoy Town project by
demarcating farmland for conversion into housing land. The villagers working on the land didn’t know
whether their farmlands were under the project area or not and whether they would have to move or not. In
2010, the government confiscated another 300 acres of farmland for the project and started to build ministry
offices and housing on some land. Individual farmlands of 64 villagers were included in the demarcation
process. For the next three years the farmers continued their farming activities in order to live, but now with
frightened hearts.
In 2013, government authorities announced that they were going to implement the project on the 300 acres of
land and that there would be a meeting at the town hall of Tavoy Township. But they said that only those with
ownership document could attend the meeting, and that those without land ownership papers and other
unrelated people would not be allowed to join. Among those 64 farmers whose farmlands had been
demarcated, over half had been peacefully working on their land for so many years without any documents. In
the meeting, the authorities announced that they would give each of the confiscated farmers a 40’×60’ piece of
replacement land for the 3 acres of confiscated land. Those who wouldn’t accept this “compensation” were told
to go to court to solve the problem. Only 6 farmers chose to sign at that time.
In June 2014, twenty of the confiscated farmers were sued for disturbing the peace and for cursing, after they
had appealed to the authorities to let them continue working on their land. At that point one of the farmers
decided to accept what the government had offered and was released. The remaining 19 farmers again chose
not to sign and were left to face the charges. One farmer was jailed for 6 month and 15 days; others were jailed
for 3 months; some had to pay a fine. Currently, buildings are being constructed on all the 300 acres of land,
even though some of the farmers have not moved and continue to farm. For those farmers, who have been
working these farmlands already for many years, the reason is clear: the government didn’t provide fair
compensation, but more importantly, if they lost this land, there would be no place for them to live and farm.
Farming is their life and livelihood, and so they will continue to resist the confiscation and to work in their
fields.#
The government then gathered the villagers from the flooded area in the lower part of the dam on eastern side
of the Mone River and told them that a new village would be created for them in Than Sel Town and forced the
villagers to move off the mountainside. But the area where they relocated the villagers was actually farmland
owned by the Than Sel villagers. The government gave only 5,000 to 30,000 kyat each for them to build their
houses and then never came to check and take action for them. By late 2004, the promised Than Sel new town
project had still not happened. The displaced villagers were still living on land borrowed from the Than Sel
villagers. They had no land of their own to work on and encountered so many difficulties.
Under these circumstances, all the villagers from 13 villages who had been forcibly relocated to Than Sel
eventually decided to move back to the mountainous area near their flooded villages on their own. There they
survived by farming on land which appeared when the water level fell, as well as by cutting bamboo and wood
and doing odd jobs.
When the people from flooded area asked the respective authorities about compensation, rehabilitation and
about their rights to do farming, the official replied that the land had not been confiscated, but flooded,
implying that compensation was not required in this case. In this way the affected villagers found out that the
government would not take responsibility for their plight. The residents do not know how much hydropower
electricity is being produced from the dam. Nor do they know where it goes, although they have heard that the
electricity goes to Sidoktaya Town. They only suffer from negative impacts but receive no benefits at all. #
Figure 6. Was the purpose of the confiscation disclosed prior to the confiscation?
Figure 7. Was the confiscation when it occurred take place in accordance with the law?
There is an overwhelming belief among the respondents that the confiscations that they have suffered do not
comply with the law, for example the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (see Figure 7 above). But the many
examples already mentioned clearly show how and why, these days, official talk about the “rule of law” in
Myanmar is deeply contradictory – because its expression in reality is endemic lawlessness on the part of mil-
itary and government authorities, and deep injustices committed with impunity by people in positions of
authority and power.
Some more examples can be added here that help to southern Shan State), the military confiscated about
reveal further how negatively people experience and 2,000 acres of land including an ethnic Shan village,
therefore view the actions of the government. telling the people that the area is military-owned land.
After confiscation, some people migrated either to
One example comes from Pinlaung Township in Shan another country like Thailand or to other places
State, where the government confiscated the villager’s inside Myanmar as migrant workers, while others
land and demarcated them as housing places in order remained to work on the land. For those who
to create a new “sub-township” called Naungtayar. As remained, based on the amount of land that they were
one of the interviewees recalled, “On some of the working on, they had to pay rental charges to the
confiscated land, they built a land tenure office, a military until 2013. When they tried to demand their
development committee office, as well as other related land back, they were threatened by the Military. As
government offices and staff houses. But there is no one of the villagers recalled, “The villagers whose
transparency with their plans. Some of the lands were confiscated had been working on those
confiscated land was then leased back to the local lands for many years since before 1991. When they
people. They not only confiscated the villagers’ land asked their land back from the Military or wherever
but when they leased back the land to the villagers, they report about the case, they never win. The
the villagers had to sign a leasing agreement. If the military told them that they can even sue the farmers
confiscated land is included in the police back for trespassing” (A farmer whose land was
demarcation, the villagers have to pay rental charges confiscated, Group (5), Nansang Township, Southern
to the police station. If the land is in the government Shan State, interviewed on 22 August 2015). Although
office area, they have to pay it to the government since 2014 the farmers have not had to pay the rental
office. And even though they do not need to pay the charges, they are deeply worried and concerned about
rental charges for 2015, the villagers are worried about what will happen in the future, and are living and
the day when they will forbid them to work on the working under a cloud of uncertainty.
land and tell them to move” (A local female data
collector, southern Shan State, interviewed 22 August BOX 7. Confiscation of Chin Christian Cemetery
2015). In March 2014, the Kale Township Municipal
Committee suddenly announced the closure of the
In another case, villagers reported that the farmland Chin Christian cemetery in Taung Hpee Lah section,
they had worked on for over 40 years in Waingmaw Kale Town, Sagaing Region for “development”. The
Township (Wuyang Village Tract including La Myan cemetery had been in use since December 1914. To
Village) was being confiscated as forestry land. Later, the surprise and dismay of religious leaders and local
the Border Guard Force (BGF – local militia under residents, the committee produced a document
control of the Myanmar Army), local administrative showing that announcement that the graveyard was to
leaders and cronies got permission to use these lands. be closed down and ordering the people to remove it
Without transparency or access to justice, cronies and completely within one month had been made 2 years
Chinese companies began implementing projects on earlier in 2012. Villagers only knew about this plan,
the confiscated land. In response, the local people however, when the document was produced in 2014.
have written joint complaint letters to the respective The 100-year old cemetery was extremely important
government departments and to Pyithu Hluttaw. At to the villagers of Taung Hpee Lah as part of their
present, Chinese companies are planting banana trees traditional practices and they had always planned to
on the confiscated land. In late 2014, the Pyithu maintain it in a customary way.
Hluttaw land committee produced a letter allowing
the local people to work on the confiscated farmland The villagers sent letters protesting against the
again. But the local leaders are reportedly failing to confiscation to different government departments of
implement this decision. Union of Myanmar. After several meetings with the
religious leaders and local residents, the Municipal
Another example highlights how the “rule of law” is committee requested them to donate at least some of
actually used against those who it ought to serve and the land if they could not give the entire 2.60 acres of
protect from arbitrary rule and abuse of power. In land. However, the religious leader and the local
1991-1992, in Nansang Township (Group No.5, residents, thinking that it didn’t make sense to
break-up the precious land into pieces, refused. Then BOX 9. Establishing human rights compliance after
in June 2015, without warning at 2 o’clock in the confiscation
morning when everyone was sleeping, the According to the UN Guidelines on Eviction and
development committee came with bulldozers into Displacement there are at least eight measures related
the graveyard and began clearing it of all the trees and to relief and relocation that the government must
tombs. A huge number of police were on hand to ensure are in place immediately after an eviction:
guard the bull dozers as they worked. Only after the
entire cemetery had been destroyed, the local • At minimum, regardless of circumstances and
residents were allowed to go and collect the bones, without discrimination, competent authorities must
which had become all mixed up. ensure:
• Essential food, potable drinking water &
The cemetery was thus destroyed without warning sanitation;
even as talks and negotiations over its fate were still • Basic shelter & housing;
ongoing, according to the villagers. Immediately • Appropriate clothing;
afterward, the villagers tried to meet with officials • Essential medical services;
from the Sagaing Region administrative office and • Livelihood sources;
other related offices, but they were refused. Later, staff • Fodder for livestock, access to common
from the Sagaing Region District administrative office property resources previously depended upon;
informed the villagers that the order to confiscate and • Education for children & childcare facilities;
bulldoze the cemetery had come from above, leaving • Ensure that members of same family &
them no choice. Currently, the cemetery remains community are not separated.
cleared and empty (no project has been implemented
yet), while the villagers continue to protest the All these cases show that although the UN Guidelines
injustice and to demand that the land be returned.# on eviction and displacement establish strict criteria
for human rights compliance, these are routinely
ignored. When a confiscation fails the human rights
test in the first stage (e.g., before an eviction occurs),
BOX 8. Establishing human rights compliance during and yet proceeds to unfold anyway, the confiscation
confiscation cannot be considered human rights compliant. None
According to the UN Guidelines on Eviction and of the land confiscations covered in this research met
Displacement there are at least four actions that the requirements for being human rights compliant at
should be ensured by the government during a this stage.
confiscation:
This failure to be human rights compliant in the first
• Mandatory presence of governmental officials instance influences the perceptions, calculations and
or their representatives on site; actions of the affected people also in subsequent
• Manner should not violate the dignity and stages (e.g., during and after eviction or
human rights to life and security of those affected; displacement). Land confiscation is a devastating and
• Must not take place during inclement weather, illegitimate experience that must be understood first
at night, during festivals or religious holidays, prior to and foremost as a matter of human rights, and not
elections or during or just prior to school simply a matter of business. It is from this human
examinations; rights perspective that the question of how people
• Must ensure no one is subject to direct or dealt with compensation must be faced. While most
indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence. of our respondents said that they did not receive
compensation, some people said that they did receive
compensation, and in a few places the proportion of
those who said that they did receive compensation is
significant, as in Yangon, in Shan (South) and in
Mandalay (Figure 8 below).
None of those who accepted the compensation that was offered said that they were satisfied with it, giving a
variety of reasons, including: that what was given was “not enough”; that they had “confiscated my lands”
(implying that no amount of compensation would ever be enough); that their “livelihood depends on my land”;
and that the amount of compensation offered was “unfair”.
For example, in 2010-2011, in Sidoktaya Township, Section No. 2, Southern Ktaya Village and Ywarthit
Village, the Tatmadaw Defense Weapon Factory No. 20 confiscated about 100 acres of land to build a military
factory compound. They asked the plantation owners to sign the agreement. Villagers felt compelled to accept
the compensation that was offered -- 36 kyat per acre and 5,000 kyat per person. The military officials told the
villagers that this was all according to the law and based on the current situation. The farmers until now do not
have any land to farm and are forced to do odd jobs in order to survive.
Many respondents said that that they were “afraid of the military” and that there had been “no negotiation” and
that they had been given no choice or chance to decline or disagree. To illustrate, in Se Kone, Sin Mee, Chone
Soon and Hta Naung Kan Villages, Meiktila Township, Mandalay Region, approximately 5000 acres of
villagers’ land was confiscated by the military in 2010. The confiscated area included their individual
farmlands, village owned land, communal pasture area, a communal pond and a communal forest that villagers
used to collect firewood. Over 100 villagers were directly affected. Later, the military gave 1 million kyat per
acre of farmland and 500,000 kyat per acre of plantation as compensation. The villagers were asked to sign an
agreement and told that whether they took the compensation or not their land would be confiscated. Fearing
trouble if they did not accept, the villagers submitted. In some cases, the promised compensation was never
paid.
In sum, the vast majority of the reported confiscations experienced by LIOH members have failed in the very
first instance to meet the most basic human rights requirements specified by the UN Guidelines on Eviction
and Displacement. In practice, what an actual confiscation fails to do in this stage cannot simply be dismissed
or somehow remedied in a later stage (either during and after). Compensation cannot remedy the govern-
ment’s failure to meet its human rights obligations before, during, and after confiscation. Once a confiscation
fails in practice to cross the minimum threshold in terms of human rights obligations, and lives are disrupted
and destroyed, any legitimacy that a confiscation might have had is lost forever.
5.5 Who is responsible for the confiscations and their associated injustices
In almost half of the cases, confiscation directly involved either the military alone, or the military in
combination with other actors (see Table 8 below). The other half of cases are mainly linked to various
government departments, to business actors especially domestic companies, and to local authorities.
Figure 9. Who is responsible for the confiscation of their land according to respondents?
As some of the examples already mentioned have shown, the impacts of land grabbing on the lives of the people
whose lands have been taken have been severe. Moreover, the impacts are not confined to one aspect (e.g.,
livelihood), or to moment in time (e.g., during confiscation), nor are the impacts confined to one place (e.g.,
the area designated for confiscated). Instead, the impacts are wide ranging across the economic, social,
cultural and political spheres, and encompass the physical and psychological dimensions of peoples’ lives too.
“In 1996, local government authorities and Chinese businessmen confiscated the farmland that I worked on.
The reason they gave was that they were going to build a government cement factory. Then, they did not do
anything on the land but they just sold the land out. We have had to go looking for work in the hills, which are
very difficult to travel and there are also landmines, which they planted for the security of the region. Two res-
idents have been hit by landmine. We are also afraid of that. It would be great if we can work on the confiscated
land” (a farmer whose land was confiscated, Nam Tawng Village, Pan Sai (Kyu Koke) Sub-Township, Muse
District, Shan State, interviewed on 25 August 2015).
The impacts of land grabbing on people are likely to spill over from one place to another: they are likely to be
felt even by people whose lands were not grabbed, but happened to be living nearby – as in the case of the
villagers whose farmlands were for a time occupied by the families whose lands were suddenly flooded Mone
Hydropower Dam (see Box 6 above).
Impacts also extend to what is done to the land after it is grabbed -- as in the case of Ma Sei Seik, War Thein
Kha and Hmaw Taw Villages, Kawhmu Township, Yangon Region, where village pastureland that was confis-
cated by the military ended up in the hands of a business crony who made it into a fishpond. Later, the villagers’
buffalos and cows died from poisoning after eating grass around the fishpond area.
Likewise, the impacts of land grabbing go beyond one moment in time, to impact on peoples lives and
livelihoods for years afterward. Our research confirms that large numbers of people, who had previously built
lives and livelihoods around farming, were driven by land grabbing and against their will, out of farming
completely (see Table 9 above), and into less satisfying and often more precarious non-farming economic
activities including casual labor situations. These numbers do not reflect the aspirations of the people behind
the numbers; interview data suggests that many did not want to leave farming and would go back to it if they
could.
Deprived of their farmland and farm-based livelihoods, families are broken apart as individual family
members are compelled to migrate in search of work, whether inside Myanmar or, as often is the case, outside
the country, which frequently places them in very uncertain and difficult situations under oppressive and
exploitative working conditions. For example, in 1990-1991 in Lwai Lwee Village, Tee Tain Township in Chin
State, the military confiscated and set up camp in about 300 acres of villagers’ shifting cultivation land. Thus,
the farmers couldn’t farm on it anymore. Then in 2011, in order to expand this Tatmadaw encampment, the
military confiscated a further 100 acres of farmland in Tat Lwee Village. Villagers have only the little amount
of land left over to farm, and most people have had to go to foreign countries for their livelihood.
Many people from Hkay Nin Village Tract in Lashio Township, northern Shan State, are suffering a similar fate.
From 1995 to 1996, the military confiscated the farmland, housing areas and village land and gave permission
BOX 11. Case of Yuzana land grab in Kachin State villagers felt compelled to accept the compensation,
Yuzana company confiscated 250,000 acres of land one group of 17 villagers rejected the compensation
including plantations and villages from Hpakant and offer and decided to sue the company in cooperation
Tanai Townships in Kachin State, claiming that they with local land activists.
had gotten permission to work on these lands. In
2006- 2007, they started to confiscate the land and Eventually, company officials and local authorities
constructing a road, telling the villagers that it was for went to the villagers who had sued to say that they will
development projects, although villagers saw only return the land to those who had sued, although it
company vehicles using the road. Once it was would be up to the villagers to do whatever repair
constructed, they started confiscating more of the work necessary to make the land suitable again for
villagers’ farmland step by step, until finally in 2010 farming. Rather than accept this deal, the villagers
the whole village from Wa Ra Zut village tract in demanded instead that the company repair the land
Hpakant Township was displaced. At the same time, and in addition compensate them for the 9 years they
one night they came with bulldozers and destroyed have lost while the land was confiscated. They also
the farmers’ plantations in Kawng Ra Village, and demanded that full permission be given for all the
then started demarcating the land. Then they moved other villagers to be able to work on their land again.
the Wa Ra Zut villagers who were displaced to a
relocation site, where they were given no farmland, However, until today, there is no justice and the
but only a place for housing and 50 pieces of 6’ tin villagers are still facing serious difficulties for their
roofs, and then were expected to build their own livelihoods. The confiscated farmers’ lawsuit against
houses. Some of the widows could not build the house the company remains ongoing.#
well and until now the villagers are still building their
houses. Compensation was never discussed with the
displaced villagers. Some of the villagers refused to
move; those who resisted suffered threats.
villagers to solve the land conflicts in a transparent should be a good and clear process to ensure that the
way. Accurate and reliable information about the land restituted land is not already occupied and used by the
confiscation and historical background should be other farmer occupants, and that it is good quality
documented and prepared by both the government land near the village where the relocated farmers
and the villagers. could rebuild their lives and livelihoods in peace and
• In case of land confiscation by the military, the with dignity.
relevant government authorities should assist • The compensation for the villagers to restart
villagers to solve the land conflict in a transparent and and work on the new land. The cost can be calculated
fair manner. the current value of the crop on the land that the
• International and local Non-Government villagers lost since the year which land was
organizations, community based organizations and confiscated and they couldn't work on.
farmers groups should work together with the
villagers who had their land confiscated to help claim Legal issues
it back. In order not to undermine the efforts of local
villagers to claim their land tenure rights, good • Laws, policy, and regulations should protect
understanding of the villagers' strategies at the the local villagers who work on their land equally. If
different places or geographical context are essential. villagers whose land has been confiscated would like
to prosecute land grabbers, there should be a clear and
Restitution unbiased channel/space in legal process for them.
• Farmers engaged in land conflicts should be
• Villagers who lost their land and who were protected and supported by the government to ensure
relocated unfairly and by force should get back their a fair and transparent decision making process,
land to work on it. instead of being criminalized as is now often the case.
• Confiscated land should be returned to the • Farmers who are already in the prison for land
original occupants. This should be carried out with related conflicts and in the process of prosecution
dignity and in a transparent way in front of the local need support from (voluntary) lawyers.
communities, with strong and proper documents.
• Land restitution should be done in such a way The new government is in a position to put an end to
that it does not cause more conflict; restitution of land the terrible experiences of land conflicts that local
to the original farmer-occupants should not proceed communities have been facing and to put the country
directly where that land is now occupied by other on a more democratic transition path. At the same
farmer-occupants who are working on it. Additional time, it will be crucial for the new government to
processes will be needed to determine how restitution responds in a way that is accepted by the people who
could be done in such cases, so that the human rights have been suffering these injustices all these years. It is
of both the original and other farmer-occupants are also important to include the affected people and
respected and protected, and both are able to acquire community voices in decision making processes.
land that is good quality near the village where they Otherwise, the new government risks being a
can live and work peacefully and with dignity. continuation of the old government, with land
grabbing continuing unabated and people’s future will
Compensation continue to be haunted.
ENDNOTES
1
See "Forced Displacements and Destroyed Lives
around Upper Paunglaung Dam in Shan State,
Myanmar" Physicians for Human Rights, October
2015, Yangon. https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Re-
ports/burma-shanstate-english-report-oct2015.pdf
2
Land in Our Hands Founding Statement, LIOH,
February 28th 2014, Land Rights Advocacy work-
shop, Yangon.
3
LIOH submission on National Land Use Policy
(draft), " National Land Use Policy of Myanmar: Our
Response and Recommendations”, LIOH network,
January 29th 2015. And "LIOH Demands for Land,
Photo: As seen in this photo taken on October 2014
Peace and Democracy", LIOH, April 2015, Yangon.
by local community member, villagers’ farmland that
4
Rakhine is not included in the research because
was confiscated by the military in 2010 was later
LIOH members from this state eventually had to drop
marked as an industrial zone/area in 2011. Sel Kone
out due to schedule conflicts.
village track, Meiktila Township, Mandalay Region.
Some documented photo section