The Liberal Government of Unfreedom

Author(s): Barry Hindess

Source: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr.-June 2001), pp. 93-111
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 26 (2001), 93-111
Alternatives

The LiberalGovernment
ofUnfreedom

BarryHindess*

Perhapsthe mostinfluential aspectof MichelFoucault'sworkon

government has been his treatment of liberalismas a distinctive
is
formofpoliticalreason.Liberalism commonly regardedas a nor-
mativepoliticaldoctrineor theorythattreatsthe maintenanceof
individuallibertyas an end in itselfand therefore viewslibertyas
settinglimitsof principlebothto the legitimateobjectivesof gov-
ernmentand to themannerin whichthoseobjectivesmaybe pur-
sued. Foucault'saccountof liberalismas a rationality of govern-
mentalso accordscentralplace to individualliberty, whichis seen
as givingriseto a prudentialconcernthatone mightbe governing
too much.The suggestion is that,ratherthanpursueitsobjectives
through the detailed regulationof conductin the mannerof po-
lice, it mightbe more effective forthe government of a stateto
workthroughthemaintenanceand promotionofcertainformsof
individualliberty.
Accordingto thisaccount,underlying the liberalfearof gov-
erning too much are two distinct but related perceptionsof the
population to be governed. It is seen firstas containinga number
of self-regulating domainsof social interaction,and secondlyas
consisting ofindividuals endowedwitha capacityforautonomous,
self-directing activity. liberal political thought,Foucault ob-
In
serves, the market epitomizesbothperceptions, serving,in effect,
as "a locus ofprivilegedexperiencewhereone can identify theef-
fectsof excessivegovernmentality."1 Liberalpoliticalreason,then,
seesindividual liberty as a limit,notsimply to thelegitimate reachof
government, but also to its effectiveness. More recent scholars have
adapted thisaccount of liberalism to the analysis of neoliberal at-
to
tempts governthrough the decisions of autonomous individuals.

SchoolofSocialSciences,Australian
♦Research Canberra,ACT
NationalUniversity,
E-mail:b.hindess@anu.edu.au
0200,Australia.

93

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94 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

Theyhavefocused,in particular, on thegovernmental uses of in-

dividualchoice and empowerment and on the moregeneralpro-
motionof marketor quasi-market regimesin the government of
domainspreviously regulatedin otherways.2
In fact,thisfocuson thegovernmental uses oflibertygiveslib-
eral politicalreasonfartoo good a press.Authoritarian rule- the
government ofunfreedom - has alwaysplayedan important partin
the government of statescommittedto the maintenanceand de-
fenseofindividualliberty, as, ofcourse,ithas in thegovernment of
otherstates.Nineteenth-century Westernstatesrestricted thefree-
dom of important sectionsof theirownpopulationsand imposed
theirrule on substantialpopulationsoutsidetheirown national
borders.Evennow,long afterthecollapseofWesterncolonialism,
coerciveand oppressivepracticesof government continueto play
an importantpart,not onlyin the independentstatesthattook
overfromWesternimperialrule,but also in Westernstatesthem-
selves:in thecriminal justicesystem, thepolicingof Romanypeo-
ple, immigrant communities, and the urbanpoor; in theprovision
ofsocialservices;and in themanagement oflargepublic-and pri-
vate-sector organizations.Authoritarian rulehas also been invoked
as a necessaryinstrument of economicliberalizationin muchof
LatinAmericaand in partsofSoutheastAsiaand Centraland East-
ernEurope.
How do such authoritarian practicesrelateto the liberalgov-
ernmentoffreedom? Contributors to theliteratureinspiredbythis
aspectofFoucault'sworkhavetendednotto treatthegovernment
ofunfreedom as playinganysignificant partin liberalpoliticalrea-
son.3NikolasRose,4forexample,acknowledgesthatcoerciveand
oppressive practicesare clearlystillemployedin thegovernment of
Westernsocieties.He goes on to argue,however,thatthe signifi-
cance ofliberalismhereis to be seen,notin thesepracticesthem-
selves,butratherin thefactthatsuchpracticesmustnowbe justi-
fiedon theliberalgroundsoffreedom.
This articlearguesthatthereis more to the relationshipbe-
tweentheliberalcommitment to libertyand theliberalgovernment
ofunfreedom thanseemsto be suggestedbyeithermainstream po-
liticaltheoryor theFoucaultianaccountofliberalpoliticalreason.
Far frombeinga simplematterof liberalhypocrisy, of denyingits
commitment to liberty,the resortto authoritarian rule in certain
cases is a necessaryconsequenceof the liberalunderstanding of
thatcommitment.5 Libertyand dominationare joined in liberal
thoughtliketwosidesofa singlecoin:thevalueofone mayappear
on theface,butthefigureoftheotheris firmly stampedon there-
verse.Liberalpoliticalreasonhas been as much concernedwith

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 Hindess 95
Barry

paternalistic ruleoverminorsand adultsjudged to be incompetent

as withthegovernment of autonomousindividuals,as muchcon-
cernedwiththesubjectpeoplesofimperialpossessionsas withthe
freeinhabitants ofWesternstates.Westerncolonial rule has long
sincebeen displaced,but itspaternalistic perspectiveremainsin-
fluentialbothin theprogramsof economicand politicaldevelop-
mentpromotedbyinternationalagenciesand the governmental
practicesadoptedbyindependent,postcolonialstates.
I beginwithan examinationoftheliberalviewofliberty, argu-
ing thatit is predicated,first,
on thetransformation of thehuman
sciencesthatFoucaultexploresin TheOrderofThings,6 and, sec-
ondly, on a developmental understanding of both individuals and
populations. The second in
stage myargument is thento show that
thisdevelopmentalviewmeans thatmanypeople, in the Westas
wellas outsideit,willbe seen as not- or notyet- readyforfree-
dom. This perceptionis thekeyto understanding centralfeatures
ofliberalpoliticalreason- featuresthatrelatenotonlyto thegov-
ernmentof unfreedombut also to the mannerin whichfreedom
appearsas an objectof liberalgovernment. In myexplorationof
I
liberalresponsesto thisperception, hope also to locatethetwen-
tieth-century ethosofwelfarewithinthe broaderspectrumof lib-
eral approachesto the workof government. A shortconcluding
sectionconsidersthepostcolonialliberalcondition.

Liberal Freedoms

Perhapsthemostrevealingwayto exploretheplace offreedomin

liberalpoliticalreasonis to beginwiththe liberalcritiqueof gov-
ernmentbypolice.The term"police"is nowgenerallyseen as des-
ignatinga specializedagencyofgovernment, one thatis expected
to focuson theconstabulary role ofkeepingthepeace, protecting
property and people fromcertainkindsof harm,and apprehend-
ingwrongdoers. However,thismodernunderstanding of "police"
is a comparatively recentdevelopment:in much of seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century Europe,the termreferredto the detailed
governmental regulationof all areas of social life.In thisearlier
sense,policingwasseen to embracea widerangeagenciesand ac-
tivitiesconcernedwiththe productionand maintenanceof good
orderin a territorial community.7
The theoryofpolicetooktheviewthattheeffectiveness ofgov-
ernmentdependedon thecarefuluse ofdetailedand comprehen-
siveinformation (muchofit remainingin thehandsofauthorities
at a local level)aboutmembersofthepopulationconcerned,their

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96 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

formsof associationand patternsof activity.In practice,as we

mightexpect,the information availableto police was alwaysse-
verelylimitedand therewas thereforea constantdemand for
more:theultimateobjectiveof police was to workfroman imma-
nentknowledgeofthepopulationconcerned - a knowledgewhich
couldbe collectedand gatheredtogetherin themanualsofpolice.
I shouldadd thatpolice government also made use of a verydif-
ferentkindofknowledge, namely, theoryand practiceofdisci-
the
plinarycontroloverthe behaviorofindividuals -
and collectivities
a formof knowledgewhose developmentFoucault examinesin
Disciplineand Punish.8
Liberalismin no waydisputesthispolice viewof the impor-
tance of disciplinein the productionand maintenanceof good
order.It does,however, insistthattheworkings ofsocietycould not
be knownin the mannersupposedby the theoryof police, and
therefore thatitcould notbe governedentirely in accordancewith
police prescriptions.One of the most influential formulations of
thisviewappears in Adam Smith'sTheWealthofNations,9 which
analyzesthe economicactivities of individualswithincommercial
societiesas contributingto a largersystem ofinteraction.The con-
ductof each participant in thissystemis said to be regulated,not
onlybythevalues,habitsofthoughtand thelikewhichtheybring
to theirinteractionsbutalso bythesignalsofotheractors - thatis,
by the for
prices goods and labor resultingfromnumerousindi-
vidualdecisionsto buyor to sell,or to seeka betterdeal elsewhere.
This accountof the complexrelationshipbetweenpriceson the
one handand numerousindividualdecisionson theotherenables
himto maketwofundamental pointsabout marketinteraction, at
leastwithincommercialsocieties:first, thatit fostersthe develop-
ment of punctuality, discretion,industryand other prudential
virtuesin theindividual,10and secondly, thatit shouldbe seen as a
self-regulatingdomainof interaction. On thisview,stateinterfer-
ence withanyof thesepriceswillprovideindividuals withmislead-
ing signals,therebysubverting theirprudentialvirtues,distorting
theregulatory mechanisms of thelargereconomicsystem and un-
dermining itsefficiencyoverall.
Liberalpoliticalthoughttreatsthisargumentabout the self-
regulatingcharacterof the marketas but one exampleof a more
generalthesis:namely, thatthepopulationofa statecan be seen as
encompassinga varietyof self-regulating domains- the sphereof
economicactivity, theworkings ofcivilsociety,theorganization of
domesticlife,processesof populationgrowth,and so on- each
subjectto itsownlawsand developmental tendenciesand each gov-
erned in largepartbyperceptionswhichindividualsformin the
courseoftheirinteractions withothers.

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 Hindess 97
Barry

Thus,wherethetheoryofpolicepresentssocietyas heavilyde-
pendenton, and ultimately held togetherby,theworkof govern-
ment- in effect, as an artifact ofgovernment - liberalismsees
itself
societyas somethingmore: as involvinggovernmenton the one
hand and self-regulating processesof interactionon the other.
While,on thisview,societymaybe dependenton the statein cer-
tainrespects,it also has a significant degreeofindependence.It is
thislatterunderstanding of societythatFoucaultseemsto havein
mindwhenhe describesliberalpoliticalthoughtas starting"not
fromthe existenceof the state. . . but ratherfromsociety, which
is in a complexrelationof exteriority and interioritywithrespect
to thestate."11 WhatFoucaultidentifies, in one ofhisinterviews, as
the discovery of society12 is more appropriately seen as the emer-
gence of theviewthatsociety - a socialentity whoseexistenceand
boundarieswasalreadytakenforgranted - actuallyhas itsownde-
velopmentalprocesseswhichthe mereaccumulationof informa-
tionis simplyunable to grasp.This "discovery," in fact,represents
a fundamental shiftin theimageof society:fromone in whichso-
cietyis to be understoodon the basisof an immanentknowledge
ofthepopulationconcernedto one thatreliesinsteadon themore
abstract and theoretical knowledgeofsocialprocessespresentedby
theemergent social sciences.
The liberalunderstanding ofsocietyas traversed bya varietyof
self-regulating domains of social interaction suggests that we
shouldbe waryof assumingthattheirworkingscould be further
improvedbythedetailedregulationofconduct.Thiscautionis es-
peciallyimportant withregardto domainswhichseem to produce
beneficialoutcomesforsocietyas a whole:in such cases,the role
of thestateis essentially to leavewellenoughalone. On thisview,
then,the absence of stateinterference representsone desirable
kind of freedom:a freedomwhichprudentialgovernmentof a
modernstateshould allow not onlyin the regulationof its own
populationbut also in itsrule overthe subjectpopulationswhich
inhabititsimperialpossessions.Like manyofthelibertiesenjoyed
in medievalEurope,freedomofthiskindis notsomething granted
to individualsas such and in general:it is grantedto certainindi-
vidualsonlyand withinparticularcircumscribed domains.Indeed,
especiallyin theimperialpracticeof indirectrule,manyindividu-
als mayfindthemselves to be severely constrained bypatternsofin-
teractionin whichthestateprefersnot to intervene.
Where,in theviewofliberalpoliticalreason,themodernstate's
treatment of itsown people should differfromthe treatment of
the subjectpopulationsinhabitingitsimperialdomainsis in rela-
tionto a kindoffreedomthatis thoughtto pertain,at leastin prin-
ciple,to individualsas suchand in general.Partofwhatis at issue

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98 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

in thisnovelvalorizationof individuallibertycan be seen byob-

serving,first, thatthe shiftnotedabove- froman immanentto a
more abstractand theoreticalunderstanding - reflects
of society
theradicaltransformation ofthehumansciencesthatFoucaultde-
scribesin TheOrder ofThings. It is an expressionof themovefrom
theclassicalto themodernepistemethatresultsin theemergence
ofthefigureofman- a figurethat,as Foucaultpresentsit,locates
man in the ambiguousepistemologicalpositionof "an object of
knowledgeand a subjectthatknows."13
We shouldobserve,secondly,thattheaccountof thismovein
TheOrder ofThings is seriouslyincomplete.Indeed,theconnection
thatFoucaulttakesup in his laterwork,betweenthe liberalcri-
tiqueof police on the one hand and the claimto an abstractand
theoretical knowledgeofsocietyon theother,itselfsuggestsan im-
portantrespectin whichhis earlier,epistemic,accountof thefig-
ure of man should be seen as too restricted. ChristineHelliwell
and I havearguedthat,liketheidea of a self-contained cultureor
society that it helps to sustain, the figure of man should be seen as
a politicalconstruct, notsimplyas an epistemicor "cultural"one.14
In fact,althoughI can hardlypursuetheimplications ofthispoint
here, it is a construct whose appearance coincideswith the emer-
gence of modern forms ofpopulargovernment. Considered in this
the
light, figure of man exhibits a second kindof ambiguity in ad-
ditionto theepistemological one thatis thefocusofFoucault'sdis-
cussion.On the one hand,as a subjectthatknows,man is consti-
tutedby the facultiesof reason and perceptionand is therefore
capable,at leastin principle,of autonomousactionin something
liketheKantiansense.On theotherhand,likeall objectsofknowl-
edge, man appearsto be moldedbythe effectsof externalforces
and stimuli.The qualitiesof rationality and moralautonomythat
therhetoricof constitutional government demandsof thecitizens
ofmodernstatesare thusseen bothas representing theessenceof
man- and in thatrespectperhapsas naturally occurring- and as
theproductofveryparticularconditions.15
Since naturalman is thoughtto be ratherthinon theground
in modernsocieties,some approximationto autonomousaction
willnormally be expectedto appearonlyin suitablycultivated set-
tings.Indeed, as the link noted above between thisview of the
essenceofmanand therhetoricofmoderncitizenship wouldlead
us to expect,liberaland otherWesterncommentators havebeen
to
tempted identify such cultivated with
settings thoseinhabited by
themoreeducatedmembersofwell-governed Westernsocieties.16
Whilethismaynot be a necessaryconsequence of the figureof
man,it does suggestthatthose,in the Westand elsewhere,who

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 Hindess 99
Barry

conductthemselves in waysthatare remotefromWesternnormsof

civilizedconductshouldbe seen not onlyas behavingdifferently
fromcultivated Westerners but also as inferiorto themin certain
respects- as standingevenfurther fromtheideal ofindividualau-
tonomy.Criticson the Lefthave takena more complexviewof
thesematters - suggesting, forexample,thatratherthan simply
promote itsrealization,Western societyalso in factdistorts and re-
presses the essence of man - but their arguments are not the con-
cernofthepresentdiscussion.17
Thus,theliberalcritiqueofpolice can be seen as one political
expressionof thefigureof man,of thepeculiarmodernviewthat
manis essentially free,evenifthisfreedomis difficult to realizein
practice.However, liberalism is by no means in
unique thisrespect:
thesameunderlying viewofmanis shared,as Foucault'sdiscussion
ofthefigureofmanwouldlead us to expect,byotherpoliticalisms
ofthemodernperiod.Whatsetsliberalpoliticalreasonapartis not
so muchitsclaimthatmanpossessesa capacityforautonomousac-
tionas itsoptimistic beliefthata reasonableapproximation to this
is
capacity alreadywidely realized within the populationsof the
modernWest.
Here, too,theimageof themarketplaysa particularly impor-
tantrole. I notedearlierthatliberalthoughttreatsthe marketas
theparadigmofa domainofinteraction thatis bestleftto regulate
- if
itself only after the statehas intervened to remedytheeffects of
earlierpolitical interference. However, the market is also seen as
promotingthe capacityforautonomous,self-directing -
activity
first,byencouragingindividualsto calculatethecostsand benefits
of theirowndecisionsand thereby, as notedabove,fostering the
cultivation ofprudentialvirtues, and secondly, byundermining re-
lationsofdependenceand subservience.
In his Lectures onJunsprudence, forexample,Smithobserved
that"thosecitieswherethe greatestpolice is exercisedare not
thosewhichenjoythegreatestsecurity."18 In fact,he maintained,
thelevelofcrimeand disorder - and therefore theamountof po-
lice regulationexercisedoverthe population- was fargreaterin
Edinburghand Paris,withtheirlargenumbersof servantsand re-
tainers,thanitis in London,wheresuchpeople makeup a smaller
proportionof theoverallpopulation.The mostimportantreason
forthedifference is this:"Nothingtendsto corruptand enervate
and debase themindas dependency, and nothinggivessuchnoble
and generousnotionsofprobity as freedomand independency."19
In Smith'sview,themosteffective wayto reducecrimeand dis-
orderin the populationwas to promote"freedomand indepen-
dency"byturningservantsand retainersintofreewage-laborers -

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100 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

thatis,byrequiringthemto maketheirlivingthroughtheirinter-
actionswithothersin themarket.Servantsand retainers no longer
pose sucha problemin thesocietiesof themodernWest,butsim-
ilarclaimscontinueto be made about the demoralizingeffectsof
dependency.The focusnowis on the conditionofwelfarerecipi-
ents,whichis frequently contrastedto thesturdy independency of
thosewhoselivelihooddependson themarket.
Liberalpoliticalreason,in effect,is predicatedon a belief-
firstthatthepopulationto be governedconsistsof individualsen-
dowednaturally withthe capacityforautonomousaction (even if
they do not alwaysrealizethatcapacityin practice),and secondly
thattheubiquityof marketrelationsin contemporary Westernso-
cietiesensuresthata significant portion of the populationis not
farremovedfromthe realizationof thiscapacity.Withoutsuch a
faithin theliberating capacitiesofmarketinteraction, thenorma-
tivecommitment to individuallibertywould hardlybe giventhe
centralrole thatit currentlyoccupiesin liberalpoliticaldiscourse.

LiberalUnfreedom

Normativediscussion,however,is neitherthe onlynor the most

consequentialaspectofliberalpoliticalreason.Liberalismhas also
been concernedwiththepracticalimplications forgovernment of
thebeliefthatmembersof thepopulationto be governedare nat-
urallyendowedwitha capacityforautonomous,self-directing ac-
The Foucaultianaccountof liberaland neoliberalgovern-
tivity.
menthas takenthe mostsignificant generalimplicationof this
beliefto be thatgovernment should aim to make use of thisca-
pacity,and ithas therefore focusedon thewaysin whichindividual
libertyhas been recruitedforgovernmental purposes.In fact,as
we havejust seen,theimplications are rathermorecomplex:indi-
vidualsmaybe naturally endowedwitha capacityforautonomous
action,but thisdoes notmean thatthecapacitywillalwaysbe suf-
ficientlywelldevelopedforsuch governmental uses to be viable.
Indeed,modernpoliticalthoughthas normally takenthecontrary
view,insistingthatwhiletheremaybe contextsin whichsuitable
habitsofself-government are able to takeroot,thereare manymore
in whichtheyare unableto do so. Liberalshaveusuallyseen there-
alizationof thiscapacityforautonomousactionin historicaland
developmental terms,suggesting thatan extendedperiodof edu-
cationand training is requiredbeforeitcan be realizedin an indi-
vidualand thatitwillbe wellestablishedamongnumerousadults
onlyin thepopulationsofrelatively civilizedcommercial -
societies

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 Hindess 101
Barry

and even here theyoftenhave severereservations about the ma-

jorityof thepopulation.
How,then,has liberalpoliticalreasondealtwiththeproblemof
governingtheremainder, withthosein whomthe capacityforau-
tonomousconductis thought tobe insufficiently developed?The an-
swerdependsin parton howtheperceiveddeficiency is understood,
and herewe can distinguish threebroadcategoriesofresponse.
The firsttypeofresponseis to suggest - alongthelinesofJohn
Locke'sdiscussionofwhatshouldbe done aboutthenativeinhab-
itantsof America20 - thatsome people are so farfromacquiring
the relevantcapacitiesthattheyshould simplybe cleared out of
theway.21 Weare all familiar withtheconsequencesof thisview:it
suggests that the people questionmightsensiblybe drivenoff
in
the territory theycurrently inhabit,be exterminated, enslaved,
workedto death,or,morehumanelyperhaps,allowedto die out
whilethemoreadvancedamongthemare absorbedintothelower
reachesofcivilizedpopulations.
Secondly,thereis theviewthatthecapacitiesrequiredforau-
tonomousconductand thesocialconditionsthatfosterand sustain
themcan be developedin a populationonlythroughcompulsion,
throughtheimpositionof moreor less extendedperiodsof disci-
pline.Thisviewhas been particularly influential bothin thedevel-
opmentof social policy in the West - where it representsthe au-
thoritarian side ofthemodernwelfarestate - and in thehistory of
colonialadministration.
Finally,at the oppositeextremeto the first, we findthe view
that,at leastin relatively civilizedpopulations,manyof thosewho
lack the capacitiesrequiredforautonomousactiondo so largely
forwhatmightbe called externalreasons- reasonsto do withill
health,poverty, or inadequateeducation - and thattheroleofgov-
ernmentshouldbe to facilitate thedevelopment oftheircapacities
byestablishing a benignand supportivesocial environment. This
lastview,in fact,reflects theliberalethosofwelfare.
Ifwewereto do a head countofthosesubjectedto liberalrule,
wewouldhavetosaythat,beforethemiddleofthetwentieth century,
thevastmajority consistedof thosewhowerethoughtto belongto
mysecondcategory - thecategory ofthosewhowouldbenefitfrom
beingsubjectedto authoritarian rule:thesubjectpeoplesofWestern
imperialrule and, throughout the nineteenthand earlytwentieth
centuries,substantial groupsinWestern societiesthemselves. In spite
of liberalism's undoubtedcommitment to liberty, onlya minority
wereactually governedas freeindividuals. Anotherminority - whose
sizeis,forobviousreasons,difficult -
to estimate consistedof those
whoweremoreor lesssuccessfully clearedoutoftheway.

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102 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

The remainderof thisarticleconsiderseach of these cate-

goriesin turnand thenmoveson to a briefconclusion.

Hopeless Cases
It is temptingto suggest,the exampleof Locke notwithstanding,
thatliberalshavegenerally seen as repugnantthepracticeofclear-
ingpeople out of theway, and therefore thatonlythesecondand
thirdpartsof thisclassification havemuchto tellus about liberal
politicalreason.In his studyof nineteenth-century Britishliberal
for
thought, example,Uday Mehta relegates to a lengthy footnote
the issue of the extermination of aboriginalpeoples in manyEu-
ropeansettlercolonies."Liberals,"he insists,"didnotadvocateor
countenancethispractice."22 Unfortunately, as we shall see in a
moment, some nineteenth-century British
liberals did countenance
thispractice.Such viewsmaynot havebeen typicalof thefigures
Mehta examines,but the more protectivetreatmentfavoredby
thoseliberalsis notinconsistent withthejudgmentthatsomeabo-
riginalpeoples fallinto the categoryof hopelesscases. Moreover,
whileliberalpoliticalthoughtcommonlydisplaysa civilizeddis-
tasteforthe dirtyworkof government - as, indeed,does political
thought of other kinds - this factalone can hardly theinfer-
justify
ence thatthe distasteful in
practices question have nothingto do
withliberalpoliticalreason.I commenton thislast pointin dis-
cussionofmysecondcategory, thesubjectsofimprovement.
Like the liberalcritiqueof police,the liberalallocationof in-
dividualsor populationsintoone or otherofthesethreecategories
restson thebeliefthatobservation alone,howevercomprehensive
it mightbe, cannotprovidegovernment withan adequate knowl-
edge of thepopulationconcerned.Rather,as we haveseen,liber-
alismmaintainsthatthe populationshould be governedon the
basis of a knowledgeof underlyingsocial processesand condi-
tions- a knowledge, in fact,of thekindprovidedbythesocialsci-
ences,mostespeciallybypoliticaleconomy(and providednowby
theeconomicsthathas takenitsplace). Thus,theliberalallocation
of individualsinto categoriesis a matternot onlyof referring to
observablefeaturesof thoseconcerned,but also of applyingspe-
cializedformsof knowledge.In thisarea as in manyothers,it is
thisreliance on expertisethatparticularly distinguishesliberal
frommanynonliberalpracticesofgovernment. The role ofexpert
advicehereprovidesscantcomfort forthevictims, ofcourse,but-
-
and thisis thepointthatconcernsus itmakesa considerabledif-
ferenceto themannerin whichvictimsare chosen.

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 Hindess 103
Barry

For liberalpoliticalreason,then,it is not the simplefactof

people beingthere,in theway,thatleads to thedecisionthatthey
cannotbe made intogovernablesubjectsand shouldtherefore be
clearedout of theway.Thiswas,of course,a commonresponseof
colonialofficials
settlers, on theground,and even- as in theScot-
-
tishhighlands of local chieftainsempoweredby imperialrule.
Whatleads liberalpoliticalreason to thisdecision,however,is a
combinationof twofactors,one relatingto the specializedknowl-
edgesthatmaybe broughtto bear on thegovernment of thepop-
ulationconcerned,and theotherrelatingto theavailability ofsuit-
able instruments ofgovernment.
This is hardlytheplace fora lengthy analysisofdevelopments
in thespecializedknowledgeofpopulationsthatmightbe available
to liberalgovernment. However,we can get a sense of whatis at
issue here bynotingthat,in the eighteenthand nineteenthcen-
turies,thecentralquestionfacingthe naturalhistoryof humanity
wasthatoftheunityor otherwiseofthespecies.23 On one sidewas
a viewthatPaul Muldoon findsin accountsof Australiaby early
nineteenth-century ethnographers; namely,thatthenativeinhabi-
tants"werenot so muchfundamentally different fromtheirEuro-
pean counterparts as less civilizedthan them. If theylackedtheso-
phistication of the new arrivals, it was not because theywere
different in theirunderlying capacities,but because their ascentup
thescale ofcivilization had been barred by the limitations of their
environment."24 We mightadd that,by the end of the century, the
conceptof culturewas also beingused to providea ratherdiffer-
ent,environmental accountof thisdeficiency.
Bythemiddleof thenineteenthcentury, however, we findan
alternative scientificviewemerging,a viewthatremainedinfluen-
tialuntilwellintothetwentieth century. It claimed,contrary to the
environmental view,thatthesenativeswerenot constituted in the
samewayas thecivilizedinhabitants ofEuropeand itsoverseasex-
tensions.Accordingto thisview,humanity could be dividedintoa
numberofdistinctraces,ofwhichsomeweredecidedlyinferior to
theothers:theirmemberscould neitherbe properly governednor
expectedto advancemuchbeyondtheirpresentlowlycondition.
Their presumedinabilityto advance suggestedin turnthatthey
wouldeventually be displacedbymembersof the superiorraces.
While thissecond viewdoes not necessarilyimplythatinferior
racesshouldtherefore be extinguished, itdoes suggestthat,where
theystandin thewayof progress,theirremovalwouldnot be en-
tirelygratuitous. It is forthisreasonthatHerbertSpencer'sSocial
Staticscelebratesmodernimperialism as one ofthemostimportant
forcesworking towardtheimprovement ofhumanity. These forces,

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104 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

he tellsus, "takingno accountofincidentalsuffering, exterminate

suchsectionsofmankindas standin theirway.... Be he humanor
be he brute- thehindrancemustbe gotridof."25
It mightwellseem,though,thatthefirstof thesecontrasting
perspectives, in whichhumandiversity is understoodin environ-
mentalor culturalterms,shouldresultin a verydifferent conclu-
sion.IftheRomanypeople ofEuropeand thenativeinhabitants of
Australiaand otherareas havebeen held back mainlybytheacci-
dents of environment or culture,then,at least in principle,it
shouldbe possibleto bringthemup to a conditionin whichthey
could be broughtunder civilizedformsof government. This, of
course,bringsus to the second of mythreecategories,and I will
turnto it in a moment.All thatneed be notedat thispointis that,
whatever maybe thecase in principle, itwilloftenseemthatin the
absence of suitableinstruments liberalgovernment can do little
about suchpeople in practice.In the earlydaysof imperialinter-
vention,forexample,representatives of the Westernpowersfre-
quently found themselves with few means of actingon thepopula-
tionconcerned.In suchcases,or so itseemedto them,government
had no realalternative to theuse offorce.In thesecases,too,then,
people were oftencleared outofthewayin thenameofprogress.26

The Subjectsof Improvement

The second categorybringsus to the view thatmanyof those

whoseconductfallsbelowthecivilizednormmustbe subjectedto
improvement throughmoreor lessextendedperiodsofdiscipline
beforetheycan sensiblybe leftto managetheirownaffairs. In its
liberalvariants,thisconceithas providedan importantrationale
fortheeducationof childrenin Westernsocieties,thepracticeof
colonialrule,and thetreatment of theunemployedand otherde-
viantmembersof themetropolitan populations.Since the educa-
tionof childrenconcernsthosewho,whilebelongingto relatively
civilizedpopulations,are normallynotregardedas deviant,it pre-
sentsa ratherspecialcase, and I willnot considerthe matterfur-
therin thisarticle.
We can see whatis at stakein the treatmentof the deviant
membersof civilizedpopulationsby considering,for example,
JohnLocke'sproposalsforreformof thepoor-lawadministration.
Since,in hisview,thereare alwaysopportunities foremployment,
thefactofwidespreadunemployment cannotbe explainedbythe
absence of demandforlabor.It mustthereforehave anotherex-
planation,whichLocke findsin "therelaxationof disciplineand

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 Hindess 105
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thecorruptionof manners;virtueand industry beingas constant

companionson theone sideas viceand idlenessare on theother."27
If thisis indeed the reason,thenthe onlyremedyis to break
thebad habitsand establishbetterones in theirplace. The workof
LawrenceMead offersa morerecent,and in some respectsmore
refined, versionofthisrationale,and I returnto it briefly
below.28
For reasonsofbrevity, my discussionin thissectionfocusesmainly
on colonialadministration.
Whilethe necessity fordisciplineand compulsionhas been a
standardrefrainin thewritings of colonial administrators,29per-
haps itsbest known expressiontodayis theone thatappearsin the
worksofJohnStuartMill,notablyin the introduction to his essay
on Representative
On Libertyand his Considerations Dis-
Government.
cussionof colonial rule takesup onlya smallpartof thesetexts,
but,as Bhabha notes,theirfundamentalarguments"wereorigi-
nallyformulated in a draftdispatchon Indian education,written
in responseto Macaulay'sinfamous'Minute.'"30 In thelatter,Mill
insiststhat"allrealcivilization" is theproductof "continuouslabor
ofan unexciting kind":"inthatwithoutsuchlabor,neithercan the
mindbe disciplinedinto the habitsrequiredbycivilizedsociety,
northematerialworldpreparedto receiveit. ... Hence evenper-
sonalslavery, bygivinga commencement to industriallife,and en-
forcing itas an exclusiveoccupation of the most numerous portion
of the community, mayacceleratethe transitionto a betterfree-
dom thanthatoffighting and rapine."31
WhileMillmaintainsthata civilizedpeople has no need to rely
on personalslaveryfor"imparting civilizationto thoseundertheir
influence,"32 he clearlyregardsthepeoples ofIndia and otherde-
pendenciesas incapableofgoverningthemselves. In hisview,they
are not sufficiently advanced"to be fittedforrepresentative gov-
ernment," and it is therefore to theirownadvantagethattheybe
governedby others - in effect,by agentsof the imperialpower:
"Thismode ofgovernment is as legitimate as anyother,ifit is the
one whichin theexistingstateofcivilization ofthesubjectpeople,
mostfacilitates theirtransition to a higherstageofimprovement."33
Mill'sreferenceto "improvement" remindsus, ifreminderis
needed,thatWesternpoliticalthoughtcommonly relieson an evo-
lutionary viewof historythatplaces modernWesternsocietiesat,
orverycloseto,thepinnacleofhumandevelopment. Non-Western
peoplesare accordingly locatedat a lowerstageofhumanimprove-
ment:theirconductis measuredagainstthenormofWesterncivi-
lizationand foundto be seriously wanting.
Mill does not dwellon the price thatsubjectpopulationsare
forcedto pay for theirown improvement, countingit of little

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106 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

importance comparedwiththebenefits theycan be expectedto re-

ceive.He is seriously concerned,however, withthedemoralizing ef-
fectsof imperialrule on the colonial administrators themselves,
and in particular withthedangerthat,in respondingto theunciv-
ilized conductof thoseoverwhomtheyrule,the administrators'
owncivilizedstandardswillbe corrupted.He observes,forexam-
ple, thattheywillbe temptedto thinkthe people of the country
"meredirtundertheirfeet"- and he mighthave noted the com-
plementary dangerthatsome amongthemwillbe temptedto "go
native."Mill clearlyassumesthatthe imperialgovernment itself
willrepudiatethefirst viewin thenameofthegreatliberalproject
ofimprovement, buthe observesthatitwillnotbe able "tokeep it
downin theyoungand rawevenof itsownciviland military offi-
cers."It is easierto takea morecivilizedviewofsubjectpeoples,he
seemsto suggest,ifone is able to deal withthemonlyat a distance.
Mill uses thisdistinctionbetweenthe civilizedand humaneatti-
tudesof theimperialgovernment and thedistinctly less attractive
viewsof itsofficers on thegroundto introducethe moregeneral
themethatimperialrule "is as likelyto produce evil as good."
"Realgood government," Mill insists,"is not compatiblewiththe
conditionsof the case. There is but a choice of imperfections."34
Imperialrule,in otherwords,mustbe expectedto involveprac-
ticesthatare repugnantto theliberalconscience.
Civilizeddistasteforauthoritarian rule has alwaysbeen a sig-
nificantcomponentof the liberalviewof empire.Equallysignifi-
cant,however, is thebeliefthatthe dirtyworkof government is a
crossthatmore civilizedpeoples willhave to bear if theyare to
bringabouttheimprovement of thesubjectpopulation.

The Ethosof Welfare

Mythirdcategorycorrespondsto the liberalethosofwelfare.In

markedcontrastto Mill's perspectiveon the people of India-
whichsuggeststhattheywill requireseveralgenerationsof im-
provementbeforetheycan reasonablybe set free- the liberal
ethosofwelfarefocuseson the conditionof thosemembersof an
alreadyimprovedpopulationwhoseconditionhas been setbackby
theaccidentsofill health,poverty,incompleteeducation,and the
like.This viewfindsitsclearestexpressionin Mill'sargument,in
anotherpartof his ConsiderationsonRepresentative for
Government,
allowingthosewhoexhibita relativelyhighdegreeofimprovement
to improvethemselves furtherbyparticipatingin government,
and
in T. H. Marshall'swell-known argumentsforthe importanceof

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 Hindess 107
Barry

social policyin thefulldevelopmentof citizenship.35 The sugges-

tionin bothcasesis that- exceptin theeducationofchildrenand
certainkindsofmedicalprocedure - theimprovement ofmanyin-
dividualswithinan alreadyimprovedpopulationcan and should
be broughtaboutwithonlylimitedresortto authoritarian means.
We mightbe temptedto conclude,then,thatthislastcategory
has littleto do withthe liberalgovernmentof unfreedom.This
wouldbe a seriousmistake,firstbecause the allocationof individ-
uals to one or otherof thesecategoriesis itselfan act of govern-
ment,and secondlybecause,as notedearlier,liberalgovernment
performs itsallocationson thebasisofvariouskindsof expertise.
Contemporary Westernstates,forexample,treatsomewelfarere-
cipients in themanner thatMarshall'sargumentseemsto require,
whilesubjectingothersto a degreeof coercionthat,in Marshall's
terms,effectively denies theirstatusas citizens.The choice be-
tweenthesedifferent modes of government is, at least in part,a
functionofexpertadvice- advicewhichsuggeststhat,whilemany
disadvantagedindividualsare capable of managingtheirown af-
fairs,perhapswithsomeassistancefromsocialwelfare, manyothers
are not. It must seem, in the light of thisadvice, that the latter
should be governed as Lawrence Mead's new paternalismsug-
gests36- thatis, byauthoritarian meansthatworkto promotethe
capacitiesrequiredforautonomousaction.
These arguments willbe familiarenoughand I willnot dwell
on themhere exceptto note one further complication - whichis,
in fact,anotherversionofmyearlierpointabouttheavailability of
suitablegovernmental machinery. The currentAustraliangovern-
mentis clearlyattractedbythe newpaternalismand adoptsmany
ofitsprescriptions in certainareasofpolicy - forexample,withre-
gard to the unemployed.37 But thereare otherareas of policyin
which,I am reliablyinformed, it is seriouslyconcernedabout the
costsof establishing and maintaining the meansof exercisingthe
necessarypaternalistic control.Atleastsomeofthedisadvantaged,
then,fallundertheethosofwelfarenotbecausetheyare regarded
as capable,withsomeassistance, ofmanagingtheirownaffairs, but
simplybecauseitwouldbe too expensiveto treatthemotherwise.
I notedearlierthat,untilthemiddleof the twentieth century,the
vastmajority of individualsgovernedbystatescommittedto indi-
viduallibertyin factbelonged to the subjectpeoples of Western
imperialpossessions.Imperialadministration of such possessions
disappearedwiththe endingof Westernrule,but itspassinghas
liberaldemarcations
done littleto underminethecharacteristic be-
tweensettings inhabitedlargelybythosewhocan safelybe treated

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108 TheLiberal
Government
ofUnfreedom

as autonomousagentsand settings thatare not of thiskind.Many

ofthelattercan stillbe foundin whathad once been imperialdo-
mains- as indeed theycan in Westernstatesthemselves - and the
liberalproblemofwhatto do about thepeople who inhabitthese
settingsremains.So, too, withonly minorvariations,does the
rangeofliberalresponsesnotedearlier:fromsimplyleavingthem
to sink or swim - the fate of large partsof Africa,Centraland
SoutheastAsia,and ofindigenouspeoplesin muchof theworld-
to usingaid programsto providefacilitating conditionsthatmight
allowforautonomousaction.
Betweentheseextremes, thegreatliberalprojectofhumanim-
provement has been displacedby- or, more precisely,relabeled
as- thehardlylesspatronizing projectofhumandevelopment. The
aimsoftheprojecthavebarelychanged,buttheend ofempirehas
transformed theconditionsin whichitcan be pursued.In thecolo-
nial era,directrule byofficers of theimperialpowernormally co-
existedwithwhatthe Britishcalled indirectrule- a rule thatal-
lowed,albeitalwaysunder sufferance, the subjectpopulationto
govern themselves in certainrespects.Today,sincethepopulations
offormerimperialdomainshavestatesof theirown,theseearlier
formsof directand indirectrule are not immediately availableto
Westernstates - althoughtheyhave been adapted foruse by the
successorstatesthemselves, oftenwithdisastrous results.38
The lib-
eral projectof improvement, then, can no longer work through
whatit once sawas thecivilizing effects of a benignimperialrule,
and itexpectsrulersand publicofficials in thesuccessorstatesto be
especiallyvulnerable to -
corruption39even more so, in fact,be-
cause oftheirlocal affiliations,thancolonialadministrators on the
ground were seen as vulnerable beforethem.
Instead,the liberalprojectis now pursuedbysignificant mi-
noritiesin non-Western states,manyofwhomhaveadoptedsome
versionof theearlierliberalviewof thepeople amongwhomthey
live,and also,moreremotely, byWesternstatesthemselves working
througha different rangeof indirectmeans.Theyoperate,in ef-
fect,throughnationaland international aid programsthatassist,
adviseand constraintheconductofpostcolonialstates,throughin-
ternational financialinstitutionsand also, of course,throughthat
fundamental liberalinstrument ofcivilization, themarket.The lat-
in
ter, fact, has become increasinglyprominent as we movefurther
away from the decolonizations of the mid-twentieth century.The
marketappears in liberaleyesto performa varietyof necessary
functions, just as it does in the West:reducingopportunities for
corruptionbyconstraining stateconduct,providingan alternative
to (or a meansof organizing)thestateprovisionof services,and,

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 Hindess 109
Barry

finally,
promoting civilizedattitudes
and patterns ofconductamong
theinhabitants oftheselessfortunate settings.
Thus,whilethegreatliberalprojectof improvement remains
verylargelyin place, itsconditionsof actionhave been radically
transformed. Whereit could once relyon the government of un-
freedom,theliberalWestnowhas no alternative but to treatmost
of those who are in need of improvementas if theywere au-
tonomousagents.This pointleads me to one concludingspecula-
tion.Manyauthorshavenotedhowimperialdomainswereused by
Westernstatesas social laboratories,developingand testinggov-
ernmentaltechniquesthatcould thenbe employedin the man-
agementofotherdomains,and evenoftheirownpopulations.40 It
is temptingto suggestthat,in somerespectsat least,theneoliberal
marketization of social relationsin the Westmayhave resulted
froma similartrajectory - thatthe unceasingeffortto replacedi-
rectstateintervention withnewformsofgovernment throughthe
marketfirstpracticed on non-Western peoplesis now beingturned
also on thepeoplesof theWest.

Notes

This articleis part of a collaborativeproject (withBruce Buchan and

Christine Helliwell),"Government, SocialScience,and theConceptofSo-
ciety," that is supportedby the AustralianResearchCouncil.Earlierver-
sionshavebeen presentedat a symposium on liberalgovernment, Univer-
sityof Auckland, June 2000, and at "The Ethos of Welfare" Conference,
University ofHelsinki,August/ September2000.The articlehas benefited
fromdiscussionsat thoseeventsand fromthe advice of Pal Ahluwalia,
MitchellDean, Lisa Hill,Ian Hunter,Paul Muldoon,DavidOwen,and San-
jay Seth.
1. M. Foucault,Ethics:Subjectivity and Truth(New York:New Press,
1997),p. 76.
2. Three editedcollectionsprovideusefulsamples:A. Barry,T. Os-
borne,and N. Rose,eds.,FoucaultandPolitical Neo-liber-
Reason:Liberalism,
alism,andRationalities ofGovernment (Chicago:U of ChicagoP, 1996); G.
Burchell,C. Gordon,and P. Miller,eds., TheFoucault Studies
Effect: in Gov-
ernmentality (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991); M. Dean, and B. Hindess,
eds., Governing Studies
Australia: in ContemporaryRationalities
ofGovernment
(Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1998). Tworecentsurveys of thefieldare M.
Dean, Governmentality: Powerand Rule in ModernSociety (London: Sage,
1999), and N. Rose, PowersofFreedom: Reframing PoliticalThought (Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUP, 1999).
3. Butsee Dean, n. 2, pp. 132-138,B. Hindess,"Democracyand the
Neo-LiberalPromotionofArbitrary Power,"Critical
Review ofInternational
Socialand PoliticalPhilosophy 3, no. 4 (2000): 68-84, and M. Valverde,
"'Despotism'and EthicalLiberalGovernance," Economyand Society25, no.
3 (1996): 357-372.

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110 TheLiberalGovernment
ofUnfreedom

4. Rose,n. 2.
5. DesmondKingmakesa similarpointin his In theNameofLiberal-
ism.IlliberalSocialPolicyin theUSA and Bntain (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999).
6. M. Foucault,TheOrder
ofThings(London:Tavistock,
1970).
7. M. Raeff,The Well-OrderedPoliceState:Social and Institutional
Change
through Law in theGermantes and Russia, 1699-1800 (New Haven: Yale UP,
1983); K. Tribe, Strategiesof EconomicOrder:GermanEconomicDiscourse,
1750-1950(Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1995).
8. M. Foucault,Discipline
andPunish(London:Penguin,1979).
9. A. Smith,An InquiryintotheNatureand Causes oftheWealthofNa-
tions(Oxford:Clarendon,1976).
10. My thanksto Lisa Hill forinsistingon the importanceof this
point.See, esp.,her "HomoEconomicus,'Different Voices,'and theLib-
JournalofAppliedPhilosophy13, no. 1 (1999):
eral Psyche," International
21-46.
11. Foucault,η. 1, p. 75.
12. M. Foucault,"AnEthicsofPleasure,"in S. Lotringer, ed.,Foucault
Live(NewYork:Semiotext, 1989),p. 261.
13. Foucault,η. 6, p. 312.
14. Ibid.
15. C. J.Helliwelland B. Hindess,"'Culture,''Society,'and theFigure
of Man,"History oftheHumanSciences 12, no. 4 (1999): 1-20. In a later
commenton TheOrderofThings, Foucaultlamentsthefactthatthebook
"mayhavegiventheimpression thatmyanalyseswerebeingconductedin
termsof culturaltotality" (TheArcheologyofKnowledge [London:Tavistock,
1972],p. 16).
16. Cf.Kant'sargumentin "Idea fora UniversalHistory"thatman's
naturalcapacitieswillbe realizedonlyat theend ofa longprocessof his-
tory.H. Reiss,ed., Kant'sPoliticalWntings (Cambridge:CambridgeUP,
1970),pp. 41-53.
17. See B. Buchan, The Government
ofPeace: LiberalCivilizationand the
ProblemofViolence, Ph.D. thesis,Canberra,Australian
unpublished National
U, 2000,fora revealingexaminationoftheliberaldiscourseofcivilization.
18. H. Marcuse,OneDimensional Man (London:Abacus,1972) is one
of theclearestexpressionsofthisperspective.
19. Ibid.,d. 333.
20. See the discussions in J. Tully,An ApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy:
Lockein Contexts
(Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 1993), and StrangeMultiplicity.
Constitutionalism
in an AgeofDiversity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995).
21. A closelyrelatedviewformedthe basis of liberaleugenicspro-
gramsproposedin Britainand theUnitedStates.See King,n. 5.
22. U. S. Mehta, Liberalismand Empire.A Studyin Nineteenth-century
Bntish
LiberalThought(Chicago:U ofChicagoP, 1999),p. 3.
23. G. W. Stocking,Victonan (NewYork:The Free Press,
Anthropology
1987),p. 48.
24. P. Muldoon, UndertheEyeoftheMaster:The ColonisationofAbongi-
nality,1770-1870,unpublishedPh.D. thesis,Melbourne,MonashUniver-
sity,1999,p. 60.
25. Spencer,citedin S. Lindqvist,"Exterminate
AlltheBrutes"
(London:
Granta,1996),p. 8.
26. Readerswhodoubtmypointon thisaspectofliberalgovernment
shouldreadLindqvist's powerfulreflectionson Europeaninterventions
in
Africa;Lindqvist,n. 25.

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 BarryHindess 111

27.J.Locke,"AReportoftheBoardofTradeto theLordsJustices Re-

specting the Relief and Employment of the Poor" (1697), in H. R. Fox
Bourne,ed., TheLifeand TimesofJohnLocke([London: 1876] Darmstadt:
ScientiaVerlagAalen,1969), p. 378.
28. L. M. Meade, TheNewPaternalism (Washington: Brookings, 1997).
29. See, forexample,thediscussionsof themeof "thelazynative"in
A. L. Conklin,A MissiontoCivilize:TheRepublican Idea ofEmpire inFrance
and West Africa,1895-1930(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997),and S. Philpott,
Rethinking Indonesia:Postcolonial Theory,Authontananism, Identity (Bas-
ingstoke,UK: Macmillan,2000).
30. H. K. Bhabha,TheLocationofCulture (London:Routledge,1994),
pp. 94-95.
31.J. S. Mill,Considerations onRepresentativeGovernment, inJ. M. Rob-
son,ed., CollectedWorks ofJohnStuartMill (Toronto:U ofTorontoP, 1977
[1865]), pp. 394-395.
32. Ibid.,p. 395.
33. Ibid.,p. 567.
34. Ibid.,pp. 572-573.
35. T. H. Marshall,Citizenship andSocialClass(Cambridge:Cambridge
UP, 1950).
36. Meade,n. 28.
37. M. Dean, "Administering Asceticism:Reworking theEthicalLifeof
theUnemployed Citizen,"in M. Dean and B. Hindess,eds., Governing Aus-
tralia:Studiesin Contemporary Rationalities
ofGovernment (Cambridge:Cam-
bridgeUP, 1998),pp. 87-107.
38. See thetreatment of thisissuein M. Mamdani,Citizen and Subject:
Contemporary Africa and theLegacyofLateColonialism (Princeton:Princeton
UP, 1996).
39. SusanRose-Acker manpresentsa particularly clearexampleofthis
perspective in her Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, andRe-
form(Cambridge:CambridgeUP, 1999).
40. See, forexample,C. Hill, Liberty againsttheLaw (London: Pen-
guin,1996); O. McDonagh,Ireland:TheUnionand ItsAftermath (London:
Allen& Unwin,1977); P. Rabinow, FrenchModern: Norms andForms oftheSo-
cialEnvironment (Cambridge:MIT Press,1989); G. Viswanathan, Masksof
Conquest: LiteraryStudyand BntishRulein India (London: Faber& Faber,
1989).

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