ISRAEL’S UNIQUE “UNITY-

GOVERNMENT” EXPERIMENT

1 INTRODUCTION
peculiarity (different from other post-poll alliances)
backdrop

2 BODY
Flow of events (3 elections, 11 judge bench hearing, demonstrations against the coalition
deal, the Knesset’s approval of the unity government)
Distinctive aspects (Netanyahu’s corruption charges, covid-19, economic fallout)
Features of the govt (new post of alternate PM or designated premier, freshly created
offices, veto, twin objectives for the early weeks – annexation of West Bank and addressing
the economic devastation due to coronavirus)
Reactions of the people

3 CONCLUSION
Implications
Future prospects
Introduction
This year, from the start, has proven beyond speculation that it’s not of the run-of-the-mill,
mundane, vanilla variety. 2020 has turned out to be shocking in more than one unusual
way. Beginning with the deadly wildfires that ravaged Australia and the apprehensions of a
war, possibly nuclear, between US and Iran to the historic withdrawal of Britain from the
EU, it without preamble landed us in the middle of a global pandemic even as the anti-CAA
protests all over India were in full swing.
Adding to the slew of unforeseen events is Israel’s new one of its kind “power-sharing deal”
and the consequent formation of the “unity government” as it is popularly being called.
What distinguishes it from other post-poll alliances is the fact that the coalition was formed
between two political rivals, Likud party led by the incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and Blue and White party headed by the former military chief, Benny Gantz,
embodying fundamental ideological differences. Moreover, this comes after a year of
political instability borne out of the three inconclusive Knesset elections held between April
2019 and March 2020.
The case becomes even more riveting as we take a closer look at its peculiar, unique
aspects.
Body
Let’s begin by establishing the course of events that led to this unusual outcome.
Elections were called by Netanyahu in April 2019 following the resignation of the Defence
Minister Avigdor Liberman, leaving the ruling coalition near collapse. Some saw this as a
tactic to win a renewed public mandate to side-line the prosecutors on the verge of
finalising the charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust against Netanyahu.
In keeping with Israel’s history of elections never producing a clear majority, the Netanyahu-
led Likud party failed to get enough seats. This was followed by months of failed attempts to
negotiate a coalition with any of the opposition parties. Instead of allowing his primary rival
Gantz a chance to form a government, Netanyahu provoked a second election on
September 17.
Once again, inconclusive verdict and failed talks maintained the political deadlock. By this
time, Netanyahu had been formally indicted on corruption charges which further
complicated the coalition talks as Gantz refused to work under a Prime Minister facing
criminal charges.
These developments left them with little but to go for a historic third election in less than a
year, making it the longest period of political uncertainty in Israel’s history. The third
election, held on March 2, produced a mixed verdict yet another time, perpetuating the
neck-and-neck competition between Likud and Blue and White.
This time, however, coalition talks proved fruitful as Gantz gave in, ostensibly on account of
the emergency created by the pandemic. A power-sharing agreement between Netanyahu’s
right-wing Likud party and Gantz’ centrist Blue and White was crafted, specifying in detail,
the conditions of the coalition and the sharing of offices.
So, what does the agreement say? Under the three-year deal between Netanyahu and
Gantz, each would head the government as the Prime Minister for 18 months, during which
the other would occupy the newly-created post of “Alternate” Prime Minister and Defence
Minister. It allows the government to pass legislation only aimed at mitigating the economic
fallout caused by the pandemic in the initial six months. It also freezes certain public
appointments during the initial six-month emergency phase. Besides, it creates multiple
new offices and portfolios to accommodate the prominent coalition partners and avoid
defection, notwithstanding the economic vulnerability of the nation at such a juncture.
Clearly, it didn’t take long for various provisions of the agreement to come under fire by the
opposition and civil society. To begin with, the agreement is for a period of three years
while the law of Israel endows governments with a term of four years. Secondly, it is a direct
violation of the law for a minister indicted on criminal charges to hold office. According to
the opposition, the coalition partners are counting on the public not reading agreement.
At the same time, demonstrations were held by thousands of Israelis against the coalition
deal in Tel Aviv, urging Gantz not to join forces with the leader accused of bribery and fraud.
A panel of 11 judges heard the 8 petitions against the deal in a trial that was televised live in
Israel. Though reservations were expressed about the legality of certain provisions, at the
end of the day, it received a go-ahead from the court, averting the possibility of a fourth
election amidst the crisis.
After receiving the Knesset’s approval, the new government was sworn in on May 17 in
Jerusalem. Its immediate goals, as highlighted in the leaders’ speeches at the event, are
addressing the health emergency and economic crisis as well as annexing the Jewish
settlements and Jordan Valley in West Bank, for which the US has expressed its support in
its Middle east plan, much to the fury of the Palestinians.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say that this deal is as unprecedented as it is legally flawed. How it
plays out and what it means for the governance of the country and the well-being of its
citizens, only time will tell. It could surprise us all by becoming a successful experiment of a
government exemplifying a broad spectrum of ideological leanings and policy preferences
that is able to bring to the table inclusive programmes enjoying widespread public approval
or Israel could be going for a fourth election sooner than it expects. The possibilities are
endless. Let’s hope it works out for the best, setting a fresh example for effective
emergency response and deadlock resolution in electoral politics.