Fig. 6 . 3 . A skeletal composite of Mead's and Schutz's models.

Conclusion: A Synthesized Model

In Fig. 6.3, I have combined Mead's and Schutz's models into a com- posite that provides a
skeletal outline of the current theoretical work on interactional processes. As the model
underscores, the processes of mu- tually signaling and interpreting are the vehicle by which
actors influence each others' responses. For unless the signals of actors are mutually inter-
preted and used to organize subsequent signaling, interaction does not oc- cur. A theoretical
analysis of interaction must, therefore, explain the dy- namics of signaling and interpreting of
gestures.

As is portrayed in the composite model, actors use their stocks of knowl- edge as deep-
background configurations of experiences to frame, in broad strokes, their deliberations about
themselves, their emission of signals, and their interpretation of the signals emitted by others.
Moreover, individuals in interaction must focus their stocks of knowledge through the
invocation of the relevant generalized other(s), which provide(s) a more precise frame- work
for interpreting gestures, thinking about alternatives, viewing one- self, and signaling a
course of behavior. The generalized other thus makes more specific how actors are to orient
themselves in a particular interac- tion. It provides more clear-cut standards and criteria by
which one weighs potential alternatives, conceives of self, signals intentions, and interprets
the responses of others.

In approaching more contemporary theories of interaction, then, our goal should be to

develop a more detailed analysis of how people signal and interpret through their behavioral
capacities for using implicit stocks of knowledge, focusing these stocks through shared
cognitive frameworks,

Mead's and Schutz's Models 83

84.INTERACTIONAL PROCESSES

deliberating on potential responses, and seeing themselves as objects. As the composite

model communicates by the juxtaposition of these variables, an individual's self-conception,
as broadly framed by stocks of knowledge and more clearly defined by the criteria of the
generalized other, circum- scribes how an individual signals in an interaction, whereas stocks
of knowledge, as concretized by the cognitive ability to invoke more specific frameworks, are
most directly critical in interpreting the gestures of others. All of these dynamics presuppose,
of course, the ability to think reflectively, for it is through this capacity that stocks of
knowledge are accumulated and brought to bear in a situation, that conceptions of self are
possible, and that generalized frameworks can be invoked. Moreover, as the causal arrows in
the model stress, reflective thinking is more than a mediator be- tween stocks of knowledge,
self, and generalized others, on the one hand, and signaling and interpreting, on the other.
While thought and reflection are clearly constrained by self, stocks of knowledge, and
generalized frame- works, these "mind" processes also exert direct and, to some extent, in-
dependent effects on signaling and interpreting.
Such is my view of the early theoretical legacy as Talcott Parsons con- fronted it in 1937 with
the publication of The Structure of Social Action. Parsons did not use this legacy, but most
contemporary theorists have em- ployed the skeletal outline in Fig. 6.3, usually emphasizing
only some di- mensions of signaling and interpreting, while ignoring others. Theorists have
also tended to assert that the variables in their own theories are the only critical processes. In
contrast, I suggest that only when these theories are combined under the guidance of the
composite model in Fig. 6.3 will an adequate conceptualization of signaling and interpreting
emerge.

7. Contemporary Models of Interaction

As CONTEMPORARY THEORISTS have implicitly worked with the skeletal model

provided by Mead and Schutz, they have empha- sized some signaling and interpreting
processes at the expense of others. The result is a series of discrete models that, though full of
insight, ignore many important dimensions of social interaction. In this chapter, I present the
underlying models in the work of diverse theorists, with a special eye to how their ideas can
be reconciled for the synthesis presented in Chap- ter 8.

In selecting the theorists to be examined here, I have chosen for detailed review the most
visible representatives of particular theoretical traditions. I open with an examination of
Ralph Turner's role-theory perspective, then explore the dramaturgical analysis of Erving
Goffman, especially as his early work on dramaturgy was modified by his conceptualization
of ritual and framing. Next, I present Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodological "al- ternative"
in a way that encourages reconciliation with mainstream theo- rizing about interaction; and
finally, I extract elements from Jiirgen Ha- bermas's critical theoretic project, particularly his
formulation of "validity claims" in the "ideal speech act."

Turner's Role Theory

Over the last 25 years, Ralph Turner has used Mead's model of inter- action to develop a
strategy for the analysis of roles (1979, 1978, 1968, 1962). In so doing, he has blended
contemporary symbolic interactionism (e.g., Stryker, 1980; Manis and Meltzer, 1978;
Blumer, 1969; Strauss, 1959) with role theory (e.g., Heiss, 1981; Biddle and Thomas, T966)
in ways that maintain the emphasis of symbolic interactionism on process and, at the same
time, revitalize the more structural concept of "role." Too often, I feel, the notion of "role" is
abandoned in micro analysis; contrary to perhaps a majority of current micro theorists, I see
the dynamics of "roles" as fundamental in human relations.1

‘ Yet I will not use it to denote normatively regulated behavior associated with a "status
position," which was Parsons's (1951) use in his conceptualization of the "status-role."
86.INTERACTIONAL PROCESSES

Turner has developed his approach partly in response to the problems of role theory (R.
Turner, 1962), which include an excessively structured view of interaction,2 too great a
concern with deviant roles, and a failure to ex- tend the central concept in Mead's approach—
role-taking—in creative di- rections. As a result of addressing these problems, Turner
implicitly em- ploys a model of interaction that emphasizes the process of role-taking and, as
will become evident, its conceptual companion, "role-making."

Turner views role-taking in much the same terms as Mead—reading and interpreting the
gestures of others so as to assume their perspective, dis- position, and likely line of conduct.
But Turner adds an important element to this conceptualization: humans operate with the
"folk assumption" that behavior is organized into identifiable roles. That is, people assume
that the gestures of others constitute a syndrome or system of signals.' This syn- drome of
signals constitutes a role that, according to Turner, involves ste- reotypical sequences of
behavior that are part of the knowledge base of competent actors. Indeed, in Turner's view,
humans tacitly employ a "folk norm of consistency" that predisposes an assessment of
behaviors in terms of their internal consistency and their capacity to signal what role others
are playing. Until shown otherwise, people assume that gestures are con- sistent and mark an
underlying role. Hence, the process of role-taking in- volves interpreting the behavior of
others as a syndrome of gestures that reveals a role. For at the heart of role-taking "is the
tendency to shape the phenomenal world into roles" (R. Turner, 1962: 21).

Turner (1962: 23) recognizes, however, that "interaction is always a ten- tative process, a
process of continuously testing the conception one has of the role of the other." Role-taking is
thus both active and provisional be- cause additional gestures will be assessed in terms of
how they fit with the role marked by previous gestures. This set of processes is termed by
Turner "validation" or "verification." Actors read new gestures to see if they are consistent
with those emitted earlier; and so they verify, or fail to verify, the imputed role. Verification
depends upon the capacity of the imputed role to maintain the flow of interaction and/or to
correspond to external criteria, such as relevant group norms and contextual features of the
sit- uation. Should gestures fail to be verified, a reassessment is in order, but this reevaluation
will still involve the use of the "folk norm of consistency" in an effort to discover and verify a
new role.

While Turner argues that actors typically possess only "loose cultural frameworks" of norms,
beliefs, values, and contexts for interpreting ges- tures and imputing roles, I advocate a more
extreme position: competent

‘Turner critiques not only Parsons but also most "role theorists" who assume that "struc-
ture" is simply a system of complementary roles.

‘This line of argument derives more from Schutz than Mead, although I'm not sure if Turner
is directly borrowing from Schutz here.
87 actors possess relatively fine-tuned conceptions of roles and they use these as guidelines in
role-taking, imputation, and verification.4 In contrast, Turner would assert that, to some
degree, imputation and verification in- volve a more creative and situational interpretation of
another's role. Al- though this is the case under some conditions, I argue that, in most cir-
cumstances, role-taking begins with the use of shared role-conceptions as the basis for
imputing a role. Only when the gestures of others do not seem to correspond to these more
shared and standardized conceptions do ac- tors begin to construct a situationally unique role
for others.

Moreover, as Schutz (1932.) stressed, role-taking occurs at varying lev- els—from mutual
typification to deeper insight into another's subjective states. This point can be used to extend
Turner's argument into a simple hypothesis: long-term interactions, especially those involving
strong emo- tional feelings, will increasingly move from imputation in terms of cultur- ally
shared role-conceptions to more idiosyncratic constructions and im- putations of another's
role. Yet, even here, these idiosyncratic roles are constructed within the parameters of
culturally shared role-conceptions (for example, in any culture, actors evidence common
conceptions of what "friendship" involves or what "long-term" interaction should produce).

Thus, Turner's analysis of role-taking extends Mead's, and more implic- itly Schutz's, ideas in
creative ways. The left and bottom portions of Fig. 7.1 outline this critical process in ways
that encourage comparison with the skeletal model presented in Fig. 6.3. Actors possess
"loose cultural frameworks," which I see as similar to Schutz's conceptualization of "stocks
of knowledge." A critical aspect of these cultural stocks is the "folk norm of consistency," in
which individuals assume, until it is clearly dem- onstrated otherwise, that the gestures of
others constitute a syndrome marking a role. These cultural frameworks, ordered by folk
norms of con- sistency, lead actors to develop (through socialization and experience) an
inventory of role-conceptions, which represent clusters or syndromes of behaviors denoting
both general classes and more specific types of roles— for example, mother, father, son,
daughter, good worker, close friend, ac- quaintance, serious student, etc. By virtue of humans'
capacity for "mind," or deliberation, actors "run through" this inventory of conceptions as
they role-take with others. They seek to determine which roles the gestures of others signal,
make preliminary imputations, and then on the basis of sub-

‘In saying this, however, I am not arguing that one's position in a system automatically
dictates the role to be played. Rather, people know the syndromes of gestures associated with
an enormous number of roles and can use this knowledge to interpret what others are doing.
Moreover, actors may be unconscious of all their gestures and the role that they imply for
others; yet these others will generally be able to assign a role—say, "sullen and depressed
student-intellectual"—to an individual, and when confronted with a given set of gestures,
most people will come up with the same role-designation.