Pastoral Psychology, Vol. 53, No.

5, May 2005 (

C 2005)

DOI: 10.1007/s11089-005-2587-9

Dogmatism, Religion, and Psychological Type

Christopher F. J. Ross,1 Leslie J. Francis,2,4 and Charlotte L. Craig3

A sample of 422 female undergraduate students, attending a university-sector

college in Wales specialising in teacher education and liberal arts subjects, com-
pleted the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator together with the Troldahl-Powell Dog-
matism Scale. The data demonstrated that higher dogmatism scores are most
clearly associated with sensing rather than intuition. Higher dogmatism scores
are also associated with extraversion rather than introversion, and with judging
rather than perceiving. No significant difference in dogmatism scores were found
between thinking and feeling.
KEY WORDS: dogmatism; psychological type; religiosity; students.

INTRODUCTION

Webster’s New World Dictionary (Neufeldt, 1988) defines dogmatism as (i)

having strong beliefs, (ii) not caring about the different beliefs of others, and in
turn (iii) not considering evidence that may warrant changing or modifying one’s
beliefs. Religious dogma was critiqued by Freud (1928) as belief that was based
on authority rather than reason. The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale was designed
by Rokeach (1960) to measure differences in the extent to which individuals’
belief systems were open or closed. Seeking to minimise the ideological content
of beliefs present in the Authoritarianism Scale proposed by Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950), Rokeach wished to assess the general
1 Christopher F. J. Ross is Associate Professor, Department of Religion and Culture, Waterloo, Wilfred
Laurier University, Ontario, Canada.
2 Leslie J. Francis is Director of the Welsh National Centre for Religious Education and Professor of
Practical Theology, University of Wales, Bangor, UK.
3 Charlotte L. Craig is Project Officer, Welsh National Centre for Religious Education, University of
Wales, Bangor, UK.
4 Address correspondence to Leslie J. Francis, Welsh National Centre for Religious Education,
University of Wales, Bangor, Normal Site, Holyhead Road, Bangor, Gwynedd, LL57 2PZ, Wales,
UK; e-mail: l.j.francis@bangor.ac.uk.

483
0031-2789/05/0500-0483/0

C 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
484 Ross, Francis, and Craig

structure of belief systems. He thought the Dogmatism Scale useful in identifying

“general authoritarianism and intolerance.”
There has been a long and interesting history concerned with exploring the
relationships between a number of derivatives of Rokeach’s Dogmatism Scale and
a number of aspects of religion. For example, a first group of studies compares
Christian believers with unbelievers or with general population norms. Kania
(1967) found that seminarians recorded higher dogmatism scores than the pub-
lished population norms. Feather (1967) found that students belonging to religious
societies recorded higher dogmatism scores than student atheists. Poythress (1975)
found higher dogmatism scores among religious believers than among sceptics,
when undergraduates were divided into two groups according to their profiles
on the LAM scales (Hunt, 1972). In a sample of adults, Paloutzian, Jackson, and
Crandall (1978) found higher dogmatism scores among those who identified them-
selves as Christians than among the other respondents. In a second study among
students, however, Paloutzian, Jackson, and Crandall (1978) failed to replicate this
finding. Cryns (1970) found higher dogmatism scores among Catholic seminarians
and priests than among ex-seminarians and ex-priests.
A second group of studies focuses on a behavioural measure of religiosity,
examining the correlation between dogmatism and church attendance. A pos-
itive relationship between dogmatism and frequency of church attendance has
been reported in studies among professional Italian politicians (Di Renzo, 1967),
students from Georgia University and Loyola University (Kilpatrick, Sutker, &
Sutker, 1970), undergraduates from Ithara College (MacDonald, 1970), psychol-
ogy students (Steininger, Durso, & Pasquariello, 1972), and adult churchgoers
(Strickland & Weddell, 1972). On the other hand, no significant relationship be-
tween dogmatism and frequency of church attendance was found among adult
participants in a seminar (Eckhardt & Newcombe, 1969), among undergraduates
(Primavera, Tantillo, & DeLisio, 1980), among high school pupils (Wilson, 1985),
or among adult church members (Schlangen & Davidson, 1985). The factor an-
alytic study undertaken by Wearing and Brown (1972) found church attendance
and dogmatism to load on unrelated factors. Similarly, Kahoe and Dunn (1975),
in a study among churchgoers, found no relationship between dogmatism and
regularity of various religious activities.
A third group of studies explores the correlation between dogmatism scores
and various indices of religiosity. Some of these studies reported a positive re-
lationship. Stanley (1963a) found a positive correlation between dogmatism and
a single item measure of fundamentalism among students involved in Christian
groups. Using the same measure of fundamentalism, Stanley (1963b, 1964) repli-
cated this finding among theological students from eight denominations. In a study
among psychology students, Feather (1964) found a positive correlation between
dogmatism and a twenty-four item religious attitude test. Using the religious scale
of the Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey (1960) Study of Values, positive correlations
Dogmatism, Religion, and Psychological Type 485

with dogmatism were found among male college applicants by Plant, Telford, and
Thomas (1965) and among students entering five medical schools in the USA by
Juan, Raiva, Haley, and O’Keefe (1974). Swindell and L’Abate (1970) found a
positive correlation between dogmatism and their two religiosity scales, the Re-
ligious Attitude Questionnaire and the Fundamentalist Attitude Inventory, among
psychology students. Di Giuseppe (1971) found a positive correlation between
dogmatism and his nine item scale assessing the importance of religion among
students. Using Batson’s (1976) Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale, McNeel and Thorsen
(1985) found a positive correlation with dogmatism among students. Using a
modified form of King and Hunt’s (1969) Creedal Assent Scale, Hoge and Keeter
(1976) found a positive correlation with dogmatism among university teachers. In
a study among psychology students, Thalbourne, Dunbar, and Delin (1995) found
a positive correlation between dogmatism and the traditional religious belief index
developed as a subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale proposed by Tobacyk and
Milford (1983). However, in a factor analytic study among university students,
Wearing and Brown (1972) found religious belief and dogmatism loading clearly
on different factors. Other studies failed to find any correlation between dogma-
tism and measures of religiosity. Plant, Telford, and Thomas (1965) found no
relationship with the religious scale of the Study of Values among female college
applicants. Meredith (1968), in a study among psychology students, found no
relationship in a multiple regression model with either the Thurstone and Chave
(1929) Attitude toward the Church Scale or the Ferguson (1944) Religionism
Scale. Francis (2001) and Francis and Robbins (2003) found no significant asso-
ciations between dogmatism scores and scores recorded on the Francis scale of
attitude toward Christianity (Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Brown, & Lester, 1995).
Moreover, Wilson (1985) found a significant negative correlation between dog-
matism and a thirty-item Likert type measure of conservative Christian beliefs in
a study among high school pupils.
The fourth and more sophisticated group of studies is concerned with the cor-
relation between dogmatism and different Christian orientations. Raschke (1973)
employs the distinction drawn by Allen and Spilka (1967) between consensual
and committed religiosity. Using his own measures of these dimensions Raschke
(1973) concludes that dogmatism is “more positively associated with consensual
religiosity than with committed religiosity” (p. 339), although no statistics are
cited to support this claim.
A larger number of studies employ the distinction between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic religiosity, as developed by Allport and Ross (1967), and some include
the quest orientation introduced by Batson and Ventis (1982). Even these studies,
however, lead to no simple consensus, in part because of the variety of ways in
which scores on the Religious Orientation Scales can be employed. In simple cor-
relation studies both Kahoe (1974) among college students and Kahoe and Dunn
(1975) among churchgoers found dogmatism correlated positively with extrinsic
486 Ross, Francis, and Craig

religiosity but was uncorrelated with intrinsic religiosity. In two separate samples
of church members, Hoge and Carroll (1973) found dogmatism correlated pos-
itively with both extrinsic religiosity and intrinsic religiosity. In two samples of
students, both Paloutzian, Jackson, and Crandall (1978) and McNeel and Thorsen
(1985) found dogmatism to be independent of both extrinsic religiosity and in-
trinsic religiosity. On the other hand, in a sample of adults, Paloutzian, Jackson,
and Crandall (1978) found dogmatism to be independent of extrinsic religiosity,
but positively correlated with intrinsic religiosity. Using Wilson’s (1960) extrinsic
scale, Primavera, Tantillo, and DeLisio (1980) found no correlation with dogma-
tism. Using the scale scores in a different way, Strickland and Weddell (1972) found
intrinsic church members were more dogmatic than extrinsic church members in
a study among Unitarian and Southern Baptists. Thompson (1974) found both
the indiscriminately anti-religious and the intrinsic religious to be less dogmatic
than the extrinsic religious or the indiscriminately pro-religious. This finding held
good across their three separate analyses of Catholic adolescents, their mothers,
and their fathers. Finally, McNeel and Thorsen (1985) found a positive correlation
between the quest orientation and dogmatism.
This review makes it abundantly clear that there is no simple empirical
consensus to support the popular accusation that religious faith and the closed
mind go hand in hand. At the same time, there is enough evidence to show
that there may be conditions under which the accusation holds true. Research
concerned with the relationship between personality and dogmatism may well
hold an important clue. A series of studies using Eysenck’s two dimensional
model of personality (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964) indicate how dogmatism can be
located within wider personality theory.
Eysenck’s first major dimension of personality is that of neuroticism. While
two early studies by Day (1966) and Drakeford (1969) found no relationship
between dogmatism and neuroticism, eight studies by Stanley (1964), Smithers
(1970), Wearing and Brown (1972), Gilliland, Rogers, and Walsh (1977), Smithers
and Lobley (1978), Schmitz (1985), Thalbourne, Dunbar, and Delin (1995), and
Francis (1998) found a positive relationship between dogmatism and neuroticism.
Thus, the balance of research findings confirms Rockeach’s view that dogmatism
is a defensive cognitive structure resorted to by individuals who are highly anx-
ious: “ideological dogmatism has its motivational basis in anxiety” (Rockeach &
Fruchter, 1956, p. 158). Similarly, David Wulff (1997) concluded that, while the
exact nature of the Rockeach Dogmatism Scale “is far from clear,” dogmatism
“and related scales have yielded predictable results consistent with the theories
proposed to explain the origins and dynamics of the personality characteristics in
question” (Wulff, 1997, p. 230).
Eysenck’s second major dimension of personality is that of extraversion.
No consistent relationship has been established between dogmatism and various
editions of the Eysenckian extraversion scale. Gilliland, Rogers, and Walsh (1977)
and Schmitz (1985) reported a negative relationship with extraversion, while
Dogmatism, Religion, and Psychological Type 487

Cohen and Harris (1972) reported a positive relationship, and Smithers and Lobley
(1978) reported a curvilinear relationship. However, in six studies by Stanley
(1964), Day (1966), Smithers (1970), Wearing and Brown (1972), Thalbourne,
Dunbar, and Delin (1995), and Francis (1998), no relationship was found between
dogmatism and extraversion.
A somewhat richer and potentially more fruitful model of personality for illu-
minating individual differences in dogmatism and religiosity may be provided by
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). This instrument is based on a compre-
hensive theory of personality developed by C. G. Jung (1971) and refined by Isabel
Briggs Myers (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Alongside an extraversion measure,
the MBTI also includes three other measures of individual personality differences
that have been related to others factors composing the Big Five Factor Model of
personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999). Furthermore, the MBTI has been found to be
useful in many applied settings (Myers & McCaulley, 1985; Kendall, 1998). The
MBTI allocates individuals in regard to four basic sets of personal preferences.
Using the theory of psychological type developed by Jung and Briggs Myers the
following hypotheses were formulated.

Extraversion and Introversion

According to Jung’s (1971) theory of psychological type, as measured by

the MBTI, extraversion (E) and introversion (I) are the two orientations, two con-
trasting ways of gathering psychological energy. Extraverts derive energy from
the outer world and through opportunities to interact with others, while introverts
derive energy from their inner world and through opportunities to reflect. It was
hypothesised that extraversion and introversion would not be related to dogma-
tism. The rationale for this hypothesis is the fact that the majority of previous
studies which employed measures of dogmatism alongside the Eysenckian scale
of extraversion found no relationship between these two variables.

Sensing and Intuition

According to Jung’s (1971) theory of psychological type, as measured by

the MBTI, sensing (S) and intuition (N) are the two perceiving functions, two
contrasting ways of perceiving and processing information. Sensing types focus
on details, realities and practicalities as perceived by the senses, concentrating
on specific content, while intuitive types focus on possibilities, meanings, and
relationships as perceived by the unconscious, relating information to the wider
context. It was hypothesised that individuals who preferred sensing, rather than
intuition, would be prone to higher scores on a dogmatism scale. The rationale for
this hypothesis is that dogmatism involves closing off alternative ways of seeing
the world, including the beliefs of others, which would be more difficult for those
preferring intuition as their way of dealing with information.
488 Ross, Francis, and Craig

Thinking and Feeling

According to Jung’s (1971) theory of psychological type, as measured by the

MBTI, thinking (T) and feeling (F) are the two judging functions, two contrasting
ways of making judgements, coming to conclusions, and making decisions. Think-
ing types make judgements on the basis of logical consistency, often involving
analysis that differentiates cause and effect without direct reference to human and
personal consequences, while feeling types make judgements in a “close up” or
personalised manner based on a consideration of values and human consequences
for themselves as well as for others. It was hypothesised that, while thinking
and feeling might accentuate intuitive/sensing differences, thinking and feeling
on their own would not make a difference in regard to dogmatism. The rationale
for this hypothesis is that it could be argued that both thinking and feeling would
be associated with lower dogmatism, thinking allowing for a more detached and
dispassionate view of the different beliefs of others, and feeling making for a more
empathic and compassionate orientation towards disparate beliefs held by others.

Judging and Perceiving

According to MBTI theory, judging (J) and perceiving (P) are the two atti-
tudes toward the outside world, determined by which of the two sets of functions
(that is, Perceiving S/N, or Judging T/F), is preferred in dealings with the outer
world. Judging types seek to order, rationalise, and structure their outer world, as
they actively judge external stimuli, while perceiving types do not seek to impose
order on the outer world, but are more flexible, perceptive, and open, as they pas-
sively perceive external stimuli. It was hypothesised that individuals who preferred
judging, rather than perceiving, would be prone to higher scores on a dogmatism
scale. The rationale for this hypothesis is that a judging function, irrespective
of the specific kind of judging function favoured by a given individual (feeling
judgement or thinking judgement) operates to bring closure, determination, and
decision in orienting to the outside world. Therefore, inasmuch as dogmatism has
been considered as a closing off in relation to both the perspective of others and to
disconfirming evidence, judging types may be expected to have higher dogmatism
scores.

Function Pairs

According to Jung’s (1971) theory of psychological type, as measured by the

MBTI, the combination of function pairs preferences will have implications for
a variety of personality characteristics. It was hypothesised that NTs with their
value of autonomy and abstract thinking would be the most free from unexamined
beliefs and least dogmatic, followed by NFs, whose idealism would encourage
Dogmatism, Religion, and Psychological Type 489

development of universal values of tolerance and fairness associated with low

scores on the dogmatism scale, but whose feeling function might be more suscep-
tible to prevailing conventional wisdom. It was hypothesised that STs would have
higher dogmatism scores than SFs, whose feeling preference with its concern for
the human implications of decisions would soften the impermeability of belief
systems associated with high dogmatism scores.

Perception/Attitude Pairs

It was hypothesised that SJs, with their focus on specific details combined
with a judging preference for closure, would be more dogmatic than SPs, whose
preference for perceiving might lead them to be more open to information that did
not necessarily confirm their beliefs. It was hypothesised that NPs would have the
lowest scores based on the expectation that both intuition and perceiving would
be associated with lower dogmatism scores.
Thus, the predicted ranking of means on the dogmatism scale for the function
pairs and perception/attitude pairs was SJs, followed by STs, SPs/SFs, NJs, NFs,
NTs, and NPs.
According to MBTI theory, the four indices of psychological type (EI, SN,
TF, JP) combine to form sixteen discrete types. A final additional purpose of this
study was to see which of the sixteen psychological types might be associated
with high and with low levels of dogmatism.

METHOD

A sample of 422 female undergraduate students, attending a university-sector

college specialising in teacher education and liberal arts subjects in Wales, com-
pleted the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Form G (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) dur-
ing the induction week at the start of their course of study. Two-fifths (41%) were
enrolled in the four year initial teacher education degree; three-fifths (59%) were
enrolled in the three year liberal arts degrees. The majority (79%) were aged 18 or
19, 11% were aged 20 or 21, and the remaining 10% were over the age of 21 years.
Students also completed the 20-item Dogmatism scale proposed by Troldahl and
Powell (1965). Each item is scored on a six-point scale: agree completely, agree
mostly, agree a little, a little wrong, mostly wrong, and completely wrong.

RESULTS

The Dogmatism Scale demonstrated highly satisfactory qualities of internal

consistency and homogeneity (alpha coefficient = .80). Table 1 presents the mean
dogmatism scores according to dichotomous preferences for extraversion and
490 Ross, Francis, and Craig

Table 1. Dogmatism Scores by Basic Preference Set

Type categories N Mean SD F P

Preference set
Extraversion 296 72.44 13.71
Introversion 126 69.29 13.55 4.68 <.05
Sensing 255 74.06 13.36
Intuition 167 67.59 13.38 23.68 <.001
Thinking 95 71.57 14.01
Feeling 327 71.48 13.66 0.00 NS
Judging 226 72.78 13.95
Perceiving 196 70.02 13.34 4.26 <.05

introversion, for sensing and intuition, for thinking and feeling, and for judging
and perceiving. These data show that high dogmatism scores were associated with
preference for sensing over intuition, with preference for judging over perceiving,
and with preference for extraversion over introversion. There were no significant
differences with regard to dogmatism scores between students with a feeling
preference and students with a thinking preference.
Table 2 presents the mean dogmatism scores according to function pairs
and perception/attitude pairs, ranked from high to low dogmatism. Individuals
were grouped according to selected pairs of combined preferences. The following
statistical analyses focus in turn on comparisons between the four function pairs
and the four perception/attitude pairs.

Function Pairs

The four function pairs, namely STs, SFs, NFs, and NTs, were tested for
overall difference in regard to their dogmatism scores. A significant overall dif-
ference was found (F = 8.7, p < .001), and so specific comparisons were made.
STs scored significantly higher than NFs (t = 3.21, p < .01) and NTs (t = 3.69,
p < .001), as did SFs compared to NFs (t = 3.68, p < .001) and NTs (t = 3.81,

Table 2. Ranking by Mean Dogmatism Scores for

Selected Combined Preferences
Type Predicted
categories rank N Mean SD

SJ 1 165 74.93 13.07

ST 2 66 74.77 13.53
SF 3 189 73.81 13.33
SP 3 90 72.47 13.81
NF 6 138 68.28 13.51
NP 8 106 67.95 12.62
NJ 5 61 66.95 14.70
NT 7 29 64.28 12.43
Dogmatism, Religion, and Psychological Type 491

p < .001). The dogmatism scores of the two intuitive function pairs (NTs and
NFs) were not significantly different from each other (t = 1.47, NS), nor did
those of the two sensing function pairs (SJs and SPs) significantly diverge from
each other (t = 1.39, NS).

Perception/Attitude Pairs

The four perception/attitude pairs, namely SJs, SPs, NPs, and NJs, were tested
for overall differences in regard to their dogmatism scores. A significant overall
difference was found (F = 8.6, p < .001). The trend for SJs to score higher
than SPs on dogmatism was in accord with type theory but was not statistically
significant (t = 1.39, NS). Other specific comparisons were not made. The slightly
higher mean dogmatism scores for NPs rather than NJs was counter to type theory.
Table 3 presents the mean dogmatism scores according to the 16 psychologi-
cal types proposed by MBTI theory. The sixteen types are rank ordered according
to mean dogmatism scores. These data demonstrate that there was a significant
overall difference among the sixteen specific psychological types on mean dog-
matism scores (F = 2.9, p < .001).

DISCUSSION

The clearest results of the study are in regard to the sensing/intuition pref-
erence set: sensing types have higher dogmatism scores than intuitive types. This

Table 3. Ranking by Mean Dogmatism Scores

for 16 Psychological Types
Type categories N Mean SD

Sixteen types
ISTJ 18 77.55 15.32
ESFJ 79 76.06 13.74
ESTJ 26 75.08 14.18
ESFP 51 74.55 14.31
ENTJa 6 73.67 10.98
ESTP 19 72.58 9.83
ISFJ 42 71.60 9.34
ENFPa 64 69.66 12.46
ISTPa 3 69.33 20.26
ENFJ 35 68.17 14.38
INFP 22 67.82 12.44
ISFPa 17 66.65 14.47
INFJ 17 63.94 16.79
ENTP 16 63.38 12.74
INTP 4 59.75 12.58
INTJ 3 56.33 1.15
a These types were located contrary to expectation.
492 Ross, Francis, and Craig

finding accords with expectations based on Jungian type theory, which suggests
that intuition is focused on the wider context and sensing is focused on the spe-
cific content, as well as with previous research on Jungian psychological type
and religion-related variables. Of the four indices of psychological type, differ-
ences between sensing and intuitive types are most frequently reported as being
associated with aspects of religious belief and practice generally (Ross, Weiss,
& Jackson, 1996), and in regard to approaches to Christian spirituality (Francis
& Ross, 1997). As regards active membership in, and affiliation to, different
Christian denominations, sensing types were found to be more frequent among
evangelical Protestant congregations (Delis-Bulhoes, 1990; Bramer, 1996; Ross
& Francis, in press), and intuitives more frequent among more liberal Protes-
tant churches both for Unitarians (Gerhardt, 1983) and Anglicans (Ross, 1993).
Moreover, Strickland, and Weddell (1972) in a study of religious orientation, prej-
udice and dogmatism found that Unitarians were less prejudiced and dogmatic
than Baptists, even though Unitarians scored higher on extrinsic religiosity which
has been frequently associated with higher dogmatism (Hoge & Carroll, 1973;
Kahoe & Dunn, 1975). It would be interesting, therefore, to investigate the role of
psychological types in relation to Christian denominational differences regarding
dogmatism and prejudice. Different proportions of type related preferences may
account for some of the discrepancies between studies of extrinsic, intrinsic, and
quest, and prejudice and dogmatism.
The significantly higher dogmatism scores for judging types also accorded
with expectations based on type theory, which suggests that judging is focused
on closure, while perceiving is focused on remaining open to new information.
This finding is also consistent with previous studies of type and religious be-
liefs and practices. Ross, Weiss, and Jackson (1996) found that judging types
tended to regard religion as providing a sense of security. Moreover, most type
frequency studies of Christian denominations (Bramer, 1996; Carskadon, 1981;
Delis-Bulhoes, 1990; Ross, 1993, 1995) have found judging types outnumber per-
ceiving types, though the margin is greater among evangelical Protestant groups
and among Catholic congregations than for liberal Protestant groups. Bramer
(1996) found more judging types among Canadian evangelical Protestants com-
pared to Canadian Anglicans. A study by Ross and Francis (in press) found those
with a no religious affiliation tended to have, in addition to a preference for intu-
ition, a combined thinking perceiving preference. ENTPs in particular congregated
among the religiously unaffiliated. Table 3 shows that the two NTP groups rank
fourteenth and fifteenth out of sixteen on dogmatism. It may be that intuition plus
introverted thinking (TP) are an antidote to dogmatism. More study with larger
numbers in the smaller psychological type subgroups, especially the NTs types,
is needed.
The finding that extraverts scored more highly than introverts on dogmatism
was surprising for two reasons. First, such a relationship was not expected on the
Dogmatism, Religion, and Psychological Type 493

basis of Jungian type theory that conceptualises extraversion and introversion as

contrasting ways of deriving psychological energy. Second, the majority of previ-
ous studies which have examined the relationships between dogmatism scores and
the Eysenckian measure of extraversion have reported no significant relationships
(Stanley, 1964; Day, 1966; Smithers, 1970; Wearing & Brown, 1972; Thalbourne,
Dunbar, & Delin, 1995; Francis, 1998). Further studies are needed to confirm
a positive correlation between dogmatism and extraversion as measured by the
MBTI.
Further analyses of the present results also indicated significantly higher
dogmatism scores for the two sensing function pairs compared to the two intuitive
functions (Table 2); STs were more dogmatic than NTs and SFs more dogmatic
than NFs. A rank ordering of the function pairs and the perception/attitude pairs
shown in Table 2 conformed with type theory, except that NPs appear to have
slightly higher dogmatism scores than NJs.
In terms of the sixteen specific Jungian psychological types (Table 3) six of
the eight sensing types were among the top eight in regard to high dogmatism
scores, with just the ISFPs and ISTPs scoring in the same range as most of the
intuitive types. It is possible that extraverted sensing, which these two types have
as their auxiliary function, may be less strongly associated with dogmatism than is
introverted sensing. Introverted sensing is the kind of sensing preferred by the four
types with preference for SJ, three of which—ISTJ, ESTJ and ESFJ—achieved
the highest dogmatism scores (Table 3). However, while SJs had higher means
scores on dogmatism than SPs, the difference was not statistically significant. The
highest scoring type for dogmatism was the ISTJ. Myers and McCaulley (1985)
describe the ISTJ, the introverted sensing type as:
Serious, quiet, earn success by concentration and thoroughness. Practical, orderly, matter-
of-fact, logical, realistic, and dependable; see to it that everything is well organised. Take
responsibility. Make up their own minds as to what should be accomplished and work
toward it steadily, regardless of protests or distractions. (Myers & McCaulley, 1985, p. 20)

This description shares characteristics with Welford’s (1971) attempt to recast

the authoritarian personality in more neutral terms. Welford was cognisant of the
link discovered by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950)
between authoritarianism and the conventionally religious who “view religion as
a means instead of ends.” Welford was also aware of the connection between
what became differentiated as extrinsic religiosity to prejudice and dogmatism.
Therefore, he essayed to portray the authoritarian personality in a more positive
light as someone who is:
prepared to sacrifice spontaneity for stability, some permissiveness for the sake of order,
some immediate pleasure for the pursuit of long term aims, and some sentimental toleration
for the sake of efficiency. He may of course go too far in these direction. A substantial
measure of his qualities is, however, essential for dealing responsibly with the world as it
is. (Welford, 1971, p. 71)
494 Ross, Francis, and Craig

Both descriptions portray a serious, responsible, goal-oriented, focused per-

son. This is not to suggest that all ISTJs are dogmatic or prejudiced. However, the
high ranking of three of the four SJ types, two of which have introverted sens-
ing combined with external judgement, may indicate a cognitive vulnerability to
dogmatism. These findings may have research implications for new approaches to
the literature on religious orientation, bearing in mind Wulff’s favourable review
of Hunt and King’s (1971) reappraisal of the extrinsic scale as not “a measure
of religion at all but a reflection of more general cognitive or personality char-
acteristics” (Wulff, 1997, p. 236). An approach using Jungian psychological type
theory and research could also have practical implications for reducing dogma-
tism and prejudice. SJs, described by Keirsey and Bates (1978) as traditionalists
who bond with institutions, may be more amenable to approach in their familiar
church setting, and feel secure enough amidst people with whom they had other
things in common, to be open to some variant of Altemeyer’s personal values
confrontation that was designed to reduce scores on his Right Wing Authoritarian
Scale (Altemeyer, 1994). The SJs are the religious joiners par excellence and not
just of Christian groups, as research of the Hindu Hare Krishna religious group
indicates (Poling & Kenney, 1986). If such types are also prone to closed belief
systems, it is important to find settings in which to reach them.

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