2019 International Conference on High Voltage Engineering and Power System

October 1-4, 2019, Bali, Indonesia

Risk Calculation Formula of the bay in Switchyard

to Determine the Main Priority of Maintenance at
PLN UIT JBTB
Daniel B Limbong Rachel I Silaban Feri Febriandi
Controlling of Substation Maintenance Assesment of Substation Equipment Controlling of Substation Maintenance
– Maintenance Department – Maintenance Department – Maintenance Department
PT PLN (Persero) UIT JBTB PT PLN (Persero) UIT JBTB PT PLN (Persero) UIT JBTB
Surabaya, Indonesia Surabaya, Indonesia Surabaya, Indonesia
daniel.b@pln.co.id rachel.silaban@pln.co.id feri.f@pln.co.id

Bayu Tri Nugroho

Assesment of Substation Equipment
– Maintenance Department
PT PLN (Persero) UIT JBTB
Surabaya, Indonesia
bayu.trinugroho@pln.co.id

Abstract—Currently PLN Unit Induk Transmisi Jawa TABLE I. TOTAL EXSISTING BAY IN PLN UIT JBTB
Bagian Timur dan Bali (PLN UIT JBTB) planned the
TOTAL
maintenance of an HV equipment installed in Substation both TYPE BAY
150 kV 70 kV 30 kV 20 kV ALL VOLTAGE
preventive and corrective maintenance carefully, because it’s so
BUS SECTION 17 10 0 0 27
so difficult to offline the bay maintained and limited budgeted BUSBAR 162 69 4 0 243
of maintenance costs. Therefore, a risk calculation formula in CAPASITOR/SVC/MSC 29 7 0 1 37
one bay in Substation is made to determine the priority of COUPLE 70 19 0 0 89
maintenance. DIAMETER 35 0 0 0 88
MOBILE TRANSFORMER/SUBSTATION 8 0 0 3 11
Keywords—HV Equipment, risk, the priority of maintenance. POWER PLANT & CONSUMERS 63 21 6 1 94
REACTOR 0 1 0 0 5
I. INTRODUCTION BAY LINE 387 156 10 0 571
BAY TRANSFORMER 226 57 0 0 294
PLN UIT JTBT has total 2125 existing conventional bays BAY TRANSFORMER (LOW VOLTAGE) 34 33 1 232 300
without GIS (see Table.I). PLN has several maintenance TOTAL 1031 373 21 237 1759
strategies including preventive and correction maintenance. In
2013, PLN established refreshment regulation of high In this paper, the authors makes a calculation by
voltage (HV) equipment [1]. The refreshment criteria are calculaiing likelihood including assesment condition, age and
based on technical, age, and risk consideration. However, failure occurrence on all HV equipment in one bay and impact
Equipement replacement justification is only based on age citeria on the bay.
and technical condition in practically. Also PLN has no
regulation to determine the maintenance priorities of the bay II. ASSESSMENT PARAMETERS
in Switchyard. Good planning in determining maintenance Assessment parameters of HV Equipment used for
priorities reduces the chance of equipment failure and the consideration the maintenance priority of the bay, consist of
impact of the risk, so that in the future PLN UIT JBTB will Inpection Level-1, .Inpection level-2, and inpection level-3.
not be doing the routine maintenance or the corrective Inpection Level-1 is In service Inspection that detected
maintenance to other HV equipment at the same bay in the abnormalities or anomaly in HV equipment then initiated
same year. further inspections, this Inspection using the senses (vision,
hearing, smell, etc). For example, gas leakage by looking at
gas pressure, cracks on the insulator, etc. Inpection Level-2 is
online inspection with a measuring instrument that aims to
determine the condition of the HV equipment (condition
assessment) such as leakage current monitor. Inpection Level-
3 is shutdown measurement that aims to understand the

978-1-7281-2669-2/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE

XXX-X-XXXX-XXXX-X/XX/$XX.00 ©20XX IEEE
condition of the HV equipment such as insulation test, tan F. Gas SF6
delta, grounding test, contact resistance and timing test. The measurement of SF6 gas quality was done to study the
A. Anomaly characteristics of the gas whether it is still feasible to be used
as an insulation.
Inpection Level-1 did periodically on every day by PLN
employees (operator) stayed in the switchyard. The anomaly Purity
data was inputted by the application (SAP) or sent a formal • “9” for purity more than 97%.
letter to their next step unit. • “1” for purity less than 97%.
Anomaly is used for weighting factor of technical condition
as follows: Dew point
• “9” if there is no anomaly; • “9” for temperature less than -5oC
• “6” if there is minor anomaly with small impact to • “1” for temperature more than -5oC
equipment or just need to be monitored periodically; and Moisture content
• “1” if there is anomaly with high impact to • “9” for moisture content lower than manufacturer
equipment or need to be repaired. standard value;
• “1” for moisture content higher than manufacturer
B. Grounding system standard value.
Decompose
Grounding is important for safety equipment to discharge
• “9” for SO2 is 0 ppmv
over current from the system. Standard grounding resistance
value of substation is ≤ 1 Ω. • “6” for 0 < SO2 < 12 ppmv
Score assessment for grounding system: • “1” for SO2 more than 12 ppmv
• “9” for grounding resistance value ≤ 1 Ω;
• “1” for grounding resistance value > 1 Ω. G. Timing test
In general, this measurement was done to determine the
C. Insulation condition value of the dissipation factor of the insulation material.
Decreasing the quality of insulation will cause the delta
Insulation resistance testing used to determine leakage tangent value to be higher
current of HV equipment. Standard of insulation resistance in
• “9” for tan delta less than 1.0% or less manufacturer
maintenance guideline is 1 MΩ per kV but for LA is 1 GΩ .
standard value.
If the insulation resistance result is below the standard, its
indicate breakdown insulation of CB and need to do • “6” for tan delta less than 1.0% but has increase to 200%
replacement. Score assessment for insulation resistance result: of last measurement.
• “1” for Insulation resistance result lower than standard • “1” for tan delta more than 1.0% or less manufacturer
value; standard value
• “9” for Insulation resistance result higher than standard
value. H. Thermovision
There are 2 (two) types of thermovisi with each standard /
D. Timing test guideline that can be used, namely:
i. Check on the main terminal:
Timing test used to ensure CB performance fault clearing
By calculating the temperature difference (∆T) in 2 (two)
time. Fault clearing time standard is 150ms for 70 kV system,
points with different components / materials.
120ms for 150 kV system, and 90ms for 500 kV system. CB
timing test consist of individual CB opening time, CB closing • “9” for ∆T < 5oC
time, and phase to phase time deviation (∆t). Timing test • “6” for for 5oC < ∆T < 30oC
standard depend on CB manufacturer standard. Phase to phase • “1” for ∆T > 30oC
time deviation standard in maintenance guideline is less than ii. Check on the dielectric HV equipment:
10ms. Score assessment for timing test result: By calculating the temperature difference (∆T) in 2 (two)
• “1” for timing test result lower than standard value; other phase.
• “9” for timing test result higher than standard value • “9” for ∆T < 5oC
• “6” for for 5oC < ∆T < 30oC
E. Contact resistance • “1” for ∆T > 30oC
High contact resistance equal to high electrical losses on
CB or DS. It could happen from bad connection of conductor I. Leakage current
termination or internal CB or DS. Standard value for contact LCM (Leakage Current Monitor) measurement to
resistance measurement is less equal than 120% of CB determine the degradation of the LA active component
manufacturer standard, or measurement value at (varistor), the condition of the ZnO varistor in LA can be
commissioning. Score assessment for contact resistance known through analysis of resistive leakage currents. Standard
measurement: value for leakage current resistivity measurement is less than
• “9” for contact resistance lower than standard value; 100% of manufacturer standards or 4 (four) multiply
• “1” for contact resistance higher than standard value. measurement value at commissioning or 100 µA of the
statistical approach by PLN. Score assessment for leakage
current resistive measurement.
• “9” for contact resistance lower than standard value;
 • “1” for contact resistance higher than standard value. Mechanic
structure  min
wf = 0.05
J. Ratio Grounding
  min
wf = 0.05
Ratio measurement to compare the value of the ratio of the
measurement results with the value on the nameplate
• “9” for ratio isn’t match with manufacturer (nameplate) Different from CT, Ratio measurement affect the biggest
standard value; weighting factor of PT sub-system (see Table V).
• “1” for ratio is match with manufacturer (nameplate) TABLE V. WEIGHTING FACTOR OF PT SUB-SYSTEM
standard value. Sub Thermo Grounding Insulation Tan For
Anomaly Ratio
system vision System Condition delta mula
Electro
III. SCORING OF HV EQUIPMENT CONDITION ASSESMENT magnetic
   min
Circuit
wf = 0.41
Purity and decompose conditions in Gas SF6 affect the
Primary sub-system, while for the dew point and moisture Dielectric
    min
wf = 0.4
content affect the Dielectric sub-system (see Table II).
Voltage
TABLE II. WEIGHTING FACTOR OF CB SUB-SYSTEM Divider  min
wf = 0.14
Sub Ano Thermo Grounding Insulation Timing Contact For Mechanic
SF6
system maly vision System Condition Test Resistance mula structure   min
wf = 0.05
Primary
    min
wf = 0.4
Leakage current affect hot spot on the active part (see
Secondary Table VI).. Some LA existing in PLN UIT JBTB, leakage
  min
wf = 0.12 current was monitored online.
Dielectric TABLE VI. WEIGHTING FACTOR OF LA SUB-SYSTEM
    min
wf = 0.2
LA As s e s s me nt Parame te rs
Driving Sub
Mechanism   min system Thermo Grounding Insulation Leakage For
wf = 0.28 Anomaly
vision System Condition Current mula

The Primary sub-system that consists of knives/contact Active Part

   min
(finger) and clamps is a part of DS that is conductive as flow wf = 0.35

elctric current. The Primary sub-system is a subsystem with

Dielectric
the biggest weighting factor (see Table III). wf = 0.2
   min

TABLE III. WEIGHTING FACTOR OF DS SUB-SYSTEM

Monitoring
 min
Sub Thermo Grounding Insulation Contact For wf = 0.07
Anomaly
system vision System Condition Resistance mula
Mechanic
Primary structure  min
   min wf = 0.06
wf = 0.47

Secondary Junction
  min  min
wf = 0.03 wf = 0.17

Dielectric Grading
   min
wf = 0.24 Ring  min
wf = 0.04
Driving
Mechanism  min
Grounding
wf = 0.21   min
wf = 0.1
Grounding
 min
wf = 0.05
Calculate the range to determine lower limit and upper
limit.
Tan delta measurement is the main measurement of CT,
error in measuring is one of caused why some the CT Lower limit
exploded. It is the biggest weighting factor (see Table IV). = (1 x Sub system of the biggest WF)+∑(9 x the other Sub system)
TABLE IV. WEIGHTING FACTOR OF CT SUB-SYSTEM
Upper limit
Sub Thermo Grounding Insulation Tan For = (6 x Sub system of the biggest WF)+∑(9 x the other Sub system)
Anomaly Ratio
system vision System Condition delta mula
Current
The category of index condition
Carriying    min • “9” for scoring of HV equipment > upper limit
wf = 0.26 • “6” for lower limit < scoring < upper limit
Dielectric
    min
• “1” for scoring of HV equipment < lower limit
wf = 0.63
 One case of CB condition assesment as Table VII, was V Fail
Fai
lur
found anomaly crack on insulator and cable in the secondary ol Ma ure V Man
e
V Man
Failure
t nu Occ olt u olt u
box have chipped. Total scoring of CB condition is 7.04 (see (k fact ur (k factu
Oc
(k factu
Occur
cur rence
Table VII). Lower limit = (1 x 0.4)+ (9 x 0.6) = 5.8, Upper limit V urer renc V) rer
ren
V) rer
) e
= (6 x 0.4) + (9 x 0.6) = 7.8. So the category of index condition ce
1
is “6”. 1 5 A 1 150 A 2 150 A 1
0
TABLE VII. ONE CASE OF CB CONDITION ASSESSMENT 7
2 B 1 150 B1 2 150 B1 1
0
Sub Ano Thermov Grounding Insulation Timing Contact 1
system SF6 Formula 3 5 C 1 500 B2 2 150 B2 2
maly ision System Condition Test Resistance
0
7
4 D1 1 500 B3 2 150 C 2
Primary = 6 x 0.4 0
9 6 9 9
wf = 0.4 = 3.2 1
5 5 D2 1 500 B4 1 150 D 2
0
Secondary = 1 x 0.12
1 9 1
wf = 0.12 = 0.12
6 5 E 1 150 C1 1 150 E1 2
0
Dielectric = 6 x 0.2 1
1 9 9 9
wf = 0.2 = 1.2 7 5 F1 1 70 C2 2 150 E2 2
0
Driving 1
= 9 x 0.28
Mechanism 9 9 8 5 F2 1 150 D1 1 150 E3 2
wf = 0.28 = 2.52
0
7
9 F3 1 150 D2 1 150 E4 2
0
1
IV. AGE OF EQUIPMENT 1
0
5 G 1 150 D3 1
0
In normal ageing condition, age of HV Equipment has 1 7
H1 1 150 E1 2
influence to HV Equipment performance. HV Equipment 1 0
1 7
reliability decreases with time due to ageing process, minor 2 0
H2 1 70 E2 1
failure will occur during time operation. Age criteria of HV 1
150 E3 2
3
Equipment divided in two conditions [1] (see Table VIII).:
• “Old”, with score assessment “6”;
• “Very Old”, with score assessment “1”. PLN UIT JBTB have so many failure on CT. The failure
• And another condition has score assessment “9”, and still was dominated by manufacurer “A” (see Table X), One of
in good condition. caused is the age distribution of the manufacurer “A” and
“P” have very old criteria.
TABLE VIII. AGE CRITERIA OF HV EQUIPMENT TABLE X. WEIGHTING F FACTOR OF CT FAILURE OCCURRENCE

HV Equipment Very Old Old Weighting Factor of CT Failure Occurrence

CB > 20 years 15 - 20 years N
Vol
t
Ma
nu
Failure
N Volt
Man
u
Failure
Occurr Occurr
DS > 20 years 15 - 20 years o (kV fact
ence
o (kV) factu
ence
) urer rer
CT > 20 years 15 - 25 years 2
1 150 A1 1 70 F 2
PT > 20 years 15 - 25 years 6
2
CVT > 20 years 15 - 25 years 2 150 A2 2
7
150 G 1

LA > 15 years 10 - 15 years 2

3 150 A3 1 150 H 1
8
2
4 70 A4 2 150 I 2
9
3
V. HV EQUIPMENT FAILURE OCCURRENCE 5 70 A5 1
0
150 J1 2
3
HV Equipment failure occurrence calculation used for 6 70 A6 1
1
150 J2 2

weighting factor parameter of technical condition. HV 7 150 A7 2

3
2
150 K 2
Equipment failure occurrence obtained from statistical failure 8 150 A8 2
3
150 L 2
of HV equipment with different manufactures and types. 3
3
Statistical failure data obtained from 2015 to 2018. 9 150 A9 2
4
70 M 2

Weighting factor for HV equipment failure occurrence: 1

0
150 A10 2
3
5
150 N 1
• “0” if there is no failure; 1
150 A11 1
3
70 O 2
1 6
• “1” if HV equipment failure occurrence once in 3 years; 1 3
150 A12 1 70 P1 2
• “2” if HV equipment failure occurrence more than 1 in 3 2
1
7
3
years 3
150 A13 1
8
70 P2 2
1 3
150 A14 2 150 P3 2
Weighting factor for LA on one brand and type only has 4 9
1 4
“1”, CB failure occurrence was dominated by manufacurer 5
70 A15 1
0
70 P4 2

“B”, while PT or CVT was dominated by manufacurer “E” and 1

6
150 A16 2
4
1
150 P5 2
only occurred on system voltage 150 kV (see Table IX). 1
500 B1 1
4
70 P6 2
7 2
TABLE IX. WEIGHTING F FACTOR OF LA, CB AND PT OR CVT 1 4
150 B2 2 70 Q 1
FAILURE OCCURRENCE 8 3
1 4
150 B3 2 150 R 1
Weighting Factor of Weighting Factor of 9 4
N Weighting Factor of PT- 2 4
LA Failure CB 150 B4 2 150 S 1
o CVT Failure Occurrence 0 5
Occurrence Failure Occurrence
 2
1
70 B5 2
4
6
150 T 2 VII. RISK MATRIX CONSIDERATION
2 4
2
500 C 2
7
150 U 1 Risk level determination is based on likelihood and
2
150 D 1
4
150 V 1 impact criteria [6]. Likelihood and impact factor divided into
3 8
2 4 5 criteria. Risk matrix which is used to determine likelihood
150 E1 2 150 W 1
4 9 and impact factor shown in Table XIII.
2 5
70 E2 2 70 X 2
5 0

TABLE XIII. RISK MATRIX

VI. CRITICALLITY OF SUBSTATION
Criticality of substation organized as risk impact
consideration based on stakeholder satisfaction criteria [4]
which consist of:
• Criticality of substation levels toward the system.
• Customer type and location.
A. Criticallity of substation toward the system
Main consideration for substation criticality consist of
non- ideal operation condition, backbone subsystem, and
potential outages more than 20% of subsystem. Non-ideal
operation is condition which causes subsystem vulnerability
[5].
1. Inter Bus Transformer (IBT) load more equal than 60%.
2. Non-parallel IBT.
3. Non-operational line reactor. Acceptable risk appetite is low to moderate, higher risk
4. Single busbar substation level should be mitigated to reduce the impact. Qualitative
5. Radial line circuit. and quantitative analysis used to determine risk probability.
6. Occurrence of HV equipment. (see Table XIV).
7. Two or more IBT in one busbar. TABLE XIV. RISK PROBABILITY
8. Short circuit level substation higher than HV
equipment. Description
9. Single outlet IBT or generator. Probability
Qualitative Quantitative
10. IBT load more than 60% in radial circuit.
11. Two-line circuit with different capacity. > 90% Almost certain More than once a year
12. Maneuver flexibility problem in substation.
70% – 90% Likely Once a year
. Impact level consideration shown in Table XI.
More than once in last 2-10
TABLE XI. SUBSTATION CRITICALITY IMPACT TOWARD THE SYSTEM > 30% - < 70% Possible
years
Potential outages
Non-Ideal Backbone Impact 10% - 30% Unlikely Once in last 2-10 years
more than 20% of
Operation System Level
subsystem
More than once in over last
- - - 1 < 10% Rare
- ● - 3 10 years
● - - 3
● ● - 4
- - ● 5 Impact probability describes in 6 categories.
- ● ● 5 1. Safety
● - ● 5 2. Extra fuel cost
● ● ● 5 3. Energy not Served (ENS)
4. Equipment cost
5. Stakeholder/customer/social satisfaction
B. Customer type and ocation
6. Environment impact
Main consideration for customer type and location impact
is shown in Table XII. More important of consumer, more
higher risk level and availability VIII. FORMULA FOR DETERMINATION OF MAINTENANCE
TABLE XII. CONSUMER TYPE AND LOCATION IMPACT PRIORITY
Score of HV Equipment condition assesment, age of
Location De npasar Capital of Municipality District
Type
Province equipment, and failure occurrence combination used as
A (4) B(3) C(2) D(1) likelihood factor in formula for determination of the
VVIP
a (4) 5 5 5 5
maintenance priority at the bay in substation. Criticality of
(Platinum/Gold) * substation used as impact factor. The formula using weighting
VIP (S
ilver/brounze) b(3) 5 4 3 2 factor for each parameter as shown in Table XV.
Reguler (Reguler) TABLE XV. RISK MATRIX
*** c(1) 4 3 2 1

Likelihood Weighting Factor

Parameters 0 1 2 3 4 5
 Assessment 9 6 1 Total 1 1 7 7 7 3 0 2 1 4 4 4 3
score
Age 0 1 2 of
Likelihood 26 18
Failure Likelihood
0 1 2 factor
A A E E E C A B A D D D C
occurrence
Impact
max score = 9 (Criticality 3 5
Total Score Sum of (Assessment, Age, Failure Bay)
occurrence) A3 A3 E3 E3 E3 C3 A3 B5 A5 D5 D5 D5 C5
Risk
of HV
Mod Extre
Equipment Moderate Extreme High High Extreme
erate me
Total score of likelihood weighting factor in scale “0” to
“9” used as likelihood factor in risk matrix. This total score Total
Score
converted into “A – E” scale. (see Table XVI). Risk of 78 > 90
Bay
TABLE XVI. LIKELIHOOD WEIGHTING FACTOR OF HV EQUIPMENT

Total Score of Likelihood Factor

Total score of likelihood HV Equipment in one bay
Likelihood in Risk Matrix multiplied by impact (criticality bay), the result determine
the priority of bay (bay Transformer and bay Line) that will
0 A
1 B
be maintained first. Eventhough the total score of likelihood
2-3 C
HV Equipment in bay Line is higher than bay Transfomer, but
4 D
the bay transformer will be maintained first. This calculation
5< E
makes it easy for PLN UIT JBTB to schedule preventive
and corrective maintenance.
One case in “Y” Substation have 2 bay (see Figure 1), bay
Transformer and bay Line. In bay Line have 7 HV equipment
and in bay Transformer have 6 HV equipment. IX. CONCLUSIONS

Likelihood factor of HV equipment contained HV

equipment condition assessment, age of equipment, and
failure occurrence consideration. Impact factor contained
criticality bay in substation toward the system, consumer type
and location. Likelihood and impact factor applied in risk
matrix.
Likelihood factor of bay in substation is the sum of all
likelihood factor of HV equipment existing. Likelihood
factor of bay multiplied by impact (criticality bay) to obtain
the priority scale for maintenance schedule.

REFERENCES
Fig. 1. Single line diagram of “Y” Substation

The risk is likelihood multiplied by impact. Impact level [1] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 149.K/DIR2013, “Replacement
that shown in Table XI, used as impact factor in risk matrix. criteria for high voltage equipment in PT PLN (Persero)”, Jakarta,
Likelihood and Impact from calculation formula are then 2013.
applied in risk matrix as shown in Table XIII to obtain the [2] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 0520-2.K/DIR2014, “Maintenance
guidelines for circuit breaker”, Jakarta, 2014.
priority scale for HV Equipment Maintenance. The risk is
likelihood multiplied by impact. The result of HV [3] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 0520-2.K/DIR2014, “Maintenance
guidelines for disconecting switch”, Jakarta, 2014.
equipment condition assessment and impact criteria shown in
[4] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 0520-2.K/DIR2014, “Maintenance
Table XVII. guidelines for lightning arrester”, Jakarta, 2014.
[5] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 0520-2.K/DIR2014, “Maintenance
guidelines for current transformer”, Jakarta, 2014.
TABLE XVII. SCORE RISK OF THE BAY
[6] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 0520-2.K/DIR2014, “Maintenance
Bay Line Bay Transformer guidelines for potential transformer”, Jakarta, 2014.
arameter [7] PT PLN (Persero) P3BJB, “Practical guidelines for high voltage
DS DS DS DS
Bus 1 Bus 1
CB CT
PT 1
DS LA
Bus 1 Bus 1 CB 2 CT 2 PT 1
LA equipment”, Jakarta, 2013.
1 1 Line 1 1 1
A B A B [8] PT PLN (Persero) Trans-JBTB, “Determination guidelines for
Assess criticality of bay”, Surabaya, 2019.
0 0 3 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ment [9] PT PLN (Persero) P3BJB, “Vulnerability of Java Bali subsystem”,
Age 1 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 Jakarta, 2015.
Failure [10] PT PLN (Persero) BOD Decree 0355.K/DIR2014, “Risk management
occur 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 implementation in PT PLN (Persero)”, Jakarta, 2014.
rence