1. Supreme Court Bar Association Vs.

Union of India & ANR [1998]

SCC 225
FACTS

In this case, an advocate was convicted of criminal contempt of court and sentenced to six years of
simple imprisonment as well as a three-year suspension from practising law. The sentence of
imprisonment was suspended for four years, with the possibility of it being reinstated if he was
convicted of another contempt of court offence during that time.

ISSUE

The Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to revoke an advocate's licence since, under the Advocates
Act of 1971, the State Bar Council or the Bar Council of India had sole authority to do so.

RULE

article 129 and 142(2) 

ANALYSIS

A High Court's contempt can be brought to the Supreme Court's attention. As the Court of
Record, the Supreme Court has the power to punish subordinate courts for contempt. As a
result, the Supreme Court has complete jurisdiction over the contempt of the High Courts or
subordinate courts. It was also urged that the judge who committed the contempt be
removed from office. This claim, according to the Court, was not viable. It went on to say
that under Article 129 of the Constitution, no act could limit or take away its contempt
authority, whether it was the Advocates Act of 1961 or the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971.
The Court further stated that the higher Court's contempt power is not founded on statutory
requirements, but rather is inherent authority available to them as a court of record. In terms
of the method to be followed, the Court has stated that all sorts of contempt can be dealt
with summarily by courts of record. In reference to Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court
held that the Supreme Court's supplemental jurisdiction and powers, which are intended to
offer comprehensive justice in any way, are distinct from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
and powers under Article 129, which cannot be combined. Any statutory provision, including
any provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961, or the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, may be
used against you in any way.

The Advocates Act of 1961 has no bearing on the Court's contempt authority, and the
Contempt of Courts Act of 1971, being a legislation, cannot deprive, restrict, or limit the
Court's competence to conduct contempt proceedings under Article 129.

CONCLUSION
Under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court has the
authority to penalise anyone who commit contempt of court. The High Courts have the
ability to punish contemners under Article 215 of the Constitution, and the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 governs the punishments imposed by the High Court. This act has no
bearing on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. In In Re: Vinay Mishra, the Court misinterpreted
Article 129 and 142, depriving the Bar of any ability to sanction those who engage in
professional misconduct. It even acquired jurisdiction despite the fact that Section 38 of the
Advocates Act of 1961 expressly states that the Apex Court has only appellate jurisdiction.
In the 1998 case, Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, the Court penalised Shri
Mishra by suspending him, and so the petition arose.

The Court overturned the Mishra decision and upheld the Bar Council's authority to
prosecute and penalise all individuals who engage in professional misconduct. It is well
established that contempt actions are instituted to defend the majesty of the law, to uphold
the judiciary's status as the central pillar of Indian democracy, and to give the people reason
to trust the administration of justice. In the Supreme Court Bar Association case, the court
took a very subjective approach and, using the law and correctly interpreting it, came to the
conclusion that the power to punish for any professional misconduct rests with the Bar,
whereas it only has jurisdiction over itself and subordinate courts to punish for contempt. No
statute can take the Supreme Court's or the High Court's contempt jurisdiction away.

2. Vinay Chandra Mishra AIR 1995 SC 2348

FACTS

M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. took out a loan from U.P. Financial Corporation and failed to repay
the amount in full. Under Section 29 of the U.P. Financial Corporation Act, the Corporation
took action against the Company. The lower court ordered the corporation to pay the loan in
instalments, issued an injunction against the sale of the company's assets, and required it to
provide a security for the disputed sum. Mr. Vinay Chandra Mishra, a Senior Advocate, stood
as counsel for the appellant company, challenging the lower court's ruling. Mr. Mishra was
questioned by Justice Keshote under which clause the lower court had issued the above
ruling. Mr. Mishra then began to scream, claiming that no question could have been asked of
him at this point and that he would either have the Judge transferred or see that an
impeachment motion be filed against him in Parliament. He also stated that he had
previously located a number of Judges. Mr. Mishra was served with a notice to show cause
why contempt proceedings should not be brought against him on April 15, 1994.

ISSUE

The senior judge, Justice Anshuman Singh (senior judge), who was to direct the court
proceedings should have initiated contempt proceedings against him under "Article 129 of
the Constitution," and that a court can only initiate contempt proceedings if the contempt
committed is against it, so the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to do so in this case.

RULE

Article 129
ANALYSIS
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that resenting a Judge's questions, being
disrespectful to him, questioning his authority to ask the questions, shouting at him,
threatening him with transfer and impeachment, using insulting language and abusing him,
dictating the order that he should pass, creating scenes in the Court, and addressing him by
losing temper are all acts calculated to irrationally punish him. Such acts seek to intimidate
the court, preventing it from carrying out its role of administering justice. Such behaviour
degrades and discredits the court's authority and the administration of justice, and
undermines and erodes the judiciary's very foundation by undermining the public's faith in
the court's ability to administer free and fair justice, and thus amounts to contempt of court.
The offender was condemned to a six-week sentence of simple jail. In the circumstances of
the case, however, the punishment was to be deferred for a period of four years, which
would be activated if the defendant was convicted of any other contempt of court offence
during that time.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court, while broad, is nonetheless
limited, and it cannot be expanded to include the ability to evaluate whether an advocate is
also guilty of "professional misconduct" in a summary manner, bypassing the Advocates
Act's procedure. While the power to do complete justice under article 142 is a corrective
power that favours equity over law, it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of due
process under the Advocates Act, 1961 by suspending his licence to practise in a summary
manner while dealing with a contempt of court case. As a result, the Supreme Court cannot
punish an advocate for "professional misconduct" while exercising appellate authority by
changing itself into a statutory body with "original jurisdiction." Indeed, if the concerned Bar
Council does not take any action against an advocate after being informed of his or her
contumacious and blameworthy conduct by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court may well have the jurisdiction, in exercising its appellate powers under
section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, read with article 142 of the Constitution, to proceed
suo motu and order the records from the Bar Council. By sending for the record of the
reason and passing necessary orders, Council "does not act" or "fails to act."

3.