Makalintal vs Comelec
resident in the place where he proposes
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration
that certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that
he has actual and material legal interest
in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant
petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of
Republic Act No. 9189 violates the
residency requirement in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the
same law violates the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may,
through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section
25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on
Elections, promulgate without violating
the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189
enumerates those who are disqualified
voting under this Act. It disqualifies an
immigrant or a permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host
country. However, an exception is
provided i.e. unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared
for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than 3 years
from approval of registration. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause
for the removal of the name of the
immigrant or permanent resident from
the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of
the residency requirement in Section 1
Article V of the Constitution which
requires the voter must be a resident in
the Philippines for at least one yr, and a
to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding an election. (3) No. By vesting itself with the powers
to approve, review, amend and revise
the Implementing Rules & Regulations
for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond
the scope of its constitutional authority.
However, OSG held that ruling in said Congress trampled upon the
case does not hold water at present, constitutional mandate of
and that the Court may have to discard independence of the COMELEC. Under
that particular ruling. Panacea of the such a situation, the Court is left with no
controversy: Affidavit for without it, the option but to withdraw from its usual
presumption of abandonment of Phil silence in declaring a provision of law
domicile shall remain. The qualified unconstitutional.
Filipino abroad who executed an
affidavit is deemed to have retained his
domicile in the Philippines and
presumed not to have lost his domicile
by his physical absence from this --------
country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does
not only require the promise to resume TOPIC: ART. VII CONGRESS AS
actual physical permanent residence in NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
the Philippines not later than 3 years
after approval of registration but it also
requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is
a green card holder, a temporary visitor
or even on business trip, must declare RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ VS. SENATE OF THE
that he/she has not applied for PHILIPPINES (REPRESENTED HEREIN BY
citizenship in another country. Thus, THE HON. FRANKLIN DRILON
he/she must return to the Philippines
otherwise consequences will be met
according to RA No. 9189.
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE) G.R. NO.
163556, JUNE 8, 2004
Although there is a possibility that the
Filipino will not return after he has
exercised his right to vote, the Court is
not in a position to rule on the wisdom FACTS:
of the law or to repeal or modify it if
such law is found to be impractical.
However, it can be said that the
Congress itself was conscious of this
probability and provided for deterrence
The case is a petition for prohibition and
which is that the Filipino who fails to mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13,
return as promised stands to lose his Rule VIII of the Rules of theJoint Public
right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes Session of Congress, dated May 28,
he cast shall not be invalidated because 2004, creating a Joint Committee which
he was qualified to vote on the date of shall preliminarily
the elections.
canvass the votes of the candidates for
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where President and Vice-President during the
a law sets down plainly its whole May 10, 2004 elections.
meaning, the Court is prevented from
making it mean what the Court pleases.
In fine, considering that underlying
intent of the Constitution, as is evident
in its statutory construction and intent
ISSUE:
of the framers, which is to grant Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents
abroad the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1
Article V) the Court finds that Section 5
of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally WON Congress committed grave abuse
of discretion.
defective.
HELD:
(2) Yes. Congress should not have
allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The
canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates
for President and Vice President for the No. The Court stresses that it has
entire nation must remain in the hands jurisdiction over the subject matter of
of Congress as its duty and power under this controversy, because the herein
Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution. COMELEC has the
authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-
list Reps.
Petition contains sufficient allegations
claiming violations of the Constitution.
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction
is determined by the allegations of the
initiatory pleading, like the complaint or
petition. The court deemedthat the
petition provide sufficient allegations of
violation of the constitution.
Sec. 4, Art. VII expressly provides that to
promulgate its rules for the canvassing
of the certificates."
InArroyo v. De Venecia, the Court ruled
that it had no power to review the
internal proceedings of Congress,
unless there is a clear violation of the
Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v.
Guingona, held that the Court -
under the doctrine of separation of
powers -- has "no authority to interfere"
in the "exclusive realm" of a co-
equal branch, absent a showing of grave
abuse of discretion. The Court has no
authority to restrict or limit the
exercise of congressional prerogatives
granted by the Constitution.
However, after careful deliberation on
the merits of the Petition and the
Comments filed by Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia and the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Court resolves todismiss
the Petition on the ground that it failed
to show that Congress gravely abused
its discretion in creating
such Joint Committee.
The creation of the Joint Committee
does not constitute grave abuse and
cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner and the other members of
Congress of their congressional
prerogatives, because under the very
Rules under attack, the decisions and
final report of the said Committee shall
be subject to the approval of the
joint session of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately. The
Petition is dismissed. No costs.
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Brillantes vs Comelec
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an
Automated Elections System including
the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712,
which provides for the electronic
transmission of advanced result of
“unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed
that the resolution would allow the
preemption and usurpation of the
exclusive power of Congress to canvass
the votes for President and Vice-
President and would likewise encroach
upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the
citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the
"unofficial" quick count as provided
under pertinent election laws. Comelec
contended that the resolution was
promulgated in the exercise of its
executive and administrative power "to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections” Comelec added
that the issue is beyond judicial
determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation
of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution
6712. The issue squarely fell within the
ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of
the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution,
further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon
Congress the sole and exclusive
authority to officially canvass the votes
for the elections of President and Vice-
President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No.
7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173,
and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act
No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL,
the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to
conduct the “unofficial counting of
votes for the national or local elections.
The quick count under the guise of an
“unofficial” tabulation would not only
be preemptive of the authority of
congress and NAMFREL, but would also
be lacking constitutional and/or
statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed
COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional
provision that "no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." It
being “unofficial”, any disbursement of
public fund would be contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution and Rep.
Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing
the powers and functions of the
Commission subjects the same to
certain conditions with respect to the
adoption of the latest technological and
electronic devices, to wit:
(1)consideration of the area and
available funds (2) notification to all
political parties and candidates. The
aforementioned conditions were found
to have not been substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.
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ESTRADA VS ARROYO
FACTS:
During the May 1998 election,
petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued
by problems that slowly eroded his
popularity.
On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor
Chavit Singson, a long time friend of the
petitioner, accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’
immediately ignited reactions of rage.
On November 13, 2000, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. On
November 20, 2000, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a
vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled
against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name “Jose Velarde.” The
ruling was met by a spontaneous
outburst of anger that hit the streets of
the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed
Forces and the PNP withdrew their
support to the Estrada government.
Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries
and bureau chiefs resigned from their
posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon,
Chief Justice Davide administered the
oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. On the same day,
petitioner issued a press statement that
he was leaving Malacanang Palace for
the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of the nation. It also
appeared that on the same day, he
signed a letter stating that he was
transmitting a declaration that he was
unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation
of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.
A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President
Pimentel on the same day. After his fall
from the power, the petitioner’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion.
Petitioner sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in
any criminal complaint that may be filed
in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only
if legally warranted. Erap also filed a
Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as
and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cases at bar involve
a political question.
Whether or not the petitioner resigned
as President.
Whether or not the petitioner Is only
temporarily unable to Act as President.
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys
immunity from suit.
Whether or not the prosecution of
petitioner Estrada should be enjoined
due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
The cases at bar pose legal and not
political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in
the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1
of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII,
and the allocation of governmental
powers under section II of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity. As early as
the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,
the doctrine has been laid down that “it
is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the
law is . . .”
The Court also distinguished between
EDSA People Power I and EDSA People
Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of
the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President.
EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the
sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
EDSA I presented political question;
EDSA II involves legal questions.
SECOND ISSUE
Using the totality test, the SC held that
petitioner resigned as President.
a.) The proposal for a snap election for
president in May where he would not
be a candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time.
b.) The Angara diary shows that the
President wanted only five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open
the second envelop to clear his name.
c.) During the negotiations, the
resignation of the petitioner was
treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the
parties during and after transition
period.
d.) His resignation was also confirmed
by his leaving Malacañang. In the press
release containing his final statement,
(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of
our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country.
Petitioner’s reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of’
the president which he has given up;
and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense.
THIRD ISSUE
The petitioner is permanently unable to
act as President. Section 11 of Article
VII:
“Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions.”
Both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. The House of Representative
passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. l75 which states:
“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE
SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION
INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT
OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS
AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.”
The Senate also passed Senate
Resolution No. 82 which states:
“RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if
petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision
that respondent Arroyo is the de jure
President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.

FOURTH ISSUE
The petitioner does not enjoy immunity
from suit. The Supreme Court rejected
petitioner’s argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must
first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the
events that led to his loss of the
presidency. On February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
“Recognizing that the Impeachment
Court is Functus Officio.” Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before
he can be prosecuted. The plea, if
granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. The debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to
the resignation of the President, the
proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him.
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino
Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure” but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment
process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner cannot demand
as a condition sine qua non to his
criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision
of the SC licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from
liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.
FIFTH ISSUE
Petitioner was not denied the right to
impartial trial. Pervasive publicity is not
per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-
day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not
by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. In the
case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual
bias against appellant as a consequence
of the extensive media coverage of the
pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality
of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a
fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable if change
even by evidence presented during the
trial. Appellant has the burden to prove
this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
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Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective
official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including
Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Civil Liberties Union v Executive
Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the
Executive Order No. 284 issued by the
President allowing cabinet members,
undersecretary or asst. secretaries and
other appointive officials of the
executive department to hold 2
positions in the government and
government corporations and to receive
additional compensation. They find it
unconstitutional against the provision
provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet
members and their deputies to hold any
other office or employment. Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B further states that
“Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries." In the
opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the
Solicitor General, the said Executive
Order is valid and constitutional as
Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless
otherwise allowed by law” which is
construed to be an exemption from that
stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such
as in the case of the Vice President who
is constitutionally allowed to become a
cabinet member and the Secretary of
Justice as ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B
provides an exemption to Article VII,
section 13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an
exemption since the legislative intent of
both Constitutional provisions is to
prevent government officials from
holding multiple positions in the
government for self enrichment which a
betrayal of public trust. Section 7,
Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII
is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. Thus the
phrase “unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution” in Section 13, Article
VII cannot be construed as a broad
exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B
that is contrary to the legislative intent
of both constitutional provisions. Such
phrase is only limited to and strictly
applies only to particular instances of
allowing the VP to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as
ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council. The court thereby declared
E.O 284 as null and void.
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REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic, through the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the
declaration of the aggregate amount of
US$356 million (now estimated to be
more than US$658 million inclusive of
interest) deposited in escrow in the
PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds
were previously held by the following
five account groups, using various
foreign foundations in certain Swiss
banks. Moreover, the petition sought
the forfeiture of US$25 million and
US$5 million in treasury notes whICh
exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries,
other lawful income as well as income
from legitimately acquired property.
The treasury notes are frozen at the
Central Bank of the Philippines, now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of
the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a
General Agreement and the
Supplemental Agreements were
executed by the Marcos children and
then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of
the assets of the Marcos family to
identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be
owned by the Marcos family under their
conditions contained therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Swiss funds can be
forfeited in favour of the Republic, on
the basis of the Marcoses’s lawful
income.
RULING:
Yes. R.A. No. 1379 raises the prima facie
presumption that a property is
unlawfully acquired, hence subject to
forfeiture, if its amount or value is
manifestly disproportionate to the
official salary and other lawful income
of the public officer who owns it.
The following facts must be established
in order that forfeiture or seizure of the
Swiss deposits may be effected:

(1) ownership by the public officer of
money or property acquired during his
incumbency, whether it be in his name
or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of
that money or property exceeds, i. e., is
grossly disproportionate to, the
legitimate income of the public officer.
Herein, the spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos were public officials
during the time material to the present
case was never in dispute.
The spouses accumulated salary of
$304,372.43 should be held as the only
known lawful income of the Marcoses
since they did not file any Statement of
Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required
by law, from which their net worth
could be determined.
Besides, under the 1935 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
not receive “any other emolument from
the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities”.
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
“not receive during his tenure any other
emolument from the Government or
any other source.” Their only known
lawful income of $304,372.43 can
therefore legally and fairly serve as basis
for determining the existence of a prima
facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss
funds. The Republic did not fail to
establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are deposited in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank
in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January
2002, plus interest, were forfeited in
favor of the Republic.
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JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO
(D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was
elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected
Vice-President.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the
petitioner, went on air and accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords.
House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. This
caused political convulsions in both
houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was
replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated
by Representative Fuentebella.
Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the
2nd envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The
public and private prosecutors walked
out in protest of the ruling. In disgust,
Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and
speeches full of sulphur were delivered
against the petitioner and the 11
senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity
intensification of the call for petitioner's
resignation. A 10-km line of people
holding lighted candles formed a human
chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati
City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the
people's solidarity in demanding
petitioner's resignation.
January 19, 2001, the fall from power of
the petitioner appeared inevitable.
Petitioner agreed to the holding of a
snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and
General Reyes, together with the chiefs
of all the armed services went to the
EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes
declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of
the Armed Forces, we wish to announce
that we are withdrawing our support to
this government.” A little later, PNP
Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
and the major service commanders gave
a similar stunning announcement.
January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
Petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace.
January 22, 2001, the Monday after
taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the
duties of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with
this Court a petition for prohibition with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from
"conducting any further proceedings in
any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term
of petitioner as President is over and
only if legally warranted."
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel,
petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He
prayed for judgment "confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner resigned
as president.
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent
Arroyo is an Acting President.
HELD:
Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express.
It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that
petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang Palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his
act and omissions before, during and
after January 20, 2001 or by the totality
of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that
petitioner resigned as President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII
is in order. It provides:
Whenever the President transmits to
the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice-President as Acting
President xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these
irrefutable facts is that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear
in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove
that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by
a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by this Court.
✋✋✋✋✋
Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)
October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668
Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners
Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al.,
respondents
FACTS:
On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-
7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos
family to allow the return of former
President Ferdinand Marcos from
Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The
Court held that President Corazon
Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos
and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances pose a
threat to national interest and welfare.
The decision affirmed the
constitutionality of President Corazon
Aquino's prior refusal, fearing the
instability and security issues that may
arise once the remains of former
President Marcos were to be brought
back to the country. In a statement, she
said:
"In the interest of the safety of those
who will take the death of Mr. Marcos
in widely and passionately conflicting
ways, and for the tranquility of the state
and order of society, the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed
to be brought to our country until such
time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one,
shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not President Aquino has
the power to deny the return of Marcos'
remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's
refusal to allow the return of Marcos'
remains is tantamount to dictatorship.
HELD:
1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it
cannot be denied that the President,
upon whom executive power is vested,
has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on
the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to
limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime
of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not
a diminution of the general grant of
executive power. Among the duties of
the President under the Constitution, in
compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the
interest and welfare of the people. Her
decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present
time and under present circumstances is
in compliance with this bounden duty.
2. No, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should
not be confused with the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution
to legislate pursuant to Amendment No.
6. Whereas the residual powers of the
President under the 1987 Constitution
are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution refers to an express
grant of power.
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LAUREL V. GARCIA 187 SCRA 797
FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one
of the properties acquired by the
Philippines from Japan pursuant to a
Reparations Agreement. The property is
where the Philippine Embassy was once
located, before it transferred to the
Nampeidai property. It was decided
that the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of
the first properties opened up for public
auction was the Roppongi property,
despite numerous oppositions from
different sectors.
HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired
together with the other properties
through reparation agreements. They
were assigned to the government
sector and that the Roppongi
property was specifically designated
under the agreement to house the
Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property
has become patrimonial. The
respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and payment,
in application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the
social group. The purpose is not to
serve the State as the juridical person
but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot
be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not
been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service doesn’t automatically
convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use.
A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part
of the government to withdraw it from
being such.
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Domingo v. Zamora
GR 142283; February 6, 2003
Facts: President Estrada issued EO
entitled Transferring the Sports
Programs and Activities of the DECS to
the Philippine Sports Commission in
School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81,
former DECS Secretary Gonzales issued
a Memorandum which temporarily
reassigned, in the exigency of the
service, all remaining BPESS Staff to
other divisions or bureaus of the DECS.
Issue: Is the reassignment valid?
Ruling: Yes. Since EO 81 is based on the
Presidents continuing authority under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, it is a
valid exercise of the Presidents
delegated power to reorganize the
Office of the President. The law grants
the President this power in recognition
of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The
Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office
of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies.
After all, the Office of the President is
the command post of the President.
This is the rationale behind the
Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President.
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RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 92008 | 188 SCRA 154 | July
30, 1990 | En Banc | Justice Cruz
It is an appointment (and not a
designation) that results in security of
tenure
FACTS:
In 1986, petitioner Binamira, as
evidenced by the memorandum which
allowed him to qualify, was designated
General Manager (GM) of the Phil
Tourism Authority (PTA) by the then
Minister of Tourism and Chair of the
PTA Board. In 1990, President Aquino,
on noting that he was not designated by
herself but merely by said Minister
contrary to that required by law,
designated the new Sec. of Tourism
respondent Garrucho as the GM until
such time she makes an appointment
thereto. Binamira now seeks
reinstatement, claiming he has been
removed without just cause in violation
of his security of tenure.
ISSUE:
Does Binamira have a claim on security
of tenure?
RULING:
No. It is not disputed that Binamira was
not appointed by the President but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism.
Where the person is merely designated
and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or
temporary appointment, which does
not confer security of tenure. It is when
an appointment is completed, usually
with its confirmation, that security of
tenure results for the person chosen,
unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office.¹
Moreover, even if it is to be conceded
that his designation by the Minister
constituted an act of the President—as
Binamira contends—such act shall be
considered valid only if not
“disapproved or reprobated by the
President” which is what happened in
the case at bar.
¹ Appointment and designation,
distinguished. – Appointment may be
defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with power, of an
individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. Designation,
on the other hand connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties
on an incumbent official. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative.
(Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., 188 SCRA
154)
------------------------
JOHN ALEXANDER S. BELDEROL PUBLIC
OFFICERS JAVIER vs. REYES G.R. No. L-
39451 February 20, 1989
PRINCIPLES: 1.) Acceptance is
indispensable to complete appointment.
2.) Acts amounting to acceptance;
vested rights to the office in appointee’s
favour . Challenging a contested
appointment by bringing a suit for
mandamus, when coupled with a
previous oath of office, amounts to an
acceptance and gave a vested right to
said office in appointee’s favor.
FACTS:
Petitioner allegedly was the duly
appointed Chief of Police of Malolos,
Bulacan, on November 7, 1967 by the
then Mayor Victorino B. Aldaba, which
appointment was confirmed and
approved by the Municipal Council of
the said municipality on the same date
as per Resolution No. 210, Series of
1967. The following day, petitioner took
his oath of office and thereafter
assumed and discharged the rights,
prerogatives and duties of the office. On
January 3, 1968, pending approval and
attestation of his appointment by the
Civil Service Commission, respondent,
who had then assumed the office of
Municipal Mayor, recalled petitioner's
appointment from the Civil Service
Commission in her letter of said date.
Not satisfied with her letter of recall,
respondent summarily, arbitrarily and
illegally ousted and relieved petitioner
as Chief of Police and at the same time,
designated Police Lt. Romualdo F.
Clements, a non-eligible, as Officer-in-
Charge of the Police Department. On
May 2, 1968, the Civil Service
Commission attested and approved the
appointment of petitioner as such Chief
of Police. The mayor, on the other hand,
quickly installed Bayani Bernardo as
Chief of Police of Malolos. For lack of
the mandatory requirement of
confirmation by the municipal council
under Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 1551, the
Civil Service Commission pronounced
the appointment of the replacement
null and void and directed respondent
"that steps be taken immediately to
install Mr. Javier as Chief of Police of
that Municipality (Malolos)".
Notwithstanding the aforementioned
ruling and directive, respondent
neglected and refused to reinstate
petitioner to tile position of Chief of
Police of Malolos which act is
specifically enjoined upon her as
Municipal Mayor and public officer, in
Sec. 19, Article IV of Rep. Act 2260
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act
of 1959.
ISSUE:
Between two appointees, the first
complying with all the legal
requirements to hold office, and the
second one
RULING:
The first appointee which complies with
all the legal requisites for appointment
prevails. Bernardo never
made by the incumbent appointing
power but without assuming office or
taking his oath of office, which one
prevails?
assumed office or took his oath. It
cannot be said, then, that he had
accepted his appointment. Such an
appointment being ineffective, we hold
that the petitioner's appointment
prevails. Acceptance is indispensable to
complete an appointment. The fact that
Bernardo's appointment was confirmed
by the Civil Service Commission does
not complete it since confirmation or
attestation by the Commission, although
an essential part of the appointing
process, serves merely to assure the
eligibility of the appointee.
Furthermore, Bernardo never contested
the petitioner's right to office. In the
case at bar, Bayani Bernardo never
undertook steps that would have
convinced us that he was interested in,
or had accepted, the appointment. He
did, of course, intervene in the
mandamus suit, but it was a belated
effort to assert his alleged rights. It is
not indicative of an interested party. It
was too little and too late. On the other
hand, we cannot say the same thing as
far as the petitioner is concerned. The
records show that he was appointed on
November 7, 1967, and the following
day, November 8, 1967, he took his oath
of office and discharged the duties
appurtenant thereto until January 13,
1968, when the succeeding mayor, the
herein respondent Purificacion Reyes,
recalled his appointment and appointed
another. Thereupon, the petitioner
went to the Civil Service Commission to
ask for reinstatement. Finally, he
brought suit for mandamus. These acts
amounted to acceptance and gave rise
to a vested right to the office in his
favor. Respondent Mayor is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petitioner to office of
Chief of Police, Malolos, Bulacan, or its
equivalent, or to any position equivalent
in rank and pay, subject to the
requirements of age and fitness, and to
PAY him back salaries equivalent to five
(5) years without qualification or
deduction.
JAVIER V. REYES
FACTS:
Javier was appointed chief of police in
Malolos by Mayor Aldaba. He already
took oath and discharged his functions
as chief of police. However, the
municipal mayor was assumed by
Reyes, who recalled his appointed.
Reyes even illegally ousted Javier and
replaced him with Clements. Javier took
this up in CSC. It appears that there
were already 2 appointments for the
chief of police Javier and Bernardo. The
CSC ruled that Javier should be the one
appointed, as Bernardo was not
confirmed by the counsel of Malolos.
But Reyes still refused to instill Javier in
the position.
ISSUE:
Whether Javier should prevail as chief of
police?
HELD:
YES. Javier should be chief of police. He
already took oath and performed the
functions of his office. This amounts to
acceptance by Javier. Javier acted
immediately when his position was
taken and filed a mandamus suit, this
also amounts to acceptance. On the
other hand, Bernardo never assumed
office. He did not even contested
Javier’s right to the position. His motion
to intervene in court was way too late. It
seems that there was no acceptance of
appointment for his part. Acceptance is
important in appointments. It is what
makes the appointments complete.
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SSoriano vs. Lista Case
The President shall nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until after
disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. (Sec. 16,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed public respondents to
different positions in the Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG). Petitioner
questioned the said appointments for
failure to undergo the confirmation
process in the Commission on
Appointments.
Issues:
1. Does petitioner have any legal
personality to file the instant petition?
2. Do the appointments of respondents
required confirmation of the CA?
Held:
1. No. A private citizen is allowed to
raise constitutional questions only if he
can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action
and the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action. In the case at bar,
petitioner has failed to clearly
demonstrate that he has personally
suffered actual or threatened injury. It
should be emphasized that a party
bringing a suit challenging the
constitutionality of an act or statute
must show not only that the law or act
is invalid, but also that he has sustained
or is in immediate, or imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way.
The instant petition cannot even be
classified as a taxpayers suit because
petitioner has no interest as such and
this case does not involve the exercise
by Congress of its taxing power.
2. No. The PCG used to be administered
and maintained as a separate unit of the
Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA
5173. It was subsequently placed under
the direct supervision and control of the
Secretary of the Department of National
Defense (DND) pursuant to Section 4 of
PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated
into the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the
Philippine Navy under Section 54 of
Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV
of EO 292, as amended.
However, on March 30, 1998, after the
aforesaid changes in the charter of the
PCG, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in
the exercise of his statutory authority to
reorganize the Office of the President,
issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from
the DND to the Office of the President.
He later on again transferred the PCG
from the Office of the President to the
Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC
and no longer part of the Philippine
Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the
rank of captain and higher for that
matter, do not require confirmation by
the CA.
It is clear from Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution that only appointed officers
from the rank of colonel or naval
captain in the armed forces require
confirmation by the CA. The rule is that
the plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be
given a construction that changes its
meaning.
The enumeration of appointments
subject to confirmation by the CA under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is exclusive. The clause
officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain refers to
military officers alone. This is clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the proposed text of
said Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Since the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers are
not covered by the above-cited
provision of the Constitution, the same
need not be confirmed by the CA.
(Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881,
March 24, 2003)
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Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private
respondent approved the following
resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr.
Bruno Aparri, as general manager of
NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives
and compensations to take effect on
January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of
directors approved resolution # 24
which stating thereat that the
incumbent general manager shall
perform his duty up to the close of
office hour on March 31, 1962. In
accordance with the provisions of
section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It
hereby fixes the term of office of the
incumbent general manager until march
31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus
with preliminary injunction with the first
instance court. The petition pray for the
annulment of the resolution of NARRA
board.
Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24
was a removal or dismissal of petitioner
without cause.
Held:
It was affirmed that the term of office of
petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It
is necessary in each case to interpret
the word "Term" with the purview of
the statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the
office under examination. In the case at
bar, the term of office is not fixed by
law. However, the power to fix the term
is rested in the board of directors
subject to the recommendation of the
office of economic coordination and the
approval of the president of the
philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of
no removal but an expiration of the
term of office of the petitioner. The
statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule
in statutory construction that if the
words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and
intention of the legislative must be
determined from the language
employed and where there is no
ambiguity in words, there is no room for
construction.
The petitioner in this case was not
removed before the expiration of his
term rather, his right to hold office
ceased by the expiration on March 31,
1962, of his term to hold such office.
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DRILON VS. LIM
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local
Government Code or the Procedure For
Approval And Effectivity Of Tax
Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings, Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared
Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known
as the Manila Revenue Code, null and
void for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment
of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and
public policy.
In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretary's
resolution and sustained the ordinance,
holding inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed.
Instead, it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture
in the Secretary of Justice of the power
of control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on
the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local
governments. By citing the distinction
between control and supervision, the
lower court’s concluded that the
challenged section gave the Secretary
the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the
Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a
violation not only of Article X,
specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of
Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments, 8 and the policy of local
autonomy in general.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 187 of the Local
Government Code is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court is reversed insofar as it declared
Section 187 of the Local Government
Code unconstitutional and affirmed the
findings of the procedural requirements
in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it
on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside
a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted
to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He
did not pronounce the ordinance
unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he
did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment
of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under
the Local Government Code.
The Court finds that Secretary Drilon
had performed an act not of control but
of mere supervision. An officer in
control lays down the rules in the doing
of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or
he may even decide to do it himself.
While in supervision, it merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules,
nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing
of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
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Gascon vs. Arroyo (Consti1)
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, Faustino
"Bong" L. Lapira, and Spouses Alberto
and Karla Lim, petitioners,
vs.
The Hon. Joker T. Arroyo, in his official
capacity as Executive Secretary to the
President, Hon. Teodoro Benigno, as
Press Secretary, Hon. Reneirio Reyes, as
the Secretary of Transportation and
Communication, Hon. Jose Alcuaz, as
Chairman of the National
Telecommunications Commission, Hon.
Conrado A. Limcaoco, Jr., as the Officer-
in-Charge of the People's Television,
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, and
Messrs. Vicente Abad Santos, Pastor Del
Rosario and Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in
their respective capacities as Chairman
and Members of the "Arbitration
Committee", respondents.
En Banc
Padilla, October 16, 1989
Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against
the State - Expropriation
Facts:
Lopez family is the owner of 2 television
stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4,
which they have operated through the
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
When martial law was declared on Sept
21, 1972, Ch. 4 was closed by the
military and its facilities were taken over
by Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS)
which operated it as a commercial TV
station
In 1978, KBS was taken over by the
National Media Production Center
(NMPC), which operated it under
Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4
(MBS-4)
After the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution, the PCGG sequestered the
TV stations and the Office of Media
Affairs took over the operation of Ch. 4
On. April 17, 1986, the Lopez family
requested Pres. Aquino to order to
return to them Chs. 2 and 4
On October 18 1986, Ch 2 was returned
to the Lopez family
Upon the Lopez family's request, the
respondent Executive Secretary, by the
authority of the President, entered into
with ABS-CBN, represented by its Pres.
Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to
Arbitrate"
Arbitration Committee was created
composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig,
Jr., for RP and Atty. Pastor del Rosario
for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente
Abad Santos as Chairman
Issue:
Note: There wasn't exactly an issue, as
the court dismissed the case because
the petitioners did not have locus
standi. If the need arises, I would say
the issue is "Whether or not the
Agreement to Arbitrate, as an
alternative to a lawsuit against the
State, is valid"; to which, the answer is
yes. Either way, I'll just enumerate
below the court's statements regarding
the expropriation topic.
The Executive Secretary, in entering into
the "Agreement to Arbitrate," was
acting for and in behalf of the President
when he signed it. Hence, the aforesaid
agreement is valid and binding upon the
Republic of the Philippines.
Where the government takes property
from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process
of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without
thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit
without its consent.
The government's immunity cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice to a citizen.
Note: In a separate opinion, Justice
Feliciano remarks that the above
comments as obiter dicta.
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CESAR R. DE LEON v. J. ANTONIO M.
CARPIO, GR No. 85243, 1989-10-12
Alter-ego" Doctrine
FACTS:
Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI
agents terminated by then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal
to the Review Committee, the said body
declined to act on their petitions for
reconsideration on the ground that it
had lost its jurisdiction with the
ratification of the new Constitution.
They were advised instead to seek relief
from the Civil Service Commission.
The Merit Systems Protection Board of
CSC held that their dismissals were
invalid and unconstitutional, having
been done in violation of their security
of tenure under the 1987 Constitution.
Accordingly, the Board ordered their
reinstatement.
However, respondent Carpio, as
Director of NBI, returned the orders
issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC
“without action,” claiming that they
were null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of the NBI
can disobey an explicit and direct order
issued to him by the Secretary of Justice
HELD:
It is an elementary principle of our
republican government, enshrined in
the Constitution and honored not in the
breach but in the observance, that all
executive departments, bureaus and
offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines.
The President’s power of control is
directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn
and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. The constitutional vesture
of this power in the President is self-
executing and does not require
statutory implementation, nor may its
exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full
control of all the members of his
Cabinet and may appoint them as he
sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure,
subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, and
replace them in his discretion. Once in
place, they are at all times under the
disposition of the President as their
immediate superior. “Without
minimizing the importance of the heads
of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President.
Hence, their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of
business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior)
In the case at bar, there is no question
that when he directed the respondent
to reinstate the petitioners, Sec.
Ordonez was acting in the regular
discharge of his functions as an alter ego
of the President. His acts should
therefore have been respected by the
respondent Director of the NBI, which is
in the Department of Justice under the
direct control of its Secretary. As a
subordinate in this department, the
respondent was (and is) bound to obey
the Secretary’s directives, which are
presumptively the acts of the President
of the Philippines.
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🧡❤ ❤ ❤ ❤ ❤
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August
15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization
of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved.
The IBP filed a petition seeking to
declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s
factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the
armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the
civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom.
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such
equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power
in a different category from the power
to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the 3 powers and
provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the
treatment of the said powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by
the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary
power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present
petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists
no justification for calling out the armed
forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention
that by the deployment of the Marines,
the civilian task of law enforcement is
“militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II
of the Constitution. The deployment of
the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of
the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the
police force. The real authority in the
operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to
speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character
of the PNP.
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[CASE DIGEST] Sanlakas v. Angelo
Reyes (G.R. No. 159085)
February 3, 2004 | G.R. No. 159085
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines stormed into
the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in
the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among
other things, the resignation of
President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of
Defense Angelo Reyes, and PNP Chief
Hermogenes Ebdane.
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation,
the President issued later in the day
Proclamation No. 427 ("Declaring a
State of Rebellion") and General Order
No. 4 ("Directing the AFP and the PNP to
Suppress the Rebellion"), both declaring
“a state of rebellion” and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the
Oakwood occupation had ended. After
hours-long negotiations, the soldiers
agreed to return to barracks. The
President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion and did so only on
August 1, 2003, through Proclamation
No. 435 ("Declaring that the State of
Rebellion Has Ceased to Exist").
Subsequently, several petitions have
been filed challenging the
constitutionality of the President
Arroyo's declaration of state of
rebellion. These were:
• G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v.
Executive Secretary, et al.) - Party-list
organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM), contend that
Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call
out the armed forces. They further
submit that, because of the cessation of
the Oakwood occupation, thereexists no
sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state
of rebellion for an indefinite period.
• G.R. No. 159103 (SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al.) - Officers/members of
the Social Justice Society (SJS), “Filipino
citizens, taxpayers, law professors and
bar reviewers" claim that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not
authorize the declaration of a state of
rebellion. They contend that the
declaration is a “constitutional
anomaly” that “confuses, confounds
and misleads” because “[o]verzealous
public officers, acting pursuant to such
proclamation or general order, are liable
to violate the constitutional right of
private citizens.” Petitioners also submit
that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial
law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated
any such power to the President.
• G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo) -
petitioners brought suit as citizens and
as Members of the House of
Representatives whose rights, powers
and functions were allegedly affected by
the declaration of a state of rebellion.
Petitioners do not challenge the power
of the President to call out the Armed
Forces. They argue, however, that the
declaration of a state of rebellion is a
“superfluity,” and is actually an exercise
of emergency powers.Such exercise, it is
contended, amounts to a usurpation of
the power of Congress granted by
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution.
• G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo,
et al.) - Senator Pimentel assails the
subject presidential issuances as “an
unwarranted, illegal and abusive
exercise of a martial law power that has
no basis under the Constitution.” In the
main, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion
“opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests”
for the crime of rebellion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case is moot and
academic, given that the President has
already declared the cessation of the
state of rebellion.
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal
standing to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether or not Section 18, Art. VII of
the 1987 Constitution grants the
President the power to declare a state
of rebellion.
4. Whether or not the declaration of a
state of rebellion is a mere superfluity.
5. Whether or not the declaration of a
state of rebellion has an effect on the
rights of the citizens.
HELD:
1. Yes, the Court held that the case is
moot and academic, judicial power
being limited to the determination of
"actual controversies." However, the
Court treated the immediate case as
one that is "capable of repetition yet
evading review." Hence, the discussion
of the merits and demerits of the issues
presented.
2. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al.
and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge
the subject issuances. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution. An act of the
Executive which injures the institution
of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which
can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the
courts.
3. Yes, the Court held that it is within
her prerogative as Chief Executive for
the President to declare a state of
rebellion. For the fact is, the
Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers
but, first and foremost, with Executive
powers.
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Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile
Enrile (then Minister of National
Defense), pursuant to the order of
Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of
a number of individuals including
Benigno Aquino Jr even without any
charge against them. Hence, Aquino and
some others filed for habeas corpus
against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile
answered that the arrest is valid
pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of
Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s
detention is legal in accordance to the
declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in
case of invasion, insurrection or
rebellion, or imminent danger against
the state, when public safety requires it,
the President may suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part therein under
Martial Law. In the case at bar, the SC
ruled that the state of rebellion plaguing
the country has not yet disappeared,
therefore, there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state. The arrest is
then a valid exercise pursuant to the
President’s order.
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People vs. Casido Case Digest
Facts: In an effort to seek their release
at the soonest possible time, accused-
appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin applied for pardon before the
Presidential Committee on the Grant of
Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as
well as for amnesty before the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC). The
PCGBRP was constituted in line with the
confidence-building measures of the
government. Thereafter, accused-
appellants were granted conditional
pardon. But the Court ruled in
resolution that the conditional pardon
granted to accused-appellants is void for
having been extended during the
pendency of their appeal. Prior to the
resolution, the NAC favorably acted on
the applications for amnesty of accused-
appellants.
Issue: Whether or not the release of
accused-appellants is valid
Held: The release of accused-appellants
was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and not by the
pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive
and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by the Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is to classes
of persons or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes
or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does not work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the
culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence. While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void
for having been extended during the
pendency of the appeal or before
conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first
paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for
which accused-appellants voluntarily
applied under Proclamation No. 347
was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of
Congress.
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G.R. No. L-27206 August 26, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
CULANAG v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS:
Andres Culanag was found on December
16, 1961 guilty as charged and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
for falsification
of public document herein
identified as Crim. Case No. 671 with
details as follows:
 On or about June 19,
1960, in Iligan City, he subscribed and
swore to a petition for commission as
notary
public for and in the
City and Province of Cotabato, and
falsely claimed to be one Ross V.
Pangilinan, to be
a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the
Visayas, to have passed the bar
examinations and
to have been admitted
to the practice of law.
ï‚· The accused was committed to
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, for service of the sentence.
ï‚· On July 9, 1962, Culanag was
discharged from the penitentiary on
parole. Among the conditions of said
release
were:
 To reside at Iligan
City;
 Not to change his
residence without the consent of the
Board of Pardons and Parole;
 Not to commit any
crime; and
 That should he violate
any of the conditions, the remaining
unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence imposed on
him would again be in full force and
effect.
ï‚· Subsequently, on March 31, 1964,
another information for falsification of a
public document was filed against him
in the Municipal
 Court of Mamburao, provincial
capital of Mindoro Occidental, herein
identified as Crim. Case No. 790, with
details as
follows:
 Alleged this time was
that on June 1, 1963, he claimed to be
one Ross V. Pangilinan and filed with the
Clerk
of Court of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Mindoro a
sworn petition for commission as notary
public
for and in the Province
of Occidental Mindoro, falsely stating
that he is a law graduate of the
University
of Visayas, had passed
the bar examinations and been
admitted to the practice of law.
ï‚· Aside from this, an information
was filed against him in the same court
on April 3, 1964, for the offense of
violation of
conditional pardon under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code (Crim.
Case No. 789).
ï‚· Furthermore, on May 18, 1964,
for violation of the condition of his
parole, Culanag was ordered arrested by
the Board of Pardons
and Parole and delivered to the
custody of the Director of Prisons in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, to serve the
remaining portion of his
prison term imposed in Crim. Case
No. 671 of the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte.
ï‚· On December 22, 1964, he filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal contending that
the second
falsification case (Crim. Case No.
790) involved the same act of
falsification as the first one (Crim. Case
No. 671), so that double
jeopardy was attendant. Said
contention was rejected by the Court of
First Instance. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower
court, finding that falsifications
involved were two different acts done at
different times and in different places.
ï‚· After unsuccessfully moving to
quash in Crim. Cases Nos. 789 and 790,
pleading double jeopardy, Culanag
pleaded guilty on
December 4, 1964 in said new
criminal cases. As to Crim. Case No. 789,
for violation of conditional pardon
under Art. 159,
Revised Penal Code, he was
sentenced to imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor.
ï‚· Alleging that the prison sentences
under Crim. Cases 789 and 790 have
already been fully served by him,
Culanag
filed on December 13, 1966
another petition for habeas corpus, in
forma pauperis, in the Court of First
Instance
of Rizal raising as issue on whether
petitioner has still to serve, in addition
to the sentences in Crim. Cases 789
and 790, the remaining unexpired
portion of his sentence in Crim. Case
No. 671; if so, he is not yet entitled to
release;
otherwise, he is.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Culanag still has to
serve in addition to the sentences in
Crim Cases 789 and 790, the remaining
unexpired
portion of his sentence in Crim Case No.
671, even when Crim Case 790
stemmed out from his violation of the
conditional parole in Crim Case 671, and
he has already fully served his sentence
for Crim Case 790.
RULING:
Yes. Culanag still has to serve his
unexpired sentence in Crim Case 671.
The power of the Chief Executive under
Section 64(i) of the Rev. Administrative
Code to arrest and re-incarcerate any
person who violates his parole
condition, stands even in the face of
prosecution, conviction and service of
sentence for violation of conditional
pardon under Art. 159, Rev. Penal Code.
For Culanag’s violation of
conditional pardon and falsification of
public document, the criminal and
administrative penalties are not
mutually exclusive (meaning they can
both happen at the same time) and may
be successfully availed of by the
President for the
punishment of the violator of the
conditional pardon. To reiterate, there
is no double jeopardy, because the
sentences refer to
different offenses; in this case, (1) to
falsification (Crim. Case 671) and (2) to
violation of conditional pardon (Crim.
Case 789). Nor is
there deprivation of liberty without due
process of law because in both cases he
was found guilty and sentenced, after
due process of law. And before full
service of said sentences, he is not yet
entitled to liberty.
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Sumulong Torres v. Gonzales Case
Digest
Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the
Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Facts:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In
1979, he was was granted conditional
pardon by the president on condition
that he "would not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines". He
accepted the conditional pardon and
was consequently released from
confinement. In 1982, he was charged
with 20 counts of estafa (pending trial)
while in 1985, he was convicted of
sedition (pending appeal). In 1986,
Justice Secretary Gonzales petitioned
for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon.
Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Torres thus filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the SC questioning the
validity of the arrest order. He claimed
that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted
by final judgment of 20 counts of estafa
nor of the crime of sedition.
Issue:
Is conviction by final judgment
necessary before a person may be
validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his condition
pardon?
Held:
The determination of the occurrence of
a breach of a condition of a pardon, and
the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may
be a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in
order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon.
Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code defines a distinct, substantive,
felony, the parolee or convict who is
regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to
suffer the penalty prescribed in Article
159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a
convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon,
the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such
pardon." Here, the President has chosen
to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
76872, July 23, 1987)
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Monsanto vs. Factoran Case Digest
Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the
Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Facts:
In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city
treasurer of Calbayog City) was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
estafa thru falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail
and to indemnify the government in the
sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the
decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion
was pending, she was extended by
President Marcos absolute pardon
which she accepted (at that time,
clemency could be given even before
conviction).
On the strength of such pardon, she
wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog
asking for automatic reinstatement to
her position without need of a new
appointment since it was still vacant.
The letter was referred to the Ministry
of Finance (MF) which at that time had
control over the City Treasuries. The
Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of
Monsanto but said that appointment
was only to retroact from the date of
she was given pardon. Monsanto asked
for reconsideration saying that the full
pardon wiped out the crime and thus
her service in the government should
not be considered to have interrupted.
Thus, the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension; that she is
entitled to backpay for the entire period
of her suspension; and that she should
not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of
P4,892.50.
The motion for reconsideration was
referred to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Factoran reversed
the ruling of MF, ruling that acquittal
and not pardon is the only ground for
reinstatement in the public service and
entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension
pendente lite.
Monsanto thus filed a petition before
the SC. She contends that since the
pardon was given when her case was
still pending on appeal before the SC, no
final verdict has yet been handed and
consequently the accessory penalty
attached to the crime which is forfeiture
from public office did not attached. Also
she contends that the pardon given
before the final verdict is tantamount to
acquittal.
Issues:
1. What is the effect of absolute
pardon?
2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
3. Is a public officer, who has been
granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to
her former position without need of a
new appointment?
4. May petitioner be exempt from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It
is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he
never committed the offense, it does
not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt.
It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out
the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.
2. No. A pardon looks to the future. It is
not retrospective. It makes no amends
for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It
does not impose upon the government
any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. “Since the
offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done
or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done
and justly suffered, and no satisfaction
for it can be required.”
3. No. Pardon granted after conviction
frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But
unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot
preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
The pardon granted to petitioner has
resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer,
she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

4. No. Civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the Revised Penal Code. It
subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the
rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. (Monsanto
vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9,
1989)
Note: Conviction by final judgment is
now necessary before parole or pardon
could be extended. (Section 19, Article
VII of the Constitution, People vs.
Casido; People vs. Salle)
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People vs. Jose Patriarca Case Digest
The person released under an amnesty
proclamation stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed
no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code, provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty; the
penalty and all its effects are thus
extinguished.
Facts:
Patriarca was charged with the crime of
murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo
before RTC Sorsogon docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also
charged with murder for the killing of
one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer
Cadag under Informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672,
respectively. The RTC found him guilty
in Criminal Case No. 2773 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed
the decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting
Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All
Other Persons Who Have or May Have
Committed Crimes Against Public Order,
Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance
of Political Ends, and Violations of the
Article of War, and Creating a National
Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his
application was favorably granted by
the National Amnesty Board concluding
that his activities were done in pursuit
of his political beliefs.
Issue:
What is the effect of the grant of
amnesty to the conviction of the
accused-appellant?
Held:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general
pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants
to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and
abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes
the penalty and all its effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the
grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is binding and effective. It
serves to put an end to the appeal.
Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of
murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were
ordered dismissed.(People vs. Patriarca,
Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29,
2000)
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BAYAN (vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA)
unconstitutional
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America
entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The
agreement was treated as a treaty by
the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph
Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of
the total membership of the Philippine
Senate. The VFA defines the treatment
of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and
further defines the rights of the U.S. and
the Philippine governments in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the
VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that
“foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 25, Article
XVIII disallows foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under
a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when
so required by congress, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state. There is no dispute
as to the presence of the first two
requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate
through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
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JUDGE DADOLE VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
DOCTRINE: The President can only
interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds
that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the President’s
supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President
or any of his or her alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and
the Constitution. Any directive therefore
by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom
of a law-conforming judgment on local
affairs of a local government unit is a
patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive
and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations.
FACTS: In 1986, petitioners as RTC and
MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City
received a monthly allowance of P1,260
each pursuant to the yearly
appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in
1991, it was increased to P1,500 for
each judge. However, on March 15,
1994, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued Local
Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
provides that the additional monthly
allowances to be given by a local
government unit should not exceed
P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700
in municipalities. Acting on the said
DBM directive, the Mandaue City
Auditor issued notices of disallowance
to herein petitioners in excess of the
amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus,
petitioners filed with the Office of the
City Auditor a protest. However, it was
treated as a motion for reconsideration
and was endorsed to the Commission
on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In
turn, the COA Regional Office referred
the said motion to their Head Office
with recommendation that the same
should be denied. Accordingly, it was
denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners
filed the instant petition. They argued,
among others, that LBC 55 is void for
infringing on the local autonomy of
Mandaue City by dictating a uniform
amount that a local government unit
can disburse as additional allowances to
judges stationed therein.
ISSUE: WON a local government unit
may provide an allowance exceeding P
1,000.
HELD: YES. We recognize that, although
our Constitution guarantees autonomy
to local government units, the exercise
of local autonomy remains subject to
the power of control by Congress and
the power of supervision by the
President. Section 4 of Article X of the
1987 Philippine Constitution provides
that: “Sec. 4. The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. . . .
“ ordinances, in accordance with the
The President can only interfere in the
affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that
the latter has acted contrary to law. This
is the scope of the President’s
supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President
or any of his or her alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and
the Constitution. Any directive therefore
by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom
of a law-conforming judgment on local
affairs of a local government unit is a
patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive
and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations.
LBC 55 provides that the additional
monthly allowances to be given by a
local government unit should not
exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities
and P700 in municipalities. Section 458,
par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that
supposedly serves as the legal basis of
LBC 55, allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges “when the
finances of the city government allow.”
The said provision does not authorize
setting a definite maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges.
Thus, we need not belabor the point
that the finances of a city government
may allow the grant of additional
allowances higher than P1,000 if the
revenues of the said city government
exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to
illustrate, a city government with locally
generated annual revenues of P40
million and expenditures of P35 million
can afford to grant additional
allowances of more than P1,000 each
to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the
finances of the city can afford it.
Respondent COA failed to prove that
Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for
the additional allowances of the judges.
There was no evidence submitted by
COA showing the breakdown of the
expenses of the city government and
the funds used for said expenses. All the
COA presented were the amounts
expended, the locally generated
revenues, the deficit, the surplus and
the IRA received each year. Aside from
these items, no data or figures were
presented to show that Mandaue City
deducted the subject allowances from
the IRA. In other words, just because
Mandaue City’s locally generated
revenues were not enough to cover its
expenditures, this did not mean that the
additional allowances of petitioner
judges were taken from the IRA and not
from the city’s own revenue.
The DBM neither conducted a formal
review nor ordered a disapproval of
Mandaue City’s appropriation
procedure outlined by Sections 326 and
327 of RA 7160[.] . . . Within 90 days
from receipt of the copies of the
appropriation ordinance, the DBM
should have taken positive action.
Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed
to have been properly reviewed and
deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch
as, in the instant case, the DBM did not
follow the appropriate procedure for
reviewing the subject ordinance of
Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day
period to lapse, it can no longer
question the legality of the provisions in
the said ordinance granting additional
allowances to judges stationed in the
said city.
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Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No.
118295, May 2, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al.
questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of
the President’s ratification of the
international Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
They argued that the WTO Agreement
violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to)
give preference to qualified Filipinos
(and to) promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.” Further, they
contended that the “national
treatment” and “parity provisions” of
the WTO Agreement “place nationals
and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the
“Filipino First” policy of our
Constitution, and render meaningless
the phrase “effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”
II. THE ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our
country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic
globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It
sustained the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate of the President’s
ratification of the Agreement
establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT
prohibit our country from participating
in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions
in the Constitution to allow the Senate
to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does
not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx
xxx
[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-
reliant and independent national
economy” does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy
in the international community.”
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Villavert vs. Desierto Case Digest
Appellate Jurisdiction of SC0 Comments
No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
(Sec. 30, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
An administrative charge for grave
misconduct was filed against Villavert,
Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO
Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation
Officer recommended the dismissal of
the case. However, Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas issued a
Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of
the charge. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27
of RA 6770.
Issue:
May decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases be appealed to the
Supreme Court?
Held:
No. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA
6770, which authorizes an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases, was declared violative
of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of
the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court without its advice and
consent. In addition, the Court noted
that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of
the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as
reiterated in the subsequent case of
Namuhe v. Ombudsman. (Villavert vs.
Desierto, G.R. No. 133715. February 23,
2000)
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In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta
Power of Appointment – Power and
Functions of the President Date:
November 9, 1998 Ponente: THE
Chief Justice Narvasa
SUMMARY:
Said appointees for vacancies of
RTC Branch 62 and 24 of
Cabanatuan City, Valenzuela and
Vallarta respectively, were appointed
on March 30, 1998. Their
appointment was transmitted to the
Office of the Chief Justice on May
12, 1998. The Court ruled said
appointments were made during
the ban contemplated by Art. VII,
Sec. 15, regardless of the
obligations of the President
provided under Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1)
and Art. VIII Sec. 9.
ISSUES:
1. WoN Art. VIII Sec. 4 (1) and
Sec. 9 supersede the ban prescribed
under Art. VII Sec. 15.
2. WoN the ban contemplates only
Executive appointments, and not
appointments to the Judiciary.
3. WoN the appointments of
Valenzuela and Vallarta are valid.
FACTS:
1. The President had, prior to
these two appointments, made
appointments to fill the vacancies
of 8 Associate Justices, on March 11,
1998, and transmitted to the Chief
Justice through the Executive
Secretary on April 6, 1998. The
Chief Justice took this to be the
President deviating from the
previous position that said ban does
not apply to the Judiciary. 2. March
11, 1998 was the day prior to
the start of the election ban
contemplated under Art. VII, Sec.
15. 3. JBC sought clarification on
this matter and met as a whole.
On May 5, Secretary of Justice
Silvestre Bello requested the Chief
Justice for
JBC session to discuss the
vacancies needed to be filled. The
President had made the
appointments of the two judges,
made on March 30, 1998. Prior the
JBC session, the Chief Justice
promised a reply to the President
on May 6, 1998 as regards
transmitting the list of final nominees
by the JBC for a vacancy in the
Supreme Court. Supposedly, behind
the Chief Justice’s back, the other
members of the JBC met without
the former and had also
communicated to the President on
May 6, 1998 that they would seek
the Chief Justice’s presence and
holding of a meeting May 7.
Should he not accede to the
same, they would meet anyway, in
“xxx complying with its Constitutional
mandate.” C.J sent a letter on May
6 saying the JBC would convene
after the elections and entertain
the appointments after the same.
May 7, the President again
requested transmission of list of
nominees and asserted that the
ban applies only to Executive
appointments. May 8, the Chief
Justice replied with a letter that
would address the issue the same
way the Court would resolve to later
on. Valenzuela took his office on
May 14, 1998 with the said copy
of his appointment by Malacanang
in his possession, but the original
not being transmitted by the Office
of the Chief Justice just yet.
Related Provisions: Article VII,
Section 15; Two months
immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. Note: 1.
No mention of distinction of who
or who are not covered by the
general ban. 2. Exception only
where “xxx temporary appointments
to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.” Article VIII, Section 4
(1); The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or, in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof. Article VIII,
Section 9; The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges in
lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation. For the lower
courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.
Art. VII, Sec. 4
HOLDING:
1. NO. Art. VII Sec. 15 provides a
ban to which Art. VIII Sec. 4 (1)
and Sec. 9 must be read in line
with. Apart from taking the
Constitution as a whole, the Court
holds that the need to fill a vacancy
still submits to the Constitutional
restriction on this power of the
President to appoint.
1.a. There is no distinction in the
Constitution as regards who are
covered by the ban or not,
regardless of this power and ban
being found under the title of the
Executive in the Constitution.
2. Hence, NO, the ban does not
contemplate only Executive
appointments.
RULING:
The appointments are DECLARED
VOID. Said judges are ordered to
CEASE AND DESIST from discharging
the office of Judge of the Courts.
This, without prejudice to their
being considered anew by the
Judicial and Bar Council for re-‐
nomination to the same positions.
Presidential Term: a. 6 years b.
From June 30, noon 20XX to June
30, noon 6 years later Elections for
the Presidency are held on the
second Monday of May on the same
year of the end of the President’s
term. Hence; In this case: March 12,
1998 as the identified start of the
ban Ban ends June 30, 1998 Period
is some 90 days or three months
coverage Appointments of Valenzuela
and Vallarta were made WHEN the
same were signed on March 30,
1998. The transmission of the
appointments were made on M ay
12, 1998. Both fell w ithin the ban.
It w ould seem then that the
reckoning point of when
appointment is m ade is WHEN IT IS
SIGNED. It w ould not seem to
preclude that the transmission be
made within the election ban period.
The Constitution explicitly bans
MAKING (SIGNING) APPOINTMENTS.
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FORTICH vs. CORONA G.R. No. 131457,
April 24, 1998
Facts:
This case involves a 144-hectare land
located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC),
one of the petitioners. Pursuant to
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted
Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-
classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy.
San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional
with a view of providing an opportunity
to attract investors who can inject new
economic vitality, provide more jobs
and raise the income of its people.
Notwithstanding the foregoing
favorable recommendation, however,
on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru
Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to
approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an
Order denying the instant application
for the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to agro-industrial and,
instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and
directed the distribution thereof to all
qualified beneficiaries. After a careful
evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the
grounds upon which the denial thereof
by Secretary Garilao was based, we find
that the instant application for
conversion by the Municipality of
Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with
merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-
industrial would open great
opportunities for employment and bring
about real development in the area
towards a sustained economic growth
of the municipality. On the other hand,
distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants,
as there are none) does not guarantee
such benefits. In pursuance of the spirit
and intent of the said legal mandate and
in view of the favorable
recommendations of the various
government agencies, the subject Order
of Department of Agrarian Reform, was
SET ASIDE, DAR filed a motion for
reconsideration of the OP decision
which having been filed beyond the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days.
The DAR filed a second motion for
reconsideration of the June 23, 1997
Order of the President.
Some alleged farmer-beneficiaries
began their hunger strike in front of the
DAR Compound in Quezon City to
protest the OP Decision of March 29,
1996. On October 10, 1997, some
persons claiming to be farmer-
beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property
filed a motion for intervention (styled as
Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P.
Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP
Decision allowing the conversion of the
entire 144-hectare property be set
aside. President Fidel V. Ramos then
held a dialogue with the strikers and
promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. He
created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding
Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture
Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into
the controversy and recommend
possible solutions to the problem. On
November 7, 1997, the Office of the
President resolved the strikers’ protest
by issuing the so-called “Win/Win”
Resolution penned by then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona. A
copy of the “Win-Win” Resolution was
received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich
of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on
November 24, 1997 28 and, on
December 4, 1997, they filed the
present petition for certiorari,
prohibition (under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and injunction
with urgent prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (under Rule 58,
ibid.), against then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence this
case.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the president still
have Jurisdiction when it entertained
the Second Motion for Reconsideration
and became the basis of the Win-Win
Resolution?
Held:
No, When the Office of the President
issued the Order dated June 23, 1997
declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the
case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of
the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became
the basis of the assailed “Win-Win”
Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative
Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandate that
only one (1) motion for reconsideration
is allowed to be taken from the Decision
of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was
permitted to be filed in “exceptionally
meritorious cases,” as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18,
still the said motion should not have
been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into
finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29,
1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic
legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations
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Dumlao vs COMELEC 95 SCRA 392
Facts:
Patricio Dumlao was the former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has
already retired from his office and he
has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom. In 1980, he filed for
reelection to the same office.
Meanwhile, Batas PambansaBlg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among
others, that retirees from public office
like Dumlao are disqualified to run for
office. Dumlao assailed the law averring
that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo
Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These
two however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of
a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the
length of the campaign, and the
provision which bars persons charged
for crimes from running for public office
as well as the provision that provides
that the mere filing of complaints
against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify
them from office.
Issue:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and
Salapantan have a cause of action.
Ruling:
No. The SC pointed out the procedural
lapses of this case for this case should
have never been merged. Dumlao’s
issue is different from Igot’s. They have
separate issues. Further, this case does
not meet all the requisites so that it’d
be eligible for judicial review. There are
standards that have to be followed in
the exercise of the function of judicial
review, namely:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case;
(2) an interest personal and substantial
by the party raising the constitutional
question;
(3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity;
and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was
met.
The SC ruled however that the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may
not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and
after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office as
null and void. The assertion that BP 52 is
contrary to the safeguard of equal
protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings
are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable. In respect of election to
provincial, city, or municipal positions,
to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time
they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as
the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law should be to
promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons.
On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may
also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service
may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged
65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a
65-year old elective local official
(Dumalo), who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there
is reason to disqualify him from running
for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.
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Marbury v. Madison SUMMARY
The Supreme Court established the
ability of courts to examine
Congressional acts for constitutionality
and to overturn them for being
unconstitutional through the process of
“judicial review”. In this case, the Court
used “judicial review” as a way of
declaring the portion of the Judiciary
Act of 1789—which allowed for writs of
mandamus to be issued by courts to
officers of the United States—to be
invalid.
KEY PLAYERS in Marbury v. Madison
1Appellants: Marbury, who demanded
that the court issue a writ of mandamus
ordering Madison to provide
commissions for the office of justice of
the peace to him and others appointed
as such.
2Appellees: James Madison, U.S.
Secretary of State, who withheld
commissions for the office of justice of
the peace to Marbury and others
appointed.
Marbury v. Madison BRIEF
The central theme of this case is the
concept of judicial review, which allows
the Supreme Court to examine
legislation enacted by Congress for
constitutionality and to invalidate such
legislation if it is found to be
unconstitutional.
Marbury v. Madison FACTS
President Adams appointed Marbury to
a new position as justice of the peace.
To begin his new position, he had to
receive a document—a “commission”—
which officially gave the role to him. The
President signed the commission for
Marbury and all those appointed to the
office of justice of the peace at the time
of appointment. James Madison was
supposed to have given Marbury this
document but failed to do so. Marbury
and other appointed justices of the
peace who had not received their
commissions filed a lawsuit demanding
that a writ of mandamus be issued
which ordered Madison to send
Marbury and the other justices of the
peace their commissions. The central
issues in the lawsuit were (i) whether it
is constitutional for the Supreme Court
to issue writs of mandamus; (ii) whether
the U.S. Secretary of State is allowed to
issue writs of mandamus; (iii) whether,
in this case involving commissions, the
Supreme Court can issue a writ of
mandamus to the U.S. Secretary of
State.
The Marbury v. Madison DECISION
The Court noted that the appointment
of Marbury to the role of justice of the
peace by the President created a
“vested legal right” in Marbury to
receive the office of justice of the peace
even before the commission was
delivered to him. It went on to detail
how the signing of the Marbury’s
commission by the President effectively
constituted an appointment and how
the signing of the commission by the
President created a vested, exclusive
right in Marbury to accept or reject the
appointment. The Court described the
principle that the appointment of an
officer who is not removable at will by
the President is irrevocable and “cannot
be annulled”.
The Court concluded that the courts are
empowered to provide remedies to
citizens whose “vested rights” have
been violated. The Court also noted that
“the judicial power of the United States
is extended to all cases arising under the
constitution” and, further, asserted that
it was a “judicial duty” to, when the
constitution and an enacted law
conflict, decide which rule applies to a
particular case. Based on the powers
granted to the Court through the
Constitution, the Court decided that the
power of “judicial review” allowed it to
examine the constitutionality of
legislation and to determine when the
violation of vested rights is the result of
a law being unconstitutional (The Court
concluded that “the judicial power of
the United States is extended to all
cases arising under the constitution”
and “the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law
is”). It held that that the part of the
legislation—the Judiciary Act of 1789—
which established the federal courts and
allowed the courts to issue writs of
mandamus to officers of the United
States allowed the courts to go beyond
the powers reserved for them in the
Constitution by engaging in an act that
constitutes an “original legal action”
against an “officer of the United States”.
Such original jurisdiction was not
explicitly established for the courts by
the Constitution. In that way, the Court
found that that portion of the Act
unconstitutional.
KEY TAKEAWAYS for Law Students
1“Judicial review” is a remedy that
allows a court to review acts of
Congress for constitutionality and to
hold that such acts are invalid if they are
unconstitutional.
2Writs of mandamus, as allowed for by
the Judiciary Act of 1789, are
unconstitutional; and the portion of the
Act which allows for them is invalid.
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DR. JOSE CUYEGKENG, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs.DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, as
member of Board of Medical Examiners,
respondent.G.R. No. L-16263, 65 Phil.
56July 26, 1960NATURE OF ACTION: A
quo warranto proceeding against an
appointed member of the Board of
Medical Examiners. FACTS: The
petitioners were in the list of qualified
physicians that were approved and
submitted, bythe Executive Council
of the Philippine Medical
Association of the Philippines
pursuant to theprovisions of section
13 of Republic Act No. 2382, to the
President for appointment as members
ofthe Board of Medical Examiners. The
President appointed 6 physicians, 5 of
them were on the listaforementioned
but the last, herein respondent, was not
among the list submitted by the
council.Petitioners filed a quo warranto
alleging that herein respondent was
unlawfully appointed tohis public
office.ISSUE: Whether or not a
recommended individual to a position
for appointment has the right to file
aquo warranto to question an
appointment to the said
position.RULING: No. The Court Ruled
that Respondent has a good and valid
right to his title on the groundsthat one
who does not claim to be entitled to
the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held orexercised by another
cannot question his title by quo
warranto. In the case at bar, petitioners
do notclaim to entitled to the office held
by respondent herein. None of them has
been appointed theretoand none of
them may, therefore, be placed in
said office, regardless of the
alleged flaws inrespondent's title
thereto. They merely assert a right to be
appointed to said office.Wherefore, the
writ prayed for should be, as it is
hereby, denied, with costs against
thepetitioners. It is so order
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Kilosbayan vs. Guingona (1994)
GR No. 113375 | 232 SCRA 110 | May 5,
1994 | En Banc | Justice Davide, Jr.
Constitutional Law | Judicial
Department | Judicial Power
Where the issue is of transcendental
importance of paramount public
interest, the procedural barrier of the
issue on a petitioner’s locus standi MAY
be set aside.
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.
FACTS:
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), with the approval of the
President, entered into a Contract of
Lease with Phil. Gaming Management
Corp. (PGMC) which was organized
through the initiative of the Berjaya
Group Berhad, a foreign company. This
was executed despite vigorous
opposition from petitioner Kilosbayan
on account of its alleged immorality and
illegality. Kilosbayan, an organization of
“civic-spirited citizens,” filed the instant
petition as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. Respondents challenge the
petitioners’ legal standing to file this
petition.
ISSUE:
Must the action fail for the alleged lack
of a legal standing?
RULING:
No. We find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the
public, and the issues it raised are of
paramount public interest. The
ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral wellbeing of the
people even in the remotest barangays
of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of
the envisioned on-line lottery system
are as staggering as the billions in pesos
it is expected to raise. In the exercise of
its sound discretion, in keeping with its
duty to determine whether or not the
other branches of govt have exercised
grave abuse of discretion given them,
this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of.
The Court voted 7-6 on this issue. (The
Contract of Lease was eventually
declared invalid for being violative of
the charter of PCSO)
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Tuesday, February 27, 2018
GUAZON V. DE VILLA - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
GUAZON V. DE VILLA G.R. No. 80508
January 30, 1990
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to prohibit the
military and police officers represented
by public respondents from conducting
"Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila.
The 41 petitioners alleged that the
"saturation drive" or "areal target
zoning" that were conducted in their
place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional.
The alleged acts committed during the
raid are the following:
1. Petitioners alleged that there is no
specific target house to search and that
there is no search warrant or warrant of
arrest served.
2. Most of the policemen are in their
civilian clothes and without nameplates
or identification cards.
3. The residents were rudely roused
from their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their houses.
4. The residents were at the point of
high-powered guns and herded like
cows.
5. Men were ordered to strip down to
their briefs for the police to examine
their tattoo marks.
6. The residents complained that they're
homes were ransacked, tossing their
belongings and destroying their
valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the
operation.
7. The residents also reported incidents
of maulings, spot-beatings, and
maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and
physical torture to extract confessions
and tactical information.
l The respondents said that such
accusations mentioned above were
total lies.
l Respondents contends that the
Constitution grants to the government
the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the
maintenance of peace in the state.
l The aerial target zoning was intended
to flush out subversives and criminal
elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted.
l Respondents averred that they have
intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead for the actual operation
and that local and foreign media joined
the operation to witness and record
such event.
ISSUE:
WON the areal target zoning and the
saturation drive is legal
HELD:
YES. The conduct of areal target zoning
or saturation drive is a valid exercise of
the military powers of the President.
According to the Supreme Court,
everything stated before them consists
only of allegations. According to
petitioners, more than 3,407 persons
were arrested in the saturation drives
covered by the petition. No estimates
are given for the drives in Block 34,
Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz
Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive
near the Manila International Airport
area. Not one of the several thousand
persons treated in the illegal and
inhuman manner described by the
petitioners appears as a petitioner or
has come before a trial court to present
the kind of evidence admissible in
courts of justice. Moreover, there must
have been tens of thousands of nearby
residents who were inconvenienced in
addition to the several thousand
allegedly arrested. None of those
arrested has apparently been charged
and none of those affected has
apparently complained.
The areal target zonings in this petition
were intended to flush out subversives
and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of
public officers and police officials by
elements supposedly coddled by the
communities where the "drives" were
conducted.
Moreover, there is nothing in the
Constitution which denies the authority
of the Chief Executive, to order police
actions to stop unabated criminality,
rising lawlessness, and alarming
communist activities. Where there is
large scale mutiny or actual rebellion,
the police or military may go in force to
the combat areas, enter affected
residences or buildings, round up
suspected rebels and otherwise quell
the mutiny or rebellion without having
to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights.
The Constitution grants the Government
the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements which would
bring down constituted authority and
substitute a regime where individual
liberties are suppressed as a matter of
policy in the name of security of the
State.
❤❤❤❤❤
PEOPLE v. MUNAR (1973)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Feliza Munar
was originally charged with grave
slander in the municipal court of San
Fernando, La Union for having uttered
defamatory words in calling the
offended party, Erlinda Munar, an
unmarried woman and a distant
relative, the paramour of somebody.
The trial court thereafter rendered its
decision of wherein like the municipal
court it rejected as not worthy of
credence the accused's defense of alibi
that she was in Manila on the day of the
commission of the offense and took a
moderate view of her defamatory
remarks, finding her guilty merely of
slight slander.
The accused filed a motion for
reconsideration praying for acquittal
and for reduction of the civil liability.
The trial court denied reconsideration,
rejecting the belated objection raised
for the first time by accused as to the
proceedings being invalid because the
private prosecutor conducted the
examination of the witnesses on three
hearing days, notwithstanding his
announcement — later withdrawn —
that the offended party would file a
separate civil case and ruling correctly
that since the government prosecutors
were present at the hearings, the
prosecution of the case remained under
their control and the private
prosecutor's presence and participation
which were then not objected to were
"of no particular importance."
The accused thereafter filed her notice
of appeal directly to the Supreme Court
"solely on a question of law, to wit: that
there was no legal basis for the
judgment of conviction because the
proceedings were null and void as the
private prosecutor had no legal
personality to represent, or present
evidence for, the prosecution in view of
the reservation of the civil action, as
borne out by the records."
ISSUES:
[1] WON the private prosecutor for the
offended party had no legal personality
to conduct the examination of some
witnesses and that his participation
rendered null and void the proceedings
[2] WON the crime of grave slander of
which accused-appellant was charged
comes within the area of concurrent
jurisdiction of Municipal Courts of
Provincial Capitals or City Courts and
Courts of First Instance,
[3] WON the judgment of the La Union
Court of First Instance to which accused-
appellant had expressly appealed the
municipal court's conviction should be
deemed null and void for want of
jurisdiction as her appeal should have
been directly to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court
HELD:
[1] No.
[2] Yes. The question is foreclosed by
the doctrine of estoppel enunciated by
the Court that "after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court."
[3] No.
RATIO:
[1] Accused-appellant hold that private
prosecutor for the offended party had
no legal personality to conduct the
examination of some witnesses and that
his participation rendered null and void
the proceedings is manifestly without
merit. Aside from the fact that accused's
objection brought up only in her motion
for reconsideration was too late, the
objection had no valid basis since the
private prosecutor had withdrawn the
reservation to file a separate civil case
and prosecution of the case remained at
all times under the control of the
government prosecutors.
[2] As restated in Crisostomo vs. Reyes
and a number of subsequent cases, the
principle decrees that "While the
jurisdiction of a tribunal may be
challenged at any time, sound public
policy bars the petitioners from so doing
after their having procured that
jurisdiction themselves, speculating on
the fortunes of litigation."
[3] As the People's brief puts it, an
appellant cannot be permitted to
experiment with the court - the court of
first instance in the case of herein
appellant — by submitting herself to its
jurisdiction and after the experiment
has proved unsuccessful for her with the
rendition of an adverse decision to raise
for the first time its lack of jurisdiction.
As restated by Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion in Francisco vs. City of
Davao, the ends of justice would not be
served if such belated jurisdictional
questions were to be entertained and
the proceedings nullified — when the
court's jurisdiction had been invoked all
the time by the party who would now
belatedly question its jurisdiction
because of its adverse decision.
Sound public policy and the interests of
a just, orderly, efficient and inexpensive
administration of justice, whereby
justice and fairness are accorded both
to plaintiff and defendant, to the
offended party as well as to the
accused, properly raise a barrier against
a party who would speculate on the
fortunes of litigation and in the event of
an adverse decision challenge the
jurisdiction of the very tribunal whose
jurisdiction he or she has invoked and
procured at the expenditure of so much
time, expense and effort on the part of
the litigants and of the State.
As a matter of substantial justice, both
the municipal court and the court of
first instance in the case at bar had dealt
with the criminal charge of grave
slander against the accused-appellant as
if it were one of slight slander
punishable with a penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00
— and both courts imposed merely a
fine well below the maximum of
P200.00.
In this context, the municipal court can
be said to have properly exercised
exclusive original jurisdiction and the
court of first instance to have properly
exercised appellate jurisdiction as
invoked by the accused-appellant
herself — and she cannot now be
allowed to question for the very first
time here the very jurisdiction invoked
by her, especially where she has raised
no question whatever as to the
correctness in fact and in law of the
penalty and civil liability imposed upon
her by the lower court's judgment.
🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy (1968)
A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question by laches, which is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier.
Here, the Surety could have raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial
court, but it only did so after receiving
the appellate court’s adverse decision.
Hence, it is barred by laches.
FACTS:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month
after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948
— the spouses Serafin Tijam and
Felicitas Tagalog commenced a case in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) against
the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
and Lucia Baguio to recover from them
the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest
thereon. As prayed for in the complaint,
a writ of attachment was issued by the
court against defendants’ properties,
but the same was soon dissolved upon
the filing of a counter-bond by
defendants and the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to
as the Surety, on the 31st of the same
month.
After trial upon the issues thus joined,
the CFI rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon
motion of the latter, the CFI issued a
writ of execution against the
defendants. The writ having been
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs
moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety’s bond
against which the Surety filed a written
opposition. The CFI denied this motion
on the ground solely that no previous
demand had been made on the Surety
for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Thereafter, the necessary demand was
made, and upon failure of the Surety to
satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed
a second motion for execution against
the counter-bond. Upon the Surety’s
failure to file an answer to the motion,
the CFI granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ
was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to
quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in
Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the CFI denied the motion, the
Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) from such order of denial and from
the one denying its motion for
reconsideration. Not one of the
assignment of errors raises the question
of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly
nor indirectly.
The CA decided the case affirming the
orders appealed from. After the Surety
received notice of the decision, it filed a
pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS,
alleging substantially that appellees’
action was filed in the CFI of Cebu on
July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the
sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month
before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of
1948, had already become effective,
Section 88 of which placed within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts all civil actions where the value of
the subject matter or the amount of the
demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs; that the
CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try
and decide the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Surety is barred from
raising the jurisdictional issue by laches.
RULING:
Yes. A party may be estopped or barred
from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus, we
speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches. Laches, in a general sense, is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The facts of this case show that from
the time the Surety became a quasi-
party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in
force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction
of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered
by the CA that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. If such
conduct is to be sanctioned, the SC
would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present
case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once
more.
🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡🧡
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs.
Commission on Audit
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement
signed on September 13, 1986, the
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
(CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong
Administration agreed that the
Cordillera people shall not undertake
their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means,
such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then
arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an
Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making
and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the
Cordillera panel join the study group of
the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive
Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement,
E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the
Philippine government and of the
representatives of the Cordillera people.
This was then signed into law by
President Corazon Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers,
creating the Cordillera Administrative
Region [CAR], which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province
and the City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by
issuing the said order, the President, in
the exercise of her legislative powers,
had virtually pre-empted Congress from
its mandated task of enacting an organic
act and created an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is
constitutional

Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the
conclusion that petitioners’ are
unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of
the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily
conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex
procedure for the creation of an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Since such process will undoubtedly
take time, the President saw it fit to
provide for some measures to address
the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in
the meantime that the organic act had
not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created. At this
time, the President was still exercising
legislative powers as the First Congress
had not yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the
Constitution (providing the basic
structure of government in the
autonomous region), the Supreme Court
finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish
an autonomous regional government.
The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do
not supplant the existing local
governmental structure; nor are they
autonomous government agencies.
They merely constitute the mechanism
for an "umbrella" that brings together
the existing local governments, the
agencies of the National Government,
the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and
non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in
the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the
organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region signed into law on
October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for
the approval of the act which completed
the autonomous region-creating
process outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional.
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit
Zandueta vs. De la Costa
Posted on 2020-11-01
No. L-46267, 66 Phil 615 [Nov 28, 1938]
Constitutional Law; Legislative
Department; Incompatible and
Forbidden Offices
Facts:
Petitioner Zandueta was discharging the question the constitutionality of the law
office of judge of first instance, and was by virtue of which he was last
presiding over the 5th Branch of the CFI appointed. He is excepted from said rule
of Manila. When the judiciary was only when his non-acceptance of the
reorganized pursuant to CA No. 145 (the new appointment may affect public
Judicial Reorganization Act), Zandueta interest or when he is compelled to
received a new ad interim appointment accept it by reason of legal exigencies.
as judge of first instance with authority (Zandueta v. De la Costa, 66 Phil 615)
to preside over the CFI of Manila and
Palawan. After taking his new oath,
Zandueta performed several acts
pertaining to the office. Meanwhile, the
CA disapproved his ad interim
appointment. The President then
appointed respondent De la Costa as
judge of first instance with authority to
preside over the 5th Branch of the CFI of
Manila and Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by CA.
Zandueta now prays to declare De la
Costa to be illegally occupying the office
of judge of the 5th Branch of the CFI of
Manila, and himself to be entitled to
continue occupying said office.
Issue:
Is Zandueta entitled to repossess the
office occupied by him under his former
appointment?
Held:
No. There is incompatibility between his
former and latter appointments;
consequently, he is deemed to have
abandoned the office he was occupying
by virtue of his former appointment.
The territory over which Zandueta could
exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by
virtue of his latter appointment is wider
than that over which he could exercise
and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of
his former appointment. Hence, there is
incompatibility between the two
appointments. In accepting the latter
appointment and qualifying for the
exercise of the functions of the office
conferred by it, by taking the necessary
oath, and in discharging the same,
disposing of both judicial and
administrative cases corresponding to
the CFI of Manila and of Palawan,
Zandueta abandoned* his former
appointment, and ceased in the exercise
of the functions of the office occupied
by him by virtue thereof.
* xxx When a public official voluntarily
accepts an appointment to an office
newly created or reorganized by law,
which new office is incompatible with
the one formerly occupied by him,
qualifies for the discharge of the
functions thereof by taking the
necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing
acts inherent in said newly created or
reorganized office and receiving the
corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of his
former appointment, and he cannot