Well Life Cycle Integrity Guideline Issue 4 VERSAODIGITAL Temosfisica

Well Life Cycle Integrity
Guidelines
Issue 4
March 2019
Acknowledgments
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Copyright © 2019 The UK Oil and Gas Industry Association Limited trading as Oil & Gas UK
The information contained herein is given for guidance only. These guidelines are not intended to
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authors have used all reasonable endeavours to ensure the accuracy of these guidelines neither Oil &
Gas UK nor any of its members assume liability for any use made thereof. In addition, these guidelines
have been prepared on the basis of practice within the UK Continental Shelf and no guarantee is
provided that these guidelines will be applicable for other jurisdictions.
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ISBN: 978-1-9164677-3-6
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Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 2

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines
Issue 4
March 2019
Contents
1 Summary 12
2 Key Regulatory Requirements for Well Integrity 14
2.1 The DCR definition of well-operator 14
2.2 DCR – general duty for well-operators 15
2.3 DCR – specific duties for well-operators 15
2.3.1 Regulation 15 – Design with a view to suspension
& abandonment 16
2.3.2 Regulation 16 – Materials 16
2.3.3 Regulation 17 – Well Control 16
2.3.4 Regulation 18 – Arrangements for examination 17
2.3.5 Regulation 19 – Provision of drilling etc
information 18
2.3.6 Regulation 21 – Information, instruction, training
and supervision 18
2.4 Duties of the well-operator under SCR 2015 18
2.4.1 Regulation 11 – Establishment of well examination
scheme 18
2.4.2 Regulation 12 – Other Provisions as to well
examination schemes 18
2.4.3 Regulation 13 – Description of well examination 19
2.4.4 Schedule 4, Part 2 – Matters to be provided for in
a well examination scheme 19
2.4.5 Regulation 21 – Notification of well operations 19
2.5 Installation safety case duty holders 20
2.5.1 Definition of Duty holder 20
2.5.2 SCR 2015 Regulation 16 Management & Control of
Major Accident Hazards 21
2.5.3 Other duties of installation safety case duty
holders 22
2.6 Offshore environmental protection regulations 23
2.7 Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 (BSOR) 24
2.7.1 Regulation 7 – The health and safety document 24
2.7.2 Regulation 6 – Notice of the commencement of
drilling operations and the abandonment of
boreholes 25
2.8 Other relevant Onshore Regulatory Considerations 25
Page 3
2.8.1 Onshore Environmental Regulation 25
2.8.2 Coal Authority 25
2.9 Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (COMAH),
2015 26
2.10 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999
26
2.10.1 Regulation 5 – Health and safety arrangements 26
2.11 The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 2013 26
2.12 The Petroleum Act 1998 (as amended by the Infrastructure
Act 2015) 27
3 Process Safety and the Well Integrity Management System 28
3.1 Process Safety 28
3.2 Well Integrity Management System 28
3.3 Process Safety Key Performance Indicators 30
4 Well Integrity, Barriers, BOPs and Well Control 32
4.1 Well pressure containment boundary 32
4.2 Structural well integrity 32
4.3 Well barriers 33
4.3.1 Number of well barriers 33
4.3.2 Type of well barriers 33
4.3.3 Shearing and barriers 34
4.3.4 Describing well barriers 35
4.3.5 Immediacy of hazards after barrier failure 35
4.3.6 Barrier components and associated equipment 35
4.3.7 Barrier selection and qualification 36
4.3.8 Barrier installation 36
4.3.9 Testing well barriers 36
4.3.10 Maintenance and monitoring of barriers 37
4.3.11 Response to degradation of barriers 37
4.3.12 Response to failure of barriers 37
4.3.13 Cemented shoe track as a well barrier 38
4.3.14 Effects of different installations on well integrity 39
4.3.15 Use of PTFE tape 39
4.4 Blowout Preventers 39
4.4.1 Retirement of O&GUK BOP Guidelines 39
4.4.2 Good practice for UKCS wells vs. API S53 40
4.5 Pressure testing guidelines 41
4.5.1 Risk assessment 42
4.6 Positive pressure testing guidelines 43
4.6.1 Pressure test planning 43
4.6.2 Calculations of fluid volumes 44
4.6.3 Pressure test operations 45
4.6.4 Success/failure criteria 45
4.7 Pressure Test Acceptance Criteria 46
4.8 Inflow testing guidelines 49

4.8.1 Introduction 49
4.8.2 Specific problems to be considered for inflow tests
50
4.8.3 Inflow test planning 50
4.8.4 Negative pressures across BOP 51
4.8.5 Inflow testing of downhole safety/xmas tree
valves 51
4.8.6 Flow checks as inflow tests 52
4.9 Well integrity/control of well 52
4.9.1 Primary control of well 52
4.9.2 Secondary well control 52
4.9.3 Well control equipment 53
4.9.4 Well control procedures 54
4.9.5 Tertiary well control 55
4.10 Management of change 55
4.10.1 General 55
4.10.2 Design MoC 55
4.10.3 Equipment MoC 56
4.10.4 Programme/procedure MoC 56
4.10.5 Personnel MoC 56
4.10.6 Change request and approval 56
4.10.7 ‘Material changes’ to be notified to the
Competent Authority 57
5 Well Design and Operations Planning 58
5.1 Risk identification and assessment – the ALARP principle 58
5.1.1 Review 58
5.2 Risk Assessments 58
5.2.1 Assessment of subsurface conditions 59
5.2.2 Aquifers 60
5.2.3 Presentation of subsurface assessment 60
5.2.4 Assessment of other well hazards 60
5.2.5 Well examination 61
5.3 Well design 61
5.3.1 Estimate of maximum pressure 61
5.3.2 Conductor 61
5.3.3 Surface casing 62
5.3.4 Intermediate casings 63
5.3.5 Production casing 63
5.4 Casing design 64
5.4.1 General 64
5.4.2 Design basis, premises and assumptions 65
5.4.3 Load cases 65
5.4.4 Casing design factors 66
5.5 Cement design 66
5.5.1 Factors to be considered in annulus cementing 67
5.5.2 Considerations for inner string cementing 68

5.6 Materials for wells 69
5.6.1 Wellhead equipment 69
5.7 Designing a well for primary control 69
5.7.1 Overbalanced drilling and operations 69
5.7.2 Pore pressure prediction 69
5.7.3 Maintaining overbalance 70
5.7.4 Safety margin on mud weight 70
5.8 Formation integrity/kick tolerance 70
5.8.1 Background 70
5.8.2 Leak Off Test / Formation Integrity Test 71
5.8.3 Kick tolerance 71
5.9 Design for suspension of operations, plugging and
abandonment 72
5.10 Well path and anti-collision 72
5.11 Relief well considerations 74
5.12 Dispensation / deviation during design 74
5.13 Well operations planning 75
5.13.1 General 75
5.13.2 Equipment procurement 75
5.13.3 Rig contracting for mobile drilling units 75
5.13.4 Service Company – well control equipment 75
5.13.5 Information, instruction and training 76
5.13.6 Site surveying for offshore wells 76
6 Drilling 77
6.1 Primary control of the well/active barriers 77
6.1.1 Pore Pressure monitoring 77
6.1.2 Monitoring mud weight 78
6.1.3 Reacting to lost circulation 78
6.1.4 Loss/gain situation 79
6.1.5 Roles and responsibilities for primary control of
the well 79
6.2 Potential barriers 80
6.2.1 Roles and responsibilities for potential barriers 80
6.3 Pressure containment boundary 81
6.3.1 Roles and responsibilities for pressure
containment boundary 81
6.4 Other responsibilities for drilling operations 81
6.4.1 Other roles of the drilling supervisor 82
6.5 Installation and testing of barriers 82
6.5.1 Conductor 82
6.5.2 Surface casing 83
6.5.3 Wellhead 83
6.5.4 Setting BOP 84
6.5.5 Intermediate casings 86
6.5.6 Production casing 87
6.5.7 Inner barriers 88

6.6 Managed Pressure Drilling / Under Balanced Operations 88
6.7 Drilling before BOP installed 89
7 Well Testing 91
7.1 General 91
7.2.1 Pressure containment boundary 91
7.2.2 Potential barriers during well testing 92
7.3 Responsibilities for testing operations 92
7.3.1 Well control procedures during testing 93
7.4 Well test planning 93
7.4.1 Risk assessment and mitigation 94
7.5.1 Running liner or lower completion 94
7.5.2 Liner lap 95
7.5.3 Test string and tubing 95
7.5.4 Annulus barriers (packer and BOP) 96
7.5.5 Inner potential barriers (tester valve and surface
tree) 96
7.6 Well testing operations 98
7.6.1 Perforating 98
7.6.2 Flow and shut-in periods 98
7.6.3 Killing the well 98
7.6.4 Suspension of operations, plugging and
abandonment 99
8 Completion 100
8.1 Primary control of well/active barriers 100
8.1.1 Fluid column 100
8.1.2 Mechanical barriers 100
8.1.3 Removing the rig BOP/installing the xmas tree 101
8.2 Pressure containment boundary 101
8.4 Completion design and planning 103
8.4.1 Packer 103
8.4.2 Tubing 103
8.4.3 Tubing hanger 104
8.4.4 Downhole Safety Valve 104
8.4.5 Wellhead 105
8.4.6 Xmas tree 106
8.5 Artificial lift 106
8.5.1 Gas lift 106
8.6 Completion operations 108
8.6.1 Displacement to light fluid 109
9 Commissioning 110
9.1 Summary 110
9.1.1 Well Integrity 110

9.2 Initial well handover information 110
9.3 Life of well information 111
9.4 Surface equipment considerations 112
9.5 Well examination and verification 112
10 Operate and Maintain 114
10.1 Well integrity assurance 114
10.1.1 Well integrity management systems 114
10.1.2 Roles and responsibilities 114
10.1.3 Competency 114
10.1.4 Well files and operational histories 115
10.1.5 Well stock performance review 115
10.1.6 Risk Assessment and Management 115
10.2 Operating procedures 116
10.2.1 Special precautions for start-up and shutdown 116
10.2.2 Operating parameters and monitoring 116
10.2.3 Verification of control measures 116
10.3 Visual inspection of wells 117
10.4 Annulus management 117
10.4.1 Key Requirements of an Annulus Management
Process 117
10.4.2 MAASP and Annulus Operating Limits 118
10.4.3 Pressure Testing & Topping up annuli 118
10.4.4 Factors affecting annulus pressure 119
10.4.5 Sustained annulus pressure 119
10.4.6 Annulus depressurisation and bleed down 120
10.5 Xmas tree and wellhead valves 121
10.5.1 Barriers within wellheads 121
10.5.2 Wellhead valves 121
10.5.3 Xmas tree valves 121
10.5.4 Testing xmas tree valves 122
10.5.5 Example of valve failure matrix 123
10.5.6 Valve removal plugs 123
10.5.7 Xmas tree and wellhead instrumentation and
accessories 123
10.5.8 Potential damage to subsea xmas trees 124
10.6 Downhole Safety Valves 126
10.6.1 Types of DHSV 126
10.6.2 Testing of DHSV 126
10.7 Testing of gas lift valves 126
10.8 Deviation control/management of change 127
10.8.1 Repairs/corrective actions 127
10.9 Operating conditions affecting well integrity 127
10.9.1 Failure of well equipment 127
10.9.2 Failure of risers/conductors 129
10.9.3 Non-well equipment that could impact on well
integrity 129

10.10 Review of degradation and life extension 129
10.11 Management of late-life wells 131
10.11.1 Shut-in well 131
10.11.2 Plugged well 132
10.11.3 Suspended (abandonment phases 1 and 2) 132
10.11.4 Review of the availability and continued use of
wells 132
11 Intervention/Workover 134
11.1.1 Well barriers during intervention/workover 134
11.1.2 Completion fluid as a barrier 135
11.1.3 Downhole safety valve as a well barrier 135
11.1.4 Full bore tool strings 136
11.1.5 Long tool strings 136
11.1.6 Installation and testing of well barriers 136
11.1.7 Well control equipment/barriers 137
11.1.8 Intervention/workover well integrity matrices 138
11.2 Responsibilities for the well 140
11.2.1 Isolation from installation emergency shutdown
system 140
11.3 Intervention/workover planning 141
11.3.1 Risk assessment 141
11.3.2 Well control planning 141
11.3.3 Emergency planning 142
11.3.4 Information, instruction, training and supervision 142
11.4 Intervention/workover operations 143
11.4.1 Well handover 143
11.4.2 BOP/well control panel 143
11.4.3 BOP installation and testing 143
11.4.4 Removing xmas tree 144
11.4.5 In-situ tubing repairs 144
11.4.6 Recovery of equipment from well 145
11.5 Wireline operations 145
11.6 Coiled tubing operations 145
11.6.1 Coiled tubing pressure control equipment 145
11.6.2 Annulus barriers 146
11.6.3 Inner barriers 146
11.6.4 Coiled tubing life cycle 146
11.7 Fluid pumping operations and stimulation 147
11.7.1 General Considerations 147
11.7.2 Stimulation Operations 148
12 Abandonment 150
13 Special cases 151
13.1 Multi-Lateral and Multi-Branched Wells 151
13.1.1 Junction Integrity 151

13.1.2 Well Control 151
13.1.3 Multi-Lateral Abandonment 152
13.2 Cuttings re-injection/disposal wells (offshore only) 152
Appendix 1 – Background to these guidelines 153
Appendix 2 – Divestment Information 155
Abbreviations and Glossary 157
References and useful reading 162

1 Summary
All duty holders shall comply with their duties under all relevant regulations. These guidelines will help
but are not a substitute for a full understanding of the regulations.
The most important role of the well-operator is to ensure the integrity of its wells, barriers and the
pressure containment boundary throughout the well life cycle from design to final abandonment.
The well-operator should have a policy defining its commitments and obligations to safeguard health,
environment, assets and reputation by establishing and preserving well integrity. This well integrity
policy should be endorsed at a senior level within the well-operator’s organisation.
The well-operator’s system for managing well integrity should clearly indicate how the policy is
interpreted and applied to well integrity.
As a minimum, the system for managing well integrity should cover:
• Accountability and responsibility

• Well design and construction
• Well operations/production including
• Well monitoring and reporting
• Tubing/annulus programme
• Wellhead/tree maintenance and testing
• Safety valve maintenance and testing
• Well interventions
• Well plugging and abandonment and suspension of operations
Integrity can be assured by keeping adequate barriers between the hazards in the well and the surface.
The selection, installation, monitoring, checking, testing, maintenance and repair of barriers are the
most important aspects of well planning and operations.
There should be at least two well barriers available throughout the well life cycle.
For overbalanced drilling, primary control of the well is maintained by an active barrier (hole full of the
correct weight fluid), backed up by Blowout Preventer (BOP) equipment.
Barriers should be explicitly described in procedures and plans. The description may be a schematic, a
matrix (in these guidelines) or descriptive text. Operations reports should explicitly describe the
installation and testing of barriers.
The removal, or degradation, of a well barrier should be carefully considered to ensure that well
integrity risks remain as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) [Ref 16].
A cemented shoe track is not a barrier unless it is specifically designed to be one and proven by
adequate testing.
All well designs should start with an assessment of the potential hazards that may be encountered
throughout the entire lifecycle of the well. The design should ensure the risks are ALARP. The well
should be designed for all anticipated uses. The hazards should be reviewed throughout the life cycle
of the well and any significant changes should be assessed.

The well-operator is responsible for assessing the well risks and reducing them to ALARP. This should
be demonstrated to the offshore installation duty holder who has primary responsibility for the safety
of the installation and the personnel on board.
All wells should be designed to facilitate plugging, suspension of operations and abandonment.
Extra care is needed during well testing and completion stages as the reservoir is open and
hydrocarbons are brought to the surface.
Well-operators should have a system for ensuring well integrity throughout the life cycle. Management
of operations may be devolved but the responsibility for the integrity of the well remains with the well-
operator.
Well-operators should have a Management of Change (MoC) procedure covering wells and well
operations throughout the full life cycle from initial design to final abandonment, supported by a
suitable and sufficient risk assessment.
Duty holders should provide an effective management system and ensure that personnel are
competent in the tasks they are required to do. A vital part of the competence is the ability to recognise
significant changes and to ensure programmes are modified to deal with these changes. The ‘human
element’ is very important in all aspects of well integrity. Further information can be found in the Oil
& Gas UK Guidelines on competency of wells personnel [Ref 30].

2 Key Regulatory Requirements for Well Integrity
All duty holders must comply with their legal obligations in terms of all relevant legislation. These
guidelines are intended to help duty holders meet their legal obligations regarding well integrity but are
not a substitute for understanding and complying with the relevant legislation.
Well-operators should satisfy themselves (including through effective audits where required) that their
procedures and processes for complying with all relevant legislation are effective.
Key regulations that apply to oil and gas wells in Great Britain include:
The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996, as amended,
hereafter referred to as DCR [Ref 1] which apply to all oil and gas related wells both onshore and
offshore;
The Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.) Regulations 2015 hereafter
referred to as SCR 2015 [Ref 3] which apply offshore in external waters of UK territorial waters and the
UK Continental Shelf.
The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 hereafter referred to as SCR 05 [Ref 5] which
apply offshore in UK internal waters; and
The Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 hereafter referred to as BSOR [Ref 11] which only
apply onshore.
2.1 The DCR definition of well-operator

The "well-operator”, in relation to a well, in Great Britain (i.e. wells on land or in internal waters) means
the person appointed by the licensee for a well to execute the function of organising and supervising all
operations to be carried out by means of such well or, where no such person has been appointed, the
licensee; and in relation to a well situated or to be situated in external waters, has the meaning given by
regulation 2 of the Offshore Petroleum Licensing (Offshore Safety Directive) Regulations 2015 (Licensing
Regulations).
Regulation 2, DCR (as amended).
The “well-operator” (in external waters) in relation to a well or a proposed well means a person
appointed in accordance with regulation 5 or 6 to conduct the planning or execution of well operations.
Regulation 2, The Offshore Petroleum Licensing (Offshore Safety Directive) Regulations 2015 [Ref 4]
Regulations 5 and 6 of Licensing Regulations set the requirements for appointing the well-operator and
stipulate in effect that the OGA must be given three months written notice of the proposed
appointment. The well-operator may then be appointed if OGA advises in writing of no objection, or
after three months if OGA has not objected in writing.
These regulations define a well-operator as the person appointed by the licensee to organise and
supervise operations associated with the well. The licensee is usually a consortium of oil companies,
granted a licence by OGA and they usually appoint from amongst themselves the operator to operate

the licence and exploit the field and who in most cases, will also be the well-operator. They may also
choose to appoint another party as well-operator. The license operator and well-operator must be
approved by the OGA. The well-operator will have control of the organisation and supervision of well
operations. A contractor would have to be provided with all the information necessary to discharge the
duty of well-operator and achieve the safe design, construction, maintenance, operation and eventual
abandonment of the well.
2.2 DCR – general duty for well-operators

The well-operator shall ensure that a well is so designed, modified, commissioned, constructed,
equipped, operated, maintained, suspended and abandoned that –
a) so far as is reasonably practicable, there can be no unplanned escape of fluids from the well;
and
b) risks to health and safety of persons from it or anything in it, or in strata to which it is connected,
are as low as is reasonably practicable.
Regulation 13, DCR.
In these guidelines, well integrity is the application of people, equipment and processes to comply with
this general duty throughout the well life cycle.
The well-operator should ensure the safe condition of the well at all stages in its life. The focus overall
should be on the safe physical condition of the well rather than the actual operation being carried out
on the well.
These guidelines concentrate on maintaining physical barriers between the well (and any hazards it may
contain) and both the surface and, other than intended production or injection intervals, the subsurface
throughout the well life cycle.
2.3 DCR – specific duties for well-operators

Regulation 14 – Assessment of conditions below ground
1) Before the design of a well is commenced the well-operator shall cause –

a) the geological strata and formations, and fluids within them, through which it may
pass; and
b) any hazards which such strata and formations may contain, to be assessed.
2) the well-operator shall ensure that account is taken of the assessment required by paragraph
(1) when the well is being designed and constructed.
3) the well-operator shall ensure that while an operation (including the drilling of a well) is carried
out in relation to the well, those matters described in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph
(1) shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be kept under review and that, if any change is
observed in those matters, such modification is made where appropriate, to –
a) The design and construction of the well; or
b) Any procedures,

as are necessary to ensure that the purposes described in regulation 13 (1) will continue to be
fulfilled.
These issues are covered in the following sections of these guidelines:
• Section 5 (Well Design and Operations Planning); (Section 5.2.1 Assessment of subsurface
conditions)
• Section 6: (Drilling)
• Section 10 (Operate and Maintain)
2.3.1 Regulation 15 – Design with a view to suspension & abandonment
The well-operator shall ensure that a well is so designed and constructed that, so far as is reasonably
practicable –
a) it can be suspended and abandoned in a safe manner, and

b) after its suspension and abandonment there can be no unplanned escape of fluids from it or
from the reservoir to which it led.
This is covered in Section 5.9 (Well design/planning; Design for suspension of operations, plugging and
abandonment) and Sections 10.11 and 12 which reference the Oil & Gas UK Well Decommissioning
Guidelines. [Ref 24]
2.3.2 Regulation 16 – Materials
The well-operator shall ensure that every part of a well is composed of material which is suitable for
achieving the purposes described in regulation 13 (1).
This is covered in Section 5 and 5.6 (Well design, operations planning and materials for wells) and Oil &
Gas UK Guidelines on qualification of materials for the abandonment of wells. [Ref 25]
2.3.3 Regulation 17 – Well Control
1)Before an operation in relation to a well (including the drilling of a well) is begun elsewhere than at a
borehole site to which the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 apply, the well-operator shall
ensure that suitable well control equipment is provided for use during such operations to protect against
blowouts.
Well control equipment includes equipment whose primary purpose is to prevent, control or divert the
flow of fluids from the well. As such, well control equipment includes blowout preventers, downhole
preventers, Christmas trees, wireline lubricators and stuffing boxes, rotating heads, tubing injection
heads, circulating heads, internal blowout preventers and kelly cocks, choke and kill lines, choke
manifolds and diverters. Plugs and other isolating devices installed in a borehole to prevent the well from
flowing are also included;
Paragraph 34, DCR guidance [Ref 2]
Well-operators can make sure they are discharging their duty for ensuring the provision of well control
equipment under this regulation, by reviewing the contractor’s arrangements. This means taking

reasonable steps to make sure that the contractor has the equipment specified for well control (e.g.
checking that the necessary equipment is available at the site, asking the contractor providing equipment
to produce evidence that the equipment to be provided is what is needed and is suitable for conditions
in the well). If necessary, the well-operator should check that the contractor has suitable policies,
procedures and management controls to ensure suitable equipment is supplied;
2) In the case of an operation to which paragraph (1) applies which is begun –
a) from an installation, the duty holder; and

b) otherwise than from an installation, the well-operator,
shall ensure that equipment provided pursuant to paragraph (1) is deployed when the prevailing well
and operational conditions so require.
The requirement for deploying the well control equipment of the well is placed on the duty holder for the
installation (who has primary responsibility for the safety of the installation). In instances where the well
operations are to be conducted from a vessel not defined as an offshore installation, the duty is placed
on the well-operator. In the latter case, well-operators can discharge their duty by checking that the
specialist contractor carrying out the operations has suitable policies, procedures and management
controls for the installation, testing and use of the specified well control equipment. A similar approach
may be used by the installation duty holder for equipment supplied and operated from an installation by
third parties.
“Deployment” of well control equipment covers the installation and use of the equipment on the well.
Well control equipment should be deployed on all wells where there is a risk of release of flammable,
explosive or toxic fluids or gases from the well. It should also be deployed where there is a risk of high-
pressure water flow.
These issues are covered in Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11.
For onshore activity the well control requirements are covered by the BSOR (Schedule 2(7)) [Ref 11 and
12]
2.3.4 Regulation 18 – Arrangements for examination
Regulation 18 of DCR applies only to wells in UK internal waters and to landward wells. Regulation 11 of
SCR 2015 (Establishment of well examination schemes), Regulation 12 of SCR 2015 (Other provision as
to well examination schemes) and Schedule 4, Part 2 (Matters to be provided for in a well examination
scheme) apply to wells in external waters.
Well examination is covered in the following Oil & Gas UK guidelines:

Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26]
Guidelines for well-operators on competency of well-examiners [Ref 27].
2.3.5 Regulation 19 – Provision of drilling etc information
1) Where an operation to which this paragraph applies is being carried out on a well the well-operator
shall cause to be sent to the [Health and Safety] Executive, at such intervals as may be agreed or, failing
agreement, at intervals of one week calculated from its commencement, a report comprising the
following information –
a) the identifying number, and any slot number, of the well;

b) the name of any installation or vessel involved;
c) a summary of the activity in the course of the operation since its commencement, or the
previous report;
d) the diameter and true vertical and measured depths of –
i. any hole drilled; and
ii. any casing installed;
e) the drilling fluid density immediately before making the report; and
f) in the case of an existing well, its current operational state.
2) Paragraph (1) applies to –
a) a drilling operation;
b) a workover operation;
c) an abandonment operation;
d) an operation consisting of the completion of a well;
e) any other operation of a kind involving substantial risk of the unplanned escape of fluids
from a well.
2.3.6 Regulation 21 – Information, instruction, training and supervision
This is covered in the Oil & Gas UK Guidelines on competency for wells personnel [Ref 30].
2.4 Duties of the well-operator under SCR 2015
2.4.1 Regulation 11 – Establishment of well examination scheme
Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].
2.4.2 Regulation 12 – Other Provisions as to well examination schemes
Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].

Guidelines for well-operators on competency of well-examiners [Ref 27].
2.4.3 Regulation 13 – Description of well examination
See Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].
2.4.4 Schedule 4, Part 2 – Matters to be provided for in a well examination scheme
See Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].
2.4.5 Regulation 21 – Notification of well operations
1) The well-operator must ensure that no well operation is commenced from a production installation in
external waters unless –
a) in the case of a well operation that does not involve drilling, but involves:
i. insertion of a hollow pipe in a well; or
ii. altering the construction of a well,
the well-operator has sent a notification containing the particulars specified in Schedule 9 to the
competent authority at least 10 days (or such shorter period as the competent authority may specify)
before commencing that operation; or
b) in any other case, the well-operator has sent a notification containing the particulars
specified in Schedule 9 to the competent authority at least 21 days (or such shorter period
as the competent authority may specify) before commencing that operation.
2) The well-operator must ensure that no well operation is commenced in external waters (other than a
well operation falling within paragraph (1)) unless the well-operator has sent a notification containing
the particulars specified in Schedule 9 to the competent authority at least 21 days (or such shorter period
as the competent authority may specify) before commencing that operation.
3) The well-operator must include with the notification sent to the competent authority a statement,
made after considering reports by the well examiner under 11(2)(b), that the risk management relating
to well design and its barriers to loss of control are suitable for all anticipated conditions and
circumstances.
4) Where the well-operator plans or prepares a material change to any of the particulars notified
pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) the well-operator must consult the well examiner under the well
examination scheme about the planned or prepared material change.
5) Where there is a material change in any of the particulars notified pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2)
prior to completion of the relevant well operation, the well-operator must notify the competent authority
as soon as practicable.
6) A notification of a material change under paragraph (5) must contain sufficient details fully to update
the previously submitted notification and be accompanied by the report of the well examiner following
the consultation under paragraph (4), addressing in particular the matters in paragraph 6(c) to (e) of

Schedule 9. (These matters are: barriers against loss of well control, directional control of the well path
and limitations on safe operation.)
7) The well-operator must not commence a well operation (of any description) where the competent
authority expresses objections to the content of the notification sent in respect of a well notification or
to any of the change to that content notified to the competent authority pursuant to paragraph 5. (i.e.
a material change).
Schedule 9 requires the name and address of the well-operator to be stated to the Offshore Safety
Directive Regulator. This is the formal notification to the relevant Competent Authority that the named
company is the well-operator under SCR 2015 and DCR for the operations described on that well.
Stand-alone wireline interventions on a production installation are deemed to be well operations. To

avoid unnecessary bureaucracy, routine wireline notifications or other operations that do not involve
drilling, inserting hollow pipe through the well head or alter the well should be covered by a single generic
one-off notification for the installation. Details of major hazard controls should be included in the
installation safety case.
Where wireline activity is required to alter the well construction, this is notifiable each time. Any change
to the existing barriers that will remain in place at the conclusion of the activity are likely to be regarded
as ‘altering’ the well construction. Inserting hollow pipe includes inserting coiled tubing.
Paragraphs 256 to 258, SCR 2015.
Refer to HSE website for the publications Understanding Offshore Oil and Gas Notifications
(2017/329870) [Ref 18]. and Understanding Onshore Oil and Gas Notifications [Ref 19]
2.5 Installation safety case duty holders
2.5.1 Definition of Duty holder
“duty holder” means –
a) in relation to a production installation, the operator; and

b) in relation to a non-production installation, the owner;
Regulation 2, SCR 2015.
The expression “duty holder” is used in these Regulations to refer to the person (whether the owner or
the operator of an installation) on whom duties are placed by SCR 2015 in respect of installations,
particularly to prepare the safety case. It does not mean that these are the only people with duties under
health and safety law.
Paragraph 67, SCR 2015 guidance.
“operator” means, in relation to a production installation, an “installation operator” as defined in

regulation 2(1) of the Offshore Petroleum Licensing (offshore Safety Directive) Regulations 2015;
“owner” means the person who controls or is entitled to control the operation of a non-production
installation;

Regulation 2, SCR 2015.
The owner of a non-production installation is also a main duty holder under SCR 2015. The owner is the
person who contracts with the licensee/-field operator to use the installation for oil- and gas-related
activity and is in direct operational control of that activity. This may not be the owner in the ordinary
financial sense. The term does not refer to the operator (who contracts with the owner) or to the
installation manager, who is appointed by the owner.
Paragraph 83, SCR 2015.
2.5.2 SCR 2015 Regulation 16 Management & Control of Major Accident Hazards
(1) A duty holder who prepares a safety case pursuant to these Regulations must, subject to paragraph
(2), include in the safety case sufficient particulars to demonstrate that—
(a) the duty holder’s management system is adequate to ensure—
(i) that the relevant statutory provisions will, in respect of matters within the duty holder’s
control, be complied with; and
(ii) that the management of arrangements with contractors and sub-contractors is satisfactory;
(b) the duty holder has established adequate arrangements for audit and for the making of reports of
the audit;
(c) all hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified;
(d) all major accident risks have been evaluated, their likelihood and consequences assessed, including
any environmental, meteorological and seabed limitations on safe operations, and that suitable
measures, including the selection and deployment of associated safety and environmental-critical
elements have been, or will be, taken to control those risks to ensure that the relevant statutory
provisions will be complied with; and
(e) in the case of a non-production installation, all the major hazards have been identified for all
operations the installation is capable of performing.
Demonstrations should include evidence to show:
That hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified and that risks arising
from those hazards are or will be adequately controlled. The evidence should show that reasoned
arguments have been used to make professional judgements about the nature, likelihood and
consequences of potential major accident events that may occur, and the means to prevent these
events or minimise their consequences should they occur. The evidence should also show that the
dutyholder’s risk acceptance criteria are appropriate.
Paragraph 210c SCR 2015 guidance
Duty holders will typically utilise several key process safety techniques to identify, manage and mitigate
major accident hazards and satisfy regulation 16. These may include HAZID, HAZOP, LOPA and the
principle of inherent safety in design.

2.5.3 Other duties of installation safety case duty holders
Under Regulations 17 and 18 of SCR 2015, duty holders shall prepare a safety case for the installation
and put in place a Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) for that installation.
The Well-Operator’s Safety and Environmental Management System should be submitted with the Well
Notification where it has not already been submitted under Regulations 17 and 18 of SCR.
For a production installation (which by definition in Management and Administration (MAR) guidance
[Ref 7] includes all bridge-linked platforms, and platforms and subsea wells that are connected to that
platform) the duty holder is the installation operator.
The ‘installation operator’ means a person appointed in accordance with regulation 5 or 6 (of the
Licensing Regulations) to conduct any offshore petroleum operations, other than the planning or
execution of any well operations. The requirements for appointing the installation operator (i.e.
notifying OGA three months in advance etc.) are the same as for appointing a well-operator. See
paragraphs 83–84 SCR 2015 guidance [Ref 6].
If a modular rig is installed on a production installation, the operations should be covered in the safety
case. If these modular rig operations were not included in the original safety case, this is classed as a
‘material change’, see Regulation 24(2), SCR 2015.
The duty holder for a non-production installation (including mobile drilling rigs) is the ‘owner’. The
owner means the person who controls the operation of a non-production installation, see paragraphs
83 and 75 SCR 2015 guidance [Ref 6].

2.6 Offshore environmental protection regulations
Full Title Requirements
Environmental Statement (ES) or

EIA Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines
Application for a Direction from
(Assessment of Environmental Effects)
[Ref 93] the SoS (PETS DRA DR) for drilling
Regulations 1999 (as amended)
operations
Habitats Regulations
The Offshore Petroleum Activities (Conservation Assessments for well operations
HRA
of Habitats) Regulations 2001 (as amended) in protected European sites
(HRA)
Use and Discharge Permit for all

OCR offshore chemicals (PETS DRA CP
Offshore Chemicals Regulations 2002 (as
and WIA CP) for well operations
[Ref 91] amended)
involving use and discharge of
offshore chemicals
Oil Discharge Permits (PETS DRA

OPPC Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution
OTP and WIA OTP) for well
Prevention and Control) Regulations 2005 (as
[Ref 92] operations involving discharge of
amended)
oils
Navigational Consent to Locate

(CtL) for all well operations
CtL Energy Act 2008, Part 4A Consent to Locate
undertaken by Mobile Drilling
Units
OPRC Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Preparedness,

Oil Pollution Emergency Plans
Response Co-operation Convention) Regulations
[Ref 90] (OPEPs) for all well operations
1998 (as amended)
EPC Involvement of SOSREP

Offshore Installations (Emergency Pollution
(supplementary provisions
[Ref 94] Control) Regulations 2002
covered in OPEPs)
Demonstration or Declaration of
Offshore Petroleum Licensing (Offshore Safety
FLA Financial Liability Arrangements
Directive) Regulations 2015
(FLA) for all well operations
Table 1. Principle Environmental Protection Regulations Applicable to Offshore Well Operations

Duty holders are not recognised in the environmental legislation, but the term covers Installation
Operators and Well-Operators appointed under the Offshore Petroleum Licensing (Offshore Safety
Directive) Regulations 2015. For well operations the Well-Operator is responsible for complying with
the environmental regulations, although the OPEP and FLA provisions may be underwritten by the
licensee(s), and the Well-Operator should understand and comply with all the requirements of the
regulations relevant to wells and well operations.
Further information and guidelines in relation to the legislative requirements relevant to the
environmental legislation can be found on the GOV.UK and Offshore Safety Regulator websites at
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/oil-and-gas-offshore-environmental-legislation and
http://www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/index.htm respectively.
Following these guidelines should help the well-operator comply with the:
• OPPC Regulation 3A on the prohibition to release any oil.

• OCR Regulation 3A on the prohibition to release an offshore chemical.
The guidelines will also help well-operators develop relief well planning for OPEPs.
2.7 Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 (BSOR)

BSOR [Ref 11] apply onshore.
2.7.1 Regulation 7 – The health and safety document
1) No borehole operation shall be commenced at a borehole site unless the operator has ensured that
a document (in these Regulations referred to as “the health and safety document”) has been prepared,
which –
a) demonstrates that the risks to which persons at the borehole site are exposed whilst they
are at work have been assessed in accordance with regulation 3 of the Management
Regulations;
b) demonstrates that adequate measures, including measures concerning the design, use and
maintenance of the borehole site and of its plant, will be taken to safeguard the health and
safety of the persons at work at the borehole site; and
c) includes a statement of how the measures referred to in sub-paragraph (b) will be co-
ordinated.
2) In addition to the matters referred to in paragraph (1), the health and safety document shall also
include where appropriate –
a) an escape plan with a view to providing employees with adequate opportunities for leaving
work places promptly and safely in the event of danger and an associated rescue plan with
a view to providing assistance where necessary;
b) a plan for the prevention of fire and explosions including in particular provisions for
preventing blowouts and any uncontrolled escape of flammable gases and for detecting the
presence of flammable atmospheres;

c) a fire protection plan detailing the likely sources of fire and the precautions to be taken to
protect against, detect and combat the outbreak and spread of fire; and
d) in the case of a borehole site where hydrogen sulphide or other harmful gases are or may
be present, a plan for the detection and control of such gases and for the protection of
employees from them.
2.7.2 Regulation 6 – Notice of the commencement of drilling operations and the abandonment
of boreholes
In the case of petroleum, the operator of a borehole site shall ensure that no drilling operation,
abandonment operation or other operation on a well which would make a significant alteration to it, or
involve a risk of the accidental release of fluids from the well or reservoir, is commenced at that site
unless he has notified to the [Health and Safety] Executive the particulars specified in Part I of Schedule
1 at least 21 days in advance, or such shorter time in advance as the [Health and Safety] Executive may
agree.
2) The operator of a borehole site or, in the case of particulars previously notified under paragraph (3),
the person entitled to drill the borehole shall ensure that the [Health and Safety] Executive is notified as
soon as reasonably practicable of any material change of circumstances which would affect particulars
previously notified under paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (4).
2.8 Other relevant Onshore Regulatory Considerations
2.8.1 Onshore Environmental Regulation
There are some circumstances where the Competent Authority for regulation of wells falls to the
Environment Agency or, in Scotland, SEPA. These include:
1. Where there is a credible source-pathway-receptor (SPR) linkage to an environmental

receptor (e.g. a loss of well integrity adjacent to a groundwater-bearing formation such as
the Sherwood Sandstone), or;
2. After well abandonment, where EA or SEPA are responsible for ensuring the environment
is protected “in perpetuity”, or;
3. Where there is a relevant Best Available Techniques conclusion under the Environmental
Permitting Regulations 2016 [Ref 141] or IED Regulations, following these guidelines will
generally provide a demonstration that BAT have been applied
Wherever potential implications for groundwater or the environment are identified, such as cross-flow,
the well-operator should seek advice from a groundwater specialist and discuss the situation with their
local EA (or SEPA) Area hydrogeologist.
2.8.2 Coal Authority
Where wells intended for hydrocarbon extraction exist within mining areas within the UK additional
considerations related to mining activities may be required. The Coal Authority should be contacted for
further information.

2.9 Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (COMAH), 2015
COMAH cover gas storage sites including the associated wells, and certain land well sites. Operators
should consult the regulations directly [Ref 20].
2.10 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999
2.10.1 Regulation 5 – Health and safety arrangements
1) Every employer shall make and give effect to such arrangements as are appropriate, having regard to
the nature of his activities and the size of his undertaking, for the effective planning, organisation,
control, monitoring and review of the preventive and protective measures.
Employers should ensure that they have a plan to make adequate routine inspections and checks to
ensure that the preventative and protective measures that they identified are in place and effective.
Employers have a responsibility to adequately investigate incidents and accidents (HSWA). The results
of these investigations should be shared across their organisation in a timely manner (Maitland Panel
Report, page 45) [Ref 127].
The investigation should try to identify underlying trends by comparison with other incidents, both
company and industry wide.
Employers should consider publicising the investigation results more widely throughout industry, if it is
legally appropriate to do so. This could be done by issuing a safety alert, by discussion at industry forums
(e.g. the Oil & Gas UK Wells Forum or Well Services Contractor Forum, or via the International
Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), or other industry forums) or by presenting the results in a
technical paper.
2.11 The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations

(RIDDOR) 2013
Reporting regulations are applicable both onshore and offshore however the reporting requirements
are different for onshore and offshore incidents and dangerous occurrences.
Onshore incidents require reporting via an online report form. [Ref 23a]
Offshore incidents and dangerous occurrences should be reported via the ROGI form. The ROGI form
replaces HSE forms OIR8, OIR9b and OIR 12, which have been withdrawn. The form can be found at:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/reporting/incidents-to-osdr.htm [Ref 23b]
The following five types of dangerous occurrence must be reported (the wording of each of the five
types of event has been extended to include the guidance provided in the official version, and that
provided by HSE inspectors for wells):
• A blowout (i.e. an uncontrolled flow of fluids from a well) which is to include events of a limited
duration.

• The coming into operation of a blowout prevention or diverter system to control flow from a
well, where normal control procedures fail. This includes 'underground blowouts', where the
well fluids flow to subsurface rock formations rather than to the surface. Reports are not
required where flow is due solely to variations in the density of fluid across pipe installed in the
wellbore, an effect commonly known as ‘U-tubing’, nor where it is known that mud previously
lost to the formation is subsequently returned, an effect commonly known as ‘ballooning’ or
‘breathing’.
• When Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) is detected during operations or in samples of well fluids (this
is not applicable to development wells exploiting reservoirs with a known H2S content).
• When precautions, in addition to those contained in the original drilling programme, must be
taken following failure to maintain planned minimum separation between wells drilled
directionally from an installation. ‘Near misses’ should also be reported if normal drilling
operations have to be interrupted for remedial action to reduce the risk of collision.
• The mechanical failure of any Safety and Environmental Critical Element (SECE) of a well (and
for this purpose the SECE of a well is any part of a well whose failure would cause or contribute
to, or whose purpose is to prevent or limit the effect of, the unintentional release of fluids from
a well or a reservoir being drawn on by a well). Failures of the primary pressure containment
envelope of a well, or of safety devices, namely BOPs, or surface, subsea and subsurface safety
valves, should be reported where there is a major loss of pressure integrity requiring immediate
remedial action. It is not necessary to report minor leaks or failures found and rectified during
routine maintenance, including replacement of worn components. Significant leakages around
a well of hydrocarbon gas from shallow formations should also be reported.
In respect to the latter point, for failures occurring in completed wells, the following guiding principles
should be followed:
• Not all mechanical failures are reportable

• No distinction is made between hydrocarbon or water service wells
2.12 The Petroleum Act 1998 (as amended by the Infrastructure Act 2015)
The Petroleum Act 1998, as amended by the Infrastructure Act 2015, places a duty of the Secretary of
State to produce one or more strategies for enabling the Principal Objective of “maximising the
economic recovery of UK petroleum to be met”. This is the first MER UK Strategy and came into force
on March 18th, 2016. [Ref 137]
The Energy Act established the OGA as a Government Company and equipped the body with additional
powers to maximise economic recovery of oil and gas from beneath UK waters. These powers give the
OGA the ability to issue enforcement notices and financial penalties, and to revoke licences for clear or
persistent breaches of the MER UK Strategy.
Therefore, the MER UK Strategy should be read as a legal document containing obligations with which
those bound by it are required to comply. The Strategy is binding on the OGA, petroleum licence holders,
operators appointed under those licences, the owners of upstream petroleum infrastructure, and those
planning and carrying out the commissioning of upstream petroleum infrastructure.

3 Process Safety and the Well Integrity Management System
3.1 Process Safety

IOGP have issued 3 reports that are relevant to process safety in wells:
IOGP 415: Asset integrity – the key to managing major incident risks. [Ref 138]
IOGP 456: Process safety recommended practice of key performance indicators. [Ref 139]
IOGP 556: Process safety - leading performance indicators. [Ref 140]
“Process safety is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems and processes
handling hazardous substances. It is achieved by applying good design principles, engineering, and
operating and maintenance practices. It deals with the prevention and control of events that have the
potential to release hazardous materials and energy. Such incidents can result in toxic exposures, fires
or explosions, and could ultimately result in serious incidents including fatalities, injuries, property
damage, lost production or environmental damage”
IOGP 456: Process safety recommended practice of key performance indicators [Ref 139]
The disciplined framework referred to above, with regards to wells, is the Well Integrity Management
System (WIMS). The primary objective of a WIMS is to prevent the loss of containment of hydrocarbons
from the wellbore throughout all stages of the life of the well.
Therefore, the principles of process safety as applied to wells are to have:
• a systematic approach to establishing well barriers

• a clear process for maintaining well barriers
• a robust method of verifying the barrier condition and effectiveness
In well operations a significant number of process safety practices and procedures depend on human
actions and behaviours, reacting to changing well conditions. Well-operators should refer to
“Guidelines on competency of wells personnel, Issue 2, August 2017” [Ref 30]. In the Operate and
Maintain phase of the well life cycle (section 10) it is equally important that the relevant production
personnel are competent in well integrity matters.
Step Change in Safety have developed useful material related to understanding and learning from
human factors in recent incidents. Refer to “Human Factors First Steps [Ref 37] and Human Factors
Toolkit [Ref 38].
3.2 Well Integrity Management System

The well-operator should have a policy defining its commitments and obligations to safeguard health,
environment, assets and reputation by establishing and preserving well integrity. This well integrity
policy should be endorsed at a senior level within the well-operator organisation.
An effective Well Integrity Management System is integral to the whole life of a well from design to final
abandonment.

Figure 1. Typical Activities in the Well Lifecycle Addressed by a Well Integrity Management System
An effective Well Integrity Management System should be designed to ensure all well activities are
performed to minimise risk under ALARP principles, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The Well-Operator’s Well Integrity Management System should clearly indicate how the policy is
interpreted and applied to well integrity.
Within the Well Integrity Management System, the following elements should be addressed as a
minimum:
• Well integrity policy and strategy

• Resources, roles, responsibilities, competencies and authority levels
• Risk assessment aspects of well integrity management
• Well examination and verification requirements
• Well design and barriers
• Well component performance standards
• Definition of well operating limits
• Well monitoring and surveillance requirements
• Annulus pressure management
• Requirements to monitor the effects of aging and degradation of barriers
• Well integrity failure management
• Requirements and schedule for performing well stock performance reviews
• Well handover requirements
• Documents required during the well life cycle (see Appendix 2)
• Duration of retaining well records (see below)
• Management of change processes
• Typical activities in the well lifecycle captured by a WIMS include:
• Construction and verification of barriers
• Recording of non-conformances

• Anomaly identification, reporting and management
• Compliance auditing and monitoring the performance of the well integrity management
systems
• Well maintenance
• Assessment of replacement or downrating of barriers
• Investigating, learning & continuous improvement
The well-operator should have complete and accurate records for all wells. The well-operator should
have a policy on the retention of well records.
As part of the Well Examination scheme, details and sufficient records should be kept to form an
auditable trail showing what work has been done, its findings, any recommendations made, and any
work carried out as a result. DCR specifies keeping records for a period of six months after the relevant
scheme ceases to be current (for example, after the well has been abandoned). Earlier records pertinent
to a new scheme should be retained for as long as they are relevant.
All wells, including suspended wells, should have a defined monitoring and maintenance strategy, with
clear responsibility and accountability, to give continuous well integrity assurance until the final well
decommissioning.
The well-operator should develop a scheme for the transfer of well records in the event of asset
transfers etc. See Appendix 2 - Divestment Information.
3.3 Process Safety Key Performance Indicators

To manage process safety, the well-operator should develop an auditable system for measuring and
recording the robustness of its equipment, procedures, well designs, people and safety leadership.
IOGP Report 456: Process safety recommended practice of key performance indicators [Ref 139]
recommends a 4-tier framework for process safety KPIs. Level T3 and T4 KPIs are primarily intended for
monitoring and review of barriers, especially at the operational level. They should comprise a mix of
“leading” and “lagging” indicators for each topic area, as further developed in IOGP Report 556: Process
safety - leading performance indicators. [Ref 140]
Table 2 gives some examples of process safety barriers related to well integrity and the corresponding
leading and lagging indicators of barrier performance. Well-operators may choose from these examples
and/or may develop other KPIs suitable to their well stock and well operations activities.
Barrier Example Lagging KPI (Tier 3) Example Leading KPI

(Tier 4)
• % personnel assessed to
• Number of personnel be competent.
Competence of personnel in whose training is overdue.
well integrity-critical roles* • % of well kick kill drills
completed per plan

• % well barriers installed
• Number of kicks incurred without issue, per plan.
(without LOPC). • Annual review of well
• Number of spills recorded integrity completed on
Well Design & Procedures
(from LOPC). schedule.
• Numbers of well stock
with integrity issues.
• % of well control
• Number of failures of well equipment tests
control equipment under completed on schedule
routine testing. • % maintenance of
• Number of non-routine equipment completed on
Safety & Environmentally and emergency
Critical Equipment schedule
maintenance work orders. • % of planned preventative
• Number of overdue critical maintenance versus total
maintenance routines. maintenance (including
unplanned).
• % Management visits to
• Number of overdue action wellsite completed per
items from audits & visits. schedule and actions
Safety Leadership tracked to closure.
• % Audits completed per
schedule and actions
tracked to closure.
LOPC = Loss of Primary Containment

* See Ref 30 – Guidelines on competency of wells personnel
Table 2. Example well integrity-related process safety KPIs

4 Well Integrity, Barriers, BOPs and Well Control
Loss of containment from a well can be determined as a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) in terms of a
threat to the safety of the installation or personnel on it and a Major Environmental Hazard (MEH) in
terms of a threat to the environment.
The guidance to DCR in Section 2 states that the well is defined in terms of its pressure containment
boundary. This concept is used in these guidelines. Maintaining the pressure containment boundary
should ensure well integrity throughout the life cycle.
The most important role of the well-operator’s representative on the rig (e.g. drilling supervisor or well
services supervisor) is to ensure the integrity of the well.
4.1 Well pressure containment boundary

A pressure containment boundary can be described as the safety and environmentally critical
equipment whose failure could cause, or contribute substantially to, or whose purpose is to prevent or
limit the effect of, a major accident.
The pressure containment boundary equipment includes downhole pressure-containing equipment

(e.g. casing, cement, production packer) as well as pressure containing equipment on top of the well,
such as a xmas tree and wellhead or BOP, usually referred to as well control equipment.
The operating limits of a pressure containment boundary are defined by the design limits as stipulated
in the well basis of design, the properties of the equipment and barriers installed during construction,
construction verification testing and the final reservoir conditions. Gas storage wells and water injection
wells should define the maximum allowable injection pressure derived from the cap rock strength.
Pressure containment boundaries are classified as primary or secondary. The classification does not
imply the relative importance of one boundary over another; rather the distinction is made to convey
the proximity of the pressure containment boundary to the reservoir.
4.2 Structural well integrity

The Conductor and Surface Casing strings have two sets of functional requirements: one is related to
structural design and one is related to well design. The full well lifecycle needs to be addressed for both
sets of requirements. Multiple conductor / surface casing failures across the global offshore well-stock
suggest that additional focus needs to be given to this area. Structural failure may adversely affect the
well pressure containment boundary. See section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 for further details.
Any proposed changes to the well or facilities should consider the corresponding impact on the
conductor and surface casing for structural and fluid/pressure retention requirements.
Ongoing maintenance and monitoring should identify any fluid content changes in the annulus and any
mechanical degradation which could affect the ability of the conductor / surface casing to maintain
structural integrity.

Information from monitoring routines should be used to re-assess the ability of the conductor and
surface casing to sustain the anticipated loads. Also see Section 10.1.6.
4.3 Well barriers

A barrier prevents unplanned movement of fluids in, from, or to the well and is part of the pressure
containment boundary. The design, selection, installation, testing, checking, monitoring and
maintenance of these barriers are the focus of these well integrity guidelines.
The design, selection, installation, testing and checking, monitoring and maintenance of well barriers
should be documented in the well design and well operating procedures.
Identified well barriers are required to be verified against performance standards to ensure they remain
effective in mitigating the major hazard threat.
The well-operator should ensure there are sufficient and suitable barriers between the hazards in the
well and the surface throughout the well life cycle.
4.3.1 Number of well barriers
The well should be designed and constructed so that no single failure of a well barrier (including the
formation) will ever result in an uncontrolled flow of fluids to the environment for the expected life of
that well.
There should be at least two well barriers available throughout the well life cycle which may be a
combination of one active and, where appropriate, one potential barrier in place between the reservoir
and the environment.
To carry out operations with fewer than two barriers available, requires careful consideration by the
well-operator to demonstrate that the risks are ALARP.
4.3.2 Type of well barriers
4.3.2.1 Active versus potential barriers
An ‘active’ barrier actively prevents unplanned escape of fluid from the well without being functioned,
e.g.:
• Overbalanced drilling – a hole full of the correct weight fluid (providing the overbalance is
maintained).
• Underbalanced wireline logging – the stuffing box
• Producing wells – the xmas tree and wellhead
• Managed pressure drilling – the rotating control device
• A known fluid level (e.g. via echo meter) where reservoir pressure conditions are known.
Active barriers always provide well pressure containment, and verification of their integrity condition is
achieved by appropriate well condition monitoring which may be defined as real-time monitoring and
interpretation of well data such as: tubing/casing pressures; annulus pressures; flowing and shut-in

tubing pressures; temperature; H2S and CO2 production, and fines or solids production to assure that
the well remains within its defined operating limits.
Whilst drilling in gas storage reservoirs, or in reservoirs with active water injection, the reservoir
pressure should be maintained under control to ensure that the active barrier (overbalanced drilling
fluid) is not compromised.
Potential barriers will not prevent an unplanned escape of fluids from the well until they have been
functioned. Verification of their integrity condition is achieved by testing on a set frequency. For more
details see Section 4.3.9.
The main potential barrier during drilling is the BOP, which is open during normal operations but can be
closed quickly when needed. Examples of other potential barriers are: xmas tree flow wing valve and
lower master gate valve, and the downhole safety valve.
Different standards and guidelines may describe barriers in different ways. For example, “primary” and
“secondary.”
4.3.2.2 Well Pressure Containment Boundary Reliability
The multiple redundancy provided by a combination of individual potential barriers enhances well
isolation reliability. The competence of the pressure containment boundary is then not compromised
by the failure of a single potential barrier.
4.3.2.3 Inner versus annulus and other flow path barriers
During most phases of the well life cycle there is pipe inside pipe. Barriers need to be considered for
both the inner pipe (e.g. drill string or completion) and all outer well annuli potential flow paths.
In a completed well, a xmas tree valve is an inner potential barrier and a production packer is an annulus
active barrier.
4.3.2.4 Permanent versus temporary barriers
Permanent barriers are needed for well abandonment and are defined in the Oil & Gas UK Well
Decommissioning Guidelines [Ref 24] as a “verified barrier that will maintain a permanent seal”, (e.g. a
cement plug across the width of the well). All other barriers are considered temporary.
4.3.3 Shearing and barriers
In some situations, there is a need for equipment in the well to be sheared to seal the well if the active
barrier fails. For example:
• Blind shear rams (BSR) that cut drill pipe and seal the wellbore are included in drilling rig BOP
stacks
• Casing shear rams that cut tubulars, but do not seal the well, are included in some BOPs. These
need to be backed up by a separate blind ram that seals the well
• Some xmas trees valves may be designed to shear wireline

• Wireline shear seal BOPs that cut wireline and seal the wellbore may be rigged up when wireline
is run through a xmas tree
For further information refer to section 4.4 BOPs and API S53 [Ref 39].
4.3.4 Describing well barriers
Barriers should be explicitly described when planning and carrying out operations for all stages of the
well life cycle. This is to encourage all personnel involved to think about well barriers and to recognise
the significance if a barrier is not installed or tested as planned.
This description may be in the form of a well integrity matrix which may be included in operations
programmes or status reports. Examples for each stage of the well life cycle are included in following
sections of these guidelines. Barriers may also be described with schematics and in engineering
diagrams. Examples of barrier schematics may be found in Section 6.6.4 and Section 11.1.8 Further
information is given in NORSOK D-010 [Ref 110].
Alternatively, the barriers may be described by text descriptions.
4.3.5 Immediacy of hazards after barrier failure
The failure of an active barrier can lead to fluid flow from the well. This flow is an immediate hazard to
personnel if the fluid is under pressure and/or hazardous (e.g. hydrocarbons or H2S).
The immediacy of the hazard should be considered when assessing the risks during well planning and
operations.
The failure of an active barrier with pressured hydrocarbons (e.g. a coiled tubing stripper packer on a
producing well) can cause an immediate hazard to personnel before potential barriers can be activated.
By contrast if a kick is taken, there is a hazard. Often there may be time to activate potential barriers,
preventing the release of hydrocarbons or fluid under pressure, if the crew is alert and responds to the
kick indicators.
4.3.6 Barrier components and associated equipment
A barrier may need several components to be considered a complete barrier.
For example, the rig BOP has multiple components (e.g. pipe rams, chokeline valves) and associated
equipment such as control systems, hydraulic power supply. It is considered a single barrier. A single
point of failure (e.g. of the BOP/ wellhead connector) can negate the barrier.
Where a barrier (such as a BOP) is categorised as ‘safety and environmentally-critical', because the
associated equipment is needed to activate the barrier, individual components should be considered
‘safety and environmental-critical elements’ (as defined in Regulation 2, SCR 2015).

4.3.7 Barrier selection and qualification
The well design process should include the selection of adequate barriers throughout the well life cycle
to ensure well integrity, and this should be explicitly described in the well planning documents and
operational programmes.
Part of this process may be formal qualification of barriers for equipment such as downhole safety valves
(DHSV).
Barrier selection is covered in Section 5 (Well Design and Operations Planning) of these guidelines.
4.3.8 Barrier installation
The procedures for installing barriers during well operations should be explicitly described in all
operations plans and procedures.
Steps for checking that barriers are in the right place should be described in the operations procedures.
There should be criteria for how to check the location of the barrier and a description of how failure
(e.g. barrier not in the right place) would be indicated. Confirmation that barriers are in the correct
location should be included in operations reports.
4.3.9 Testing well barriers
After a well barrier is installed, it should be tested to ensure:
• It is functioning correctly (e.g. BOP function test)

• It can withstand the maximum potential differential pressure by:
• a pressure (positive) test (see Section 4.6 for details);
• an inflow (negative) test (see Section 4.8 for details).
Barriers should be tested in the direction of flow whenever possible. If this is not possible, the well-
operator should assess the probability and consequences of failure of the barrier to align with principles
of ALARP [Ref 16].
Where barriers are established using equipment designed to hold pressure from both directions, such
as cement plugs, or packers with a bi-directional locking mechanism and bi-directional seals (O-rings or
solid seal elements), they may be considered bidirectional barriers if tested from the opposite direction
to flow.
Plugs dressed with chevron seals (or ‘V’ packing), or valves with separate sealing faces, should be
considered uni-directional. They should be tested in the direction of flow to be considered a barrier.
Test procedures should include:
• Success/failure criteria
• Reaction to trends (e.g. increase in annulus pressure)
Barrier tests should be witnessed by the representative of the well-operator who is responsible for the
integrity of the well.

The results of the installation and testing of barriers should be described in operations reports (daily
and final). This information should be included in reports to the well-examiner.
If reporting to the HSE is required [Ref 20] by Regulation 19, DCR, it should include brief details of barrier
installation and the results of tests.
Records of the tests should be kept in the well files.
Testing to confirm the well pressure containment envelope should be repeated, as necessary,
throughout the well life cycle to ensure that the barrier is still functioning as a well barrier.
4.3.10 Maintenance and monitoring of barriers
Barriers should be monitored and maintained during the life of the well. This may be described in well-
specific programmes and/or in standard operations procedures.
The ability of operations personnel to recognise barrier failure, and react to it, is a very important aspect
of their competency.
The results of the barrier monitoring, and any required maintenance, should be communicated to the
well-examiner. See Oil & Gas UK Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].
4.3.11 Response to degradation of barriers
If barriers become degraded (not fully functional) the well-operator should have a management system
for recognising and reacting to the situation.
Degradation can be described as signs that there are problems with a barrier, but it has not yet definitely
failed, and it should still function as a barrier.
Examples of barrier degradation include:
• In overbalanced drilling – severe lost circulation making it difficult to keep the hole full of mud
• In underbalanced wireline logging – the grease injection system fails but the flow tube is still
full of grease
• In production – a valve that is showing a trend of increasing leak rate during testing but is still
within the acceptance criteria; minor leaks in the control system for xmas tree valves indicate
that activating the valve might take more time than normal
• In production – ingress of well fluids to control lines
• In production – unexplained annulus pressure
4.3.12 Response to failure of barriers
If an active barrier fails, other potential barriers should be activated at once to seal the well.
For some situations, immediate repair of a barrier should be carried out, or operations on the well
should stop until the barrier is reinstated. For other situations, mitigation may be possible before the
barrier is reinstated. There should be a defined timescale for delayed repair of barriers.

The well-operator should carry out a specific risk assessment for continuing operations with a failed or
degraded barrier in place. This should be described in the well-operator’s MoC procedure.
4.3.13 Cemented shoe track as a well barrier
A cemented casing or liner shoe track is not an acceptable barrier after installation without adequate
design, placement and testing.
The failure of ‘cemented’ shoe tracks to prevent flow has been a key factor in several blowouts.
Shoe tracks should be treated as open-ended casing unless they are designed and can be verified to
demonstrate they are an adequate barrier to flow from the well.
All the following aspects should be considered to qualify the shoe track as a well barrier.
4.3.13.1 Length of cement in the shoe track
If the shoe track is being designed as a barrier, the length of shoe track should be considered. With the
dual plug cementing technique, the lower plug is designed to wipe mud and the top plug to wipe cement
from the inside of the casing. The well-operator usually chooses a shoe track length to contain any
cement contaminated by mud during the displacement process.
4.3.13.2 Quality of cement in the shoe track
Good cement in this context is a slurry which has been properly mixed and is uncontaminated. Any
leakage around plugs or over displacement may reduce the quality and volume of uncontaminated
cement in the shoe track.
4.3.13.3 Adequacy of cement placement
An internal (or positive) pressure test of the casing does not qualify the shoe track as a barrier, because,
typically the top wiper plug holds pressure from above but not from below.
Even if the shoe or collar float valves are pressure-tested before installation, they may be damaged or
washed out during the cementing process [Ref 53].
An inflow test should be carefully planned and carried out to provide a robust demonstration that the
shoe track is an adequate barrier (see Section 4.6 for inflow testing guidelines). Specific problems are:
• The top plug may be held in place by a small amount of cement which may fail as the casing
flexes with temperature or pressure changes or with time
• The float valves may seal against cement slurry initially but if hydrocarbon, (especially gas),
builds up under the float valve the barrier may fail
The following actions may help to improve the adequacy of the barrier:
• Set a mechanical plug inside the casing above the float collar and test from below
• Set a cement plug on top of the float collar and pressure test from above

• Drill out the plugs and casing collar floats to demonstrate that there was cement inside the
casing. If the remaining length of ‘good’ cement was verified this could qualify it as a cement
plug barrier
4.3.14 Effects of different installations on well integrity
The ability to maintain well integrity will, in part, be influenced by the characteristics of the installation
to which the well is connected. Each type of installation, whether fixed or floating, will present risks to
well integrity which will need to be identified, assessed and managed.
Factors that may directly or indirectly lead to well integrity problems include:
• Structural failure
• Loss of station keeping ability
• Foundation failure (e.g. punch through or scour related movement)
• Excessive topside motions (e.g. related to heave, pitch and roll)
For drill ships, well intervention vessels and semi-submersibles held on station by dynamic positioning
(DP), or mooring systems, or a combination of both, the total or partial loss of station-keeping ability
during an operation can, if not recognised and addressed at an early stage, escalate to a significant well
integrity challenge.
The motions of a floating drilling platform should be considered with a view to determine the conditions
at which certain actions need to be taken to limit damage to drilling equipment and consequential
impacts on well integrity. These limitations are often expressed in the form of ‘well specific operating
guidelines’, which are agreed between the well-operator and installation duty holder prior to
commencement of a drilling operation.
4.3.15 Use of PTFE tape
PTFE tape should not be used on threaded plugs or threads that may see hydrocarbons. The use of PTFE
tape should be restricted to pipework that will not see hydrocarbons where the nominal bore of the
pipe is less than or equal to 1.1/2” inches, design pressure up to 100 Bar, design temperature range -
1900C to 2000C and the PTFE tape used conforms to British Standard 7786 Grade H. The use of PTFE
tape should be kept to an absolute minimum and where possible eliminated in favour of liquid thread
compounds.
4.4 Blowout Preventers
4.4.1 Retirement of O&GUK BOP Guidelines
After the Macondo blowout in 2010 O&GUK introduced good practice guidelines for subsea BOPs on
the UKCS. Guidelines on subsea BOP systems, Issue 1 was published in July 2012. These were extensively
revised and expanded to include offshore surface BOPs and issued as Guidelines on BOP Systems for
Offshore Wells, Issue 2 in May 2014. [Ref 31]

The API similarly revised its Recommended Practice API RP53 Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems
for Drilling Wells and issued it as a Standard, API S53 Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling
Wells, Fourth Edition in November 2012. [Ref 39]. The fifth edition was being finalised as this edition of
the Guidelines were developed and includes an improved focus on onshore BOPs.
The O&GUK guidelines largely replicated the API standard. With the publication of this Issue 4 of the
Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines the opportunity is being taken to retire the O&GUK BOP Guidelines.
Well-operators should refer to API S53 [Ref40] for further detailed guidance.
There remain several areas where the good practice previously defined for the UKCS in Ref 31 is
different to that proposed by API S53. These differences are described in the next section.
4.4.2 Good practice for UKCS wells vs. API S53
The well-operator should undertake a risk assessment against the BOP configuration requirements of
API S53 to confirm whether this guidance is suitable for its planned well operations.
Sub-hydrostatic well operations should be risk assessed and, if a Class 1 system is in place, the annular
type preventer should be a type capable of closing on open hole
Where it is planned to re-enter an existing well, previously drilled with a lighter Class 4 BOP stack, the
well-operator should assess its suitability for a heavier (API S53-compliant) BOP stack. This is to confirm
that the conductor and wellhead will not be overloaded.
Table 3 lists the areas of recommended good practice for UKCS wells [Ref 31] that differ from API S53.
API S53 (4th Edition**, Nov 2012) UKCS Good Practice from the retired Ref 31
Subsea BOP
Subsea BOPs shall be Class* 5 or greater and Subsea BOPs should have at least three pipe
have at least two pipe rams (excluding test rams). rams.
Subsea BOPs shall have at least one annular Subsea BOPs should have two annular preventers.
preventer.
DP subsea BOP stacks shall have a minimum of Moored rigs with a riser margin and BOPs with
two sets of shear rams (at least one capable of four cavities should have three pipe rams and one
sealing) for shearing the drill pipe and tubing in BSR.
use.
Moored rigs without a riser margin should
For Moored rigs, a minimum of one set of BSRs conduct a risk assessment for the need for two
(capable of shearing DP) may be used after shear rams.
conducting a RA.
DP rigs, and rigs with five or more ram cavities,
should have a minimum of two shear rams, at
least one of which should seal.

API S53 (4th Edition**, Nov 2012) UKCS Good Practice from the retired Ref 31
Autoshear shall be installed on all subsea BOP All DP rigs should have an autoshear system that
stacks. should shear the pipe and seal the well if the
Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) unlatches
from the BOP.
A deadman system shall be installed on all All DP rigs should have a deadman system. This
subsea BOP stacks. automatically shears the pipe and seals the well
on loss of both the electrical signal and the power
supply to the control pods.
Offshore Surface BOP
Surface BOP systems <3K psi Rated Working All surface BOP systems should adopt a minimum
Pressure (RWP) / Class 2 or where ram of one set of blind rams. BSRs should be capable
preventers are planned a minimum of one set of of shearing drill pipe in use and sealing the
blinds / BSRs shall be included. wellbore.
Surface BOP systems 5K psi rated shall include a Surface BOP systems 5K psi rated should utilise a
Class 3 system. A minimum of one set of blinds / Class 3 system and should have as a minimum
BSRs must be used and the third device may be one set of blind / BSRs capable of shearing drill
ram or annular type. pipe in use and sealing the wellbore. The third
device should be an annular type device.
A minimum of Class 4 BOP system is to be used Class 4 / 10K psi rated surface BOP systems
on 10K psi systems and shall include a minimum should utilise as a minimum one set of BSRs
of one set of blind / BSRs capable of shearing the capable of shearing drill pipe in use and sealing
drill pipe in use and sealing the wellbore. the wellbore, one annular type device and the
fourth device should be a ram or annular type
device.
Onshore BOP
Note that API S53 permits the use of a blind ram

in BOP systems rated to 5K psi and less.
*The classification or “class” of a BOP stack is the total number of ram and annular preventers in the BOP stack. [Ref 39]
** Will be updated to 5th Edition prior to publication
Table 3. UKCS BOP good practice vs. API S53
4.5 Pressure testing guidelines

Where possible, pressure testing should be carried out with liquid (hydraulic testing) rather than air or
gas (pneumatic testing). This is because the lower stored energy in hydraulic testing reduces the risk of
personal injury in the event of failure during testing [Ref 21].
Consideration should be given to the test medium, bearing in mind that viscous fluids containing solids
and fluid loss control additives might mask small leaks.

Pressure tests should be covered by written procedures. These may be standard operating procedures
for routine tests such as BOP testing. Otherwise the testing procedures should be included in the
operations programme. Pressure tests should be completed with calibrated test equipment with a
suitable pressure and time range which allows accurate monitoring of the test.
Users should be aware of the factors affecting the accuracy of pressure tests, such as:
• Volume of ‘system’ being assessed for leakage

• Pressure
• Temperature (thermal effects and thermal stability)
• Compressibility of fluid (presence of mixed fluids)
• Change in volume/deformation of system (e.g. casing ballooning)
• Duration
• Type of barrier
• Compound/multiple barrier
• Pressure source and potential leak path
• Measurement range and accuracy
Pressure tests should be the subject of a suitable and sufficient risk assessment process.
Test results should be recorded with an auditable trail (e.g. all pressure tests graphed and signed off by
a competent person).
If circumstances in the well change (e.g. if the closed-in tubing head pressure for a well to be worked
over is higher than predicted) the test procedures should be revised in line with the well-operator’s
MoC procedures.
4.5.1 Risk assessment
Pressure testing risk assessments should cover the following two distinct aspects:
4.5.1.1 Well integrity
The most important aspect of designing a well and planning well operations is assuring well integrity.
This is done by the selection, installation, verification, testing, maintenance and repair of suitable
barriers through the life cycle of the well.
The risk assessment covering barrier testing should include:
• Maximum differential pressure across the barrier throughout the well life cycle
• Fluids to which the barrier could be exposed (hydrocarbon gas, H2S, CO2 etc)
• Frequency of testing
• Criteria for success of a pressure test
• Criteria for failure of a pressure test
• Contingency plans if the barrier cannot be successfully tested as required
It is important that the assessment of permanent barriers (e.g. cemented production casing) covers the
full life cycle through production operations to final abandonment, including all the different conditions

to which it might be subjected. For example, if there is a possibility that a production well may be gas
lifted, even if this is not the original design, the production casing connectors should be gas tight.
The risk assessment should consider the consequences of the test not fulfilling its objective. The lack of
a test, or an inadequate test, may mean the well is left with an inadequate barrier that may fail during
operations. The risk assessment should also consider the consequence if a barrier fails and exposes
another part of the well to higher pressure than it is designed to contain.
4.5.1.2 Operational
This covers the immediate hazards to rig personnel carrying out the test. The main hazard during
positive pressure testing is the unintentional release of stored energy.
A failed inflow test may release reservoir fluids.
The installation duty holder should ensure that a suitable and sufficient risk assessment has been carried
out.
The assessment should consider:
• Competence of personnel
• Hazards of fluid released if a barrier fails
• Protection from projectiles if there is a sudden barrier failure
• Hazards if the test fluid is released to the atmosphere
• Potential for escalation (other parts of the well may be damaged)
• Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS)
• Safe systems of work (permits, barriers, etc)
• Securing pipework used in tests
• Temporary pipework service and rating
4.6 Positive pressure testing guidelines
4.6.1 Pressure test planning
A written procedure should be available covering:
• The test objectives

• Test acceptance criteria
• Duration of tests
• Bleeding down pressures to desired operational status
• Calculated volumes especially if testing a plug where a deeper set plug is already present in the
same string
This may be a standard operating procedure for repeated tests (e.g. stump test for a rig BOP). Before
each regular test, any specific circumstances (e.g. weather, changes to equipment, new personnel etc)
should be reviewed to ensure the standard procedures are still applicable.

For operation specific tests, procedures may be included in an operations programme or a specific test
procedure may be issued. These procedures should be checked well before the testing starts to ensure
that the assumptions made when designing the test are still valid. If there are significant changes (e.g.
actual reservoir pressure is higher than predicted or a plug setting depth is shallower), the test
procedures should be revised under the well-operator’s MoC procedures.
The test arrangements should be checked to ensure there are no barriers upstream or downstream of
the barrier to be tested as this could mask a leak. For some barriers, a schematic showing valves and
their status will be needed.
For multi-element barriers (e.g. a rig BOP or a xmas tree), a series of tests will be needed to qualify the
separate elements in the barrier. The sequence of steps and the success/failure criteria for each step
should be clear in the procedures.
4.6.2 Calculations of fluid volumes
For large fluid volumes (e.g. a casing pressure test), the procedures should include a calculation of the
volume of fluid that is required to raise the pressure to the required level.
It is understood that this simple calculation is approximate. However, it should indicate gross mistakes
(in order of magnitude) if a much smaller, or larger, volume is being pressured up than planned.
4.6.2.1 Compressibility calculation
Compressibility calculation is as follows:
Volume pumped initial volume pressure fluid Compressibility
(bbl) (bbl) (psi) (psi-1)
Compressibility (psi-1) of neat fluids that may be used are:
Water = 2.8 x 10-6
Diesel = 4.6 x 10-6
Base oil = 5.1 x 10-6 (varies by type of oil and supplier)
Compressibility of oil-based mud should take account of the relative proportions of constituents. The
following equation may be used to calculate the effective compressibility:
Effective Compressibility (psi-1) = WCW% + OCO% +SCS%
Where W%, O% and S% are the relative percentages of water, oil and solids in the mud by volume and
Wc, Oc and Sc are the compressibility of the water, oil and solid components respectively.
A typical value for the compressibility of solids (SC) is 0.2 x 10-6 psi-1
The presence of gas in the fluid should be considered as this may have a considerable effect on the
compressibility.

4.6.3 Pressure test operations
A pre-job safety meeting (or equivalent) should be held before the test with those involved to check:
• Understanding of the objectives of the test

• Test procedures
• Review of risk assessment results
• Worksite and equipment
• Contingency plans
• Safety precautions required (e.g. barriers, area clearance, Public Address (PA) announcements
etc)
• A low-pressure test should be considered. It is prudent to perform a low pressure test as an
initial integrity check before performing a high pressure test that may be more hazardous in the
event of a failure.
Where possible the pressure behind the component being tested should be monitored to ensure there
is no leak and the correct component is being tested (e.g. monitoring the 13 3/8” x 9 5/8” annulus when
testing the 9 5/8” casing).
The low pressure test, generally 250 to 350 psi, should be just high enough for measuring and
monitoring with equipment available, and it should remain stable for the length of time specified in the
programme, at least 5 minutes [Ref 110]. Tests where the pressure acts on a large area (e.g. a 20” casing
circulating swage) are more hazardous, as force is a function of pressure multiplied by cross sectional
area.
If the low-pressure test is successful, the pressure should be increased to the full test pressure. The
procedures should state if this is done in one step or in a series of steps with checks at intermediate
stages. The volume of fluid pumped should be noted and compared to the value calculated in the
procedures.
The final pressure should be held for the length of time specified in the programme. This will depend
on the trapped volume being monitored.
The procedures should explain how the pressure is released safely, and at what stage the test is over. If
possible, the volume returned should be measured and compared with the actual volume pumped.
4.6.4 Success/failure criteria
Positive pressure tests raise the pressure in an enclosed space upstream of the barrier.
The main confirmation is given by checking that the pressure upstream of the barrier does not reduce.
This may be supplemented by monitoring for flow or pressure increase downstream of the barrier.
The best success criterion is that there is zero change in the pressure over the specified time. It may not
be possible to achieve this, and the well-operator should define the acceptance criteria for each
pressure test.
The procedures should state how long the pressure should be held for both low and high tests.

It may not be possible to remove all trapped gas and so there may be an initial pressure change. The
system should be recharged to the test pressure and monitored.
After allowing for any minor pressure decline associated with residual trapped gas, any further pressure
drop may indicate a failure of the barrier. Any identified problems in the procedure or equipment should
be remedied and the pressure test repeated.
Problems that may occur include:
• Gas within pressured void (gas or air should be removed before testing as far as possible)
• Temperature effects (cold fluid pumped into a warmer void may result in a pressure increase).
If this creates a problem, the temperature should be left to stabilise before a final monitoring
of the pressure.
4.7 Pressure Test Acceptance Criteria

Acceptance criteria for pressure tests vary widely [and have traditionally failed to consider the
differences in the physical properties of the systems being tested for integrity]. The compressibility
calculation, in paragraph 4.6.2.1, provides an indication of the volume change which is likely to be
associated with a pressure change during a pressure test. In addition to understanding this relationship
for every pressure test, it is necessary to establish acceptable leak rates as part of the pressure test
design.
The two graphs in Figure 2, below, demonstrate the pressure increase in annuli, associated with two
different leak rates from an external pressure source. The graphs also demonstrate that the pressure
build up is significantly influenced by the compressibility of the fluid and the volume of the annulus. The
lower leak acceptance criteria of 2 cm3 per minute (see below) may be difficult to detect even over
many hours.

Figure 2. Pressure Change associated with leakage into an annulus

It can be difficult to select appropriate acceptance criteria for pressure tests. The industry has some
standards which are summarised in Table 4 below. ‘Leak tight’ means that no change in pressure or
leakage is observed during the test, which should be conducted with specified conditions that would
permit leakage to be observed. ‘Operator Specific’ requires that a leak acceptance criterion is specified
by the operator e.g. leak tight, 2cm3 per minute per inch of valve, 15psi per 30 minutes, etc.
Manufacturing Construction Phase Operational Phase

Well Component
Leakage Leakage Leakage
Leak Tight Leak Tight

Cement Barrier
PFO and PBU PFO and PBU
Casing & Tubing

ISO13679 Leak Tight Leak Tight
Connections
Fully Cased Annulus ISO13679 Leak Tight Leak Tight
Annulus with Open Shoe Leak Tight FIT Leak Tight FIT
Leak Tight Leak Tight

Injector or Producer
ISO13679 PFO and PBU Monitor ‘A’ Annulus
Tubing
(plugged) PFO and PBU (plugged)
Qualification
Gas or Hydraulic Lift
testing of gas lift Operator Specific Operator Specific
Producer Tubing
valve.
Leak Tight
Leak Tight Monitor ‘B’
Gas or Hydraulic Lift Monitor ‘B’ Annulus Annulus
ISO13679
Production Casing
PFO and PBU PFO and PBU (plugged)
(plugged)
DHSV API 14A API 14B API 14B
API Standard 598

API RP14H API RP14H
Tree & Wellhead Valves
Operator Specific Operator Specific
API 6A
API Specification
Wellhead Seals Leak Tight Leak Tight
6A

Intervention Equipment Operator Specific
PFO = Pressure Fall-Off. PBU = Pressure Build-Up
Table 4. Potential leak acceptance criteria for different components of a well at different well life cycle
phases
Definitions of the various acceptable rates include:
• Leak Tight FIT = Formation Integrity Test (FIT) – nominal pressure at which no leak-off would be
expected
• ISO 13679 = 0.9cm3/15 minute for each connection (internal & external)
• API RP 14A = 5scf/minute
• API RP 14B = 15scf/minute or 400cm3/minute
• API 598 = 3cm3/minute/inch of bore maximum, but varies with valve type and size
• API 6A = Specification does not indicate leakage acceptance of tests performed
• Seeps and weeps - No Industry Standard. Sometimes Gas <20% LEL measured 0.1m from the
leak source or <0.1 litre per second or Liquid <4 drops per min
• Leak Tight = to be determined by the well-operator
If the barrier will not contain the pressure specified in the procedures, the barrier has failed the test. It
should be replaced, repaired or adequately addressed through a MoC procedure. Operations may
include:
• Unseating a mechanical plug and resetting it

• Setting an additional mechanical plug above the first
• Setting a cement (or other competent material) plug on top of the failed plug
4.8 Inflow testing guidelines

These are also referred to as negative or drawdown tests.
4.8.1 Introduction
Inflow tests are used to test a barrier in the direction of flow. An inflow test is needed when a barrier
cannot be adequately tested by:
• A positive test from the downstream side (because the barrier is not bidirectional)
• Direct pressure applied to the upstream or reservoir side (no access)
Barriers that may need an inflow test include:
• Liner hangers/liner top packers (unless bi-directional)

• Production casing shoe track
• Mechanical plugs inside casing
• Downhole safety and xmas tree valves
• Formation isolation valves

• Casing hanger seal assemblies
• Inflatable packers
• Mechanical plugs inside tubing
4.8.2 Specific problems to be considered for inflow tests
The pressure upstream of the barrier may not be known and it may change over time. For a plug set in
a production well, the reservoir pressure acting on the upstream side of the barrier will increase after
production has stopped. If the barrier is inflow tested immediately after setting the plug, this will not
reflect the maximum differential pressure to which the plug will be exposed.
The fluid on the upstream side of the barrier may change. If there are formation fluids, gas may migrate
to the upstream side of the barrier. Therefore, an immediate inflow test may be done with liquid
upstream and this may be replaced by gas after some time.
It can be difficult to measure pressure increase or flow in a large void downstream of the barrier. This is
relevant to barriers at the bottom of the well where some or all of the well volume is between the
barrier and any measurement.
There may be temperature changes during the inflow test. Horner plots may be used to differentiate
between pressure build up due to a leak and thermal effects.
For overbalanced operations, the active barrier is deliberately degraded or removed to create the
differential pressure. If the barrier being tested fails, the well is in an underbalanced condition and there
may be an influx or kick. This may happen during the test or afterwards.
Inflow tests can merge into displacement operations (where the well is completely displaced to a lighter
fluid). It is important that the two phases are planned and managed as separate operations. The well-
operator’s site representative should review the results of the inflow test (ideally with the onshore
supervisors) and ‘sign-off’ the test before continuing with displacement operations.
If the well is to be displaced to a lighter fluid, the displacement should be planned with a step-down
chart of pressure versus volume, with clear notification of the point at which the well is underbalanced.
Any deviation should be reviewed, and if there are concerns the displacement should be stopped and
the well closed in at the BOP. The situation should then be assessed.
An inadequate inflow test or a ‘false positive’ (that is a test that is wrongly thought to have qualified a
barrier) may lead to a major well control problem if the well is then displaced to light fluid.
To verify a successful test, all final fluid volumes may be closely monitored. A Horner plot analysis may
be used to assist this process.
4.8.3 Inflow test planning
To create a differential pressure to test the barrier, the pressure needs to be lowered on the
downstream side of the barrier. The differential pressure should reflect the foreseeable use of the well
during the life cycle.

Lowering the pressure, typically by displacing to a lighter fluid, removes the active barrier for
overbalanced operations. If the barrier being inflow tested fails, there will be an influx requiring
activation of potential barriers and secondary well control.
Important points for inflow test planning are that there should be:
• Clear indications of success if the barrier holds

• Clear indications of failure if the barrier leaks
• A safe way of returning the well to an overbalanced condition if the barrier fails
The criteria should as a minimum stipulate:
• The minimum time for the test

• The maximum time for the test
• The maximum allowable volume to be bled-off.
• The maximum allowable flowrate at the end of the test
• That the fluid flowrate should be on a clearly decreasing trend
Keeping the volume of lighter fluid to a minimum by pumping the fluid down the drill pipe rather than
the annulus, is preferable to achieve the above objectives for deep-set barriers.
The hydrostatic head of the annulus needs to be isolated for the inflow test. A suitable way of achieving
this is setting a multi-use packer on an open-ended drill pipe, after the lighter fluid has been pumped
down the drill pipe.
Alternatively, a multi-use circulating valve may be placed in the string above the packer, and the packer
is then set before opening the valve and circulating fluid.
If using a packer, this should be run as deep as possible into the well, though it should be set no lower
than the component(s) to be inflow tested. Note that the integrity of the annulus above the packer is
not verified as part of this test.
4.8.4 Negative pressures across BOP
These guidelines suggest introducing light fluid down the drill pipe for inflow tests. It is possible to
reduce pressure in the well by introducing light fluid into the annulus or down a choke line. If this is
done, care should be taken that:
• The BOP sealing elements are not subject to excessive pressure from above (riser mud
hydrostatic > wellhead pressure) causing damage.
• It does not cause a leak. Seals and gaskets are not designed for inward acting pressures (the
external (seawater) pressure may be higher than the internal BOP pressure).
4.8.5 Inflow testing of downhole safety/xmas tree valves
Commissioned production wells will have formation fluids in the tubing. For naturally flowing wells,
closing the in-line production valves allows them to be inflow tested. The pressure downstream will be
monitored to qualify the valves. It should be noted that the upstream pressure will gradually increase
as the reservoir pressure builds up.

The ‘test medium’ will be whatever fluid is flowing from the well which is likely to contain hydrocarbon
gas. This will be a more severe test than hydraulic tests with liquid.
Refer to Section 10.5.4 for more information on testing xmas tree valves.
4.8.6 Flow checks as inflow tests
Flow checks during drilling are a type of inflow test. The bottom hole pressure is reduced to hydrostatic
head when circulation stops. The hole is then checked for flow by monitoring the trip tank/flowline for
any returns, or for pressure increase below a closed BOP.
If there is flow, this may indicate that the well is underbalanced under static, non-circulating conditions.
The potential barrier, rig BOP, should be closed and the well observed. Bottoms up should be circulated
under well control (through the choke).
If conditions indicate that the well is underbalanced, the mud weight should be increased to ensure the
well is over-balanced under static conditions before further operations are carried out.
It should be noted that, even where static mud hydrostatic gradient exceeds formation Pore Pressure,
mud returned from the borehole may have picked up hazardous formation fluids such as gas or H2S by
diffusion.
Before performing controlled bleed-offs, assess the most likely worst case for the nature of the influx.
Mitigations against hazardous influx of fluids should include limiting the volume bled back to a level
likely to be well within the capacity of surface gas-handling equipment when circulated out. The process
of controlled bleed-offs should continue only if shut-in pressures indicate a continued reduction in
bottom hole pressure.
4.9 Well integrity/control of well
4.9.1 Primary control of well
Primary control of the well is maintained by the active barrier.
Planning to ensure primary control of the well throughout its life cycle (by ensuring there is an active
barrier in place) is the main function of well design and planning.
Ensuring primary control of the well throughout its life cycle (by monitoring and maintaining active
barriers) is the main function of operations personnel responsible for the well.
4.9.2 Secondary well control
If an active barrier fails, primary control of the well is lost. Secondary well control is needed immediately,
and this involves the activation of potential barriers such as:
• Overbalanced drilling: the drilling BOP

• Underbalanced wireline logging: wireline BOP
• Production: master valve in xmas tree

Ensuring suitable well control equipment is available throughout the well life cycle is the responsibility
of the well-operator. See Regulation 17(1), DCR; paragraph 35, DCR guidance; Regulation 9(1) and
Schedule 2, BSOR.
Deploying the well control equipment and ensuring it is ready when needed is a vital part of all
operational phases of the well life cycle. It is the responsibility of the installation safety case duty holder
or the well-operator. See Regulation 1(2), DCR and paragraph 33 of DCR guidance.
Identifying when well control procedures are needed, and carrying them out, is an important aspect of
well operations management as required by Regulation 21 of DCR [Ref 2].
4.9.3 Well control equipment
The well-operator should ensure that suitable well control equipment is available at the well site before
operations start. Operations include:
• Drilling, testing, completion

• Intervention/workover
• Operations and maintenance
Checking the ‘suitability’ of temporary well control equipment should take place during contracting of
services, or with drilling contractor and service companies. The following points should be considered:
• Pressure rating of equipment compared to the maximum anticipated pressure

• Temperature rating compared to the maximum anticipated temperature
• Suitability of equipment for service (e.g. CO2, H2S)
• Number, type and location of rams in the BOP
• Where shear rams are used, understanding what equipment can be sheared and the associated
conditions
• Suitable connection to the wellhead or xmas tree
• Adequacy of the primary control system
• Requirement for secondary and/or emergency control systems
• Inspection of certification
Arrangement drawings and flow diagrams for well control equipment should be easily accessible for
users of this equipment, ensuring that it is possible to determine the position of non-shearable
components relative to the shear rams/valves at all times.
These drawings and flow diagrams should include:
• Geometrical description (e.g. location, size, distances to rig floor, between rams, etc)
• Operational limitations (e.g. pressure, temperature, type of fluid, flow rates)
• Overview of the fluid circulation system (pump, including choke and kill manifold)
The specification of well control equipment should be reviewed by an independent and competent
person under the well-operator’s well examination scheme. See the Oil & Gas UK Guidelines for well-
operators on well examination [Ref 26].

The adequacy of the equipment owner’s maintenance and testing arrangements should be reviewed by
the well-operator. See API S53 [Ref 39] where applicable.
For offshore operations, all well control equipment should be considered SECE under SCR 2015. They
should have an independent review under the installation verification scheme. See Step Change in
Safety: Assurance & verification guidance suite [Ref 32].
4.9.4 Well control procedures
The company responsible for managing the well control equipment (e.g. the drilling contractor’s rig BOP
on a mobile rig) should provide the well control procedures for using that equipment.
The well-operator should review these procedures. This will be part of the procedures to align the well-
operator and contractor’s Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS). There should be an
interface document between the two systems.
It is the responsibility of both the well-operator (under Regulation 13, DCR, and Regulation 9(1) and
Schedule 2 of BSOR) and the installation duty holder (Regulation 21, DCR) to ensure that rig site
personnel directly involved in well control have:
• Clear responsibilities
• Clear procedures to follow to prevent well control incidents
• Clear procedures to identify/manage incidents – particularly initial response
• Sufficient competence to fulfil their responsibilities and carry out the procedures
Offshore, the installation duty holder should ensure that well control procedures are available,
appropriate and understood by all relevant parties on the installation. The parties should have the
relevant competencies and training to carry out the procedures.
Equipment and systems should be put in place, and responsibilities assigned, such that well behaviour
is continuously monitored at surface to the extent necessary to identify any unplanned movement of
fluids.
The driller, or other appointed person (e.g. coiled tubing operator), has the authority to shut the well
in, if they consider it necessary, without authorisation from anyone else. This should be formally noted
in operations plans and emphasised in conversations with site management personnel (e.g. drilling
supervisor, toolpusher and Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)).
The well control procedure should include drills and exercises covering all phases of the operations to
ensure the team understand their responsibilities. It is important that immediate responses are carried
out quickly and correctly and that these are recorded accordingly.
The drills and exercises should cover reasonably foreseeable situations and non-standard situations. The
latter could include:
• Power system loss

• Kick without pipe in the hole, etc
For some well operations specific additional training may be required.

4.9.5 Tertiary well control
If secondary well control fails there may be an unplanned release of fluids from the well, i.e. a blowout.
People, equipment and procedures to regain control of the well are outside the scope of these
guidelines. Refer to O&GUK Guidelines on relief well planning for offshore wells [Ref 29].
4.10 Management of change

Well-operators should have an MoC procedure covering wells and well operations throughout the full
life cycle from initial design to final abandonment.
Duty holders should design their procedures to suit their methods of working but all MoC systems
should have:
• Definitions of changes that need to go through the MoC procedure

• Levels of approval for different levels of changes
Changes to well integrity, the pressure containment boundary or well barriers should go through the
MoC process. For example, rig ups for annulus bleed down should be subject to management of change
that includes addressing any HP/LP interfaces e.g. between the annulus and a closed drain system
4.10.1 General
There are likely to be deviations from well operations programmes due to uncertainties in the
subsurface environment, or problems encountered during operations. The well-operator should have
an MoC policy and procedures to define what needs to be done in the event of these deviations.
Minor changes to the well operations programme should be discussed at the rigsite and agreed with
the off-site supervisor (e.g. drilling superintendent). This may be done by a specific call or at a regular
operations meeting/morning call. Minor programme changes should be recorded in the daily reports.
These minor changes do not affect the final well status, for example:
• Change in running order of the bottomhole assembly (BHA)

• Formation top high but within the error band given by subsurface team
• Function testing of a downhole tool before running in the hole
A vital part of well operations is recognising when a significant change has occurred. The well basis of
design and operations (drilling) programme should include the definition of a significant change. In some
cases, this may be done by giving a range for important values (e.g. 13-3/8” casing to be set at 5,800
feet +/- 300 feet).
In this example, if the casing setting depth was changed to <5,500 feet or >6,100 feet it would be classed
as a significant change, and therefore need to go through the well-operator’s MoC procedure.
4.10.2 Design MoC
A significant change would be any alteration to design that results in a change to:

• Primary control of the well (fluid type/weights, pore pressure prediction)
• Well duty (exploration to development, injection or gas lift)
• Well barriers (casing or tubing design)
• Well control equipment (rig BOP, DHSV, etc)
4.10.3 Equipment MoC
A significant change would be:
- Any proposed use outside the equipment’s certified design or operating envelope
- Design change to equipment designed to a recognised standard or code
- Any design change in equipment that is part of the well pressure boundary
4.10.4 Programme/procedure MoC
A significant change would be:
• Any alteration that results in a significant change to an approved well operations programme,
or regulatory notification
• Any alteration that results in a change to an approved standard or procedure
• Any alteration that may result in a significant change to the risk profile and require additional
control measures
4.10.5 Personnel MoC
Any change to the personnel team in a safety critical role should be reviewed under the MoC
procedures.
4.10.6 Change request and approval
The programme change should be written out as an amendment to the approved programme. The
originators of the amendment may be either the well engineers who wrote the original programme or
operational, rigsite personnel.
Changes to the well or well programme should be assessed to ensure that risk of unplanned release of
well fluids remains ALARP. Risk assessment of altered downhole hazards needs to be carried out to
ensure the new plan meets ALARP criteria.
Significant changes should be reviewed and approved to at least the same authority level as the original
programme.
Well-operators should consider specific approvals by a technical authority (or equivalent title) outside
the line management of the operations team, as well as review by installation duty holder.
The well-examiner should be informed of significant changes and be copied on the change request.
There should be enough time for the well-examiner to comment before the operations are started (or
restarted).

4.10.7 ‘Material changes’ to be notified to the Competent Authority
‘Material changes’ should be reported to the OSDR as required by SCR 2015 [Ref 3] and to the HSE as
required by BSOR [Ref 11]. The requirements are described in Section 2 of these guidelines.

5 Well Design and Operations Planning
5.1 Risk identification and assessment – the ALARP principle

The primary responsibility for identifying, assessing and mitigating well hazards rests with the well-
operator.
The well-operator should ensure that the personnel assigned to the well design and operations planning
are competent.
The first step for well design should be the assessment of subsurface conditions and identification of
potential hazards.
Identified risks should be recorded (e.g. in a risk register) and any actions required to reduce the residual
risk to ALARP tracked to closure.
Making sure a risk has been reduced to ALARP is about weighing the risk against the sacrifice needed to
further reduce it. The decision is weighted in favour of health and safety because the presumption is that
the duty-holder should implement the risk reduction measure. To avoid having to make this sacrifice, the
duty-holder must be able to show that it would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk
reduction that would be achieved. Thus, the process is not one of balancing the costs and benefits of
measures but, rather, of adopting measures except where they are ruled out because they involve grossly
disproportionate sacrifices.
ALARP at a glance [Ref 16].
Environmental, as well as health and safety hazards should be considered during well design and
planning.
The risks and measures to reduce them to ALARP should be discussed with supervisors, and outside
experts as needed, during the design process.
5.1.1 Review
The draft well design (basis of design) should be reviewed. The reviewers may be other well engineers
in the same company, but not involved in the design, partner personnel, service company specialists,
drilling contractors and/or external experts.
From a Well Integrity viewpoint, the objectives of this review include:
• Substantiate the well integrity aspects of the well design,

• Validate the pore pressure /fracture gradient estimate,
• Review and endorse the well integrity related aspects of the planned operations.
5.2 Risk Assessments

Formal risk assessment, Hazard Identification Studies (HAZIDs) and/or Hazard and Operability Studies
(HAZOPs) should be carried out during the well design and planning process. These may be both:

• A further challenge to the design, assumptions and operations planning
• A demonstration that risks have been identified and reduced to ALARP
Risk assessments should be suitable and sufficient. They should include an assessment of conditions
below ground and other well hazards. Well-operators should update their risk assessment after
acquiring new data.
Further information on risk assessments and risk management may be found in References 36, and 79.
5.2.1 Assessment of subsurface conditions
The well design should consider an assessment of subsurface conditions so that the hazards contained
within the geological strata and fluids are properly assessed.
The assessment team should be multi-discipline (e.g. geologists, geophysicists, reservoir and drilling
engineers).
For well integrity purposes, the assessment should include:
• Purpose of the well (e.g. exploration, appraisal, development, gas storage)

• A full geological prognosis
• Depths and formation type of potential hydrocarbon-bearing zones
• Type of hydrocarbons expected (e.g. oil or gas)
• Potential for other hazardous fluids (e.g. H2S or CO2)
• Potential hazardous formations (e.g. salt or reactive clays)
• Estimate of potential overpressure (depth and intensity)
• Estimate of temperature gradient in the well
• Estimate of fracture gradient and potential lost circulation zones
• Shallow hazard assessment (gas + shallow water flows)
• Potential for natural or induced seismic events (e.g. fault slip), particularly onshore
• For gas storage wells, consideration of the alternating injection and production pressures.
Inputs to the assessment should include:
• Output from seismic surveys and interpretations

• ‘Deep’ (exploration) seismic
• ‘Shallow’ (site survey) seismic
• Geological review of the basin, area and well
• Review of offset wells
• The proximity of operating wells at the reservoir interval and the pressure regime when drilling
into the reservoir.
The assessment should take account of the anticipated full well life cycle, including:
• Potential for pressure increase in later field life due to injection or fracturing
• Formation movement due to injection or depletion
• Well movement caused by thermal growth or contraction, and mechanical movement e.g. due
to wave action
• Long term changes to reservoir pressure

• Increasing water cut
• Reservoir souring (and effect on tubulars)
• Change of well purpose (e.g. from producer to injector)
• Implementation and impact of cuttings re-injection (CRI)
• The potential for field subsidence
The statement of subsurface hazards should provide the wells team with information in a form that they
can use to enhance the well planning process. The range of potential outcomes should be provided
together with most likely outcomes in quantitative terms such that both a base case and contingencies
can be part of the well design process.
There may be significant ranges on both pore and fracture pressure predictions. Subject to the guidance
on maximum pore pressure in Section 5.3.1 the well should be designed based on the most likely
outcome with contingencies, commensurate with the risks, to address the range of potential outcomes.
5.2.2 Aquifers
Aquifers which require specific isolation should be identified by considering:
• Fluid content (fresh water, brine etc.)

• Formation pressure
• Depth
• Current or potential domestic usage
• Specific, local, regulatory requirements
5.2.3 Presentation of subsurface assessment
The results of the assessment should be included in an approved document and presented directly to
the well design personnel at a meeting to allow discussion.
Any significant changes to the assessment of subsurface conditions (either in the planning or operations
phases) should be identified. The changes should be formally brought to the attention of the well design
or operations team via the MoC process.
5.2.4 Assessment of other well hazards
All available data sources should be reviewed to identify well hazards including:
• Offset wells reports (for well hazards and operations problems)

• Site survey (for seabed conditions)
• Metocean reports (weather and environmental conditions)
• Platform or project HAZIDs/HAZOPs for relevant wells
The results of these hazard assessments should be recorded and considered during well design. The
record may be in the form of a risk register, which may also note mitigation and closeout of items.
For re-entry or sidetrack wells, the records of the existing well (e.g. construction, operation,
intervention, suspension) should be reviewed.

5.2.5 Well examination
An independent check should be carried out by an independent and competent person under the well
examination scheme. See Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].
5.3 Well design

The process should start with a definition of the type of well being designed. The types include:
• Exploration
• Appraisal
• Development (e.g. production, injection, CRI)
• Combination (e.g. water injection with CRI)
• Gas storage
Well-operators should have their own process for designing wells which should include the following
steps (Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5). These steps may be in another order and different terms may be used.
5.3.1 Estimate of maximum pressure
The subsurface assessments should predict a maximum downhole pressure at a given depth. A range of
uncertainty may be provided. If data is limited, the estimate should err on the side of caution.
From this value a maximum wellhead pressure is calculated. If detailed data is not available, worst case
assumptions should be used, e.g. that the hole is filled with the lightest possible fluid. Typically, 0.1 psi/ft
is used.
The maximum estimated wellhead pressure will be used to define the pressure rating of equipment
(wellhead and production casing) and well control equipment.
The regulations do not distinguish between High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT) and ‘standard’
wells. The duty is to identify the hazards and design the well accordingly. Well-operators may categorise
some wells as HPHT and have specific design and operations procedures if they wish. HPHT well
guidance is provided by the Energy Institute model codes of safe practice Part 17 Volume 1 [Ref 60, 61
and 62].
Casing setting depths and sizes (sometimes called well architecture) are the starting point of well design.
This defines how the pressure containment boundary is installed downhole by cementing casing in place
to ensure integrity during the well construction and throughout its life cycle.
5.3.2 Conductor
The conductor cases off the shallow, often unstable, formations. Depending on the specific application,
a conductor may also provide structural support. Onshore the conductor and/or surface casing may be
used for aquifer isolation. When aquifer isolation is required the well-operator should ensure that the
conductor, and/or surface casing, and associated cementation are designed to achieve aquifer isolation.
The risk of fluid broaching to the seabed (or surface on a land well) outside the conductor should be
reduced to ALARP. Figure 3 shows typical arrangements.

Design of the conductor / surface casing requires structural and well design input, to decide the pipe
size, wall thickness, connection type, material, centralisation and cementation that satisfies the
requirements for fluid retention/isolation and structural loading, including bending and cyclic loads. On
land wells, connection to the cellar should also be considered. The design should be suitable for the full
well lifecycle, for all structural and fluid/pressure retention potential load cases that can be envisaged.
For subsea wells this includes structural loading from the riser during drilling and snagging loads from
trawling and other offset forces. An estimate of the maximum bending load provides input to the
calculation of the required diameter, length and wall thickness of the top conductor joint.
The criticality of load sharing between the conductor and surface casing should be understood.
The suitability of the connectors to withstand all life cycle loads should be reviewed. ‘Quick connect’
types should have a means of confirming they are fully made up and locked.
The potential for long-term corrosion of the conductor and surface casings from external environmental
influences should be considered. The method of protection should be defined.
There are several methods of installing conductors including driving, auguring, drilling in, jetting and
cementing in a drilled hole. For a drilled hole the top of the cement in the annulus should be brought
back to the seabed (or surface on a land well). The well design should specify a minimum acceptable
depth below the seabed for the cement top. Specific techniques for verification of Top of Cement (TOC)
and cement top-up may be considered during well planning.
Reference may be made to the Energy Institute Guidelines for Routine and Non-Routine Subsea
Operations from Floating Vessels [Ref 64] and Guidelines for the Analysis of Jack-up and Fixed Platform
Well Conductor Systems [Ref 65].
The basis of design should be used by structural and well engineers to define the requirements for
ongoing maintenance and monitoring. Fluid content changes in the annulus together with mechanical
degradation could impact the ability of the conductor / surface casing to maintain structural integrity.
Typically, a conductor or surface casing will hold the full well loading throughout the well lifecycle, and
its condition should be known.
Information from monitoring routines should be used to re-assess the ability of the conductor and
surface casing to sustain the anticipated loads. Also see Section 10.1.6.
5.3.3 Surface casing
For the purposes of these guidelines the surface casing is assumed to be attached to the high-pressure
wellhead. The rig BOP or xmas tree is installed on the wellhead, forming the first part of the pressure
containment boundary. It may provide structural support to the BOP and xmas tree.
The high-pressure wellhead should be locked into the low-pressure wellhead on subsea wells to
maximise wellhead stability for the life of the well.
Surface casing should be set above any predicted hydrocarbon traps or where there is a risk of high-
pressure water flows. This should take account of significant anomalies identified by the shallow seismic
review.

If the well-operator decides to set surface casing below a potential shallow gas horizon then suitable
precautions should be taken. Precautions may include drilling a pilot hole through the potential shallow
gas horizon whilst ensuring that procedures to deal with any flow are in place and understood. These
procedures may include the following:
• Pumping mud at maximum rate

• Continuous Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) bubble watch at the seabed
• Continuous monitoring of the sea surface for any indications of gas
• Dropping the drill string and moving off location
The predicted fracture gradient should then be considered, with any potential hole problems identified
from offset wells or by the subsurface team.
The surface casing is set at a depth where formation strength is adequate to allow a workable kick
tolerance in the next hole section.
The potential for long-term corrosion of the conductor and surface casings from external environmental
influences should be considered. The method of protection should be defined.
The criticality of load sharing between the conductor and surface casing should be understood.
5.3.4 Intermediate casings
The number and setting depths of intermediate casings will depend on a review of the subsurface
hazards and the predicted fracture pressure and pore pressure in the formations between the surface
casing depth and the production casing setting depth.
5.3.5 Production casing
This is the innermost casing at the wellhead and is part of the pressure containment boundary. It should
be designed for the highest internal pressure load.
It may be set across the reservoir at Total Depth (TD) or the casing shoe may be set above the reservoir.
If drilling is carried out after setting the casing, casing wear should be considered.
Since the production tubing may leak, design of the production casing should recognise the potential
for exposure to reservoir fluids.
If the production casing may be exposed to erosion and corrosion this should be considered during the
design.
The potential for production casing hanger seal movement when exposed to anticipated loads
throughout the well lifecycle, and the implications for well integrity, should be assessed. The production
casing hanger should be locked into the high-pressure wellhead if calculations indicate this is necessary
to ensure the seals stay in position for the life of the well.

Figure 3. Well diagrams showing conductor and surface casing
5.4 Casing design
5.4.1 General
Casing should be specified, manufactured, inspected and tested to the appropriate standard e.g. [Ref
70, 71 and 76].
All components of the casing string, including connections, circulation devices and landing string, should
be subject to load case verification. The worst case (that is lowest) physical properties should be used
in calculations. The weakest points in the string with regards to burst, collapse and tensile strength
rating should be clearly identified.

Casings should be designed to withstand the worst conditions of burst, collapse, tensile and tri-axial
loadings during the full life cycle of the wells and for any reasonably foreseeable well operations, with
adequate allowance for deterioration in service including wear, corrosion and erosion.
For through tubing drilling operations, the tubing and accessories should be reclassified to casing and
reassessed against drilling loads.
5.4.2 Design basis, premises and assumptions
The design process should include the following:
• Planned well trajectory, bending stresses from doglegs and hole curvature
• Maximum allowable setting depth with regards to kick margin
• Estimated pore pressure development
• Estimated formation strength
• Estimated temperature gradient
• Drilling fluids and cement programme
• Loads induced by well services and operations
• Completion design requirements
• Estimated casing wear
• Setting depth restrictions due to formation evaluation requirements
• Potential for H2S and/or CO2
• Metallurgical considerations
• Annulus pressure build up
• Well abandonment requirements
• Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD) and surge/swab effects due to narrow annulus clearances
• Isolation of weak formation, potential loss zones, sloughing and caving formations
• Protection of reservoirs
• Protection of aquifers
• Geotectonic forces if applicable
• Cyclic forces on gas storage wells
• Any other requirements that may influence casing string loads or service life
Normally, rupture disks should not be included in a casing string.
In certain circumstances, the well-operator may decide that rupture disks may be included in a casing
design (e.g. to reduce the risk of casing collapse due to annulus pressure build-up). The reduction in
strength of the casing string should be fully assessed and mitigation put in place to ensure risks are
ALARP.
Data from previous wells in the area or similar wells should be evaluated to determine additional design
requirements.
5.4.3 Load cases
When designing for burst, collapse and axial loads, the following load cases may be considered:
• Gas kick

• Gas-filled or evacuated casing
• Production or injection tubing leaks
• Cementing operations
• Pressure testing casing
• Thermal expansion or contraction of fluid in enclosed annuli
• Dynamic loads from running of casing, including overpull to free stuck casing
• Squeezing by plastic salt
• Well kill loads, (e.g. bullheading)
• Life of well operations (e.g. fracture, perforation, stimulation)
• Cyclic forces on gas storage wells
This list is not comprehensive. All load cases for the planned activity, plus possible changes in design
loads and stresses during the life cycle of the well, should be assessed.
The assumptions and load cases used in the well design should be explicit and clearly stated in the well
basis of design document.
5.4.4 Casing design factors
Stress design or stress verification programs may be used to demonstrate the presence of appropriate
design factors. Minimum design factors (for burst, collapse and axial loads) should be greater than the
load induced stress/capacity. The well-operator would normally have approved internal design factors.
Table 5 illustrates typical design factors which may be used [from Ref 110].
Burst 1.1
Collapse 1.1
Tension (stuck pipe, cementing and pressure testing) 1.25
Tri-axial stress 1.25
Table 5. Typical design factors from Ref 110
5.5 Cement design

Conductors and surface casings should be designed to be cemented (where not driven or jetted) back
to surface or the seabed.
If the structural integrity of the conductor needs the TOC to be at a specific height, a means of carrying
out a top up job to achieve this should be included in the planning.
Casings below the surface casing should be cemented back into the previous casing unless:
• It would preclude a subsequent sidetrack

• In a subsea production well where the annulus cannot be bled down to relieve overpressure
caused by thermal expansion of trapped fluid during production

• The section is too long to be fully cemented
• To prevent losses or breakdown of weak formations exposed in the annulus
• It is planned to reinject cuttings down the annulus
If the cement is not brought back into the previous casing, there should be at least 1,000 feet (300
metres) Measured Depth (MD) of cement above the shallowest hydrocarbon interval, if the top is
calculated indirectly (displacement pressures and volumes). This 1,000-foot column is considered
adequate for two permanent barriers or a combination permanent barrier for the eventual
abandonment of the wellbore. See Oil & Gas UK Well Decommissioning Guidelines [Ref 24].
If the height of cement in the annulus is planned to be verified by direct measurement (sonic logs, etc)
this height may be reduced.
If the design height is not achieved, then consideration should be given to any necessary remedial
action.
For high inclination or horizontal wells, the vertical height of the top of the cement above a hydrocarbon
zone, should be considered.
Where reasonably practicable, non-hydrocarbon-bearing permeable formations should be sealed by

cement in the annulus to reduce the risk of flow outside the casing and potential corrosion, or flow from
one formation into another.
The density of the slurry and spacer should be designed so that the well remains overbalanced
throughout the cementing operation. The density and planned height of the cement should be designed
so that the formation is not fractured during cementing.
The cement job should be designed to:
• Prevent influx whilst the cement is setting

• Provide compressive strength as quickly as possible in the context of the application
• Provide a long-term (permanent) barrier to flow in the annulus
5.5.1 Factors to be considered in annulus cementing
The most important factor is to completely fill the annulus around the casing with cement from the
shoe, to a high enough level to provide the required barrier.
The following should be considered:
• Preventing over-gauge hole sections forming during drilling

• Centralising the casing. The pipe should be held off the hole walls to ensure a complete sheath
of cement around the pipe
• Mud displacement by prejob circulation, spacer and lead cement slurry
It is also important to place uncontaminated cement around the shoe, and to avoid any contamination
from mud during the cementing and displacement operations.
Bottoms up should be circulated after running casing to ensure there is no gas in the well.

The cement placement/displacement method should be chosen to provide the most reliable means for
placing uncontaminated cement to the right place. This is likely to be the dual plug method for smaller
(≤ 13-3/8 inch) casings.
Normally float valves should not be locked open when the casing is being run in the hole.
In certain circumstances, the well-operator may decide that self-fill equipment may be used. The
following should be considered:
• Risk of influx up the casing while running and mitigation

• Contingency if floats do not convert when needed
• Contingency if floats convert unexpectedly
• Potential problems if cuttings or junk enters the shoe track
• Advantages of the float shoe and collar being separated by several joints
The shoe track should be a big enough volume to contain all cement contaminated by mud displaced
from the casing by the top plug. As a minimum, assuming range 3 pipe, this should be two joints for
large (≥ 13-3/8 inch) diameter casing and at least three joints for smaller inside diameter (ID), but
longer, casing strings.
There should be accurate displacement calculations to prevent cement being pumped out of the shoe
track in the event of the plug not bumping. There should be clear instructions in the operations
procedures on what to do if the plug does not bump.
Cement jobs should be designed to achieve a greater hydrostatic pressure in the annulus than in the
casing at the end of the operation, to reduce the risk of over displacement of cement.
The cement slurry design may include specific additives to improve integrity:
• Gas migration control

• Fibrous material for greater toughness
• Silica for improved performance at high temperature
Where possible, for liner cementing, the liner should be rotated while placing the cement.
Advice on testing cement slurries may be found in API 10 series [Ref 42].
5.5.2 Considerations for inner string cementing
The internal height of cement left above the shoe should be considered and specified when the inner
string/stab-in float shoe methods are used. This should be a volume large enough to ensure
uncontaminated cement around the outside of the shoe.
The potential impact of annulus bridging on casing collapse should be considered when inner string
cementing. The severity of this risk increases with longer/deeper casing.

5.6 Materials for wells
The metallurgy, manufacture, inspection and testing of well tangibles should be selected with due
consideration for the possible presence in wellbore fluids of corrosive elements such as H2S and/or CO2
e.g. [Ref 71].
The effects of corrosive fluids on non-metallic materials should also be considered.
All materials should be designed, manufactured, and supplied to an applicable standard (e.g. API, ISO,
etc). If a standard does not exist, the well-operator should define their own standards, based on the
requirements necessary to assure suitability for the well, along with appropriate implementation of
quality assurance processes.
For all material supplied for the well, whether by the well-operator, rig contractor or service companies,
the well-operator should assure itself of the suitability of the material.
The specification of any replacement part, component or assembly within the pressure containment
boundary should be carefully considered to ensure that they match, or exceed, the design criteria or
relevant standard throughout the life cycle of the well.
5.6.1 Wellhead equipment
Wellhead equipment should be manufactured, inspected and tested to the appropriate standard e.g.
[Ref 40 and 72].
Within each standard, the well designer should assess the service environment against the performance
option, for example in references 40 and 72:
• PSL3G for gas testing trees

• PR2 for HPHT applications
5.7 Designing a well for primary control
5.7.1 Overbalanced drilling and operations
Designing a well for primary control has two elements:
• Predicting the mud weight window based on the pore pressure and fracture gradient at all
depths through the drilling phase of the well
• Ensuring the hole is kept full of drilling mud of the correct weight
5.7.2 Pore pressure prediction
Part of the assessment of subsurface conditions (see Section 5.2.1) should include an estimate of the
potential overpressure in the well. For exploration wells in a new area, this will be based on seismic
interpretation and geological review of the basin. In drilled areas, there should also be an offset wells
review for mud weights, log data and any kicks or well control problems.

For development wells, note should be taken of any injection operations as these may raise pressures
in the injection zones. Reservoir engineering input is required for assessment.
The prediction should describe the estimated start depth of the overpressure, any specific seals, and
any pressure ‘ramps’ (rapid increases in overpressure).
5.7.3 Maintaining overbalance
The well design should state mud weights for each hole section. The recommendation should consider
pore, sand fracture, shale fracture and overburden pressures. The uncertainties associated with the
prediction should be documented.
5.7.4 Safety margin on mud weight
For overbalanced drilling, the mud weight should be high enough to prevent flow when there is no
circulation. Well-operators should plan to use a higher mud weight as a safety factor (either riser margin
or trip margin) as described below.
5.7.4.1 Trip/safety margin
A trip (or safety) margin should be used to ensure that the hydrostatic pressure in the hole stays above
the pore pressure. This margin may be expressed as pressure (e.g. 200 psi at the bottom of the hole) or
a density/weight (e.g. Specific Gravity (SG) of 0.1).
5.7.4.2 Riser margin for floating rigs
A riser margin is a specific safety factor (based on the loss of hydrostatic head if the drilling riser is lost)
to keep the well overbalanced.
A riser margin should be included in the mud weight for floating rig operations if possible.
If it is not possible to have a riser margin, the well-operator should put in place alternative arrangements
to reduce the risk of a well flow if the riser is lost.
5.8 Formation integrity/kick tolerance
5.8.1 Background
The maximum mud weight used in a hole section will depend on the strength of formations exposed in
that section. If the bottomhole pressure is higher than the fracture strength of the formation, there will
be mud losses to the formation.
The basic well design (casing setting depths) is affected by the predictions of pore pressure and fracture
gradient. At each casing shoe the estimated fracture gradient at the shoe (leak off) is used to define a
maximum mud weight for the next hole section.
If primary well control is maintained, the rising pore pressure is matched by increasing the mud weight
until close to the leakoff. The next casing is planned to be set at this depth.

However, there may be a kick (primary well control is lost). Secondary well control operations always
lead to higher pressures in the well. As a kick is circulated out, the imposed pressure at the surface
(choke pressure) compensates for the lower density of the oil or gas in the influx. This additional
pressure may cause lost circulation.
5.8.2 Leak Off Test / Formation Integrity Test
The well design should include taking Leak Off Tests (LOT) after drilling out the surface and deeper casing
shoes. This provides a measure of the maximum pressure that the formation just under the shoe can
withstand when circulating out a kick; the highest imposed pressure relative to rock strength is usually
just below the shoe. It also serves to confirm the integrity of the cement at the casing shoe.
Current understanding is that a correctly conducted LOT does not reduce the strength of clay or shale,
and so this is usually the preferred option. There may be formations deeper in the section that are
weaker than the casing shoe (e.g. fractured limestone below a shoe set in clay).
In a known area, or where the formation strength is high compared to the maximum planned mud
weight for the section, a FIT may be done. A FIT raises the internal pressure to a specified level without
initiating leakoff.
5.8.3 Kick tolerance
Kick Tolerance is an estimate of the largest volume of influx (at a given intensity) that can be circulated
out of the well without fracturing the formations below the shoe. This value is used to calculate the
maximum length of section that can be drilled before setting another string of casing.
Unless the risk of gas in the next hole section is negligible, the kick fluid should be modelled as dry gas
at a hydrostatic gradient of 0.1 psi/ft. Alternatively the kick fluid may be modelled as oil, brine or water
if such fluids are predicted to a high degree of confidence.
The assumed kick intensity should, in areas with a known pore pressure gradient, be equivalent to the
predicted pore pressure gradient plus an appropriate safety margin. If the pore pressure gradient in the
next hole section is unknown, or carries significant uncertainty, the assumed kick intensity should be
equal to the maximum proposed mud weight for the section plus an appropriate safety margin.
For kick tolerance modelling purposes, it should be assumed that the influx occurs while drilling at
planned TD in the next hole section.
Kick tolerance calculations should take account of the expansion of gas when circulating out the kick
under constant bottom hole pressure conditions, and should consider two possible cases for maximum
pressure at the casing shoe:
• When the kick is taken on bottom and is opposite the drill collars
• When the top of the gas bubble has been circulated to the casing shoe
The well-operator should state the maximum estimated kick volume that can be accepted for each hole
section.

During well design several assumptions are made for this calculation. The kick tolerance estimate should
be recalculated when the actual casing depth and LOT/FIT values are known. The values should then be
recalculated in response to changes in significant factors such as the mud weight in use.
If the recalculated kick tolerance is less than the well-operator’s stated minimum, then a formal risk
assessment should be done. This should include consideration of:
• Likelihood of an influx
• nature of the influx
• potential “worst-case” scenario
• ability to detect the influx rapidly
• speed with which the well can be shut-in
• ability to circulate out the influx
• rig type
It should be noted that the weakest part of the well may not be just below the shoe. Well-operators
may wish to calculate the kick tolerance based on an estimate or measurement of the open hole weak
point.
5.9 Design for suspension of operations, plugging and abandonment

The well-operator shall ensure that a well is so designed and constructed that, so far as is reasonably
practicable:
It can be suspended or abandoned in a safe manner
After its suspension or abandonment there can be no unplanned escape of fluids from it or from the
reservoir to which it led
Regulation 15, DCR
See Oil & Gas UK Well Decommissioning Guidelines [Ref 24].
5.10 Well path and anti-collision

A hazard for some wells is drilling into another well. For new wells and sidetracks close to existing wells,
or future planned wells, an important part of the design is the well path. This should be designed to
minimise the risk of collision with both existing wells and future planned well profiles.
The well-operator should work closely with a directional drilling and surveying specialist to design a well
for:
• Minimum risk of collision

• Reducing the well location uncertainty so a relief well can intersect the well if necessary [Ref
29]
The well-operator should have a documented system for managing well trajectory information with:
• Surface coordinates, slot details, trajectory details and their respective uncertainties

• Survey redundancy (overlap)
• Quality Assurance (QA) / Quality Control (QC) of survey procedures and data to ensure the
accuracy of the data and the avoidance of material error
Accurate and up to date information should be maintained for all wells, including: wells being drilled,
completed wells, during suspension of well operations and for plugged and abandoned wells – including
sidetracks.
The well-operator should record the location of any abandoned radioactive sources in its wells and the
position of any radioactive pip-tags installed during the well construction.
Surveying techniques that do not rely on magnetism should be considered where wells being drilled
may be affected by magnetic materials (e.g. steel) in other wells.
The well-operator should use a model for quantifying well bore positioning uncertainty. The probability
of the well being drilled being within the ellipse of uncertainty of an existing well should be <5%. The
Industry Steering Committee for Wellbore Surveying Accuracy (ISCWSA) has established models which
may be used for this purpose.
Before drilling, the likelihood of a well to well collision should be analysed to confirm if this is a significant
risk. This should be analysed by:
• Verifying the existence of wells within a reasonable vicinity of the well to be drilled
• Performing a scan to confirm the proximity of the well to be drilled with all respective offset or
adjacent wells (e.g. centre to centre, or sidewall to sidewall distance)
• Verifying the relative positional uncertainty of the well to be drilled with the offset wells.
Separation Factor (SF) or similar techniques may be used to quantify this as a ratio of the
distance between the two wells divided by the combined positional uncertainty of those two
wells.
• Considering whether a collision poses a risk e.g. an isolated pilot hole may be of no concern.
Clear metrics (side wall to side wall distance and separation factor) should be established with respect
to these criteria which trigger the requirement to manage the collision risk to an acceptable level.
If the likelihood of a collision is deemed as unacceptable then the following precautions may be
considered:
• Re-plan the well trajectory with an anti-collision nudge to increase the distance from respective
offset wells to an acceptable level
• Stipulate a stopping point during drilling, if a certain well collision risk becomes unacceptably
high (e.g. SF <1)
• Improve the survey accuracy of the well to be drilled
• Improve the survey accuracy of respective adjacent wells, possibly by re-surveying said wells
In high risk cases, magnetic or other physical ranging techniques may be considered.
To mitigate against a collision the following actions should be considered:
• Control the drilling parameters

• Monitor changes in drilling parameters for indication of drilling into a well

• Monitor returns for cement or casing swarf in mud returns
• Change annulus pressure in completed wells e.g. depressurise, cease gas lift, or stop cuttings
reinjection.
• Monitor the offset wellheads for noise and vibration. A stethoscope may be used
• Utilise a less aggressive drilling assembly
• In high risk cases, adjacent wells may need to be plugged
• Monitor annuli pressures. In particular the first annulus likely to be intersected. Note: this may
require applying positive pressure on the annulus.
• In fields with water or gas injection, including gas storage fields, shutdown injection on selected
wells and monitor wellhead pressures.
If there are any indications of collision with an adjacent well, drilling should be stopped immediately,
the potential collision investigated, and action taken as required to ensure that life cycle well integrity
of the impacted wells is maintained.
5.11 Relief well considerations

The requirements of a relief well should be considered during the well design. This forms part of the
OPEP required by OPRC [Ref 90].
The Oil & Gas UK Guidelines on Relief Well Planning for Offshore Wells [Ref 29] should be consulted.
A relief well may be needed if:
• Primary well control fails

• Secondary well control fails leading to a blowout
• Tertiary well control is unsuccessful, unavailable or unable to be used to effect a well kill, re-
entry and recovery of the blowing well
Wells with a long open hole section below surface or intermediate casing, might pose problems for relief
well drilling, especially if the section is through a potential reservoir. Furthermore, a shallow casing shoe
may make a relief well kill more difficult.
5.12 Dispensation / deviation during design

Well-operators should have a system for designing wells that includes a dispensation/deviation policy.
This system should specify who is responsible for reviewing and approving dispensation/deviation.
If a well design does not comply with the well-operator’s internal or other relevant industry standards,
specific dispensation should be sought. This application should:
• Describe the dispensation requested

• Specify the well operation to which the dispensation applies, or the start date and length of
time the dispensation will be in force, whichever is more appropriate
• Justify why it does not comply with standard
• Describe the risk mitigating measures to be taken

After the request has been reviewed it should be submitted for formal approval. Where appropriate,
this may require a competent person out-with the well planning team (e.g. technical authority, QHSE
manager or managing director of the well-operator) and a senior representative of the installation duty
holder (drilling contractor for a mobile rig).
Dispensations should be reviewed by the well examiner under the well-operator’s well examination
scheme.
The dispensation should be closed out when it is no longer required.
5.13 Well operations planning
5.13.1 General
The planning phase of the well lasts from approval of the well design until operations start. It includes
equipment specification, procurement, contracting and detailed operations planning.
5.13.2 Equipment procurement
All equipment and material should be specified, manufactured, inspected and tested to the appropriate
standards, with appropriate quality assurance, to ensure that it is fit for the intended purpose over the
full well life cycle.
5.13.3 Rig contracting for mobile drilling units
The suitability (pressure rating, etc) of the well control equipment supplied by the rig owner should be
assessed by the well-operator as part of the contracting process. An independent inspection/audit of
the equipment may be carried out.
The installation owner’s SEMS should be reviewed, and a bridging document issued to align this with
the well-operator’s SEMS. The installation owner’s well control procedures should be reviewed.
A full well life cycle wellhead bending analysis and riser analysis, which covers local environmental
conditions, should be available for floating operations. This analysis should take account of wellhead
stickup. Limits for the allowable wellhead angle should be set that are applicable to the equipment in
use. A full well life cycle riser stress analysis and conductor analysis, which cover local environmental
conditions, should be available for bottom supported offshore operations.
5.13.4 Service Company – well control equipment
The well-operator should assess the suitability of any well control equipment to be provided by a service
company. For offshore wells, this information should be provided to the installation owner or operator
to comply with their verification scheme for SECEs.
See Step Change in Safety: Assurance & verification guidance suite [Ref 32].

5.13.5 Information, instruction and training
The detailed operations programme (e.g. drilling, completion, intervention) should describe in detail
how the well objectives will be achieved while keeping risks ALARP.
For well integrity, the planning should concentrate on:
• Maintaining primary control of the well during all operations,

• Installation, removal, testing and monitoring of barriers during all operations.
Drilling contractor and service company personnel should be involved in the detailed planning, both to
take advantage of their specialist knowledge and to encourage ‘ownership’ of the finished programme.
The operations programme should be accepted by a representative of the installation duty holder, or
site operator, as they have the primary responsibility for safety on the installation or borehole site.
Drilling contractor and service company personnel should attend risk assessments, drill (or test,
complete or intervene) the Well on Paper (DWOP) and/or pre-spud meetings.
5.13.6 Site surveying for offshore wells
An adequate site survey should be carried out as soon as practicable after the well objectives and targets
have been agreed.
If shallow hazards are identified during the survey, the survey area may be increased, or the well location
moved to avoid these hazards.
The survey area should be large enough to cover potential relief well drilling locations.
Offshore drilling hazard site surveys should be conducted in accordance with the guidance contained
within IOGP Report No. 373-18-1 Guidelines for the conduct of offshore drilling hazard site surveys. [Ref
129]
Reference may also be made to the HSE guidance Jackup (self-elevating) installations: review and
location approval using desk-top risk assessments in lieu of undertaking site soils borings, Offshore
Information Sheet No 3/2008 [Ref 15].

6 Drilling
The drilling stage begins when rig operations start on a new well or a sidetrack. It ends when testing or
completion operations start, or when there is suspension of operations for an extended period, or well
abandonment is initiated.
Operations in this stage should be described by a drilling programme (the names of which will vary
between companies) produced by the well-operator.
The drilling programme should be supported by some or all of the following:
• Well-operator standing instructions or manuals (e.g. drilling manual)

• Specialist programmes provided by service companies (e.g. mud programme)
• Well control bridging document that clarifies control barriers and clarifies roles and
responsibilities and whose well control procedures are to be followed
• Drilling contractor manuals covering standard operational procedures (e.g. BOP running)
• Site or operation specific instructions (e.g. daily orders, section guidelines)
• An assessment of all subsurface risks that have been identified (see Section 5.2)
6.1 Primary control of the well/active barriers

The drilling programme should explain how primary control of the well will be maintained.
For overbalanced drilling, this means keeping the hole full of mud of a high enough weight to prevent
an influx. The role of the drilling team, with respect to integrity of the well, should be to:
• Monitor and predict the pore (formation) pressure in the well

• Measure the mud weight and maintain the specified weight
• Monitor and respond to gas levels (background, trip, connection)
• Check primary control with flow checks as needed
• Keep the hole correctly filled on all trips
• React immediately to suspected kicks by shutting-in the well
• Recognise and respond to lost circulation
• Ensure that there is always enough drilling fluid and weighting material available at the wellsite.
For operations that do not rely on overbalance, a mechanical active barrier is always needed to prevent
flow from the well. For Managed Pressure Drilling (MPD) / Under Balanced Operations (UBO) this is
usually a Rotating Control Device (RCD). The role of the well-operator, supported by equipment
specialists, is to provide appropriate planning, testing, regular inspection and preventative maintenance
for this equipment.
6.1.1 Pore Pressure monitoring
Direct checks on the pore pressure compared to the mud weight may be made by checking that the well
is not flowing. A flow could confirm that the pore pressure is more than the bottomhole pressure (if
there is a permeable zone exposed in the well).

The well should be monitored for flow whenever circulation stops during drilling (e.g. connection). The
active surface volume of mud, also known as the Pit Volume Total (PVT), should be monitored as well
as any flow indicators to check the well is not flowing.
Connection gas levels which increase with depth may be an important indicator of increasing pore
pressure compared to the bottomhole pressure.
Indications of an underbalanced well (with no permeable formation exposed) could include:
• Cavings (‘sloughing shale’) size (large) and shape (splintery)

• Tight hole (increased torque and drag when moving pipe)
• Hole fill after connections or trips
Logging tools may also be used to directly measure the formation pressure.
Pore pressure prediction while drilling means measuring the properties of the formations and plotting
them to identify normal compaction trends with depth and any deviations from this. Properties that
may be measured include:
• Drill rate, drilling exponent, DCS (mud logging)

• Gas reading, connection gas (mud logging)
• Sonic, density, resistivity, Measurement While Drilling (MWD) or wireline loggings
These predictions are based on the changing properties of clay rich sediments with depth. Clays are
deposited with high water content. With burial, the increasing weight of the overburden forces water
out of the sediments. With increasing depth, normally pressured sequences are denser and harder to
drill. This trend is reflected by sonic, density and resistivity logs. In these normally pressured conditions,
the pore pressure is equivalent to a seawater gradient. Where the adjacent geology prevents the
expulsion of water from the sediment and limits normal compaction, overburden stress creates over-
pressured zones with a pore pressure greater than a seawater gradient. As a result, the sub-compacted
sediments are easier to drill, are seen as less dense on sonic / density logs and less resistive to electricity
on resistivity logs. These are recognised by deviations from a depth based normal compaction trend.
6.1.2 Monitoring mud weight
Direct measurement of the returned mud weight (coming out of the hole) should be taken on a regular
basis by the drill crew and checked by the mud engineer, if available.
6.1.3 Reacting to lost circulation
Lost circulation is when mud (rather than filtrate) is lost to the formation, and is indicated by less mud
coming out of the hole than is being pumped in. If the hole stays full of fluid, this is only an operational
problem.
If the hole cannot be kept full of mud, it becomes a well integrity problem for overbalanced drilling,
because the active barrier cannot be adequately maintained or monitored.
No new formation should be drilled before the active barrier (keeping the hole full of mud) is reinstated
and can be maintained.

If a pipe is plugged by lost circulation material the well cannot be circulated. This may prevent the active
barrier (mud) being adequately maintained.
6.1.4 Loss/gain situation
In some situations, especially HPHT wells, it is difficult to know for certain if the hole is losing mud or
flowing. This is probably due to factors including:
• The narrow window between fracture gradient and pore pressure results in alternating losses
and gains.
• Thermal expansion or contraction and dynamic effects due to wellbore ballooning.
This potential situation should be considered when planning the well. Specific procedures should be put
in place to cover this situation and should be discussed at pre-start meetings or training (e.g. pre-spud
meetings or HAZIDs).
The rig should be set up to measure the volumes returning from the well (e.g. calibrated trip tank) as
accurately as needed.
There can also be a masking effect due to the expansion of gas. Small downhole volumes may expand
to large volumes at surface pressures. Long circulating periods may be needed to reduce gas levels at
surface, and to confirm there is no influx.
6.1.5 Roles and responsibilities for primary control of the well
The drilling supervisor should ensure that the relevant operations personnel are aware of their general
duties, and any specific responsibilities to maintain primary control of the well at all times. See Oil & Gas
UK Guidelines on competency of wells personnel [Ref 30].
The drilling contractor (informing the drilling supervisor) should:
• Monitor that the hole stays full of mud

• Measure and report drilling parameters (e.g. a drilling break) that might indicate pore pressure
increases
• React to and report increases or decreases in return mud flow
• React to and report lost circulation
• Monitor and report active mud volume
• Monitor and react to any flow at connections or flow checks and report actions
• Monitor correct hole fill during trips, and react to and report discrepancies
• Measure, record and report mud weight in and out
• Monitor and report any significant changes in hole conditions (torque, drag, etc)
• Monitor mud return flow rate
The mud loggers (informing both the driller and drilling supervisor) should:
• Monitor and record active mud volume (independently) and report discrepancies
• Monitor and record mud flow back at connections and report discrepancies
• Monitor, record and report lost circulation
• Monitor and record system pressure loss and report discrepancies;

• Measure, record and report drilling parameters (e.g. a drilling break) that might indicate pore
pressure increase
• Monitor and report gas readings (background, connection and trip gas)
• Immediately report significant changes in gas readings
• Monitor and record torque and drag, and report any significant changes
• Estimate and report pore pressure estimates and record trends
• Monitor and describe cuttings, record in mud log and report significant changes
The drilling fluid (mud) engineer (informing the driller and the drilling supervisor) should:
• Monitor mud properties and return flow for any abnormalities

• Co-ordinate the building and maintenance of the mud system
• Check and confirm all volumes of mud and chemicals on board
• Check and confirm calibration of mud balance
The MWD/logging engineer (informing drilling supervisor and wellsite geologist) should:
• Monitor factors that may be pore pressure indicators (e.g. density, resistivity, sonic)
• Record trends and report significant changes
The wellsite geologist (informing the drilling supervisor) should:
• Monitor and describe cuttings, record in geological log and report significant changes
• Compare actual formations with prognosis and report significant discrepancies
The well-operator should ensure that there is adequate communication between all parties concerned
with well integrity, including the OIM. This may be helped by a rigsite organisation chart or schematic.
The driller should be the focal point for communications.
6.2 Potential barriers

The annulus potential barrier for all drilling operations is the rig BOP and associated equipment.
Internal potential barriers include:
• Drill pipe float valves (non-ported) in the BHA

• Dart sub installed above the BHA (to hold a drop-in dart)
• Internal BOP
• Stab-in manual valve (with suitable crossover for the drill string) at the drill floor
6.2.1 Roles and responsibilities for potential barriers
The drilling contractor (communicating to the drilling supervisor) should:
• Install, function and pressure test well control equipment according to agreed programme
• Monitor and maintain well control equipment
• Ensure suitable stab-in valves and circulating swage are available for all connection sizes and
types in use
• Carry out well control drills and record results

• Visually inspect surface BOP and report any leaks or problems
• Monitor shakers and report significant debris including pieces of rubber or steel
The mud logger (communicating to both the driller and the drilling supervisor) should:
• Monitor shakers and report significant debris including pieces of rubber or steel
The ROV crew (communicating to both the driller and the drilling supervisor) should:
• Inspect the subsea BOP, record on electronic media, and report any leaks or problems
• Inspect marine riser where possible, record on electronic media, and report any leaks or
problems
6.3 Pressure containment boundary

The first part of the well pressure containment boundary is the surface casing, the cement in the annulus
and the associated wellhead.
Subsequent casing strings, annulus cement and casing hanger seals become part of the pressure
containment boundary.
6.3.1 Roles and responsibilities for pressure containment boundary
The drilling contractor (communicating to the drilling supervisor) should:
• Visually inspect surface wellhead and report any leaks or problems

• Monitor annulus pressures for surface wellhead, record trends and report changes
The mud loggers (communicating to both the driller and the drilling supervisor) should:
• Monitor and record system pressure loss

• Report changes/trends that might indicate a hole in the drill string;
• Report any change in downhole conditions
The ROV crew (communicating to both the driller and the drilling supervisor) should Inspect seabed
around well, monitor scouring and gas bubbles, record on electronic media, and report any leaks.
6.4 Other responsibilities for drilling operations

The well-operator is responsible for well design and planning, including issuing the drilling programme,
and managing all drilling operations.
A rigsite drilling team is made up of specialists who have specific roles in the operations. It is managed
by the well-operator’s representative (e.g. the drilling supervisor).
The drilling contractor and third-party service companies should carry out the required operations as
directed by the well-operator’s representative.
The installation duty holder (the drilling contractor on a mobile drilling rig) has overall responsibility for:

• The integrity of the installation
• The health and safety of all personnel on board
These responsibilities, for installation integrity and occupational safety, are very important, but are
distinct from well integrity. Investigations into major accidents [e.g. Ref 115] have shown the
importance of focusing on well integrity.
All personnel on the installation, including the well-operator, have a duty of cooperation with the
installation duty holder’s appointed OIM.
6.4.1 Other roles of the drilling supervisor
In addition to managing the integrity of the well, the role of the drilling supervisor is to:
• Help the drilling contractor and rig OIM ensure that health and safety risks in well operations
have been identified and reduced to ALARP
• Ensure the drilling contractor and third-party services have enough information to carry out
their specific roles efficiently
• Monitor the competency of drilling contractor and service company personnel for their
assigned roles
• Identify and report any circumstance that prevents the approved programme being carried out.
Ensure a suitable programme amendment is approved and followed
• Manage any unplanned events so that remedial operations are carried out safely, and
operations return to the planned programme as safely as possible
• Comply with specific conditions imposed by the regulator
• Ensure that all required personnel, equipment and materials are available on the rig in good
time for all planned operations and foreseeable contingency operations
• Act as the focal point for all well-operator communications to and from the rig
• Ensure that the well is drilled in accordance with the drilling programme and any changes are
managed through MoC procedures.
6.5 Installation and testing of barriers

The installation, checking and testing of all barriers should be in compliance with the drilling
programme. Any proposed changes should be covered by the well-operator’s MoC procedure.
6.5.1 Conductor
Typically, the conductor is the first stage of the structural integrity of the well. The drilling programme
will specify the setting depth and installation technique.
Checks on important steps should be made, e.g.:
• Connector makeup – (observation/approval by drilling supervisor and toolpusher)

• Shoe at correct depth – verified casing tally and count remaining joints
• Wellhead at correct height – running string tally. ROV check (before cementing)
• Cement quality (if not driven or jetted) – slurry density monitoring and sample collection

• TOC outside conductor – observation (for subsea wells, indicators such as mica flakes, may be
added to spacer or slurry)
• The annulus outside the conductor may be tagged with a stinger, if necessary, to identify
cement top and, if required, carry out a top up job
• Wellhead inclination and movement
• Good shoe cement – hardness of cement inside conductor
• On onshore wells – the integrity between the conductor and the cellar.
No pressure testing of the conductor is needed. The seabed around the conductor should be monitored
by ROV, if visibility allows, to check that fluids do not broach to the seabed.
6.5.2 Surface casing
The surface casing is attached to the wellhead which supports the BOP and is the first part of the well
pressure containment boundary.
6.5.2.1 Barrier installation/checking
The barrier depends on the quality of the annulus cement which is improved by:
• Minimising hole wash outs/adequate clearance of mud from hole

• Adequate centralisation of casing at critical intervals API 65 part 2 [Ref 51]
• Quality of cement and quantity to fill annulus to desired TOC
• Suitable placement technique to place uncontaminated cement at shoe (calculated
displacement volume or stab-in shoe or dual cement plugs)
The following verification checks on important steps should be made:
• Connector makeup – observation by drilling supervisor, casing contractor (if used) and drill crew
• High pressure wellhead landing – loss of weight on landing and pull test
• Wellhead inclination and movement
• TOC – monitoring returns at wellhead, monitoring cement displacement pressures or post job
logging to identify top
6.5.2.2 Barrier testing
The casing should be pressure tested to check the integrity of the pipe body and connections after the
BOP has been installed and before drilling out the shoe track.
The test pressure should be higher than the maximum potential pressure to which the casing can be
subjected (calculated during well design and included in the programme).
The cement seal around the shoe should be tested by LOT or FIT.
6.5.3 Wellhead
Casing hangers should be locked in the wellhead where assessment indicates this is required to prevent
movement that could break the seals.

Surface wellheads should have access to annuli (sidearms) for monitoring and bleeding off pressures;
each should be fitted with two barriers.
Surface wellheads that require the BOP to be removed to gain access for installing seal assemblies
should not be used for new wells, because of the potential for well flow up the annulus without potential
barriers.
For existing wells, sidetracks, including those with emergency slips (where needed), on surface
wellheads that require the BOP to be removed to gain access for installing seal assemblies:
• There should be adequate procedures to ensure the casing annulus is fully isolated before BOP
removal
• The annulus should be flow checked for a long enough period to ensure that the well is stable
before lifting the BOP. Well flow may occur many hours or even days after cementing and/or
problems may occur mechanically sealing the annulus. The risk assessment should recognise
that these situations may occur and address the possibility of well flow
• There should be barriers in place before lifting the BOP
• There should be a procedure for nippling down the BOP (including a lift plan as per Lifting
Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations (LOLER) [Ref 17] for a complicated lift)
6.5.4 Setting BOP
The BOP system should be function and pressure tested before being put into operation.
After landing, the connection between the BOP and the wellhead should be pressure tested to the
highest potential pressure that may be experienced in the next well section.
Information needs to be passed to offshore personnel about:
• Shearing capability of the shear rams [Ref 39].

• The procedures in place if a tubular is across the BOP and cannot be sheared, and the well needs
to be closed in
Annulus Pressure containment

Inner barrier
barrier boundary
Active kill weight mud kill weight mud casing(s)
cement outside casing

Potential IBOP (drilling)
wellhead
Stab-in valve BOP
(connection) casing hanger seals
Shearing BSR
Table 6. Well Barrier Matrix Example – Overbalanced Drilling with BOP

If a well barrier matrix table (Table 6) or a schematic (Figure 4) is used, it should be updated as each
casing string is installed.
Figure 4. Example Barrier Schematic for Overbalanced Drilling
Figure 4 (5.8.1) from NORSOK D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations (Rev. 4, June 2013) [Ref
110] are reproduced by Oil and Gas UK in this Issue 4 of the Oil and Gas UK Well Integrity Guidelines
under licence from Standard Online AS 11/2013 © All rights are reserved. Standard Online makes no
guarantees or warranties as to the correctness of the reproduction. In any case of dispute, the NORSOK
original shall be taken as authoritative. See www.standard.no.

6.5.5 Intermediate casings
6.5.5.1 Cementing operations
The active annulus barrier during intermediate cementing operations consists of the mud, spacer and
liquid cement slurry. If the spacer and slurry are heavier than the mud, the well will be overbalanced
until the slurry stops transmitting hydrostatic pressure provided there are no losses during the
placement and the annulus is kept full.
6.5.5.2 Installation/checking of casing and cement barrier
The casing, plus the cement around the shoe, forms the next section of the pressure boundary. This
cement quality depends on:
• Setting the casing shoe in a gauge section of impermeable formation

• Adequate removal of mud from hole
• Adequate centralisation in cemented sections
• Quality of cement, and quantity to fill annulus to desired TOC
• Cement slurry recipe
• Suitable placement technique to place uncontaminated cement at shoe (calculated
displacement volume with dual cement plugs)
• An accurate placement temperature to inform the cement slurry design.
Reference may be made to API S65- part 2 [Ref 51].
The following checks on important steps should be made:
• Review slurry properties, optimising placement techniques, pump rates, displacement rates,
spacer design
• Laboratory test of slurry recipe with materials from the rigsite (a check by an independent
laboratory may be considered)
• Connector makeup/clear acceptance criteria and responsibilities
• Casing hanger locked in wellhead – loss of weight on landing and pull test
• Top of cement (TOC)
o monitor mud returns to rig
o monitor cement displacement pressures
o post-job logging to identify the TOC may be considered
6.5.5.3 Testing of the casing barrier
The casing hanger seal assembly should be pressure tested.
The casing should be pressure tested to check the integrity before drilling out the casing shoe track.
Test pressures should be higher than the maximum potential pressure to which the casing can be
subjected. These values should be calculated during well design and included in the programme.

The effects of heavy drilling fluid inside the casing should be considered when specifying the test
pressure.
6.5.6 Production casing
The production casing is the innermost casing at the wellhead. It would be exposed to formation fluids
during testing or production if the tubing leaked. In gas lifted production wells (Section 8.5.1) the casing
is exposed to hydrocarbon gas under pressure.
It is vital that optimum installation is achieved to ensure protection of the outer annuli over the life time
of the well. Therefore, additional consideration should be given to:
• Good centralisation, avoiding over-gauge hole, especially in reservoir

• The cement quality, additives and design (including transition time and fluid loss rates) to
reduce gas migration
• The height of the planned TOC above the top reservoir
6.5.6.1 Casing/cementing operations
If a permeable hydrocarbon-bearing formation is exposed during a casing running operation, the

dangers of a kick are increased. These hazards should be assessed during the planning stage and then
reviewed when actual conditions (hole, weather, etc) are known.
Monitoring the surface mud volume and comparing the actual displacement with calculated values is
very important. An agreed response to any discrepancies should be provided.
If there is a kick during casing running or cementing, an agreed well control procedure is needed. This
is a non-standard operation, and these are not always adequately covered by procedures, training or
drills.
Specific well control decisions need to be considered before running casing:
• How the well will be closed in (special casing rams or annular)

• The circumstances in which the shear rams would be used
• What emergency procedures to use if the shear rams cannot cut the casing
If the cement is to be displaced by non-kill weight mud or brine, then a provision (full-bore valve) should
be in place to permit removal of the cement head to carry out remedial operations (e.g. wireline set
bridge plug). If a full-bore valve cannot be installed below the cement head, then either the cement
should not be displaced with non-kill weight mud, or the risks should be evaluated, and mitigation
measures put in place.
6.5.6.2 Installation of casing and cement barrier
Production casing that may be exposed to hydrocarbon gas should have gas tight (premium)
connections. It should be assumed that the casing will contain gas, unless it is only to be used for
injection or an exploration well that will be abandoned without testing.
Therefore, in addition to the points listed for intermediate casing in the previous section:

• The makeup of the connections should be monitored (torque/turn equipment) to check that
the connections are made up correctly to make the gas tight seal
• High specification casing or stainless materials may require special handling and make up to
prevent damage that would reduce integrity
• If the cement in the annulus is planned to provide a long-term seal, consideration should be
given to direct measurement of the TOC (cement bond log) and quality of the cemented section
(cement evaluation log)
• Remediation plan if the TOC does not reach the planned height
6.5.7 Inner barriers
During conventional drilling the hydrostatic pressure of the mud in the drill string is the active inner
barrier. If the drill string is not kept full, or the mud weight is too low, fluid can flow up the drill string.
A potential inner barrier while drilling is either the top drive safety valve or kelly valve. These valves
should be rated to the same pressure as the BOP.
Another inner barrier is an inside BOP, or Internal Blowout Preventer (IBOP), which is either a surface
installed back pressure check valve (e.g. Gray valve), or a drop-in dart which seats in a landing sub
positioned above the drill collars in the drilling assembly (dart sub).
Float valves should be included in the BHA, in addition to any surface valves or IBOPs. Ported float valves
(with a hole) do not constitute a barrier. Non-ported valves may wear and cannot be tested in use.
During connections and trips, potential inner barriers should be provided by manual valves that are
stabbed into the top of the drill string and made up. There should be a suitable valve for all elements of
the drill string and a way to install it quickly. If valves are installed manually, this should be practiced in
drills.
Mud provides an active barrier, and the casing should be topped up with mud during running. The level
should always be high enough to prevent an influx if the floats fail.
During casing running, float valves run in the shoe track may be considered inner active barriers. If so,
consideration should be given to pressure and function testing before running.
Potential inner barriers are provided by crossover/valve sets or internal packers. These should be rated
for any potential differential pressure and installation methods should be tested to ensure they can be
put onto the casing quickly.
6.6 Managed Pressure Drilling / Under Balanced Operations

The annulus active barrier for MPD / UBO may be an RCD. There are other names for equivalent
equipment. The RCD seals the annulus while allowing the drill string to rotate and reciprocate.
For MPD, the differential pressure is low, and the fluid in the well is drilling mud, therefore failure of the
RCD will result in a leak of drilling fluid and a kick. The rig BOP is a potential barrier.
Inner barriers are important because the mud in the drill string is not an active barrier. Tested non-
ported float valves should always be run.

For Under balanced drilling (UBD), the bottomhole pressure is designed to be less than the pore
pressure, and so any permeable formations will flow during drilling. There are likely to be hydrocarbons
in a release if the active barrier fails. The rig BOP is a potential barrier.

Inner barrier
barrier boundary
Drilling
Pump pressure (drilling) Casing(s)
Active fluid &
Check valves (connection) Cement outside casing
RCD
Wellhead
IBOP (drilling)
Potential BOP Casing hanger seals
Check valves (connection)
Shearing BSR
Table 7. Well Barrier Matrix Example – MPD/UBO (see above text)
6.7 Drilling before BOP installed

Before the BOP is installed, the active barrier is provided by the drilling fluid, but there are no potential
annulus barriers during well operations. These operations include:
• Installing conductor (e.g. drill, cement, drive or jet)

• Drilling surface hole
• Running and cementing surface casing
If there is a riser back to the rig (jackup with riser and land operations), and the conductor shoe is strong
enough, mud may be used to drill with returns to the rig. This should not be done if there is any risk of
a shallow gas kick, as a riser will bring the gas directly to the rig.
It is possible to connect a riser from a floating rig to the wellhead (pin connector) without the BOP. This
should not be done, because it takes away the safety feature of being able to move the rig away quickly
from above the well if there is a shallow gas flow to the seabed.
Options exist for better primary control when drilling top hole for subsea wells:
• Drill with weighted mud and discharge it at the seabed

• Drill with weighted mud and subsea pumping system to return mud and cuttings
• Drill with seawater and sweeps
• A small diameter pilot hole may be drilled to check for shallow gas. If there is a shallow gas kick
in the pilot hole, the smaller diameter increases the chances of a dynamic kill by pumping kill
mud at a high flow rate
For all subsea drilling operations before the BOP has been installed, the following precautions should
be taken:

• Continuous bubble watch with ROV
• Observation of sea from the rig
• Preparation to move the rig away from the well (drills)
•

Inner barrier
barrier boundary
Kill weight
Active Kill weight mud
mud
IBOP (drilling) None

Potential None
Stab-in valve (connection)
Shearing None
Table 8. Well Barrier Matrix Example – Top Hole Drilling (see above text)

7 Well Testing
7.1 General
This phase covers temporary production or injection operations to gather information. This may be a
high-risk activity and is therefore included in the well life cycle considerations.
The following is based on offshore operations; however, the general principles apply to onshore
operations.
Offshore extended well tests should be considered as a ‘temporary’ completion under the completions
section.
For these guidelines, it is assumed that an offshore production installation will use a completion and the
installation production facilities. Section 8 (completions) covers these operations.
If well testing operations include stimulation activities refer to Section 11.7 for guidance.

If there is kill weight fluid filling the well, this is the active barrier when running in the test string. The
fluid level should be monitored to ensure the hole stays full, especially if there is open hole.
If the plan is to displace the cased hole to light fluid (less than kill weight), the active barrier will be the
casing, liner, plugs inside casing and liner top packer. These barriers should be inflow tested before
displacement. The fluid level in the well and the surface volume should be monitored as a check on the
integrity of these barriers.
If the reservoir is not cased (openhole), a subsurface barrier valve (formation isolation valve) should be
installed if the well is to be displaced to light fluid.
When the test string is installed, the active annulus barriers are typically the completion or Drill Stem
Test (DST) packer plus the BOP ram closed around the slick joint (below Subsea Test Tree (SSTT) for
floating rigs).
During the well test there is no active inner barrier, as formation fluid is allowed to flow to surface.
When pulling the test string after the test, the active barrier will be the kill weight fluid in the hole. The
hazards at this stage are greater than for drilling operations because:
• The reservoir is open and is likely to contain hydrocarbons

• There may be pockets of hydrocarbons remaining in the well or test string
• The design of the test string may not allow full circulation of the well
7.2.1 Pressure containment boundary
The pressure containment boundary is formed by the:
• Cemented production casing and/or liner

• Casing hanger landed and sealed in the high-pressure wellhead
• Rig BOP with ram closed around string, slick joint or SSTT slick joint
• Riser and flowhead
7.2.2 Potential barriers during well testing
The inner potential barriers during well testing include:
• The main tester valve

• Other test string valves
• Subsea test tree valves
• Surface test tree valves
The annulus potential barrier is the rig BOP (other rams and annulars).
7.3 Responsibilities for testing operations

The following is based on offshore operations; however, the general principles apply to onshore
operations.
The well-operator is responsible for well integrity during testing.
The primary duty of the well-operator’s representative (e.g. well test supervisor or drilling supervisor)
is supervising the installation, checking, testing and monitoring of well barriers to ensure well integrity.
The well-operator is responsible for planning and managing the well test operations.
The well-operator should ensure that the additional well control equipment used in testing is suitable
for the planned operations. This will involve reviewing the contractor’s procedures and standards.
Offshore, this information should be provided to the safety case duty holder for verification [Ref 32].
Well test equipment should be classed as SECEs.
The well-operator should also ensure that all personnel with safety critical functions are competent to
carry out their tasks, and that they have suitable information and instruction concerning the well test.
Refer to the Oil & Gas UK Guidelines on competency for wells personnel [Ref 30].
The installation duty holder should ensure that third party equipment can meet the installation’s
performance standard for well test equipment.
If it is equipment which is to be used on the installation for the first time, then the independent
competent person should carry out enough verification activities to ensure it is suitable prior to use.
The installation OIM should:
• Be involved in the well test planning

• Be aware of the installation and commissioning of the well test package
• Check that it has been installed as per the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) seen by
the Independent Competent Person (ICP)

• Check that any post-installation changes have gone through the supplier’s MoC procedure and
been verified by the ICP
• Check that the drilling contractor is aware of changes and any further mitigation measures
needed
7.3.1 Well control procedures during testing
The well control procedures should be reviewed to ensure that the proposed well testing operations
are covered. The review should cover:
• How the well will be opened up to flow and shut in, in order to conduct the well test
• How to circulate through test string (running and retrieving)
• The potential for trapped hydrocarbons in string and annulus after testing
• Which ram or annular should be used to close the well in on different test tools
• The circumstances in which the shear rams would be used
• The requirements to release the rig from well due to unsuitable weather on a floating
installation
• Procedures if screens or fired TCP guns, or components that communicate from inside to
outside the string, are at the BOP
• Any requirements for wire cutters at the rig floor (e.g. for cables)
• Requirement for Slow Circulating Rates (SCR) at different times
• How the well will be killed or perforations isolated in order to recover the test string
7.4 Well test planning

Well test planning should start as soon as the well objectives are known, to ensure specialist equipment
is available and the risks are thoroughly assessed.
The information needed for planning well tests includes:
• General well information (see 9.2)

• Predicted reservoir fluids (oil, gas, H2S, H20 etc)
• Reservoir temperatures and pressures
• Objectives of the test
• Potential for solids production
• Predicted flow rates and productivity
There should be an Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system to close in the well. The location of the controls,
and the authority to use them, should be considered during planning and operations.
Well control equipment planning requirements are similar to the well intervention phase. See section
11.3.2 for further details.
Detailed test planning should include input from the installation duty holder and the main (downhole
tools and surface equipment) service companies. The final programme should be reviewed and
accepted by the offshore installation duty holder (or the BSOR site operator for onshore).
A tubing stress analysis should be carried out on the test string.

7.4.1 Risk assessment and mitigation
Hazards, which can be more immediate during production well testing, are due to the following:
• There are volatile hydrocarbons at surface

• Potential for H2S and other dangerous substances
• There is an open reservoir containing pressured hydrocarbons
• The active barrier (fluid column) has been replaced by potential barriers at surface
• Testing requires a lot of temporary people and equipment (including well control)
Consideration should be given to the prevention of hydrates, and the consequences if hydrates do form.
An initial risk assessment and HAZOP should be carried out as soon as the surface conditions for the test
have been calculated using predicted reservoir conditions. Both the drilling contractor and the testing
service companies should be involved in the planning/risk assessments.
After the well has been drilled and evaluated, the well test plan and risk assessment should be reviewed
to ensure they are adequate for the actual conditions in the well.
During the well test, actual flowing conditions will be recorded. These should be compared with the
predicted values, and the risk assessment reviewed if there are differences.
In addition to well integrity, the risk assessment should also consider the risks of leaks from the surface
well test equipment, as this is a major hazard.
Some additional precautions that may be considered are:
• Additional gas detectors (hydrocarbons and H2S) in the well test area
• Temporary deluge and fire-fighting equipment in the well test area
• Fire watch in the well test areas
• Cooling for rig sides from flare radiant heat
• Special precautions for methanol/glycol (if used)
• Sand monitoring and control equipment
Erosion may be caused by entrained solids. Consideration should be given to erosion modelling and
physical measurement of pipe wall thickness (e.g. at critical elbows) to detect wear and erosion
during/after flow periods, and flow simulations through temporary packages to determine maximum
acceptable flowrates. This is particularly relevant to testing and cleaning up high rate gas wells. Small
bore pipework and fittings such as needle valves may be susceptible to wall loss and failure due to
erosion.
7.5.1 Running liner or lower completion
Running the liner or lower completion may be treated as part of the drill phase (operations to run a solid
liner or casing are covered in Section 6.6) or as part of the test phase.

The risks are higher because the reservoir is exposed in open hole. There is a danger that any gas in the
well (especially high angle or horizontal holes) can migrate upwards when there is no circulation.
If the pipe rams do not seal around the liner or casing, the potential annulus barrier is provided by the
annular preventers or casing rams (unless slotted liner or screens are being run).
The ability of the shear rams to shear the casing or liner should be considered. If the BSRs are not
capable of shearing the pipe, there should be alternative secondary well control procedures to cover
this situation.
The presence of an inner washpipe string should be considered when assessing the shearing capability
of the BOP.
Alternative arrangements may include running or stripping the string below the BOP on drill pipe so that
pipe rams can be used. A triple bushing that can connect to the liner, inner string and surface stab-in
valve may be considered.
7.5.2 Liner lap
If the well is displaced to a light fluid before running the test string, the active barrier is no longer the
fluid column (see Section 8.1.1).
The test packer should be set in the casing above the liner top, if possible, to put the well barrier above
the liner lap. A leak past the lap will not then affect the integrity of the well.
If the liner lap is above the test packer, it becomes an active annulus barrier. The well-operator should
ensure that it will not leak during the well test. It should be adequately tested before the test string is
run in the hole.
7.5.3 Test string and tubing
The test string should be considered in light of the ability of the pipe rams to close around it, and the
capacity of the shear rams to cut through it. If standard well control procedures are not suitable, specific
procedures should be agreed with the installation duty holder and put in place. This may need special
training and drills to ensure adequate well control.
The tubing is an active barrier. A tubing leak above the BOP would be a major hazard because it contains
pressurised hydrocarbons.
The tubing should be checked by pre-shipment inspection, and a visual inspection of the pipe, tools and
connections as it is being run.
The coupling manufacturer’s recommended makeup procedures and torque specifications should be
reviewed and applied before running. The makeup of the tubing connections should be monitored
(torque/turn equipment) to check that the connections are made up correctly to ensure a gas-tight seal.
Any anomalous connections should be rejected.
High specification tubing or stainless materials may require special handling and makeup to prevent
damage that would reduce integrity.

The complete string should be pressure tested internally from below the depth of the packer to the
surface test tree. This will also test the tools that are part of the string.
7.5.4 Annulus barriers (packer and BOP)
The active annulus barriers are the test packer and the BOP sealing around the test string. Rams may
need to be changed to suit the tubulars in use.
BOP elastomers should be checked to confirm they are compatible with predicted flowing conditions,
especially temperature.
The internals of the casing at the setting depth may be scraped to provide a better surface for the packer
elements to seal against. A check of the packer setting depth is by a tally of the test string. This may be
confirmed by logging radioactive tags in the casing or liner and test string. After setting the packer, it
should be pressure tested from below to above the maximum bottomhole pressure, if possible.
The potential casing wear at the proposed setting depth should be considered, especially in wells where
multiple sections have been drilled through that casing.
The rig BOP should be function and pressure tested before running the test string.
The BOP should then be closed around the test string (or SSTT) to provide the second barrier. Before
starting the test, the annulus should be pressured up (taking care not to exceed operating pressures for
test tools or burst disc ratings) to test the external integrity of the string and the BOP closure on the test
string
If annulus pressure operated tools are included in the test string, the casing pressure test should be
greater than the highest operating pressure.
During well test operations, the pressure in the annulus should be monitored to identify if the packer is
leaking. This annulus may be kept at a specific pressure to keep the main tester valve open during flow
periods.
7.5.5 Inner potential barriers (tester valve and surface tree)
The tester valve is the main working valve during a well test, opening to allow flow, and closing to shut
the well in for pressure build-up in the reservoir. In an emergency it would be used to shut the well in,
but unless it can be tested from below, it cannot be fully qualified as a barrier.
There are normally other downhole valves that may be used as barriers. Some are manipulated by direct
annulus pressure and some by cycling. Some open a port to the annulus after closing to allow
hydrocarbons to be displaced out of the tubing by mud or brine. If these are pressure tested from below,
they may be qualified as barriers.
Tests carried out from floating rigs need a means of sealing the well and allowing the rig to move off in
the event of bad weather. This is provided by a SSTT which lands in the BOP with a disconnect sub. This
allows the rig to release from the well. The dual in-line valves in the SSTT should be tested in the
direction of flow before running.

The inner potential barrier at surface is the test tree. The flow wing valve is a fail-safe valve held open
by hydraulic pressure. This should be tested from the well side.
There should be an ESD system for this valve so that it can be closed remotely if there are indications of
a problem (or there should be a dedicated isolation valve). This should be function tested as part of the
surface equipment rig up and test. The other valves on the test tree (swab and kill wing) should also be
tested from the well side.
Pressure containment
Inner barrier Annulus barrier
boundary
BOP ram Casing(s)

Active NONE
Test packer Cement outside casing
Main tester valve Wellhead
Potential Shut-in valves BOP annular Casing hanger seals
SSTT valves Riser from BOP to rig on

floating rigs
SSTT ball valve or Surface test tree
Shearing dedicated shear BSR2
valve1
Table 9. Well Barrier Matrix Example – Well Testing
Note 1 – If wireline is run through the test string, these valves may be used to cut the wire in an
emergency.
Note 2 – The test string should be designed to put a shear sub opposite the BSR when the string is
landed. The shear capability of the BSR should be reviewed to check that the ram will cut that shear sub.
The preferred emergency release is to close the SSTT dual in-line valves, disconnect the test string at
the SSTT and pick up the string above the BOP rams. The BSR (as a blind ram) can then be closed as an
additional barrier.
There may be test tools in the string that cannot be sheared by the BSR. These situations should be
reviewed during the risk assessment or HAZOP and alternative procedures should be in place to cover
these situations.
Barrier matrices or schematics should be produced for each stage of the test:
• Running in test string

• Testing
• Pulling out test string after killing the well
The use of a valve status board on the rig floor is considered to be good practice to help monitor the
well test system.

7.6 Well testing operations
There should be extra (compared to making up drill pipe) emphasis on the makeup and verification of
the tubing connectors, because they are an active barrier when the well is flowing.
SCRs (see Section 7.3.1) should be taken and recorded, as required.
7.6.1 Perforating
For cased hole tests, the casing or liner needs to be perforated. This may be done using perforating guns
on wireline, drillpipe or coiled tubing, either before the test string is run, or through the test string.
More commonly the TCP guns are run as part of the test string. Risks of premature detonation should
be considered in the risk assessments, including detonation in the riser. Consideration should also be
given to ensuring the test packer has not been unset by shock loads due to perforating gun firing.
Procedures need to be considered if problems develop when running the guns through the rig BOP. This
is especially important if long strings of guns are to be run.
Special precautions need to be taken if the guns are retrieved from the hole (rather than dropped and
left downhole) as some of the charges may not have detonated. Special care will be needed when pulling
the fired guns through the BOP as the holes in the guns will bypass the pipe rams and the reservoir will
be open.
7.6.2 Flow and shut-in periods
Conditions should be carefully and constantly monitored during flow and shut-in periods (both surface
and downhole shut-in) including surface pressure/temperatures, pressures both sides of the choke,
annulus pressure, flow rates, fluid types, condition of flare, etc.
The need to inject glycol and methanol to mitigate the risk of hydrate formation should be considered.
The flow should be monitored for sand production and the efficacy of any sand filters, if used.
7.6.3 Killing the well
After the final shut-in, the well should be killed before pulling the test string. There should be detailed
procedures on displacing the well back to kill weight fluid and ensuring there are no pockets of
hydrocarbons left in the well.
It is vital to check the hole fill when pulling the test string, because the reservoir is open. This is especially
important for sections of the string that cannot be sheared.

7.6.4 Suspension of operations, plugging and abandonment
If another test is to be carried out in the same well, the perforated section should be plugged off. This
may be done with a mechanical plug as a temporary measure while another test is carried out. For
longer term suspension of operations, plugging and abandonment, permanent cement plugs should be
set as described in Oil & Gas UK Well Decommissioning Guidelines [Ref 24].

8 Completion
The completion stage is between drilling or testing the well (or finishing a workover) until it is ready for
commissioning as a production or injection well. It may be considered in three parts; lower completion,
upper completion and xmas tree.
If completion operations include stimulation activities refer to Section 11.7 for guidance.
Responsibilities in this phase are similar to the well test phase, refer to section 7.3.
Well control equipment planning requirements are similar to the well intervention phase. See section
11.3.2 for further details.
The well hazards are usually greater for completion operations than for drilling because:
• The reservoir is exposed if there is open hole (uncased)

• For producers, and some injectors, the reservoir will contain hydrocarbons
• Horizontal reservoir sections may contain gas which can migrate to surface
• The design of some lower completions will mean the BOP is not a potential barrier when the
lower completion is opposite the BOP rams
• The design of some upper completions prevents conventional circulation
• The main potential barrier, the rig BOP, has to be removed in order to be replaced by a xmas
tree
8.1 Primary control of well/active barriers
8.1.1 Fluid column
For overbalanced operations the active barrier is keeping the hole full of kill weight fluid.
During completion operations, drilling mud may be replaced by kill weight brine which does not have
fluid loss control, and so the risk of losing fluid to the formation is higher. With clear brine, close
monitoring may be needed to ensure the hole stays full of fluid if the reservoir is open. Contingency
plans may be needed if the losses are too high to control.
If a cased hole is displaced to a light (lower than kill weight) fluid, the active barrier is no longer the fluid
column. It is the casing or liner, and any mechanical plugs that have been installed. There are increased
hazards during displacement operations needing careful planning and supervision (see Section 8.6.1).
Shoe tracks should be treated as open-ended casing, unless they are designed and can be tested to
demonstrate they are an adequate barrier to flow from the well. Refer to Section 4.3.13.
8.1.2 Mechanical barriers
A subsurface barrier valve (formation isolation valve), or equivalent, may be run on top of the lower
completion (especially for gravel pack or similar openhole completion equipment techniques). After
successful testing, this becomes an active barrier. If the well is displaced to light (less than kill weight)
fluid, it becomes the only active barrier when running the upper completion.

The potential for the subsurface barrier valve being damaged, or opened inadvertently, should be
considered during planning and risk assessments. The bottom profile of a cleanout string should be
incapable of opening a subsurface barrier valve.
8.1.3 Removing the rig BOP/installing the xmas tree
When removing the main potential barrier (the rig BOP) active barriers (in addition to the completion
fluid) are needed. There should be at least two independent, tested barriers for all flow paths from the
reservoir to surface.
There should be deep-set barriers (e.g. completion packer and tubing plug) as well as near-surface
barriers (e.g. tubing hanger and seals plus tubing hanger plug).
These should be tested in the direction of flow where possible.
The well-operator should consider a contingency plan in case one or more barriers fail during the
operations to replace the BOP with a xmas tree.
8.2 Pressure containment boundary

While installing the upper and lower completions the pressure containment boundary is the same as
for drilling and testing operations.
When completion operations are finished, the xmas tree will have replaced the rig BOP as part of the
pressure containment boundary.

The important elements from a well integrity standpoint include:
• Completion packer
• Tubing
• Tubing hanger
• DHSV
• Any device installed with the tubing that permits communication with the annulus (e.g. sliding
sleeves, gas lift mandrels and injection subs)
Operations for installation and testing of barriers for the lower and upper completions are the same as
in Section 7.5 – Installation and testing of barriers in the well test phase, except for the artificial lift and
downhole safety valve aspects.

boundary
Kill weight fluid Casing(s)

Kill weight fluid
Active Formation isolation Cement outside casing
Internal plug
valve
Wellhead
Potential Stab-in valve BOP1 Casing hanger seals
Shearing BSR2 Liner, cement and lap
Table 10. Well Integrity Matrix Example – Upper Completion Running
Note 1 – Pipe ram or variable bore rams (VBR) if they fit tubing in use, otherwise annular preventers.
If there are cables (including fibre optic) or control lines being run with the tubing, the adequacy of the
annular to seal the well should be reviewed and tested if required.
With screens or slotted liner across the BOP, it is not a potential barrier
Note 2 – BSR if it can cut the tubing (plus lines if applicable); otherwise casing shear rams to cut, plus a
blind ram to seal the well.
boundary
Kill weight fluid1

Kill weight fluid1
Active Casing(s)
Completion packer
Deep set plug
Cement outside casing
Tubing hanger and
Tubing hanger plug
seals Wellhead
Casing hanger seals

Potential None
Liner, cement and lap
Shearing Not required
Table 11. Well Integrity Matrix Example – Removing the BOP
Note 1 – Kill weight fluid may be in both the tubing and annulus. However, this may not be possible to
monitor during this operation.
There should be two independent, tested barriers in place before BOP removal operations are started.

8.4 Completion design and planning
The construction of a development well (i.e. drilling plus completion) may be designed and planned as
one operation. Risk assessments and DWOPs should consider the overall construction process.
Some well-operators have a definite split between the drilling and completion stages. Close cooperation
is required between the teams and responsibility for overall well integrity should be made clear. A
‘complete well on paper’ (CWOP) may be carried out for the separate stage of the operations.
The starting point for the completion design will be the subsurface conditions anticipated through the
life cycle of the well, and operations planned for the well.
Other factors to be considered include:
• Temperature, pressure, fluid type

• Injection pressure from water/gas
• Suspension of operations, plugging and abandonment
• Potential changes in condition during the well life cycle (e.g. tertiary recovery schemes)
Where applicable, equipment should be specified, manufactured, inspected and tested to the
appropriate standard (e.g. [Ref 73 and Ref 42]).
All completion equipment should be qualified for its planned service life. This may require specific
testing where API or ISO standards are not adequate.
8.4.1 Packer
The packer should be designed for the anticipated downhole conditions of differential pressure,
temperature, production or injection fluids (including entrained solids and/or gas) and packer fluids,
including hydrocarbons if used for lift gas. Consideration should be given to full life cycle conditions. For
example, near end-of-life conditions should also be assessed when the reservoir may be depleted
leading to a higher differential pressure across the packer.
The packer should be set in cemented casing.
The packer should be set as close to the reservoir as practicable, ideally above any production liner lap,
in which case the packer is an active barrier between the liner lap and the surface. If the packer is to be
set below a production liner lap, the liner lap needs to be adequately tested.
In some completions the upper completion may be stabbed into a liner top packer. The seals on the
liner top packer become an active annulus barrier for this style of completion.
8.4.2 Tubing
For completions that will contain hydrocarbons, the tubing and equipment connectors should be gas
tight under expected load conditions.
Any completion components (e.g. nipples) should be designed for the same loadings as the tubing, to
ensure the components are not a weak link in the completion.

Tubing and connectors should be designed for worst case burst, collapse, tensile and triaxial loading.
For deterministic calculations of loads and ratings, the well-operator-approved design factors should be
used. Table 12 has examples from NORSOK Standard D-010 Rev4, June 2013 [Ref 110]:
Burst 1.1
Collapse 1.1
For well testing a design factor of 1.50 should be used to

Axial 1.25
cater for pulling the packer free at the end of the test.
Tri-axial 1.25 Tri-axial design factors are not relevant for connections
Table 12. Tubing Design Factors (taken from NORSOK Standard D-010 [Ref 110])
The well-operator may use existing approved internal standards.
Special handling requirements for high specification (e.g. corrosion resistant alloy) tubing should be
considered at the planning stage, as well as equipment for making up connectors correctly.
The potential tubing movement should be calculated for all anticipated temperatures and service loads
for the well. The resultant loads on the packer and tubing hanger should be included in the analysis.
Polished Bore Receptacles (PBR) and floating seals may be used to avoid high loads due to tubing
movement.
The completion design should permit the installation of a mechanical plug deep in the completion, just
above the reservoir.
Consideration should also be given to the potential requirement to plug the completion as a precaution
against well collision.
8.4.3 Tubing hanger
This is a second active annulus barrier for development wells. An important factor is to be able to
monitor the annulus pressure below the tubing hanger.
8.4.4 Downhole Safety Valve
The DHSV is an inner potential barrier designed to shut-in the well in the event of a catastrophic failure
of the xmas tree.
Requirements for DHSV are set out in the relevant standards [Ref 74 & 72].

The DHSV should be appropriate to the functional requirements of the well. In water injection wells it
may be acceptable to install injection valves (rather than surface-controlled valves), provided a risk
assessment concludes that it is safe to do so.
The depth at which the valve is set will be decided by assessing the potential risks. For platform wells,
the most severe risk is a catastrophic loss of the platform to which the well is attached (cratering).
Other factors include:
• Hydrate formation capability

• Inventory of hydrocarbons above the DHSV
• Adjacent slot drilling activities and well shut-in requirements
• Valve specification
• Operability
• Recovery method
Land wells designed for production using beam pumps, or any well with a mechanical downhole drive
mechanism (e.g. Progressive Cavity Pump (PCP)) cannot have a conventional DHSV installed. At the
design stage, well integrity should be reviewed and any measures necessary to reduce risk to ALARP
implemented. For sub-hydrostatic sweet oil wells produced using a beam pump a surface stuffing box
and control valves will typically be adequate.
8.4.5 Wellhead
The well-operator should have a policy covering surface wellhead sidearm valve and plug configurations.
These should have the same ratings as the wellhead.
Wellhead sidearm valves should be configured to enable isolation and pressure bleed off for removal or
changeout of instrumentation or gauges. Assemblies should be mounted directly on to sidearms to
minimise the risk of damage to extension pipework. Configuration should be such that a sidearm valve
can be closed to effect isolation should the instrumentation or gauge assembly be knocked off the
wellhead.
Surface wellheads should usually be equipped with two side outlets for each annulus between casings.
Wellhead components above the surface casing housing should have a valve removal (VR) capability.
Protection sleeves or plugs should be fitted to any VR profile on an annulus outlet which sees regular
flow (e.g. gas lift wells).
Where annuli are exposed to open formations, both casing spool side outlets should have valves fitted,
and should not be blanked off. This is to allow circulation across the annulus. For annuli not exposed to
open formation, the minimum configuration should be that at least one side outlet has a valve installed.
If sidearm valves are likely to be cycled on a regular basis, a second valve should be installed on the
outlet, and the outer valve used preferentially.
The tubing head should have both outlets fitted with double valve configurations. The outlets, valve
apertures and annulus between casing and tubing should be sized appropriately to allow well kill.

If wells are gas lifted, the surface wellhead should be designed to reduce the risk of loss of ‘A’-annulus
gas containment to ALARP.
8.4.6 Xmas tree
The xmas tree should be thoroughly pressure and function tested before opening up the well to flow or
injection. The testing should include the connection to the wellhead and all associated equipment and
control systems.
The xmas tree valves should be hydraulically tested from below. Since there are multiple valves, the
procedures should detail the sequence of testing to ensure all valves are tested to the required pressure.
The function testing should include the primary control for all the systems plus the emergency shutdown
systems.
8.5 Artificial lift

The need for artificial lift should be assessed during the well design stage. The well integrity and barriers
should be considered as part of this assessment.
The main types of artificial lift include:
• Gas lift – gas injected into ‘A’ annulus and then into tubing via a gas lift valve
• Electric submersible pump (ESP) – downhole pump powered by electricity
• Hydraulic submersible pump (HSP) – downhole pump powered by fluid
• Foamer injection and velocity strings
• Beam pump – downhole pump connected to surface beam pumping unit (nodding donkey) by
rods in onshore wells
• Progressive cavity pump (PCP) – generally used onshore (replacing rod pumps)
The means of artificial lift should be reassessed on a regular basis to confirm that risks relating to the
selected options are ALARP, and that any new developments in technology or understanding of hazards
are considered.
8.5.1 Gas lift
Gas lift systems fill the ‘A’ annulus with hydrocarbon gas under pressure. This volume of pressurised gas
should be regarded as a potential major accident hazard.
It is important to consider containment of lift gas in the event of failure of the primary barrier e.g.,
production casing string or surface gas lift pipework. The following should be considered:
To ensure containment if there is a leak from A to B annulus, the gas injection pressure should not
exceed the fracture pressure at the B annulus shoe. For wells that do not meet these requirements, a
risk assessment is required to operate the pressure in excess of the fracture pressure.
The well should be designed to minimise the gas inventory below the wellhead that would be released
by wellhead failure.

A fail-safe safety device should be incorporated on the gas lift side on all platform gas lift wells. This may
be a surface controlled downhole valve or an internal valve in the wellhead. The option selected should
be the one that reduces risk to ALARP.
Examples of downhole valves include an annulus safety valve or a Surface Controlled Sub-Surface Safety
Valve (SCSSSV) installed in the gas lift string of a dual-string completion. In the latter case, and located
above the uppermost gas lift valve, there should be a dual-string packer, and / or available barriers
installed in the VR profiles of A annulus outlets.
A valve installed in the wellhead should be protected from dropped objects and risk assessed for other
potential failure mechanisms and wellhead vulnerabilities.
The wellhead should have a double barrier on the non-active side of the wellhead (i.e. the dead side)
with ability to test both barriers independently.
The requirements for subsea wells will depend on hazards to personnel during well entry, and the
potential for leaks to the environment if the gas lift inventory is not minimised.
Gas lift systems should be designed, constructed and operated to comply with the requirements of
Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER) [Ref 9].
There should be provision for monitoring the gas lift pressure in the well. Where feasible all wells should
have continuous monitoring of the ‘B’ annulus with alarms. For subsea wells, the ‘B’ annulus should be
designed to withstand the effect of thermally induced pressure and pressure due to A to B annulus
communication in the event of a leak.
There should be adequate means for blowing down the annulus or gas lift injection string. This is
essential for testing the gas lift downhole safety device.
Well tubing and critical casings should have premium gas tight connections. These should be properly
made up and tested to achieve a gas tight seal.
In exceptional situations, there may be mitigating circumstances for using completions with single gas
lift valves for well kick-off without installing an annulus protection system. To ensure that the potential
volume of vented hydrocarbon is as low as possible, conditions imposed on gas lift kick-off from
unprotected wells should include:
• Production annuli are depressurised and filled with brine after each kick-off
• On platforms with multiple wells with no annulus safety valves, well kick-off operations should
only be carried out on one well at a time
The gas lift annulus should be hydraulically tested before gas lift or orifice valves are installed. This
should be to a pressure above the worst-case annulus pressure.
Whenever gas lift is first introduced to the well, the annulus side should be inflow tested with gas below
the barrier, and the pressure above bled down.
Some wells may not be originally designed for gas lift but changing reservoir conditions may lead to it
being considered. In exceptional situations, it may not be practicable to retrofit premium type
connectors to an existing well without major modifications to the wellhead, or risking damage to the

pressure integrity of the well. In such circumstances, it may be appropriate to introduce gas lift down
casing with non-premium connections, but only after rigorous risk assessment has been conducted,
indicating that the risk is reduced to ALARP.
In this case, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the probability of gas leaking into the ‘B’ annulus,
and any consequences, would be ALARP. The risk assessment should consider several factors including:
• The presence of other platform gas lift wells on-stream

• The annulus design being capable of containing gas lift pressure
• Lift gas composition (water, H2S, CO2)
• Stable annulus response
• Comprehensive arrangements for monitoring annulus conditions
• A lift gas bleed down system of adequate capacity and responsiveness
• The ability to monitor the B annulus
If it is planned to retro-fit gas lift to an installation, the safety case should be reviewed and modified.
Since this may significantly affect the hazards, a ‘material change’ may need to be submitted to the HSE
as required by Regulation 21 of SCR 2015 [Ref 3].
Other well integrity-related considerations for gas lift include:
• Moisture content of the gas lift gas – gas injected through the wellhead and into the production
annulus should be dry to reduce the risk of casing corrosion or hydrate blockage.
• Gas lift valve check valves – gas lift operating valves should contain one or more check valves to
prevent reservoir fluids entering the annulus when gas lift shuts down. The consequence of
reservoir fluids in the gas lift annulus include: casing corrosion, loss of barriers and damage to
gas lift valves through liquid erosion.
• Gas lift materials – to reduce the risk of premature failure, gas lift valve materials (e.g.
elastomers and metallurgy) should be checked for compatibility with injection fluids (e.g. scale
inhibitors) misted into the lift gas.
• Gas lift casing design – the casing forming the outer envelope of the gas lift annulus should be
designed for loads including full evacuation down to the deepest gas lift mandrel. The
next/adjacent casing should be pressure tested in excess of the gas lift pressure.
8.6 Completion operations

Well control procedures should be reviewed before starting completion operations. Factors to be
considered include:
• Ability of BOP to close around tubing and completion equipment

• Ability of BOP to shear completion equipment and alternative procedures if shearing is not
achievable
• Ability to circulate through completion string when running
• Well kill methods if a kick is taken when running completion
• Complications due to control lines/cables run outside the completion string
If the reservoir is open, consideration should be given to measuring SCR pressure drops, in case there is
a kick when running in the hole with the completion.

8.6.1 Displacement to light fluid
A well may be displaced to a light fluid (less than kill weight) at some point during completion operations.
The active barrier is no longer the fluid column but the casing or liner and any mechanical barriers in
the well.
Casing and any cement plugs should be pressure tested before starting displacement.
If possible, the casing hanger seal assemblies should be inflow tested before displacement starts.
For downhole barriers that cannot be adequately tested by an internal casing pressure test (e.g. a liner
lap or isolation valve), a successful inflow test is needed before displacement starts.
There should be a clear distinction between the inflow test and subsequent displacement or well clean-
up operations. An inflow test should be formally accepted by the representative of the well-operator
before starting any other operations. On offshore installations, the results of the test should be
reviewed with the installation safety case duty holder or their representative.
The displacement operations should be covered by approved procedures. If circumstances change and
prevent the operations being carried out as planned, new procedures should be written under the well-
operator’s MoC system.
During displacement, the volume of fluid returned should be monitored and compared with the volume
of fluid pumped. The rig pit system should be set up so that these measurements can be done. Ideally
there should be independent checks (e.g. mud loggers and rig crew).
Simultaneous displacement and transfer operations have been a contributory factor in several serious
incidents. Therefore, other fluid transfer operations (such as offloading mud to a supply boat) should
not be carried out at the same time, unless sufficient personnel and control measures are available to
adequately monitor both operations.
The pump pressures and volumes should be estimated before starting operations. The actual pressures
and volumes during displacement should be compared to the estimates and any differences reviewed.
If the well is to be displaced to a lighter fluid, the displacement should be planned with a step-down
chart of pressure versus volume, with clear notification of the point at which the well is underbalanced.
Any deviation should be reviewed.
If there are concerns during displacement, or discrepancies in volume or pressure measurements, the
displacement should be stopped and the well closed in at the BOP to review the situation.
There should be a contingency plan if there are indications of an influx during displacement operations.
The well should be shut-in at the BOP and the well circulated back to kill weight fluid under controlled
conditions (through the choke system).

9 Commissioning
9.1 Summary
Commissioning starts when the completion (or intervention/workover) stage ends. It covers tying in the
well to production or injection systems and may include handing over operational responsibility for the
well to the production department. It ends when steady state production/injection operations start.
Well-operators should ensure that the relevant people at the site e.g. the production control room
operators. have the key information from the handover process, such as the MAASP data, prior to well
start-up.
9.1.1 Well Integrity
Suitable and sufficient barriers should be installed in the well and tested before commissioning. An
important part of the handover of operational responsibility for the well is a review of the barrier status
and pressure containment boundary.
9.2 Initial well handover information

The following information should be readily available to the well-operator before the well is brought on
line and should be included in the initial handover document.
General well information:
• Quadrant, block, field, well number, surface coordinates and slot reference if applicable
• Platform or rig drilling contractor, rotary table elevation
• Well type description (e.g. water injector)
• Spud date, completion date
• TD, hold-up or plug-back depth, maximum inclination at depth
• Any obstructions (e.g. ‘fish’) left in the wellbore should be documented and indicated in the
appropriate well schematics
• Definitive survey of the well including the type of equipment the survey used (i.e. error and
accuracy) and any well path that is near the ellipse of uncertainty.
Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressures (MAASP). For each annulus, with information on the fluid
type and weight in each annulus. The MAASP should be defined for each annulus. Equipment limits
(including wellhead internal components, seals, etc), burst/collapse ratings, leakoff or FITs, estimated
casing wear, or post-construction pressure tests may all be factors that determine the MAASPs.
Additionally, a Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) may be defined for each annulus to
provide an operating margin (i.e. the MAOP is less than the MAASP). This should be carefully selected,
and not just based on a percentage of the MAASP. It is a trigger to take executive action and to review
what is going on in the well.
Valve status. Operating parameters and any isolations that are in place. For all manual valves the number
of turns to open and close should be stated. For actuated valves the volume of fluid required to open

and close the valve should be stated with opening and closing times. There should be a record of any
plugs installed in the well, including wellhead VR plugs.
Well completion. Schematic showing installed components with: manufacturer, component description,
depth, serial number, material, maximum Outside Diameter (OD), minimum ID, drift, connections,
working pressure and temperature; test pressure, completion fluids, hold up depth with a description
of the tool string; and any required operating data (e.g. release mechanism for downhole packers).
Information should be included on any remedial work (including stimulation), anomalies encountered,
or material left in hole.
Wellhead and xmas tree. Schematic showing installed components with manufacturer, component
description, serial number, material, maximum OD, minimum ID, working pressure, test pressure, and
any required operating data.
Casing and cement. Schematic showing installed casing strings with setting depth, grade, weight (lb/ft),
connection, cement top and method of verification (e.g. cement bond log, calculated, etc); annulus fluid,
pressure test, LOT or FIT; and information on any installed components (e.g. diverter (DV) collar, liner
hanger).
Control system. Information on any hydraulic or electrical control systems including function test results.
Information on DHSV control line pressures (min and max) and maximum injection pressures for water
injection or gas lift.
Well site clearance. For subsea wells: certificate with information on the status of the area around the
well, including any material left on the seabed and the status of any well protection devices.
Operating risks and conditions. Any identified well operating risks (e.g. anticipated thermal
growth/contraction or lateral movement) or conditions attached to the well operating consents (e.g.
PON 15B/F requirements).
Pressure containment barriers. All the barriers and well integrity controls should be described. A barrier
schematic may be produced for the well to illustrate all the barrier and well integrity controls.
9.3 Life of well information

Within one month (or other reasonable timeframe as determined by the well-operator) of the
completion of a well, or an intervention/workover that changes the status of the well, the following
additional information should be available to facilitate life of well integrity.
Contact details - Key personnel involved in the design and construction of the well.
Well data - Reservoir pressure, reservoir temperature, gas oil ratio or gas condensate ratio; shut-in
wellhead pressure and temperature; flowing wellhead pressure and temperature; produced/injected
fluid data (gravity/density and composition). For multi-zone wells information should ideally be available
for each zone.
Well Numbering - It is important for the well-operator to have an effective system for well numbering,
especially during handovers between different departments.

As-built drawings - Engineering drawings and operating manuals for all equipment installed on or in the
well, and all materials left in the well, including cement. This would include the definitive wellbore
survey, including any sidetracks. Valve status and valve manipulation sequence during start up and shut
down should be noted. All the barriers and well integrity controls should be described.
End of well reports - Details of the design and construction of the well or intervention, including
geological data and any information relevant to future well integrity e.g. kicks and losses.
9.4 Surface equipment considerations

All operating and testing procedures for the surface equipment should be in place and readily available
to those personnel operating the equipment.
Equipment installed on, or around, the well should not restrict access to the well and components
required to operate, maintain or intervene in the well. Personnel should have access to operate valves
and hand wheels for manual valves. Access should be available to use VR plug lubricator assemblies.
Gauges should be specified to match the anticipated pressure range and should be sited such that
personnel can read them easily. Pin stops may be useful on some types of gauges to help verify that the
pressures are within the gauge range. Consideration should be given to using real time wireless gauges.
Valves and bleed arrangements should be installed such that pressure can be bled off safely and gauges
changed out with two barriers in place.
Gauges should be calibrated for first use and have a periodic maintenance routine to ensure that they
are calibrated in line with the manufacturer’s recommendation.
Any lines and fittings should be specified to meet the conditions (fluid, pressure and temperature) to
which they may be exposed during the life of the well.
Removable well fittings (e.g. plugs, bleed nipples, tie down bolts and VR plugs) should be identified on
schematics which should be available to operational personnel. In some cases, it may be suitable to
label fittings, but it is important that the labels are correct. Incorrect labels are worse than no labels.
Allowance should be made for well movement, both thermal growth or contraction, and mechanical
movement (e.g. due to wave action).
Equipment attached to the well that is part of the pressure containment boundary should be sited as
close to the well as practicable and protected against damage.
The well interface with the topsides equipment should be explicitly stated (e.g. flowline hub, gaskets,
instrumentation). It should be clear what is covered by the platform verification scheme and the well
examination scheme.
9.5 Well examination and verification

The well-operator should have a well examination scheme that covers all wells throughout their life
cycle.

How this duty is fulfilled may change when the well is commissioned. Different companies have different
methods, but the important point is that well examination, as described in the scheme, should continue
into the ‘operate and maintain’ stage.
Offshore, the installation duty holder should have a verification scheme that covers all SECEs, which will
include wells that are connected to the installation.
The commissioning stage is a good time for the installation duty holder to check that the well is included
in the installation verification scheme.
Offshore, it is vital that there are no gaps between the examination and verification schemes. The well,
and any operations carried out on it, should be examined by an independent and competent person
throughout its life cycle.

10 Operate and Maintain
This section covers well integrity during the operational phase of the life cycle of a well, from well
handover at the end of construction (or commissioning) through to late-life. It ends with a handover
back to the wells team for intervention, workover or abandonment. This section is written to cover all
types of wells: where a requirement is specific to a type of well, then the well type is specified.
The main well integrity function is to monitor and maintain the well barriers and pressure containment
boundary installed during previous operations, and to continue to demonstrate that risks from the well
are ALARP.
During the operational phase the original risk assessments and basis of design documents should be
referenced, and routines set to address and reflect failure data.
Well-operator routines for inspection, maintenance and testing should be conducted at a frequency
that is based on reliability data.
10.1 Well integrity assurance
10.1.1 Well integrity management systems
This should include methods of inspection, maintenance and testing of well related SECE for every well.
These should be documented in the performance standard for each SECE. Refer to Section 3 for an
overall description of a well integrity management system.
10.1.2 Roles and responsibilities
The well-operator should define who has responsibility for wells covering:
• Day-to-day operation, flow assurance and condition monitoring

• Routine inspection, maintenance and testing
• Verification of well related SECEs/well examination
• Anomaly/deficiency identification and MoC
See [Ref 32] and the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group (OSPRAG) report [Ref 34] for
further information.
10.1.3 Competency
The well-operator should ensure that the personnel undertaking the work are competent to do so. This
is particularly important given the potential hazards of trapped pressure and hydrocarbon release,
combined with the safety critical nature of well equipment.
Equipment operating and testing procedures should be readily available to personnel operating the
equipment.

10.1.4 Well files and operational histories
Detailed design, construction, commissioning and operational records are important to ensure the well
is operated within design criteria.
Operational records should include:
• Monitoring of operating parameters (condition monitoring)

• Inspection, calibration and testing findings
• Planned maintenance records, investigation and intervention reports
Schematics and installed equipment records should be current. These records should be controlled and
updated when well equipment is modified or replaced. Wellhead manuals should be controlled
documents.
10.1.5 Well stock performance review
The well operator should conduct performance reviews to assess the application of the WIMS to its well
stock.
The primary objectives of a performance review are to: assess whether the well stock is performing in
accordance with the WIMS and its objectives and; assess how the well stock conforms to the WIMS
processes and adheres to the policies, procedures and standards defined in the WIMS and; identify
areas of improvement.
Where areas for improvement are identified, any changes required to address these improvements
should be specified and implemented. Implementation of any changes should follow the well-operator’s
risk assessment and MoC processes.
Performance reviews should be carried out at a defined frequency determined by the well-operator
based upon associated risks.
In addition, ad hoc reviews should be performed as and when deemed necessary when new information
becomes available that can have a significant impact on well integrity risk or assurance processes.
The review should be performed by a group of personnel deemed competent in well integrity principles
and who are familiar with the well-operator’s WIMS. It is recommended that, where practicable, at least
some personnel involved in the review not be directly involved in well integrity management of the well
stock under review.
10.1.6 Risk Assessment and Management
Well-operators should have a process to review well hazards and assess any significant changes,
throughout the life cycle of the well.
In the operational phase, factors to be considered include:
• Barrier degradation and repair (see section 4.3.11 and 4.3.12)

• Changes in production parameters or production plant pressures (e.g. sand production,
separator operating pressure)

• Unrecorded creeping change
• Modifications to SECE
• Changes in structural well loading, or the ability to withstand the loads (see section 4.2)
• Changes to annulus pressures and MAASP (see section 10.4)
• Sustained annulus pressures
• Other changes affecting the original well design premise (e.g. tertiary production schemes)
• Well maintenance backlog
Well-operators may also wish to refer to the OGA Stewardship Expectations document: SE-06
Production Optimisation Implementation Guide, June 2017 [Ref 142] which has relevant information.
Well-operators should have a process to confirm that mitigating actions are in place, are tracked and
are time-bound. See Section 10.8.
10.2 Operating procedures

Procedures should be available to describe how the different types of wells associated with each
installation/field are operated.
10.2.1 Special precautions for start-up and shutdown
• Annulus monitoring to avoid over-pressurisation associated with thermal affects

• Monitoring of wellhead movement (thermal effects causing growth or slumping)
• Initiation of chemical treatments to control hydrates, scaling, waxing or asphaltene deposition
that could affect well valves
10.2.2 Operating parameters and monitoring
Well operating parameters that impact on well integrity should be clearly defined, readily available to
personnel operating and maintaining wells, and routinely monitored. Examples include:
• Pressure (e.g. to avoid bubble point deposition of scale and asphaltene)

• Fluid flow rate (e.g. to avoid exceeding erosion limits)
• Sand production rate (e.g. to avoid unacceptable erosion)
• Water compositions for scaling tendency which could impair valve operation
The frequency of monitoring should consider:
• Pressure limits
• Rates of pressure build-up
• Allowable leak rates
• Age of the well
10.2.3 Verification of control measures
Well-operators should have a process to verify that the correct information and control data, such as
MAASP data for all wells, is available and correctly implemented at site.

10.3 Visual inspection of wells
Wells should be subject to routine visual inspection for signs of damage and leaks. Whenever possible,
digital images (or video) should be used to record the visual inspection and create a history of
impairments for each well.
For subsea wells, vessels should be alert to any surface signs of leakage, considering the type, age and
condition of the well. A frequency for visual subsea inspection should be set by the well-operator based
on risk assessment. In the absence of any prior history, as a guide, a two-year inspection frequency is
recommended. This inspection should be undertaken, where possible, at the same time as the well
integrity testing, to visually confirm valve status and operation.
10.4 Annulus management
10.4.1 Key Requirements of an Annulus Management Process
The well-operator is responsible for the monitoring of well annuli and reassessment of MAASP over the
lifetime of the wells.
There should be a MAASP for each annulus that is monitored.
The well-operator should understand the specific operating requirements and annulus pressure
management of each well design.
Annulus management procedures should document how annulus pressures are recorded, monitored
and trended to ensure pressure variations and anomalies are detected.
Pressure trending of annuli enables the well-operator to determine the integrity of the pressure
containment envelope and potentially identify degrading components.
The well-operator should define acceptance criteria for annulus leakage.
Absence of pressure in an annulus does not mean that the annulus is pressure containing. A minimum
positive pressure may be maintained in an annulus to provide an indication of annulus containment.
It may not be possible to maintain a positive pressure in some annuli. Regular measurement of liquid
levels, or refilling of annuli, combined with pressure testing, should be used to verify the integrity of all
annuli or identify leaks.
Operating changes and thermal affects associated with them, may affect annulus pressures. Increase or
decrease of annulus pressure should be assessed to ensure that the cause is understood.
Procedures should document how to react to changes in annulus pressure, and how changes may be
related to potential annulus barrier failure.
Sampling and analysis of fluids should be done whenever annulus pressures need to be reduced.
Excessive rates of depressurisation or repetitive bleeding of liquid should be avoided since this may
exacerbate the leak path or increase fluid ingress from external sources.

Modification of a well design can potentially result in an annulus that cannot be monitored at surface.
Since pressure in ‘blind’ annuli cannot be monitored or controlled, the well-operator should ensure that
the resultant limitations and their potential consequences are understood.
The management of sustained pressure should have more intensive monitoring and pressure control
processes to confirm conditions are stable and at an acceptable level.
10.4.2 MAASP and Annulus Operating Limits
The MAASP is the maximum pressure that is allowed at the wellhead of an annulus to avoid
compromising the integrity of any of the component barriers of that annulus.
The MAASP should be determined for each annulus of a well. The basis of each MAASP should
document: - design factors used in calculations, component specifications, the design of trapped / non-
monitorable annuli, and pressures applied during tests, including those of open-hole formations.
MAASP should be recalculated if any of the following criteria is evidenced:
• There are changes in the integrity of components of an annulus or adjacent annuli

• There are changes in the test acceptance criteria e.g. reduced test pressure
• There are changes in the service or operation of the well that is at variance from assumed load
cases, temperatures and pressures
• There are changes of annulus fluid density
• Tubing, casing or other annulus component has degraded or has been down rated due to age
The well-operator should determine upper and lower operating limits for each annulus that can be
monitored. The upper operating limit is normally lower than the calculated MAASP (MAOP-see Section
9.2), to enable reaction to avoid a potentially damaging increase of pressure. This is particularly relevant
during well start-up or shut-down when thermal affects may significantly affect annulus pressure, or
(due to lack of access to control annulus pressure) during an installation emergency situation.
A lower annulus operating pressure limit may be implemented for the following reasons:
• Observation pressure for the annulus

• Providing hydraulic support to an annulus barrier component
• Avoiding casing collapse of adjacent or ‘blind’ annuli
• Avoiding hydrate formation
• Balancing pressure to minimise degradation of small leaks
• Variability of fluid properties
• Temperature fluctuations
• Avoiding vapour phase generation (corrosion acceleration)
• Preventing air ingress if the annulus pressure is lower than atmospheric
For subsea wells, the lower annulus operating pressure limit should be above the sea water hydrostatic
pressure at the wellhead.
10.4.3 Pressure Testing & Topping up annuli
Well-operators should have a documented procedure for pressure testing and topping up annuli.

Annulus pressure testing, or integrity verification by other methods, should be considered when:
• Changing the well functionality, i.e. from producer to injector, etc

• There is a risk of external casing corrosion because of aquifer penetration
• Hydraulically fracturing the well
• There is a lack of evidence from positive pressure monitoring
This procedure should include details of the composition of the fluid to be used for topping up annuli
including:
• Fluid type
• Fluid density
• Chemical composition
• Corrosion inhibition
• Biocide concentration
10.4.4 Factors affecting annulus pressure
Pressure in annuli may occur or change for several reasons:
• Normal Operating Pressure is a pressure deliberately applied to an annulus as part of its

function or to enable monitoring. Examples of this are:
o gas lift in the ‘A’ annulus
o an applied pressure in the ‘A’ annulus to protect against collapse risk from pressure in
the ‘B’ annulus
o small positive pressure applied to monitor the integrity of the annulus
• Thermally Induced Pressure is generated when the well heats up due to production flow or
when water injection is stopped. This pressure is not bled off unless it reaches a defined limit
(trigger) related to the annulus pressure limit (or MAASP)
• Ballooning or compression of tubing or casing due to changes of pressure in an adjacent flow
conduit or annulus.
• Sustained Annulus Pressure is a pressure in an annulus that rebuilds after having been bled off,
which cannot be attributed to an applied pressure or to thermal effects. Sustained annulus
pressure is typically due to a shallow, charged formation at an open shoe, or damage to casing
primary cement after setting.
• Leakage of an Annulus Containment Barrier. This may result from a leak across the casing,
tubing, packer, wellhead or other barrier component
10.4.5 Sustained annulus pressure
The management of sustained annulus pressure (may also be known as; Annulus Charging, Sustained
Casing Pressure or Annulus Vent Flow) should have more intensive monitoring and pressure control
processes to confirm conditions are stable and at an acceptable level.
Sustained annulus pressure should be investigated with consideration being given to the following:
• Establish the source of the sustained pressure by sampling and fingerprinting the annulus fluid

• Establish the leak rate into the annulus. This is usually achieved by measuring pressure build up
(or drop off) in an annulus. The annulus fluid composition will have a large impact on the
pressure build up, particularly if liquid is passing into a gas filled annulus
• The casing tubing and cement conditions of the annuli should be assessed, either by sampling
or full engineering assessment. The MAASP of the adjacent annulus with casing shoe formation
leak-off strength, should be confirmed based on most recent data
• The consequences of large volumes of gas in an annulus, and annulus barrier component failure,
and loss of containment should be considered
• The annulus liquid level should be checked on a regular basis
• Well logs, such as temperature logs, may provide useful information
• Consider installation of second wellhead annulus sidearm valves, with a corresponding update
to the performance standard.
• Actions taken in response to sustained annulus pressure are likely to be well and/ or installation
specific and should be informed by risk assessment.
10.4.6 Annulus depressurisation and bleed down
Annulus depressurisation or ‘bleed down’ may be required to maintain the annulus pressure below the
upper operating pressure limit. Annulus pressure management procedures should clearly define the
constraints of depressurisation and consider the following:
• Minimizing the number of bleed downs and volume of fluids bled off to limit flow erosion and
degradation of leak paths
• Bleed downs may introduce fluids into an annulus that could accelerate corrosion or erosion of
casing strings
• Bleeding off liquids which are replaced by gas or lighter liquids can result in higher annulus
pressure and increased hydrocarbon mass in the annulus
• The risk of hydrate formation during bleed-off of hydrocarbon gas should be addressed
• Contingency plans should be in place to manage annulus pressure during shut downs when
bleed off facilities may not be available
• When pressure is bled from an annulus, the following information should be recorded:
• Date and time
• Well, slot number and annulus bled down
• Time to bleed down
• Pressure bled down
• Estimated volume of fluid drained
• Type of fluid (gas, liquid, mixture) bled off and weight, if possible
• If the fluid bled off changes state (e.g. from gas to liquid)
This information should be reported to the person accountable for evaluating well integrity and
recommending further investigation or action.

10.5 Xmas tree and wellhead valves
10.5.1 Barriers within wellheads
Wellhead designs and seal configurations provide void spaces within the wellhead. On surface
wellheads, these should be accessed to confirm the integrity of barriers between different annuli and
the environment.
Casing void spaces on surface wellhead systems should be tested at installation to ensure the integrity
of packoff seals and ring gaskets. The well operator should determine the frequency of further testing
based on an assessment of the risks e.g. personnel potentially exposed to a release of pressurised fluids
vs. the benefits of confirming integrity by stinging. The risk assessment should be informed by reliability
findings specific to the asset and the wellhead type.
The pre-job risk assessment should include potential mitigation if the check valve fails to hold pressure
after stinging operations.
Positive pressure testing should be carefully considered in relation to the wellhead design and the
function that some seals provide within the wellhead. A variety of bleed, test and other port fittings and
buried check valves may have been installed.
Most wellhead voids should be isolated from pressure sources and therefore the presence of pressure
may indicate seal failure and potential communication.
When testing wellhead plugs and fittings due consideration should be given to the potential for pressure
behind the fitting, for example trapped in a void, and the hazard this may present. The use of fittings
where pressure can be measured before removal is advantageous in this situation.
10.5.2 Wellhead valves
Valves associated with annulus gas lift and jet pumps should be tested and maintained on the same
basis as xmas tree valves.
Wellhead valves installed on annuli should be tested and maintained at appropriate intervals.
Commonly this is at the same time, and using the same methods, as for xmas tree valves.
Valves installed within the wellhead profile may be simple Non-Return Valves (NRV), or actuated surface
annulus safety valves.
10.5.3 Xmas tree valves
The xmas tree valves provide several individual potential barriers between process systems and the well.
During normal operation of the well the flowline is an active barrier, and the header valves provide
potential barriers for the containment of well fluids. It may then be acceptable that individual xmas tree
valves do not have to provide a ‘leak tight’ barrier. The well-operator may accept that the actuated xmas
tree valves that are part of the ESD system may have leak rate acceptance criteria.

10.5.4 Testing xmas tree valves
The frequency of testing valves should be validated by reliability findings specific to the asset and type
of valve or location.
The test method(s) to assess valve leakage should detail how the tests are performed. Several ways of
testing may be required to validate the condition of every valve on a xmas tree and wellhead. Inflow
testing using natural (or applied gas lift) well pressure, and measuring pressure build up or pressure fall
off in cavities adjacent to the valve, may be used. Alternatively, split gate valves or wells without
pressure may be tested using a test pump.
There are currently no industry-wide standard leak rate acceptance criteria for subsea xmas tree valves.
Alternatives may be specified in the method or performance standard for example:
• [Ref 46, 72 and 74]

• 2cm3 per minute per inch of valve bore
• Operator specific ‘rules of thumb’
• Leak tight
The time to closure for actuated valves should be a performance standard. This may be included in the
Installation verification scheme.
If a valve fails to test ‘as found’ (i.e. before greasing and cycling), this should be recorded and reported.
If the valve passes the test after being functioned and lubricated several times, this should also be
recorded.
The aim of the testing is not just to get a valve to pass the test, but to gauge how effective the valves
would be if they were used in an emergency. If the full information is not reported, then the installation
duty holder and well-operator will not be given the full picture of the valve status. They may also miss
generic issues and latent defects of valves.
Valves that fail to test after lubrication, multiple functioning, and attempts to test, should be identified
for corrective action in the test report, and a repair order raised with a timescale for repair/replacement
and retesting.

10.5.5 Example of valve failure matrix
A matrix may be drawn as an illustration of valve status and reactions to problems.
Lower Upper
DHSV Flow wing Failure Type Notes
master master
X Risk assessment. +
Change-
X Single management
Failure policy. Continued
production with
X
timetable for repair
X Shut-in well + risk
assessment.
X X Restart production
only with
Dual failure dispensation from
or single a technical
authority and
DHSV
X X positive outcome
from risk
assessment.
Definite repair date
X X
Shut well in. Plan
Failure with repairs.
X X
DHSV or Consider installing
X X deep set plug
triple failure
immediately
X X X
X = Failed valve
Table 12. Example Valve Failure Matrix
This is a generic example, and well-operators may wish to produce matrices for their wells. These should
reflect their internal standards and procedures.
10.5.6 Valve removal plugs
Well-operators should have policies and procedures in place covering the use of VR plugs on surface
wellheads. Where VR plugs are used on wellhead side outlets to effect the inner isolation of a double
isolation, solid bull plugs should not be used to effect the outer isolation. In such a configuration, failure
of the VR plug could lead to trapped pressure which could not be safely vented. Where VR plugs are
used to effect isolations, procedures should be in place to routinely check the integrity of such plugs
and change them out if required.
Well-operators should have procedures in place for the safe installation and removal of VR plugs using
the correct tooling.
Unless there is an alternative way to monitor annulus pressure, VR plugs should not be routinely
installed in both side outlets of an individual casing spool since this leads to an inability to monitor
annulus pressure.
10.5.7 Xmas tree and wellhead instrumentation and accessories
Ancillary equipment may also be critical to maintaining well integrity, including:
• Pressure and temperature gauges/transducers

• Sand and corrosion monitors
• Chemical injection facilities
• Valve actuation systems
Well instrumentation should be included in installation instrumentation verification schemes. The

instrumentation should be calibrated and functionally verified to conform to appropriate performance
standards.
Well equipment should be included in either the well examination or verification processes.
Well-operators should have procedures in place to ensure that fittings are not removed without first
safely checking for, and venting off, any trapped pressure behind them.
Fittings (e.g. plugs, bleed nipples, tie down bolts and VR plugs) should be correctly identified and
recorded on schematics. In some cases, it is useful to label the fittings, especially where fittings with
different functions and modes of operation may look the same. Fittings should be subject to controlled
maintenance and inspection to ensure their continued fitness for purpose.
Wellhead accessories (e.g. lubricators, test pumps and stingers) should be subject to independent
certification that the equipment design is suitable for the intended purpose, and this equipment should
be subject to maintenance and inspection to ensure continued fitness for purpose.
Duplication of assurance by well operation and production operations teams may be a benefit to ensure
continuous fitness for purpose.
10.5.8 Potential damage to subsea xmas trees
10.5.8.1 Over-trawling by fishing boats
The probability of a wellhead/xmas tree being damaged by fishing activity depends on:
• Fishing vessels trawling in area (a study should be carried out by the well-operator)
• Vessels ignoring or unaware of well position (recorded on Kingfisher charts)
http://www.seafish.org/industry-support/kingfisher-information-services
• Dynamic snagging load from boat
The planned and as-built wellhead/xmas tree should be assessed to estimate the minimum load that
would be likely to lead to loss of containment.
See [Ref 77] for more details.
A review of the lateral and torsional resistance should be carried out for all wellhead/xmas trees and
compared to the potential trawling loads.
Well-operators should check that all their wells (operating or suspended) are included in current
versions of the Kingfisher charts and ‘Yellow card’.

10.5.8.2 Dropped connector assembly
Xmas tree assemblies should be assessed to estimate their resistance to dropped objects damage.
Previous studies have indicated that xmas trees should withstand up to 300 kilojoules of impact energy
without xmas tree failure.
The well-operator should ensure that the connector assembly is run and pulled over a ‘safe area’ some
distance from the wellhead. The connector should only be moved over and away from the xmas tree at
a small height (i.e.1-2 metres) above the top of the tree.
Dropped objects onto wellheads are also a hazard during completion operations as well as
intervention/workover operations.
10.5.8.3 Other dropped objects
Other potential dropped objects include:
• Dropped anchors
• Dragging anchor
• Dropped load at sea surface from a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) in attendance at the
well site
Impact energies from anchors (including anchor drag) are likely to be much less than the required
wellhead/tree failure energies. The small size of the tree footprint makes the probability of contact very
low in the extremely unlikely event of anchor drag.
Drilling rig anchors could possibly damage the wellhead but no examples of complete loss of rig position
are recorded anywhere in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) where mooring analysis is applied. The rig
will have an emergency mooring release mechanism, which would be activated in a drift situation,
especially near the subsea infrastructure.
Dropped objects from the MODU at the sea surface leading to impact to the wellhead are considered
to be of very low frequency. It is assumed that lifting of loads in excess of the above levels would be
managed by special procedure.
Cranes should work within safe areas dependent on the type of load being handled. This may require
shifting the rig to a safe area away from the wellhead for heavy loads such as xmas trees, etc.
10.5.8.4 Installation failure
Subsea wells connected to a Floating Production Storage and Offloading Unit (FPSO) may be at risk, due
to a failure of the installation’s mooring or dynamic positioning systems. Depending on the field layout,
the production riser load may be transferred to the xmas tree.

10.6 Downhole Safety Valves
10.6.1 Types of DHSV
A variety of emergency shutoff valves may be installed within the completion, wellhead or annulus, to
prevent inventory loss in the event of catastrophic damage to the xmas tree and wellhead.
The main types of DHSV are:
• Surface controlled subsurface safety valve – hydraulic control line operated

• Subsurface controlled subsurface safety valves - storm chokes
• Water injection valves – inject through, failsafe closed
• Surface controlled annulus safety valves or alternatives
• Storm chokes or flow activated subsurface safety valve.
10.6.2 Testing of DHSV
Testing of the DHSV and control system usually includes inflow testing of closed DHSV, and monitoring
of the closure time and volume returns of the control line. Valve leakage may be assessed for compliance
with [Ref 74].
Testing standards should be defined by the well-operator and clearly documented.
DHSVs should be tested at least every six months, unless local conditions or documented historical data
indicate a different testing frequency see [Ref 74].
The integrity of the control line should be tested at the same time as the DHSV. ‘Lock-in’ pressure testing
and testing for hydrocarbon ingress into the line may be used to confirm containment within the
downhole control system.
Personnel should be made aware of the possibility of pressure and hydrocarbons in the control line if
the control line has to be opened. Contingency procedures to deal with the situation should be in place.
Ingress could occur slowly over a period of days or weeks in a depressurised or vented control line.
Consideration should also be given to the potential for over-pressuring control lines and the DHSV
especially as the wellhead pressure declines; if the control line pressure is maintained at the initial value
unacceptably high-pressure differentials may be created.
10.7 Testing of gas lift valves

Testing of annuli on wells with gas lift should be performed when the gas lift valves are part of a well
barrier. The objectives of the test are to confirm that the non-return valves of the gas lift valves are
functioning and to confirm tubing and packer integrity.

10.8 Deviation control/management of change
Deficiencies identified from monitoring, inspection, testing and maintenance should be handled in
accordance with the well-operator’s dispensation/deviation and MoC processes. This would typically
include:
• Investigation and risk assessment

• Policy/standard/procedure compliance review
• Definition of on-site management of deviations, including additional controls
10.8.1 Repairs/corrective actions
When a well barrier, or element, fails (in service or during test), or it is identified that failure could be
expected to occur before the next scheduled inspection, the well-operator should review the well status
to ascertain that there are at least two available barriers in place.
If there are not two available well barriers in place, the well-operator should undertake remedial work
to reinstate at least two available barriers. The timing of the work will depend on the results of the well-
operator’s risk assessment and the performance standards for the equipment. In addition, the well-
operator should undertake a risk assessment to determine the way forward for the well until the
remedial work has been completed.
Well-operators should have a process to escalate the level of management approval required for
repeated deferral of remedial work.
10.9 Operating conditions affecting well integrity

If well logging, or similar operations, are being planned for operational reasons, consideration should
be given to including tools to assess the condition of the tubing and the rest of the completion.
If there are concerns about the downhole integrity of the well, specific logging may be carried out for
assessment purposes. The value of the information gained should be balanced against the hazards of
entering a well, and the potential for causing damage by the logging process.
10.9.1 Failure of well equipment
10.9.1.1 Temperature and pressure
The implications of temperature and pressure changes of an operating well should be carefully
considered and controlled for:
• Re-perforation of virgin reservoir layers

• Conversion of well service (e.g. from natural to gas-lifted production or production to injection)
• Pumping of treatment fluids

10.9.1.2 Corrosion
Logging (calliper, sonic, etc) of production tubing may indicate the location and extent of corrosion.
Monitoring of produced fluids may clarify causes and potential for control.
The effects of corrosive substances (e.g. CO2 and H2S) should be considered. These include:
• The souring of reservoirs after water injection activities

• Lift gas containing CO2 at the interface with the static completion fluid in the ‘A’ annulus
Preventative treatments to minimise potential corrosion of the well include:
• Injection water and lift gas treated and maintained within strict quality limits
• Produced fluids treated using downhole chemical injection
• Cathodic protection to limit external corrosion
10.9.1.3 Erosion and sand production
Production of abrasive solids should be monitored and controlled.
Circulating sand subsurface should be considered. Wells with high risk of sand ingress may need
additional downhole monitoring to ensure integrity of subsurface components.
10.9.1.4 Scale/asphaltene/hydrates/wax
Produced fluids, in combination with specific operating conditions, can result in deposition of
contaminants that can directly affect well valves and compromise integrity.
10.9.1.5 Biological erosion
Biological erosion should be considered. Specification of annulus fluids may need to include biocides,
etc., to prevent or reduce biological effects.
10.9.1.6 Downhole chemical injection issues
Selection of incompatible downhole injection chemicals, e.g. scale inhibitor, can lead to increased
corrosion rates.
Consideration should be given to the possible effect of these chemicals on the production casing string
in the event of injection line failure.
10.9.1.7 Seismicity and Other Geological Movement
Loss of well integrity may occur because of natural or induced seismicity, for example due to
compaction-related fault slippage. Consideration should be given to casing and cement design and
performance standards, and placement in relation to zones where geo-mechanical movement is
possible, to ensure that if such movement occurs the well retains sufficient integrity that containment
is not lost.

10.9.1.8 Downhole seal failure
Over time downhole seals may fail. For example, downhole safety valve seals may start to allow gas to
enter the control line. In this scenario the gas can migrate into the surface storage tank for the control
line fluid, and thence to atmosphere, or cause a pressure build up in the holding tank if the tank is
sealed. Operators should evaluate this risk and put mitigations in place e.g. gas detectors, ventilation
etc.
10.9.2 Failure of risers/conductors
For offshore platform wells external corrosion and failure of risers/conductors, from the seabed to the
platform, is a concern, particularly in the splash zone area.
In the original design, consideration should be given to soil strengths and the possibility of fatigue failure
in later life.
A strategy should be put in place for monitoring and managing the conductor and surface casing
throughout the well life cycle, including any centralisation and platform guides.
Conductors and/or surface casing may have been designed as main load bearing elements for the well
and/or the platform structure. The well-operator should ensure that the load bearing function of the
conductor/riser/surface casing is clearly documented, and the implications of failure understood, with
mitigations in place. See section 5.3.2.
10.9.3 Non-well equipment that could impact on well integrity
The well-operator should be aware of non-well equipment that may impact on well integrity and should
ensure that this equipment is maintained, and mitigations are in place in case of failure. Examples of
equipment to consider include:
• Caissons (e.g. for seawater lift pumps) that could fall and damage adjacent well structures
• Flowline hangers that could fail and thereby cause flowline failure or load transfer onto the
xmas tree
• Heavy equipment that could fall onto a well (e.g. crane lifts over wells or rig operations on
adjacent wells)
Non-well equipment that may impact on well integrity should be considered in the well integrity
management scheme.
10.10 Review of degradation and life extension

Mature assets may be older or have an expected lifespan beyond that originally anticipated. The well-
operator should ensure that every well is structurally and operationally competent irrespective of age.
Well integrity monitoring processes should adequately address additional types, and potentially
increased frequency, of failures that may be associated with age related degradation of components.

Increasing age should prompt consideration of undetected degradation or the onset of failure
mechanisms that may well be un-noticed as wells age. Additional indicators and tests to establish
changes of well condition should be considered. For example, performing a casing wall thickness
assessment prior to a heavy workover.
It is important to consider degradation processes that could result in failure, so that management plans
are put in place to mitigate degradation or pre-emptively repair or replace ageing components, fixtures
and fittings etc.
The key elements of a program to manage the degradation, ageing and the potential extension of life
of wells which should be included in the Well Integrity Management System (WIMS) are:
• Proactive approach to Asset Life Extension (ALE).

• Well integrity failure trending and component degradation analysis.
• Degradation and failure assessments to ensure well integrity management processes remain fit
for purpose.
• Examination and assessment of the ongoing competency of processes and personnel to
continue the management of well integrity into the future.
WIMS should specifically consider ALE, degradation and well component failure during well life cycle.
The well-operator should be aware of ‘creeping changes’ that occur over time that may not be identified
through MoC processes. As far as practicable the integrity management system should identify creeping
changes, the adverse effects of which may not be immediately apparent. Creeping change may be
weakening not only well structures and components, but also the knowledge and experience of
operating the wells of an asset over an extended period.
Degradation may lead to well component failures. Interpretation of failures will help to clarify the
mechanisms, potential consequences and the development of strategies to minimize the potential
effects of degradation and component failure.
The well-operator should develop strategies to manage the degradation and failure of wells. Strategies
in the early years of production may be very different from those in later life as the production profile
evolves and will vary from field to field. Each operator may develop a combination of strategies, based
on the operating environment of their assets. Potential strategy types are described below:
Reactive reacting to failures and repair / replace as soon as reasonably

practicable with known spares availability
Proactive gathering and analysis of data, monitoring trends and predicting

failures allowing maintenance prior to failure
Pre-emptive regularly workover wells, replace trees before degradation becomes

an issue thus minimizing downtime
Review and assessment of the degradation and failure of well components is essential to ensure the
continuing efficacy of inspection and maintenance strategies. Any additional failure mechanisms that
are identified through well life should be reflected in WIMS revisions.

Operators may find it effective to include a regular (typically annual), forward-looking life extension
review of the well stock, as part of the Well Examination scheme, so that integrity can be managed in a
way which is always consistent with the ALARP principle.
10.11 Management of late-life wells

Late-life wells are simply an extension to the operating phase of the well life cycle, where the
commercial value of a well is declining over time. Degradation of the well and cost of maintenance and
repair will eventually exceed the value of the well and result in cessation of operation.
All wells, regardless of value and operational status, should continue to be subject to the well-operator’s
WIMS and Well Examination scheme, until they are abandoned.
One of the key requirements of well integrity management is to minimise the risk of loss of well
containment to ALARP. A well that is no longer operated and is redundant should be assessed to
determine whether the major accident hazards and risks associated with the well can be reduced below
what was considered acceptable for a well which was flowing. Reassessment of: available and additional
barriers; disconnection and isolation; and revised monitoring and verification may identify potential risk
reduction measures and a requirement to change the operating status of the well.
A well that is no longer operating but is not decommissioned (abandoned phase 3) is in one of three
statuses:
• 1. Shut-in
• 2. Plugged
• 3. Suspended (abandonment phases 1 and 2)
For more information well-operators may refer to the Oil & Gas Authority document: Guidance for
applications for suspension of inactive wells, October 2018 [Ref 143].
10.11.1 Shut-in well
A shut-in well is one with one or more valves closed in the direction of flow. Reinstatement of the
operation of the shut-in well should be possible at any time without the requirement for intervention
or the reconnection of facilities or control systems.
Shut-in should be considered as a temporary well status and is usually associated with process system
outage or planned installation shut-downs. The installation operator will be expected to define: which
xmas tree, wellhead and downhole valves will be shut, and the requirement for the cessation of artificial
lift; isolation of sources of water or gas injection, and gas lift inventory removal, appropriate to the
reason for well(s) shut-in.
If a well is shut-in due to impairment of well operability or failure of components and barriers, the well
should be shut-in in a manner that minimises the risk of loss of well containment.
An increasing proportion of wells are being shut-in for reasons such as commercial considerations and
water handling issues. For prolonged periods of well shut-in the well-operator should define in

regulatory applications and notifications a date when the operation of the well is expected to resume
or when plugging or abandonment will be implemented.
A well that is shut-in should be monitored and maintained according to a risk-based schedule defined
by the well-operator with due consideration of the risk profile brought about by the change in flow- and
non-flow-wetted components irrespective of whether the well is hooked up to production facilities.
The status and monitoring requirements of a shut-in well are not determined by whether it is hooked-
up to production and ESD facilities.
The well-operator should clearly define how each of the well operating parameters will be monitored
and recorded during periods when the well is shut-in.
10.11.2 Plugged well
A well is plugged when an object or material is placed in the well with intention to function as a qualified
barrier to isolate the wellbore from the reservoir. Guidance on the isolation of a well by plugging will
need to cover:
• The purpose of the plugging

• the number and location of plugs (e.g. deep-set, shallow)
• the type(s) of plug material (e.g. cement)
• the mechanical design
• the permanence or expected life of the plugs (individually and in combination)
• the verification requirements to assure the competence of the plug(s) as a barrier.
A well with a back-pressure valve or tubing-hanger plug installed may be considered as plugged,
however a down hole safety valve (SCSSSV) is not considered a down-hole isolation device.
The well-operator should define how the well operating parameters and applicable limits should be
monitored and recorded when the well is plugged. The planned preventative maintenance routine and
frequency should also be defined. Components above the isolation device are no longer flow wetted,
however degradation mechanisms that may influence the competence and longevity of plugs should be
considered.
10.11.3 Suspended (abandonment phases 1 and 2)
Phase 1 and 2 well abandonment refers to the permanent isolation of the reservoir and intermediate
zones with flow potential. The wellhead is still in place. Refer to Oil & Gas UK Well Decommissioning
Guidelines [Ref 24] for further details.
Suspended wells are temporary. The well-operator should establish a periodic review process that
documents and details the intended plan for the well, which may include its permanent abandonment.
10.11.4 Review of the availability and continued use of wells
The well-operator should conduct a regular (annual) review of the status of each well (i.e. operating,
shut-in, plugged or suspended).

The review should establish whether the wells that are no longer operating are:
• Available for continued operation (fully connected and functional)

• Have potential further use and will be required for operation in the next year
• Redundant and will never be used again.
The well-operator should establish a plan for each well which identifies restoration to operation,
plugging or abandonment.

11 Intervention/Workover
This section covers the entry of a completed well for any purpose.
Intervention/workover operations may be carried out by drilling rigs, vessels, snubbing units, coiled
tubing units, electric wireline/braided/slickline units and pumping/stimulation units.

On a production well, potential barriers will have been activated to shut-in the well before the
workover/intervention starts.
A well barrier may be damaged or unavailable and the intervention/workover is needed to repair or
replace it. The lack of the well barrier should be considered in the planning and operations.
Pressure Control Equipment (PCE) (for example rig BOP, workover riser, snubbing unit BOP) should be
installed on top of the xmas tree or tubing spool top flange and tested, before any well barrier is opened,
compromised or removed.
Gas lifted wells will have hydrocarbon gas in the annulus between the completion packer and the
wellhead or annulus safety valve. This should be displaced out of the well before workover starts. The
gas lift valves may be replaced by dummy gas lift valves. If these dummy valves can be tested adequately,
the tubing can be considered a well barrier.
11.1.1 Well barriers during intervention/workover
An active barrier is needed during workover/intervention operations such as:
• Riser/lubricator/stuffing box for wireline operations

• Stripper rubbers (annulus) and work string check valves (internal) for coil tubing
Running wire or pipe into a well may compromise some of the well barriers, e.g. the DHSV or master
valve in a ‘conventional’ xmas tree (that is a tree with in-line valves).
Alternative potential barriers are needed during the intervention operations such as:
• Wireline BOP/valves
• Shear seal BOP
• Coiled tubing BOP
• Hydraulic workover (HWO) BOP
Installation safety case duty holders should have performance standards for workover/intervention PCE.
These standards should include closure times as identified in associated risk assessment.
Emergency closure times for shear seal BOP (measured from initiation to closure) should be less than
45 seconds, to align with typical closure time of actuated surface xmas tree valves.
Closure time for coiled tubing or HWO unit BOP and wireline valves should be designed to avoid a
release sufficient to create either an explosive or life-threatening composition of fluid or gas.

Testing may be conducted before installation on the well to demonstrate closure within the design time.
It may be necessary for the wire or pipe to be sheared for two barriers to be activated.
It may be necessary to lift the pressure control equipment during a well intervention to perform a repair
or to fish equipment. For these situations two barriers may be attained by closing one mechanical
barrier and having a second mechanical barrier available to close if required. For example, when
removing the pressure control equipment above a single closed mechanical barrier to perform repair
operations such as dropping a cutter bar, repairing a greasehead or removing wire with a broken strand,
the shear device can act as the second barrier, remaining open during the operation but being available
to close if the first barrier fails. The well-operator may rely on the shearing capability of the
completion/xmas tree valves or the intervention BOP. More commonly, an additional blind/shear or
shear/seal BOP is installed as part of the intervention rig up. If shearing is required, the sequencing of
activating the barriers is important, and should be included in the intervention procedures/preparation.
All affected barriers should be re-instated and tested at the end of workover/intervention operations.
11.1.2 Completion fluid as a barrier
Completion fluid is usually solids-free brine which is designed to minimise damage to the formation. It
does not form a filter cake like drilling mud. When brine is used as a column of fluid to provide
hydrostatic overbalance, the fluid needs to be supported (by a packer or plug) to prevent it dissipating
into the formation.
The plug plus brine can be considered a single barrier. The fluid reduces or reverses the pressure
differential across the plug. The level of fluid in the well and the surface volume of fluid should be
monitored continuously to identify any losses or gains of fluid.
Fluid loss control materials or fluid loss control pills may be used in clear brines to reduce fluid loss to
the formation, and to keep the well full of fluid. Care should be taken during intervention, not to create
a swabbing effect in the well.
In wells without flow potential in either direction (e.g. a well open to an impermeable formation such
as a shale gas well prior to stimulation) a brine may be considered to be a barrier without a plug provided
the level of fluid in the well is continuously monitored and can be maintained sufficient to prevent any
flow from the well.
11.1.3 Downhole safety valve as a well barrier
A DHSV may be used as a well barrier provided:
• It is the lower barrier with a closed tree valve or mechanical plug above it preventing dropped
objects accidentally opening the DHSV
• The DHSV has been tested to demonstrate it has zero leak rate
• The tubing integrity is confirmed

11.1.4 Full bore tool strings
Any tool string that contains full bore components (i.e. work on or above the safety valve) should be
short enough to be contained between the xmas tree swab valve and the BOP. This may not always be
feasible when operating without rig support (stand alone on jacket top deck) and should be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis.
Precautions should be taken to avoid the hazards of fouling or sticking full bore tools across the xmas
tree. Examples of full bore tools are:
• Shallow set bridge plugs (above DHSV)

• Wireline insert safety valves
• Hanger plugs
• Back pressure valves (BPV)
Mitigation may include running a full-bore drift which simulates the full-bore tool. Other considerations
may include a mechanism of release from the running tool, should the running tool pre-shear, allowing
locking dogs to partially expand and prevent withdrawal of the tools.
Consideration should be given to tool string length to ensure that barriers can be initiated if full bore
tools, such as a wireline insert safety valve or hanger plugs, become stuck across the xmas tree.
Mitigation may include well kill capability with a contingency plan in place.
11.1.5 Long tool strings
Tool strings for general work below the DHSV may, on occasion, be designed to be longer than the
distance between the swab valve and the BOP. In such instances, a thorough risk assessment should be
carried out to consider additional mitigation.
11.1.6 Installation and testing of well barriers
The barriers in the completed well may be degraded (not in full working order) or have failed: this may
be the reason for the workover. Additional barriers may therefore be required to maintain two barriers
at all stages of the operations.
If two tested barriers cannot be installed, alternative precautions should be planned. The risk
assessment covering these procedures should thoroughly consider all aspects, including identifying any
suitable mitigations and contingencies.
The first stage of an intervention/workover may be to displace formation fluids from the tubing. This
may be done through production facilities. The displacement fluid is usually water, seawater offshore,
but may be brine at a higher density. The formation fluid in the tubing may be circulated out of the well
to the production facilities, or bullheaded back into the formation. In any case, sufficient flow rate and
pump capacity are required to ensure removal of all the hydrocarbons from both the tubing and
annulus.
There have been incidents caused by hydrocarbon releases from wells classified as being unable to flow
to surface.

The connection between the xmas tree and the PCE should be tested to the maximum potential
wellhead pressure, plus safety factor if needed.
If possible, a deep-set plug (at the bottom of the completion near the packer) should be set to provide
a second active inner barrier. The well above the deep-set plug and packer may be filled with kill weight
fluid to provide another active barrier (if the fluid can be monitored).
Well barriers should be monitored throughout the operation and should include reporting of annulus
pressures.
11.1.7 Well control equipment/barriers
Potential well control barriers are those used as a backup to the active devices and include a BOP
(variable, pipe, blind and shear rams). They need activation to close in the well.
Shearing is for use in an emergency, when it is necessary to shear whatever is in the hole and then seal
the well. This could include:
• A wire cutting device located on the deck (backed by a blind ram or a valve to seal the wellbore)
• BSR – designed to shear pipe or wire and seal the well
• Shear rams – designed to shear but not seal
• Blind rams – these seal on open hole (required after non-sealing shear rams are used)
Shear rams on a wireline valve will cut wire or cable only.
Some xmas tree valves have a cutting capability and are designed to seal after cutting. If valves are used
for emergency closure, or they have closed on wire, they should be inspected and redressed as required.
Installation safety case duty holders should have performance standards for workover and intervention
PCE. These standards should include closure time. Key variables influencing BOP closure time are: hose
internal diameter, hose length, control fluid viscosity and temperature. As temperature decreases hose
internal diameter, hose length and fluid viscosity have an increasing impact. When operating in
temperatures below 50 degrees Fahrenheit consideration should be given to using a low viscosity fluid
and/or hoses of ½” internal diameter or greater.

11.1.8 Intervention/workover well integrity matrices
Barriers
boundaries
Active Stuffing box Casing(s)
Cement outside casing

Wireline BOP
Wellhead
Potential DHSV1
Casing hanger and seal
Xmas tree master valve1
Tubing hanger and seal
Shear seal BOP Tubing and gas lift valves
Shearing
Xmas tree valves2 Completion packer
Table 14. Wireline/Slickline Operations Example Matrix
Note 1 – may only be effective after the wire is cut by other means.
Note 2 – depends if the valves can cut the wire.

Figure 5.
Example Barrier Schematic for Wireline Operations
Figure 5 (10.7.2) from NORSOK D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations (Rev. 4, June 2013)
[Ref 110] are reproduced by Oil and Gas UK in this Issue 4 of the Oil and Gas UK Well Integrity Guidelines
under licence from Standard Online AS 11/2013 © All rights are reserved. Standard Online makes no
guarantees or warranties as to the correctness of the reproduction. In any case of dispute, the NORSOK
original shall be taken as authoritative. See www.standard.no.

Inner Pressure containment
Annulus barrier
barrier boundaries
Coil Casing(s)
Active Check Stripper rubbers Cement outside casing
valves
Wellhead
Potential Coil Tubing BOP Casing hanger and seal
Tubing and gas lift valves
Completion packer
Shearing Coil tubing shear rams
Tubing hanger and seal
Table 15. Example of a Coiled Tubing Operations Matrix
11.2 Responsibilities for the well

The well-operator is responsible for the integrity of the well throughout its life cycle.
Operational responsibility for the well may be handed over to a different team for
intervention/workover operations. There should be a formal handover with a written status report
covering at least the well integrity and barriers.
Personnel responsible for the well in its ‘operate and maintain’ stage should be consulted in the planning
and preparation of the intervention/workover operations.
11.2.1 Isolation from installation emergency shutdown system
The xmas tree of the well being worked on may be isolated from the main facility installation control
and ESD systems. However, as ESD systems become more reliable, the requirement to isolate the xmas
tree from the ESD system should be addressed in the individual risk assessment.
The primary control panel should be sited in a safe area away from any hazards that could impede
operations. This equipment should be classified as safety critical and should be covered by the
installation verification scheme.
The operation of the control panel for the well is vital. The persons controlling the panel:
• Should always be able to activate the panel during operations

• Should always be in contact with the equipment operators, driller, well supervisor and control
room
The panel operator should be competent to recognise an emergency and if appropriate in the
circumstances to shut-in the well without consultation.

The risk assessment may require a second control panel or emergency button to be sited remotely from
the primary control panel. These should be located along pre-defined escape routes. Examples of where
secondary controls should be available include:
• Bridge-linked platforms (on the accommodation side of the bridge)

• Installations or wells with high levels of H2S
• New installations where the costs of permanent installation of such a system are minimal
11.3 Intervention/workover planning

The well-operator should issue an approved programme or operational procedures covering:
• Current status of well

• Objectives of intervention/workover
• Responsibility for well (may be handed over from production)
• Responsibility for managing operations
• Risk identification and mitigation
• The operational sequence with enough detail for the proposed activity
• Contingency plans (well conditions are likely to be different from predictions)
• Emergency plans (in response to well or associated installation emergency)
• A diagram showing the PCE arrangement
Modelling, including appropriate fatigue modelling, should be carried out to ensure there is a good
understanding of the medium (wire/tubulars) limitations in terms of potential failures.
11.3.1 Risk assessment
Extra consideration is required if the reason for the intervention/workover is to replace or repair a failed
barrier.
11.3.2 Well control planning
The well-operator is responsible for ensuring that suitable well control equipment is provided for the
operations. The suitability of the equipment covers:
• Pressure rating
• Internal diameter (correct size for the wireline, coil or jointed pipe to be used)
• Number and placement of rams
• Number and capacity of shear/seal rams
• Material to suit well or introduce a fluid e.g. H2S
• Condition (maintenance and testing) of equipment and primary controls
• Emergency and backup controls
• Associated equipment (lubricator, crossovers, control skid)
• Temperature rating
• Non-metallic materials (elastomers)

Offshore installation duty holders should include the well control equipment in their verification
scheme, which will provide an additional check.
If equipment to be run in the well cannot be sheared by the well control equipment, special precautions
need to be taken. Contingency plans should be in place if there is a problem with unshearable
equipment across the BOP.
11.3.3 Emergency planning
Well kill facilities should be available during intervention/workover operations where fluid is part of the
well control arrangements. If not immediately available, contingency plans should be made to provide
the equipment. Well kill facilities should be available on mobile units (with riser to surface) when
connected to a subsea well.
There should be an emergency plan covering activating potential barriers in an emergency. This should
include recognising when the wire/pipe should be cut, and the sequence for activating the barriers.
There should also be remote shutdown button(s) so that the well can be shut-in, even if the well control
panel is disabled.
Regular and realistic well control drills should be carried out before starting the intervention/workover.
These drills should be repeated as needed to ensure a suitable response.
There should be a plan of action in the event of an installation alarm not connected with the
intervention/workover operations. This will include making the well safe, mustering for nonessential
personnel and contacting the installation control room with a roll call of essential personnel at the site.
11.3.4 Information, instruction, training and supervision
In all offshore operations from installations, it is the OIM who has overall charge of the safety of the
intervention/ workover operation. The OIM should be involved in the handover of the well and be kept
aware of the intervention/workover operations.
For operations from vessels that are not installations, the well-operator has the overarching duty for
the health and safety of the operations.
For land operations, the operator of the borehole site has the overarching duty for the health and safety
of the operations.
For all operations, everyone has a duty of cooperation with the main duty holder.
The intervention/workover should be planned and supervised by a competent person to ensure that
procedures and plans are followed in a safe manner.
The roles and responsibilities for pressure control and well integrity should be defined and
communicated to all involved personnel.
If required, specific training should be organised. This may be needed for unusual conditions in the well
or non-standard operations. For example, using a snubbing unit on a production installation will need

training for the workover personnel on the platform systems, and training for installation personnel on
how to coordinate with the snubbing unit.
11.4 Intervention/workover operations
11.4.1 Well handover
Control of the well should be formally transferred to the intervention/workover team.
Information to be transferred at handover includes:
• The status condition and designation of all valves

• Wellhead pressure
• Annulus pressures
• Control line (DHSV and Annulus Safety Valve (ASV)) pressures and status (i.e. pressure locked in
or bled off)
• The flowline pressure
Handover information should be written down and accepted by the intervention/workover team.
If appropriate, this handover may be completed at the well so that the physical location of the valves
can be confirmed.
The personnel responsible for the operations and maintenance of the well should have leak tested the
xmas tree valves.
11.4.2 BOP/well control panel
A temporary control panel is used for control of the completion/xmas tree valves when they are isolated
from the installation controls. The same panel may control the intervention/workover BOP, or it may be
a separate panel. Good communication between the well control panel operator and the
intervention/workover unit personnel is essential.
11.4.3 BOP installation and testing
The BOP maybe tested on a suitable test stump before installation on the well to:
• Check condition of ram inserts

• Check correct line size guide if fitted for wireline
• Check rams meet centrally when functioned (note closing times)
• Pressure test each set of rams from below
• Check function of BOP equalising valve
System verification should be carried out after installation, including a function test of all rams via the
dedicated control system. If shear seal or BOPs are removed temporarily or any hose connection broken,
a repeat verification function test should be done.

11.4.4 Removing xmas tree
For some workovers, the xmas tree needs to be removed for repair, or as the first step in a continued
operation.
Conventional xmas trees may be removed with the tubing in the well, providing the well is plugged with
two barriers typically:
• Deep, completion packer and deep-set plug

• Shallow, tubing hanger and plugs
At least one of the barriers should be tested in the direction of flow (from below), if possible, as there
will be no potential barriers when the xmas tree has been removed and before installation of the BOP.
It may not be possible to test the second plug in the direction of flow. In this case it is necessary to
ensure the plug:
• Is in the correct position

• Is firmly locked in place
• Will withstand pressure from above
Consideration should be given to the effect of wellhead penetrations being potential leak paths e.g. fluid
flow in control lines, etc.
In addition, consideration should be given to the isolation of the xmas tree from the flowline and
production facility.
11.4.5 In-situ tubing repairs
In-situ repairs may be used to seal off a leak in the tubing. They will reduce the internal diameter of the
completion tubing.
Configuration of a wireline set straddle packer assembly or other repair should not compromise the safe
operation of the well.
Use of a straddle packer should not prevent installation of a deep-set plug to isolate the reservoir
interval, even though it may not be possible to run a fixed OD plug to the original nipple through the
straddle.
Alternative ways of installing a deep-set plug include:
• Retrievable straddle assemblies to allow for future deep-set plug installation

• Installation of an insert in the original nipple so that a smaller OD plug can be used
• Use of expandable plugs that will pass through the straddle and seal the completion
Tubing repairs should be tested with an internally applied pressure greater than maximum shut-in
wellhead pressure.
If it is impossible to set a deep plug in the well, the repair should be externally tested to a suitable
pressure which considers the worst-case differential pressure across the patch.

11.4.6 Recovery of equipment from well
Equipment recovered from a well should be inspected to ascertain downhole conditions with respect
to well integrity and the future life of the well.
The results of the inspections and analysis should be recorded, and any learnings considered for future
design improvements.
11.5 Wireline operations

Slickline is externally smooth single strand wire which is used:
• To convey tools in and out of the well

• As a single coaxial conductor or optical core for data transmission
Braided or electric wireline is a multistrand line with a conductor wire, armour and insulation. This
construction makes it more difficult to achieve a seal around the wire compared to slickline. If it breaks
it tends to collapse into bundles, or birds-nests, which are difficult to fish out of the hole. Braided cable
may require seasoning to effect a gas tight seal.
The active barrier for wireline operations is:
• A stuffing box or liquid seal for slickline operations

• A grease injection head for braided line operations
The effects of ambient temperature, well fluids, well pressure and temperature on the grease should
be considered during planning. The equipment should be monitored during operations to ensure it
maintains a seal.
11.6 Coiled tubing operations

Coiled (or reeled) tubing is continuous pipe, of various diameters, which is spooled on large reels. The
inner end is connected, via a rotating joint, to the axle. Fluid can be pumped down the tubing and balls
pumped down the pipe for operating downhole tools. These operations are covered by API RP 16ST [Ref
45].
The tubing is pushed in and pulled out of the hole by a tubing injector head. It is important that the
correct pressure is kept on the gripper blocks: too much might crush the pipe, and too little could allow
the pipe to slide into or out of the well without control.
11.6.1 Coiled tubing pressure control equipment
All connections from the xmas tree to the top of the CT BOP should be flanged or clamped and have
metal to metal seals.
For coiled tubing and HWO operations, a riser analysis should be conducted to identify any issues with
loading and buckling from the tree flange to the BOP.
For coiled tubing operations, a shear seal BOP should be installed as close as possible to the xmas tree.

There is a risk of quick connectors backing off during offshore operations due to sea movement. For
offshore operations, all connections should either be flanged or clamped, and have metal to metal seals.
Alternative connections and seals should only be used where they are qualified for the intended purpose
or have been subject to a comprehensive risk assessment and mitigating actions. For example, if a quick
connect is used on a coiled tubing rig up to minimise working at height, then that quick connect should
be marked and regularly monitored for signs of backoff, with remedial actions identified should a
backoff occur.
11.6.2 Annulus barriers
The active barrier for coiled tubing operations on a live well is the stripper packer/stuffing box.
The use of two stripper packers in one stack of coiled tubing pressure containing equipment may be
used, with the lower stripper packer in reserve and not energised.
The potential barrier for coiled tubing is a BOP, a smaller scale version of a rig’s drilling BOP. It is usually
a quad (four ram bodies) and may have pipe, slip, blind or shear rams installed.
11.6.3 Inner barriers
When using coiled tubing on a live well, check valves (nonreturn valves) should be used in the BHA to
prevent backflow, unless operational requirements such as reverse circulating preclude their use. There
are two forms of check valve:
• Dart type
• Flapper type
When NRVs are not run (e.g. when reverse circulating operations are being carried out), then the well-
operator should ensure appropriate mitigations are in place.
The flapper type valve is designed for use with ball operated tools (such as a shear sub to release the
BHA). The dart type valve will not allow the passage of a ball.
Typically, two valves are run in tandem, or a dual flapper valve is used to give backup in case of one
flapper failing to seal.
The coil tubing itself can be a barrier, so its condition should be closely monitored by the service
company to prevent failure during operations.
11.6.4 Coiled tubing life cycle
Four coiled tubing limitations need to be monitored:
• Life limits – when being run on and off the reel and over the goose neck
• Tension limits – vary with the weight of coiled tubing and length run
• Pressure limits – burst and collapse pressures vary with tension and compression
• Diameter and ovality limits – real time monitoring of the pipe is required to ensure that the pipe
is not ballooned, ovalled, or mechanically damaged

• Corrosion and abrasion should be considered, and the pipe inspected if coiled tubing is used in
a corrosive or abrasive environment
To track fatigue loading conditions, coiled tubing companies should have computer-based systems to
quantify and record the historical job exposure of each string.
Depending on the internal pressure present in each section of the coiled tubing while reeling, unreeling
or travelling over the goose neck, varying factors are applied to the cycle count to adjust the cycle life
of that section. Past and present job data should be merged and kept on file to maintain up-to-date
records for each string.
This data should be reviewed by the well-operator during the planning of well intervention/workovers
with coiled tubing.
11.7 Fluid pumping operations and stimulation
11.7.1 General Considerations
There may be a need to pump fluid into a well for operational or reservoir stimulation reasons and such
operations require planning and consideration of well barriers.
To gain access to the well requires breaking into the pressure containment envelope or well pipework
downstream of the production master valve(s).
The effects of the fluid being injected, and the pressures generated on the well pressure containment
boundary should be part of the well design and should be reviewed as part of the planning for fluid
pumping operations.
Facilities should be available to monitor adjacent annuli for pressure build up; the cause of any pressure
increase (temperature, pipe expansion or leak) should be verified.
After pumping, all annuli (that can be monitored) should be monitored regularly until temperature
equilibrium is reached.
Pumping operations should be conducted in accordance with written procedures/standards agreed

between the well-operator and the installation (or vessel) operator (or borehole site operator)
considering the following:
• Fitment of pressure relief valves

• Pressure bleed off arrangements
• Communication especially if the pump unit is in a different or remote location
• “Make Safe” procedure if the pumping operation is suspended
• Use of a check valve in the pump in line
• Selection of appropriate temporary piping (size, pressure rating, fluid composition etc.)
• Anchoring and restraining of temporary piping
The above is not an exhaustive list of the issues to be considered

The connection from the pumping equipment should be tested before opening any valves in the
pipework.
All the well barriers and pipework should be reinstated and tested after the operations.
11.7.2 Stimulation Operations
For stimulation operations consideration should be given to the containment of induced fractures and
the risk of induced seismicity.
11.7.2.1 Fracture Containment
Well integrity during hydraulic fracturing operations should always be maintained. The induced fracture
should be contained so that it does not create an unplanned flow path. The hydraulic fracturing
programme should describe the control and mitigation measures for fracture containment and the
proposed design of the fracture geometry including:
• Fracturing target zones

• Aquifers (both fresh and saline water)
• Sealing mechanisms preventing fracturing fluids migrating from the designed fracture zones
Performance standards should be documented which characterise the basis for the sealing mechanism
and demonstrate that adequate control measures will be implemented. Examples of control measures
include modelling and by exception micro-seismic or tiltmeter monitoring of hydraulic fracture growth.
Fracturing operations should be monitored and recorded and compared with the hydraulic fracturing
programme performance standards.
Faults that may impact the hydraulic fracturing seal mechanism should be thoroughly researched and
documented and referenced in the hydraulic fracturing programme to demonstrate that fracturing
fluids cannot migrate, via faults, beyond the designed fracturing zones.
11.7.2.2 Induced Seismicity Risk
The risk of induced seismic events should be considered when planning a hydraulic fracturing operation
and adequate controls put in place to eliminate or to minimise any potential impact; this is particularly
important for onshore operations.
Wellbore pressures during fracturing operations are a key factor in determining induced seismicity risk.
Consideration should be given to the following factors that affect pressure in the well during fracturing
operations:
• The volume of injected fluid, larger volumes generate higher pressures.

• The volume of flow back fluid, larger flow-back volumes reduce the pressure.
• The injection rate, more rapid injection generates higher pressures.
• The flow-back rate, more rapid flow-back reduces the pressure.
The induced seismicity risk assessment control and mitigation measures identified should be included
in the hydraulic fracturing programme.

Particular attention should be paid to hydraulic fracturing in the presence of a pre-stressed fault and,
where practicable, induced seismicity risk should be mitigated by identifying pre-stressed faults and
avoiding fracturing fluids entering such faults. The risk assessment should consider the following:
• Geological knowledge of the play area

• Actual field experience in the area
• The depth of fracturing operations
To adequately evaluate the area and the associated induced seismicity risk sufficient geological
information should be gathered; this information should include an understanding of the in-situ
stresses.
Site specific surveys should be carried out prior to hydraulic fracturing to characterise local stresses and
identify nearby faults and stress data from nearby boreholes should be integrated. The potential
presence of faults that cannot be detected within the limitations of seismic reflection surveys should be
considered.
11.7.2.3 Pre-fracturing injection test
A pre-fracturing injection test should be considered to characterise the fracture behaviour of a

particular formation and inform subsequent operations. Enough time should be allowed following the
test to ensure no seismic activity occurs as injected fluid migrates away from the well and stresses in
the surrounding rocks are redistributed.
Further information on hydraulic fracturing may be found in API RP 100-1 Hydraulic Fracturing – Well
Integrity & Fracture Containment [Ref 54].
11.7.2.4 Matrix acidisation
If matrix acidisation operations are planned, particular attention should be paid to the following:
• inhibition requirements to mitigate corrosion when live acids are being injected
• during acid backflows, verification that corrosion levels are tolerable, particularly as the spent
acid may still be corrosive and may no longer be fully inhibited
• monitoring during both injection and flowbacks to ensure that the strength and concentration
of the acid does not have the potential to cause excessive corrosion.

12 Abandonment
Well integrity during the ‘abandon’ phase is covered in the Oil & Gas UK Well Decommissioning
Guidelines [Ref 24].

13 Special cases
13.1 Multi-Lateral and Multi-Branched Wells

The Technical Advancement of Multilateral Wells guidance (TAML) [Ref 135] makes a distinction
between multi-lateral and multi-branched wells as follows:
A multi-lateral well is one in which there is more than one open horizontal or near -horizontal lateral
well drilled from a single site (or mother bore) and connected back to a single bore.
A multi-branched well is one which has more than one open branch well drilled from a single site
connected back to a single bore. The branch may be vertical, horizontal, inclined or a combination of all
three.
Well integrity considerations for these well types concern junction integrity, well control and
abandonment. More detailed information may be found in the TAML guidance [Ref 135].
13.1.1 Junction Integrity
The multi-lateral or multi-branch junction should be considered an integral part of the casing design. It
should be designed to ensure the junction construction, however formed, and including any exposed
formation adjacent to the junction, can withstand the anticipated loads during construction, operation
and abandonment of the multi-lateral well.
During well construction and subsequent operations, consideration should be given to the potential for
damage to the junction (e.g. casing wear) and the potential consequences and their mitigation.
13.1.2 Well Control
Consideration should be given to well control for multi-branched and multi-lateral wells which may
require a different response to conventional single bore operations. One important aspect is how well
control is addressed in the operational programme and rig crew training.
Kick indications, such as pit gain and increasing flow out of the well, and the causes of kicks, such as
swabbing and insufficient mud weight, will be the same as conventional single bore wells.
On a well with multiple branches or laterals particular care should be taken:
• When re-entering a bore that has not been entered for some time and in which hydrocarbons
may be present. Poor fluid condition and/or diffusion of hydrocarbons into the well while static
may result in the presence of a bubble of gas.
• To consider the potential for underbalanced conditions on the static bores due to pressure
changes on the active bore (e.g. swabbing or insufficient hole fill).
• Programme instructions should contain guidance on assessing which bore has taken the influx
(i.e. the active or static bores).
Provided reliable hydraulic isolation between the bores is maintained, existing well control methods
may be applicable and well control in each bore managed separately.

If hydraulic isolation is not maintained however, when planning for well control operations
consideration should be given to the following:
• The weakest formation in each bore and the potential for formation breakdown at this point.
• The potential for influx from each bore and the presence of multiple kicks.
• The potential for different mud weights in each bore and the potential for different bottom hole
pressures for a given surface pressure during a well kill.
Given the number of different multi-lateral systems the well programme should also provide guidance
for well control considerations specific to the multi-lateral system being deployed (e.g. how to manage
a kick with a particular whip-stock or anchoring system and with debris in the hole).
13.1.3 Multi-Lateral Abandonment
The design of a multi-lateral or multi-branch well should consider the abandonment of the well such
that each lateral, and ultimately the whole well, can be abandoned in accordance with the Oil and Gas
UK Well Decommissioning Guidelines [Ref 24].
13.2 Cuttings re-injection/disposal wells (offshore only)

CRI/disposal wells are designed and used to inject liquids (water, brines, slurries or similar) into
dedicated formation(s). These wells enable well-operators to achieve zero discharge targets.
Such wells need to be carefully managed for the following reasons:
• Plugging due to improper slurry rheology

• Plugging due to improper operational procedures
• Failure to reseal the fracture resulting in high casing pressure
• Excessive erosional wear from long-term slurry injection
• Corrosion from long-term injection.
Plugging of the injection conduit can lead to rapid pressure build-up, and possibly cause casing collapse
or tubing burst.
Consideration should be given to the annuli adjacent to the cuttings re-injection annulus. If these are
not full of fluid cuttings re-injection may increase the risk of casing failure.
Well-operators should have procedures in place covering:
• Slurry design: slurry rheology design includes ensuring the correct slurry viscosity, solid carrying
capacity, and optimal particle size distribution.
• Operational procedure design: the injection rate should be high enough to avoid cuttings
plugging off the fracture or settling and forming solid beds along the injection annulus or
tubular.
• Monitoring and verification: monitoring and verification of CRI operations are integral parts of
the operation’s quality assurance process.
• Disposal well capacity.

Appendix 1 – Background to these guidelines
In May 2010 the UK offshore oil and gas industry set up the OSPRAG to review the UK’s well control
practices and oil spill response capability following the Macondo tragedy on 20 April 2010. One of
OSPRAG’s four review groups, the Technical Review Group (TRG), carried out a review of industry
practices and procedures relating to well examination, verification, and primary well control; BOP
competency, behaviours, and human factors. The unanimous conclusion was that there is a high degree
of confidence in the UKCS regulatory regime and that it drives the right health, safety and environmental
behaviours. Several recommendations to the Industry were proposed which were primarily based upon
the best practices observed during the TRG review. A TRG recommendation was for Oil & Gas UK to
form a project team to compile a series of well life cycle integrity guidelines similar to those prepared
for well abandonment. For more information, please refer to the OSPRAG final report which is available
from the Oil & Gas UK website: http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/product/final-report-of-the-uk-oil-spill-
prevention-and-response-advisory-group/
The Well Life Cycle Practices Forum (now called the Wells Forum) was set up in December 2010 by Oil
& Gas UK as a vehicle for implementing the TRG recommendations and as a permanent forum in which
well-related pan-industry issues can be identified and discussed. The Wells Forum is also the interface
of choice for HSE, the OGA, and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) to
engage the UK offshore industry on well-related matters. The Wells Forum has representatives from
over 60 different operators and well management companies, who have been involved in the various
workgroups and review cycles.
The WLCIG had its first meeting in January 2011 and continued with at least monthly meetings through
2011. A first draft was reviewed internally and at a review day 24 August 2011 with input from United
Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas (UKOOG) and Norwegian operators (OLF). In 2012 the guidelines
underwent a full review by the WLCPF member companies. Following approval by the Board of Oil &
Gas UK, Issue 1 was published in July 2012.
After Issue 1 of the Guidelines, the UKOOG issued the UK Onshore Shale Gas Well Guidelines in February
2013. The UKOOG Guidelines [Ref 131] reference the Oil & Gas UK Well Integrity Guidelines for all
aspects of well integrity covered by these guidelines.
Through 2013 the Oil & Gas UK well integrity workgroup undertook reviews of annulus pressure
management and pressure testing to identify potential updates to the Guidelines. Workgroup members
provided input to the development of NORSOK D-010 Rev 4 and International Oil and Gas Producers
Association (IOGP) Technical Specifications for well integrity.
A workshop for Oil & Gas UK member companies and representatives from the Norwegian well integrity
forum, IOGP well integrity workgroup, BEIS, HSE and UKOOG was held in June 2013. Feedback on the
Guidelines and proposed changes were reviewed and draft content for Issue 2 of the Guidelines was
agreed. Gap analyses were performed against the current NORSOK D-010 and the draft IOGP Technical
Specification for well integrity during the operational phase. An updated draft Issue 2 was circulated to
Oil & Gas UK members and the wider industry for review in December 2013. Issue 2 was published in
June 2014.

Issue 3 of the Guidelines was developed based on feedback from Issue 2 and a workshop held in June
2015. Four sub-teams were formed to work specific issues: ISO, Asset Life Extension, Legislation and
General Well Integrity. Issue 3 was discussed with the Norwegian Well Integrity Forum and with the
IOGP workgroup producing the ISO standard for full life cycle well integrity to confirm there were no
significant gaps between Issue 3 and their work. The document also benefitted from input and review
by UKOOG to include input from the UKOOG Shale gas Guidelines. A draft of Issue 3 was issued for
industry review in November 2015. Issue 3 was issued in March 2016.
Issue 4 of the guidelines was developed based on feedback and learnings from Issue 3. Alignment with
API S53, the IOGP process safety guidance documents, and ISO Well Integrity guidelines [Ref 80 & 81]
have been reviewed and incorporated. Retirement of the O&GUK offshore BOP guidelines whilst
retaining the good practices developed for the UK sector has been considered and incorporated. Input
has also been incorporated from the onshore UK gas storage industry.
The well life cycle integrity workgroup and its sub-teams included:
• Co-leads: Steve Bedford (BP), Mike Richardson (Spirit Energy)

• Taylor Begnaud (Chevron Upstream Europe)
• Bill Barrows (CNOOC International Limited)
• Gavin Mundie (Taqa Bratani Ltd)
• Ian Taylor (Shell Upstream International)
• Joseph From (iGas)
• David McGuckien (CNOOC International Limited)
• Mike Hartley (Neptune Energy Limited)
• Peter Irvine (ConocoPhillips (U.K.) Limited)
• Ronald Schutz (Wintershall Noordzee B.V.)
• Carl Johnson (Schlumberger)
• Stuart Connon (Total E&P U.K. Limited)
• Huw Roberts (Premier Oil)
• Laura Bennie (Oil & Gas UK)

Appendix 2 – Divestment Information
BS EN ISO 16530-1:2017 provides guidance in section 5.10 on reporting and documentation for wells.
Oil and gas wells have been drilled in the United Kingdom since the late 19th century. Reporting and
documentation requirements have varied over time. Multiple systems have been used to store
information including: paper, microforms, fax and computer-based document management systems.
Some of the storage systems are not robust e.g. text on fax paper can fade over time. As information
has been transferred between various systems (e.g. computer system upgrades) there is a risk that
information has been lost. The purpose of this Appendix is to provide guidance on the minimum
information on wells that should be provided by the seller divesting an asset to enable the purchaser to
manage well integrity. This guidance supports the OGA guidance on information and sample plans by
providing a summary of the minimum information required in a table that can be used as checklist if
desired.
Well-operators should also use this list to define the information they should retain throughout the
well’s life.
Minimum Well Information for Divestment
Item Description Received /

Comment
Master wells A list of all the wells in the asset being divested (including
list abandoned wells) with the current and previous well status as
per WONS (e.g. a water injection well may have formerly been a
production well), OGA well number, local well number, field and
installation to which the well is connected.
Well location Map showing the location of each well which is being divested,
map including abandoned wells. For offshore platforms this could be a
slot diagram, for land wells this could be a well site diagram or for
subsea manifold it could be a manifold schematic. GPS
coordinates should be included to aid future location of the
wellbore if required.
Definitive For every well, including abandoned wells, a survey (reference

wellbore point, measured depth, true vertical depth, inclination and
survey azimuth) of the complete wellbore and any sidetracks that
includes the surface co-ordinates of the well and survey tools
used.
Well Activity summaries, logs and/or pictures from the most recent
intervention well interventions since the current completion was installed.
records
Well Work undertaken and results from the last well maintenance
maintenance undertaken, including any local monitoring such as visual
records inspections of subsea wells and groundwater surveys around land
wells

Well One or more documents that provide the following for each well:
completion
diagram / Rig name, rotary table elevation, spud date and completion date.
information Total depth, hold up or plug back depth.
Leak off or Formation integrity test results.
Fish left in hole with: description of the fish, length, depth and
dimensions.
Conductor/casing/liner shoe depth and top with: OD, grade,

connection type, weight, test pressure and information on any
installed components (e.g. conductor centralisers, liner hanger
system, burst disc and/or stage collar) for each string.
Cement top and method of verification e.g. log, calculated.
Completion components (including control lines, gauges and

clamps) with: manufacturer, description, depth, maximum OD,
minimum ID, connection type and any operating instructions with
status e.g. direction to shift a sleeve open or closed and current
position, downhole safety valve operating pressure
Wellhead (including associated valves) and xmas tree

manufacturer, type, rated working pressure, test pressure,
minimum IDs, test ports, seal types, internal profiles, valve turns
to open/close or fluid volume required for actuated valves to
open/close.
Pressure containment barriers, including contents, design and

operating limits for each annulus.
Operating risks and conditions e.g. thermal movement or

conditions attached to the well operating consents.
Anomalies e.g. failed valves.
Well The Well Examiner’s reports specified in the O&GUK guidelines

Examination for well-operators on well examination issue 2 [Ref 26]

Abbreviations and Glossary
Abbreviation Definition
A annulus Inner most annulus
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
ALE Asset Life Extension
API American Petroleum Institute
ASV Annulus Safety Valve
BEIS Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
BHA Bottomhole Assembly
BOP Blowout Preventer
BPV Back Pressure Valves
BSOR Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995
BSR Blind Shear Ram
CDA Common Data Access (a not for profit subsidiary of Oil and Gas UK
http://cdal.com)
CRI Cuttings Re-Injection
CT Coiled Tubing
CWOP Complete Well on Paper
DCR Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc)
Regulations 1996
DHSV Downhole Safety Valve
(Can also be referred to as a Sub-surface Safety Valve (SSSV) and
other derivations)
DP Dynamically Positioned
DST Drill Stem Test
DWOP Drill Well on Paper
EA Environment Agency
ECD Equivalent Circulating Density

EEMS Environmental and Emissions Monitoring System
ES Environmental Statement
ESD Emergency Shutdown

ESP Electric Submersible Pump

FIT Formation Integrity Test
FIV Formation Isolation Valve

FPSO Floating Production Storage and Offloading Unit
H2O Water
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide

HAZID Hazard Identification Study
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HP High Pressure
HPHT High Pressure High Temperature

HSE Health and Safety Executive
HSP Hydraulic Submersible Pump
HWO Hydraulic Workover
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors
IBOP Internal Blowout Preventer

ICP Independent Competent Person
ID Inside Diameter
ISCWSA Industry Steering Committee for Wellbore Surveying Accuracy
http://iscwsa.org/
IOGP International Oil and Gas Producers Association
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LEL Lower Explosive Limit

LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis is a risk assessment and hazard
evaluation method which provides a simplified balance between
qualitative process hazard analysis and detailed and costly
quantitative risk analysis.
LOT Leak Off Test
MAASP Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure

MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
MD Measured Depth
MoC Management of Change

MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
MPD Managed Pressure Drilling

MWD Measurement While Drilling
NORSOK Standards Norway
NRV Non-Return Valve

OD Outside Diameter
OGA Oil and Gas Authority
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
OPEP Oil Pollution Emergency Plans

OPOL Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement
OSDR Offshore Safety Directive Regulator
OPPC Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control)
Regulations 2005
PA Public Address
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

PBR Polished Bore Receptacles
PBU Pressure Build-Up
PCE Pressure Control Equipment

PCP Progressive Cavity Pump
PFO Pressure Fall-Off

pressure containment The well is defined in terms of its pressure containment boundary.
boundary / envelope Any equipment that is vital to controlling the pressure within the
well is therefore covered. This would include downhole pressure-
containing equipment and the pressure-containing equipment on
top of the well such as BOPs or Christmas trees, but excludes well
control equipment downstream that can be isolated from the well
by valves.
Examples of where the well ends are:
• above the top BOP in the BOP stack and outside the choke and
kill valves
• downstream of the swab and production wing valves of an xmas
tree
• at the top of the wireline stuffing box of a wireline BOP
Regulation 2, paragraph 14, DCR Guidance
PVT Pit Volume Total
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Control
QHSE Quality Health Safety Environment

RCD Rotating Control Device
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SECE Safety and Environmental-Critical Element
SEMS Safety and Environmental Management System
SCR Slow Circulating Rate
SCR 2005 Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 2005
SCR 2015 Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.)
Regulations 2015
SCSSSV Surface Controlled Sub-Surface Safety Valve
SF Separation Factor
SG Specific Gravity
SMS Safety Management System
SSTT Subsea Test Tree

SSSV See DHSV

Swage A short crossover joint used between two sizes or specifications of
casing. A circulating swage is an adapter that enables a temporary
circulating line to be rigged to the top of the casing string, allowing
circulation of fluids to help properly locate the casing string.
TCP Tubing-Conveyed Perforating

TD Total Depth
TRG Technical Review Group
TOC Top of Cement
UBD Under Balance Drilling

UBO Under Balanced Operation
UKOOG UK Onshore Operators Group
UKCS United Kingdom Continental Shelf
VBR Variable Bore Rams
VR Valve Removal
Well A well made by drilling or a borehole drilled with a view to the
extraction of minerals through it or another well. [Regulation 2,
DCR]
well-examiner In this document ‘well-examiner’ means an independent and

competent person who performs functions in relation to a well
examination scheme. [Regulation 2, SCR 2015]
Well examination scheme Has the meaning given in regulation 11(1) of SCR 2015.
well-operator In relation to a well, means the person appointed by the licensee
for a well to execute the function of organising and supervising all
operations to be carried out by means or, where no such person
has been appointed, the licensee (DCR guidance)
WIMS Well Integrity Management System
WLCIG Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines

WLCPF Well Life Cycle Practices Forum (an Oil & Gas UK forum)
WONS Well Operations Notification System
Workover A term used to describe activity that changes the completed status
of a well. Typically, the term covers non-drilling activity undertaken
with a rig but may also be used to describe intervention operations
that change the completed status of the well.

References and useful reading
# Reference to
Health and Safely Executive (HSE) regulations and guidance
1 [DCR] The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations
1996, (SI 1996/913) as amended.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1996/913/contents/made
2 [DCR guidance] A guide to the well aspects of the Offshore Installation and Wells (Design
and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996 – L84, Second edition 2008, ISBN 978 0 7176
6296 8, www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l84.htm
3 [SCR 2015] The Offshore Installations (Offshore Safety Directive) (Safety Case etc.)
Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/398).
4 [FLA] The Offshore Petroleum Licensing (Offshore Safety Directive) Regulations 2015 (SI
2015/385) https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/385/contents/made
5 [SCR 05] The Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/3117) as
amended. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/3117/contents/made
6 [OSCR guidance] A guide to the Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 –
L30, Third edition 2006, ISBN 978 0 7176 6184 8, www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l30.htm
7 [MAR] A guide to the Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Management and
Administration) Regulations 1995 – L70, Second edition 2002, ISBN 9 7807 1762 5727,
www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l70.htm
8 [HSG 65] Successful health and safety management. HSG 65, Second edition 1997, ISBN 0
7176 1276 7, www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg65.htm
9 [PFEER] Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency

Response) Regulations 1995 – L65, Approved Code of Practice and guidance, Second
Edition 1997, ISBN 9 7807 1761 3861, www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l65.htm
10 [HSG 48] Reducing error and influencing behaviour HSG 48, Second edition 1999, ISBN 0
7176 2452 8, www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg48.htm
11 [BSOR] Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 (SI1995/2038)

12 [BSOR guidance] A guide to the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 – L72,
Second edition 2008, ISBN 978 0 7176 6287 6, www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l72.htm
13 [PUWER] Safe use of work equipment. Provision and use of Work Equipment Regulations
1998. Approved Code of Practice and guidance – L22, Third Edition 2008, ISBN 978 0
7176 6295 1, http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l22.htm

# Reference to
14 [HSWA] Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974,

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37/contents
15 Jack-up (self-elevating) installations: review and location approval using desk-top risk
assessments in lieu of undertaking site soils borings, Offshore Information Sheet No
3/2008, http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/infosheets/is3-2008.pdf
16 ALARP - HSE internet guidance (accessed October 2011),

http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm
17 [LOLER] Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998. Approved Code of
Practice and guidance – L113, ISBN 978 07176 -16282, www.hse.gov.uk/work-
equipment-machinery/loler.htm
18 Understanding Offshore Oil and Gas Notifications (2017/329870),

https://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/assets/docs/understanding
-offshore-oil-and-gas-wells-
notifications.pdf&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwjescrO57vZAhVIDCwKHSBYBkMQFggIMAE&client=
internal-uds-
cse&cx=015848178315289032903:hqkynptgd1o&usg=AOvVaw0pNTB13PwvIJg8e7Om4u
vu
19 Understanding Onshore Oil and Gas Notifications

https://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/og/og-
00094.pdf&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwjescrO57vZAhVIDCwKHSBYBkMQFggKMAI&client=intern
al-uds-cse&cx=015848178315289032903:hqkynptgd1o&usg=AOvVaw1NmdhrgRtr-
gKfO32IFakq
20 [COMAH] Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015,

http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/
21 Safety in pressure testing, Guidance Note GS4, ISBN 978 0 7176 1629 9,
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/gs4.htm
22 [RIDDOR] The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations

2013 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1471/contents/made
23a Report of an incident or dangerous occurrence onshore
https://extranet.hse.gov.uk/lfserver/external/F2508DOE
23b Report of an incident or dangerous occurrence offshore
http://www.hse.gov.uk/osdr/reporting/incidents-to-osdr.htm
Oil & Gas UK and Step Change in Safety documents
Oil & Gas UK guidelines can be accessed at the publications website

https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/publications-shop/ Members of Oil & Gas UK can access the guidelines
free of charge.

# Reference to
Step Change in Safety documents can be downloaded from

https://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/safety-resources/publications
24 Well Decommissioning Guidelines, Issue 6, June 2018 ISBN 1 903 004 92 6.
25 Guidelines on qualification of materials for the abandonment of wells, Issue 2, October

2015. ISBN: 1 903 004 56 x
26 Guidelines for well-operators on well examination, Issue 2, August 2017.
ISBN 1 903 004 88 8
27 Guidelines for well-operators on competency of well-examiners, Issue 2, August 2017,

ISBN 1 903 004 89 6
28 Well integrity guidelines, Issue 1, July 2012, ISBN 1 903 003 82 9.
29 Guidelines on relief well planning for offshore wells, Issue 2, March 2013, ISBN: 1 903
003 92 4.
30 Guidelines on competency of wells personnel, Issue 2, August 2107, ISBN 1 903 004 90 X
31 Guidelines on BOP Systems for Offshore Wells, Issue 2 May 2014,
ISBN 1 903 004 27 6
32 Step Change in Safety: Assurance & verification guidance suite (tier 1, 2 and 3).
33 HS011–OCES–Operators Cooperative Emergency Services Agreement (2011),

http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/OP076.pdf
34 OSPRAG – Technical Review Group Final Report. Updated September 2011

http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EN022.pdf
35 Report on risk assessment workshop (1st November 2011). Which UKCS operations need
two Blind Shear Rams? Part of reference 31.
36 Step Change in Safety: Task Risk Assessment Guide.

https://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/safety-resources/publications/task-risk-
assessment-guide
37 Step Change in Safety: Human Factors First Steps
https://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/safety-resources/publications/human-factors-first-
steps
38 Step Change in Safety: Human Factors Toolkit
https://www.stepchangeinsafety.net/safety-resources/human-factors
American Petroleum Institute (API) documents

# Reference to
API documents are available from http://www.api.org/publications-standards-and-

statistics/publications-catalog
39 [API Std 53] Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Fourth Edition.
Published 1st November 2012.
40 [API Spec 17D] Design and Operation of Subsea Production Systems-Subsea Wellhead
and Tree Equipment (ISO 13628-4), 2nd edition: 1 May 2011.
41 [API Spec 14A] Subsurface Safety Valve Equipment (ISO 10432), 12th edition: 2015.
42 [API 10] Recommended practices for testing well cements: series, various dates.
43 [API Spec 11D1] Packers and Bridge Plugs (ISO 14310), 3rd edition: 2015.
44 [API S 598] Valve inspection and testing, 9th edition: 1 September 2009.
45 [API RP 14B] Design, Installation, Repair and Operation of Subsurface Safety Valve
Systems, Sixth Edition, (2015)
46 [API Std 6AV2] Installation, maintenance and repair of surface safety valves and
underwater safety valves offshore. 1st edition: August 2014.
47 [API RP 17H] Remotely Operated Tools and Interfaces on Subsea Production Systems (ISO
13628-8) 2nd edition (includes errata) January 2014.
48 [API Spec 16A] Drill-Through Equipment (ISO 13533), 3rd edition 2004.
49 [API Spec 6A718] Nickel Base Alloy 718 (UNS N07718) for Oil and Gas Drilling and
Production Equipment, Second Edition, 2009
50 [API S65 – part 2] Isolating Potential Flow Zones During Well Construction, 2nd Edition:
Dec 2010.
51 [API 16ST] Coiled tubing well control equipment systems, 1st edition: March 2009.
53 [API RP 10F] Recommended Practice for Performance Testing of Cementing Float

Equipment (ISO 10427), 3rd edition: 2002 (Reaffirmed 2010)
54 API RP 100-1 Recommended Practice for Hydraulic Fracturing – Well Integrity and
Fracture Containment, 1st edition: October 2015.
Energy Institute (EI) documents
These documents are available from https://publishing.energyinst.org/
60 Model code of safe practice Part 17 Volume 1: High pressure and high temperature well
planning, First edition April 2009, ISBN 978 0 85293 529 3.
61 Model code of safe practice Part 17 Volume 2: well control during the drilling and testing
of high pressure and high temperature offshore wells, Second edition April 2009, ISBN
978 0 85293 507 1.

# Reference to
62 Model code of safe practice Part 17 Volume 3: High pressure and high temperature well
completions and interventions, First edition April 2009, ISBN 978 0 85293 530 9.
63 Guidelines for the management of safety critical elements, Second edition March 2007,
ISBN 978 0 852293 462 3.
64 Guidelines for routine and non-routine subsea operations from floating (drilling) vessels,
1995 ref: 978-0-85293-156-1, ISBN 0 85293 156 5.
65 Guidelines for the analysis of jackup and fixed platform well conductor systems, 2001 ref:
978-0-85293-284-1, ISBN 0 85293 284 7.
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) documents
These documents are available from the International Oil and Gas Producers Association (IOGP)
website (in addition to the ISO website) https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/
70 [BS EN ISO 11960] Petroleum and natural gas industries – steel pipes for use as casing or
tubing for wells, 2014
71 [BS EN ISO 15156] Materials for use in H2S-containing environments in oil and gas
production, 2015.
72 [BS EN ISO 10423] Petroleum and natural gas industries – drilling and production
equipment – wellhead and christmas tree equipment, 2009.
73 [BS EN ISO 14310] Petroleum and natural gas industries – downhole equipment –
packers and bridge plugs, 2008.
74 [BS EN ISO 10417] Petroleum and natural gas industries – subsurface safety valve
systems – design, installation, operation and redress, 2004.
75 [BS EN ISO 4406] Hydraulic fluid power – Fluids - Method for coding the level of
contamination by solid particles, 1999.
76 [BS EN ISO 13680] Specification for corrosion resistant alloy (CRA) seamless tubes for use
as casing, tubing and coupling stock, 2010.
77 [BS EN ISO 13628-4:2010] Design and operation of subsea production systems -- Part 4:
Subsea wellhead and tree equipment.
78 [PD ISO/TR 12489:2013] Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries. Reliability
modelling and calculation of safety systems
79 [ISO 31000:2009] Risk management – principles and guidelines.
80 [BS EN ISO 16530-1:2017] Petroleum and natural gas industries - Well integrity. Part 1:
Life cycle governance
81 [BS EN ISO 16530-2:2014] Well integrity - Part 2: Well integrity for the operational phase
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy regulations and guidance.

# Reference to
Guidance on BEIS regulations is available from the following website:

http://og.decc.gov.uk/en/olgs/cms/environment/leg_guidance/leg_guidance.aspxhttps://www.g
ov.uk/guidance/oil-and-gas-offshore-environmental-legislation
90 [OPRC] Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response Co-operation

Convention) Regulations 1998
91 [OCR] Offshore Chemicals Regulations 2002 (as amended 2011)

92 [OPPC] Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations
2005 (as amended 2011) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/983/contents/made
93 [EIA] Offshore Petroleum and Production & Pipelines (Assessment of Environmental

effects) Regulations 1999 (as amended 2007)
94 [EPC] Offshore Installations (Emergency Pollution Control) Regulations 2002

95 [PON] Oil and Gas: Petroleum Operations Notices https://www.gov.uk/guidance/oil-and-

gas-environmental-alerts-and-incident-reporting#pon-1
Other documents
110 NORSOK Standard D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations, (Rev.4, June 2013),
http://www.standard.no/en/webshop/ProductCatalog/ProductPresentation/?ProductID=
644901
111 Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended guidelines for well integrity – No:117, Revision 6
June 2011,
https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/contentassets/e8f7a98e933b43feb76f823097e2e7b8/1
17-norwegian-oil-and-gas--recommended-guidelines-well-integrity---rev-6-final.pdf
112 Developing and maintaining staff competence, Railway Safe Publication 1; Office of rail
regulation, Second edition 2007, ISBN 07176 1732 7.
113 Competence management systems – guide to approval, OPITO 004.04B, Rev.09 –

December 2009.
114 Supervisor competency guidelines, Enform: The (Canadian) safety association for the oil
and gas industry 2010,
http://www.enform.ca/files/pdf/publications/Supervisor_Competency_Guideline_Final.p
df
115 Disastrous Decisions: The Human and Organisational Causes of the Gulf of Mexico
Blowout, Andrew Hopkins, 2012, ISBN 978 1 921948 77 0
116 [NOS] National occupational standards, UK Commission for employment and skills
(accessed October 2011), http://www.ukstandards.co.uk/Pages/index.aspx

# Reference to
117 Capping and Containment – IOGP Global Industry Response Group recommendations.
Report No. 464, May 2011, https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/capping-and-
containment-global-industry-response-group-recommendations/
118 Deepwater Wells – IOGP Global Industry Response Group recommendations. Report No.
463, May 2011, https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/deepwater-wells-global-
industry-response-group-recommendations/
119 Oil Spill Response – IOGP Global Industry Response Group recommendations. Report No.
465, May 2011, https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/oil-spill-response-global-
industry-response-group-recommendations/
120 SQA (Scottish Qualifications Agency), Accreditation/ awarding body in Scotland for
vocational qualifications (SVQ), https://www.sqa.org.uk/
121 EAL: Specialist awarding organisation for the engineering & related sectors,
http://www.eal.org.uk/
124 Deepwater Well Control Guidelines, IADC 1998 / 2000.
125 SPE/IADC 140365 Low Force Shear Rams: The Future is More, Frank Springett, Eric
Ensley, Darrin Yenzer, NOV, Scott We130
aver Noble Drilling; 2011.
127 [Maitland report] Offshore Oil and Gas in the UK, - an independent review of the
regulatory regime. Published December 2011,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/offshore-oil-and-gas-in-the-uk-
independent-review-of-the-regulatory-regime
128 [NAS 1638] Cleanliness requirements of parts used in hydraulic systems,

http://global.ihs.com/search_res.cfm?RID=Z56&MID=5280&input_doc_number=NAS%2
01638&s_kwcid=TC|5891|NAS%201638||S|p|7783878794&gclid=CIW-9-
7gjq8CFVEjfAod9Eum0Q
129 Guidelines for the conduct of offshore drilling hazard site surveys: April 2013,
https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/guidelines-for-the-conduct-of-offshore-
drilling-hazard-site-surveys/
130 [PPDM Association] What is a Well? Rev 2.4 October 2014

http://ppdm.org/ppdm/PPDM/Standards/What_is_a_Well/PPDM/What_is_a_Well.aspx?
hkey=9568903b-44b9-4993-b333-3387cfea43b9
131 [UKOOG] UK Onshore Shale Gas Well Guidelines, Issue 1, February 2013.
http://www.ukoog.org.uk/onshore-extraction/industry-guidelines
132 [OPOL] Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (amended 27 June 2013).
http://www.opol.org.uk/agreement.htm

# Reference to
133 SPE 166142 Environmental Risk Arising From Well Construction Failure – Differences
Between Barrier and Well Failure, and Estimates of Failure Frequency Across Common
Well Types, Locations and Well Age, G E King, D E King, SPE Production & Operations
Journal, November 2013, p 323.
134 Oil and Gas Wells and their integrity: Implications for shale and unconventional resource
exploitation, R.J. Davies, S. Almond, R.S. Ward, R.B. Jackson, C. Adams, F. Worrall, L.G.
Herringshaw, J.G. Gluyas, M.A. Whitehead., Marine and Petroleum Geology 56 (2014)
239-254.
135 Technical Advancement of Multilateral Wells (TAML) (JIP Project) April 1999.
136 Oil & Gas UK Liability Provision Guidelines for Offshore Petroleum Operations 2018
https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/product/liability-provision-guidelines-for-offshore-petroleum-
operations-2018/
137 Oil & Gas Authority March 2016. Maximising economic recovery of UK petroleum: the
MER UK strategy https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/news-
publications/publications/2016/maximising-economic-recovery-of-uk-petroleum-the-
mer-uk-strategy/
138 IOGP 415: Asset integrity – the key to managing major incident risks.
https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/asset-integrity-the-key-to-managing-major-
incident-risks/ December 2008
139 IOGP 456: Process safety recommended practice of key performance

indicators.https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/process-safety-recommended-
practice-on-key-performance-indicators/ November 2011
140 IOGP 556: Process safety - leading performance indicators.

https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/process-safety-recommended-practice-on-
key-performance-indicators/
141 Environment Agency: The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations
2016
142 Oil & Gas Authority: SE-06 Production Optimisation Implementation Guide, June 2017.
https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/news-publications/publications/2017/stewardship-
expectations-implementation-guides/
143 Oil & Gas Authority: Guidance for applications for suspension of inactive wells, October
2018. https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/news-publications/publications/2018/guidance-
for-applications-for-suspension-of-inactive-wells/

oilandgasuk.co.uk/guidelines
Guidelines
Oil & Gas UK works together with member companies to produce a suite of industry-leading
guidelines, drawing on a wealth of specialist resources and technical expertise. This guidance
is continually reviewed to improve the performance of all offshore operations.
Guidelines are free for our members.
oilandgasuk.co.uk @oilandgasuk
info@oilandgasuk.co.uk Oil & Gas UK
ISBN 978-1-9164677-3-6
© 2019 The UK Oil and Gas Industry Association Limited, trading as Oil & Gas UK

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Well Life Cycle Integrity

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 2

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 4

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 5

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 6

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 7

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 8

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 9

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 10

As a minimum, the system for managing well integrity should cover:

• Accountability and responsibility

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 12

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 13

2.1 The DCR definition of well-operator

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 14

2.2 DCR – general duty for well-operators

2.3 DCR – specific duties for well-operators

1) Before the design of a well is commenced the well-operator shall cause –

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 15

These issues are covered in the following sections of these guidelines:

2.3.1 Regulation 15 – Design with a view to suspension & abandonment

a) it can be suspended and abandoned in a safe manner, and

2.3.2 Regulation 16 – Materials

2.3.3 Regulation 17 – Well Control

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 16

2) In the case of an operation to which paragraph (1) applies which is begun –

a) from an installation, the duty holder; and

These issues are covered in Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11.

2.3.4 Regulation 18 – Arrangements for examination

Well examination is covered in the following Oil & Gas UK guidelines:

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 17

Guidelines for well-operators on competency of well-examiners [Ref 27].

2.3.5 Regulation 19 – Provision of drilling etc information

a) the identifying number, and any slot number, of the well;

f) in the case of an existing well, its current operational state.

2) Paragraph (1) applies to –

2.3.6 Regulation 21 – Information, instruction, training and supervision

2.4 Duties of the well-operator under SCR 2015

2.4.1 Regulation 11 – Establishment of well examination scheme

Well examination is covered in the following Oil & Gas UK guidelines:

Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].

2.4.2 Regulation 12 – Other Provisions as to well examination schemes

Well examination is covered in the following Oil & Gas UK guidelines:

Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 18

2.4.3 Regulation 13 – Description of well examination

See Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].

2.4.4 Schedule 4, Part 2 – Matters to be provided for in a well examination scheme

See Guidelines for well-operators on well examination [Ref 26].

2.4.5 Regulation 21 – Notification of well operations

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 19

Stand-alone wireline interventions on a production installation are deemed to be well operations. To

2.5 Installation safety case duty holders

2.5.1 Definition of Duty holder

“duty holder” means –

a) in relation to a production installation, the operator; and

“operator” means, in relation to a production installation, an “installation operator” as defined in

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 20

(a) the duty holder’s management system is adequate to ensure—

Demonstrations should include evidence to show:

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 21

Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 4 Page 22

Full Title Requirements

Environmental Statement (ES) or