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CIVIL PROCEDURE

THE CONCEPT OF COURTS

A court is an entity or body vested with a portion of the judicial power.


(Lontok v. Battung, 63 Phil. 1054)

The Constitution provides that “the judicial power shall be vested in


one Supreme Court (SC) and in such other lower courts as may be
established by law.” (Art. VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution).

Courts of Law versus Courts of Equity

Courts of law are tribunals only administering the law of the land, whereas
Courts of Equity are the tribunals which rule according to the precepts of
equity or justice, and are sometimes called “courts of conscience.” (Ballentine’s
Law Dict., 2nd Ed., p. 303)

Courts of Law dispose cases according to what the law says. Courts of Equity, it
adjudicates cases based on the principles of equity. Principle of equity means
principles of justice, fairness, fair play.

In our jurisdiction, our courts are both courts of law and equity.

Civil Code of the Philippines: When the law is silent, the court decides
based on what is just and fair, principle of estoppel, laches or solutio indebiti.

Equity Follows The Law: when there is no applicable law, courts have
to decide according to customs and general principles.

We are a court both of law and of justice.

G.R No. 72873. May 28, 1987


May 28, 1987, J. Cruz
ALONZO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:
The children-heirs inherited in equal pro indiviso shares of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two of the heirs sold their
share/portion of the land by way of “pacto de retro sale” to third persons. The
third persons (vendees) occupied and built their house thereon. Twelve years
after said sale, one of the heirs, filed a complaint invoking the Right of
Redemption. The RTC dismissed the complaint upon ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of sale (given by
the vendors to their co-heirs) as required in Art. 1088 of the Civil Code. The
court furthered that although there was no written notice as required by law ,
there was actual knowledge of the sale by the co-heirs as they lived nearby on
the other portion of the land.

On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC in that the heir can still
redeem the property since the notice required in Art. 1088 of the Civil Code is
written notice, and no written notice was served upon the heir.

Ruling:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious


conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the
law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? The
answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice.
We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the
scheme of our Republic.

Strictly applied and interpreted Art. 1088 requires a written notice


given by the vendors to their co-heirs. But we test a law by its results and by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of
the lawmaker. We interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable. As judges, we are not
automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent.
We cannot accept the respondents' pretense that they were unaware of
the sales made by their siblings. By requiring written proof of such notice, we
would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false
claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.

Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the


facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice.

The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.

G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997


SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK

Facts:

Greg Bartelli, an American, tourist raped several times a 12-year old


minor. He was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail being
charged for Serious Illegal Detention and four counts of rape. A Civil Case for
damages with preliminary attachment was also filed against him. He escaped
from jail, thereby causing all criminal cases filed against him to be archived
pending his arrest. A writ of preliminary attachment of his bank deposit was
issued. However, China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of the
Central Bank Circular No. 960 that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court.

Ruling:

The said law was enacted in 1983 at a time when the country's economy
was in a shamble. It was enacted to give protection to foreign investors. But the
realities of the present times show that the country has recovered
economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to
due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the
questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case
before us.

Besides, the foreign currency deposit made by a tourist is not the kind of
deposit encouraged and given incentives and protection by said laws because
such depositors stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will
maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that "in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.” It would be unthinkable, that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by
accused, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

Note: Compare the above the pronouncement with the ruling below given
a different set of facts.

Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of


equity. Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription
is based on law.

G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013


PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
V. TAGMAYON

Facts:

Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) retrenched some of


its employees. The said employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal against
PCMC. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaints for
lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the LA decision, applying the
principle of laches for the employees’ inaction for an unreasonable period.

On a petition for certiorari filed by the employees, the CA refused to apply


the principle of laches because the case was instituted prior to the expiration
of the prescriptive period set by law which is four (4) years under Article
1146 of the Civil Code which allows an action upon an injury to the rights of
the plaintiffs to be filed within 4 years. And an action for reinstatement by
reason of illegal dismissal is one based upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiffs. The CA stressed that said principle of laches cannot be invoked
earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period.

Ruling:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it. Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts
are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked
to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to
disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court was more emphatic
in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside


legality," this is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure.  The pertinent positive rules
being present here, they should prevail over all abstract arguments based only
on equity.

Constitutional Courts and Statutory Courts

Constitutional courts are created directly by the Constitution itself.


Statutory courts are created by law or by the legislature.

In our jurisdiction, there is only one Constitutional court—the Supreme


Court. Sandiganbayan is not considered a Constitutional court, The 1973
Constitution ordered Congress to create the Sandiganbayan (a provision in the
1973 Constitution says, “ There should be created a Sandiganbayan”).
Presidential Decree 1486 created the Sandiganbayan.

The CA, RTC and MTC are created by Congress. Congress has the power
to abolish said courts but it can not abolish the Supreme Court.

Inherent Powers of the Court

Sec 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court


Section. 5. Inherent powers of courts. Every court shall have the power:

a.) to preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;

b.) to enforce order in proceedings before it, or leave a persons empowered to


conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

c.) to compel obedience to its judgments orders, and processes, and to the
lawful orders of a judge out of court, in a case therein;

d.) to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,


and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in
every manner appertaining thereto;
e.) to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;

f.) to administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein,


and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the existence of its
powers;

g.) to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;

h.) to authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed


and used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in
its records and proceedings.

SEC. 6.Means to carry jurisdiction into effect- When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or a judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and all other
means to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
is not specifically pointed out by law or these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
[G.R. Nos. 178085-178086. September 14, 2015.]
UNIVERSITY OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION vs. OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

A grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the


necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it — also referred
to as "incidental jurisdiction."

Incidental jurisdiction includes the power and authority of an office or tribunal


to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgment and mandates.
Incidental jurisdiction is presumed to attach upon the conferment of jurisdiction
over the main case, unless explicitly withheld by the legislature.

JURISDICTION IN GENERAL

Latin words: juris- means law; and dico– means to speak, or to say. “I
speak by the law.” “I speak with authority”.

Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear, try and decide a case. In
its complete aspect, jurisdiction includes not only the powers to hear and
decide a case, but also the power to enforce the judgment.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the nature of the


action as embodied in the allegations of the complaint and the principal relief
thereby sought. (Petronilo Barayuga v. Adventist University of the Phil. G.R. No.
168008, August 17, 2011).

If a court has NO JURISDICTION, the trial as well as the judgment is


null and void.

G.R. No. 201286. July 18, 2014.]


INOCENCIA TAGALOG vs. MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ

The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including


its decision, are null and void. It then follows that the appeal brought
before the appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions
promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without force and
effect.
Indeed, a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right neither
can it be the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. The same can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it will be void.

[G.R. No. 203075. March 16, 2016.]


MILAGROS et al vs. SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN and TERESITA
PUNZALAN
Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MCTC of Sta.
Ana-Candaba, Pampanga. The MCTC then rendered a Decision in favor of
plaintiffs. On appeal by defendants, the RTC affirmed the MCTC. However, when
elevated to the CA, the latter found that the MCTC has no jurisdiction. Based on
the allegations of the complaint, it alleges illegal entry which is a cause of action
for forcible entry but was filed beyond 1 year period.

Ruling:

Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. The complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the
party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Here, petitioners claim that their cause of action is one
for unlawful detainer and not for forcible entry. The Court disagrees. The
Complaint states that the Spouses Punzalan constructed their dwelling house
on a portion of petitioners' lot, without the latter's prior consent and knowledge.
This clearly categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry.

This failure of plaintiffs to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive


of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC
corollarily failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, a void judgment
for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
neither can it be the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. The same can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it will be void. Plaintiffs-
petitioners may be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but they
unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession. Nevertheless,
they may still opt to, file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with the
proper RTC.
Comparison:

In an Error of juridiction in criminal case, the accused files a motion to


quash.
In Error of jurisdiction in civil action, the defendant files a motion to
dismiss.

JURISDICTION versus VENUE

G.R. No. 145022 Sept. 23, 2005


NOCUM and PDI vs. LUCIO TAN

Facts:

Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Nocum, et al with the RTC
of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations contained in a news article. Defendants filed their joint
answer and alleging therein that venue was improperly laid; It appeared that
the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant Tan at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article
was printed and first published pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code. The RTC of Makati issued an Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Tan filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking reconsideration of the dismissal
and admission of the Amended Complaint which now alleged: "This article was
printed and first published in the City of Makati" and "This caricature was
printed and first published in the City of Makati". The RTC Makati set aside the
previous order of dismissal. Defendants appealed the RTC decision to the CA
contending that by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, the original
complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC and the Amended Complaint
was meant to vest jurisdiction on the RTC which is proscribed by law.

Ruling:

The amended complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower
court. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action.
It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction,
except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were improperly laid in the
court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a
jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case
because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were
printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a
criminal case.This is not to be, because the case before us is a civil action where
venue is not jurisdictional.

Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction and venue. Justice Florenz D.


Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to
be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue of a
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and
the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or
petitioner and respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the
parties.”

Jurisdiction versus Exercise of Jurisdiction

The authority to decide a case is what makes up jurisdiction. It does


not depend upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decision made. Where there is jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter, the resolution of all other questions arising in the case is
but an exercise of jurisdiction. (Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245)

Error of Jurisdiction versus Error of Judgment

1.) When a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision
or order on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
jurisdiction; Errors which the court may commit in the exercise of such
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment; whereas, When a court
takes cognizance of a case over the subject matter of which it has no
jurisdiction, the court commits an error of jurisdiction.
2.) errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari; whereas, errors of
judgment are reviewable by appeal.

ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ERRORS OF JUDGMENT


1. Happens when a court takes 1.Happens when a court with
cognizance of a case that it has no competent jurisdiction
jurisdiction over; commits errors in the exercise
of such authority to hear the
case;

2. Reviewable by certiorari. 2. Reviewable by appeal.

An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the


exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by
appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

G.R.No. 201199. October 16, 2013


STEEL CORP. OF THE PHIL. V. MAPFRE INSULAR
INSURANCE CORP.

Facts:

Equitable PCI Bank (creditor) filed with the RTC a petition to have Steel
Corporation (debtor) placed under corporate rehabilitation which suffered
financial difficulties. In the said Corporate Rehabilitation Proceeding before the
RTC, filed a Motion to Pay to direct its insurers to pay insurance proceeds for
property damage and business interruption, after its establishment was burnt
by fire. Insular Insurance Co. (one of the insurers) entered a special
appearance questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the insurance claim in a
corporate rehabilitation proceedings. But the RTC granted the motion of Steel
Corporation and in its decision directed Insular to pay property damage and
business interruption. This prompted Insular Insurance Co. to file with the CA
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 raising issue that the RTC lack
jurisdiction over Steel Corporation’s insurance claim.

Issue:

Is the remedy filed with the Court of Appeals of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 proper instead of an appeal (petition for review under Rule 43)?

Ruling:

The RTC acting as rehabilitation court has no jurisdiction over the


insurance claim of Steel Corp. against respondent insurer. Steel must file a
separate action against its insurers to recover whatever claim it may have
against them. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy when
the issue raised involves errors of jurisdiction. On the other hand, a petition for
review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy when the issue raised involves
errors of judgment. In a petition for certiorari (under Rule 65), the jurisdiction
of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of
jurisdiction. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a
remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reversible only by appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

The remedy of certiorari is not available when the remedy of


appeal is available (which is to correct error of judgment).
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for
a lost appeal.

[G.R. Nos. 206808-09. September 7, 2016.]


LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION FOR
PROGRESS vs. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA)
Facts:

Employees of LWUA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and


mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction with the RTC of Quezon City against LWUA and DBM over a the
reorganization plan (Staffing Pattern) of LWUA, alleging grave abuse of
discretion in adopting and implementing the reorganization plan (Staffing
Pattern). After the CA rendered an adverse decision, the employees filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 45.

Ruling:

It is settled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of


Court is a pleading limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to
keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged in
and established by the petition: (1) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) that such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
proper only when there is neither appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal; it is not allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment to the proper forum, especially if one's own negligence or
error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.

TYPES OR CLASSIFICATION OF JURISDICTION


(Classification of Courts)

1.) General Jurisdiction and Special or Limited Jurisdiction.


2.) Original Jurisdiction and Appellate Jurisdiction; and
3.) Exclusive Jurisdiction and Concurrent or Coordinate Jurisdiction;
4.) Exclusive and Original
1. General Jurisdiction and Special or Limited Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction is the power of the Court to adjudicate all controversies


except those expressly withheld from the plenary powers of the court. It
extends to all controversies which may be brought before a court within legal
bounds of rights and remedies.

“The RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court…” (sec. 19 [6] Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, BP Blg. 129) as amended by RA 7691).

Special or limited jurisdiction is the authority of the court to hear and


determine particular cases or causes of action only and can be exercised only
under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute . Its power is
limited.

e.g. family court, special commercial court, probate court.

General Jurisdiction versus Limited and Special Jurisdiction

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 181284. April 18, 2017.]
LOLOY UNDURAN et al vs. RAMON ABERASTURI et al

Facts:

This involves an action for Reivindicatoria and Injunction over a parcel


of land involving IPs/ICCs. Defendant Petitioners argue that all disputes
between different ICCs/IPs shall also be within the jurisdiction of the NCIP
under the IPRA.

Ruling:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or


by law. A court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear
and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court
acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated. An
administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of
limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically
granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that
which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under
limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.
The NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to
the same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under Section 66 of
the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties
have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws." Thus, the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same
ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall
have jurisdiction.

2. Original Jurisdiction and Appellate Jurisdiction

a.) original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take cognizance of


a case as its inception or commencement. One can file the case
there for the first time.
e.g. SC, CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC, Shariah Didtrict/Circuit
Court, MTC.

b.) appellate jurisdiction is the power vested in a superior court to


review and revise the judicial action of a lower court.

3. exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction

a.) exclusive jurisdiction is that possessed by a court to the


exclusion of all others.
- The power to adjudicate a case or proceedings to the exclusion of
all other courts at that stage.

b.) concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that possessed by the


court together with another or other courts over the same subject
matter, the court obtaining jurisdiction first retaining it to the
exclusion of the others, but the choice of court is lodged in those
persons duly authorized to file the action.

e.g. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Habeas Corpus


can be filed in the SC, CA or RTC.
Doctrine of Heirarchy of Courts (Judicial Heirarchy)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 202781. January 10, 2017.]
CRISANTO M. AALA vs. HON. REY T. UY

Facts:

Petitioners questioned the Ordinance Approving the New Schedule of


Market Values, its Classification, and Assessment Level of Real Properties in
the City of Tagum by way of an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus to the SC. They argued that the ordinance imposes exorbitant
real estate taxes, which the residents of Tagum City could not afford to pay.
Contending that respondents city council and the mayor acted with grave
abuse of discretion, petitioners invoke the SC’s original jurisdiction under
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the Constitution in view of the need to immediately
resolve the issues they have raised.

Ruling:

Petition for certiorari is denied.


The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed
to restrain parties from directly resorting to the SC when relief may be
obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on
the need to prevent inordinate demands upon the SC's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction as
well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. There is another
reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. As explained in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, "the
doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in
an effective and efficient manner."

The SC Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari,


prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." However, it is
shared with the CA and the RTCs. This “concurrence of jurisdiction” does
not give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine
on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where
petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot randomly
select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed.

There are well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts


where immediate resort to this SC may be allowed when any of the following
grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised
that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by the SC; (5) when time is of
the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional
organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may
affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when
the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in
this case.

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

It is the principle that requires litigants to initially seek the proper relief
from the lower courts in those areas where the Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the CA and the RTC to issue the extraordinary writs (of
mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari). As a court of last resort, the SC should
not be burdened with that task of dealing with causes in the first instance. The
SC’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary, or where serious and important reasons therefor
exist. (Pearson v. IAC, G.R.No. 74455, September 3, 1998).

Exception to this rule is when the Supreme Court may suspend its own
rules when the interests of justice so require, as when there are special and
important reason therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition (Lim
v. Vianzon 497 SCRA 482).

G.R NO. 183409 June 10, 2010


CREBA vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Facts: 
          Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court for
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in amending a provision of a DAR
Administrative Order directly to the SC. 
 
 Ruling:
  The petition must be dismissed. Although the SC, the CA and the RTCs
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. The SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set
forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and
why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance. The
present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts .  Failure to do
so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.

G.R.NO. 187256, FEB. 23, 2011


CONSTANCIO MENDOZA AND SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY OF BALATASAN BULACAO ORIENTAL
MINDORO VS. MAYOR VILLAS
Facts: 

From the adverse decision of the RTC, petitioner questioned it directly to


the SC instead of the CA via petition for certiorari.

Ruling:
 
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma,
this Court made the following pronouncements: 
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with
the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs.
It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket. 
 
Similarly, there are no special and important reasons that petitioners cite
to justify their direct recourse to this Court under Rule 65.

4. exclusive and original-the power of the court to take judicial


cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first
time under the conditions provided by law, and to the
exclusion of all other courts.

Doctrine of Non-interference or doctrine of Judicial Stability

No court can interfere by injunction with the


judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction.

[A.M. No.RTJ-10-2225. September 6, 2011]


ATTY. TOMAS CABILI vs. JUDGE BALINDONG

Facts:

An action for damages was filed in the RTC of Iligan City against the
Mindanao State University (MSU), arising from a vehicular accident. The Iligan
City RTC rendered a decision, holding the MSU liable for damages. The
judgment becomes final and executory for which the Iligan City RTC issued a
writ of execution. The Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU,
however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, the Sheriff served a Notice of
Garnishment on the MSU's depository bank, the Land Bank of Marawi City
Branch.
MSU then filed a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and
mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction against the Land Bank and the Sheriff. The
Judge of Marawi RTC issued a TRO.

Ruling:

The RTC judge of Marawi City committed gross ignorance of the law.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders


or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to
the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment.

A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration
of justice. The respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial
stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain the Sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution issued by a co-equal court of the Iligan City RTC. If the Sheriff
committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the
writ, the proper recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an application
for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not from any other
court, or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.

Note: An exception cited by the SC may be found in Section 16, Rule 39


(Proceedings where property claimed by third person) otherwise called as
“Terceria” whereby a third party claimant, not the judgment obligor, may file a
claim in another court over a property levied on execution. Such another court
may, in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, issue a TRO. But in this case, the
petition for injunction/TRO before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU
itself, the judgment obligor.

Doctrine of Continuity of Jurisdiction (Adherence of Jurisdiction)

Jurisdiction is referred to as “continuing” in view of the general


principle that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction
continues until the court has done all that it can do in the exercise of that
jurisdiction. This principle means that once jurisdiction has been acquired, the
court retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. (Dela Rosa v.
Roldan. G.R. No. 133882. September 5, 2006).

Doctrine of Non-interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability

[G.R. No. 215348. June 20, 2016.]


ELDEFONSO G. DEL ROSARIO vs. CRISTINA OCAMPO-FERRER

Facts:

Plaintiff in a complaint for sum of money before the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City (RTC-Las Piñas), Branch 275, obtained a judgment upon a
compromise settlement. Since defendant still failed to comply with her
obligation, plaintiff moved for execution, which was granted by the RTC-Las
Piñas Br. 275. After the issuance of the Writ of Execution, the sheriff of RTC-
Las Piñas Br. 275 issued a Demand/Notice to Pay to plaintiff, which the latter
failed to act upon. The sheriff levied defendant’s land in Las Piñas and
scheduled the public auction. At the auction sale, plaintiff came out as the sole
and highest bidder, and consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued in his
favor.

Defendant filed a complaint before the RTC-Las Piñas Br. 198 seeking
the annulment of the sheriff's sale, as well as payment of damages. In her
complaint, defendant claimed that plaintiff and the sheriff committed unlawful
acts in enforcing the writ of execution. The RTC dismissed the latter complaint.
However, the CA reversed it declaring that the levy and auction sale was null
and void in that the sheriff does not follow the appropriate manner of enforcing
judgments for money as laid down under Section 9, Rule 39 as there was no
showing that the sheriff gave defendant the opportunity to exercise the option
of immediately choosing which among her properties should be levied upon.

Ruling:
Under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province
or city, having the same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders
or judgments. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in
the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration
of justice.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of
execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A
TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely
the executing sheriff. The appropriate action is to assail the implementation of
the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon
failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Courts will not resolve a contoversy involving a question which is


within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Paloma v. Mora, 470
SCRA 711).

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies "where a claim is


originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view."
G.R. No. 186487. August 15, 2011
ROSITO BAGUNU vs. Sps. AGGABAO

Facts:

Binag filed an Application For Free Patent over application over a parcel
of unregistered land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management
Bureau), DENR. Spouses Aggabao filed a protest against the application
asserting ownership over subject lot based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale it executed with previous owners.

Later, Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instrument over the


same lot with the RTC against Rosita alleging that the sale refers to another lot.
In the meantime, the DENR Regional Office ruled in favor of Atty. Binag
Application For Free Patent, which on appeal was affirmed by the DENR
Secretary. Likewise, the CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary.

In petition for review on certiorari before the SC, Rosita argued that the
CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretary's jurisdiction to resolve the parties'
conflicting claims of ownership over the subject lot notwithstanding that the
same issue is pending with the RTC. She faulted the CA for applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over
the lot in controversy does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of
the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts under
Civil Code within the competence of the courts.

Ruling:

Actions for reformation of instrument issue of landownership ordinarily


fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. However, issue of identity of
the lands of public domain requires a technical determination by the Bureau of
Lands. Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival
claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction
to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary
and the Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists.

After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over the subject lot, pursuant to its
mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues
on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction, such as the distinct cause
of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. The
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for
the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the
matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and
determined.

It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a


particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court.

The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Doctrine of Primary


Administrative Jurisdiction)

It vests in an administrative tribunal the jurisdiction to determine a


controversy involving a question requiring the exercise of sound administrative
discretion. Thus, even where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, but the resolution of the issues in said case requires expertise,
specialized skills, and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
of technical matters or intricate questions involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceedings before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
(Brett v. IAC G.R.No. 74223, November 27,1990).

[G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623. November 27, 2013.]


THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN vs. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Facts:

Plaintiff sued defendant Province in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of


Marikina City for collection of sum of money over a contract for the
construction of the Port and Terminal. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff
and issued a writ of execution. The CA ruled the lower court has no jurisdiction
over money claims against a local government unit.
Ruling:

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of


Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over
money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may
well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such
a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case
without prejudice.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court


in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until
after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 209271. December 8, 2015.]
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, INC. vs. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES).

Ruling:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same
after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is


the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and


the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings. . .

ELEMENTS/AREAS OF JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES

a. Jurisdiction over the subject matter;


b. Jurisdiction over the person of the parties;
c. Jurisdiction over the res (if jurisdiction over the defendant
cannot be acquired); and
d. Jurisdiction over the issues.

A. jurisdiction over the subject matter

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power of the court to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong. (Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921) Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by law and is never acquired by consent or
submission of the parties or by their laches. This is a matter of legislative
enactment which only the legislature can change.
The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
nature of the action, as embodied in the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. (e.g.allegations for nullity of marriage, accion
publican, accion reinvindicatora, etc.).

Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired by:

1. agreement between the parties;


2. through a waiver or failure to object, except when estoppel by
laches set in (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy).

B. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Parties:


a) Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the filing of
the complaint by the plaintiff.
b) Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by service of
summons (Rule 14) or his voluntary appearance in court, which could
be through his counsel.

C. Jurisdiction over the res.

Note: In some instances, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may
not be acquired (as when defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines) but the court may still take cognizance of the case considering
the kind of action filed, to wit:

(1) When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in
the

Philippines, The “status” is the res, the thing. (Rule 14 Sec. 17.)

Example: declaration of nullity of marriage or legal separation under


the Family Code.

(The court can validly try and decide the case without acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but it cannot declare a
judgment in personam, like one for support or damages, unless the
defendant voluntarily appears).

(2) When the action relates to, or the subject of which involves property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent,or in which the relief demanded consists
in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of
the defendant has been attached. (Rule 14 Section 17).
(d) Jurisdiction over the issues

(a) Jurisdiction over the subject matter:

Jurisdiction by Estoppel:

TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
APRIL 15, 1968

Facts:

On July 19, 1948, barely one month after the effectivity of RA No. 296,
(which mandates that money claim not exceeding P2,000 shall be within the
jurisdiction of inferior courts) Sps. Tijam and Tagalog commenced in CFI of
Cebu against Sps. Sibonghanoy an Action for Recovery of sum of P1, 908.00
with legal interest. The Court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, writ of
execution issued after the judgment became final and executory. They were
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff moved for the issuance of writ of execution
against the Surety’s bond upon grounds of absence of a demand upon the
Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment (but not upon
grounds of lack of jurisdiction because of jurisdictional amount).

The Court denied the motion for execution on the ground that there was
no previous demand. Thereafter, the necessary demand was made, and upon
failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, plaintiffs filed a second Motion for
Execution against Surety. Upon failure to answer motion for execution, the
Court granted the motion for execution. The Surety moved to quash the writ on
the ground that it was issued without summary hearing (but not upon grounds
of lack of jurisdiction because of jurisdictional amount). The Court denied the
motion to quash.
The Surety appealed to the CA upon grounds of absence of summary
hearing etc. (but does not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction). The CA
affirmed the order appealed from. The Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the CFI of Cebu has no jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as lack of its affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case. We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches
from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything
done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the
Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of
lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

PNB V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT


143 S 301, JULY 31, 1986

Facts:

Spouses Florendo filed for SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES


against Land Bank and PNB and their officers before the Court of Agrarian
Relation. After trial on the merits, the trial court ruled that the loan with PNB
secured with property has been duly paid and satisfied, ordering PNB to deliver
and release unto the plaintiffs the land titles. Upon motion of the Florendos,
the court issued a writ of execution. PNB filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction to stay the execution before the
CA. It also raised in the CA for the first time the issue that the Court of
Agrarian Reform has no jurisdiction.
Ruling:

The issue of jurisdiction was first raised in the CA. In the Court of
Agrarian Relation, the PNB filed an ANSWER setting up its SPECIAL
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES WITH COUNTERCLAIM. PNB thru its counsel
and representative actively participated in all the hearings. In fact, the
parties agreed upon the issues of the case and the PNB never raised the
issue on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation.

On this score alone, the PNB is precluded from raising for the first time
on appeal the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation
over the case. While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto,
they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and
seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the
trial of the case by cross examining respondent. They cannot now be allowed
to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking jurisdiction of the court to
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.”

Note: This principle of jurisdiction by estoppel


has been clarified and settled in more
recent jurisprudence.

ATWEL V. CONCEPCION PROGRESSIVE


ASSOCIATION INC.
APRIL 14, 2008

Facts:

Concepcion Progressive Association (CPA) owned a parcel of land. Some


elected officers and members of CPA formed their own group and registered in
the SEC as officers as a corporation under the name Concepcion Progressive
Association Inc. (CPA Inc). The latter claimed ownership over the same parcel
of land and filed a case for Mandatory injunction at the SEC special
commercial court.
Atwel, one of the members of CPA, went to the Court of Appeals and
contested the jurisdiction of the special commercial court contending they are
not members of CPA Inc. Hence the case did not involve intra-corporate
dispute between and among members of CPA. On the other, CPA Inc. hand
argued that petitioners were in estoppel as they participated actively in the
court proceedings. CA ruled that there was no intra-corporate dispute but
held that petitioners were already barred from questioning the court’s
jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel.

Ruling:

Estoppel cannot apply because a court’s jurisdiction is conferred


exclusively by the Constitution or by law, not by the parties’ agreement or by
estoppel. Under RA 8799 of 2000, the SEC jurisdiction over intra-corporate
dispute and other cases enumerated in sec. 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction. The doctrine of estoppel did not bar
petitioners from questioning the jurisdiction of the special commercial court. In
Luzon v. NLRC, this Court came up with a clear rule on when JURISDICTION
BY ESTOPPEL applies and when not:

‘’the operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction


seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried
and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction , the parties
are NOT BARRED on appeal from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same MUST EXIST AS A MATTER OF LAW, and may not be
conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. However, if
the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory , such, for instance, as that the court
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position
– that the lower court had jurisdiction’’

TIJAM provided an exceptional circumstances. To void the trial court’s


decision for lack of jurisdiction was not only unfair but patently revolting
considering that the question on jurisdiction was raised only after 15 years of
tedious litigation.

The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even for the first
time on appeal.
G.R. No. 162322. March 14, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BANTIGUE
POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Facts:

Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the RTC of Batangas


an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with a total
assessed value of P14,920 for the entire property. The RTC Clerk of Court
transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan. The
MTC commenced with the reception of evidence. Thereafter, it awarded the
land to the Corporation. The Republic appealed to the CA upon grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the case. The CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the
jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.

Ruling:

Petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of


the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on
appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through
a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be
cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that “a party may be estopped from
raising such jurisdictional question if he has actively taken part in the very
proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in
the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him"
is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine
first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Considering the unique
facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the
party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. Tijam
must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the
most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.

G.R.NO. 182403 Mar 9, 2010


CUDIAMAT V. BATANGAS SAVINGS
Ruling:

The RULE when jurisdiction by estoppel shall apply:

If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppels.”

If the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided
upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal,
to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred


by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint. The nature of an action is determined based on
the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

G.R. NO. 168973, AUGUST 24, 2011


CITY OF DUMAGUETE vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

Facts:

The City of Dumaguete filed before the RTC an Application for Original
Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements under the
Property Registration Decree. The city alleged in support of its application:

That the applicant, City of Dumaguete is the owner of the land subject of
this application with all improvements and buildings comprising the
Engineer’s Compound where it is now situated and has been in
continuous occupation and possession of the same for more than 30 years
or from the year 1960.
The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case arguing that Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership. The subject property in Land
Registration Case is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land
and the City has not been in open, contiguous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the property for 30 years based on evidence. The RTC issued an
Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondent.

Ruling:

The dismissal by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction is patently erroneous.


Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint
which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained
in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones
to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be


made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely
depend upon the defendant. As to whether or not the subject property is indeed
foreshore land is a factual issue which the RTC should resolve in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to present their
respective evidence at a full-blown trial.

Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter v. Exercise of Jurisdiction

G.R. No. 219491. October 17, 2018.]


STEPHEN Y. KU vs. RCBC SECURITIES, INC.
Facts:

Plaintiff filed with the RTC of Makati a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Specific Performance with Damages against RCBC SECURITIES Inc. over his
trade account for buying and selling stocks of companies through the platform
provided by RCBC SECURITIES which was mismanaged.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss upon grounds of insufficient
payment of docket fee and lack of cause of action. However, The RTC of Makati,
Branch 63, issued an Order that the case involves trading of securities which
should be heard and tried before a Special Commercial Court. It directed the
Branch Clerk of Court to forward the entire record of the case to the Office of
the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. The case was re-raffled to Branch 149 of the
RTC of Makati. Thereafter, the RTC Branch 149 denied the Motion to Dismiss
for lack of merit. Defendant then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion upon
Judges of the RTC of Makati City, Branches 63 and 149.

The CA granted the petition for certiorari holding that the RTC of Makati,
Branch 63, has acknowledged that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case; and having acknowledged its lack of jurisdiction, Branch 63
should have dismissed the Complaint, instead of having it re-raffled to another
Branch, as a consequence, all the proceedings undertaken by Branch 149 of
the same RTC which received the case are utterly null and void.

Ruling:

Section 5.2 of RA 8799 provides:

The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5


of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of
general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided,
That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the
cases.

As it now stands, jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of


PD 902-A, collectively known as intra-corporate controversies or disputes, now
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

The designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a


procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the
court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but
only by an internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules
governing matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the
administration of all courts and the personnel thereof. Certainly, an internal
rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But
as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial Courts
is, to stress, merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.

Let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a


particular case's subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the
exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided
by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from
time to time by the Court.

Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the subject


matter cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in a motion to dismiss in the answer. But it is the duty of
the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations
of tenancy. If, after HEARING, the tenancy had in fact been
shown to be the real issue, the court shall dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction.

[G.R. No. 140973. November 11, 2004.]


LARESMA V. ABELLANA

Facts:

Abellana filed a complaint with the RTC of Toledo Cebu against Laresma
for RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF Agricultural land. He alleged that
defendant had been a lessee of an adjoining land and encroached into his
property by means of threat, strategy and stealth took possesion of plaintiff’s
property and deprived him of its possession. In his answer, defendant Laresma
averred that the dispute was agrarian in nature, within the jurisdiction of the
DAR, involving his right of possession covered by Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) under agrarian laws.

Ruling:

DARAB has no jurisdiction over the action. The bone of contention is


whether the disputed lot is a portion covered by the land under the name of
plaintiff Laresma. Well-entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction is
determined by the materials allegations of the complaint and the law,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action
and the subject matter cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
a motion to dismiss in the answer, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of litigation.
It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction
over an ejectment case by simple expedience of a party raising as a defense
therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relation between the parties. But it is
the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of
tenancy. If, after hearing, the tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real
issue, the court shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. (Isidro v. CA 228
S 503 [1993])

Note: In several cases of ejectment, where tenancy was raised as a defense


in the Answer or Motion to Dismiss, the Court went beyond the allegation of
the complaint in determining jurisdiction in resolving the motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and required the
presentation of evidence to prove or disprove the defense of tenancy. After
finding the real issue to be a tenancy, the case may be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. (Hilado v. Chavez 438 S 623. Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan 42S
89).

(b) Jurisdiction over the Person:


 In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is
acquired from the moment he files his complaint. Upon filing his
complaint in court, he is automatically within the jurisdiction of
the court. (MRR Co. v. Atty. Gen. 20 Phil. 523).
 While Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired:

1.) Upon service on him of coercive process (summons) in the


manner provided by law; or
2.) By his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. So
if the defendant was never served with summons, any judgment
rendered by the court will not bind him. Judgment cannot be
enforced because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person.

Note: We’ll discuss extensively jurisdiction over the person of the


defendant when we reach Rule 14 (Summons) considering the
significant changes on it under the 2019 Amendments of the civil
procedure .

(c) Jurisdiction Over The Res is that acquired by the court over the
property or the thing in contest, and is obtained by seizure under
legal process of the court whereby it is held to abide such order as the
court may make. (Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291)
Examples: (1) A and B quarreled over a piece of land. The piece of land
is the res of the case.

(2) Res may be intangible, like when an illegitimate child files


compulsory recognition.The res is the status of the child because
it is the object of the litigation.

Q: Why is jurisdiction over the res important?

A: It may be a substitute for jurisdiction over the person.

Example: a defendant who is non-resident and out of the country,and


the object of litigation is a parcel of land is here in the
Philippines, so the may court acquires jurisdiction over the
res (land) even if the defendant is abroad. The judgment
over the res can be enforced.

Note: under Rule 14 Sec. 15, service of summons to the defendant


is not for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant but to comply with the due process.

D. JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES

Distinction jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over


the issues.

1.) Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and try
a particular case, while Jurisdiction over the issues is the power
of the court to resolve lsegal questions involved in the case;

2.) Jurisdiction over the subject matter is acquired upon filing of


the complaint, while Jurisdiction over the issues of the case is
acquired upon filing of the answer which joins the issues
involved in the case.

G.R NO. 131286 MARCH 18, 2004


LAM VS. CHUA
Facts:

In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana Chua


with the Pasay RTC the ground cited is the psychological incapacity of Jose,
without raising the issue and prayer for the support of her child. The RTC
declared the marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam null and void for
being bigamous in nature and awarded support.

Held:

A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided
beyond them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a
judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its
allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of
jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack. It is a serious error for the trial
court to have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it
was beyond its jurisdiction to do so.

G.R.NO. 136913. MAY 12, 2000

ANITA C. BUCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Anita leased a parcel of land owned by Tiongco. Later, Tiongco (lessor)


increased the rentals to which Anita opposed. Instead, Anita issued checks
corresponding to the rentals based on the original lease contract. Tiongco
refused to accept said payment and claimed that the contract has already
expired.

Anita then filed with the RTC a complaint for specific performance with
prayer for consignation and alleged that the contract contains an automatic
renewal clause, thus, the lease contract is still subsisting. The RTC found for
Anita and ruled that the contract was automatically renewed in case of inaction
of parties. However, the CA reversed the RTC contending that the lease
contract was not automatically renewed and ordered Anita to immediately
vacate the leased premises upon this ground.

Ruling:
The CA is correct in finding that the contract has expired. However, it
must be noted that defendant lessor did not include in his Answer with
Counterclaim a prayer for the restoration of possession of the leased premises.
Moreover, the issues agreed upon by the parties to be resolved during the pre-
trial were the correct interpretation of the contract and the validity of plaintiff’s
refusal to pay monthly rental. The issue of possession of the leased premises
was not among the issues agreed upon by the parties or threshed out before
the court a quo. Neither was it raised by defendants on appeal.

THE COURTS

Constitutional limitation on the power to legislate in


matters of court jurisdiction (Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution):

Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution. However, Congress may increase the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, but only with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court itself. Moreover, Congress may reorganize the judicial system
provided it does not undermine the security of tenure of its members. In the
exercise of these powers, Congress may not infringe the independence of the
judiciary.

JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS (RTC)

CIVIL

Exclusive Original Jurisdiction (sec. 19 BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA


No. 7691)

(1) In all civil actions the subject matter of which is incapable of


pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where scuh value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,

(3) Admiralty and maritime cases where the demand or claim exceeds
P300,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or exceeds P400,000.00 (Metro
Manila);
(4) Probate proceedings, testate or intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds P300,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or exceeds
P400,000.00 (Metro Manila);

(5) Actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) All cases not falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;

(7) Actions and special proceedings within the exclusive original


jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the
Court of Agrarian Relations;

(8) All cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damagesof


whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and cost or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds P300,000.00 (outside
Metro Manila) or exceeds P400,000.00 (Metro Manila);

Note: Determination of Jurisdictional Amount:

a). The exclusion of “damages of whatever kind” applies to cases


where the damages are merely incidental to or consequence
of the main cause of action . (Administrative Circular No. 09-
94, June 14, 1994). Thus, if the main cause of action is
recovery of damages, the amount of damages shall all be
included in determining the jurisdictional amount.

a). But for purposes of determining the correct payment of


filing/docket fees, these matters, to wit: interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs
are included in the computation.

(1) Actions the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary


estimation;

[G.R. No. 119347. March 17, 1999.]


EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO vs.
HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL
Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants, denominated


"Declaration of Nullity and Partition," with the RTC of Mandaue City.
The complaint alleged that plaintiffs are co-owners of that parcel of land
with defendants. However, defendants co-heirs fraudulently executed a
document denominated as "Declaration Of Heirs And Deed Of
Confirmation Of A Previous Oral Agreement Of Partition," dividing among
themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground


of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case which involves
division/repartition over a parcel of land, and since the total assessed
value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) 3 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Plaintiffs filed
an Opposition saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since
the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the
contemplation of Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.

Ruling:

The pertinent allegations of the complaint run:

xxx xxx xxx

That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal


heirs of spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho
who died long time ago;
That in life the spouses became the owners in fee
simple of a certain parcel of land;

That plaintiffs discovered a public document, which


is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a
previous oral agreement of partition, affecting the land
executed by and among the defendants whereby
defendants divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of plaintiffs who are entitled thereto;

That the instrument is false and perjurious and is a


complete nullity because the defendants are not the only
heirs of Casimero Tautho; plaintiffs are also legal heirs
and descendants of said deceased; moreover, there has
been no oral partition of the property;

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this


Honorable Court to declare null and void the document of
declaration of heirs and confirmation and to order the
partition of the land into seven equal parts;

The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of
the RTC. The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment
of a document denominated as "Declaration Of Heirs And Deed Of
Confirmation Of Previous Oral Partition.” The main purpose of plaintiffs
in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which
defendants declared themselves as the only heirs. While the complaint
also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the
main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-
described.

In Singson vs. Isabela Sawmill, we rule that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not


capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those


for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price
paid, and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.

[G.R. No. 80040. September 30, 1988.]


ISMAEL AMORGANDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

Spouses Saycon (lessors), leased to spouses Amorganda (lessees) a


fishpond for a period of ten years. In a complaint filed by the lessees to
compel the lessors to return the leased premises, they allege that the
lessors forcibly entered the leased fishpond and prevented the lessees
and their workers from entering the premises. Defendants filed their
Answer alleging that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case
since the complaint filed is in the nature of a forcible entry and should
have been filed in the Municipal Court of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where
the land is situated, in accordance with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

On appeal, the CA found that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case since the object of the complaint was to recover possession of the
land which the herein private respondents had secured by means of
force, threats and intimidation. The complaint thus alleges the facts
which confer exclusive jurisdiction in the Municipal Trial Court to try the
case. (Sec. 33(2), BP 129).

Ru
ling:

While the complaint in the trial court alleges that they were
dispossessed of the leased fishpond by the lessors by means of force,
stealth and intimidation, so that the complaint would appear, at first
blush, to be one for forcible entry, the action is, in reality, one for
specific performance, i.e., to compel the respondents, as lessors, to
comply with their obligations under the lease contract and return the
possession of the leased premises to them. Such action is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation and comes within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of regional trial courts.

[G.R. No. 176858. September 15, 2010.]


HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented
by CLAUDIO PADILLA vs. DOMINADOR
MAGDUA

Facts:

Plaintiffs-heirs filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, for


Recovery of Ownership, Possession, Partition and Damages against
their co-heir, brother, Ricardo. It was alleged that the defendants
claimed ownership through a fictitious Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property purportedly executed by their mother and defendant Ricardo.
Plaintiffs also sought for the Annulment of Sale of the subject land
subsequently made by the children of defendant in favor of a third
person, Dominador.

Defendant Dominador, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of


lack of jurisdiction since the action involves title to a real property and
the assessed value of the subject land in the amount of P590.00 as
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte.

Plaintiffs argued that the action was not merely for recovery of
ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for
annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions
beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
Ruling:

In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of
the land was P590.00, (below P20,000.00), which seems the MTC has
jurisdiction over the case. However, the action was not merely for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also
for annulment of deed of sale, and since annulment of contracts are
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case.

In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, we held that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of


which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due
execution and authenticity of the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in
favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to
the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to
the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed between
Ricardo's daughters and Dominador. Since the principal action sought
here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC.

G.R. No. 181622. November 20, 2013


GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC. vs. HEIRS of CEFERINO
EBARASABAL
Facts:

The heirs filed a Complaint for "Declaration of Nullity of Documents,


Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees” against
defendants. The Complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Barili, Cebu. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the RTC has
no jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to
or possession of real property or any interest therein and since the assessed
value of the subject property does not exceed P20,000.00 (the same being only
P11,990.00), the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
of Cebu. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss which was affirmed by the CA,
finding that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the


title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the
contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of
the MTC. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show
that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs
prayed for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The complaint was
for "Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition,
Damages and Attorney's Fees." Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of
action which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or recovery of
shares or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for
declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

As cited by the CA, this Court, in the case of Singson v. Isabela


Sawmill, held that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is


not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts].
This rule was reiterated in Russell v. Vestil and Social Security
System v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc.

The principal relief sought by petitioners is the nullification of the subject


Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale entered into by and between some of their
co-heirs and respondents, insofar as their individual shares in the subject
property are concerned. Thus, the recovery of their undivided shares or interest
over the disputed lot, which were included in the sale, simply becomes a
necessary consequence if the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the principal
action sought in respondents' Complaint is something other than the recovery
of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus,
cognizable by the RTC. Well entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.

Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of


Court that where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain
to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC
provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above, respondents' complaint
clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Where collection of sum of money for unpaid rental,


plus damages, interest, and attys. fees sought by
plaintiff, are merely incidental to the cause of action
of breach of contract, it does not change the kind of
action for specific performance (which is beyond
pecuniary estimation).

GR NO. 136109. AUGUST 1, 2002


RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHIL. INC. V. CA

Facts:

Manuel Dulawon filed with RTC, Kalinga a complaint for BREACH OF


LEASE WITH DAMAGES AGAINST RCPI. The material allegations of the
Complaint goes:
That the RCPI surreptitiously removed is equipments and other
personalties from the leased premises and failed to pay rentals to the damage
and prejudice of plaintiff;

That the acts of defendant amounts to a breach of contract which is


unlawful and malicious, as in fact, it caused plaintiff serious anxiety, emotional
stress, and sleepless nights for which he is entitled to moral damages;

Plaintiff could have leased the premises to other persons for business
purposes; that this unlawful and malicious must be taught a lesson by being
ordered to pay exemplary damages;

RCPI filed a Motion To Dismiss contending it was MTC which has


jurisdiction as it is basically are for collection of unpaid rentals of P84,000, as
it is payment of an amount plus interest plus attorney’s fees. The MTC
denied the motion to dismiss.

Ruling:

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is


conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. In the case at bar, the allegation in
the complaint plainly show that private respondents CAUSE OF ACTION is
breach of contract.

It is settled that a BREACH OF CONTRACT IS A CAUSE OF ACTION


either for SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE or RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS. The
action should not be titled Breach of Contract but either SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE or RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS the cause of action being
breach of contract.

Actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation


and therefore all under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Here, the
averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by plaintiff was primarily
one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease
contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards. The prayer,
therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84, 000.00 plus
damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the main action for
specific performance. Similarly, in Manufacturers Distributors Inc. the court
explained:

That plaintiff’s complaint also sought the payment by the defendant of


P3, 376.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees, does not give a pecuniary
estimation to the litigation, for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered
as a consequence of the specific performance. If no such liability is judicially
declared, the payment cannot be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not
represent the value of the subject of litigation.

Note: Compare the case Radio Communications with the case


of Pajares below.

[G.R. No. 212690. February 20, 2017.]


SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. PAJARES vs. REMARKABLE
LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING, represented by ARCHEMEDES G. SOLIS

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a Complaint denominated as "Breach of Contract and


Damages" against defendant before the RTC of Cebu City. The RTC issued an
Order dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the plaintiff's
complaint is actually for the recovery of damages for the alleged breach of
contract. The complaint sought the award of P200,000.00 as incidental and
consequential damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as legal expenses; the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the amount of P20,000.00
as cost of the suit, or for the total amount of P280,000.00 as damages which is
less than the jurisdictional amount of the RTCs.

However, the CA rendered a Decision setting aside the Order of the RTC
and remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. It held the
complaint is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC's
jurisdiction. A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as
a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Ruling:
An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint
shows that there is nothing therein which would support a conclusion that
plaintiff-respondent's Complaint is one for specific performance or rescission of
contract. The principal obligation of defendant under the Dealership Contract
is to act as plaintiff's dealer outlet. Plaintiff, however, neither asked the RTC to
compel petitioners to perform such obligation as contemplated in said
contract nor sought the rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading,
and relief are bereft of such allegation.

In fact, neither phrase appeared was used in the Complaint when


respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and
should have used any of those phrases to indicate the proper designation of the
Complaint. To the contrary, respondent's counsels designated the Complaint as
one for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a misnomer and inaccurate.
There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract." Rather, "breach of
contract is a cause of action, but not the action or relief itself." Breach of
contract may be the cause of action in a complaint for specific performance or
rescission of contract, both of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, therefore, cognizable by the RTC. However, breach of contract may also be
the cause of action in a complaint for damages.

[G.R. No. 122806. June 19, 1997.]


TIMES BROADCASTING NETWORK V. COURT OF
APPEALS

Facts:
Times Broadcasting network entered into a contract of lease over Hotel
Arocha in Ozamis City with its owner Filomeno Arocha. It is stipulated that
Times Broadcasting should install its radio antenna on the 4 th floor of the
Hotel. The installation, however, was made on the 3 rd floor. Arocha sued for
Ejectment. Times Broadcasting resisted contending that the cause was for
specific performance and not ejectment, hence, the municipal court did not
have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

A reading of the allegations of the complaint shows that the action was
for ejectment and not for specific performance.
The nature of the action and the jurisdiction of courts are determined by
the allegations of the complaint. That the owner Arocha was unlawfully
deprived of the possession of the third floor rooftop of the Hotel through stealth
and strategy when Times Broadcasting used it as monitoring pad for its
antenna. Arocha sought to recover physical possession through an action for
ejectment filed before the MTCC. Hence, the case properly falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTCC.

Jurisdiction of the RTC in cases that are


incapable of pecuniary estimation is based
on the subject matter of the action, not on
the cause of action of the complaint.

GR NO.166876. MARCH 24, 2006


INIEGO V. PURUGANAN

Facts:

This is a complaint for QUASI-DELICT AND DAMAGES filed in the RTC


against the driver and owner of the truck. The jurisdictional issue hinges on
whether an action for quasi-delict is one beyond pecuniary estimation,
excluding the moral and exemplary damages sought for.

Ruling:

Action for damages based on Quasi-delicts are primarily and


effectively actions for recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendants’ tortious acts, and are therefore capable of
pecuniary estimation. It is crystal clear from BP 129 as amended by RA
7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuriary
estimation is not the cause of action but the subject matter of the action.

A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission commited by


the defendant inviolation of the primary rights of the plaintiff.Subject matter
of the action is the physical facts, the thing real or personal , the money,
lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and
not the delict or wrong commited by the defendant.(Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Co. Aug. 26, 1974).

GR NO. 138896. JUNE 20, 2000


BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY CEBU V. HEIRS
OF FRANCISCO PASTOR

Facts:

Brgy. San Roque filed before the RTC a complaint to expropriate property
of Heirs of Pastor. RTC dismissed the action upon grounds that the value of
the property to be expropriated determines whether it is within MTC or RTC .
since it is less than P20,000, it falls in the MTC (Based on current tax
declaration of the land).

Ruling:

In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s


exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in


monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with
the property of the expropriation. Verily, the value held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Zurbano that “condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.”

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is


conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or
by erroneous belief of the court that it
exists.

[G.R. No. 141818. June 22, 2006.]


INSULAR SAVINGS BANK vs. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

Facts:

Far East Bank & Trust Company filed against Home Bankers Trust Co.
with the Phil Clearing House Corp’s (PCHC) Arbitration Committee under RA
No. 876 (The Arbitration Law) over dishonored the checks under arbitration
proceedings. The Philippine Clearing House Corporation was created to
facilitate the clearing of checks of member banks. Petitioner and respondent
are members of PCHC, thus they underwent arbitration proceedings.

PCHC Arbitration Committee rendered a decision in favor of Far East


Bank. Defendant Home Banker filed a Petition for Review in the RTC Makati
pursuant to PCHC Rules of Procedure for Arbitration. Far East filed a motion to
dismiss Petition for Review upon grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.

Ruling:

The filing of a Petition for Review with RTC is erroneous. In the instant
case, petitioner and respondent have agreed that the PCHC Rules would govern
in case of controversy. However, since the PCHC Rules came about only as a
result of an agreement between and among member banks of PCHC and not by
law, it cannot confer jurisdiction to the RTC. Thus, the portion of the PCHC
Rules granting jurisdiction to the RTC to review arbitral awards, only on
questions of law, cannot be given effect. The petition for review with the RTC
when the same should have been filed with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court.

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right


to act in a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent
or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court
that it exists.
Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs — like arbitration,
mediation, negotiation and conciliation — are encouraged by the Supreme
Court. By enabling parties to resolve their disputes amicably, they provide
solutions that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and
more productive of goodwill and lasting relationships. It must be borne in mind
that arbitration proceedings are mainly governed by the Arbitration Law and
suppletorily by the Rules of Court.

(2) Actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest


therein, where the assessed value of exceeds P20,000.00 (outside Metro
Manila) or exceeds P50,000.00 (Metro Manila), except forcible entry and
unlawful detainer;

Ultimate Objective Rule:


Where the ultimate objective of plaintiff is to obtain
title, possession over the real property.

[G.R. No. 180321. March 20, 2013.]


EDITHA PADLAN vs. DINGLASAN

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a case for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title


before the RTC over a parcel of land which it claimed was transferred to
defendant through a falsified document executed by a third party. The RTC
rendered a Decision finding defendant to be a buyer in good faith and,
consequently, dismissed the complaint. On appeal the CA reversed and set
aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT. Before
the SC, defendant raised the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction of the
subject matter, considering that from the complaint, it can be inferred that the
value of the property was only P4,000.00, cognizable by the MTC, which was
the amount alleged by plaintiff that the property was sold to defendant.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. In order to determine which court has


jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic
as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.

From the Complaint, the case filed by plaintiff is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent
jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting
parties is the lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to
its possession and enjoyment.

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's


cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has
the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition
of the same. A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the
subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by a
third party to defendant in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was
even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property.

Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real


property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the
Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and
not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the
RTC are null and void.

[G.R. No. 138248. September 7, 2005.]


BARANGAY PIAPI vs. IGNACIO TALIP representing
the HEIRS OF JUAN JAYAG
Facts:
Complainants- petitioners filed with the said RTC of a complaint for
reconveyance and damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against defendant. The
complaint alleges that complainants and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open possession for more than 30
years of a parcel of land in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur. Complainants
contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

Ruling:

Basin as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action is not


determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the
allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claims asserted therein. Where the
ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to
real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the

The pertinent allegations in petitioners' complaint read:

2. Plaintiffs by themselves and/or thru their predecessors-in-


interest have been in actual possession, in the concept of an owner, in
good faith and in a manner that is open, peaceful, uninterrupted,
public, adverse and continuous, for more than 30 years, the following
described parcel of land;

2a. The market value of the above-described land is Fifteen


Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

3. The respective areas that private plaintiffs occupy consisted of


an average of 100 square meters on which their homes and houses are
built while a large chunk of the above-described property has been
used or set aside for the barangay site of and other infrastructures for
Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur.

5. Defendant or his predecessor-in-interest has never been in


possession, of the land in suit and except for the year 1998, has not
paid taxes thereon nor declared the same for taxation purposes — a
clear index that defendant's title over the same is not genuine.
6. Defendant, in procuring title to the land in suit did so by fraud,
mistake and/or misrepresentation, hence, he holds the title for the
benefit and in trust of the landowner — that is, herein plaintiffs.

7. Defendant is by law under obligation to reconvey the land in


suit in favor of herein plaintiffs, . . "

It can easily be discerned that petitioners' complaint involves title to, or


possession of, real property.

[G.R. No. 187696. June 15, 2016.]


FILOMENA CABLING vs. RODRIGO DANGCALAN
Facts:

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and damages


against Rodrigo Dangcalan over respondent's alleged encroachment on
petitioner's property. In her Complaint, petitioner alleged that she owned a
125-square-meter parcel of land located at Malitbog, Southern Leyte which has
an assessed value of P2,100. After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor
of plaintiff. The RTC reversed it stating that the action already prescribed and
defendant is a builder in good faith. On the other hand, the CA annulled both
the RTC and MCTC Decisions for lack of jurisdiction. Instead of ruling on the
issues presented by plaintiff-petitioner, the appellate court held that the
threshold question was whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over petitioner's
complaint. After examining the averments therein, the CA ruled that the MCTC
had no jurisdiction because the Complaint was clearly an accion publiciana. As
such, it was a plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession,
which properly fell under the RTC's jurisdiction.

Ruling:

It is no longer good law that all cases for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana lie with the RTC, regardless of the value of the property. All cases
involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court (sec. 19, 33, BP 129 as amended by RA 7691).

The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions (sec. 19, 33, BP 129
as amended by RA 7691) are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint. The
Court explained further in Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction
and Development Corporation that its jurisdiction would now be determined by
the assessed value of the disputed land, or of the adjacent lots if it is not
declared for taxation purposes. If the assessed value is not alleged in the
complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction . The
reason behind this rule is that the trial court is not afforded the means of
determining from the allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another court. After all,
courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.

Action for Quieting of Title under Rule as a special civil


action under Rule 63 specifies that it may be brought
before the appropriate RTC. But being a real action that
involves ownership or possession of realty, the assessed
value determines which court (MTC or RTC) has
jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 195834. November 9, 2016.]


GUILLERMO SALVADOR vs. PATRICIA, INC.

Facts:

This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the
property occupied by the plaintiffs was field by the latter before the RTC which
decided in their favor. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's judgment
declaring that the plaintiffs had not legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit
for quieting of title.

Ruling:

(Note: The facts of the case apparently did not show that the issue of jurisdiction
was disputed be it in the RTC or the CA. Nevertheless, the SC took up and
resolved the same).
The RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for injunction because
it was one in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary
estimation. But the same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the
quieting of title, which had the nature of a real action — that is, an action that
involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property, or any interest
in real property — in view of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level
courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April 15, 1994, to now pertinently provide as
follows:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal


Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. —
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which


involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: . . .

As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the
property in dispute. An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil
action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Although Section 1 of Rule 63
specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial Court," the specification
does not override the statutory provision on jurisdiction. This the Court has
pointed out in Malana v. Tappa, to wit:

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in


the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said
provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does


not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the
RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" — that an action for quieting of
title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief,
and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may . . .
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the
word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive
and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

[G.R. No. 134230. July 17, 2002.]


JOVENAL OUANO vs. PGTT INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT CORPORATION
Facts:

PGTT Corporation filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and


Possession of Real Property and Damages against Juvenal before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the involved is only P2,910.00 as
indicated in the latest tax declaration. PGTT opposed, saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction considering that the market value of the lots involved is
P49,760.00

Ruling:

The MTC has jurisdiction. Since the action involves ownership and
possession of real property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim is determined by the assessed value, not the market value, thereof.

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,


damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

[G.R. No. 173915. February 22, 2010.]


IRENE SANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO CLARAVALL
Facts:

Plaintiff filed before the RTC of Baguio City a Complaint for Damages
against defendants for the slanderous remarks made in public by the latter
against the former. She prayed that defendants be held liable for P300,000.00
as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney's
fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit. Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the MTCC that had jurisdiction
over the case as the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than
the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary
damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

The RTC held that the total claim amounted to P420,000.00 above the
jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. Defendants filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition claiming grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC. Meanwhile, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint increasing
the claim for moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.

Issues:

1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the


amendment of the complaint?

Ruling:

Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act


No. 7691, states:

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,


damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 19 is instructive: The


exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action . However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining
the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, the main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages
being claimed, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses,
are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute
the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. In cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.

Likewise, it is proper for the RTC to issue an order allowing the


amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00
despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the CA. While it is a
basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the
court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly had
jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was
then still a matter of right.

Concurrent with the Supreme Court (original jurisdiction):

Cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls. (Sec. 21 (2)


of BP 129).

Concurrent with the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals original


jurisdiction):

1. Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus against lower


courts and bodies.

NOTE: Principle of Hierarchy of Courts of RTC and CA


(Constancio Mendoza and Sangguniang Barangay of
Balatasan Bulacao Oriental Mindoro v. Mayor Villas G.R.
No. 187256 Feb. 23m 2011); between CA and SC ( United
Claimants Associations of NEA v. NEA G.R. No. 187107
Jan. 31, 2012.

2. Petitions for Quo Warranto and Habeas Corpus (Sec. 9(2) and Sec.
21 (1) of BP 129).

3. Petition for habeas data (A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC).

4. Petition for Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC).


5. Petition for writ of continuing mandamus (sec. 2 Rule 8 Part 111
Rules of Procedure in Environment Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).

JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS (R.A 8369)

1. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, and habeas corpus


involving children.

2. Petition for adoption for children and revocation thereof.


3. Complaints for annulment of marriage, nullity of marriage and those
relating to status and property relations of spouses, petition for
dissolution of conjugal partnership.

4. Summary judicial proceedings under the family Code.


5. Petition for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent
or neglected; petition for voluntary or involuntary commitment of
children; suspension, termination or restoration of parental authority
under PD 603.

6. Petition for constitution of family home. (sec. 5 RA 8369)

Enforceability of Court Writs and Processes

Sec. 3.Writs and Processes of the Interim Rules and Guidelines:

a.) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas


corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be
enforced in any part of the region.

b.) All other processes whether issued by the RTC or MetTC, MTC
may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, the last three
cases, without a certification by the judge of the RTC.

[G.R. No. 154598. August 16, 2004.]


IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS RICHARD THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON
Facts:

The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family
Court in Makati, but this was dismissed because of the allegation that the child
was in Basilan, the place where the wife claimed she would bring the baby.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time with the CA
(which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country).

The CA denied the petition on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that The Family Courts Act of 1997 (RA
8369) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus. That it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980).

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving custody of minors.

Ruling:

The CA should take cognizance of the case since the provisions of RA


8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
custody of minors. RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7092 and BP
129 — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.

Note: See distinction between territorial jurisdiction of the RTC and


territorial area of its branch (sec. 17, 18 BP 129) for purposes of filing a
complaint.

JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS (MTC)


METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS (METCS) AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS (MCTC)

RA No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994 (Administrative Circular 09-
94, June 14, 1994) amended the jurisdictional provisions of BP Blg.-129 and in
effect has expanded the jurisdictions of MTCs, MTCCs, MCTCs.

CIVIL

Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate


proceedings, Actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, with
jurisdiction to resolve issue of ownership to determine issue of
possession;

2. Actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest


therein, where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.000 (outside
Metro Manila) or P50,000.00 (Metro Manila);

3. Actions where the demand does not exceed P300,000.00(outside Metro


Manila) or P400,000.00 ( Metro Manila); in both cases exclusive of
damages, interest, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs, the
amount of which must be specifically alleged, but the filing fees thereon
shall be paid; (sec. 1 RA 7691; see 33, BP Blg. 129)

Note: Sec. 5 of RA 7691, provided that 5 years from the effectivity of the
law, the amount of P100,000.00 for courts outside Metro Manila shall
be adjusted to P200,000.00 and the amount of P200,000.00 for
Metro Manila shall be adjusted to P400,000.00. It further provided
that the jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00 for courts outside
Metro Manila shall be further adjusted to P300,000.00 for 5 years. At
present, the jurisdictional amount of an MTC outside Metro Manila is
not exceeding P300,000.00 and for MTCs in Metro Manila remains
constant at an amount not exceeding P400,000.00.

4. Actions involving personal property valued at not more than P300,


000.00 (outside Metro Manila), or P400, 000.00 (Metro Manila); (sec. 19
BP Blg. 129, sec. 3 RA No. 7691).

5. Admiralty and maritime cases where the demand or claim does not
exceed P300, 000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P400, 000.00 (Metro
Manila); (sec. 1 RA 7691).

6. Probate proceedings, testate or intestate, where the gross value of the


estate does not exceed P300,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or
P400,000.00 ( Metro Manila); (sec. 3 RA No. 7691; sec. 19(4) BP Blg.
129)

7. Inclusion and exclusion of voters (Sec. 138 of BP 881);

8. Provisional remedies in principal actions within their jurisdiction, and in


proper cases, such as preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction,
appointment of receiver, and delivery of personal property (Rules 57, 58,
59 and 60).

Delegated

1. Cadastral and land registration cases assigned by the Supreme Court


covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested
lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000.00 (Sec. 34 BP 129;
sec. 4 RA No. 7691).

Note: Decisions of these courts shall be appealable in the same manner


as decisions of RTC (sec. 34 BP 129; sec 4 RA 7691). Meaning the MTC
acting under its delegated jurisdiction is acting as RTC which decisions
are appealable to the CA.

Special

1. Petitions for Habeas Corpus in the absence of all the Regional Trial Court
judges in the province or city (sec. 35 of BP 129).
2. Application for bail in the absence of all Regional Trial Court judges (Sec.
35 of BP 129).

Summary Procedure (Exclusive Original):

1. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of


damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered;

2. All other cases, except probate proceedings, where total claim does not
exceed P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00, (Metro
Manila) exclusive of interest cost.

Small Claims Cases:


Sec. 2 A.M No. 08-8-7(October 27, 2009) on the Rules of Procedure
on Small Claims Cases provides for the rule on small claims cases. It states
that-

“Sec. 2. This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court for payment of money where the value of the
claims does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) exclusive
of interest and costs.”

3. Actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any


interest therein, where the assessed value does not exceed
P20,000.000 (outside Metro Manila) or P50,000.00 (Metro
Manila);

4. Actions where the demand does not exceed P300,000.00 (outside


Metro Manila) or P400,000.00 ( Metro Manila); in both cases
exclusive of damages, interest, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses
and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged, but the
filing fees thereon shall be paid; (sec. 1 RA 7691; see 33, BP Blg. 129.

The concept of Totality Rule in determining


Jurisdictional Amount of court:

[G.R. No. 140746. March 16, 2005.]


PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and
ALEXANDER BUNCAN vs. STANDARD INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE

Facts:

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Sum of Money before the RTC out of a
vehicular incident involving her jeepney and a passenger bus owned by
Pantranco North Express, Inc. The total cost of the damage was P21,415.00,
but plaintiff’s insurer Standard Insurance Inc. paid only P8,000.00. So plaintiff
shouldered the balance of P13,415.00. Standard Insurance and the plaintiff
demanded reimbursement from Pantranco and its driver for the amount of
P8,000.00 and P13,415.00 respectively.
In their answer, both Pantranco and driver averred that it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case
arguing that plaintiff’s claim of P13,415.00 and insurance company's claim of
P8,000.00 individually is below the jurisdictional amount of the RTC at that
time which was P20,000.00.

Ruling:

Under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional
amount. Here, the total of the two claims is more than P20,000.00 which at the
time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional
Trial Court. In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is,
Pantranco's bus hitting the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact,
that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction
common to both Martina and Insurance Co, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against Pantranco and its driver.

Accion reivindicatoria (recovery of ownership of


land) may be cognizable by the MTC. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of
the property is dismissible.

G.R. No. 160384. APRIL 29, 2005


CESAR HILARIO V. SALVADOR

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed an action for Reivindicatoria (recovery of ownership of


land) with the RTC of Romblon against defendant. Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of
the action, averring that the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the
land which is essential requisite for determining the jurisdiction of the Court
in an action for reivindicatoria. The plaintiffs maintain that the RTC has
jurisdiction as an accion reivindicatoria is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Plaintiffs also contended that the RTC can take judicial notice of the market
value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and
considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total
value thereof is P3,500,000.00, cognizable by the RTC.

Ruling:
Under section 33(3) (MTC, MTCCs), section 19(2) (RTC), the jurisdiction
of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market
value thereof. The complaint does not contain an allegation stating the
assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. Absent any allegation
in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the petitioners' action. Hence, it is dismissible. The court cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.

Note: In this case the SC found that the action is not an accion reivindicatoria but
accion publiciana. The SC has this to say: We find and so rule that the
action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery
of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion
reivindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other
hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the
right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from
the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. The action of the
petitioners does not involve a claim of ownership over the property but of
possession.

Again in a complaint for accion publiciana or


recovery of possession of land that failed to
allege the assessed value of the subject property,
the court shall grant a motion to dismiss.
Otherwise the proceedings in court are null and
void.

[G.R. No. 155179. August 24, 2007.]


VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ
Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land


with Compensation and Damages against defendant before the Regional Trial
Court of Tuao, Cagayan. Defendant Victorino filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.
Ruling:

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana


lies with the RTC no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must
be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. (sec. 19 and
SEC 33, BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7691).

A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of
the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the type of relief prayed for irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.

Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject


property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the
complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action. The courts cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land. Failing to allege in
their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously
erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the
RTC are null and void.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (CA)


(Under B.P.Blg. 129 as amended by R.A No. 7902)

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in actions for the annulment of the


judgment s of the Regional Trial Courts(Sec. 9(2), B.P. Blg. 129; Valdez vs.
China Banking Corporation, 455 SCRA 687).

2. Concurrent and original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to issue


writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamusagainst the (a) Regional Trial
Court, (b) Civil Service Commisson, (c) Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, (d) Other Quasi-judicial agencies mentioned in Rule 43, and (e)
National Labor Relations Commission (St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC,
295 SCRA 949). Following the “doctrine of hierarchy of courts,” the
petition for certiorari against the NLRC must first be filed with the Court
of Appeals.
3. Concurrent and original with the Supreme Court and the Regional
Trial Court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
lower courts and bodies and writs of quo warranto and habeas corpus,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Previously, the Court of
Appeals could issue these writs only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, i.e.,
only in connection with a case appealed to it (Sec. 9(1), B.P. Blg. 129).

4. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction by way or ordinary appeal from the


Regional Trial Court and the Family Courts (Sec. 9(3), B.P.Blg. 129).

5. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction by way of petition for review whether


the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or
questions of law from the Regional Trial Court rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction (Sec. 22, B.P.Blg. 129;Rule 43, Rules of
Court;Sec. 9, B.P.Blg. 129).

6. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction by way of petition from review from


the decisions, resolutions orders or awards of the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals and other bodies
mentioned in Rule 43 (Sec. 9 (3), B.P.Blg. 129) and of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases (Enemencio vs. Office of
the Ombudsman, 419 SCRA 82; Gonzales vs. Rosas, 423 SCRA
488)whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact
and law, or questions of law.

Note: under R.A No. 9282 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of


the CTA, the Court of Appeals has been divested of its
jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the CTA and
effectively made the same as as its co-equal court. The
decisions of the Divisions of the CTA are now reviewed
under a procedure analogous to that provided for in Rule
43 with the CTA, which shall hear the case en banc.
Judgments of the Court of Tax Appeals rendered en banc
are appealable to the Supreme Court by way of Rule 45
(Sec. 11, R.A. No. 9262).

7. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of Municipal Trial Courts in


cadastral or land registration cases pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction
(Sec. 34, B.P. blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691).

Note:This is so because decisions of Municipal Trial Courts in


these cases are appealable in the same manner as
decisions of Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 34, B.P. Blg. 129).
Republic Act No. 7902 amending Section 9 of BP 129: The CA shall have
the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform
any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the
Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within 3
months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

Concurrent with the Supreme Court and Regional Trial Court:

a.) Petitions for writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)

b.) Petition for habeas data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)

c.) Writ of continuing mandamus (sec. 2 Rule 8 Part 111, Rules of


Procedure in Environment cases.

Concurrent with the Supreme Court:

a.) Petitions for writ of Kalikasan (sec. 12 Rule 7, Part 111 Rules of
Procedure in Environment Cases A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari,prohibition


and mandamus against the:

a.) Commission on Elections (Art. IX, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution of


the Philippines);

b.) Commission on Audit (Art. IX, Sec. 7, 1987 of the Philippines);


and
Note: Because the CTA has now the same rank as the CA
by virtue of R.A No. 9282, the CTA should be
included in this enumeration.

2. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in


petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the:

a.) Regional Trial Court (Sec. 21 (1), B.P. Blg. 1. 129);


NOTE: This jurisdiction is subject to the
Principle/Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
between CA and SC (United Claimants Associations
of NEA v. NEA G.R. No. 187107 Jan. 31, 2012).

b.) Civil Service Commission (R.A. No. 7902);

c.) Central Board of Assessment Appeals (P.D.No. 464; B.P.Blg.


129;R.A.No. 7902);

d.) National Labor Relations Commission (St. Martin Funeral


Homes vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494; R.A No. 7902); and

e.) Quasi-judicial agencies (B.P.Blg. 129; R.A.No. 7902; Heirs of


Hinog vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460)

3. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the


Regional Trial Court in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against lower courts and bodies, and in petitions for quo
warranto and habeas corpus. This jurisdiction is subject to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts (Secs. 9(1), 21 (1), B.P.Blg. 129; Art
VIII, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).

4. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Court in


cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls (Sec. 21
(2), B.P.Blg. 129; Art. VIII, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines).

5. Appellate jurisdiction by way of petition for review on certiorari


(appeal by certiorari under Rule 45) against the:

a) Court of Appeals, b) Sandiganbayan, c) Regional Trial


Courts on pure questions of law (Sec. 1, Rule 45) and in cases
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or
regulation, legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or
penalty, jurisdiction of a lower court (Sec. 5, Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines) and d) Court of Tax Appeals in
its decisions rendered en banc (R.A. 9282).
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

There are important principles worthy of note in relation to the


jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

1.) The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts which means that passing upon
a factual issue is not within the province of the Supreme Court (Romy’s
Freight Service vs. Castro, 490 SCRA 160). The findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals, are not generally reviewable by the Supreme Court
(Sarmiento vs. Yu, 497 SCRA 513). Also, factual findings of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding
on this Court (Tan vs. G.V.T. Engineering Services, 498 SCRA 93; Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Lazaro-Baldazo, G.R.No. 170815, February 2, 2007).

2.) It is not the function of the SC to determine the weight of evidence


supporting the assailed decision (J.R Blanco v. Quasha, 318 SCRA 373).
However, factual issues may be inquired into and resolved where findings
and conclusions of the trial court or quasi – judicial bodies are frontally
inconsistent with the findings of the Court of Appeals.
(Office of the Ombudsman v. Tongson 499 S 567).

Exceptions

While it is a settled rule that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
power of review is not a trier of facts, jurisprudence has, however recognized
several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court,
namely:

1.) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or


conjectures;

2.) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or


impossible;

3.) when there is grave abuse of discretion;


4.) when the judgment based on a misapprehension of facts;
5.) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
6.) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admission of the appellant and
appeallee;

7.) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;


8.) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;

9.) when the facts set forth in the petition, and in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

10.) when the findings of fact are premised on supposed absence of


evidence and contradicted by evidence on record; and

11.)when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant


facts disputed by the parties, which if considered, justify a different
conclusion.
(Cristobal Cruz v. Cristobal 498 S 37; Heirs of dicman vs. Cariño, 490 S
240; Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. Vs. Tangco, 511 S 67; Delos
Santos v. Elizalde 514 S 14;National Power Corporation v. dela Cruz GR
No. 156093 Feb. 2, 2007; Spouses Yu vs. Ngo Yet Te, G.R. No. 155868,
February 6, 2007).

Cases which under the 1987 Constitution must be heard en banc

Under the Constition of the Phillippines, the following cases should be


heard by the Supreme Court en banc:

a.) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or


executive agreement, or law;

b.) All cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc;

c.) All cases involving the constitutionality, application or operation of


presidential decrees, proclamations orders, instructions, ordinances
and other regulations (see.4(2) Art. VIII);

d.) Cases heard by a division when required majority not obtained;


e.) Cases involving modification or reversal of a doctrine or principle of
law laid down previously by the SC in a decision rendered en banc or
by division. (Art. VII Sec.4(3);

f.) Cases involving the discipline of judges of lower courts. (Art. VIII sec.
11);
g.) Contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president or vice-president. (Art. VII see. 4).

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