Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi

History and Philosophy of Logic
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Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi
Riccardo Strobino
To cite this article: Riccardo Strobino (2019) Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi, History and
Philosophy of Logic, 40:1, 42-62, DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2018.1514572
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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 2019
Vol. 40, No. 1, 42–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2018.1514572
Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi

RICCARDO STROBINO
Tufts University, USA
riccardo.strobino@tufts.edu
Received 5 January 2017 Accepted 19 August 2018
This paper analyzes a classification of different types of demonstration introduced by Alfarabi (d. 950 CE) in his
Kitāb al-Burhān (Book of Demonstration). Alfarabi identifies eight combinations of demonstrative syllogisms,
grouped in function of the different types of per se relations expressed by their premises and conclusions, where
terms are definitionally connected with one another. The list contains a total of thirty-nine moods illustrated by
a rich array of examples drawn from various scientific disciplines, including arithmetic, geometry, and natural
philosophy. The combinations and moods are discussed extensively by Averroes (d. 1198 CE) in the section of his
Epitome of the Organon devoted to the Posterior Analytics and in his Quaesita on logic. Alfarabi’s classification
also possibly inspired a simplified taxonomical effort in Avicenna’s (d. 1037 CE) Kitāb al-Burhān.
1. Introduction
In 1981, Fritz Zimmermann suggested, in the preface to his groundbreaking Alfarabi’s
Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, that of all the commen-
taries Alfarabi (d. 950 CE) is known to have written on the Aristotelian Organon, his work
on De Interpretatione is ‘perhaps not the one we should have most desired to retrieve’ and,
more importantly, that ‘his best effort is likely to have gone into the treatment of the book
he saw at the heart of the whole of logic: the Posterior Analytics’.1 If Alfarabi’s extended
lemmatic commentary (šarh.) has sadly failed to come down to us, judging at least from
certain sections of the edited material in the extant corpus devoted to Aristotle’s theory of
demonstration, Zimmermann’s verdict could hardly be truer.
The purpose of this paper is to examine one such section and—at the risk of twisting
the knife in the wound of the historian of logic—to shed light on an extraordinary (and,
to the best of my knowledge, unparalleled) attempt in the Aristotelian tradition to offer a
systematic classification of demonstrative arguments, on the basis of the theory of scientific
per se predication.
Moreover, while Alfarabi’s place in the history of Arabic logic has already been the
object of serious scrutiny,2 his role in the reception of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration
is a theme of great interest that still remains practically untouched.3 Such a state of neglect
is all the more lamentable in light of the fact that Alfarabi’s views on demonstration seem
to have had a significant impact on Avicenna’s (d. 1037 CE) Kitāb al-Burhān and on Aver-
roes’ (d. 1198 CE) commentaries, especially with regard to the relevant sections of the
Epitome and the Quaesita, but also in the Long commentary on the Posterior Analytics.4
1
Zimmermann 1981, p. ix.
2
For example in Lameer 1994, Street 2001, 2004, Karimullah 2014, Hasnawi and Hodges 2016.
3
With the only significant exception of Black 2006, whose focus, however, is primarily on epistemological questions.
4
On the transmission of the Epitome and the Long commentary see Minio-Paluello 1951, p. 116. The section of the Epitome on
demonstration is unedited and in the following I primarily refer to the Latin text printed by Giunta in 1562, a Renaissance trans-
lation from the Hebrew by Abraham de Balmes (Averroes, Epitome in primum librum Posteriorum, in Aristotelis Opera cum
Averrois Commentariis, Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562–1574: Primi Voluminis Pars II: Averrois Cordubensis Epitome in Libros
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi 43
In spite of the fact that Aristotle’s account of the logic of scientific discourse became
a predominant model of scientific explanation in pre-modern philosophy of science, there
are certain crucial details of it that were left undeveloped by Aristotle and which even the
subsequent Aristotelian tradition—in its Greek, Arabic, and Latin iterations—generally
failed to address. A striking example is the case of the theory of per se predication and
the question of how exactly it is supposed to work in the formulation of demonstrative
syllogisms, instances of which are neither particularly numerous in the Posterior Analytics
nor classified by Aristotle in a systematic way.5 Alfarabi’s attempt to articulate in detail
some technical aspects of the theory offers a rare insight into the mechanics of this model
of scientific reasoning and constitutes, in this respect, an exception in the tradition.
2. Alfarabi on demonstration
The two extant edited sources where Alfarabi deals with the doctrine of Aristotle’s Pos-
terior Analytics are his Kitāb al-Burhān (Book of Demonstration) and the Šarā»it. al-yaq¯ın
(Conditions of Certainty).6 Neither of these works is a lemmatic commentary (in fact both
texts are fairly short, especially the second), but they offer instructive insights into the early
stages of the reception of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration in Arabic philosophy.
The Kitāb al-Burhān is an innovative exposition of the contents of An. Post. which
covers Aristotle’s two books, reorganizing the material in a different order and with the
addition of several original contributions. The Šarā»it. al-yaq¯ın focuses on the conditions
an assertion is required to meet in order to count as a scientific statement.
Among the original contributions to be found in Alfarabi’s Burhān, some of which are
appropriated in different ways by later authors such as Avicenna and Averroes, are the
introduction and systematic use of the distinction between conception (tas.awwur) and
assertion (or assent) (tas.d¯ıq); the related use of the notion of certainty (yaq¯ın) in the
definition of scientific knowledge (–ilm) as a counterpart of the Aristotelian concept of
epistēmē; the introduction, in nuce, of a distinction between ‘being part’ (ğuz») and ‘being
under’ (tah.ta) in the account of scientific subordination to reflect various hierarchical rela-
tions holding among different sciences. But, more importantly for our present concerns,
logicae Aristotelis Abrahamo de Balmes interprete: fols. 52ra–57va; repr. Minerva G.m.b.H., Frankfurt am Main 1962; on this
famous edition, see in particular Cranz 1976 and Burnett 2013). I also had the opportunity to consult Charles Butterworth’s
working edition of the section of the Epitome on demonstration (based on two Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts, see Butterworth
1977, pp. 14–17) and refer to it below for Averroes’ Arabic text.
The Long Commentary is partially extant in Arabic and published in Averroes (Ibn Rušd), Šarh. al-Burhān li-Arist.ū wa-Tal h¯ıs.
al-Burhān, edited by ‘A. Badaw¯ı, Kuwait: al-Mağlis al-wat.an¯ı li-t-taqāfa wa-l-funūn wa-l-ādāb, 1984, pp. 157–486, but in the
Šarh. there seems to be no trace of the specific discussion I am concerned with in this paper. By contrast, Alfarabi’s classifica-
tion of demonstrative arguments is extensively used in the third of Averroes’ questions on logic devoted to demonstration. The
text survives in the Renaissance Latin translation by Abraham de Balmes under the heading De conditionibus praemissarum
demonstrationis (see Averroes, Quaesita in libros logicae Aristotelis Abrahamo de Balmes interprete, in Aristotelis Opera
cum Averrois Commentariis, Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562–1574: Primi Voluminis Pars II: Averrois Cordubensis IX Quaesita
demonstrativa in Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis: fols. 106ra–111va; repr. Minerva G.m.b.H., Frankfurt am Main
1962). The Arabic, by contrast, does not appear to be among the extant questions printed in Averroes, Maqālāt f¯ı l-mant.iq
– – –
wa-l- ilm at.-t.ab¯ı ¯ı, edited by Ğamāl ad-D¯ın Alawi, Casablanca: Dār al-Našr al-Maġribiyya 1983. For reasons of space and
scope, I cannot analyze in this paper the mutual relations between these texts in detail, but I intend to return to the issue in the
future.
5
See for example Malink 2015, which sees a tension between the kind of demonstrations discussed in An. Post. I and those
discussed in An. Post. II. If not for the purposes of a direct exegetical exercise on Aristotle’s text, Alfarabi’s classification
offers interesting insights into how the subsequent tradition might have understood the examples presented in An. Post. in
terms of doctrinal unity.
6
Both texts are printed, along with Avempace’s annotations on the Burhān, in Alfarabi, Kitāb al-Burhān wa-Kitāb šarā it.
»
al-yaq¯ın, edited by M. Fa hr¯ı. Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq 1987 [henceforth = Burhān]. Another edition is M. T. Dānešpažūh, al-
–
Mant.iqiyyāt li-l-Fārāb¯ı, 3 volumes, Qumm: Mat.ba at Bahman, 1987–89. In the following, I refer to chapter, page, and line
numbers of Fa hr¯ı’s edition, unless otherwise noted.
44 R. Strobino
another area of great originality is Alfarabi’s classification of demonstrative arguments,

which relies in turn on his account of per se predication.
Before turning to the analysis of this crucial section, it will be useful to offer a brief
outline of the structure of the work, to gain a better appreciation of the place and role of
the classification in its general economy.
3. The contents of Alfarabi’s Kitāb al-Burhān

In the first chapter of his Burhān, Alfarabi discusses (I, 1) the fundamental elements
of scientific knowledge (–ilm): conception (tas.awwur) and assertion (tas.d¯ıq), developing
more in detail the related notions of (I, 2) complete assertion (tas.d¯ıq tāmm) and of (I, 3)
certainty (yaq¯ın) along with its internal divisions.
The second chapter deals with an array of technical notions and problems at the core
of an Aristotelian model of scientific knowledge. It begins with a canonical distinction
between (II, 1) two basic kinds of demonstration (that-it-is and why-it-is; burhān al-anna
and burhān al-limā), followed by an analysis of (II, 2) certain knowledge (–ilm yaq¯ın)
and its divisions. After introducing (II, 3) the concept of absolute demonstration (burhān
mut.laq) (which is both a that-it-is and a why-it-is demonstration), Alfarabi offers a detailed
taxonomy of (II, 4) per se predicates (mah.mūlāt d ātiyya) and (II, 5) the classification of
demonstrative and non-demonstrative combinations that concerns us here. Finally, he dis-
cusses (II, 6) anteriority and posteriority, and (II, 7) the relation between causes (asbāb or
–ilal) and demonstration.
The third chapter is entirely devoted to the classification and analysis of (III) definition
(h.add) and description (rasm), perhaps as a natural development of the previous discussion
of the various kinds of definitional relations associated with per se predication and the
resulting taxonomy of demonstration.
In chapter four, Alfarabi deals with (IV, 1) the use of demonstration and definition in
theoretical disciplines, (IV, 2) the interrelations among the sciences (a relevant source for
Avicenna’s own treatment of the topic7 ), and (IV, 3) the distinction between theoretical and
practical sciences.
The fifth and last chapter of the book deals with various applications of demonstrative
discourse, focusing in particular on (V, 1) different types of demonstrative argument forms
and (V, 2) the notion of instruction (ta–l¯ım, didaskalia); it also resumes and completes the
analysis of (V, 3) assertion, provides a classification of (V, 4) the principles of instruction,
and offers an original account of the idea of (V, 5) demonstrative conflict (–inād burhān¯ı),
covering various topics from An. Post., including ignorance and error in demonstration; the
book ends with an account of the notion of (V, 6) scientific testing (imtih.ān –ilm¯ı), which
takes into account various ways to assess scientific principles and questions.
In this framework, chapters II, 4 and II, 5 appear to be almost like a short treatise within
the treatise developing in some depth the Aristotelian notion of per se and integrating it
into the structure of demonstrative arguments.
4. Per se predicates
In Burhān II, 4 Alfarabi reformulates the canonical distinction between the first two
types of per se introduced in An. Post. I, 4 and provides a detailed analysis which articulates
the general Aristotelian criterion (namely the idea of a term being part of the definition of
another term) into a more fine-grained array of sub-types. In addition to that, Alfarabi
investigates criteria for primary and non-primary per se predication as well as criteria for
7
For a detailed discussion of Avicenna’s account of the division of the sciences, see Strobino 2017.
proper and non-proper per se predication, both in the case of per se 1 and in the case of per
se 2 predicates.
The class of (a) per se 1 predicates is divided into the following sub-classes: a term A
is per se 1 of another term B if and only if A is either (aa) a definition or (ab) part of a
definition of B. If A is part of a definition of B, then A is in turn either (aba) a proximate
genus, (abb) a remote genus or (abc) something that plays the role of a genus of B, or (abd)
a proximate differentia, (abe) a remote differentia or (abf ) something that plays the role of
a differentia of B.
The class of (b) per se 2 predicates comprises two basic sub-classes: a term A is per se 2
of another term B if and only if B is either (ba) part of the definition of A (in which case B
itself will be a genus or a differentia of A, whether proximate or remote) or (bb) the genus
of B is part of the definition of A.8
As we shall see below, Alfarabi’s classification of demonstrative and non-demonstrative
combinations aims to isolate groups of arguments that produce certain kinds of conclu-
sions, depending on the predicable relations expressed in their premises. Thus, if we
represent a (first-figure) demonstrative syllogism as xR1 y, yR2 z xR3 z, where x, y, z stand
for terms and R1 , R2 , R3 for two-place predicable relations, Alfarabi’s goal is (i) to iden-
tify relevant groups on the basis of R1 and R2 , and (ii) to determine the status of R3 as a
function of R1 and R2 . The relations that can be substituted for R1 , R2 , and R3 are those
characterized above (or combinations thereof), that is to say, in the case of per se 1,
(1) x is definition of y
(2) x is genus of y
(3) x is differentia of y
and, in the case of per se 2,
(4) x is in the definition of y (also formulated as ‘x is part of the definition of y’)

(5) the genus of x is part of the definition of y (also formulated as ‘the genus of x is in
the definition of y’ or ‘part of x is part of the definition of y’).
Thus, Alfarabi’s analysis relies on five relations, imported from the theory of the
predicables, that are used as the basic ingredients for the classification of demonstrative
arguments. Burhān II, 4 concludes with the contention that whenever the relations among
the terms in a syllogism are per se in one of these senses, the argument is demonstrative:
These are the modes (ğihāt) in which the parts of the premises of demonstrations
are predicated one of the other. When the middle terms of demonstrations that
give the belonging (wuğūd) and the causes (asbāb) are exactly one of the types
of causes that have been mentioned, and the ways (anh.ā») in which the parts of the
demonstrations are predicated are these, then it necessarily follows that the state of
the causes that are taken as middle terms is, with respect to each one of the two
extremes, one of these states; and it necessarily follows that all causes are either
8
Alfarabi illustrates the above cases by means of the following examples. Per se 1: (aba) ‘circle’—‘plane figure;’ (abb)
‘circle’—‘extended figure;’ (abc) ‘human’—‘having flesh and extension;’ (abd) ‘circle’—‘contained by one single line;’ (abe)
‘circle’—‘contained by a line;’ (abf ) ‘heart’—‘letting the internal heat flow out’. Per se 2: (ba) ‘human’—‘capable of laugh-
ter;’ ‘number’—‘even’ or ‘odd;’ (bb) ‘product of an odd number by an even number’ (genus = ‘number’)—‘even;’ ‘triangle’
(genus = ‘plane rectilinear figure’)—‘having the internal angles equal to two right angles’ (Burhān II, 4, pp. 29–31). These
examples are supplemented by the sets of terms that illustrate the demonstrative moods discussed in Burhān II, 5.
46 R. Strobino
definitions or parts of the definitions of the two extremes or of one of them, or

[that] they share in their definitions in some way, either proximately or remotely.9
Having established the role of definitional connections as the basis of scientific pred-
ications, Alfarabi deploys the apparatus on a full scale in the laboriously ingenious
classification developed in the subsequent chapter.
5. Demonstrative combinations (ta»l¯ıfāt) and moods (d.urūb)

In Burhān II, 5 Alfarabi devises an elaborate classificatory scheme in order to distin-
guish among different sorts of deductive arguments. The analysis completes, and should be
understood in tandem with, the treatment of per se predication that immediately precedes it.
Arguments are classified according to the relations holding among their terms. Depend-
ing on whether the relations in question are per se predications (of the kind discussed
in Burhān II, 4), Alfarabi’s stated aim is to distinguish between (i) demonstrative and
non-demonstrative combinations (ta»l¯ıfāt) and (ii) to examine the conclusions of the
demonstrative ones, namely the type of per se predication they express. This leads
him to the identification of eight types of demonstrative combinations, where each type
is associated with a defining characteristic and then further analyzed into its moods
(d.urūb).
(1) First type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 33.14–35.1)
The defining characteristic of the first type (s.inf ) of combination (ta»l¯ıf ) is that the
predicable relation (nisba) expressed by the major premise and the one expressed by the
minor premise are identical. In other words, the major term stands to the middle term in the
same way as the middle term stands to the minor term. Alfarabi considers eight sub-cases,
which he calls ‘moods’ (d.urūb), articulated as follows:10
1.1 A is definition of B, and B is definition of C;
1.2 A is genus of B, and B is genus of C;
1.3 A is differentia of B, and B is differentia of C;
1.4 B is definition of A, and C is definition of B;
1.5 B is differentia of A, and C is differentia of B;
1.6 B is in the definition of A, and C is in the definition of B;
1.7 The genus of B is in the definition of A, and the genus of C is in the definition
of B;
1.8 A is in the definition of B, and B is in the definition of C.11
The standard strategy adopted by Alfarabi in this chapter is first to give a list of what
we may call the ‘demonstratively productive’ moods and then to go through each mood,
9
Alfarabi, Burhān II, 4, p. 32.16–22. The types of demonstration examined by Alfarabi in the following chapter II, 5 involve
without exception cases of predicative connections and not unqualified existence claims. For this reason, it seems preferable
to translate wuğūd as ‘belonging’ rather than ‘existence’. The wuğūd at stake here is, in other words, the wuğūd of a subject
insofar as it is qualified by an attribute or insofar as an attribute belongs to it. Moreover, the locution wuğida li and its cognates
are the Arabic counterparts of the Greek hyparchein, which is usually translated in predicative contexts as ‘belong to’ or ‘hold
of’. The systematic distinction between a one-place sense and a two-place sense of being or existence (wuğūd) is a cornerstone
of Alfarabi’s understanding of Aristotle’s metaphysics, see Menn 2008.
10
In what follows, A, B, and C, are always major term, middle term, and minor term, respectively. The sets of terms exemplifying
each mood are always given starting with the minor, followed by the middle, and the major.
11
The five main moods of the first type of combination, namely 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.7 above, are summarized in Hasnawi
and Hodges 2016, at pp. 55–56 (reading ‘B < def. A = B enters in the definition of A’, for ‘B < def. A = B enters in the
definition of B’ on p. 56, Table 2.1). Moods 1.4, 1.5, and 1.8 are presumably omitted because they are the converse moods of
1.1, 1.3, and 1.6, respectively.
one by one, with the aim of determining the nature of the conclusion. In some cases the
discussion is more detailed and brings to the fore important presuppositions (e.g. 1.1); in
other cases Alfarabi confines himself to short remarks; and in yet other cases, as we shall
see below, he omits items in the list from the discussion (e.g. 5.3).
The use of canonical vocabulary from the syllogistic (e.g. ‘combination’, ‘mood’, ‘pro-
ductive’, ‘converse’) seems to suggest that this chapter of Alfarabi’s logic aims to treat
the per se character of premises and conclusions of demonstrative arguments as a logi-
cal property, in a way analogous to modality, and that the point of the investigation is to
examine the features of inference patterns and identify those that are not merely valid but
demonstratively so. The analysis of the types of essential relations expressed by a given
premise pair determines the demonstrative character (or lack thereof) of an argument and
establishes whether the resulting conclusion has the status of a scientific statement (and, if
so, what kind of scientific statement it is), just as the analysis of a given premise pair in the
syllogistic determines the validity of a mood and the modality of the conclusion.
Finally, the Aristotelian distinction between demonstration that something is the case
and demonstration why something is the case, developed most notably at An. Post. I, 13, is
captured in Alfarabi’s language by two sets of terms. The first involves the Arabic trans-
lation of the Greek hoti and dioti as burhān anna and burhān limā (already present in
Abū Bišr Mattā’s translation of the Posterior Analytics). The second specifies these terms
by means of the notions of ‘belonging’ (wuğūd, corresponding to hoti/anna) and ‘cause’
(sabab or ‘illa, corresponding to dioti/limā). The distinction is used as an additional tool
of analysis to qualify individual moods within each type of combination in function of the
explanatory relations holding among their terms.
(1.1) The first mood produces (yuntiğu) two kinds of conclusions: the first is that (i) the
major term is a definition of the minor, the second is that (ii) the major is a definition of
part(s) of the definition of the minor.12 Alfarabi does not illustrate (ii) with an example but
points out that (i) is possible only if we are prepared to entertain the idea that something
may have two definitions, as in the case of ‘human’ (minor term), which may be defined
both as ‘rational animal’ (middle term) and as ‘two-footed walking animal’ (major term),
and to regard one definition to be more fundamental than the other and explanatory of it.13
(1.2 and 1.3) The second and third moods prove that a genus of a genus of the minor
term is a genus of the minor term and that a differentia of a differentia of the minor term
is a differentia of the minor term, respectively. They produce conclusions that Alfarabi
characterizes as ‘evident’ (bayyin), presumably due to the fact that the per se 1 relations
they express are evident in the way the constitutive parts of something’s definition (in the
sense of definiens) evidently belong to the definiendum.14 Terms that illustrate these two
moods are ‘human’, ‘animal’, and ‘body’ for 1.2, and ‘human’, ‘rational’, and ‘perceptive’
(mudrik) for 1.3.
(1.4) The fourth mood is the converse (–aks) of 1.1. Its function is to show that a definien-
dum holds of the set of terms which includes the definitions (definientia) of parts of its own
definiens. Thus, for instance, if ‘two-footed walking animal’ is taken to be the definition of
12 » »
Reading h.add li-ağzā h.addih¯ı (with Dānešpažūh, p. 285.11) for h.add al-ağzā h.addih¯ı at II, 5, p. 33.20.
13
Whether this compromises the uniqueness of the real definition is a question that Alfarabi does not seem to be concerned with
in this context.
14
Why such conclusions should be demonstratively established in the first place is either another question that Alfarabi does not
consider problematic or one which he does not seem willing to explore here. The issue becomes a major concern for Avicenna,
who is generally very critical of proofs of this kind, which according to him cannot be proper demonstrations, as they express
self-evident connections that are typically captured by definitions.
48 R. Strobino
‘human’ and ‘two-footed moving sensitive body’ to be the definition of ‘two-footed walk-
ing animal’, this mood can be used to show that the definiendum ‘human’ is predicated of
‘two-footed moving sensitive body’.
(1.5) The fifth mood seems to play a similar role—except that in this case the predica-
tions (which seem to generate the converse of 1.3, even though Alfarabi does not recognize
this fact explicitly) involve differentiae—, and shows that a term is predicated of the differ-
entia of its differentia. Alfarabi notes that this mood is productive only with co-extensive
differentiae, in the absence of which counterpredication would fail. More importantly, this
mood does not give the reason why but only a demonstration of the that-it-is because the
natural order of explanation is inverted, as the differentiae occupy the position of minor
term and middle term. Terms that exemplify the relations in question are ‘perceiver with
more than a single organ’, ‘sensitive’, and ‘animal’.
Moods 1.4 and 1.5 are omitted by Averroes in the Epitome, whereas moods 1.1 through
1.3 correspond to those in Alfarabi’s list.
(1.6) The sixth mood encapsulates the case of proper per se accidents (which Alfarabi
seems to regard as the only sort of terms that satisfy its conditions) and proves that some-
thing is predicated of what is part of its definition.15 Terms that exemplify this mood are
‘human’, ‘capable of wonder’ (muta–ağğib), and ‘capable of laughter’ (d.ah.h.āk), where the
middle is part of the definition of the major.
This mood corresponds to Averroes’ fourth and is illustrated by the same example.16
(1.7) The seventh mood counts as a genuine case of demonstration if and only if the two
genera stand in a relation of per se predication to each other, in which case the predicate of
the conclusion is ‘always an accident per se’ (II, 5, p. 34.20). Alfarabi unfortunately does
not provide an example to illustrate this mood, but judging from what he goes on to say, he
seems to regard it as a rather flexible pattern of demonstration, one which is apt to prove
the main types of per se relations identified in the previous chapter, II,4, involving primary
and non-primary as well as proper and non-proper per se attributes.
This mood corresponds to Averroes’ fifth and is illustrated by the terms ‘denarius’,
‘par’, ‘dividitur in media’ (Epitome, 55ra; the example is used again below, see 6.4).17
The relevant relation, according to Averroes, is that between (i) the genus (‘number’) of
the minor term (‘ten’), which is taken in the definition of the middle term (‘even’), and (ii)
the genus (‘quantity’) of the middle term (‘even’), which is taken in the definition of the
major term (‘divisible into two halves’).
(1.8) The eighth and last mood of the first combination is, by Alfarabi’s explicit con-
tention, the converse of 1.6 and can merely produce a factual demonstration of the that-it-is:
‘it does not give the cause but only the belonging’ (wa-laysa yu–.t¯ı s-sabab bal innamā yu–.t¯ı
l-wuğūd fa-qat.) (II, 5, 34.21–2). As a result of the fact that 1.8 is the converse of 1.6, terms
that may exemplify this mood should be ‘capable of laughter’, ‘capable of wonder’, and
‘human’, but Alfarabi does not give an example in this case.
The mood is omitted by Averroes in the Epitome.18
15
As we learn from Alfarabi’s analysis of 2.3 below, 1.6 counts as a demonstration of the fact as well as of the reason why.
16
Reading A f¯ı h.addih¯ı B wa-B f¯ı h.addih¯ı Ǧ, i.e. ‘B is in the definition of A, and C is in the definition of B’, for the (misleading)
Latin translation A est in definitione B et B est in definitione C, at Epitome, 55ra.
17 –
For the Arabic ašara, zawğ, and munqasim bi-nas.fayni.
18
The full correspondence between the two lists, with regard to the first type of combination, is as follows: F1.1 = A1.1;
F1.2 = A1.2; F1.3 = A1.3; F1.6 = A1.4; F.17 = A1.5 (where ‘F’ stands for Alfarabi and ‘A’ for Averroes). See the
Appendix at the end of the paper for a synopsis of all combinations and moods.
(2) Second type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 35.1–12)

The defining characteristic of the second type of combination is that the minor term
stands in one and the same relation to the major term and to the middle term. Alfarabi
considers four sub-cases, articulated as follows:
2.1 A and B are definitions of C;
2.2 A and B are differentiae of C;
2.3 C is in the definition of A and B;
2.4 The genus of C is in the definition of A and B.
This combination includes demonstrations that prove per se 1 relations (2.1 and 2.2) as
well as per se 2 relations (2.3 and 2.4). None of the above cases is illustrated by an example
in Alfarabi. Averroes, however, supplies his own in the Epitome.
(2.1) The first mood proves that a definition of the minor holds of the minor. In this
regard, 2.1 differs from 1.1 because here both the major and the middle term are definitions
of the minor, while in the previous case the major was a definition of the middle, and the
latter a definition of the minor. What they have in common is that both moods prove that a
definiens is predicated of a definiendum, but they differ because in 2.1 the two definitions
seem to be on a par, whereas in 1.1 they seem to be hierarchically ordered.
Averroes regards 2.1 to be related to 1.1 and to constitute a more general case.
(2.2) The second mood proves that a differentia of the minor holds of the minor and
applies to the cases of co-extensive differentiae and more general differentiae alike. An
obvious counterpart of this mood in the first combination seems to be 1.3 (and hence,
indirectly, 1.5).
(2.3) The third mood proves that the major term is a per se 2 attribute of the minor with-
out providing its cause. The brief discussion is methodologically interesting as it shows
that Alfarabi is keen to distinguish carefully between arguments pertaining to different
combinations that could easily be mistaken for one another. With regard to 2.3, he seems
to be arguing by reductio that if this mood were to provide the explanatory cause of the
conclusion, then the major and the middle term would have to be mutually related (li-kull
wāh.id min A wa-B madhal

f¯ı l-āhar

II, 5, p. 35.8), in which case 2.3 would become 1.6.
(2.4) The fourth mood is instrumental in proving all types of demonstrative conclusions,
whether of the strongest kind (limā) or of the weakest kind (anna). With respect to the
relative extension of the terms involved, this mood, just like 1.7 above, is apt to prove
conclusions where the major holds of the minor as a primary and proper attribute as well
as conclusions where the major is neither primary nor proper to the minor.19 Alfarabi goes
as far as to say that ‘upon reflection you would find most demonstrations in the sciences to
reduce to this mood’ (law ta»ammalta aktar al-barāh¯ın f¯ı l-–ulūm la-wağadtahā tarği–u ilā
hād ā d.-d.arb) (II, 5, 35.11–12).
(3) Third type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 35.13–36.5)
The defining characteristic of the third type of combination is that the major term is
always a definition of the middle, while the middle and the minor can stand in a variety of
relations. Alfarabi considers six sub-cases, articulated as follows:
3.1 A is definition of B, and B is genus of C;
3.2 A is definition of B, and B differentia of C;
19
‘Primary’ refers here to what is not predicated of something more general.
50 R. Strobino
3.3 A is definition of B, and C is definition of B;

3.4 A is definition of B, and C is part of the definition of B;
3.5 A is definition of B, and the genus of C is part of the definition of B;
3.6 A is definition of B, and C is differentia of B.
In cases 3.1 and 3.2, the middle is per se 1 of the minor, while the remaining four cases,
namely 3.3 through 3.6, are all schemata involving a minor premise where the middle term
is a per se 2 of the minor.
(3.1) The first mood proves that a definition of a genus of the minor belongs to the
minor. Terms that satisfy the conditions of this mood are ‘human’, ‘animal’, and ‘nutritive
sensitive body’.
This mood corresponds to Averroes’ first and is illustrated by the same example.
(3.2) The second mood does the same with the definition of a differentia of the minor
term. Terms that exemplify this mood are ‘human’, ‘rational’, and ‘perceptive through
reflection and by way of deduction’ (mudrik bi-ta»ammul wa-–an qiyās), where the latter is
taken to be the definition of ‘rational’.
This mood corresponds to Averroes’ second and is illustrated by a similar example.20
(3.3) Alfarabi returns to the issue of a term having more than one definition in connection
with the third mood, which only proves that something is the case without giving the cause.
This is because the definiendum is used here as a middle term, and even though this is a
sufficient condition to prove a connection between two definitions (of one and the same
thing), it is not in virtue of the definiendum itself that the two definitions are connected
(in general nothing is explained when a demonstrative argument uses the explanandum as
a middle term). Terms that meet these conditions are, for instance, ‘two-footed walking
animal’, ‘human’, and ‘living rational’.
(3.4) The fourth mood comprises two sub-cases. In the first sub-case, (i) the middle
term has genuinely distinct definitions:21 it is predicated of one definition (the minor term)
while the other definition (the major term) is predicated of it, a combination which Alfarabi
regards as ‘productive’ (muntiğ), i.e. demonstratively conclusive. In the second sub-case,
(ii) the minor term is in fact only part of the middle term’s one and only definition. What
(ii) proves is that the whole definition is predicated, via the definiendum, of one of its parts.
No example is given for (i), while (ii) is illustrated by the terms ‘rational’, ‘human’, and
‘living rational’. Alfarabi (seemingly with good reasons) regards (ii) to be redundant, that
is to say neither theoretically significant nor useful, and dismisses it as ‘futile’ (hadr). The
case is perhaps considered for purely taxonomical reasons to mark off the distinction with
(i), which is what 3.4 is truly meant to capture.
(3.5) The fifth mood is apt to prove causally justified conclusions (showing both the
that-it-is and the why-it-is) as well as merely factual conclusions, depending on the relation
between the major term and the genus of the minor term. The example offered by Alfarabi
is noteworthy: ‘Every product [lit. “everything that is multiplied” (kullu mā d.uriba)] [of a
number] by an even number is an even number; every even number is divisible into two
equals; therefore, every product [of a number] by an even number is divisible into two
equals’ (II, 5, p. 36.4–5).22
20
The example is in fact almost identical but it is worthwhile noting that the Latin expression for the major term
(comprehensivum cogitatione et consideratione) at Epitome, 55rb translates a different Arabic text (mudrik bi-fikr wa-rawiya).
21
Again, how much pressure this puts on the requirement of uniqueness for the real definition is a separate question that Alfarabi
seems not to be concerned with in this chapter.
22
Euclid, Elements VII, Definition 6 (even) and Definition 15 (multiplied).
‘Divisible into two equals’ (the major term A) is the definition of ‘even’ (the middle
term B), while ‘product (or what is multiplied) by an even number’ (the minor term C) is
such that its genus (‘number’ or perhaps an even more general term like ‘quantity’) is part
of the definition of the middle. The B-A relation is per se 1 (A is the definition of B), while
the C-B relation is per se 2, as the genus of C is taken in the definition of B. As a result,
the relation proven in the conclusion, C-A, is per se 2, because the predicate A, which is
a per se 1 attribute of a per se 2 attribute of C, is itself a per se 2 attribute of C, only one
which expresses the nature of B explicitly, as its definition. This particular example seems
to illustrate the case of a merely factual conclusion, because the major term is explanatory
of the middle and not the other way around. Alfarabi does not discuss an example of the
other kind of conclusion, which supposedly provides the cause.
(3.6) The sixth mood is analogous to the fourth. The only difference is that here the
minor term is specified explicitly as a differentia of the middle. It is unclear why Alfarabi
treats this as a separate case.
Moods (3.3), (3.4), and (3.6) are omitted by Averroes, whose third mood (tertia species)
is in fact Alfarabi’s 3.5. Averroes also points out that in some of the cases in which the
genus of C belongs to the definition of B, it is possible for B to be included in the definition
of C, whereupon this mood produces an absolute demonstration (Epitome, 55rb-va). His
example involves the terms ‘fish’, ‘swimming’, and ‘moving in water in such a way that
no part of the body is touching the ground’ (which could also serve as illustration for a
missing case in Alfarabi, see 5.3 below).
(4) Fourth type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 36.6–19)
The defining characteristic of the fourth type of combination is that the major term is
always a genus of the middle, while the middle and the minor can stand in a variety of
relations. Alfarabi considers five sub-cases, articulated as follows:
4.1 A is genus of B, and B is definition of C;
4.2 A is genus of B, and B is differentia of C;
4.3 A is genus of B, and C is definition of B;
4.4 A is genus of B, and C is part of the definition of B;
4.5 A is genus of B, and the genus of C is part of the definition of B.
The first two cases, 4.1 and 4.2, produce per se 1 conclusions, while 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5
produce per se 2 conclusions.
(4.1) Alfarabi notes, concerning the first mood, that it is used to establish that the genus,
A, of the definiens, B, is predicated of the definiendum, C, and that this only obtains when
the genus is not explicitly expressed in the definiens. Terms that exemplify the relations
characteristic of this mood are ‘human’, ‘living rational’, and ‘body’ (where Alfarabi takes
‘living rational’ to be a definition of ‘human’ rather than merely as a complex differentia).23
(4.2) The second mood proves that the genus of a differentia of the minor holds of the
minor. Terms that illustrate this case are ‘animal’, ‘sensitive’, and ‘perceptive’ (where the
latter is taken to be a genus of the middle).
It is worth noting that, in line with case 1.3 above, here too Alfarabi seems to think
that differentiae have a canonical type of definition (per genus et differentiam), just as
species and genera do. Things look very different for Avicenna, who seems to maintain that
23
The example in Averroes involves different terms: ‘human,’ ‘rational animal,’ and ‘nutritive body’ (cf. also 3.1 above).
52 R. Strobino
differentiae, strictly speaking, have a different sort of quiddity (and hence of definition) and
that in fact when we say that ‘perceptive’ is the genus of ‘sensitive’ we cannot mean a real
genus.24
(4.3) The third mood is another example of an argument form that may at best express a
factual conclusion without giving the cause. The reason is that the real cause in this mood
takes the place of the minor term (instead of being used to connect the major term and the
minor term). Here the genus (or, better, a genus) of the middle term is proven to hold of the
definiens of the middle term. Terms that satisfy the conditions characteristic of this mood
are, for example, ‘rational animal’, ‘human’, and ‘body’.
The mood is omitted by Averroes.
(4.4) In the fourth mood, the minor term is part of the definition of the middle and it is
one of the causes of the middle. Again, this kind of demonstration only proves that but not
why the genus of the middle is predicated of (part of) the definition of the middle, because
the middle term is the explanandum and not the explanans. Alfarabi illustrates the case by
means of the terms ‘human’, ‘capable of laughter’, and ‘having smile’ (dū bašāša), where
the latter is taken to be the genus of ‘capable of laughter’.
This mood is also omitted by Averroes.
(4.5) The fifth mood is apt to prove both factual and causally justified conclusions.
The type of conclusion it proves depends on something that requires further specifica-
tion, namely the relation between the middle term and the definition of the minor term (in
analogy with case 3.5 above, as noted by Averroes, in order for this mood to be an absolute
demonstration or demonstration of the why-it-is, B must somehow enter in the definition
of C). Terms that exemplify this mood are ‘product [of a number] by an even [number]’,
‘even’, and ‘having a quality’ (dū kayfiyya). While evenness is certainly a quality of even
numbers, to take ‘having a quality’ in this context as the genus of ‘even’ does not seem to
be an obvious choice but it is nevertheless accepted without objections by Averroes.
(5) Fifth type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 36.20–37.9)
The defining characteristic of the fifth type of combination is that the major term is
always a differentia of the middle, while the middle and the minor can stand in a variety of
relations. Alfarabi considers four sub-cases, articulated as follows:
5.1 A is differentia of B, and B is genus of C;
5.2 A is differentia of B, and C is definition of B;
5.3 A is differentia of B, and C is part of the definition of B;
5.4 A is differentia of B, and part of C is part of the definition of B.
Alfarabi notes that two moods, called here compositions (tark¯ıbāt), are dropped from
consideration. He does not say which ones but potential candidates might be (i) the case in
which A is a differentia of B, and B is a differentia of C, which would coincide with 1.3,
and (ii) the case in which A and B are both differentiae of C, which would coincide with
2.2.
(5.1) The first mood of this combination proves that the differentia of a genus holds of
what falls under the genus and represents the paradigmatic type of demonstration accord-
ing to Alfarabi. Since 5.1 shows, by virtue of the relations between its terms (as stated in
24
In the context of a complex argument on the status of differentiae, at Ilāhiyyāt V.6, pp. 231–5, Avicenna argues, among other
things, that if such notions were defined in terms of genus and differentia, that would entail an infinite regress. The point has
recently been raised by Thom 2016, especially pp. 150–5.
the premises and without additional conditions, as in 3.5 or 4.5), that the major belongs
(wuğūd) to the minor while supplying at the same time the reason why that is the case, it
deserves to be characterized as a ‘complete demonstration’ (burhān tāmm). The terminol-
ogy is well established in Alfarabi’s Burhān as it will be later on in Avicenna. But Avicenna
would hardly regard 5.1 to be a legitimate schema of complete demonstration, given that
he deems PS1–PS1 combinations to be redundant (with only a few notable exceptions).25
Terms that satisfy the conditions of this mood are ‘human’, ‘animal’, and ‘sensitive’.
Averroes points out (Epitome, 55vb) that the middle term is in fact merely the cause of
the minor (as its genus) and would presumably agree with Avicenna’s objection that this
demonstration fails to provide the highest kind of explanation, for it only shows why the
major holds of the minor, without exhibiting anything of the nature of the major itself.
(5.2) The recurrent theme of multiple definitions encountered above (e.g., in 1.1, 2.1, 3.3,
and 3.4) resurfaces in connection with the second mood of this combination, which is said
to result (or, literally, be composed) only when the middle term has two definitions. If the
middle has one definition only, this combination of premises is said to be (demonstratively)
unproductive (lā yuntiğu hād ā t-ta»l¯ıf šay»an, II, 5, p. 37.1–2), where the vocabulary is once
again reminiscent of the syllogistic.
The analysis of this mood seems directly related to 3.4. The redundant case (with only
one definition) is exemplified by the terms ‘rational’, ‘human’, and ‘living rational’ (while
in 3.4 (i), the terms are ‘living rational’, ‘human’, and ‘rational’). The genuine case is
illustrated, by contrast, by the terms ‘two-footed walking animal’, ‘human’, and ‘rational’,
where ‘part of one of the two definitions belongs to the other definition as a whole’ (II,
5, p. 37.4–5). This mood is only a demonstration of the that-it-is, as the middle term is
once again an explanandum that connects two explanantia, namely (one of) the middle
term’s definition(s) (the minor term) and the middle term’s differentia (the major term). In
other words, it would be incorrect to say that every two-footed walking animal is rational
because it is human. Rather, its being human is due to its being rational.
The mood is omitted by Averroes.
(5.3) The third mood is not discussed, notwithstanding the fact that Alfarabi explicitly
contends that the fifth combination consists of four moods and that he labels the first two
and the last one as first, second, and fourth, respectively.
There is also an interesting exegetical puzzle in connection with this passage. An omis-
sion is documented in Averroes (Epitome 55vb) but it seems to be an omission of something
that was not supposed to be in Alfarabi’s text in the first place. According to Averroes, the
third type of the fifth combination is the case in which A is a differentia of B and B is the
definition of C, a genuinely additional mood which does not coincide with either 5.2 or 5.3
in Alfarabi. It would be tempting to explain away the discrepancy as a result of an error
in the 16th-century Latin edition (reading ‘C est pars definitionis ipsius B’), in which case
the missing case Averroes is referring to would be 5.3, namely the mood that Alfarabi lists
in abstract terms but then fails to address. As matter of fact, however, the Latin translation
perfectly corresponds to the Arabic (B est definitio ipsius C for wa-B h.add li-Ğ) and Aver-
roes’ abstract characterization is further corroborated by his example, where B is indeed
the definition of C. The rest of the discussion, where Averroes elaborates on the potential
reasons for the omission and even mentions Avempace’s view on the matter, also seems
to confirm that what he is actually lamenting is the absence of an additional mood not in
Alfarabi’s original list. The silent omission of 5.3 must therefore be explained otherwise,
25
See note 43 below.
54 R. Strobino
even if it is a curious coincidence that two independent issues of this kind should occur in
the very same context.26
(5.4) The fourth mood is apt to prove both factual and causally justified conclusions.
It establishes that a per se attribute holds of the minor term. The relation expressed by
the minor premise is characterized by means of the locution ‘part of C’ instead of the
more specific term ‘genus’ already used in other cases above. One of the interesting fea-
tures of this mood is the example, which involves complex terms from the domain of
mathematics. Terms that satisfy the conditions of this mood are ‘lines whose ratio to one
another is like the ratio of a number to a number’ (hut ūt allat¯ı nisbat ba–d.ihā ilā ba–d. ka-
. .
– –
nisbat adad ilā adad), ‘commensurable’ (muštarak) and ‘measured by one and the same
measure’ (miqdār wāh.id bi-–aynih¯ı), where the major term is the differentia of middle.
‘Commensurable’ is a per se 2 attribute of the minor because the genus of the minor
(presumably ‘quantity’) is part of its definition.27
This mood corresponds to the second mood of the fifth type in Averroes’ list, where
the part of C that is part of the definition of B is explicitly identified as the genus of C.
Whether this mood produces a that-it-is or a why-it-is demonstration depends, once again,
on an additional relation, namely the one holding between the middle and the minor (‘si
contigerit quod eius medio termino sit aditus ad minorem’ Epitome, 56ra), for the two
terms must be suitably connected, if they are to produce an explanation of the conclusion.
Averroes omits the mathematical example.
(6) Sixth type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 37.10–38.2)
The defining characteristic of the sixth type of combination is that the middle term is
always the definition of the major, while it can stand to the minor in a variety of ways.
Alfarabi considers four sub-cases, articulated as follows:
6.1 B is definition of A, and B is genus of C;
6.2 B is definition of A, and B is differentia of C;
6.3 B is definition of A, and C is in the definition of B;
6.4 B is definition of A, and the genus of C is part of the definition of B.
The moods of this type of combination are especially significant, at least in the frame-
work of an Aristotelian theory of demonstration. This is because the relation expressed
in the major premise encapsulates the standard, paradigmatic type of explanatory rela-
tion advocated by Aristotle on multiple occasions in the Posterior Analytics, namely the
requirement that the middle term be a definition of the major. Furthermore, 6.1 and 6.2 are
cases in which the middle term is also explanatory of the minor (as part of its definition).28
The sixth type, which is referred to under the alternative heading of ‘arrangement’
(i»tilāf ), is also interesting because it is one of the few cases, if not the only one, in which
Alfarabi explicitly says that there are no moods other than those he lists. He then goes on to
address the case of what he presumably takes to be another potential candidate in addition
26
Alfarabi’s hint, at the beginning of this section, concerning the absence of two compositions involving cases of differentia
may also have something to do with this puzzle (even though it seems clear that the two missing cases are in addition to the
four he lists). I am not sure how this additional layer could help solve the problem, and rather than muddy the waters with
further speculation, I simply raise this possibility as an open interpretive option.
27
Euclid, Elements X, Definition 1 (in that context, however, only the notion of being measured by the same measure is explicitly
used).
28
Whether the middle term is required to be explanatory of—in the sense of being part of the essence or the definition of—(i) the
subject, (ii) the predicate, or (iii) both is a traditional problem in Aristotelian scholarship, and the interpretive line developed
by Alfarabi (and Averroes) here seems to have a great deal to contribute to it. For a discussion of the problem in Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics, see Bronstein 2016, especially pp. 43–50.
to his four, and rules it out for a theoretical reason: if B were a definition of both A and C,
then the resulting argument form would merely connect two synonymous expressions in
the conclusion and should not count as a demonstration.
(6.1) The first mood proves that the definition of the major term is predicated of the
minor term as its genus. The terms offered by Alfarabi as an illustration (‘circle’, ‘simple
plane surface’, and ‘plane surface’) do not seem entirely perspicuous.29 Averroes supplies
a different example, involving the terms ‘human’, ‘nutritive sensitive’, and ‘animal’. The
function of this mood may be that of proving that a genus of the minor term belongs to
minor term by means of the definition of the genus itself.
(6.2) The second mood does a similar thing with the differentia. Alfarabi’s example
in this case is slightly more perspicuous and involves another set of geometrical terms,
namely ‘circle’, ‘[containing] a point such that the lines produced from it to the circumfer-
ence are equal’, ‘[containing] a center’. Here the middle term is taken to be a differentia of
‘circle’ and a definition of ‘[containing] a center’. At Epitome, 56ra, Averroes replaces the
geometrical terms with ‘human’, ‘having thought and reflection’ (habens cogitationem et
considerationem),30 and ‘rational’.
Averroes goes on to argue that 6.1 and 6.2 are absolute demonstrations (‘haec due
species sunt specierum demonstrationis simpliciter’, i.e. they fall in the category of burhān
mut.laq, which proves both the fact and the reason why) because the middle term is the
cause of both the major and the minor term.
6.3 and 6.4 are thought by Alfarabi to be rare occurrences (wa-t-tālit min hāda s.-s.inf
fa-qillamā yūğadu mitālu d ālika wa-ka-d ālika r-rābi–, II, 5, p. 38.2), significant only if
the minor does not explicitly occur in the definition of the major. Averroes inverts their
order in the Epitome (his 6.3 and 6.4 are Alfarabi’s 6.4 and 6.3, respectively) and suggests
that his predecessor’s view depends on the fact that in these moods the middle is the cause
of the major only. In the case of Alfarabi’s 6.4, Averroes gives an example involving the
terms ‘denarius’, ‘dividitur in duo media’, ‘par’ (for a detailed account of how these terms
are related, see the analysis of 1.7 above). The other mood, 6.3, is not accompanied by an
example.31
A substantial variant (or gloss) relegated in the apparatus in both editions of Alfarabi’s
Burhān offers additional insights into this combination, even though it is probably spuri-
ous (Averroes’ remark alone on why Alfarabi says what he says seems to offer sufficiently
strong evidence to tip the scales in favor of the current printed text in Alfarabi, as it
appears to be a genuine quotation from it (wa-li-d ālika qāla Abū Nas.r ‘wa-qillamā yūğadu
mitāluhū’). In the variant, 6.1 is illustrated by a different example (‘circle’, ‘[being] only a
length and a breadth’, ‘simple’). Alternative terms are also given for 6.2 (‘human’, ‘apt for
deliberation’, ‘rational’) along with a pointer to the fact that the conclusion of this mood
proves that a differentia of the minor holds of the minor when the differentia is indicated by
a simple noun. But, perhaps more importantly, the passage supplies examples for both 6.3
29
The text of this passage might have suffered in the transmission. The corresponding notions in Euclid are found at Elements,
I, Definition 5 (surface), Definition 7 (plane surface), and Definition 15 (circle). What is unclear in Alfarabi’s example is how
the middle term ‘simple plane surface’ could be the definition of the major term ‘plane surface’ (the latter seems rather to be
the genus of the former).
30
The Arabic dū fikr wa-rawiya is reminiscent of the locution used by Averroes in his example for 3.2.
31
For Averroes’ 6.4 (which corresponds to Alfarabi’s 6.3), the Latin translation at Epitome, 56ra, misleadingly suggests that, in
the minor premise, C should be the definition rather than in the definition of B (et definitio ipsius B est C). The Arabic text is
in line with Alfarabi’s account (wa-B f¯ı h.addih¯ı Ǧ).
56 R. Strobino
(‘rational human’, ‘is delighted by what he esteems strange’,32 ‘capable of laughter’) and
6.4 (‘human’, ‘two-footed moving’, ‘walking’), again with a pointer to the type of conclu-
sion generated by the argument in the case of 6.3, where a proper attribute of the minor term
is proven to hold of the minor by means of the definition of the proper attribute itself.
(7) Seventh type of combination (Burhān II, 5, p. 38.3–10)
The defining characteristic of the seventh type of combination is that the middle term is
always in the definition of the major, while it can stand to the minor in a variety of ways.
Alfarabi considers four sub-cases, articulated as follows:
7.1 B is in the definition of A, and B is genus of C;
7.2 B is in the definition of A, and B is differentia of C;
7.3 B is in the definition of A, and C is definition of B;
7.4 B is in the definition of A, and the genus of C is part of the definition of B.
The four moods of the seventh combination all express per se 2 relations in the conclu-
sion, as the major premise is always per se 2. In the first two moods, the minor premise is
per se 1, while in the last two, the minor premise is per se 2.
(7.1) The conclusion of the first mood shows that an attribute proper to the genus of the
minor term belongs to the minor. The mood is exemplified by the terms ‘human’, ‘animal’,
‘having appetite’, and seems to be a straightforward case of an application argument by
means of which a per se 2 attribute of a genus is proven to hold of a species of that genus.33
(It differs from 8.2 below in that here it is the middle itself that is taken in the definition
of the major term, while in 8.2 it is the genus of the middle). Averroes’ characterization of
this mood and the example at Epitome, 56ra, are identical.
(7.2) The second mood establishes, in a similar way, that an attribute proper to the differ-
entia of the minor term belongs to the minor. In this case, terms that satisfy the conditions
expressed by the premises are ‘human’, ‘rational’, and ‘having [the capacity for] delibera-
tion’, where the middle term is taken to be part of the definition of the major. In Averroes’
Epitome, the major term is replaced by ‘capable of laughter’.
According to Averroes, 7.1 and 7.2 are demonstrations in which the middle is a cause of
both the major term and the minor term, which makes these two moods cases of absolute
demonstration.
(7.3) The third mood proves that an attribute (the major) holds of the definiens (the
minor) of part (the middle) of the attribute’s own definition. An attribute of this kind
is, according to Alfarabi, proper to the minor itself. Terms that meet the characteristic
requirements of this mood are ‘rational animal’, ‘human’, and ‘capable of laughter’.
Averroes gives the same example and notes in addition that even if the middle is a
cause of the major, the predication expressed by the minor premise is non-natural and
therefore this mood can count at best as an example of merely factual demonstration. But
he also seems to believe that for this reason Alfarabi has dropped from consideration a
32
Reading yahiššu li-mā yastat.rifuhū with Fa hr¯ı’s edition (or, alternatively, yahiššu li-mā yastaz.rifuhū ‘is delighted by what
amuses him’). The expression is taken to be a definition of ‘capable of laughter’, but see also moods 1.6 and 4.4 above, where
–
Alfarabi identifies as constituents of the definition of ‘capable of laughter’ the terms ‘capable of wonder’ (muta ağğib) and
‘having smile’ (dū bašāša).
33
On the notions of a subject-attribute demonstration and of an application argument (in the latter case especially with regard
to proofs involving genera and species), see McKirahan 1992, chapters XIII and XIV, respectively. Strobino forthcoming
contains a detailed discussion of these two Aristotelian models of demonstration in connection with Avicenna’s account and
classification of different types of why-it-is demonstration; cf. also Strobino 2018, Section 6.6.
number of moods that should count as demonstrative, if only of the weaker type (burhān
anna, demonstration of the that-it-is). Examples of these putative additional moods silently
omitted by Alfarabi would be cases such as (i) A is genus of B, and B is part of the
definition of C or (ii) A is definition of B, and B is part of the definition of C. According
to Averroes, the criterion of natural predication would be too restrictive even by Alfarabi’s
own standards, given that mood 1.4 in his list involves non-natural predications.
(7.4) The fourth mood is not characterized in abstract but only illustrated by means of
an example involving the terms ‘human’, ‘two-footed’, and ‘walking’, where presumably
the genus (‘animal’) of the minor term (‘human’) is part of the definition of the middle
(‘two-footed’). This seems to imply that being (at least) two-footed is a requirement for
the definition of ‘walking’. According to Averroes, in this case the middle term is a cause
of the major only.
Averroes also interestingly notes that an additional mood of this combination must have
fallen out (‘ex libro autem Abunazar cecidit species huius partis’), namely the case where
B is in the definition of A while being at the same time the definition of C. He regards this
as a case of absolute demonstration, proving both the that-it-is and the why-it-is, and gives
the terms ‘human’, ‘rational animal’, and ‘capable of laughter’ to illustrate it. In this case,
the middle term is a cause of both the minor (as its definition) and the major term (as part
of its definition), and the predication is natural. Since the inclusion of this mood would
not have been redundant, as it meets the conditions that Alfarabi sets down for absolute
demonstrations, its absence from the list must be due, according to Averroes, either to a
material error in the transmission (‘aut quod ceciderit ex ipso libro’) or to the fact that
his predecessor might have deemed it too obvious to be worth mentioning explicitly (‘aut
quod ipse eam subtraxerit confidens in intelligentia addiscentis’).34
(8) Eighth type of combination (Burhān II, 5, p. 38.10–21)
The defining characteristic of the eighth type of combination is that the genus of the
middle term is always part of the definition of the major, while the middle itself can stand
to the minor in a variety of ways. Alfarabi considers four sub-cases, articulated as follows:
8.1 The genus of B is part of the definition of A, and B is definition of C;
8.2 The genus of B is part of the definition of A, and B is genus of C;
8.3 The genus of B is part of the definition of A, and B is differentia of C;
8.4 The genus of B is part of the definition of A, and C is definition of B.
These four moods all express per se 2 predications in the conclusion, where the major
term stands for a per se attribute of the minor (‘all these produce per se accidents’ II, 5, p.
38.13). If the major premise is per se 2, the conclusion is per se 2. For if the minor premise
is per se 1 (i.e., if the middle term is a constituent of the minor), then the conclusion shows
that a per se 2 attribute holds of the minor through a per se 1 attribute of the minor. By
contrast, if the major premise is per se 1, then the relation expressed by the conclusion
depends on the relation expressed by the minor premise: if the minor premise is per se 1,
the conclusion is also per se 1; if the minor premise is per se 2, the conclusion is per se 2.
These cases also accommodate various fine-grained distinctions that are later devel-
oped by Avicenna, in particular a distinction between a (i) demonstration of the why-it-is
explaining why the major holds of the minor and a (ii) demonstration of the why-it-is
explaining why the major exists as well as why it holds of the minor.35
34
Averroes, Epitome, 56rb.
35
Avicenna’s account of the different types of demonstration of the why-it-is is discussed in detail in Strobino forthcoming.
58 R. Strobino
In this combination, the four moods are illustrated in Alfarabi by means of geometrical
examples (all replaced by Averroes with non-geometrical ones).
(8.1) In the first mood, the genus of the middle term is used to define the major term,
and the middle itself is in turn the definition of the minor term. Terms that satisfy the
conditions characteristic of this mood are ‘two right angles’, ‘equal on both sides of a
straight line standing upon a straight line’,36 ‘being on both sides of a perpendicular’.37
Averroes gives the terms ‘human’, ‘rational animal’, and ‘having desire’ (concupiscens)
to illustrate this case.38
(8.2) The second mood is a standard case of an application argument, where a per se
2 attribute of a genus (of which the attribute typically holds in a primary way) is proven
to hold of a species of that genus, as in the case of the property of ‘having the sum of
the internal angles equal to two right angles’ (2R), which is proven to hold of ‘isosceles’
as a result of the fact that it holds of ‘triangle’ first (in an essential sense of priority). It is
noteworthy that Averroes illustrates this mood with a triplet—involving the terms ‘human’,
‘two-footed’, and ‘walking’—identical to the one used by Alfarabi for 7.4.
(8.3) The third mood proves that a per se 2 attribute of the differentia of a subject holds
of the subject. Even if the problem is not explicitly addressed by Alfarabi, it is worth noting
that whether the inference is a subject-attribute demonstration or an application argument
may depend in this case on the level of generality of the differentia in question.
Terms that exemplify this mood are ‘triangle’, ‘contained by three straight lines’, and
‘having rectilinear angles’. The latter is a per se 2 attribute of ‘trilateral’, and ‘trilateral’
(that is to say, ‘contained by three straight lines’) is a co-extensive differentia of triangle.39
Averroes replaces the example with the terms ‘human’, ‘rational’, and ‘seeing’ (videns),
adding that the first three moods are all cases in which the middle term is a cause of both
the major and the minor term. As a result, these inference patterns prove both the that-it-is
and the why-it-is.
(8.4) The fourth mood proves that a per se 2 attribute holds of the definition of its subject.
It is the only case in this combination where both premises express per se 2 predications.
Terms that satisfy the conditions characteristic of this mood are ‘figure contained by three
straight lines’, ‘triangle’ (whose genus, ‘rectilinear figure’, is part of the definition of ‘2R’),
and ‘2R’.
In Averroes, the mood is illustrated by means of the terms ‘rational animal’, ‘human’,
and ‘capable of imagination’40 and is characterized as the counterpart of 7.3, because the
middle term is a cause of the major term only (and, just as 7.3, 8.4 is a case of non-natural
predication).
Alfarabi concludes the classification with a few cursory but revelatory remarks indi-
cating that he assumes that the above model (which has been developed thus far only with
regard to first-figure syllogisms with universal affirmative premises and conclusion) can be
extended to negative propositions in the first and second figure as well as to hypotheticals.41
36
That is, equal adjacent angles.
37
Euclid, Elements, I, Definition 10 (right angles and perpendicular).
38
The Latin translation at Epitome 56rb misleadingly suggests that, in the major premise, part of the genus of B (rather than the
genus itself) is the definition (rather than part of the definition) of A (definitio ipsius A est pars generis B). The Arabic text is’
»
in line with Alfarabi’s account (A ğuz h.addih¯ı ğins B).
39
Euclid Elements, I, Definition 9 (rectilinear angle), Definition 19 (rectilinear figure), Definition 20 (types of triangle).
40
Reading muta hayyil for the Latin aestimativus.
41
By hypotheticals, it is unclear whether Alfarabi means—in Avicennan terminology—connective conditional hypotheticals
»
(iqtirān¯ı šart.¯ı muttas.il) or repetitive (istitnā ¯ı) syllogisms, but it seems sufficiently clear that the role of the explanatory middle
The fact that only Barbara syllogisms are considered explicitly in Burhān II, 5 is due to
Alfarabi’s commitment to the view that those are the only type of demonstrations that are
in principle apt to prove both that-it-is and why-it-is conclusions.
6. Glimpses beyond: models of explanation

The last point is crucial because Alfarabi is constantly concerned, as already noted
with regard to various individual moods, with the idea of classifying the demonstratively
productive moods in function of their explanatory power.
In this connection, the thirty-nine moods explicitly identified above fall into three main
categories: (i) demonstrations of the that-it-is and of the why-it-is (e.g., 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1,
7.2), (ii) demonstrations of the that-it-is only (e.g., 2.3, 3.3, 4.3, 4.4), and (iii) those that
fall into one category or the other depending on a further relation between the terms not
formally specified in the premises (a larger set including, for instance, 1.7, 2.4, 3.5, 4.5,
and 5.4).
If Averroes’ explicit adoption of Alfarabi’s scheme and his comments are quite helpful
for the clarification of certain individual points, it is perhaps through the lens of Avicenna’s
classification (and much simpler account of the basic types of demonstrations) that we may
appreciate interesting systematic features of this model of scientific demonstration.42
Avicenna takes a more abstract approach and disregards the internal divisions of the per
se 1 (PS1) and per se 2 (PS2) types. Instead of grouping demonstrations on the basis of the
five predicable relations and their permutations, he identifies four general principles:
a. if x is PS1 of y, and y is PS1 of z, then x is PS1 of z;
b. if x is PS1 of y, and y is PS2 of z, then x is PS2 of z;
c. if x is PS2 of y, and y is PS1 of z, then x is PS2 of z;
d. if x is PS2 of y, and y is PS2 of z, then x is PS2 of z.
Since, according to Avicenna, arguments with per se 1 conclusions are not genuine
demonstrations, on the basis of (a), he rejects the case where both premises are per se
1.43 Demonstrative arguments then fall into two main categories both of which prove per
se 2 conclusions: the first is (A1) the class of those in which the minor premise is per se 1
and the major premise is per se 2; the second is (A2) the class of those in which the minor
premise is per se 2, while the major premise can either be (A2.1) per se 1 or (A2.2) per
se 2.44
Alfarabi’s moods may then tentatively be reduced to the three groups below (setting
aside the suspicious moods 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1 for a fourth,
un-Avicennan category):
(A1) 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3;
(A2.1) 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4;
(A2.2) 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.3, 2.4, 6.3, 6.4, 7.3, 7.4, 8.4.45
term should be played in either case by an asserted premise (the mustatnā or ‘repeated’ premise) that triggers the inference
of the conclusion (e.g., the antecedent of a conditional statement or the minor premise of modus ponens). Averroes notes that
the above considerations may be extended only to conditional hypotheticals but not to other types involving disjunctions or
reductio ad absurdum arguments.
42
See in particular Avicenna, Burhān II, 6 and II, 8.
43
On this point, see Strobino 2016, especially pp. 202–3, n37. The main reason for the rejection of this type of demonstrative
argument is that per se 1 attributes are not sought demonstratively (except in rare circumstances). This is because they are
constitutive features of the quiddity of a thing and as such they are typically known through its definition and assumed in the
demonstration of other (per se 2) attributes of that thing.
44
In other words, the major premise being per se 2 is a sufficient condition for the conclusion to be per se 2.
45
In at least one of their premises, moods 1.4, 3.3, 4.3, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 7.3 involve predicative claims which may be
regarded as limit cases of what has been characterized here as per se 2 predication. In each of these moods, there is at least an
60 R. Strobino
Figure 1. Demonstration and per se predication: four basic groups identified by premise pair
The four cases (a), (b), (c), and (d) are illustrated in Figure 1 above, where (i) continuous
and dotted lines stand for immediate and non-immediate predication, and (ii) PS1 and PS2
premises are indicated by vertical and horizontal lines, respectively; the conclusions, where
C is the minor term and A the major term, are PS1 in the first case and PS2 in the last three.
A second key aspect of Avicenna’s analysis concerns the (ultimately Aristotelian) dis-
tinction between a subject-attribute demonstration and an application argument.46 While
the distinction is not used by Alfarabi, who (at least in the extant sources) does not identify
different types of demonstrations of the why-it-is, it may be profitable to look at the above
moods with this more fine-grained model in mind. In a nutshell, the distinction captures
the idea that certain explanations are more fundamental than others. In particular, it dis-
tinguishes between two independent kinds of demonstrations: (i) one by means of which
we prove that an attribute holds of a subject (e.g., that ‘2R’ holds of ‘triangle’) in virtue
of certain definitional links between the terms and their essences, and (ii) one by means of
which an attribute that has been (or can be) established to hold of a certain subject (through
a proper subject-attribute demonstration) is proved to hold of something that falls under
that subject. The distinction is reflected in Avicenna by the presence of two types of causes
(or explanatory middle terms): one that explains the existence of the major term as well
as its holding of the minor and another that merely explains why the major holds of the
minor.47
In the Avicennan scheme of things, demonstrations of type A1 are application argu-
ments, demonstrations of type A2.2 are subject-attribute demonstrations, and demonstra-
tions of type A2.1 also seem to be application arguments of some kind.
essential relation in which the subject (or its genus) is not merely in the definition of the predicate but is itself a definition (or
the definition) of the predicate. For the most part this does not raise problems in connection with the status of the conclusion,
which is almost invariably per se 2. It is legitimate to ask, however, whether this particular kind of premises, where the subject
is the complete definiens and the predicate the definiendum, would require a separate, more fine-grained analysis. For practical
purposes, in this paper I have consciously decided to treat such moods together with the other straightforward cases but this is
merely a tentative characterization.
46
The distinction between these two types of demonstration is acknowledged in the Aristotelian scholarship on the Posterior
Analytics, even though different terms are used by different authors. Here I borrow the terminology from McKirahan 1992 with
an important difference: the paradigmatic type of subject-attribute demonstration for Avicenna is one in which the conclusion
is per se 2 (and not per se 1 as McKirahan argues to be the case for Aristotle, see McKirahan 1992, p. 169). Application
arguments and subject-attribute demonstrations are characterized as Type A and Type B demonstrations, respectively, by
Lennox 1987, pp. 92–97; cf. also McKirahan 1992, p. 296, n3 to ch. XIV.
47
For a fuller account of the problem see Strobino forthcoming. That Avicenna is keenly aware of the difference between these
two cases and does not want them to be conflated is shown by the fact that he devotes an entire chapter of his work on An.
Post. (Avicenna, Burhān I, 10) to the explanation of application arguments.
Whether or not Alfarabi’s account of the types of demonstration discussed here influ-
enced Avicenna’s is an open question. In my view, Avicenna’s classification in (his)
Burhān, II, 6 may be seen as a tacit attempt to simplify Alfarabi’s model while looking
more generally at whether a premise expresses a per se 1 or a per se 2 predication and
examining the properties of the resulting fourfold scheme: (a) PS1-PS1, (b) PS1-PS2, (c)
PS2-PS1, and (d) PS2-PS2. That Avicenna had access to Alfarabi’s work on An. Post. can
unquestionably be established on independent grounds (the influence is clearly detectable
at various places, including significant loans from Alfarabi’s classification of per se pred-
icates48 ) and it is hard to imagine that Avicenna would have ignored his predecessor’s
elaborate interpretation of such a crucial piece of Aristotelian doctrine.
Far from being a tedious exercise of scholastic taxonomy, Alfarabi’s analysis and clas-
sification of demonstrative arguments emerges as a new cornerstone in the history of the
reception of the Posterior Analytics alongside the sophisticated account of per se predica-
tion on which it relies. More generally, it documents a unique attempt in the Aristotelian
tradition to provide meaningful content to an otherwise obscure but essential chapter of the
dominant model of scientific discourse in the pre-modern era.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Khaled El-Rouayheb, Tony Street, and an anonymous referee for History and Philosophy of
Logic for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I should also like to thank Charles Butterworth
for his kind willingness to share with me his transcription and working edition of the relevant sections of the
Arabic text of Averroes’ Epitome. It goes without saying that all residual imperfections are my own responsibility.
ORCID
Riccardo Strobino http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2299-040X
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Appendix
Table A1. Correspondence between moods in Alfarabi’s Burhān II, 5 (F) and Averroes’ Epitome (A).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
F1.1 A1.1 F2.1 A2.1 F3.1 A3.1 F4.1 A4.1 F5.1 A5.1 F6.1 A6.1 F7.1 A7.1 F8.1 A8.1
F1.2 A1.2 F2.2 A2.2 F3.2 A3.2 F4.2 A4.2 F5.2 – F6.2 A6.2 F7.2 A7.2 F8.2 A8.2
F1.3 A1.3 F2.3 A2.3 F3.3 – F4.3 – F5.3 – F6.3 A6.4 F7.3 A7.3 F8.3 A8.3
F1.4 – F2.4 A2.4 F3.4 – F4.4 – F5.4 A5.2 F6.4 A6.3 F7.4 A7.4 F8.4 A8.4
F1.5 – F3.5 A3.3 F4.5 A4.3 – A5.3 – A7.5
F1.6 A1.4 F3.6 –
F1.7 A1.5
F1.8

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History and Philosophy of Logic

ISSN: 0144-5340 (Print) 1464-5149 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/thpl20

Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi

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Varieties of Demonstration in Alfarabi

Received 5 January 2017 Accepted 19 August 2018

© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

another area of great originality is Alfarabi’s classification of demonstrative arguments,

3. The contents of Alfarabi’s Kitāb al-Burhān

and, in the case of per se 2,

(4) x is in the definition of y (also formulated as ‘x is part of the definition of y’)

definitions or parts of the definitions of the two extremes or of one of them, or

5. Demonstrative combinations (ta»l¯ıfāt) and moods (d.urūb)

(2) Second type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 35.1–12)

3.3 A is definition of B, and C is definition of B;

(4) Fourth type of combination (Burhān II, 5, pp. 36.6–19)

6. Glimpses beyond: models of explanation

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