G.R. No.

L-28100 November 29, 1971

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR,
LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL JALAGAT, defendants-
appellees.

Bonifacio P. Legaspi for plaintiff-appellant.

Cecilio P. Luminarias for defendants-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the
subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata  that
the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous
case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the
affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.

The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now
appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed
by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This
was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and
malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against
Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the
very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on
October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio,
plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and
practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or
forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat.

That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already
been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated
December 6, 1965]."1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the
ground that for prior judgment or res judicata  to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on
the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which such a
conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus:
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966,
anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court
finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against
Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived
their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of
Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil
Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574
has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in
abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the same
subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]" 2 Hence, this appeal.

The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.

1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when
such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there was no denial
as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal the same
plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by
appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest. There was no denial either
of the property involved being the same and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which
would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for the
court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant.
What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictible?

Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such
a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under
the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a
case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower
court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the
comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of
previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration." 3

2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better,
not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were
subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not
have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle
from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel,
should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in mind. 5

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against
plaintiff.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-17885             June 30, 1965

GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO, JR., defendants-appellees.

Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for plaintiff-appellant.

Quijano and Azores and J. P. Arroyo for defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Gabriel P. Prieto appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 4280. Since only questions of law are involved
the appeal has been certified to this Court.

In 1948 Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition for
registration of several parcels of land, including Lot No. 2, Plan Psu-106730 (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No.
1025). After the proper proceedings Original Certificate of Title No. 39 covering said lot was issued in his
name. The same year and in the same Court Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration of an
adjoining parcel of land, described as Lot No. 3, Plan Psu-117522 (L.R.C. No. 173; G.L.R.O. No. 1474). As a
result Original Certificate of Title No. 11 was issued in his name.

After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., Original Certificate of Title No. 39 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 was issued in the names of his heirs, the defendants in this
case, namely Meden Jack, Joker, Nonito and Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed Arroyo.

On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition (L.R.C. No.
144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No. 900) in which they claimed that the technical
description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of their predecessor
did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court, and was less in area
by some 157 square meters. They therefore prayed that said description be corrected pursuant to
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act; that their certificate of title be cancelled and another one
issued to them containing the correct technical description. The petition was filed in the registration
record but was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 900.

On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to "change,
upon payment of his fees, the description in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 of Lot 2 in Plan Psu-
106730 so as to make it conform to that embodied in the decision of the Court on March 8, 1950, and to
correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden
Arroyo'.

On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur (in the original registration records of the two lots) a petition to annul the order of May 23 in Special
Proceedings No. 900. At the hearing of the petition on July 12, 1957 neither he nor his counsel
appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day issued an order dismissing the petition for
failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on September 5, 1957.

On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present action for annulment of
Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein entered on May 23, 1956. He also prayed that the
157 square meters allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff opposed, and on
January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is from the order of dismissal, plaintiff having failed to
secure its reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken.

Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was irregular and illegal mainly
because he was not notified thereof and the same was instituted almost six years after the issuance of
the decree and title sought to be corrected, and hence the order of the court dated May 23, 1956 for
the correction of the technical description in appellees' title is void ab initio.

The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No. 900 but the propriety of the
dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground of res adjudicata. The validity of the said proceedings
was the issue in the first case he filed. But because of his failure and that of his counsel to attend the
hearing the court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Since no appeal was taken from the order
of dismissal it had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, the court not having provided
otherwise (Rule 30, Section 3).

Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment because the Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents therein, defendants-appellees here, as they did
not file any opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other hand, allege that
they had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they were served copies of the petition.
This allegation finds support in the record, particularly in the following statement of appellant in his
brief:

This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but was postponed to January 14,
1957, due to lack of notice to the respondents. Upon motion for postponements of respondents, now
defendants-appellees, the hearing of January 14, 1957 was postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing set
for May 16, 1957 was again postponed upon motion of the respondents to July 12, 1957.

Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first petition for annulment
because no "parole" evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the
records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within
the judicial notice and cognizance of the said court.

In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of
cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San
Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such
records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending,
by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally,
the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first
petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.

The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.

Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both appellant seeks that the
order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance is the fact that in the
complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157 square meters of
land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. For that area would necessarily have
reverted to appellant had his first petition prospered, the relief asked for by him being that "the Register
of Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by incorporating therein
only and solely the description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu-106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and
maintaining consequently the description limits and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner,
Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land Registration No. 173." The
claim for damages as well as for other additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are not
materially different from his prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises"
contained in the former one.

There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two cases, the order of
dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second.

The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

G.R. No. 85423             May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

Ramon Dimen for petitioner.

Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of basis.
It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the
private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and
situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to
vacate the disputed lot.1

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla
while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa
Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same
time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did.
She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother
of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon
Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited from
his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until
they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and
Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the
Makato River.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial
court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff
but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of
the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different
parcel of land.

The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:

Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed in
Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00—
the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3
of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and
Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the appellant,
the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of
stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial
court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.

We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of
Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not
include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2",
"B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by
plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems
to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the
quoted transcript.

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at
the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs.
Aviles,3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they
will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such
documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial. 4

We did say in People vs. Napat-a5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be
validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses,
Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in
her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?

A The translation of the letter.

Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?

Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice
of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case
before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied
the exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending.8

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is
clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil
Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving
him no opportunity to counteract.

The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the
other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said
testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other
evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit,
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.

Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the complaint
should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It
has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo
Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was the same lot,
there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa
Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question
belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that
did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such authorization
has been presented.

It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases.1âwphi1 However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known
exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted
fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's
ownership. As this Court has held:

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. 9

It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax
declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10

The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land by the
respondents and their parents before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the
said subject parcels of land.11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously
allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes
in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with
the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is
specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he
should have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded
another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand,
if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name
when the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the
payments were made in her own name.

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of
the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession thereof for more
than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes thereon
in her own name.13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the
land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as
the owner.15 These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim
that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below and
even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily.
The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to
have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not been
formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the
Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327
and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of
existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting
sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his claim of
ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws.
By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should
have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs
against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 122480             April 12, 2000

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply
the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that a taxpayer is
entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not belonging to it. No
one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision 2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
The CA disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. 3

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner's claim for refund is hereby DENIED and this
Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 4

Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution 5 denying reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:

This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioner's tax
withheld for the year 1989.

In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items are reflected:

Income P1,017,931,831.00

Deductions P1,026,218,791.00

Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)

Taxable Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)

Less:

1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00

1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00

TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00

REFUNDABLE

It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of
P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. However,
petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of
P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.

On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount
of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due
to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.

Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund,
petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the
amount of P112,491.00.
The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground that petitioner failed
to present as evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that
petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which
is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by respondent court in its
Resolution dated May 6, 1994.6

As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. 7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990 Annual income Tax
Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in
the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding year
of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to grant the claim for refund. . . .

Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in derogation of
sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the
exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund. 8

Issue

In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:

The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112,491.90,
representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989.9

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:

Petitioner Entitled to Refund

It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus entitled to a
refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code which states that a
corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said amount for
the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the
said amount as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as
a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the Court of
Tax Appeals.

The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its 1989
Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following year,
the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled that
petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return, which would
have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are binding
on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant facts which if
considered would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such exception.

In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount as a
tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner's accounting
department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a certification issued by
Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's vice-president, stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will
not be automatically credited/offset against any succeeding quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of
the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for the first
two quarters of 1990.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In fact, it presented
no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could have easily
disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not do so.

More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment return shows whether a corporation incurred
a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner
incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in dispute as a
tax credit.

Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an opposition to
petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein, the CA did not pass upon
that significant document.

True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the
trial.1âwphi1 The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that proceedings
before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." 13 The paramount
consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly presentation of issues is
not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just
determination of a controversy.

In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner could
not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well as the other
documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court committed a reversible error.

It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination of
every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 But there can be no just
determination of the present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted
before the CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a
net loss in 1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund which rightfully
belongs to the petitioner.

Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was not
the final adjustment Return, but petitioner's first two quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This allegation is
wrong. An examination of the records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the
Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by
respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut
respondents' specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its Surrejoinder, to which was attached
the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17

CTA Case No. 4897

Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by
the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax
Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . . ." 18 Respondent, however,
urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact
that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 20

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the
Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court.
Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court
cannot take judicial notice thereof.

To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had really
believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not
suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing
therein — that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it refused to controvert the
same fact established by petitioner's other documentary exhibits.

In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's case. It is merely one
more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes
for 1990.

Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner has
established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules of procedure; it may
have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to disregard this
cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the
amount claimed as tax credits.
Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms,
however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it and
thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to
observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself in
refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor,
dignity and uprightness.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to
petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of legal
protection accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards designed to minimally
reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed, there is no critique on the plethora
of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of
judicial error is further addressed by the grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all
convictions imposing the penalty of death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar,
involving two death sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of this ultimate judicial
intervention.

Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the Regional
Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:

That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of
Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her
damage and prejudice.1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:

That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan, Municipality of Brooke's Point,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a
private individual, and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by means of deceit did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years old
(sic), for a period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty against her will and
consent and without legal justification, to the damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha. 2

During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and, after the
pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial court.3

According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding
house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan
National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark,
she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was nobody
inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck,
dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor.
Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the
moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.

When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife
with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her
private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout
her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed
at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her
teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she
and her family would be killed.

Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood.
Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house
where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she arrived
at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident.

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan,
Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might
make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go
with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.

Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind
appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for
the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if
she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's
Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three
days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with
appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.

In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's
Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the
room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place
because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing person
in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that
same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.

Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point where she
was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:

GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious, coherent Filipina.

BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.

EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora and minora, hymenal opening
stellate in shape, presence of laceration superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately
1/2 cm. length.

INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted, hymenal opening admits 2
fingers with slight resistance, prominent vaginal rugae, cervix closed.

CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight resistance, presence of laceration,
longitudinal at the fossa navicularis approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an
average size penis in erection with laceration. 4

Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a
laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the basis of the
inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that there was force
applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration. He also examined
the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The patient told him that she was raped.

During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and
"2"; that she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because of what he did to her;
and that she did not notice if there were people near the boarding house of her cousin. She narrated
that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already lying down, and that even as
appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was afraid. She could not remember with
which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely silent from the time she was made to lie down,
while her panty was being removed, and even until appellant was able to rape her.

When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but there was
no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously asked permission
from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking ahead of her. When she was
brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she was afraid. However, she admitted that
at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her. She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden
but she did not notice if there were other people inside. She likewise did not ask the appellant why he
brought her there.

Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the door of the
courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she added that there was a
sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three
nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because everytime she woke up, appellant was
always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.

Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in the
morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were swollen. When she
asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept silent. That afternoon, she
allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her teacher. However, when Mia and
appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and her husband, Adjeril, went to look for
them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she went to the house of appellant because she
was already suspecting that something was wrong, but appellant's wife told her that he did not come
home.

Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) station at
Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The following day, they went
to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto Princess City, then to the police
station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the Radyo ng Bayan program where she made
an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting
there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness
to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded
because she wanted to see her daughter.

In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch
complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by
appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this,
she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they proceeded to
the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed
separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point.

Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement
of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril,
Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of
appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of
desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn
to before Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement
because that was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not
allowed to graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened.

The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.

According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan National School
(PNS). Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him "Sir, I love you."
What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret from
everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had sexual intercourse as lovers. Appellant
was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School at the poblacion because he was the coach of
the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00 P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters
allegedly because she missed him, and she then decided to spend the night there with him.

Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a teacher at
the PNS, was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security guard of PNS, when
she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went closer to listen and she heard a
girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing
this, she immediately opened the door and was startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding
hands. She asked them what they were doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were
obviously caught by surprise, could not answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left. According to
this witness, complainant admitted to her that she was having an affair with appellant. Desirous that
such illicit relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the
latter arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994.

Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with the
present case, but the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which was executed
and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn statement, later marked in evidence as
Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she confronted Mia Taha about the latter's
indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang
pakialam mo," adding that she loves appellant very much.

Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office asking for
help with the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He agreed to meet her
at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he reached the place, the house was
dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly, they just sat on a bench near the road where
there was a lighted electric post and they talked about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They
stayed there for fifteen minutes, after which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the
street while appellant headed for home some fifteen meters away.

It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former teacher of
Mia at PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a bench and asked what
she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely replied that she was waiting for somebody.
Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she saw Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside
the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant
and she noticed that they were quite intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect
that the two could be having a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her
aerobics class and was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.

Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench. Filomena
further testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because his wife had a heart
ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told complainant's grandmother
about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of complainant appearing on the letters
marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is familiar with the same because Mia was her former
student. On cross-examination, Filomena clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of January
21, 1994, the two were talking naturally, she did not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was
pleading with her.

In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the road near
their house and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he accepted. Thirty minutes
thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her mother for them to go and solicit funds at
the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed that Mia was carrying a plastic bag and when
he asked her about it, she said that it contained her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house.
Appellant and Mia went to the poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks
at the Vic Tan Store.

Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available
transportation, so she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there was nothing
wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that Mia had repeatedly
told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was prevailed upon to stay at the
hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their registration and subsequently paid
P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That evening, however, appellant told
complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's
residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not
bring complainant along because she had refused to go home.

The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents and
informed them that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they would just
fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the hotel until 5:00 P.M.
When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom he saw while waiting near the
road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends. Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to
Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey
had to knock on the door until it was opened by her.

Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely answered
that what she was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father was not supposed
to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not know, however, was that
appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although he opted not to tell her because he
did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey further testified that when he saw appellant and
complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the couple looked very happy.

Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden, that is, from
January 22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really wanted to prove to him.
Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly could not avoid Mia because of
her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus, according to appellant, on January 24,
1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the
matter.

Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask for
assistance in procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia were already
looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey accompanied them to the house
of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's wife, but the latter refused to help because
of the complicated situation appellant was in.

Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against
appellant and after finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain Naem
who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day and bared
everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant in Muslim rites but
appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed that Naem would just
mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement with Mia's parents. Later that
day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's house.

The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to pay their
hotel bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend, Fernando Rubio,
at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just walked along the national highway
from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five hundred to seven hundred meters
away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the
couple were very happy, they were intimate and sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it
was very obvious that they were having a relationship.

In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they were there,
she would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and sometimes watch television.
When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go with appellant despite the fact the he was a
married man, Mia told him that she really loved appellant. She never told him, and Fernando Rubio
never had the slightest suspicion, that she was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later
claimed. He also testified that several police officers lived within their neighborhood and if complainant
had really been kidnapped and detained, she could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free
to come and go as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked because the lock had
been destroyed.

On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of his; that
it was Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that complainant's mother
never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who fetched appellant from the
lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.

Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's Subdivision and
informed him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's house the next day. The
following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to talk to complainant's parents
because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's Subdivision and to tell her that her mother,
who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her. Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her
that within one hour he was be going to the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle
everything there.

After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief
of Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the
whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was
not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 27, 1994, appellant was no
longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a
complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.

During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two
letters from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994, respectively. As Mia's teacher,
appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters as that of
Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was
reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it was never
mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father
because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to complainants
in order to settle the case.

Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on January 21,
1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but that was already on
January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had sexual relations. Appellant
was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would kill her if she refused to testify
against him, although by the time she testified in court, her father had already died.

Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he decided to have a
relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was what they had agreed upon.
Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together, Mia had allegedly asked
permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary, he claimed that on January 27,
1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he readily gave her permission to go.

He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on January
22, 1994, but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to return on January 27,
1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by Benedicto Rubio.

Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27, 1994 but
the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not submit a counter-
affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no longer necessary since the
complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He admits having signed a "Waiver of
Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these cases.

On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to appellant
when the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-examination, that she was
requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that she does not have any quarrel or
misunderstanding with appellant.

Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero regarding the
incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she was at the boarding
house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated the claim that Erna Baradero
confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship with appellant contending that she
did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona
Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She vehemently disavowed that she and appellant were lovers,
much less with intimate relations, since there never was a time that they became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense witnesses:
that she told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she answered "wala kang
pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship with appellant; that she was the
one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their bill; that appellant left her at Sunset
Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey came to their room and stayed there for five
minutes, because the only other person who went there was the room boy who served their food; that
they went to the house of Virey's aunt requesting help for transportation; and that she was free to roam
around or to go out of the lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.

Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra, Palawan to
have sex with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she was still in Grade VI;
that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she allegedly went to Narra; that she
wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" are not hers; that she threatened to
commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset
Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not being guarded by appellant.

However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked as
Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on Exhibits "1"
and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the handwriting on Exhibits
"1" and "2" all belong to her.

On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who volunteered to
testify in these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited appellant in jail on February
27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time, he asked her what she wanted and she
said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called appellant and told him he had a visitor. Lorna
Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting area which is around ten meters away from his post, and
then he saw her hand over to appellant a letter which the latter immediately read. This witness declared
that appellant never requested him to testify.

Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon of January
22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he passed by Ipilan, he
picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several passengers inside his
jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he brought them to the Sunset
Garden.

On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum
penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the nature of the penalty imposed, these cases were
elevated to this Court on automatic review.

The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape 7 and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention8 filed by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point
issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a  prima facie  case against appellant.
On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha executed an affidavit of desistance
withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention. 10 However, pursuant to a joint
resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were
nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.

Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the following
assignment of errors:

I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime of rape despite the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in reviewing the evidence adduced
in a prosecution for the crime of rape as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People
vs. Calixto  (193 SCRA 303).

III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had consummated the crime of rape
against private complainant.

IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1" and "2" as evidence of the
defense.

V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention as the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and
completely ignoring the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission of guilt on the part of the
accused-appellant in view of the offer to compromise.

VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified in the sum of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the alleged crimes committed.

IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each of the crimes charged on the
accused-appellant despite the fact that the crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659.12

A.  The Rape Case

A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused and the
accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that both have to bear
for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants can
testify as to its occurrence. 14 This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal
prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of
proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to
overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted. 15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused is
accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere
accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for
the prosecution must be strong  per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone
uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented
in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to
be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made,
hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;17 (2) that in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 19

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this
Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was
the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.

I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the crime of
rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force or
intimidation.

1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual
congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21, 1994, she
was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on said date and
time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible
and sustained by the evidence presented and of record.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already
inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she
was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even live there,
unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to
come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a
generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the
prosecution.

Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility that plagues
it as regards the setting of the supposed sexual assault. 20 It will be noted that the place where the
alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding house where several persons
live and where people are expected to come and go. The prosecution did not even bother to elucidate
on whether it was the semestral break or that the boarding house had remained closed for some time,
in order that it could be safely assumed that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the
invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss
PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and there was
no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant was
substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of
January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding
house, and that she even advised them to go home because it was already late and appellant's wife,
who was the head teacher of witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal,
complainant could only deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.21

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then
appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted
ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the
woman he had raped,22 and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that
accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of
the felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and
apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself
from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all other things and circumstances
related to the offense which could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to
his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where no man pursueth.

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the scene of
the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be appreciated as a
circumstance tending to identify the appellant. 23 Consequently, it is not in accord with human
experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant immediately after he had
allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion that appellant would be so
foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house, considering its strategic
location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the street, 25 and the PNS
schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away. 26

Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her boarding
house where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness to corroborate
the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very first person she came in contact
with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the Casantosan boarding house after her
alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly did not talk, the landlady could at least have
testified on complainant's physical appearance and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw
complainant on said date and hour, possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.

We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who invited him
to the boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the school contest. This is
even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her the following day in order to solicit funds
for her candidacy in that same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At
first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it
was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin.
Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding
house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version and said
that when she reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside.

The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or realign the
same with her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony even on this single
episode, thus:

Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, do you remember where you
were?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where were you?

A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn Casantosan, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there?

A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.

COURT:

Q Conversing with whom?

A With my cousin, Your Honor.

Q Your cousin's name?

A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped you, will you please relate to this Honorable Court how
that rape happened?

A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

COURT:

Q Of what date?

A January 21, 1994, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Then what happened?

A I went to the boarding house of my cousin Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed (through) the kitchen and
then when I opened the door somebody grabbed me suddenly.

xxx xxx xxx

Q During that time were there other people present in that boarding house where you said Danny
Godoy raped you?

A None, Sir.

COURT:

Q So, the house was empty?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q I thought your cousin was there and you were conversing?

A When I went there she was not there, Your Honor. 27 (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)

2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically
by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The
physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of
force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed
through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.

The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and already
healed, and the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a man on the date
which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the same findings and conclusion are
likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took place with the consent of complainant at
Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994. 28 Further, rather than substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid
theory and the supposed date of commission of rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of
extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to lend more credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a
later date and the absence of a struggle or the lack of employment of physical force. 29 In rape of the
nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by
physical evidence showing use of force.30

Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid
medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On
further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not applied. 31 He also added that
when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. 32 The absence of any sign of
physical violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the act. 33 While
the absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, 34 the instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since
appellant has successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated
complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the
alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient, since
proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts
necessary to constitute another equally important element of the crime. 35

Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was afraid of
appellant. Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we nevertheless strongly
believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident that complainant did not use the
manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her honor and chastity. 36 She failed to make any
outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no
evidence on record that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her
panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she
demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of whatever
nature or form.

Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and ruefully
unconvincing to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual attack on her by
appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the involuntary intercourse, such
was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a woman defending her virtue and
honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped renders doubtful her charge of
rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene  in the context of her asseverations.

There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be
presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape. 39 We incline to the view, however, that
this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly
proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other way where, as in the
present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been
presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier
discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of the crime. We cannot,
therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of complainant's
blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.

II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost
importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be doubted whether a
conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the uncorroborated testimony of the
woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape
was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under
all the circumstances of the
case. 40

Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents' house
and asked permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her candidacy. Nowhere
throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was armed and that by reason
thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither threatened nor intimidated by
appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed threat previously made by appellant does
not inspire belief since appellant was alone and unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of
any opportunity for him to make good his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On the
contrary, complainant even admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from her parents for
her to accompany him.

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it
was so strangely normal as to be abnormal. 41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing the person
who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show
rage, revulsion, and disgust.42 Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence of her
parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred
appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not appear that the alleged
threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant,
unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the demeanor that would naturally be expected of a person
who had just suffered the ultimate invasion of her womanhood. 43

III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: admiration and
sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous violation, and
condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges
must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal with it with extreme caution and
circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every
woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and demanding punishment for the abuser. While
they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands
justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law.44

The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to support or substantiate
the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower court overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed
decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. 46

The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding the
January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that the victim
had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted and under
these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The question then that confronts the
trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is credible. 47 The technique in deciphering
testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of that testimony. The correct meaning of the
testimony can often be ascertained only upon a perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated by the
witness has to be considered in relation to what else has been stated. 48

In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made
no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended
party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. 49 In finding that the crime of rape was committed,
the lower court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the
January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to
believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony
concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or
unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh against its
being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently of any other, the
defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment of conviction; but assessed and weighed
conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of said
judgment.50 Thus:

1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden and
around three times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same allegations. If
this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have overlooked these facts
with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information charging appellant with only one
count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's representations is further magnified by the fact that
even the trial court did not believe it, as may be inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her
testimony, unless we were to uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled.

2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was threatened
with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable
sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that complainant now advances
appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.

3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she never
noticed if appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if she slept side by
side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke up, appellant was invariably in bed
beside her.51

4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it could not be
opened from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as follows:

Q And yet the door could be opened by you from the inside?

A No, Sir, it was locked.

Q Can you describe the lock of that room?

A It's like that of the door where there is a doorknob.

ATTY. EBOL:

Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and may I ask that the door be locked and opened from
the inside.

COURT:

Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and find out for yourself if you can open that door from the
inside.

CLERK OF COURT:

Witness holding the doorknob.

COURT:

The key is made to open if you are outside, but as you're were (sic) inside you can open it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob that you held?

A There was, Your Honor.

Q What is that?

A The one that slides, Your Honor.

Q And that is used when you are already inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)

5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond supposedly
offering token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no outcry, no attempt to flee
or attract attention to her plight.53 In her own declaration, complainant mentioned that when they
checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at the information counter where appellant registered.
She did not do anything, despite the fact that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She
likewise stated that a room boy usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she was
bent on fleeing from appellant, she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to escape.
Inexplicably, she did not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to present these
two people she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated complainant's
story.

6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the house
together and walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated that appellant
went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives, that he would be that
careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable of instilling such fear in
complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in spite of the laxity of appellant,
and run as far away from him as possible despite all the chances therefor.

7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case, complainant was
dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather than support and
commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the school authorities were heartless
people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast. That would be adding insult to
injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and her parents were never heard to
complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency cannot but make one think and conclude that
there must necessarily have been a valid justification for the drastic action taken by the school and the
docile submission thereto by the Taha family.

On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete with
sweeping statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of appellant's testimony,
declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to conclude that appellant is
indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction based, not on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the defense, which is totally repugnant to the
elementary and time-honored rule that conviction should be made on the basis of strong, clear and
compelling evidence of the prosecution.54

IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the
"sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard
fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual
in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable
that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that
matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take
the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the
records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.

Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of
several witnesses for the defense, viz.:

1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant
sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple
were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.

2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision,
testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia
answered that she really loves him.55 He heard her call appellant "Papa".56 The couple looked happy and
were sweet to each other.57

3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he asked
Mia if she knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she really loved Sir
Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give counsel to appellant,
complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would commit suicide. 58 He could see that the
couple were happy together.59

4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he worked was
located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple and that when he
was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because he is married and Mia is his student,
complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would not leave Godoy, and that if
she went home her father would kill her. 60 He also observed that they were happy. 61

5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident,
inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant, "Mahal na
mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." 62 She tried to dissuade complainant from
continuing with her relationship with appellant. 63

The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant,
which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The
rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive,
definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant.64 Mere denials are self-serving negative
evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible disinterested
witnesses.65
Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete with
details which could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability thereto. 66 His
assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not to say that the
testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must have colored his account,
even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal truth. Nonetheless, there is much
in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More to the point, there is enough to raise
doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality. 67

Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous,
nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of  falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not
mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one. 68 It does not apply where there is
sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the supposed inconsistencies arise
merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not completely.69

Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by the
defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2", which she sent
to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and emphasis, said letters are
herein quoted in full:

27 Feb. 94

Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.

Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko. Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa
kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one
week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman nila na hindi ko ininom ang
gamot sinasaktan nila ako.

Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila akong maglayas sana ako. kaya
ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa
ngayon. ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko makita, ang narito lang ay
ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes
ng gabi manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa lugar na may Veta. tanungin mo
lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na
lalabas na ako at huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang disisyon mo
maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.

alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko hahaluan nila.

Please sir . . .

(Sgd.) Mia Taha70

3/1/94

Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa
ko lang naman ang sumulat sa iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong
suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na magreklamo si nanay kay
Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa DECS
para matanggal ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong lumayas ng wala sa oras at
wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni
Eden na sa harap niya mismo binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang nalaman
dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa
mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit
kong iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos
na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo. higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo.
kinukunsinsiya, nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang makita at yakapin
ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may
guardiya pa. tanungin mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong puganti.
hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi
makakain maghapon tubig lang ang laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.

Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi
ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang
pati ang kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya sa situation ko. siya
lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.

Love you

(Sgd.) Mia Taha71

There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves. It was
complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant, two other defense
witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha. They are Filomena Pielago
and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of complainant and highly familiar with her
handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these
qualified witnesses and refusing to give any probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the
dubious and lame pretext that no handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.

Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more familiarly
called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. 72 This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. The said section further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting
may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.73

The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the examination
papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has likewise carefully examined
and compared the handwriting on the letters with the standard writing appearing on the test papers as
specimens for comparison and, contrary to the observations and conclusions of the lower court, we are
convinced beyond doubt that they were written by one and the same person. More importantly,
complainant herself categorically admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters belongs to
her.

It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn a deaf
ear to this conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:

ATTY. EBOL:

Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna Baradero and Filomena Pielago were your teachers?

A Yes, sir.

Q And they have been your teachers for several months before this incident of January 21, 1994, am I
not correct?

A That is true, sir.

Q And you have (sic) during these past months that they have been your teachers you took
examinations in their classes in their particular subject(s)?

A Yes, sir.

Q And some of those test papers are in the possession of your teachers, am I correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and with
your signature and the alphabet appears in this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha, please examine
this and tell the Honorable Court if that is your test paper?

A Yes, sir.

Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable Court if
you are familiar with that.

A What subject is that?

Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar with that.

A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject, sir.

Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not familiar with that signature?

A That is min(e), sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to be that in Math, are you familiar with that signature?
A Yes, sir.

Q That is your signature?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your own handwriting?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?

xxx xxx xxx

Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?

A That is my handwriting, sir.

Q Also Exhibit "2"?

A Yes, sir.74

While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of complainant to
herein appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, who was the
guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his own accord because he knew that what
Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify
for the defense, as related by the witness himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to
disbelieve the testimony of witness Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit
appellant in jail and in truth handed to him what turned out to be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and
"2" for the defense.

V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission
of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is
generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly
affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It
has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.75

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's
innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant
but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam  or Muslim leader and who likewise
informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a
matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was
already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother
actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha,
testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother.
Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. 76

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. 77 In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a
settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices
and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties. 78

VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It may,
however, create serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates appellant's
explanation about the filing of criminal charges. 79

In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably
written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents,
complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo,
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila, hindi ko
naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping
appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was
merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and
appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon
her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families. 80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in
the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.

Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a story of
defloration, that is not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The books disclose too
many instances of false charges of rape. 81 While this Court has, in numerous cases, affirmed the
judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially where the offended parties
were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct a story just to secure indictments for a
crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed judgments of conviction and acquitted the
accused when there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charges were merely
motivated by some factors except the truth as to their commission. 82 This is a case in point. The Court,
therefore, cannot abdicate its duty to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test
of moral certainty and proof of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took advantage of
complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her teacher, he should
have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop in manners and virtue
instead of corrupting her.83 Hence, even as he is freed from physical detention in a prison as an
instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement of his conscience as a measure of
divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule out such other legal options against him
as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.

VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the  presumptio hominis  that a young Filipina will
not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more
paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the
presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence.
In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine what logical or
social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more
important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of
a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Until the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.84

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:

In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on the
theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to speak
up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably sullied. In
the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that she did not
submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of
lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will
squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was defiled, relating every embarrassing
movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will
argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act. Her motives will be
impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will
remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault of hers. This
is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet, suppressing her helpless indignation rather
than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to come out
openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. . . . 85

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is
not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a
probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do
so.86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the
lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate
is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free
if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. 87 This is in consonance with the rule that
conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt
when it is possible to do so.88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the overwhelming
evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding that the
constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular indictment.

B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case

It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. 89 In the present charge for that crime, such
intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha
spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the
guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:

To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents' house the day
after the alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked her parents to permit her
to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of
her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult to
comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent
of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping
was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by complainant.

Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her
a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's
Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we
cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and pack
her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the
knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on without comment.

Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they occupied,
whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock the door from the
inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on cross-examination about the kind of lock
that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of
the courtroom be locked and then asked complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to
do so and, in fact, she admitted that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened
from the inside in the same manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed by the
prosecution. It also failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room which was occupied
by the couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock thereof was broken.

When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway in broad
daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help of other people
and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped and abused by the
latter.90 In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves from the time they left
complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in the lodging house.

According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to Sunset
Garden to inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied nor impugned by
Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the allegation of Helen Taha that she
made a report to the police about her missing daughter was not supported by any corroborative
evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police officer to whom she allegedly reported the
incident ever identified or presented in court.

We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part for the
commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there
was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime. 91 It is true that, as a rule, the motive of the accused
in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not have to be
proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the evidence,
the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in
order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a
criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst,
immoral though it may be.

As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of clothes
belonging to complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on its announced
supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a department store. Such preposterous
reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the fact that on rebuttal the
prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification from complainant about said
clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by
the court below. Matters which could have been easily verified were thus cavalierly dismissed and
supplanted by a conjecture, and on such inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by said court.

We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this Court
against the practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial court:

It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered where trivial
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on
doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be
avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or not; and
where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may
as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he
presides, a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a
fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously
ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct
the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very
loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question
as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant,
because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the
case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is
followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment. 94

At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and substantial
evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos  thereto, we take this
opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of mankind on the penological and
societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it
generates resentment.

Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the death
penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days after its
publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and
Philippine Times Journal,95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes misinterpreted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant
Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court for Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released forthwith, unless he is otherwise
detained for any other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8200            March 17, 1914

LEONARD LUCIDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GELASIO CALUPITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Pedro Guevara for appellants.

Ramon Diokno for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly
sold at an execution sale on February 10, 1903, to one Rosales, who the text day transferred a one-half
interest in the property of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed and signed by
all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and
Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights had obligation pertaining to the property in
question to Calupitan for the amount of the purchase price together with 1 per cent per month interest
thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687 Mexican dollars, plus 33.74 Mexican dollars, the amount
of the interest. It will be observed that the computation of the transfer price is in accordance with
section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and Calupitan executed the
following document:

I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered this statement to Leonardo Lucido y
Vidal to witness that his lands, which appear in the instrument I hold from the deputy sheriff and for
which he has accepted money from me, I have ceded to him all the irrigated lands until such time as he
may repurchase all said lands from me (not only he irrigated ones), as also the Vienna chairs, the five-
lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two wall tables, and a marble table; no coconut tree on said irrigated
land is included. Apart from this, our real agreement is to permit three (3) whole year to elapse,
reckoned from the date of this instrument, which has been drawn up n duplicate, before he may
redeem or repurchase them from me.

The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to conventional redemption
set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code. The present action not having been instituted until
February 17, 1910, the fur the question arose as to whether the redemption period had expired, which
the lower court decided in the negative. The lower court further found as a fact that Lucido had prior to
the institution of the action offered the redemption price to the defendant, who refused it, and that this
offer was a sufficient compliance with article 1518 of the Civil Code. The decision of the lower court was
that the property in question should be returned to the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant
appealed, and all three of the above rulings of the court are assigned as errors.

1. Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court upon the first
question, if the document executed by the execution purchasers and the parties to this action stood
alone. In that document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the execution
purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and obligations are defined in the Code
of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the property sold, subject only to the right of redemption on
the part of the judgment debtor or a redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale. (Secs.
463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of the transaction between the parties, however, the
intervention of Lucido in the transfer would be wholly unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened
as an interested party is at least some indication that the parties intended something more or different
by the document in question than a simple assignment of the rights and obligations of the execution
purchasers to a third person.

Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the agreement entered into
between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In this document it is distinctly stipulated that the right
to redeem the property is preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The
right to repurchase must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.

Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with the right to
conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. This original answer was
introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper,
especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was the time acting as his own
attorney.

Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were not in harmony on the
point, says:

Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were based on the theory that
most of the allegations were merely pleader's matter -- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the
courts. The whole modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat pleadings as statements of the real
issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances
of each case. But some of the authorities still hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there
should be some proof that he has authorized it.
On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings
are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in
evidence.

In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right to
repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.

It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he furnished $20 Mexican of
the account necessary to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. It therefore appears
beyond dispute that the redemption of the property from the execution purchasers was made by the
plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant Calupitan, who took possession of the
major portion of the land as his security for its redemption. The ruling of the lower court the transaction
between Lucido and Calupitan was one of purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore
correct.

2. By the terms of his agreement with Calupitan the plaintiff could not exercise his right to redeem the
property within three years from March 30, 1903; and the lower court arrived at the date upon which
the right to redeem expired by computing five years from March 30, 1906, on the ground that there was
no express agreement as to how long the right to repurchase, once available, should continue. Counsel
for the appellant admits in his brief that the complaint was filed forty-three days before the expiration
of this period. In accordance with our decision in Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza  (25 Phil. Rep., 495), we
hold that this ruling of the court was correct.

3. The court held that the plaintiff had actually tendered the redemption price to the defendant
Calupitan. After an examination of the evidence of record as to this finding of fact, we concur therein.
We discussed the legal sufficiency of such tender in the above-cited case of Rosales vs. Reyes and
Ordoveza, and held that it was sufficient. This assignment of error must therefore be held to be
unfounded.

4. The defendants Oreta and Bueno have no interest in the subject matter of this action. it appears that
the defendant Dorado purchased the land from his codefendant Calupitan subsequent to the tender of
the redemption price to the latter by the plaintiff. It does not appear that the property was ever
registered by any one, nor was the document of sale with the right to repurchase registered by either
Calupitan or Lucido. No evidence of the purchase of the land from Calupitan by Dorado is of record with
the exception of the oral testimony although it may be taken as established that such a sale actually
took place, since all the parties interested agree on this point. Dorado himself testified that he
purchased the property with the knowledge that Calupitan had purchased the property from Lucido
subject to the right of redemption and insists that he purchased with the knowledge and consent of
Lucido. Lucido denies that he was aware of the sale of Dorado until after it had taken place. Upon this
state on facts, it is clear that the following provisions of article 1510 of the Civil Code are applicable:

The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose right arises that of the vendee, even
though in the second contract no mention should have been made of the conventional redemption;
without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons.

The provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons are clearly not applicable to Dorado.
(Manresa, vol., 10, p. 317.)
5. The lower court ordered the redelivery of the land to the plaintiff upon his payment to Calupitan of
P1,600, plus the costs entailed in the execution of the document of repurchase. The amount paid to the
purchaser at the execution sale for the redemption of the property was $1,720.74 Mexican. Of this
amount the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan the balance of $1,600.74 Mexican. No
amount is fixed in the document of purchase and sale above set forth, but the amount borrowed from
Calupitan to redeem the land from the execution sale being thus clearly established no objection can be
or is made to the plaintiff's paying this amount. In ordering the payment of this amount to the
defendant the lower court failed to reduce it to Philippine currency. On this appeal plaintiff alleges that
this amount in Mexican currency exceeds the amount he actually owes to the defendant by about P100,
but that rather than spend the time and incur the expense attendant to new trial for the purpose of
determining the equivalent of his amount in Philippine currency he is agreeable to pay the defendant
P1,600.74 Philippine currency, as the redemption price of the property. In view of this offer and in case
it is accepted by the defendant it will be unnecessary to go through formality of a new trial for the
purpose of ascertaining the amount of the fact that it is claimed that Calupitan has sold the land in
question to his codefendant, Macario Dorado, and it not clearly appearing to whom the plaintiff should
pay the P1.600.74, we think this amount should be turned over to the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Laguna to be held by him until it is determined in the proper manner who is the
owner of this amount, Calupitan for Dorado.

For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants Calupitan and Dorado to
deliver the possession of the land in question to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff's depositing with the
clerk of the court the sum of P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner above set forth. In all other
respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellants Calupitan and
Dorado.

G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984

MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO,
SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984

MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, BALDOMERO
BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN,
TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO, respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.

Cesar Nocon for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the judgment
rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled
"Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R.
No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et al.,
defendants-appellees and the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New
Trial, be set aside; and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be
affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.

Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents over Lot No.
551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of
approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the
name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.

The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish
regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died
leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to
Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario
Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the
private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases while Vicente died on June 4,
1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny .

After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of
marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was
born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish
Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of
petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate,
however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left blank (Exhibit "4").
Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A").
Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931
(Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").

Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily by the
Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the
lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910, the Government,
through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the
said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously
paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole
paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last
installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial
deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the
sum of P300.00.3

On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and asking
for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau
of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 7,
1957, also in the name of said heirs.

On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot No. 551
without their consent, constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part,
petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita
Torres. The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of
First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).

On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal
property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private
respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are
her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed.

The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958 with a
finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private
respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3)
portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. Pending its
resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete destruction of the
records of the two cases, which, however, were later partially reconstituted.

On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order granting
reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof reads as
follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:

(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita
Torres;

(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of
the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;

(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and two-
sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed
Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is
already dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should
be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible.
In case the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners
to make the partition.

As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.

Without costs in both cases. 5

In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:

It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her parents, Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each other. There was no legal impediment for them to
marry It has also been established that Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and reared
by her parents until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria Torres was
given the family name of Arvisu, which is also the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her
father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents were married on June 7,
1909, she became the legitimated daughter of on Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6

Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the judgment
sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:

(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres;

(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal partnership property of
the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and

(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria Torres, and the other
half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso,
legitimate children and heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties
may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to
confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion
of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners to make the partition.

As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.

Without costs in both cases. 8

The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:

Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres, the former
not having been legally acknowledged before or after the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed
out by the appellants in their brief, the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her
parents until they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows that she was given the
family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged natural child.

Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter, children shall be considered
legitimated by subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or
after the celebration thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgement of a
natural child must be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public document. Article 131 then
prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment of a natural child should be made. The certificate of
baptism of Macaria A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth referred to in Article 131. This article
of the old Civil Code 'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made in a will or other public
document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register (Samson vs.
Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9

A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In support
thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of spouses Leon
Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres,10 reading in full as follows:

SWORN STATEMENT

We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority age, and residents of
the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being duly sworn to according to law depose and
say

That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of wedlock on the 26 th of June
1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by our subsequent marriage.

That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married without dispensation
had we desired.

That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that of her mother's at the
time she was baptized as per record on file in the Church.

That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her father's family name.

Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper remedy be made for the
change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as desired.

In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day of March 1930.

(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES

Signed in the prsence of:

(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista

x----------------------------------------------------x

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon Arvisu exhibited to me
no cedula certificate being exempt on account of going over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having
exhibited no cedula certificate being exempt on account of her sex.

Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.

CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO
Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930.

Not. Reg. No. 56

P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11

The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the same was
only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal belongings of private
respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have attempted to
suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and contended that it is not
newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during the trial by the exercise of due
diligence.

The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of Justices Jesus Y.
Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial
was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial should be granted in
respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was then formed, composed
of Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes
(Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of August 24, 1973,
the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both reconsideration and new trial.

To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two assignments of error. The
first was expressed as follows:

Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child
of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the
admission made by Vicente Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that
Macaria A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters with a common
mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as
a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the
entire share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and the heirs of
Antonina Santillan. (emphasis supplied)

As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account of the
sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents.
Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not
amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, which
action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain
exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in the
Ejectment Case reading:

the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita
Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931. (Emphasis supplied).

The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the
determination of her participation in the disputed property.

We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment
Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read:

That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite,
on December 20, 1931.

In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer
forms part of the record. 13

If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having
been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no
estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14

It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied the
legitimacy of petitioner.

The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:

Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for new trial,
knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence which is offered and
no amount of diligence on the part of the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it
was offered as it was found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his
death.

It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice.
Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is
established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such vital
considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document prescribed
in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by
the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121 of the same code; 16 and
(3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document was the equivalent of the
consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative
answers would confer upon petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle
her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.

Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document she should be
chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly
discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence,
which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of due diligence; specially if
it really had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged,
suppressed the document.

In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate Court,
now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and
depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective participation of the parties in the
disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.

SO ORDERED.