Martial Law in the Philippines: The Methods of Regime Survival

Author(s): David Wurfel

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1977), pp. 5-30
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 MartialLaw in thePhilippines:
The MethodsofRegime
Survival
David Wurfel

The Philippineswas the latest of the coloniallyinspiredexperi-

mentsin constitutional democracywithinSoutheastAsia to suc-
cumb to a palace coup. Because the Filipinocitizenryhad a longer
experiencein the uses of competitiveelections,a freepress and an
independentjudiciary than did the otherpeoples of the region,the
demiseof such institutions holds a special fascinationforthe scholar
and is regardedas a special tragedyby all thosewho love freedom.
Martial law was declaredby PresidentMarcos on September2I,
I972, more than halfwaythroughhis second, and constitutionally
final,four-yearterm.He has clung to power beyond that termby
utilizingforpurposesofgaininglegitimacy thetransitory provisionsof
the I973 Constitution. That documentwas draftedin the Presidential
palace, adopted by the ConstitutionalConventionunderduress,and
"ratified"byvoicevotein villageassemblieswherearmedsoldiersand
policemenwere in prominentattendance.Though a majorityof the
Supreme Court regardedthis ratification as invalid,therewas nota
majorityto declare the new "Constitutionnot in force."'
Some writers,includingMarcos and his apologists,have described
whathappenedin theearlyi970's as the"failureofPhilippinedemoc-
racy." But that is a distortionofthe realitiesofthatperiod.Filipino
democraticinstitutions did not break down,eitherin the sense ofan
inabilityto maintainorderor a failureto respondto changeswithin
the society.The risingpoliticalviolenceafteri969 was to a consid-
erable degree the creationof Marcos himself,firstin tryingto get
himselfre-electedand thenin preparingajustificationformartiallaw.
1 See the "PlebisciteCases," Javellanavs. theExecutiveSecretary, et al, SupremeCourt,GR
No. 136142,and othercases. Decision by ChiefJusticeConcepcion,March 31, 1973. For a good
analysissee Rolando del Carmen,"Constitutionalism and the SupremeCourt in a Changing
PhilippinePolity," AsianSurvey (November1973),pp. I 050-1o6i. For politicalaspectsofconstitu-
tional "ratification"see JustusM. van der Kroef,"Communismand Reformin the Philip-
pines," Pacific Winter1973-74,pp. 54-55.
Affairs,

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 Affairs
Pacific
And the legislationas well as the Constitutional
Conventionelections
duringthe same period gave new opportunitiesto the under-privi-
leged and under-represented to put theirmarkon politicalprocesses
and governmentprogrammes.'If allowed to completeits task, the
ConCon would probablyhave produceda documentthatopened up
government to newsocial forceson a permanentbasis. It was a classic
case of intra-eliteconflictbenefitingmass participation.
At firstit appeared that Marcos would be satisfiedto prolonghis
powerby means ofa new Constitution. Nearlyhalfofthedelegatesto
the Conventionwereelectedwithhis supportand he was able to buy
enough more to secure initial approvalof a parliamentaryformin
whichhe could becomeprimeminister withoutanyrestrictionson his
termof office.3But the ConCon's leisurelypace threatenedto push
deliberationsbeyondthe end ofhis presidencyin December I973. So
he createdthe incident,the "ambush" of the Secretaryof Defense,
thatwould permita moreforceful whilehe stillpossessed
intervention
the preciousadvantageofincumbency.4 Now he rulesby decreeuntil
such time as he shall, in his own discretion,decide to activatethe
parliamentary provisionsofthe new basic document.
Marcos's Accomplishments
The legal justificationassertedforthe declarationof martiallaw
was the existenceof an armed rebellion led by the Maoist New
People's Army,having-according to Marcos himself-i,028 armed
"regulars"underitscommand.5To combatthisrebellionmanythou-
sands ofciviliansweredetainedforsuspicionofcomplicityor sympa-
thy;about 5,000 ofthemremainedunderdetentionin i976. Hundreds
weretortured.6 At the same timethe militarylaunchedcampaignsin
severalprovincesagainst the rebels-including the use of Vietnam-
style"relocation" of villages-claiming considerablesuccess. Non-
in the countrysideor
politicalcrimesofviolence,e.g., cattle-rustling
murderin the cities, were also reduced, partlyas a resultof the
massive round-up of privatefirearms.Only in Mindanao, where
Christian-Muslimconflicthad by I972 alreadyproducedbloodyin-
cidents,but the NPA forceswere veryweak, has violenceescalated
2 An early expressionof such a view was foundin Francisco Araneta and John Carroll,
"Politics and Government,"inJ. Carroll,et al, Philippine (Manila, 1970), p. 153.
Institutions
3 See Manila Times,
June 5 and 13, 1972; and Philippines
FreePressJuly8, 1972, p. 46.
' For evidencethatthe incidentwas createdsee PrimitivoMijares, TheConjugalDictatorshipof
Ferdinand andImeldaMarcos(San Francisco,1976).
5 Proclamationio8i, September21, 1972, p. 15.

6 Reportofan Amnesty MissiontotheRepublic

International ofthePhilippines,
22 November-5 December
1975 (London: Al Publications,1976), p. 20.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
since martial law (and as a directresult of its policies) in both
Christianand non-Christian areas.
Though by SeptemberI976 the government claimed widespread
success in the restorationof peace and order,culminatingin the
dramaticcaptureoftwo top NPA leaders,7therewereno substantial
signsthatmartiallaw would trulybe ended. The justification forits
continuancewas entirely separatefromtheoriginalbasis ofProclama-
tionNo. io8i: it was nowclaimedthatonlythroughtheabandonment
of electoralpoliticsand the use of presidentialdecrees could rapid
economicdevelopmentand greatersocial justice be achieved. This
purposewas spelledout in theMarcos book,Today'sRevolution: Democ-
racy(197 ) and reiteratedby his chiefhenchmenafterthe declaration
of martial law. For instance,the head of the National Economic
DevelopmentAuthority, GerardoSicat,8spelledouttheNew Society's
firstthreeprioritiesas peace and order,land reform,and economic
development.Executive SecretaryAlejandro Melchor insistedthat
"the ultimateconcernof the New Society . . . is the promotionof
social justice and equalityforall Filipinos."
Thanks to aggressivepoliciesdesignedto attractforeignloans and
investment, as well as some verygood luckin theriseofinternational
commodityprices,a remarkablereal growth-rate of io per centwas
achievedin I973.9 But by 1975 the world-market price foralmostall
majorexportshad droppeddramatically, OPEC had boostedthecost
ofPhilippineoil imports,and thePhilippinesregistered a recordtrade
deficit
of $I.04 billion.10
(In I976 sugarexportswerevaluedat only
about half those of 1975.) GNP real growth-rates slid back to pre-
martiallaw levelsand therateofnewforeign investment taperedoffas
well. If the inflowof new foreignloans should ever diminish(the
PhilippineforeigndebtrosefromP IL7 billionin I972 to P6.3 billionin
I97511),the Philippineswould facenotonlya debtcrisisbut a general
economic slump. So far,however,the major internationalcreditors
have been generous.
The accomplishments in the realmofsocialjustice have been less
noticeablethan in generaleconomic development.In fact,the rich
continueto get richer,and the poor, poorer.The sales ofthe top 50

'Manila Journal,
September5-1l, 1976,p. i.
8'New Economic in thePhilippines,
Directions (NEDA, I974), p. 12.
9 Gerardo Sicat, "The Economic Breakthrough,"in The FirstThreerearsoftheNew Society
(Manila: National Media ProductionCenter,1975),p. I I I.
iO
Russell Cheetham and Edward K. Hawkins, The Philippines: Prioritiesand Prospects for
Development(Washington,D.C.: The World Bank, 1976),p. 462.
" Cesar Virata,"DevelopmentFiscal Policy,in TheFirstThreerears. . ., op. cit.,p. 35.

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 Pacific
Affairs
corporationsgrew,betweenI972 and I974, at nearlytwicethe rateof
the GNP.12At the same timethe real incomeofwage labor declined
by 30 per cent,13and the ban on strikespreventedeven that small
portionof labor whichis organizedfromcatchingup, afterinflation
sloweddown again in I975. (Governmentsubsidiesdid help keepthe
price increase down on certainconsumeritems.) Furthermore, in-
cometaxes,theleastregressive ofgovernment revenues,droppedfrom
28 per centoftax receiptsin I972 to 26 percentin I975, despitea brief
upsurge in I973,14 indicating that the poor were paying a larger share
ofthetaxesthanat anytimein severalyears.Moreover,evidencefrom
many sourcessuggestedthatthe mostrapid accumulationofwealth
was in the coffersof the FirstFamily.
The policyforsocial justice whichreceivedthe greatestpublicity
was land reform. The pace ofland transfer in thefirstthreeyearswas
indeed impressivewhen comparedwitha comparableperiodbefore
the declarationof martiallaw. But the claims were fargreaterthan
the reality.As ofJulyi976 only ioo,oootenantshad received"certifi-
cates ofland transfer"-a tentativepromiseoffuturebenefit-about
25 per cent of the originalprogramgoal; only 26,ooo had actually
stopped payingrent to landlords and startedpaying amortization
installments to the Land Bank-the crucialtransformation thatmay
accuratelybe called "land reform."'15 At the same timegovernment
policy to increase rice productionpromoted"corporate farming."
Thousands of tenants and owners were reduced to wage-laborers
under corporatemanagement.Untitledcultivatorson public land
were oftenphysicallyremovedto make way forthe corporatebull-
dozer.16
If theseare the accomplishments ofthe regime,what are its pros-
pects? Political stabilityis recognizedby economistsand political
scientistsalikeas beinga crucialprerequisiteofeconomicgrowth.But
forthe rulingpolitical elite stabilityis not just the prerequisiteto
somethingelse; it impliestheretention ofpower-what is formostthe
primarygoal ofaction.The variouscritiquesofelectoraldemocracyin
the Philippinesand in otherlate developingpolitieshave oftencon-
centratedon thewastefulcostsofthefrequent contestsforpower.And

12See NEDA Statistical

rearbook, Day's Topiooo Corporations,
1975; and Business 1972and 1974.
13Central Bank ofthe Philippines,Statistical XXVI, December 1974,p. 398.
Bulletin,
14 R. Cheethamand E. K. Hawkins,Op.cit., p. 392.

15 Land Bank of the Philippines, "Land TransferPaymentsand Area ofDistributionas of

June 30, 1976"(typescript).
16 See David Wurfel, "PhilippineAgrarianPolicyToday," paper deliveredat International
OrientalistCongress,Mexico City,August 1976,p. 3.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
it is quite true that the costs of Philippineelectionsas a means of
achievingpowerhavesometimesbeen quiteexcessivein relationto the
total resourcesof the society-includingleadershiptime.17Yet after
power has been achieved legitimately,and especially when it is
achievedfora fixedand finalterm,relativelylittleattentionneeds to
be paid to the maintenanceof power, providedthe leadership is
willingto play by the constitutional rules. On the otherhand, fora
leader who has achievedor maintainedpowerby means ofdoubtful
legitimacyand whoclaimsindefinite tenure,theretentionofpoweris
a multi-faceted task that he faces everyday. It involesattentionto
forcesthatthreatento upsettheexistingpoliticalorder,whetherthey
originatefromthe masses, fromwithinthe economic or political
elite-civilian or military,or fromabroad.
BolsteringLegitimacy
The effortsof PresidentMarcos to maintainthe stabilityof his
regimemay be dividedintotwo generalcategories:first,his attempts
to bolsterregimelegitimacyin the eyes of the whole populace (the
strategy);and second,his movesto reducethethreatfromparticular
sources(the tactics).Effortsat legitimationincludeda vigorouseco-
nomic developmentpolicy,the success of which depended on the
vagariesof internationalcommoditypricesand on attractingforeign
loans and investment, and the institutionofreferendathroughbaran-
gays (a pre-Spanishtermnow appropriatedforthe village and for
urban neighborhoodorganizations).These referenda,firstby voice
voteand thenby "secretballot," have been used to "ratify"the I973
Constitution-as well as its "amendment"in i976-and to provide
the "right" answer forsuch questions as "Do you want President
Marcos to continuein officeand finishthe reformshe has initiated
underMartial Law?" The regularity offavorableresponsesin the go
to 95 per centrangewas, as is now known,theresultoffiguresbeing
ccpre-cooked."18By thethirdreferendum inJuly1975 a looselyorgan-
ized campaignwas waged bycertainchurchleadersagainstparticipa-
tion in such a farcicalprocess. As a resultgovernmentpressures
became more overtand more clumsy,bringingan even wider dis-
illusionment amongthecitizenry.19 A balanced assessmentby leading
Filipinoacademics has concludedthat any meaningfulparticipation
17 See David Wurfel, "The Philippines,"in Special Issue on ComparativePoliticalFinance,
JournalofPol0tiCs,Vol. 25 (1963), p. 761ff.
18 See Primitivo Mijares, op. cit.,pp. 38, 451 ff.
19 See AssociationofMajor ReligiousSuperiors,Various March 28, 1975,April4, 11,
Reports,
and i8, 1975.

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 Affairs
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ofcitizensin decision-making is impossiblethroughthebarangay refer-
endum,a "managed affairto providelegitimacyto the martiallaw
regime.)2O
The focuson the barangay seemsto implya consciousdecisionnot
to organizea new politicalpartyto supporttheregime,sinceMarcos
is well aware of this option,chosen by other authoritarianrulers.
However,he is using anotherclassic tool forbuildinglegitimacy-
nationalism.This is mostobviousin a foreignpolicythathas wisely
triedto counter-balancethe once lopsidedrelianceon the American
connection.Certainculturalprogrammes(the plan to introducePili-
pino as the language of instruction in all schools,eventhe use ofthe
term barangayitself)are furthermanifestations. Economic nation-
alism,on theotherhand,has had to be abandoned,giventhedecision
to relyheavilyon foreigncapital. The regime'spursuitofnationalism
when it is convenient,and its avoidance when not, is much easier
underconditionsof media control.
Controlofthecommunications media mustalso be accountedone
ofthekeyelementsin thefostering oflegitimacyin thepublicmind.In
fact,a measureofthepriority is theamountoftimethePresidentgives
personallyto directingmedia tactics.Media controlis essentialfor
maintainingtwo importantmythsabout the "New Society"-first
that crimehas practicallybeen eliminated,and second thatcorrup-
tionis rareor, in any case, always punished.Justas in manycitiesof
North America, crime stories were formerlythe mainstayof the
Philippinepress.Now crimeis almostneverreported;and whentheft
or murderdoes receivenotice in the newspapers,the metropolitan
police are alwaysdescribedas "gettingtheirman." Similarly,official
corruptionis seldom mentioned,and only when someonehas been
formallycharged or dismissedfromoffice.Such media controlhas
been remarkably successfulin removingfromthepublicconsciousness
phenomenawhichare no lesscommonthanbeforeand ofwhichmany
people have personalexperience.In fact,a confidential reportto the
SupremeCourt in I975 revealedthatcrimesagainstpropertyhad in
fact increased since I972-a not surprisingfact, given the steady
pauperizationoftheurbanworkingclass. Yet thepublic awarenessof
crimehas certainlydeclined.
Though corruptpracticesdid indeeddiminishsharplyin the first
severalmonthsafterthe declarationof martiallaw, when fearofthe
consequencesofmisdeedswas stillhigh,old waysquicklyreturned.In
20
Raul de Guzman, et al, "Citizen Participationand Decision-Makingunder Martial
Law. . . " (Manila, December 1974), p. 33.

I0

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
one ofthe fewattemptsby scholarsto measurelow-levelcorruption,
researchersfoundthatin one government bureau duringlate 1973 the
extra-legalreceiptsofemployeesforprocessingpapers,based on the
mostconservativeassumptions,substantiallyexceededtheirlegal in-
come. At the highestlevels, foreigninvestorsand major Filipino
entrepreneurs were findingthat, despite the disappearance of the
Congressionalpolitician-fixer,highofficialsand theirrelativeswere
expectingan ever larger"take" fromnew ventures.The factthat a
largepartofthe Lopez economicempireended up in thehandsofthe
Marcos familyis now widelyrecognizedand partlydocumented.21
That numerousother familycorporationshave been pressed into
transferring millionsofdollarsworthof stocksand otherevidencesof
ownershipto the Presidentand his representativeswithonlysymbolic
compensationhas been less widelypublicizedabroad. Any publicity
of such an incidentwithinthe Philippinesis effectively
preventedby
threatof dire sanctions.Yet such mattersare of sufficientlygeneral
knowledgewithinthe bureaucracyto underminethe moralbasis for
disciplininglesserofficials.
Anyoneactuallypunishedforcorruption is
usually understoodsimplyto have fallenfromfavor,or to be the
victimoffactionalinfighting. The majorityofthecitizensare awareof
thepervasivepettycorruption, eventhoughtheydo nothavea sophis-
ticated understandingof what goes on behind the scenes at higher
levels.
In any case, by magnifying the virtuesand ignoringthe failings,
media controlhas facilitateda majorityacquiescencein martiallaw.
High school students,who were not part of the newspaper-reading
public beforeSeptember1972, and thus not accustomedto a press
critical of government,are particularlyprone to accept the rose-
coloredglasses prescribedby "Dr." Marcos.
Categories andLegitimacy
ofAcquiescence
It would be unwise,however,to equate all acquiescence withthe
grantingof legitimacyto the regime.One measureof the extentof
acquiescenceand the boldnessofoppositioncan be gleanedfromthe
July I973 referendumin whichcitizenswereasked to submitwritten
commentson political,economicand social conditions.Less than a
thirdof thosevoting,in an atmosphereexudingpressureto support
the regime,producedthe desiredresponse-favorableremarksabout
martiallaw; a quarterdared to writecriticismof the authoritarian

21See Mijares, op,cit., pp. 198-202; Philippines

News,January2, 23, 1975.

I I

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 Affairs
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rulers,e.g., complaintsabout the loss ofcivilliberties,suspensionof
elections,and others.22 Withoutany measureofthedegreeofcoercion
feltby thosewho submittedthesecomments,it is difficult to interpret
thisresult,but it is possibleto distinguishat least fourcategoriesof
response.
These categorieswillbe delineatedby twoconcepts,acquiescence
and legitimacy:thefirstreferring to acceptanceofor submission(both
behaviorallyand verbally)to authoritybecause it has a monopolyof
force;and theseconddefinedas theacceptanceofauthority as legal or
morallyrightful.Anyonewho neitheracquiesces in, nor regardsas
legitimate,the powers that be is, by definition, resistingauthority,
eitherby simplygoing underground,or by engagingin rebellionor
moresporadicresistance.Such people did not,of course,participate
in the referendum and probablydo not exceed one per cent of the
population.
Of those who did cast a ballot, mentionedin the orderof their
supportfortheregime,thefirstgroupmightbe called "regimepartici-
pants"-those who are so involvedin the presentpoliticaland eco-
nomic order, and reaping so much benefitfromit, that they are
willing supportersof constitutedauthorityand its claims to legi-
timacy.Most membersofthemilitaryand theirfamilies,a segmentof
the bureaucracyand of the businesscommunity, as well as friends,
relativesand province-mates oftheFirstFamilyconstitutethisgroup,
not morethan threeto fourper centofthe citizenry.
The second category,the largest,make Marcos's rule possible.
These are the"unsophisticatedsubjects," almosthalfofthepopulace,
who have a fatalistic,bahalana, outlookon politics.For them,poorly
educated peasants, fishermen and workers,"what is mustbe," and
the effective exercise of authoritybegets both acquiescence and a
mantle of legitimacy.They are unaware of the propermethodsof
drafting or ratifying and are quiteobliviousto Supreme
constitutions,
Court decisions.For themcorruptionis a universalattributeofgov-
ernment.(But should the regimefail to administerthe countryside
firmlyand withoutchallenge,then the groundsforlegitimacyfrom
this sectorwould quicklyerode.) This group presumablyprovided
most of the favorablecommentsin the referendum, on instruction.
The compulsorycharacterof the I973 referendum meantthat many
"voted" forthe firsttime.
22 See University ResearchStaff,"The
of the Philippines,College of Public Administration
Concernsofthe FilipinoPeople: An Analysisofthe Resultsofthe Nationalreferendum ofJuly
28, 1973"(typescript).Acquiescencehas certainlydeclinedand oppositiongrownsincethen,as
is documentedby sample surveysand referendain 1975 and 1976,but theycannotbe cited.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
The thirdgroup,"sophisticatedsubjects,"have something-but
not much-in commonwiththe second. They are bettereducated,
moreurban, and probablyconstituteless than thirtyper cent ofall
Filipinos.Most of themprobablycast a ballot but not a comment
sheetin thereferendum; manyabstained.Thoughtheyfindsufficient
economicbenefitunder the presentregimeto acquiesce (refraining
frompublic or semi-publicverbaloppositionas well as acts ofresist-
ance), theyare somewhatfamiliarwithconstitutional processesand
the magnitudeof high-levelcorruptionand thus do not believethat
the regimerulesby legal or moralright.(They may be loquacious in
theirverbal dissent among close friends.)Members of this group
includemanybusinessmen,big and small,manyofthemoreprosper-
ous farmers(e.g., sugar-planters), salary-menand professionals,
and
some withinthe militaryand laboringclasses. (Land reformben-
eficiariesare scatteredin the first,second and thirdgroups.)Even in
this group,acquiescence will dwindleif economicprospectsdo not
improve.
The finalcategorymaybe called "oppositionparticipants"-those
who refuseto grantlegitimacyto the regimeand do not even acqui-
esce verbally,thoughtheystop shortofany act ofresistance.It was
theirnumber,perhapsfifteen percentofthepopulation,thatprovided
the negativecommentsin thereferendum, thoughsomeare so cynical
as to avoid martiallaw "elections" entirely.(Other surveysconfirm
this estimate.) Only a small minorityhave engaged in any kindof
organizedor public protest.Politicallyaware peasants,workers,stu-
dents,clergy,middle-classprofessionals, and landlords-fromleftto
right-composethisgroup.For manytheirbehavioralacquiescenceis
determinedonly by theirpragmaticassessmentof the monopolyof
force.
Ifthisanalysisbe accurate,thenitis clearthattheacquiescencein,
and legitimacygrantedto, the Marcos regime hangs, month by
month,on performance, on policyoutputand administrative effective-
ness whichreinforces the supportor neutralizestheoppositionofkey
elementsin the society.Marcos must devise strategiesto meet the
variousthreatsto his rule withcare, sincethe absence ofnon-violent
meansforchanginggovernment leadershipmakestheconsequenceof
failuredire indeed.
DealingwithPeasants
Judgingby therhetoricused in September1972, thechiefthreatto
authoritywas a mobilizedand arousedpeasantry,capable
constituted

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 Affairs
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ofposinga seriousdangerofrevolution. Whilethethreatwas exagger-
ated evenat thattime,it is nowclearlyregardedas ofless importance.
The pace ofland reformis slowingand is accompaniedby a growing
attentivenessto thewishesofsmallerlandlords.The Presidentand his
advisorsseem to assume that peasant supporthas been won by the
stepstowardland reformalreadytaken,and thatas longas expectant
tenantsdo not become securein the new statusofowners,theywill
continueto feeldependenton the maintenanceofmartiallaw forthe
fulfillment of theirdreams.23Thus a partiallyimplementedland re-
formhas its advantages,and does notnecessarilyshowinattention to
peasant potential.This shiftof tacticshas been made easier by the
President'sabilityto entice,bythreatsand promises,theleadershipof
the old (pro-Russian) CommunistPartyand that of theiraffiliated
peasant movement,MASAKA, who have been bitterlyattackedby
the NPA. In the same generalideologicalcamp, Huk veterans,now
mostlyover 50, have been allowed to organize,been invitedto the
MalacanfangPalace, and been given officialendorsementin their
quest forWorldWar II back-pay(as was grantedto otherrecognized
guerrillagroupsin earlypost-waryears).
The high prioritygivento the expansionof agriculturalproduc-
tion-as in previousregimes-reinforcedthe tendencyto disregard
peasant interests.The massivedistribution of government fundsfor
agriculturalcredit (a programdubbed "Masagana 99") was origi-
nallyjustifiedas a way bothto promotetheplantingofhigh-yielding
varietiesofriceand to facilitateland reform by providinginstitutional
replacementsforlandlordcreditsources.More than one billionpesos
in loans had been allocatedbytheend of I974 throughtheruralbanks
and the PNB. But the temporarysuccess was soon threatenedby a
rapid rise in delinquentborrowers, because ofan inabilityto pay on
the partofmanyfarmersand an unwillingness to do so on thepartof
others,compoundedby slipshodand sometimesdishonestadminis-
tration.By I976 non-repayment had becomeso seriousas to threaten
the continuedexistenceof nearlyhalf of the rural banks.24So the
courts,the police and the militaryare being used with increasing
frequency to forcefarmers to pay. Fertilizerand insecticideproducers
and distributors-whosesales rose several times over because of
Masagana 99-made great profits,as did the rural banks, but the
volumeofloans has nowbeen sharplyrestricted and formanyborrow-
23 See Marcos interviewwith Asiaweek, reprintedin The SundayStar-Bulletin
and Advertiser
(Honolulu), October31, 1976,p. H-3, whichhintsat thisapproach.
DailyExpress,
24 Philippine October 13, 1976.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
ers "the last stateofthe man is worsethanthefirst."These develop-
ments,togetherwiththecorporatefarming policynotedabove clearly
implythatpeasant discontentis no longerregardedas a seriousthreat
by the regime.Yet the New People's Armyhas in certainlocalities
successfully exploitedthe collapse of Masagana 99 or the ejectionof
cultivatorsby corporatefarmsin the processof mechanization.
The UrbanThreat
Severalobservershave suggestedthatthe regimenow fearsurban
unrestmorethanitsruralcounterpart, butpoliciesdesignedto satisfy
workerdemands are even less in evidence.The sharp declinein real
wages has alreadybeen mentioned;theywould have fallensomewhat
fartherif it had not been forthe government subsidyof retailrice-
prices-the one significant effortto softenthe inflationary blow on
lower-classconsumers.The Presidentalso announcedan increasein
the minimumwage fromP8.oo to Pio.oo on Labor Day, 1976, but
because of the emasculationof the labor movementit had little
meaning.The MinimumWage Law has almostneverbeen followed
in shops whereunionswerenot strong.(In any case, "jeepney" bus
faresand ricepriceswereraiseda fewdays later,and theseare major
componentsin a wage-earner'sfamilybudget.)
In orderto facilitateDepartmentof Labor controloverthe labor
movement, whichhad grownrapidlyin politicalawarenessduringthe
last fewyearsbeforemartiallaw, PresidentMarcos decreedthat all
unions must be "restructured"on a rational industry-by-industry
basis and then affiliatedto a single national trade union con-
federation.25So farthispolicyhad not producedthe desiredresults.
The processof tryingto change overfroma haphazardlyorganized
labor movement,rentwithfactionalinfighting, to a singlenational
structurehas, in fact,createdmoreconflictthan ever.If the Depart-
mentofLabor vigorouslyenforcesthenewLabor Code and refusesto
register-thuseffectively dissolving-any local union not affiliated
withone of the officialindustry-wide unions (as it is empoweredto
do), thenlabor's hostilitytowardgovernment willbe intensified,
since
thereare stillmanyunaffiliated locals.
In additionthe martiallaw regimehas prohibitedstrikesin "vital
industries,"whichnow includepublic utilities,transportation, com-
munication,oil refining and distribution, banking,hospitals,schools,
and vaguelydefined"companies engagedin the productionor proc-

25 See P. D. 442 (1974),The Labor Code, and ImplementingRules and Regulations.

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essing of essential commodities forexport." In other industriesstrikes
are only legal on economic issues, and if the dispute has not been
certified by the National Labor Relations Commission for arbi-
tration-which means in effectalmost never. In November 1975 Mar-
cos decided to pull the noose even tighterand prevent strikesalto-
gether"during the period of national emergency."26 At the same time
he prohibited any aliens, including clergy, from assisting labor
unions-a role in which some foreign priests and nuns had been
especially effective.Apparently in this matterMarcos underestimated
the response ofthe Catholic Church; bishops, religious orders, and lay
groups protested around the country,with the support of Cardinal
Sin. In late November nearly 4,000 Manila workersand their suppor-
ters held an open-air mass and rally which ended in cries of "Strike,
Strike!" Then again on December 6, during the visitof President Ford
to the Philippines, more than 4,000 workersand religious gathered for
worship. After prayers they spontaneously decided to march on
Malacafiang to protest the strike ban, gathering more than 2,000
additional supporters along the way. Police restraint and the dis-
cipline of the crowd prevented an outbreak of violence.27 But the
message had been given. On December i6 another presidential de-
cree28again limited the strike ban to "vital industries." As noted,
however, exceptions to a total ban are very rare in practice. The
numerous illegal strikesin the Manila area in 1976, even though strike
leaders are always arrested and often their followersas well, is one
measure of continuing labor discontent.29In any case, if the positive
gestures toward labor are feeble, the increasing efficiencyof the met-
ropolitan police in handling unrest is a compensating factor for the
regime.
Urban slum-dwellers,referredto as "squatters" when theyhave no
legal claim to their house-lot, have become another focus of mass
unrest. The regime does not seem unmindfulof the dangers, and-
primarilyunder the direction of the First Lady-has treated them to
showplace urban-renewal projects, which they can probably never
affordto inhabit, as well as to increasingly stern treatmentfromthe
military. Slum clearance was speeded in I976 by Madame Marcos's

P.D. 823,November3, 1975.

26

AMRSP, SignsoftheTimes,December 12, 1975.

27
28 P.D. 849.The prohibition againstaliensparticipating, in labor union
directlyor indirectly,
activitywas not lifted,however.
29 For a report
June 19, 1976.Strikesofsugarworkers
on six such strikessee SignsoftheTimes,
in Negroswhowerenotevengettingpaid werebeingsurpressedwithequal vigorin late 1976.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
desire to "beautify" the city for the International Monetary Fund
conference in October. In May, against the background of growing
tension, leaders of a slum-dwellers' organization which had been
invited to attend the Habitat Conference in Vancouver were denied
exit permits. Thousands of their supporters tried to hold a prayer
meeting and demonstration in frontof the Manila Cathedral and
nearly 2,000 were arrested. Evidence of militancy merely caused the
police to augment their forcewhen moving squatters. And the pace of
forcible ejection was accelerated, regardless of the fact that the gov-
ernmenthad made no advance preparations in most cases. Squatters
were commonly dumped in a field by army trucks,given some build-
ing materials and told "this is home." Sometimes there was not even
any running water within easy walking distance. In the long run
resettled squatters may be given their own house-lots, but such a
distance-and transportcost-has been put between their homes and
their only possible employmentthat most wage-earners among them
have either moved back into the central city with familyor friendsor
entered the ranks of the jobless.

DealingwiththeCatholicChurch
As should be clear from the foregoing,the Catholic Church has
provided the most effectiveleadership formass discontentagainst the
martial law regime. It is today the most significantnon-governmental
linkage between the elite and masses in the country,and only a small
portion of its potential has as yet been utilized. Since the legitimacyof
its leadership is probably more widely respected today than is that of
the government,and the contents of its vast communication network
more widely trusted, Marcos deals with this threat in a subtle, cau-
tious-but no less firm-fashion. The potency of the threat is greatly
lessened, however, by the factthat the Church is not united on how to
treat the regime. While the superiors of the religious orders and more
than a dozen of the younger bishops-led by the tough-minded Ph.D.
in anthropology,Bishop Francisco Claver, S.J. of Bukidnon (in Mind-
anao)-are willing to confrontMarcos on issues of human rightsand
social justice, and to organize the faithfulforthis purpose, the elderly
Cardinal Rosales of Cebu-who is close to the Romualdez family-
and many other bishops are horrified at the prospect. The con-
servativesregard the progressivesas not just a threat to the govern-
ment, but to their own leadership, as indeed is the case. The progres-
sives, on the other hand, perceive government attacks on "politics
fromthe pulpit" and police crack-downs on clergy-ledmovementsfor

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social justice as threats to the integrityof the Church as an in-
stitution,whichis also valid.
The Marcos tactic has apparently been to stressthose issues which
divided the Church and to show restraintin action which mightunite
it, though such an approach has not always been eitherconsistent or
successful.30In any case, taxation, or its threat,seems to have been an
effectiveweapon. Church-owned school property was made taxable
for the firsttime in I973 by PD 76. Then a "stay of execution" was
given until the end of I974 (PD 26i). During I975 and early I976
church and other private schools were given month-by-monthstays,
forcingsome influentialCatholic educators to approach Malacaniang
in supplication and thus weaken the independent stance advocated by
other churchmen. In August I976 the President signed a decree forma-
lizing the exemption for a two-year period ending December 3I,
I976.3' Taxation, along with divorce, became the topic of greatest
discussion at the annual Conference of Catholic Bishops in January
I 976.
The threat of a presidential decree permittingdivorce, under cer-
tain circumstances-first unveiled in I975-seemed to have had unin-
tended consequences. The conservativesin the hierarchywere shaken
at the prospect and moved to strengthensuch lay oragnizations as the
Catholic Women's League and Catholic Action to oppose such a
move. The progressives,hardly pro-divorcein any case, were pleased
to see that even the older leadership could become "political" when
they feltit was necessary. Thus the prospect of an amendment to the
Civil Code permittingdivorce tended to unite an institutiontorn over
issues of social justice. By mid-I976 mention of such an amendment
had almost disappeared fromthe controlled press.
Whatever unity the Church now enjoys is partly the product of
good leadership. Cardinal Jaime Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, a
Church politician of considerable finesse, assumed his present posi-
tion after martial law. Though he is not committed to the "con-
scientization" and mass mobilization of the laity to demand civil
rightsand social justice which they perceive as theirdue-as are some
of the younger priests and bishops-he is sensitive to the fact such a
viewpoint is growing within the Church and if it is ignored, the
Church as an institutionwill suffer,not least throughthe shrinkingof
" In fact,forone only baptized a Catholic at marriage,and surroundedby Protestant
advisors,he has been remarkablysophisticatedin dealingwiththe Churchhierarchy.His most
influentialassistantin i976, JacoboClave,his chief"technocrat"and economicadvisor,Gerardo
Sicat, and the PC Commander,General Fidel Ramos, are all Protestants.
31 Phlllippine
DallyExpress,
AugustI I, I976.

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 MartialLaw in thePhilippines
theranksoftheclergy.Thushe raisedhisvoicein protest againsta
needlesslyostentatious,and fruitless,
military raidon a conventin
August1974, againsttortureofpoliticalprisoners
andagainsttheban
on clericalassistanceto labor unionsin 1975. His basic approach
providessomeleverage fortheprogressives,thoughat othertimeshe
has opposedthem,e.g. his refusalin May 1976 to allowsquatter
demonstrators fromentering theManilaCathedral, perhapswiththe
purpose of tryingto head offconfrontations
withpolice, or simply
through lackofsympathy withthecause.
The increasingfrustration
ofthemilitary withclergy-supported
mass organizations-asepitomizedby the press attackson the
"ChristianLeft"inSeptember 197632-could leadtomorestrong-arm
methodsagainstchurchmen. The summary deportationof foreign
priestsand theclosingofsomeChurchradiostationsin November
1976 mightbejust a beginning.33This coulddramatizethethreatto
theChurchalreadyperceived bymanyand thusconsolidate opposi-
tionto the regimewithinthe hierarchy, as has happenedunder
similarcircumstancesin Brazil.Marcos,however, is countingon his
allieswithinthehierarchytohead offsucha development.
routh
Beforemartiallaw,student
leadership
was an important
segment
of the oppositionelite, capable of organizingan impressivemass
followingat times.PresidentMarcos,facedwitha continuing dropin
employment amongcollegegraduates-toforty percentin 197434
has plannedcarefully to avoidtherecurrence ofstudentdemonstra-
tions.On theone hand,informers reportingto militaryintelligence
are foundin largenumberson all collegeand university campuses.
When,even undermartiallaw, studentsare too daringin their
expressionofopposition-ashappenedat theUniversity ofthePhilip-
pinesin early1976-theirleadersare arrested. On thepositiveside,
Marcoshas activelywooedbothin-schooland out-of-school youth
(withemphasison the latter)throughtheKabataang Barangay,the
youthorganization withinthe barangay, whichnow coversurban
neighborhoods as wellas ruralvillages.KB members downto 15years
ofage havebeengiventherightto participate in New Societyrefer-
enda, and are automatically represented on the barangaycouncils.
32 See, for instance,Alex Allan, "The ChristianLeft:Just What Is It?," Philippine
Daily
Express,September9 & 10, 1976.
9 Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
November20, 1976.UPI dispatch.
9 Sharing in Development:
A Programme ofEmployment,
EquityandGrowth forthePhilippines
(The
Ranis Report) (Manila: NEDA/ILO, 1974),p. 310.

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PresidentsofregionalKB federationshaveevenbeenappointed tothe
nationalLegislativeAdvisory Council.
The mostmalleableleadersintheKB havebeenchosenforatten-
danceat tworemarkable "secret"training camps,one nearManila
andtheotherinCebu.Besidesbeingindoctrinated aboutNewSociety
programmes, participants listento recordedexcerptsfromThe
Leader'sspeeches,do pre-dawncalisthenics and chantslogansthat
glorify
theaccomplishments ofthePresident and hiswife.A fewofthe
moresophisticated KB leadersreflecton theexperience whenthey
returnhomeand are able to see similarities withNazi and Maoist
but formostit seemsto havebeen an intenseemotional
training,
encounterwhichproducessomeofthedesiredafter-effects.35
Many former studentleadersand theirradicalfacultyadvisors
havebeencooptedin a moresubtleway.The Development Academy
ofthePhilippines, createdby Dr. 0. D. Corpuz(nowconcurrently
oftheUniversity
president ofthePhilippines),has hireda vaststaff
at
ratesfaraboveuniversity salariesto undertake researchon a great
variety
oftopics.Thesebright youngsocialscientists
aregivena sense
ofparticipation
in thepolicy-processunprecedented forFilipinoaca-
demics,therebyneutralizing in mostcasesanyideological objections
theymayhavehadtotheregime. Someoftheresearch hasbeenquite
significant.
DealingwiththeOldElite
Aside fromthe Catholichierarchy, no othernon-governmental
civilianelitegrouptodayhas a substantial mass following,or any
communication network to buildone. (SenatorJoseDiokno,impris-
oned duringthe earlymonthsof martiallaw, and SenatorJovito
Salonga,almostkilledin thePlaza Mirandabombing of '97', have
goneas faras any laymenin trying theiropposition
to disseminate
views,but havebeen warnedby the regimeto go no farther and
neitherhas attempted to organize,thoughtheirquietfollowers are
undoubtedly numerous.) Nevertheless,PresidentMarcosdoes seem
tofearthepotentialthreatinherent inthewealthandpoliticalskillsof
segments oftheciviliansocialelitewhicharenowin politicaleclipse.
He manifested onedimension ofthatfearsoonaftertheproclamation
ofmartiallaw whenhechargedEugenioLopez,Jr.,and otheryoung
scionsofprominent families,withhiringforeign gunmento killhim.
" See P. L. Han, "Youth Indroctrination
Centers,"Pahayag,October 1976,pp. 7, io; and
"Inside the Camp September21St Movement:KabataangBarangayTrainingProgramBared,"
SignsoftheTimes,March 26, 1976,pp. 9-12.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
In fact,somejournalisticobservershave marvelledat the President's
abilityto avoid such a fate.
He has dealt withthe threatin at least threeways. First,he has
kept hostages.The young Lopez, as well as sons of otherfamous
fathers,continueinjail or underhouse arrest.This discouragestheir
families'plotting.Second, as one mightexpect, Marcos has been
unstinting in the trainingand financingofan expandingintelligence
network,now under the supervisionof General Fabian Ver, also
commandantofthe PresidentialGuards and widelybelievedto be the
President'shalf-brother. The extentof surveillancehas greatlyex-
panded and the qualityimprovedin recentyears,partlywithAmeri-
can assistance.A detachmentofthe U. S. Air Force OfficeofSpecial
Investigations helpedtrainand equip the PresidentialSecurityCom-
mand in I975. The detachmentleader, a Filipino-American captain,
receivedthe PhilippineLegion of Honor for his services.36Third,
Marcos has also triedto avoid givingthe economicelitetoo extreme
provocation.Even thosefamilyfortunes whichhave been hard hitby
Marcos depradationshave notbeen wiped out. They stillhavea large
stakein notfurther angeringthePresident-e.g.,by implicationin an
unsuccessfulassassinationplot.As longas businessis generallygood
theymay hope to recoup theirlosses by playingthe role of "good
corporatecitizen,"and whateverthefateofa fewfamilies,mostgreat
fortuneshave continuedto rise at a rate more rapid than that of
economicexpansionnationally.37
However,in the longerrun the aggrandizement ofMarcos family
interestsat the expense of othercorporateempiresmay well be a
threatto the regime.If, forinstance,the privateprofitof nearlyP5
billion projectedfromthe Manila Bay dredgingoperationby the
Constructionand DevelopmentCorporationof the Philippines(in
whichtheMarcos familyis widelyreputedto havethemajorinterest)
should not materializeaccordingto plan, seriousdislocationscould
result.Profitswere estimatedon the basis of I973 costs and a re-sale
value of filledland at approximatelyPio millionper hectare.38Fur-
thermore,a financialcrisis forMarcos familyinterestsmightwell
arise fromeconomictrendsaffectingothersadverselyas well, thus
StarsandStripes,
36 Pacific October23, 1975.
3 But sugar planting,the foundationof most great Filipino fortunes,has become utterly
unprofitable in recentmonths,whichcould cause widespreaddefaultingon sugar-croploans
fromthePhilippineNationalBank,thegovernment corporationwhichcontrolssugarmarketing
now. Understandably"plantersare murmuringdark threatsagainst PresidentMarcos." See
BernardWideman,"PhilippineSugar CrisisLooms," Far Eastern Economic
Review, November26,
I976,pp. 54-55.
38 See Far Eastern
EconomicReview,
January2, 1976.

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causing pressuresexertedunderthosecircumstancesto createacute
discomfort withinthe elite.
The elementsofthe pre-I972elite mostdisadvantagedsince mar-
tial law are themembersofCongress.Only SenatorAquino is stillin
prison and a few have both done well financiallyand remained
politicallyprominent.All (exceptone, who became a cabinetmem-
ber) have, however,suffereda sharp loss of power and most have
declinedin economicstatusas well.39Marcos showedhis distrustof
the "old politicians"as soon as the new Constitutionwas "ratified"
by barangay assemblies.Though the I973 Constitutionprovidedthat
the interimNational Assembly-to be composedofthe former mem-
bers of Congressand cooperativedelegatesto the ConCon-"shall
existimmediately on theratificationofthisConstitution,"40
thePresi-
dentinterpreted theconstitutionalauthorizationthathe convenethat
Assemblyas implyinghis rightto refrainfromconvening,so thatit
has never met. From time to time regime supportershave been
promptedto makestatements to thepressabout how"the people" do
not want the interimAssemblyconvenedbecause of the "reprobate
ways" of "Old Society" politicians.A move in January1976 by ex-
PresidentMacapagal to promotetheidea thattheNationalAssembly
conveneitself41 was nipped in the bud, thoughnot withoutconsid-
erableeffort by theregime.When it was learnedthatMacapagal had
invitedformermembersofthe ConCon and the I972 Congressto his
house for a "familythanksgiving,"presidentialassistant Gilberto
Duavit, himselfa formerConCon delegate,invitedthe same persons
to hishouse, and government helicoptersweresentto fetchmanyof
thosewho accepted. His guestsfaroutnumberedMacapagal's. Wa-
vererswere offered judgeships,and othergovernment plums.42
The Presidentwas alreadytalkingabout an appointedLegislative
AdvisoryCouncil. He saw such a Council as a way to counterforeign
criticismofthecompleteabsenceofevena quasi-legislative body,as a
meansto elevatesomeyoungermento be "dependable" leadersofthe
"New Society,"and as a methodofsidetracking theinterimNational
Assembly.The desire to have the world thinkwell of his regime43
3 Perla Makil, MobilitybyDecree:The Riseand Fall ofPhilippine sinceMartialLaw
Influentials
(Quezon City: IPC, Ateneode Manila University,1975), p. 37 if.
40 ArticleXVII, Section i.
41 See Macapagal's letterstatinghis reason forsupportingthe call of the interimNational
Assemblypublishedin the Philippine the UP studentnewspaper,on JanuaryI 2, I976,
Collegian,
just beforepublicationwas suspended.
42 See ArnoldZeitlin,AssociatedPressdispatch,FebruaryI 7, I976.
4 See, forinstance,articleby leading"New Society"journalist,Teodoro Valencia in Philip-
pineDailyExpress, SeptemberI 3, I 976.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
acceleratedevents.PD 995createdtheBatasanngBayan,or Legislative
AdvisoryCouncil,on Septemberio, i976 in timeforitto conveneprior
to the IMF meetingin Manila. It is composedof the President,his
cabinet, and membersof the executivecommitteeof the national
federationofprovincialcouncils,plus anyoneelse the Presidentmay
wish to appoint,e.g., KabataangBarangay leaders.
Then on October i6,just aftertheIMF meeting,PresidentMarcos
held another"referendum,"in which he receivedthe now "tradi-
tional" go per cent supportforthe "right" answersto the several
questionsposed at thelastminute.Eventhoughbriefpressmentionof
oppositionviewson the referendum was made in Manila forthe first
timesince martiallaw began, the media werestillprimarilya tool of
the government. The boycottmovementgained the endorsementof
fourteenbishops,and evenex-PresidentMacapagal; two mass dem-
onstrationswere organizedby the movement'ssupporters.But ad-
ministration controlof the polling process was an assurance of its
"success." Marcos announcedthatthe referendum had ratifiednine
amendmentsto the 1973 Constitution,accomplishing,among other
things,the abolitionofthe interimNational Assemblyand the crea-
tion of a partiallyelected LegislativeCouncil of not more than I20
members,includingthe Presidentand his cabinet. (No date forthe
electionshas been promised.)Nevertheless, the Presidentwill retain
legislativepower as long as martial law continuesand may issue
decreeswheneverhe believestheLegislativeCouncilis notperforming
well." Thus has the rulerattemptedto gain legitimacybothat home
and abroad. A moreserioustestofhis viewson competitionfromthe
old elitewill comewhenelectoralproceduresare announced.Indirect
elections,by thelocal SangguniangBayan,has been hintedalreadyto be
the preferred approach; theywould be much easier to control.
Giventhe dangersinherentin the holdingofpublic discussionsor
evenindirectelectionsfora regimethatcannottolerategenuinelyfree
debate or real opposition,one sometimeswondersat the timeand
effortgivento such mattersby Marcos. Certainlythereis no evidence
thathe sees thesestepsas a beginningoftheend ofone-manrule,as a
transitiontoward the restorationof genuine electoraldemocracy,
despitetheoccasionalannouncementdesignedto raise hopes.45Many
believethata littlefreedom-theopportunity for"hundredflowersto
bloom"-is givenfromtimeto timeto permittheintelligence agencies
to identifywhomtowatch.But thereis stillanotherimportant reason:
44 See ArnoldZeitlin,AP dispatch,October
ii , I976.
41
See "Marcos Bares Plan to liftMartialLaw," Phzilippine September23, I 976.
DailyExpress,

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 Pacific
Affairs
he is intenton creatingan alternativehierarchyto the militaryso as
not to become too dependenton the latter.Even the creationofthe
Sangguniang Bayan,(expandedcouncilsat themunicipaland provincial
level) was motivatedin partby a desireto createa counter-weight to
the military,manyof whom had plans to moveinto controlof local
governments in theirareas afterthe termsofelectedofficialsexpired
on December3I, I975.46

DealingwiththeMilitary
One only need studyrecentAsian historyto knowthat Marcos
rightlyfearsthe militarymost. Though before I972 the Philippine
armedforceshad been as dependenton theelectedpoliticiansas had
the civilianbureaucracy,theveryexistenceofthe martiallaw regime
now requiresthe continuedsupportofthe military.And the officers,
as well as Marcos, are increasinglyaware of that fact.One of the
President'sfirstmoves afterthe declarationof martiallaw was to
increasethe base-payof all commissionedofficers by I50 per cent.47
He stillholds the powerof appointmentand promotion,and uses it
skillfullyto forestallthe formationof cliques opposed to him. In
March I976 he was able to retireeightgenerals,includingthe com-
mandersofthe Army,Navyand Air Force, and reassigntwenty-one
othertop officers withoutapparentincident,thus indicatingthe de-
gree of controlhe stillexercises.This controlhas been maintained
with the stickas well as the carrot.The chiefof the National In-
telligenceCoordinatingAgency was believed by Marcos to have
leaked martial law plans in advance to Senator Aquino. Withina
week afterthat fatefulSeptember2I, I972, General Soliman was
reportedin the pressto have died ofa heartattack;but sourcesclose
to hisfamilyassertthathe was actuallyshotbymenofthePresident.48
Such ruthlessnesshas been carefullybalanced withinducements
such as subsidizedcommissariesand housing,and opportunities for
high-ranking to be appointedto boardsofdirectorsofgovern-
officers
mentcorporations.For instance,theprivatelyownedJacintoIronand
SteelSheetsCorporation(sequesteredbypresidentialordersoon after
the declarationof martiallaw) is now run entirelyby the military.
Furthermore, the Presidenthas closed his eyesto growingcorruption
among the military,symbolizedby colonelsand theirwivesdriving
Mercedes-Benzautomobiles.The President'spubliccommitment to a
46 Mijares,op. cit., pp. 457-8.
47 GeneralOrder No. i i, September30, 1972.
48
Mijares,op. cit.,p. 143.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
"purge" of unsavoryelementsin theDepartmentofNationalDefense
made in thefallof I975was nevercarriedout.Whenitwas threatened,
SecretaryJuan Ponce-Enrilesubmittedthe resignationsofa long list
of top officersto the President.Thereafterthe Departmentwas al-
lowed to "clean its own house," thoughthe resultswerenegligible.
The parametersofpresidentialpoweroverthemilitaryhad been more
clearlydefined.49
Militarysatisfactionis mostfundamentally assured by providing
thearmedforceswitha generousbudget.Whilecurrentexpenditures
of the national governmentnearly tripled between FYI972 and
FYI975, the percentageof nationaldefenseoutlaysrose fromI3.4 to
2I.8 per centofthe total.50 The size ofthe armedforceshas also more
than tripledsince I972, permitting rapid promotionof top officers.
However,as therateofexpansionslowsdown (as is projected),career
frustrations will increase.The increasingmilitarybiteofthe national
budget is already causing intensedissatisfaction in the civilianbu-
reaucracy; releases of fundsforcivilian departmentsregularlyfall
shortofbudgetarycommitments, the veryreverseofthe situationin
the DepartmentofNational Defense.
Affluenceforthe militaryis still not a sufficientguarantee of
loyaltyand satisfaction, however.There is a war goingon in Mind-
anao and Sulu. It engagesabout halfof the entirearmy;thousands
have already been killed, includingmany youngofficers.(Civilian
casualties may run to over io,ooo.) Though the Muslim rebellion
itself-spearheadedby a faction-ridden armyof severalthousand-
does not pose a directthreatto the Marcos regime,the problems
which flowfromit could, if improperlyhandled,cause politicalin-
stabilityin Manila.
The war in theSouthmightalreadyhavehad sucha spin-off had it
notbeen foranotherpiece ofMarcos good luck.As earlyas June I972
Col. Kaddafi of Libya had promisedto send money,arms and even
volunteers to the MoroBangsa(Liberation)Army.51 By I973theflowof
suppliesinto Sulu, aided by Sabah's ChiefMinisterTun Mustapha,
was a reality,and the levelof fighting increased.Then Mustapha's
defianceof Kuala Lumpur on a varietyof questions broughthis

49BernardWideman,"PoliticsofthePurge,"Far Eastern EconomicReview,

October31, 1975.
50
At thesame timeeducationexpendituresdroppedfrom31.1 to 19.6percent.See Cheetham
and Hawkins,Op.clt., p. 398.A USAID reportreleasedinJune 1976projecteda further
doubling
of the Philippinedefensebudget between 1976arid 1978,risingto nearly25 per cent of the
nationalbudget.ArnoldZeitlin,AP dispatch,June 3, 1976.
51 Peter Gowing, "Muslim Filipinos between Integrationand Secession," paper read at
AssociationofAsian Studies meeting,Chicago, March 1973.

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downfall.52Afterhis partylosttheApril I976 elections,a new govern-
mentsweptout his henchmenin the police; Sabah ceased to be an
arms conduitto the Philippines.53Though the rebelsalso buy weap-
ons fromthe Army(as happenedearlierin Vietnam),the numberof
theirinitiativesfelloff;medicinewas also in shortsupply.
Yet foreignsupportforthe Moro National LiberationFronthas
not ended. There was even an abortiveattemptin the last meetingof
the Islamic Conferenceof ForeignMinistersto give the MNLF the
same statusas thatofthe PLO.54And the Islamic Secretariatcontin-
ues to promotepeace talksbetweenthe head ofthe MNLF, Misuari,
and thePhilippinegovernment, but suchtalksdo notprosperbecause
Misuari practicallyequates "autonomy" with independence,and
PresidentMarcos is unwillingto grantautonomywithany substance
at all. New talkswere scheduledforOctober I976 in Libya but were
not held as planned.55Communicationswith Muslims, even those
tryingto cooperate with government, have been furtherhampered
since the dismissalof ExecutiveSectetaryAlejandro Melchor. Mus-
limsfoundhima morerespectful listenerand a moreeffective imple-
menterthananyonewho has fallenheirto hisduties.The onlyarea in
whichtherehas been any progressis in providingMuslims access to
governmentfundsthroughthe new Amanah Bank and Southern
PhilippinesDevelopmentAuthority.But, as mightbe expected,it is
the Muslim elites,not the masses,who benefitmost.
In the meantimearmed clashes continue.The MNLF struggle
claims to be against the corruptMuslim aristocracyas well as the
Christians.But moreand morethemotivation forparticularincidents
seemsto be thatofa blood feud,withthe relativesand friendsofpast
victimscreatingnew victims;"the enemy"on each side is definedin
religiousterms.In I976 some militaryunitsevenresortedto burning
whole Moro villages,again reminiscent of Vietnam.The frustration
levelamong(dominantlyChristian)Filipinotroopsis highand rising.
Firearmsare frequently dischargedon drunkenspreesand rivalries
betweenunitsoftenresultin shoot-outson thestreetsof (dominantly
Christian)towns.
52Robert 0. Tilman, "Mustapha's Sabah, 1968-1975: The Tun Steps Down," AsianSurvey
(June 1976),pp. 495-509.
6 The flow has apparentlyslackened even with the beginningof Mustapha's political
troubles in mid-1975.See DRC Reports, I:2 (September 1975), Dansalan Research Center,
Marawi City,Philippines.
64 Support of Indonesia forthe Philippinespositioninternationally has been particularly
useful.See BernardWideman in Far EasternEconomic Review, November7, 1975.
5 RodneyTasker,"WaitingforWord from the Rebels," Far Eastern
Economic Novem-
Review,
ber 12, 1976,pp. 32-33.

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
The militaryis particularlyfrustrated by the restraintsplaced by
Manila on theirurge to retaliateagainstMoro raids withunlimited
force-restraints dictatedby thefactthatmanyIslamicstatesare also
oil-exporters.The government's "policyofattraction," whilecertainly
preferable to all-outwarfare,also causes problems.Elaborateceremo-
nies are arrangedforthesurrenderofdissidentleadersand theirmen.
(The moreprominentones are broughtto Manila to meetthe Presi-
dent.) They are usuallypermittedto keep theirweapons,or are given
new ones; some are appointed to public office,or recruitedto the
Home DefenseForce. It is bad enoughforthe habituallyloyalto see
how handsomelytemporary disloyaltypays off.But thereturneesnot
infrequently findthat the favorsbestoweddo not signifyany basic
change in government policy and thus returnto the hills to resume
armedstruggle, withtheirnewweapons.Anytroopswhichreceivefire
fromtheseonce-favored rebelsare particularly bitter.
Deterioratingtroopmoraleis not limitedto Mindanao. There are
groupsofdesertersalso roamingthe mountainsand plains ofLuzon
and Panay. Some had been threatenedwithreassignment to Mind-
anao, while others deserted for their own reasons. In any case,
whetherpolitical or merelymercenaryin motivation,such groups
have become a new "peace and order" problem. Some observers
contendthatthe continuanceofa moderatelevelofconflictin Mind-
anao is indirectly beneficialto Marcos, byjustifying largerand larger
defenseexpendituresand at the same timekeepingthe militarydis-
tracted fromattentionto problemsand opportunitiesin Manila.
There is somelogicin thatanalysis.But thedeterioration ofmoraleis
difficultto handle underthese circumstances;ifit should worsen,it
could have broad repercussionsin the officer corps.
The U.S. Role
Americanmilitaryaid is partlyresponsiblefora prolongationof
the war in the South. To the degreeto whichMarcos need not cut
civilianprogramsin order to financethe military,he is relievedof
pressureto bringthe conflictto a politicalsolution.U.S. arms aid of
all typesto thePhilippineswas about ioo per centhigherin thethree
years afterthe declarationof martial law than in the comparable
periodbefore.56 But Congressionalcriticismof the Filipinodictator-
ship (fedby anti-martiallaw organizationsin theU.S.) and ofsimilar
regimesin South Korea and Chile was so vehementthat at some
58 MarjorieBakker,Barbara Cort,et al, "The LogisticsofRepression,"Philippines
Information
Bulletin,
Volume III, Nos. 2 and 3 (July1975),p. 5.

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 Affairs
Pacific
pointsin I976 furtherappropriationsseemedto be injeopardy.Eco-
nomicallythe loss ofU.S. aid to the Marcos regimewould be merely
significant,but psychologicallyit would be disastrous.Marcos is well
aware of the factthat continuingAmericansupportprovidessome
legitimacyforhisregimein theeyesofmanyFilipinos.A totalaid cut-
back would deprivehimofa commodityhe findsin increasingly short
supply. Thus Marcos has placed considerableemphasis,in bases
negotiationswiththeU.S, on extracting a fixedrental.Not onlyis the
amount desired-based on Spanish precedent-verymuch greater
than presentaid levels,57but,by embodyingit in a long-term agree-
ment,the politicaluncertainties ofthe annual appropriationprocess
in Washingtonmightbe avoided. Americanacceptance of such an
arrangementwould be a great boost both to the morale and the
financesof the martiallaw regime.
The moraleboost would resultfromMarcos interpreting such an
agreementas a signal of longer-term Americanintentions.Even be-
forethe appointmentofWilliamSullivan-the formerAmericanpro-
consulin Laos-as Ambassadorto Manila, Marcos had a deep-seated
fear of the machinationsof the CIA. Perhaps, unconsciously,he
recognizeda certainsimilarityin his own positionand that of Ngo
Dinh Diem in theearly i960's. It is widelybelievedthatthe dismissal
ofMelchoras ExecutiveSecretarywas, at leastin part,motivatedby a
suspicionthatthe Annapolisgraduatewas too much "an American
boy." Marcos's apprehensionabout SenatorManglapus and theanti-
martiallaw movementin the U.S. is linkedto a similarfear.Thus a
long-termbases agreementwith a large guaranteeddollar income
would be understoodto implyan Americanwillingnessto live with
the Marcos regimeforsome timeto come. It would,in fact,probably
assure his tenureforat least an additionaldecade.
But evenifMr. Marcos is forcedto acceptless attractivetermsfor
the continuedpresenceofAmericanbases, as is entirelypossible,his
termin powerprobablyhas severalmoreyearsto run. His political
skillsare practicallyunequalled in Philippinehistoryand, in fact,he
must rank high among Asian power-holderstoday in the sophis-
ticationofhis tactics-indeed one ofMachiavelli'smostapt disciples.
He is also, unlike Diem, finelyattunedto the nuances of Filipino
behavior. Said Rafael Salas, his formerExecutiveSecretary,who
resignedbeforemartiallaw, "He knowstheaverageFilipino:to what

5 U.S. government sourcesrevealedthatthe Philippinegovernmentwas askingfor"several

billion dollars worthof militaryequipment,"but said theywere "not takingthe bid . . . too
October 21, 1976.
seriously."HonoluluStar-Bulltein,

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 Martial Law in thePhilippines
degree [he] can be scared, what are the limitsbeforehe becomes
violent.Withinthese limits,he will apply any sort of artifice."58
Nevertheless, thetaskhe has set himself-thelong-term maintenance
ofone-manrulein a relatively well-educatedsocietywithover50years
of experiencewith free,competitivepolitics-is an impossibleone.
The conflictswhichhad alreadyemergedby 1972, betweenlandlord
and tenant,employerand employee,nationalentrepreneur and multi-
nationalcorporation,majorityand minoritycultures,and-perhaps
mostcrucial-between theforcesofhiswifeand himself, haveall been
exacerbated.Since I972 conflictbetweencivilianand military,and
betweenchurchand state,have been added. Withoutruleswhichare
perceivedas legitimateby the major actors,these conflictsare not
likelyto be resolvednon-violently, and the presentregimecould not
forlong survivetheirviolentresolution.
This is not to say that revolutionis just around the corner.The
nextoutbreakof violencewill most likelyoccur betweenelite com-
petitors.But unless that is followedby a new consensus on basic
institutionsand proceduresachievedwithunexpectedease, the suc-
ceeding stage of violencewill probably include mass participation.
Some contendthatviolentrevolutionis notinconsistent withthelong-
termdevelopmentgoals of the Filipinopeople, but what is tragicis
thatthechanceto achievethosegoals at a lowercost,whichexistedin
1972,mayneveragain reappear.The twopoliticalextremeshavebeen
radicalized and the precious fabricof politicallegitimacyhas been
rent.Even the (mostimplausible)scenarioofan earlyMarcos resig-
nationwould not restorepoliticalstability.The politicizationof the
militaryis hard to reverse.Thus in the longerrun the patternof
Philippinepolitical developmentis likelyto resemble that of In-
donesia, Vietnam,or one of the variouspoliticalsub-typesin Latin
America.As a formerUniversity of the PhilippinesPresident,Salva-
dor Lopez, has said, "It is fareasier to lose freedomwithoutblood-
shed than it is to regainfreedomwithoutbloodshed."59

University
of Windsor,
Ontario,
November
I976

POSTSCRIPT

In a dramatic
year-enddevelopment ontheMindanaowar,Mrs,Marcos
visitedLibya and the pace of negotiations
quickened.PresidentMarcos
58 Leader(April 1, 1971).
Interviewin Asia Philippine
" "Freedom withResponsibility,"Commencementaddress, Universityof the Philippines,
May 27, 1973.

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 Affairs
Pacific
appeared to make some concessionson autonomyand internationalsuper-
visionofa cease-fire,
and an agreementwas actuallyreachedwiththeMNLF
late in December.It remainsto be seen how wellMNLF leadershipin Libya
can enforcesuch an agreement,or how far Marcos will go in actually
allowing Muslim autonomy.The confrontation with the Catholic Church
sharpenedearly in I977. The Catholic Bishops Conferenceon February6
issued a stronglywordedcondemnationofgovernment arrestsand deporta-
tionofchurchmen, of mistreatment ofculturalminorities,
and ofexcessesin
the promotionof birth control.As compared with the I7 bishops who
endorsedthe previousoppositionstatement,thiswas signedby 66 ofthe 82
bishopsin the Philippines,includingbothCardinalsand six archbishops.A
documentapparently"leaked" fromthe headquartersof the Philippine
Constabularyrevealed plans to arrest i55 more clergyand lay leaders,
includingfourbishops, This, togetherwith clumsy effortsby the Papal
Nuncio to defendMarcos, seemsto have triggeredthe bishops' reaction.

March1977

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