Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968
MIAA v. Court of Appeals
Facts: A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-
reaching implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at
one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing
technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines.
He would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized
by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air
Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly
pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to
tax.
Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine
territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional function to tax.
Held: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the
Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there of that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has
to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its
sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus
be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character.
That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the
succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and
self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the
exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer
control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character.
They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are
not and cannot be foreign territory.
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
FACTS:
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under
Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such
operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the
effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of
its Charter.
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June
2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from
the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City
Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on
the airport lands and buildings.
At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying
Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires
persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption.
According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that
MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with
the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Parañaque from
imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public
sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having
been filed out of time.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is
exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234
of the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax
itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and
buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned
by the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of
Parañaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the
tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions
mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque posted
and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the
airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled
public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO
to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the
auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of
Parañaque three hours after the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt
from real estate tax?
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED.
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate
tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts
from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.
133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing
powers of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes,
fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments
cannot tax the national government, which historically merely
delegated to local governments the power to tax.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater
force when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in
favor of national government
instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA
itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can
transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings
without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the
airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their
ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a
proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they
remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable,
hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale,
and they are exempt from real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases
to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case,
MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a
consideration to a taxable person.
Neri vs. Senate
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vs. Legislative Inquiry during
Question Hour
Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege
Exception to Executive Privilege
FACTS:
This is regarding the contract entered into by DOTC with ZTE for the
supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project. In connection
with this NBN Project, Senate passed various Resolutions and pending
bills, which it then used as basis for initiating an investigation.
One of the cabinet officials invited to appear before the Senate during
the investigation was Petitioner, who was Director General of NEDA at
the time. During the 11-hour questioning, Petitioner invoked
executive privilege and refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve.
In view of his refusal, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee issued a
subpoena ad testificandum, to which Petitioner replied that he was
willing to testify to other matters besides those three questions
covered by “executive privilege” and that he wanted to be furnished
beforehand matters to be taken up during the inquiry so that he may
adequately prepare therefor. Executive Secretary Ermita also sent a
letter to the Blue Ribbon, affirming that indeed those three questions
mentioned were covered by “executive privilege” because such
information if disclosed might impair diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China. As such, the Office of
the President has ordered Petitioner not to answer those questions.
Nevertheless, the Blue Ribbon issued a show cause Letter and a
contempt Order against Petitioner. Thus, this case.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
covered by executive privilege?
RULING:
IN AID OF LEGISLATION: Scope and Limitations --
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it.
But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is
imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House
duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for
them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
Is there recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of
E.O. 464? At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of
E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received”
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.
Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need:
xxx presidential communications are presumptively privileged and
that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of
public need by the branch seeking access to conversations xxxx
Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from
respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the
answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead,
the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section
21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that “the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is conceded
that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid of
legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of
Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the
questions and the manner of inquiry is conducted.
EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: “Demonstrated, specific need
for evidence in pending criminal trial” (US v. Nixon) does not apply --
In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the
information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law
and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be
disclosed. This is the reason why the US Court was quick to “limit the
scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with
the balance between the President’s generalized interest in
confidentiality xxx and congressional demands for information.”
Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v.
Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege
depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural
setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in
Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect
military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the
present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims
executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications
privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making
process and diplomatic secrets.
Executive Privilege vis-a-vis Right of the People to Information on
Matters of Public Concern
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. The provision (Section 7, Article III) itself provides the
limitations, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these laws are
Sec. 7, RA 6713, Art. 229, RPC, Sec. 3(k), RA 3019, and Sec. 24(e),
Rule 130, ROC. These are in addition to what our body of
jurisprudence clarifies as confidential and what our Constitution
considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege.
Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
certain information. We find the information subject of this case
belonging to such kind.
Legislative Inquiry in Aid of Legislation vis-a-vis Right of the People to
Information on Matters of Public Concern: More than anything else,
though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s
right to public information. The former cannot claim that every
legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to information.
xxx
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as
justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to
the people in general. This is because when they discharge their
power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be
that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and
should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts
particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-
legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful
review by numerous decided cases.
Abakada Guro v. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005
FACTS:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party
List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee
should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there
is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the
one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the
no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation
because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the
VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the
end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum
products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a
no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in
the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because “a House provision
cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.”
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly
violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of
revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when
the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand-
by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on
account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They
submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of
Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and
inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as
policy making.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a
property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the
right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has
already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is
constitutional?
RULING:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution
provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the
President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data
and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions
laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a
property or a property right, and a VAT-registered person’s
entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.
As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a
mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as
there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means
through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to
choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds.
The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.
Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Cement Manufacturers
Association of the Phils., G.R. No. 158540, Aug. 3, 2005
(HOLY CRAP, CHECK OUT THE INTRO!!!! ^.^)
“Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in
this case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their
respective positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial
kitchen sink. At present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has
shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
and private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation
(Philcemcor),[1] who now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated
8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of petitioner
Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross).
This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For
respondents, it is about love of country and the future of the
domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. For this Court, it
is about elementary statutory construction, constitutional limitations
on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar measures, and
obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in the Decision, and
the same holds true with this present Resolution.”
POWER OF PRESIDENT TO IMPOSE TARIFF RATES: Without
Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to
impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of
foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist,
the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the
ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative
power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation
from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an
exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than
the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
QUALIFIERS: This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the
Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial
consideration: (1) there must be a law; (2) there must be specified
limits; and (3) Congress may impose limitations and restrictions on
this presidential authority.
POWER EXERCISED BY ALTER EGOS OF PRES: The Court recognizes
that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2),
Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction,
by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries.
Indeed, for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose
tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of
Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an
exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary
who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the
President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has
no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs
and imports.
TARIFF COMMISSION AND DTI SEC ARE AGENTS: Concurrently, the
tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise
construed within the same context as part and parcel of the
legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and
imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and
restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited
respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of
the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary
legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be
considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which
possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without
legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power,
authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because
taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose
safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or
the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to
perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the
legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond
the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions
imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the
procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be
imposed, and assign the various offices in the government
bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such
measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of
whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions.
Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff
Commission their respective functions in the legislature’s scheme of
things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the
limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2)
Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves
violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or
noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no
choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity
can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the
present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under
which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may
impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts.
POWER BELONGS TO CONGRESS: …the cited passage from Fr. Bernas
actually states, “Since the Constitution has given the President the
power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the
Constitution alone which can curtail such power.” Does the President
have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which
may be curtailed by the executive power of control? At the risk of
redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: “The Congress may,
by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.” Clearly the power to
impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the President.
Camid v. Office of the President, et,al.
FACTS:
• This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality
of Andong in Lanao Del Sur
• This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the
Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33
Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considerd null and void due to
undue delegation of legislative powers.
• Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong.
• The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as a
private citizen and taxpayer)
• Camid contends/argues the following:
o Municipality of Andong evolved into a full blown municipality (since
there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks
and sevices, it has ist own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office
etc. and 17 baranggays with chairman)
o He noted agencies and private grous recognizing Andong and also
the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of
Andong
• In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing
municipalties including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in
Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal
treatment for Andong.
• Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO107 arguing that in
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.Mendez, the court affirmed in
making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was
created through an executive order.
• Thus this petition.
ISSUE: May the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto
municipal corporation?
RULING:
NO. Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is
shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate
functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature,
and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford
title by prescription.
- Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the
continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporation of
its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by the other
instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislature’s action.
May the any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to
Camid’s prayer?
- NO. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority
to create or revalidate a municipality.
Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San
Andres?
- No. for the following reasons:
o There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in
the case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not
invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years
before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a
fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in
the House of Representatives apportionment.
o Andong did not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442(d)
regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It says:
 Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
o The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of
elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the
State does not recognize the existence of the municipality.
o The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which
apportioned seats for the House of Reps to the different legislative
districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities
encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong.
Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated
municipalities are now considered existing?
- No there was none. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the
1987 Constitution validates them. The fact that there existing organic
statutes passed by the legislation recreating these municipalities is
enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of
Andong.
SC DECISION: DISMISSED for lack of Merit.
RELEVANCE:
Note the following Sections with regards to juridical personality of
corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a
different treatment with Andong:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 8:
Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being
created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the
powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence
Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. -
Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed
primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them
or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code,
insofar as they are applicable.
Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45
of the New Civil Code, those considered as juridical person includes
the State and its political subdivisions and Other corporations,
institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law. These two are governed by the law creating them.
Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not a recognized
political subdivision, it is not also considered a juridical person.
Note:
What happened with the people from Andong?
- The constituent barrios of the voided town returns to its
original municipalities (Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are
recognized and still existing.
The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not
judicial confirmation of void title.
Pelaez vs Auditor General
G.R. No. L-23825:
From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued
executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this is purportedly in
pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province,
municipality, [township] municipal district or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein,
may divide any province into one or more subprovinces…The VP
Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit
the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the
said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional.
He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3
of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of
Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities
in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly:
"If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can
he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered
that only barrios are barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can
be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be
placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the
main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial of
the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of
the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of
several barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create
barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.
 In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently
legislative in character not administrative.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and
directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the
arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65
raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if
there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law
has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution
by people’s initiative?
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so
with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the
clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main
thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing
initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally
did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
People's Initiative
This is probable the best case there is on the question of the people's
right to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the
system of initiative.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
Nature: Petition for prohibition; the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the constitution through the system of
initiative.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, Ma. Isabel Ongpin –
petitioners
Jesus Delfin, Alberto & Carmen Pedrosa (PIRMA), COMELEC –
respondents
Raul Roco, DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN – petitioners/intervenors
FACTS:
Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution by People’s initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits
of elective officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI,
Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. In his petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an
order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country; (2) cause the publication of such order in newspaper of
general and local circulation; and (3) instructing municipal election
registrars in all regions of the Philippines to assist him and his
volunteers in establishing signing stations. The COMELEC then issued
an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition and
set the case for hearing.

At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago, et al., filed
a special civil action for prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
The issues in the instant petition are the following:
(1) Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
(2) Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
(3) Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re:
Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(4) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.
(5) Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of,
inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that:
(1) The instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the
COMELEC of the Delfin Petition. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition filed by Delfin and that it becomes
imperative to stop the COMELEC from proceeding any further. The SC
said that despite the pendency of the Delfin Petition in the COMELEC,
the SC had jurisdiction over the Defensor-Santiago petition because
the petition may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, given the Roco motion filed with
the COMELEC seeking dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
(2) RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend
the constitution because while Sec 3 mentions initiative on the
Constitution and Sec 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to
the percentage of registered voters needed for a proposal, the law
does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution; while there are subtitles for national and local initiatives,
there is no subtitle for the initiative on the Constitution; thus, the law
is incomplete, and this inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering
the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules and regulations.
(3) It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article
IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a)
Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
(4) Santiago’s petition contend that the people's initiative is limited to
amendments to the constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside
the power of the people's initiative. Delfin in his memoranda contend
that the lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective
officials provided under the 1987 constitution is not a "revision" of the
constitution. It is only an amendment. "Amendment envisages an
alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the constitution.
Revision contemplates a re-examination of the entire document to
determine how and to what extent it should be altered. The Office of
the Solicitor General opined that extension of term of elected officials
constitute a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof. In its amended petition in intervention DIK and MABINI
contend that the Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment
to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and
on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be
done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(5) COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. It was held that
COMELEC is without jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin Petition
because it did not contain the signatures of the required number of
voters as required by the Constitution.
The petition therefore is granted; R. A. No. 6735 is declared
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and for failure to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation; Those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution is declared
void; and the Commission on Elections is ordered to dismiss the
DELFIN petition.
Word of the Day:
Initiative is a form of direct legislation by the people consisting of two
parts: petition and election. It does not become effective until passed
by voters and its availability does not remedy the denial of the right
to referendum.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Constitutional provision on People's Initiative is not self-executory
Principle of Non-delegation of Powers, Exceptions
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case sought to amend certain provisions of the
Constitution, specifically lifting the limit of terms of elective officials,
through people’s initiative. Santiago et al. opposed on the ground
that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. There is no law passed yet and RA 6735, which provides for
initiative on statues and local legislation but not initiative on the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 adequately provided for people’s initiative on
Constitution
RULING:
Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is not self-executory
Sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the Constitution...is not self-executory. xxx
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of
this right?
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement
the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or
legislative act. xxx
We agree that RA 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
But is RA 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress
to “provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?”
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondents COMELEC, Sec.
2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. – The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.
The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section
is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the
system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”
Second. It is true that Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one
of the three systems of initiative, and that Sec. 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the
case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for
the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec. 5,
paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to
be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended RA 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and
local laws.
the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete
in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, RA 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC
is then invalid.

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete,

inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae
on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
“empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
Act.”

Principle of non-delegation of power

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as

expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Sec. 28(2), Art. VI;
Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Sec. 23(2),
Art. VI;
Delegation to the people at large;
Delegation to local governments; and
Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-

judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that