1 Justice Dipak Misra National Moot Court Competition, 2020: DMC1003-P

1ST JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
DMC1003-P
1ST JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION, 2020
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ISLANDIA
IN THE MATTER OF WRIT PETITION FILED U/ART.32 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF ISLANDIA
WRIT PETITION NO-____/2020
IN PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN:
JOSHUA MESSI ( PETITIONER)
VERSUS
UNION OF ISLANDIA (RESPONDENTS)

&
Anr.
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................I
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................................................II
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...............................................................................IV
STATEMENT OF FACTS...............................................................................................V
STATEMENT OF ISSUES...........................................................................................VIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS......................................................................................IX
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................1-18
ISSUE 1: Whether the MHA Order dated 27.03.2020 is arbitrary, and the
detention of such migrant workers in pursuance of such order amounts to a
violation of their fundamental rights?.............................................................1
ISSUE 2: Whether the suspension of several labour laws by all three states in
the garb of incentivizing economic activities vide Order dated 26.04.2020
violates Fundamental Rights of workers, and subsequently the International
Labour Organisation Conventions ratified by the Union of Westeros?..............6
ISSUE 3: Whether the sharing of medical data of COVID-19 tested patients with a
foreign private company, DMPL violates their right to privacy? .....................13
ISSUE 4: Whether all the 14 FIRs filed against Mr. Oliver is liable to be
quashed and his article entitled “The Ground Report” falls within the ambit of
freedom of speech and expression of the press?...............................................15
PRAYER..........................................................................................................................XI
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
& And
¶ Paragraph
v. Versus
Anr Another
AIR All India Reports
FRRO Foreigners' Regional Registration Office
LIN Leave Islandia Notice
Art. Article
Const. Constitution
Ed. Edition
FIR First Information Report
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honourable
HC High Court
Id Ibidium
Ltd. Limited
M.P Madhya Pradesh
Ors. Others
Ori Orissa
Punj. Punjab
Regd. Registered
Raj. Rajasthan
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
SC Supreme Court
T.N. Tamil Nadu
U/A Under Art.
U/S Under Section
U.O.I Union Of India
U.P Uttar Pradesh
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS
S.NO PARTICULARS
1. Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board –II v. Prof. MV Nayudu,
(2001) 2 SCC 62.
2. Avinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) SC 321.
3. Menaka Gandhi v. U.O.I, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
i
Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner
-Drawn and Filed by the Counsel for the Petitioner-
4. Som Raj v. State of Haryana, (1990) SC 1176.

5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) SC 898.
6. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & ors.,
(1979) SC 1628.
7. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab v. Om Prakash, (1969) SC 33.
8. Loknath v. State, (1952) Ori 42.
9. Municipal Corp. v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, (1986) 3 SCC 20.
10. Ishwar Prasad v. N.R. Sen, (1952) Cal. 273.
11. The Lord Krishna Sugar Mills &Anr. v. U.O.I & Anr., (1959) SC 1124.
12. R.C. Cooper v. U.O.I, (1970) SC 564.
13. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. U.O.I, (1973) SC 106.
14. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath
Nandkarni, (1983) SC 109.
15. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1986) SC 180.
16. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla , (1976) SC 1207.
17. Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimala Totame, (1990) 1 SCC 520.
18. PG Gupta v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 2 SCC 182.
19. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan,
(1997) 11 SCC 121.
20. Rekha v. State Of T.N Tr. Sec. To Govt.& Anr., (2011) SC 283.
21. A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SC 27.
22. Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1.
23. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. U.O.I, (1982) SC 1473.
24. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. U.O.I , (1985) 1 SCC 641.
25. Shayara Bano v. U.O.I, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
26. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) SC 1675.
27. Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pande Barde,
(1995) Supp 2 SCC 549.
28. Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa, (1995) SC 1811.
29. L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482.
30. T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. U.O.I, (2012) 4 SCC 362.
31. Jolly George vs. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360.
32. Gramaphone Company of India v. Birendra Baldev Pandey, (1984) 2 SCC 534.
33. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain , (1975) SC 2299.
34. SP Gupta v. U.O.I , (1982) SC 149.
35. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N , (1994) 6 SCC 632.
36. Suresh Kumar Koushal & ors. v. Naz Foundations & ors., (2014) 1 SCC 1.
37. Balu Goplalakrishnan v. state of Kerala & ors., W.P.(C) 84 of 2020.
38. Ram Nandan v. State, (1959) All 101.
39. Tara Singh v. The State, )1951) AIR 44.
40. Kedar Nath Singh v. State Of Bihar, (1962) AIR 955.
41. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) SC 124.
42. Sakal Paper’s Ltd v. U.O.I, (1962) SC 305.
43. Dwarka Prasad v. State of U.P, (1954) SC 224.
44. Shreya Singhal v. U.O.I , WP (CRI) 167 of 2012.
45. Brij Bhushan & Anr. v. The State Of Delhi, (1950) SC 129.
46. State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal &Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566.
47. Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (1987) 2 SCR 223.
ii
48. Balco Employees Union (Regd) V. U.O.I & ors, (2002) 2 SCC 333.
49. Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. U.O.I, WP (Crl) 130 of 2020.
50. Hamdard Dawakhana v. U.O.I, (1960) 2 SCR 67.
51. R.P Ltd v. Indian Express, (1986) SC 515.
BOOKS
S.NO PARTICULARS
1. ARVIND P DATAR, Commentary on the Constitution of India (2nd ed,
WADHWA NAGPUR 2007)
STATUTES
S.NO PARTICULARS
1. The Indian Constitution, 1950
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
3 Disaster Management Act, 2005
4. The Factories Act, 1948
5. The Industrial Disputes Act,1947
6. The Payment of Wages Act, 1936
7. The Minimum Wages Act 1948;
WEBSITES REFERRED
1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com.
2. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal.
3. SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONER APPROACHES THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ISLANDIA, 1950 WHICH
CONTAINS THAT-
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
iii
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution
PROVIDED THAT NOTHING IN THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL BE DEEMED TO TAKE

AWAY OR ABRIDGE THE POWER OF THE COURT TO HEAR, FOR REASONS TO
BE RECORDED, THE PETITION ON ANY OTHER SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF
LAW, NOT FORMULATED BY IT, IF IT IS SATISFIED THAT THE CASE INVOLVES
SUCH QUESTION.
IT SETS THE FACTS AND LAWS ON WHICH THE CLAIMS ARE BASED
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Union of Islandia:
1. The Union of Islandia is a country in the continent of Asia and got its independence
in 1947 from the United Princedom. It has the longest written constitution in the
world. The constitution of Union of Islandia guarantees fundamental rights to its
iv
citizens under part 3 and a certain amount of fundamental rights are also available to
the foreigners.
Mr Joshua Messi
2. Mr Joshua Messi is a citizen of the United Princedom. He completed his first cycle
of degree studies from the University of Princedom and then moved to Relhi in the
year 2016 in order to complete a diploma course in Hindi language at Inkson
University and he has maintained a stellar record in his academics. He had also
completed a diploma course in Sanskrit language in the year 2017-18. In 2019, in
order to complete his post graduate program which would end on 8th December
2020, Mr Joshua Messi once again came to Islandia with a student visa that was
valid until 31st December 2020.
Amendment to the citizenship law of Islandia, the protests and COVID 19
3. In July, 2020, the Government of Union of Islandia passed an amendment to the

Citizenship Law of Islandia through which the Government sought to grant citizenry
rights to religious minorities of neighbouring countries on the basis of religion. This
contagious law sparked protests all over the country. Mr. Messi also participated in
various protests with banners.
4. The breakout of SARS-CoV-2 led to the rise of a worldwide pandemic. The disease
caused by contracting this virus is called as COVID-19 or the Corona Virus disease.
The Government of Union of Islandia declared a lockdown of 6 months starting
from 10th July, 2020. However, during the lockdown period as well, the protest
against the citizenship law continued to happen and Mr. Messi continued to
participate in those protests.
Citizenship law protests
5. There were several news reports on Mr.Messi’s active role in the citizenship law
protests. Some newspapers also falsely accused Mr.Messi of leading the peaceful
protests towards violent protests.
v
5. On 9th August, 2020, Foreigners' Regional Registration Office, Relhi (FRROR)

called the petitioner for hearing before expelling him from the Country, However,
such a hearing was postponed on petitioner's request. Subsequently, on 15th
September, 2020, a Leave Islandia Notice (LIN) was issued to the petitioner in
exercise of powers conferred by the Foreigners Act, 1946 to the FRROR.
5. The said Notice was challenged by Mr. Joshua Messi before the Supreme Court of
Islandia on the ground that the hearing was not given to the petitioner prior to the
issuance of LIN and the FRRO has only relied upon the newspaper reports to issue
LIN and no other reason has been provided, thus is a violation of Principle of
Natural Justice and is arbitrary in nature and also violates various Fundamental
Rights of the petitioner, especially the Right to Protest and the Right to stay in
Islandia till the time the visa is valid.
8. However, the Respondent had submitted a two page confidential field report which
has formed the basis for the issuance of LIN and have also stated that the student visa
does not allow a foreign national to speak publicly in “anti-government”
demonstrations as the Freedom of Speech is not available to everyone.
9. The Supreme Court of Islandia decided to hear the petition filed by Mr. Joshua
Messi on 27/28/29 November 2020 before a 3 Judges Bench.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
[A.] WHETHER THE MHA ORDER DATED 27.03.2020 IS ARBITRARY, AND THE
DETENTION OF SUCH MIGRANT WORKERS IN PURSUANCE OF SUCH
ORDER AMOUNTS TO A VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
vi
[1.1] The order is arbitrary in the light of Article 14 and the Rule of Law.
[1.2] The detention of migrant workers is a violation of their fundamental rights.
[B.] WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF SEVERAL LABOUR LAWS BY ALL

THREE STATES IN THE GARB OF INCENTIVIZING ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
VIDE ORDER DATED 26.04.2020 VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF
WORKERS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION CONVENTIONS RATIFIED BY THE UNION OF WESTEROS?
[2.1] The suspension of labour laws violate the Fundamental Rights.
[2.2] It violates the International labour Organization ratified by the Union of

Westeros.
[C.] WHETHER THE SHARING OF MEDICAL DATA OF COVID-19 TESTED

PATIENTS WITH A FOREIGNPRIVATE COMPANY, DMPL VIOLATES THEIR
RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
[3.1] Right to Information in Consonance with Right to Privacy.
[3.2] That the purpose as stated by the government spokesperson is justified.
[D.] WHETHER ALL THE 14 FIRS FILED AGAINST MR. OLIVER IS LIABLE
TO BE QUASHED AND HIS ARTICLE ENTITLED “THE GROUND REPORT”
FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF
THE PRESS?
[4.1] The FIRs against Mr. Oliver are maintainable under Section 124(a) of
Westeros Penal Code and Section 54 of Disaster Management Act.
[4.2] That the report violates the Freedom of Speech and Expression of Press.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[A.] WHETHER THE MHA ORDER DATED 27.03.2020 IS ARBITRARY, AND THE
DETENTION OF SUCH MIGRANT WORKERS IN PURSUANCE OF SUCH
ORDER AMOUNTS TO A VIOLATION OF THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
vii
The Counsel for the Petitioner humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the order
issued by the MHA as on 27.03.2020 is arbitrary. Its sudden introduction and improper
implementation is unreasonable and violates the Rule of Law. Further, given the unfortunate
and helpless condition of the poor migrant workers, their detention does not withstand the
reasonability test inter alia violates their fundamental rights.


PATIENTS WITH A FOREIGNPRIVATE COMPANY, DMPL VIOLATES THEIR
RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
The Counsel humbly submits that the sharing of Covid-19 patients data with foreign private
company violates the right to privacy. As there is no assurance of confidentiality which might
create problems for the individuals and it is also the right of citizens to know what govt. is
going to do with the information. It is also mandatory for the govt. to get permission from the
individual before using their personal information and hence, the govt. violates the right to
privacy of the citizens.
[D.] WHETHER ALL THE 14 FIRS FILED AGAINST MR. OLIVER IS LIABLE
TO BE QUASHED AND HIS ARTICLE ENTITLED “THE GROUND REPORT”
FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF
THE PRESS?
The Counsel of petitioner humbly submits that the FIR's against Mr. Oliver must be quashed
as he does not violates the §124-A of IPC, because the petitioner does not excite the feeling
viii
of hatred towards the govt., moreover, the petitioner have the freedom to express his thoughts
, opinions u/a 19(1)(a) i.e. right to freedom of speech and expression of the press.
ix
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS

HON’BLE COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?
I. The instant petition is maintainable
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that instant petition is maintainable as

the LIN was issued without considering substantive evidence [1.1] moreover, the
grievance of the petitioner that he was not given a fair chance for hearing also does stand
valid in the instant case. [1.2].
I.1 The LIN was issued without considering substantive evidence
1. It is humbly submitted that the LIN was issued to the petitioner after the respondent
had not taken substantive information and evidence into consideration against the
petitioner. Factually, there has been no substantial, conclusive and compelling
evidence that was submitted by the respondent apart from the two-page confidential
report and the newspaper clippings. It is to be brought to the notice of the Hon’ble
court that such confidential report cannot be considered as solid evidence and
newspaper clippings are a mere hearsay evidence.
2. In Areni Lotha Vs. Union of India1, it was held that if a Confidential Intelligence
Report was not the basis of the order of expulsion, as reflected from the order itself,
such report could not be taken into consideration while considering the validity of the
order. In the instant case, the confidential report was merely a culmination of the
petitioner’s activities from July 2020 and it does not disclose any valid ground for the
expulsion of the petitioner from Islandia. Even the reasons set out in the Confidential
Report sent by the respondents do not include any indication as to whether the
applicant has participated in any criminal activity and/or committed any crime under
Indian law. In the absence of any specific offence having been alleged against the
1
Areni Lotha Vs. Union of India (2006) AIR Gau 83
1
petitioner, having a penal consequence, the valid visa of the petitioner could not be
negated by his expulsion from India.
3. Moreover, the newspaper clippings is not permissible under any court of law2 or
statutory jurisdiction as evidence relating to the actions of the petitioner in the
absence of the clear evidence of any criminal activity carried out by the petitioner, a
newspaper article cannot be the basis of any expulsion.
4. Even the newspaper article, that has been taken into consideration, does not suggest
any violation of Islandian law by the petitioner at all. Neither the Foreigner’s act
1946, nor any other statute, debars any person, be her/him an Islandian citizen or a
foreigner, from taking part in political activities.
5. The petitioner is merely alleged to have participated in a political protest through the
reports, that too as a bye‐stander and having expressed certain political opinions to the
press as well as through the banners carried by him. Such stray acts, by themselves,
cannot be labelled as 'political activity', let alone being unlawful under any Islandian
statute, including the Foreigner’s act of 1946.
6. Thus, in conclusion, the evidences duly submitted by the respondent was not
substantive enough and was not suggestive enough to prove that the petitioner was
involved in any activity that could possibly serve as a basis for the issuance of the
LIN or his expulsion from Islandia, for that matter.
I.2 The grievance of the petitioner not being heard is valid
7. It is humbly submitted that the petitioner was given no fair chance for a hearing prior
to the issuance of the LIN. In the present situation the petitioner clearly pleads that,
prior to the issuance of the notice of expulsion challenged, he was not granted the
chance for a trial at all after the postponement of the hearing dates upon the request of
2
Laxmi Shetty Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1988) (3) SCC 319, Quamarul Islam V. S.K Kanta and Ors (1994) SC
452 JT "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary
evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is
not one of the documents referred to in Section 78 (2) of the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact
can be proved. The presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper
report cannot be treated as proof of the facts reported therein. It is now well settled that a statement of fact
contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker
of the statement appearing in court and deposing to have perceived the fact reported. "

2
the petitioner. In the present situation, the "right of hearing" offered to the petitioner
would not be not worth the name and would simply be a post-facto consideration of
his submissions after the expulsion order had already been issued.
8. In Kamil Siedcyznski Vs. Union of India3, it was held that such accrued right (i.e. the
right to stay on Indian soil as long as the Visa is valid) of the petitioner could not be
taken away by an unreasoned order, that too without giving any prior hearing to the
petitioner for him to defend himself, thus implying that prior hearing is a crucial
procedure before the issuance of any notice that could lead to the expulsion of a
person from the country.
9. In view of the privileges granted under Article 14 and Articles 20 to 22 of the
Constitution, a foreigner must not be confined to the narrow envelope of Article 19 of
the Constitution of India4. Even foreign nationals, as long as they have the right to
remain in India by virtue of a visa given to them, cannot be removed from Islandia by
administrative order alone without justification whatsoever and without granting the
foreigner a prior hearing. In the instant case, it is to be noted that the petitioner had
only requested to postpone the hearing to a later date and not completely disregard the
hearing process. The FRROR, post the postponement of the hearing dates, did not
give the petitioner a chance for being heard. The notice was issued without a prior
hearing of the petitioner’s defence against the allegations before his expulsion and
thus, his grievance stands valid and the LIN in question has been rightly challenged
by the petitioner.
Considering all the aforementioned arguments, it can be implied that two-fold contentions
put forth by the petitioner in the said petition stands valid and thus, the petition that is
brought before the Hon’ble court is maintainable.
3
Kamil Siedcyznski Vs. Union of India, W.P No. 4432 (W) of 2020
4
Ibid
3

It is humbly submitted that the suspension of labour laws violates the fundamental rights of
the workers [2.1] and, It violates the International labour Organization ratified by the Union
of Westeros [2.2].
[2.1] The suspension of labour laws violate the Fundamental Rights.
This writ petition is filed challenging the constitutional validity of the

Notifications/Ordinances by which the establishments are exempted from the purviews of the
provisions of the above legislations. Those notifications/ordinances are unjust, illegal and
arbitrary. These Notification/Ordinance are issued without authority and in violation of the
Central Legislations. The respondent states have totally disregarded the rights guaranteed to
the labourers by various Statutes and the Constitution of India. Suspension of labour laws by
the respondent states warrants interference of this Hon’ble Court.
A reading of the provisions now suspended by the States would show that those are the key
provisions, which ensure that the workers are not exploited in terms of working hours, wages
and holidays. Those also ensure “collective bargaining power” and adequate mechanisms for
the resolution of disputes affecting the rights of the workers. By taking away these
provisions, practically, the states have abandoned the fate of the workers to the whims and
fancies of the respective employers. It is against the scheme of labour laws and scheme of the
Constitution of India. It is trite that, the working class is the most affected section of people,
due to the pandemic. They cannot be subjected to further suffering for aiding the capitalist
interests in violation of the constitutional rights. The state governments cannot deviate from
the mandate of law to protect the interest of the employers. It is submitted that several state
ordinances and notifications are under challenge in this writ petition. One of the grounds is
that the impugned laws are ultra vires the central legislations. The question of repugnance
also arises in the instant case. Several substantial questions of law and violation of the
fundamental rights are involved in the present case.

4
The impugned laws are violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 and 23 of the Constitution.
It is submitted that labour falls within the concurrent list of Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. Aspects such as regulation of labour in mines, incorporation and winding up of
corporations industries, industrial disputes concerning union employees etc. come in the
Union list. The Central labour legislations are passed invoking powers under the respective
subjects in the Union list.
Article 23(1) of the Constitution states as follows:
“(1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are
prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with law.”
The impugned laws, by suspending welfare and health measures of workers and by increasing
work hours constitute forced labour. The term must be viewed not in a limited sense where
the employees are physically threatened to work. It must be extended to situations where they
have abysmal bargaining power and where their economic status compels them to work
beyond their normal working hours. A wide interpretation of ‘forced labour’ is already
subscribed to by this Hon’ble Court in People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of
India5. By explicitly rejecting the submission that ‘exacting labour by passing some
remuneration’ will be sufficient to bring the practice of forced labour, this court held:
“The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent laid some emphasis on the word
'similar' and contended that it is not every form of forced labour which is prohibited by
Article 23 but only such form of forced labour as is similar to 'begar’ and since 'begar'
means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration
for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour
or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some
remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the words 'other
similar forms of forced labour’. This contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the
prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well
founded. It does not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India6 that when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferring
fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should be to expand the reach and ambit of the
5
People's Union for Democratic Rights v. U.O.I, (1982) SC 1473.
6
Supra note. 7.
5
fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their meaning and content. It is difficult to
imagine that the Constitution makers should have intended to strike only at certain forms of
forced labour leaving it open to the socially or economically powerful sections of the
community to exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced
labour. Could there be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give
labour or service to another without receiving any remuneration at all it should be regarded
as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condemnation of Article 23, but if some
remuneration is paid for it, then it should be outside the inhibition of that Article? If this
were the true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it would
then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or
economically dominant class to exact labour or service from a person belonging to the
deprived and vulnerable section of the community by paying a negligible amount of
remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article 23. We do not think it would be right to
place on the language of Article 23 an interpretation which would emasculate its beneficent
provisions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear of the view that Article
23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. The words "other similar forms of
forced labour are used in Article 23 not with a view to importing the particular
characteristic of 'begar' that labour or service should be exacted(sic) without payment of any
remuneration but with a view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that Article all other
forms of forced labour and since 'begar' is one form of forced labour, the Constitution
makers used the words "other similar forms of forced labour." If the requirement that labour
or work should be exacted without any remuneration were imported in other forms of forced
labour, they would straightaway come within the meaning of the word 'begar' and in that
event there would be no need to have the additional words "other similar forms of forced
labour." These words would be rendered futile and meaningless and it is a wellrecognised
rule of interpretation that the court should avoid a construction which as (sic) the effect of
rendering any words used by the legislature superfluous or redundant. The object of adding
these words was clearly to expand the reach and content of Article 23 by including, in
addition to 'begar', other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of that Article. Every
form of forced labour 'begar' or otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes
no difference whether the person who is forced to give his labour or service to another is
remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit
by this Article if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result of
force or compulsion. Take for example a case where a person has entered into a contract of
6
service with another for a period of three years and he wishes to discontinue serving such
other person before the expiration of the period of three years. If a law were to provide that
in such a case the contract shall be specifically enforced and he shall be compelled to serve
for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to forced labour and such a law
would be void as offending Article 23. That is why specific performance of a contract of
service cannot be enforced against an employee and the employee cannot be forced by
compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer...”
In this view, several of the impugned provisions having the effect of non-payment for labour
for overtime, arbitrary increase in work hours, permission for unfair labour practices etc.
constitute forced labour under the Constitution. The impugned laws are liable to be set aside
as violative of Article 23 of the Constitution.
It is submitted that the impugned laws are either notifications or ordinances and not statutes.
It was held by this Hon’ble Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union
of India7 as cited in Shayara Bano v. Union of India8, that “this Court said that a piece of
subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a
statute passed by a competent legislature. A subordinate legislation may be questioned under
Article 14 on the ground that it is unreasonable; ‘unreasonable not in the sense of not being
reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.” Therefore, the impugned laws are
less immune from a constitutional challenge. Further, in Shayara Bano case, it was held:
“The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would
apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest
arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally
and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is
excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are,
therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out
by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.”
It is submitted that the impugned laws are passed without adequate determining principle and
are irrational. The relaxation of labour welfare measures is disproportionate and excessive
and is liable to be set aside under the manifest arbitrariness test.
7
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. U.O.I , (1985) 1 SCC 641.
8
Shayara Bano v. U.O.I, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
7
It is also submitted that the right to health has been interpreted as part of the right to life
under Article 21 of the Constitution9. Article 42 calls upon the state to secure just and
humane conditions of work and Article 39(e) to secure the health and strength of workers.
Suspending the health and safety measures have a direct detrimental impact on the health of
workers.
For example, increasing the weekly work hours from 48 to 72 hours in the states and
increasing the daily work hours from 9 to 12 hours admittedly adversely affect health
conditions.
The right to minimum wage has been also been held to be an integral part of the right to life
by this court in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India10.
[2.2] It violates the International Labour Organization ratified by the Union of

Westeros.
The impugned laws are also violative of the international framework on labour laws. India is
a party to several international conventions regulating health and welfare, hours of work,
equal remuneration etc of workers.
India is a party to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and is bound by its
provisions. It defines forced labour as follows: “all work or service which is exacted from
any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or
herself voluntarily."
The Labour Exploitation Accountability hub, a portal that aims to improve government
accountability in matters of trafficking, slavery and forced labour notes: “Forced labour and
human trafficking for labour exploitation are pervasive issues in India. Forced labour and
debt bondage WWW.LIVELAW.IN 89 are common practice across the primary, secondary
and tertiary economic sectors in India, with widely reported cases in significant number of
industries, including brick kilns, carpet weaving, embroidery, textile and garment
manufacturing, mining, manual scavenging, and agriculture11.”
9
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) SC 1675.
10
Supra note. 34.
please see Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pande Barde, (1995) Supp 2 SCC 549, Regional
Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa, (1995) SC 1811, L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education and
Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482.
11
(https://accountabilityhub.org/country/india/).
8
Article 23, therefore must be seen in the context of a significant unorganised labour sector in
the country. The constitutional compatibility of the impugned laws cannot be seen isolated
from the social context in which they operate.
Part III, Chapter 1, Report III (Part 1B) of International Labour Conference, 101st Session,
2012 in its report titled ‘Giving globalisation a human face’ states: “Freedom from forced or
compulsory labour is a cornerstone of the decent work concept and one of the most basic
human rights coming within the competence of the ILO. The two fundamental ILO
Conventions on the subject – Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 – are the most widely ratified of
all the ILO instruments.
Principles embodied in these Conventions have found universal acceptance and

endorsement and have become an inalienable part of the core fundamental rights of human
beings. They have been incorporated in various international instruments, both universal and
regional. The prohibition of the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms is
considered now as a peremptory norm of international law on human rights; it is of an
absolutely binding nature from which no exception is permitted Conventions Nos 29 and 105
aim at guaranteeing to all human beings freedom from forced labour, irrespective of the
nature of the work or the sector of activity in which it may be performed. The two instruments
effectively supplement each other, and their concurrent application should contribute to the
complete elimination of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms. Since the last General
Survey on the subject in 2007, the Committee has noted with satisfaction a number of cases
of progress, which cover measures taken, both in legislation and in practice, to ensure better
observance of the Conventions in various countries of the world.
The Committee has noted, in particular, the repeal or amendment of certain legislative
provisions allowing the exaction of forced or compulsory labour for purposes of production
or service. It has also noted the repeal or amendment of provisions authorizing the
imposition of forced or compulsory labour as a means of political coercion or education, as
a punishment for holding or expressing political views, as a punishment for various breaches
of labour discipline or for having participated in strikes.”(emphasis added)
The impugned laws are also in violation of the provisions of International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force in 1976, which also is ratified by
India. Art. 6(1) says: “6(1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to

9
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work
which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.”
This right is severely endangered as a result of the impugned laws. Article 7 says: “The
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed
by men, with equal pay for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the
present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate

higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence;
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay,
as well as remuneration for public holidays.”
Provisions regarding leisure, limitation of working hours, safe and healthy conditions, fair
wages- all stand violated under the impugned provisions as explained in detail in earlier
grounds. Hence, the impugned laws are bad in law.
It is settled that “the provisions of the Treaties/Conventions which are not contrary to
Municipal laws, be deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law” as held in T.N.
Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India12.Therefore, the impugned laws cannot violate
international labour standards which India has ratified and made part of the municipal law.
12
T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. U.O.I, (2012) 4 SCC 362.
(Also see Jolly George vs. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 SCC 360, Gramaphone Company of India v. Birendra
Baldev Pandey, (1984) 2 SCC 534.
10

PATIENTS WITH A FOREIGN PRIVATE COMPANY, DMPL VIOLATES THEIR
RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble court that the sharing of medical data f Covid-19
tested patients with a foreign private company without their consent violated their right to
privacy because, firstly, Right to Information in Consonance with Right to Privacy [3.1],
secondly, That the purpose as stated by the government spokesperson is not justified [3.2].
[3.1] Right to Information in Consonance with Right to Privacy.
The right to privacy and the right to information are both essential human rights in the
Modern information society. Privacy and RTI are often described as “two sides of the same
coin” mainly acting as complementary rights that promote individuals ’ rights to protect
themselves and to promote government accountability. Dr Manmohan Singh opined “There
is a fine balance required to be maintained between the right to information and the right to
privacy, which stems out of the fundamental right to life and liberty. The citizens' right to
know should definitely be circumscribed if disclosure of information encroaches upon
someone's personal privacy. But where to draw the line is a complicated question". In Indira
Gandhi v. Raj Narain13 , the Court explicitly stated that it is not in the interest of the public to
‘cover with a veil of secrecy the common routine business - the responsibility of officials to
explain and to justify their acts is the chief safeguard against oppression and corruption.’ In
SP Gupta v. Union of India14 , the right of the people to know about every public act, and the
details of every public transaction undertaken by public functionaries was described. In R.
Rajagopal v. State of T.N15 .popularly known as "Autoshanker case" the Supreme Court has
expressly held the "right to privacy" or the right to be let alone is guaranteed by Art. 21 of the
constitution. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage,
procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education among other matters. No one can
publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or
otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right of
the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. However, position may
be differed if he voluntarily puts into controversy or voluntarily invites or raised a
13
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) SC 2299.
14
SP Gupta v. U.O.I , (1982) SC 149.
15
R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N , (1994) 6 SCC 632.
11
controversy. The petitioner humbly submits that as the above statements stated that it is the
duty of the govt. to cover the veil of secrecy. It was the duty of the govt. before giving the
data to the DMPL to seek the permission of the citizens as it is the right of the citizens to
know everything and to choose what information they want to give. It is the violation of the
right to privacy if the govt. gave their personal data to the foreign company without knowing
the consequences and other things. Imperative criteria as to whom the data can be disclosed;
whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the data remains confidential;
how it is to be dealt with after processing/analysis and its conditions, thus become
vitally important. Hence the data provided to DMPL by the govt. violates both right to
information and right to privacy.
[3.2] That the purpose as stated by the government spokesperson is not justified.
It is humbly submitted that the purpose stated by the govt. spokesperson violates the Right to
Privacy enshrined u/a 21. Privacy is that area of a man's life which in any given
circumstances a reasonable man with an understanding of the legitimate needs of the
community would think it wrong to invade. In the case of R. Rajagopalan v. State of Tamil
Nadu16, the Apex Court held that it is the a right to be let alone and a citizen has the right to
safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, protection, motherhood, child-bearing
and education among other matter. Even in the case Suresh Kumar Koushal and other v. Naz
Foundations and others 17 when the Delhi High Court outlined the enlarged scope of the right
to life and liberty which also includes right to protection of one’s dignity, autonomy and
privacy. In the present case the govt. shared the information with the company without
knowing the consequences. Prefatorily, data confidentiality is, in its ultimate sense, about
protecting data from unlawful, unauthorised as also from unintentional access and
disclosure. Hence, the authorisations to view, share and use data forms the hypostasis of
all confidentiality requirements. Imperative criteria as to whom the data can be disclosed;
whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the data remains confidential;
how it is to be dealt with after processing/analysis and its conditions, thus become
vitally important. The corner-stone of managing data confidentiality is, to a large extent,
determined by the control over access to it and the modus and the manner in which it is
dealt with. The afore observations have been made by us because the petitioners
primarily allege that the contract in question has little or no safeguards against the
16
Id.
17
Suresh Kumar Koushal & ors. v. Naz Foundations & ors., (2014) 1 SCC 1.
12
commercial and unauthorised exploitation of the data entrusted to DMPL for processing by
the Govt18. The legislation has retained the provisions in the draft framed by the Justice BN
Srikrishna panel on storing “critical” and “sensitive personal data” in the country while
enabling free flow of other information. Sensitive personal data covers financial, health and
genetic information, apart from biometrics, religious beliefs and affiliations. Such data can be
processed outside the country with the consent of the individuals concerned or under
contractual clauses that have been approved by the Data Protection Authority. Where consent
is given, a person is not harmed and the conduct falls back within the realm of personal
autonomy that does not require policing by the State. Only where there is no consent a
sanction is justified. Hence, the petitioner humbly submits there is no consent given by the
individuals to the govt. which violates their right to privacy and therefore, the purpose
justified by the spokesperson is not valid.
ISSUE 4: WHEATHER THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF

NATURAL JUSTICE
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the sacrosanct principle of natural
justice which is integral to all legal or administrative proceedings, has been violated and
injustice has been done on account of deprivation of a fair opportunity for the petitioner to be
heard. [1] Natural justice has been held as an inseparable ingredient of fairness and
reasonableness19. Fair hearing has the following two elements viz: the opportunity of being
heard hearing and that such opportunity is reasonable. 20 A person against whom the case is
being decided should be given a fair chance to defend himself and to be heard. This forms the
fundamental of the entire principle and a violation of this principle leads to a gross injustice.
Preliminary enquiry is not a substitute for full-fledged enquiry. 21 There is no rule regarding
any discretion as “absolute”22, vesting of power in a high authority does not ipso facto
exclude natural justice23.
18
Balu Goplalakrishnan v. state of Kerala & ors., W.P.(C) 84 of 2020.
19
Suresh Chandra Nanhorya v. Rajendra Rajak, (2006) 7 SCC 800
20
Indru Ramchand Bharvani v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 1; Bal Kissen Kejriwal v. Collector of Custom,
AIR 1962 Cal 460
21
Revision v. Employee Proceeded Against, CRP. No. 682 of 2009.(Kerala High Court, 27/04/2017).
22
MP Jain & SN Jain‟s Principles of Administrative Law, 406 ( Dr.Shakil Ahmad Khan, 7 th ed., 2011).
23
Gill v. Chief election commissioner , AIR 1978 SC 851.
13
4.1. No fair hearing provided prior to the issuance of LIN.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the issuance of the impugned LIN dated
15th September 2020 was sudden and deprived the petitioner of a fair opportunity to be
heard, and thus violated the principles of natural justice.
The essence of this principle has been ingrained in the following excerpt from the case of
Local Government Board v. Arlidge24:-
“Those whose duty it Is to decide must act Judicially. They must deal with the question
referred to them without bias and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of
adequately presenting the case made. The decision must come to the spirit and with the sense
of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to meet out justice.”
The opportunity of being heard should be real, reasonable and effective. The same should not
be for name sake. Audi alteram partem, i.e., no man should be condemned unheard or that
both the sides must be heard before passing any order, is an essential limb upon which natural
justice, which supplements the law of the land. A man cannot incur the loss of property or
liberty for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has a fair opportunity of answering the
case against him. It is a settled provision of law that a pre-decisional notice forms the part of
a fair hearing.25 In the landmark case of Russel v. Duke of Norfolk,26 the Hon’ble Court held
that the standard of natural justice is that the person concerned should have a reasonable
opportunity of presenting his case. Thus, it is the humble contention that if a person is
subjected to pains or penalties, it is the fundamental rule that he should be informed of the
case against him and afforded a fair opportunity of answering it.27
In the present case, the petitioner was called upon for a hearing on 9 th August 2020 by the
FRROR regarding his expulsion from the country and on the request of the petitioner the
above hearing was postponed on to later date. Without conducting the said hearing, the
FRROR issues a Leave Islandia Notice (LIN) on 15 th September 2020 which is arbitrary and
goes against the very principles of natural justice that our judicial system should uphold. In
the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.,28 it has been observed that even
where there is no specific provision for showing cause, yet in a proposed action which affects
24
Local Government Board v. Arlidge, (1915) AC 120 (138) HL
25
I.J Rao, Asst. Collector of Customs v. BibhutiBhusanBagh, (1989) 3 SCC 202
26
1 All ER 109 (1949, House of Lords).
27
Selvarajan v. Race Relations Board, 1 All ER 12 (1976.House of Lords).
28
Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597
14
the rights of an individual it is the duty of the authority to give reasonable opportunity to be
heard. This duty is said to be implied by nature of function to be performed by the authority
having power to take punitive or damaging action. Given that there may be instances where
though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders which affect the liberty or
property of an individual and there might not be a statutory provision mandating prior
hearing, it is noteworthy that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent
upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the
fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not.
“Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the
question of hearing, the courts would apply rule of universal application and founded on
plainest principles of natural justice.” 29
It is though true that the principles of natural justice are flexible in application but its
compliance cannot be jumped over on the ground that even if hearing had been provided, it
would not have served any useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose
or not is a later stage. Things cannot be presumed by the authority. This view is supported by
observations made in General Medical Council v. Spackman30. Non-observance of natural
justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. 31
The order which is passed affecting the rights of an individual must be a speaking order. It is
required that the decisions should be well reasoned. This also increases the transparency and
thus faith in the process. This is necessary with a view to exclude the possibility of
arbitrariness in the action. It is tile reason for passing an order, which checks the arbitrariness.
It is a step in furtherance of achieving the end where society is governed by Rule of law. In
Asst. Commissioner Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing Quota v.
Shukla & Bros32, the Apex court recognised the importance of passing a reasoned decision
because otherwise it can lead to harassment and arbitrariness. In addition to this, where
conclusions are controversial, howsoever slightly, and penalties discretionary, natural justice
is a must.33
29
De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1980), at page 161
30
General Medical Council v. Spackman, (1943) AC 627
31
Swadeshi Cotton mills v. U.O.I, AIR 1981 SC 818.
32
Asst. Commissioner Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing Quota v. Shukla & Bros,
(2010) 4 SCC 785
33
Supra note 4
15
In the impugned case, the said LIN was issued prior to giving any opportunity to the
petitioner to present his stance. In view of the aforementioned arguments and case laws, it is
thus contended that the principle of nature justice, audi alteram partem, was violated which
indicates towards a bad law and the LIN should thus be rendered ineffective.
4.2. Violation of principles of natural justice due to arbitrary actions without proper
disclosure of evidences
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that deprivation of fair hearing has led to an
unfair trial and arbitrary actions against the petitioner thereby violating the principles of
natural justice. In the present case, the action has been taken against the aggrieved party, i.e.,
the petitioner, by issuing the LIN dated 15 th September 2020 without prior disclosure as to on
the grounds upon which such action was based and availability of substantial evidence to
corroborate any accusations whatsoever. This indicates towards arbitrary exercise of powers
which has indeed rendered the petitioner, Mr. Joshua Messi, in a rather helpless situation in a
country foreign to him, even though he holds a valid visa for the purpose of his stay in
Islandia.
In Lapointe v. L’Association34, it has been observed, “The rule (Audi alteram partem) is not
confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is applicable to every tribunal or body
of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to
individuals.” There is thus no reason to doubt that the administrative actions are as much
under the strains of principles of natural Justice as judicial or quasi-judicial decisions
In matters decided by a Govt body, an important aspect is that it a prosecutor as well as the
judge. Therefore, the application of principles of natural justice becomes very important,
while deciding on any such matters. It is a settled law that non-observance of the principles of
natural justice renders the order null and void. 35 The Supreme Court in the Gullapali case 36
held that the authority hearing the matter should decide the same. While a decision-making
body may delegate the task of hearing the evidence to another authority, the hearing officer
should submit a full and adequate report of the evidence to the deciding body, on basis of
which any order can be made. Any order passed otherwise would be invalid on the ground
34
Lapointe v. L'Association, (1906) AC 535(539)
35
Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40; Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 1 All ER 208;
Mayes v Mayes (1971) 2 All ER 401;General Medical Council v. Spackman (1943) 2 All ER 1279. Wade
Administrative Law,1988,pp 467,493,526; DeSmith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1980 pp 240-
47. CK Thakker, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Co, 1992, pp216
36
GullapalliNageswaraRao v. Andra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation AIR 1959 SC 308
16
that there has not been a fair hearing.37 A governing body cannot make a decision for which
there is no evidential basis and it must instruct itself properly as to its facts before reaching
the decision.38These principles are applicable to any decision that affects property rights39,
which includes taking away a person’s livelihood.40
On account of absence of a fair hearing in the present scenario and non-disclosure of

substantial evidences upon which the grounds for issuing a LIN, whatsoever, has left the
petitioner in no position to defend himself and express his stance. One cannot defend himself
against the unknown. The same has thus led to the inference that such notice was based solely
on the newspaper reports and word of mouth, for no substantial evidence was presented
before him as to such a notice must be issued when he has a valid visa for his stay in Islandia.
It is noteworthy that the facts stated in a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary
evidence, unless proved by further corroborative evidence. A report in a newspaper is only
hearsay evidence.41 A newspaper is not one of the documents referred to in Section 78(2) of
the Evidence Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The presumption of
genuineness attached under Section 81 of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be
treated as proved of the facts reported therein. It is now well settled that a statement of fact
contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence in absence
of the maker of the statement appearing in court and deposing to have perceived the fact
reported.42 It is pertinent to disclose all the evidence and material so as to provide an
opportunity to the other party to present his case in its entirety by contradicting anything
prejudicial against it. The same has not been complied with in the case at hand.
Therefore it is submitted that natural justice has been violated. Neither a fair hearing nor any
an opportunity was provided to the petitioner to defend his case. In apprehension of a dispute
between two parties, no decision can be reached by hearing the stance of only either of them
as the same renders it unfair and biased. Such cases set forth the wrong examples too. Re-
emphasising upon the point that the petitioner was not given a chance to be heard before he
was served an LIN by the FRRO and in view of the aforementioned case laws and
contentions, it is humbly submitted that, the order should be held as invalid accordingly.
37
Jeffs v. New Zealand Diary Production & Marketing Board (1967) 1 AC 551
38
Wade Administrative Law (8th edn, 2000, Oxford) at page 278-285; Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude
[1997] 2 Llyod’s Rep 296 at 300, Col 1; Wright v Jockey Club Sir Haydn Tudor Evans, (1995) Times, 16 June
(QBD)
39
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB NS 180
40
Rusell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109
41
Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1988 SC 1274
42
Ibid
17

18
PRAYER
In the light of the facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited the
Petitioner humbly prays before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to graciously adjudge and
declare:
1. The MHA Order dated 27.03.2020 is arbitrary and the detention of the migrant
workers in pursuance of such an order is in violation of their fundamental rights.
2. The order dated 26.03.2020 violates fundamental rights of the workers, and
subsequently the International Labour Organisation Convention ratified by the Union
of Westeros.
3. The sharing of medical data of COVID-19 tested patients with a foreign company
violates their right to privacy.
4. The FIRs against Mr. Oliver is not maintainable and his article entitled “The Ground
Report” falls within the ambit of the freedom of speech and expression.
Also to pass any other order, which the Court may deem fit in the interest of justice,
equity and good conscience.
For This Act of Kindness, the Petitioner Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Respectfully submitted
…………………………….
Counsel(s) for the Petitioner

xi

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1ST JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020

1ST JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA NATIONAL MOOT COURT

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ISLANDIA

IN THE MATTER OF WRIT PETITION FILED U/ART.32 OF THE

WRIT PETITION NO-____/2020

JOSHUA MESSI ( PETITIONER)

UNION OF ISLANDIA (RESPONDENTS)

4. Som Raj v. State of Haryana, (1990) SC 1176.

1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com.

2. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal.

3. SCC Online, http://www.scconline.co.in.

THE PETITIONER APPROACHES THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

PROVIDED THAT NOTHING IN THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL BE DEEMED TO TAKE

The Union of Islandia:

Amendment to the citizenship law of Islandia, the protests and COVID 19

3. In July, 2020, the Government of Union of Islandia passed an amendment to the

Citizenship law protests

5. On 9th August, 2020, Foreigners' Regional Registration Office, Relhi (FRROR)

[B.] WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF SEVERAL LABOUR LAWS BY ALL

[2.1] The suspension of labour laws violate the Fundamental Rights.

[2.2] It violates the International labour Organization ratified by the Union of

[C.] WHETHER THE SHARING OF MEDICAL DATA OF COVID-19 TESTED

[3.1] Right to Information in Consonance with Right to Privacy.

[3.2] That the purpose as stated by the government spokesperson is justified.

[B.] WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF SEVERAL LABOUR LAWS BY ALL

[C.] WHETHER THE SHARING OF MEDICAL DATA OF COVID-19 TESTED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS

I. The instant petition is maintainable

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that instant petition is maintainable as

I.1 The LIN was issued without considering substantive evidence

I.2 The grievance of the petitioner not being heard is valid

Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner

[B.] WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF SEVERAL LABOUR LAWS BY ALL

[2.1] The suspension of labour laws violate the Fundamental Rights.

This writ petition is filed challenging the constitutional validity of the

Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner

Article 23(1) of the Constitution states as follows:

[2.2] It violates the International Labour Organization ratified by the Union of

Principles embodied in these Conventions have found universal acceptance and

Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner

(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;

(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate

[C.] WHETHER THE SHARING OF MEDICAL DATA OF COVID-19 TESTED

[3.1] Right to Information in Consonance with Right to Privacy.

ISSUE 4: WHEATHER THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF

4.1. No fair hearing provided prior to the issuance of LIN.

On account of absence of a fair hearing in the present scenario and non-disclosure of

Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner

Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner

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