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Kemal Atatürk's
politico‐military strategy
in the Turkish war of
independence, 1919–1922:
From Guerrilla warfare to
the decisive battle
a
George W. Gawrych
a
Middle East historian at the Combat Studies
Institute, which serves as the military history
department , US Army Command and General
Staff College , Fort Leavenworth
Published online: 24 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: George W. Gawrych (1988) Kemal Atatürk's politico‐military

strategy in the Turkish war of independence, 1919–1922: From Guerrilla
warfare to the decisive battle, Journal of Strategic Studies, 11:3, 318-341, DOI:
10.1080/01402398808437345

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402398808437345

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 Kemal Atatürk's Politico-Military
Strategy in the Turkish War of
Independence, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 2 : From
Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle
George W. Gawrych

In the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), later

known as Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, mobilized his nation
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around a politico-military strategy of war that, in the final analysis, achieved

an astounding success. Under his leadership, the Turkish people thwarted
Britain, France, Italy, and Greece in their designs to impose a harsh treaty
on the defeated Ottoman Empire after the First World War that would have
partitioned most of Anatolia and eastern Thrace, leaving only a relatively small
area around Ankara as an independent Turkish state. What makes this
accomplishment so amazing is that Atatürk began his resistance against the
Allied Powers without a regular army or a national organization under his
direct control. Yet, at the end of a struggle of almost three-and-a-half years,
he personally commanded an army of over 200,000 men that defeated a Greek
expeditionary force of slightly greater size and better equipment in a decisive
battle whereby the Turks succeeded in driving the Greeks out of Anatolia.
How Kemal conducted his war strategy forms an interesting yet forgotten
chapter in the annals of twentieth-century history.
Western scholars, in their studies of this great man, have focused on
Atatürk's statesmanship after the struggle for independence when he directed
a revolution of amazing magnitude. In 1923, Kemal founded a Turkish nation-
state upon the ashes of the exhausted, multi-national Ottoman empire. Among
the major changes instituted between 1923 and 1938 were the establishment
of a secular republic followed by the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate; the
adoption of a Latin alphabet to replace the Arabic script; the clear separation
of religion and state without any official sect; the implementation of Western
dress, law codes, and calender on the heels of the closure of religious courts
and mystical orders; the pursuance of women's rights; and the acceptance of
Sunday as the day of rest for a Muslim country. To give philosophical content
to these reforms, Kemal eventually developed an ideological platform known
as Kemalism, guided by the six principles of Turkish nationalism, secularism,
republicanism, popularism, statism and revolutionism. Turkish society truly
underwent a major transformation under his guiding hand, and a number of
prominent Middle East statesmen, among them Reza Shah in Iran, Anwar
Sadat in Egypt, and Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, were inspired by his example.
Despite the magnitude of the political, cultural, and legal changes imposed
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 319

on Turkish society over the short span of less than two decades, Atatiirk's
military career deserves serious study as well. Military historians of the First
World War are generally aware of his critical role at Gallipoli in helping defeat
the Allies in their attempt to end the First World War by the capture of
Istanbul. But the history profession in general still fails to appreciate how
Kemal's strategy and actions in Turkey's War of Independence dwarf, in many
respects, his exemplary military leadership in the Gallipoli campaign. In the
nationalist struggle for the territorial integrity of Anatolia and eastern Thrace,
Kemal exhibited the skills of a grand military strategist who proved adept at
building a large national army from the remnants of the Ottoman imperial
army. Consequently, this article, unlike previous studies in the West, focuses
on Atatiirk the military man, and his politico-military strategy for waging a
successful popularist war of liberation against overwhelming odds. In this
regard, Atatiirk stands in marked contrast to such later revolutionaries as Mao
Zedong and Ho Chi Minh who lacked professional careers in the army.
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The Strategic Setting

In the armed struggle to preserve Turkish independence, Mustafa Kemal faced
military forces on several fronts possessing scarce resources and a tired popu-
lation. No Middle Eastern society of this century, with perhaps the sole
exception of Lebanon in recent years, has undergone such a long period of
sustained and widespread violence and terror as experienced by the Turkish
population. So when the First World War came to an end, many Turks were
quite willing to seek an accommodation with the victors at almost any cost.
The cycle of violence in Turkish society went back at least to 1903 and the
Ilinden (St. Elias) Uprising in Macedonia. For the next 15 years, the Ottoman
Empire was continuously engaged in conventional and unconventional war-
fare. During this period, Turks experienced four major Albanian rebellions
(1909-12), revolts in the far-flung province of Yemen, a war with Italy over
Libya (1911-12), and the Balkan Wars (1912-13). Incidents of brigandage,
terrorism, mob violence, and political assassination further disoriented
society, and the toll in lives and emotions was high.1 Then the First World
War required the mobilization of 2,850,000 men to fight on the side of
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria in such diverse theaters as Gallipoli,
the Caucasus, Iraq, Palestine and Galicia. All told, human loss from combat
and disease, according to some estimates, exceeded two million, leaving a
population of 13 million in Anatolia and eastern Thrace.
On 30 October 1918, two weeks before the capitulation of Germany, the
Istanbul government signed the Mondros Armistice, agreeing to open up the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus to Allied occupation; demobilize most of the
Ottoman army; surrender all war vessels; and turn over railroads and telegraph
facilities to Allied officials. But the Allies possessed greater designs than the
temporary occupation of Ottoman territory. In fact, they hoped to carve up
among themselves the remains of the empire based on a number of secret
treaties concluded during the First World War.
After truncating the Arab provinces in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, these
 320 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

going to either France or Britain, the Allied Powers moved forward with plans
for the division of Turkish territory. While the Sultan lost control over Istanbul
and the Straits to an international body, the French would take south-eastern
Anatolia, Italy the southern region around Konya and Antalya, and Britain
the northern coastal areas. Greece planned to expand into western Anatolia,
eastern Thrace, and the Aegean islands, while the Armenians sought to create
an independent state in eastern Anatolia. Some contradictions, latent in the
secret treaties made during the war, surfaced only when the Allies tried to
implement them afterwards. The Italians and the Greeks, for example, both
expected to receive western Anatolia with its prize commercial city of Izmir;
furthermore, Greece wanted Istanbul for itself as part of a modern version
of the medieval Byzantine empire. Eventually, the Allies reached a rather shaky
compromise among themselves and on 10 October 1920 forced the Sultan's
government to accept a partition plan for Turkey in the Treaty of Sevres (see
Map 1). Competing designs among the victors from the First World War,
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however, undermined any meaningful unity of purpose, something Kemal

exploited to the fullest.
After the signing of the Mondros Armistice, the Allies began to occupy
select parts of Turkey. In addition to an Allied fleet moving into the Straits,
the French slowly established themselves in the Antakya and Adana areas;
the British in Samsun, Urfa, and Marash; and the Italians in Antalya and
Konya. Furthermore, the Greeks landed a large expeditionary force in the
Izmir area in May 1919 with the hope of eventually extending their Hellenic
state as far as Ankara. By May 1919, the size of the occupying forces had
reached 40,620 British, 49,500 French, 17,400 Italian, and 64,400 Greek
soldiers for a combined strength of 170,520. Meanwhile, the Armenians sought
to carve an independent state in eastern Anatolia while some European
governments aided the Kurds in their autonomy efforts. The Turks, with a
tired and demoralized army of approximately 50,000 men organized in eight
army corps with 20 divisions, were clearly outnumbered in men and
weapons.2
Several other factors made the strategic situation especially critical for the
Turks. Allied control encompassed the key urban centers, including Istanbul,
the financial and political capital, and the other important cities of Izmir and
Adana, and extended to include the most productive agricultural lands in
Anatolia. The nationalists were left with a small base of human and financial
resources from which to wage an armed struggle. Moreover, any native arms
industry, such as existed, centered in and around Istanbul; so Kemal had to
depend on outside sources for weapons and ammunition, and initially only
the Bolsheviks, who wanted to draw Western attention away from the Russian
civil war, were willing to help him here. Luckily for Kemal, central and eastern
Anatolia were relatively free of foreign troops so that he could base his
resistance movement there. These areas, however, constituted the poorest
sections of Asia Minor, thus placing severe limitations on Kemal's ability to
create a viable armed resistance. In response, Kemal developed a war strategy
that judiciously balanced political and military spheres as warranted by
changing circumstances.
 Mapl
Proposed Partitioning of Turkey under the Treaty of Sevres, 10 August 1920

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 322 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Kemal's Military Career

In formulating a strategy to prevent the partition of his country, Mustafa
Kemal drew upon his own military experience and that of the Ottoman army.
Ottoman military prowess on the battlefield had peaked in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries when sultans commanded large armies and aggressive
navies in a meteoric expansion that stretched the boundries of the empire to
Morocco in the west and Iran in the east, to Austria in the north and Yemen
in the south. Despite two subsequent centuries of military stalemate followed
by gradual retrenchment, being an officer in the army remained a noble
profession sought after by many Turkish youth. Even in the empire's twilight,
boys continued to hear stories of past military exploits and play soldier games
as part of their upbringing.3
Kemal fell under this magical spell at an early age and eventually decided
to make a career out of the military.
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We had a neighbor named Major Kadri Bey. His son, Ahmet, was
studying at the military secondary school [in Thessaloniki] and wore his
military uniform. When I saw him, I decided also to wear such a uniform.
Then I observed officers on the streets. I realized that the road to reaching
this rank required entering the military secondary school.4
Despite strong disapproval of his mother, who desired a religious career for her
only son, Kemal secretly took the entrance exam for the military secondary
school, and after passing it, proudly informed her of the fait accompli. In that
year (1893), Kemal allegedly proclaimed: 'I was born [to be] a soldier'.5
A combination of good fortune and innate ability allowed Kemal to chart
for himself a very successful and distinguished military career as a student,
commander, tactician, and strategist. In 1899, after the completion of his
secondary education in a military school, Kemal entered the military academy
in Istanbul, where in 1902 he graduated eighth out of a class of over 400
students. As a result of this impressive academic performance, Kemal quickly
moved on as a lieutenant to the staff college which in 1905 he finished fifth
of 57, leaving the school with the rank of captain and a member of the select
and prestigious General Staff.6
Although preoccupied for the next years of his life with staff and field
duties, Kemal found time to write on military subjects, a self-generated pursuit
that indicated a personal commitment to professionalism. Among his publi-
cations were translations of two manuals dealing with small unit tactics of
platoon and company levels. In 1913, he wrote a commentary entitled
Conversations with 'The Officer and the Commander' on a seminar held by
his officer friend Nuri Conker to analyze the state of the Ottoman army after
its defeat in the Balkan Wars (1912-13).7
In additional to his formal military education and writing, Kemal gained
a vast amount of combat experience at various levels of command. Between
1905 and 1912, he conducted 'counter-insurgency' operations against tribal
and other irregular forces in Syria and Albania, whereas in Libya the roles
reversed and Kemal, who generally faced superior forces, carried on a
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 323

campaign against the Italian army using Arab tribesmen in guerrilla tactics.
At the battle of Derne, for example, he faced an Italian force estimated at
15,000 to 16,000 with only 8 Turkish officers, 100 regular soldiers, and 7,700
Arab tribesmen. To help mobilize the Arabs in Libya under the Ottoman
banner, Kemal even went 'native' like Lawrence of Arabia by dressing in local
attire to help win the confidence of important tribal chiefs.8 In the Balkan
Wars and the First World War, he experienced large-scale, conventional
warfare both as a staff officer and field commander, often serving under
German generals in the latter. It is at Gallipoli in 1915, however, that Kemal
etched for himself a place in military history as an outstanding and courageous
commander.
For the Dardanelles Campaign, Kemal, a lieutenant-colonel, took command
of the 19th Infantry Division, a reserve unit under the German commander
Liman von Sanders. During the heat of combat, Kemal, unlike his superiors
who expected the main attack elsewhere, anticipated its occurrence at
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Conkbayiri and took the initiative of committing his division without awaiting
approval from higher headquarters. Yet, success resulted from this bold and
very risky move, but not without Kemal inserting himself into the battle to
rally his men, who had lost their courage, with the words: 'There is no flight
from the enemy. There is [only] fighting with the enemy. If you have no
ammunition, [then] you [still] have [your] bayonets.' Such courageous words
sparked his troops into regaining their confidence so that they held their
beleaguered position. Later in the campaign, Kemal made his now immortal-
ized command: 'I am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you to die.
In the time that it takes us to die, other forces and commanders can come and
take our place.' In one engagement, Kemal even suffered a superficial wound,
saved miracuously by his watch that caught the flying shrapnel. After the
Turkish victory at the Dardanelles, Kemal eventually emerged with a deserved
reputation in the Turkish army as a senior commander who inspired his troops
by leading from the front.
The Dardanelles Campaign proved of great importance for the war on the
eastern front in Europe, and Kemal received a promotion to colonel for his
critical role in it. The British official historian would later write of him:
'Seldom in history can the exertions of a single divisional commander have
exercised, on three separate occasions, so profound an influence not only on
the course of a battle, but perhaps on the fate of a nation.'9 By defeating the
Allies in their attempt to take Istanbul in a decisive amphibious operation,
the Ottomans, now with the capital secure, settled down to fighting on the
borders of the empire; Russia, for her part, lost an opportunity of gaining
a vital supply line for the war effort against the Germans. The war would
continue much longer as a result, and with it the Bolshevik Revolution.
The years 1917 and 1918 saw Kemal gain some successes against the
Russians in eastern Turkey, but the empire's situation had gradually become
desperate. Kemal last command involved saving part of an Ottoman army
through an orderly retreat from Palestine and Syria in the face of advancing
forces under the command of General Allenby. By the end of the First World
War, Kemal, now a brigadier-general, emerged as the most successful Ottoman
 324 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

field commander, well known throughout the General Staff for his courage
and intuitive feel for the battle.
In addition to emerging from the First World War with a number of
admirers, Kemal built a loose association of friends in the army, young officers
like himself, who had opposed the policies of the ruling clique known as the
Committee of Union and Progress. Among the items the group found most
objectionable were the army's involvement in politics and the empire's entry
into the war. Now these individuals would play a critical role in helping lay
the groundwork for Kemal's nationalist movement and then in commanding
troops during the war for independence.10
At the end of 1918 and into the first half of 1919, Kemal, who had returned
to Istanbul from the Palestinian front, emerged as the most vociferous critic of
any compromise on the unity and independence of Turkey. He called upon the
army to stop its demobilization as required by the armistice, instead urging
commanders to keep their weapons rather than hand them over to Allies. He
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encouraged able and young commanders to remain with their units and others
to seek transfers to Anatolia where he expected the main struggle to begin, and
friends in the war ministry helped him in the latter."
Kemal quickly became an embarrassment to Istanbul government and a
nuisance to the Allies. Expecting arrest soon, Kemal engineered an important
assignment in Anatolia, one that removed him from the watchful eyes of the
Allies, but one which gave him ample authority to begin rallying armed forces
to his side. On 7 May 1919, Shakir Pasha, the war minister, signed an order
appointing Kemal to the post of inspector general for the Ottoman Ninth
Army, that comprised the XV Corps in Erzurum and the III Corps in Sivas. But
his authority extended not only over a force not much over 20,000 officers and
men, but also over all civil servants in the area. His area of responsibility
included the easternmost provinces of Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, and Van as
well as the independent districts of Erzincan and Canik. But the government
directed all military and civil authorities in the neighboring provinces of
Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Elazig, Ankara, and Kastamonu to take his advise seriously.
Istanbul assigned him the task to bring peace and security to areas under his
jurisdiction and to remove any independent organizations and armies formed
outside of Istanbul's control, so that all commanders in his area had to com-
municate directly with him concerning matters of operations and security.12
When the British learned of Kemal's appointment, they tried to arrest him,
but it proved too late: Kemal had managed to sneak out of Istanbul on a boat
with a select staff of approximately twenty officers. On 19 May 1919, this small
party landed at Samsun, a town on the Black Sea, enroute to eastern Anatolia.
Many Turkish historians date the commencement of the War of Independence
with this event.

Kemal's Initial War Strategy

At Samsun, Mustafa Kemal already possessed a clear objective for his
nationalist movement and a strategy for implementing it. The Turks had to
preserve their independence and unity of Anatolia and eastern Thrace which
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 325

could only occur with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Turkish
territory and the removal of all vestiges of foreign domination. Such a goal
allowed no compromise; so victory had to be unconditional. Achieving this
noble objective thus became a life and death struggle, for the very existence
of the nation was at stake. Consequently, one slogan of the nationalist move-
ment became 'Either Independence or Death' (Ya Istiklal, Ya Oltim).
Given Turkey's disadvantageous situation at the beginning, Kemal view-
ed the future armed struggle very much along the lines of total war, topyekun
savas in Turkish, although he never specifically used the term.13
To speak of war means not only two armies but [in essence] two nations
coming face to face and fighting against one another with all their being
and all their resources, involving both material and spiritual forces. For
this reason, I had to interest the whole Turkish nation in thought,
sentiment, and action in the same way as the army on the front.14
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Thus, in his mind, three main entities of the nation (millet), the constituent
assembly (meclis), and the army (ordu) waged war, and politics had to drive
military plans. The pressing question concerned how to bring about this fusion
into one force, and the political culture and international environment of the
time shaped Kemal's formation of a strategy for conducting total war.
When Kemal disembarked at Samsun, the Turks possessed no national
organization dedicated to opposing the partition of the country. Although
the Sultan-Caliph in Istanbul had signed an armistice pledging to end all
hostilities, numerous political committees for resistance to foreign occupation
spontaneously sprang up throughout the country, but these were for the most
part local in composition, often possessing only a small militia force. A central
organization for coordinating all such activity was lacking, as was a military
command planning an armed resistance by the regular army. Kemal thus faced
the twofold task of unifying these disparate organizations while at the same
time galvanizing the rest of the nation into action for the unconditional
independence of Turkey.
The legitimate government in Istanbul was under the nominal leadership
of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, Mehmet VI, and the prestige of the Ottoman
dynasty built on six centuries of imperial rule made any formal break with
this venerable institution rather risky. As Kemal remarked later: 'That the
country could possibly be saved without a Caliph and without a Padishah
[Sultan] was an idea too impossible for them [the people] to comprehend."5
Perhaps there was even hope the Sultan might come around, but that fell to
the ground as the monarch came to regard the nationalist movement as a threat
to his own authority. To deflect any criticism of being a radical and atheist,
Kemal carefully portrayed his movement as in the name of the Ottoman Sultan,
whom he eventually depicted as a prisoner in his own palace. This stance helped
garner the support of conservative individuals - many of them clerics - who
still possessed an uncompromising attachment to the Ottoman Sultanate-
Caliphate.
Historical circumstances thus dictated the insurgency develop outside the
legitimate channels of government, and Kemal chose to appeal directly to the
 326 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

people and gain their support for his program, in a sense attempting to build
his nationalist movement from the bottom up. Popular support in turn would
provide him with the financial and human resources imperative for creating
an army for waging war. The instrument for achieving this was to be a duly
elected parliament. As Kemal once clearly stated: 'First the constituent
assembly, then the army. {Once meclis, sonra ordu'.) He also noted that 'The
constituent assembly is not a theory, it is a truth. It is the nation which will
create the army, but the constituent assembly acts in the name of the
nation."5
In essence, Kemal ranked the nation (millet), the constituent assembly
(meclis), and the army (ordu) in order of ascending importance for the success-
ful execution of war, all organically linked in a sacred trinity. Parliament, in
addition to mobilizing the nation for the war effort, served as an effective
means for presenting a united national front to the international community
in future peace negotiations. 'It is absolutely necessary that a National
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Assembly shall be formed to protect the country from foreign influence and
be independent of all control, so that it will be free to examine the position
of the nation and assert its rights before the world."7
Kemal, despite coming from an imperial tradition in which the concepts
of state (devlet) and government (hiikumet) were paramount, nevertheless used
the term meclis or constituent assembly as equivalent to government. Several
factors help explain Kemal's populist thinking on the subject of war. Certainly,
European military thought of the nineteenth century recognized the importance
of national will in waging war, and Kemal, who had studied under German
instructors at the staff college in Istanbul, no doubt was exposed to this military
thinking. Furthermore, the Ottoman experience of dealing unsuccessfully with
nationalist uprising by both non-Muslim and Muslim minorities - which
resulted in the creation of such independent states as Greece, Bulgaria, and
Albania — had clearly demonstrated to many Turks the power of nationalism
in mobilizing the civilian populace in an armed struggle.
Moreover, the Ottomans themselves also had experimented with a
democratic form of government for over ten years before the war for indepen-
dence. Since the revolution of July 1908, numerous parties had competed in
elections for seats in the Ottoman parliament, so that going to the people with
programs had become part of the new political culture. Certainly not all the
elections held during this period were free, and enfranchisement extended to
only a small percentage of the population. Nevertheless, the people and
parliament had become a factor in politics. Finally, President Woodrow
Wilson had articulated his principle of self-determination as the basis for a
political settlement after the First World War, including in his equation Turks
as one of the legitimate ethnic groups. A small group of Turks, affected by
Wilson's noble idea, actually formed a political society for the main purpose
of receiving an American mandate as the best means of preventing the partition
of Turkish territory. Kemal, acutely aware of international politics, thus
regarded the constitutent assembly as the best means of demonstrating the
will of the people for self-determination. But forming this parliament would
prove no easy matter.
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 327

First Phase: Toward a National Assembly (19 May 1919-23 April 1920)
On 22 June 1919, Kemal met with three Ottoman army corps commanders
in the town of Amasya, south of Samsun, and drafted a document appealing
for a general resistance to foreign occupation. Among the Protocol's main
points were that the independence and the unity of the country were in danger;
that the government in Istanbul was incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities;
and that, therefore, the nation must take it upon itself to preserve its national
independence. Furthermore, to mobilize the nation, provinces and districts
were asked to elect delegates for a national congress to take place in Sivas,
a town east of Ankara; in the interim, a regional congress would take place
in Erzurum. Kemal then secretly sent out the circular to select civil and military
authorities.
The Istanbul government, now concerned about Kemal's intentions,
dispatched an official to arrest him, but the man failed to get the local
commander in Erzican to help in carrying out the order. Kemal, sensing the
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inevitable break with Istanbul, resigned his commission in the Ottoman army,
doing so in a letter to the war minister dated 8 July. The resignation brought
Kemal a great deal of anxiety and concern, for he feared being unable to
influence the army and the people without his military position. Fortunately,
Brigadier Kazim Karabekir, commander of the XV Army Corps in Erzurum,
the largest and best equipped unit in the army, offered his undivided loyalty
to Kemal, thereby easing the personal drama from his unprecedented act.l8
Kemal, quickly rebounding from his brief bout with doubt, boldly turned
his resignation into a test case of whether the nation backed his program or the
timid policy of the Sultan's government.
Henceforth I continued to do my duty according to the dictates of my
conscience, free from any official rank and restriction, trusting solely
to the devotion and magnanimity of the nation itself, from whom I drew
strength, energy and inspiration as from an inexhaustible spring.19
Now to demonstrate he had the support of the people, Kemal used the vehicle
of regional and national congresses.
His strategy bore fruit, for congresses did serve to set the stage for the
eventual creation of a nationalist parliament, Kemal himself participating in
twoof them. The first of these met from 23 July to 7 August 1919 in the eastern
city of Erzurum, arranged in advance by his then close ally Kazim Karabekir.
The Erzurum Congress carried a regional character because it brought together
approximately 50 delegates from only the eastern provinces of Bitlis, Erzurum,
Silvas, and Trabzon. Those desiring to come from the neighboring regions of
Elazig, Mardin, and Diyarbakir found their road blocked by occupation forces
intent on preventing the development of a nationalist movement.
After being elected chairman of the congress, Kemal almost immediately
faced an important challenge, this one concerning the nature of authority of
the nationalist movement, before he could assume the rostrum. A number of
delegates voiced their opposition to Kemal wearing his military uniform with
its decorations out of fear that he would eventually establish a regime based
 328 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

on personal rule. Kemal agreed to remove his military garb, and now a civilian
appeared before the delegates gathered in Erzurum.20
Kemal, in his first official speech to the congress, beckoned the nation to
exhibit a 'spirit of heroism' in defense of the motherland, invoking the contem-
porary examples of Egyptian, Indian, and Afghan resistance to European im-
perialism. If the people chose to remain passive, certain partition awaited the
nation. Adamantly rejecting such a possibility, Kemal called upon the Turkish
people to be willing to spill blood for a noble cause of independence. The
emotional speech ended with an appeal to Muslim religious sentiments with the
assertion that the Islamic religion expected defense of one's sacred motherland
(vatari).21
At the end of the congress, the delegates had arrived at some very historic
decisions which were then communicated throughout the country. Among the
most important ones were the claim for the indivisability of Ottoman lands; the
affirmation of the will to fight if necessary; and the need for the establishment
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of a provisional government. The congress also created an executive board

known as The Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye). Consisting of
seven members, including Kemal as president, this body claimed to represent all
of Anatolia in the national struggle. Finally, all Muslims were declared members
of a new national party, the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern
Anatolia.
A national congress in Sivas, covering the period 4-11 September 1919,
followed the regional one held in Erzurum. Some 40 delegates, this time rep-
resenting western and central parts of Anatolia, from as far away as Thrace,
confirmed the decisions reached at Erzurum, but made a few additions of wider
significance. The Sivas Congress, to allow for a broader representation of
Anatolia, increased the size of the Representative Committee to 13 members in
order to make room for individuals coming from other parts of the country. To
reinforce the national character of this congress, Kemal changed the name of
the party to the Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli,
the latter term meaning the European part of Turkey.
Because both congresses approved the clear and uncompromising political
goals outlined in the Amasya Protocol, Kemal could now claim, with some
degree of credibility, that his resistance movement represented a large segment
of Turkish society. Yet, even at this stage, Kemal still refrained from claiming
to replace the Sultan's cabinet with himself as the head of a new government,
and apparently no one in his camp even contemplated such a drastic move.22
Judicious caution continued to characterize his dealings with the Sultan's
government in Istanbul.
In October 1919, Sultan Mehmet VI, who had failed to have Kemal arrested
during the Erzurum Congress and sent to Istanbul, now tried to reach some
compromise with the Kemalist movement. He replaced the cabinet of his
favorite Damat Ferid Pasa with a more neutral one headed by AH Riza and then
dispatched a government delegation to meet with Kemal at Amasya on 20-22
October. Although no signing of a protocal took place, the meeting accorded
certain recognition by Istanbul of the growing popularity and power of the
nationalists.
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 329

On 21 December 1919, the Sultan closed down the Ottoman Parliament,

thereby succumbing to domestic pressures calling for elections. Kemal
welcomed the idea of elections, but argued for the Ottoman parliament to meet
in Anatolia, rightly fearing the Allied presence in Istanbul would eventually
undermine the integrity of any parliament. But opposition to him on this issue,
even from within the nationalist movement, forced him to alter his strategy. In
the long run, however, this seeming defeat turned into a political victory that
fundamentally changed the character of the nationalist movement.
Elections for a new parliament took place throughout the country in
December 1919, and candidates supportive of the nationalist cause won a
majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Even Kemal gained a seat as
one of the representatives for the city of Erzurum; he wisely chose, however,
not to go to Istanbul, where certain arrest awaited him. Instead, he opted to
meet with many deputies en route to Istanbul in order to plot strategy before
the opening of the new parliament. When the Chamber of Deputies opened at
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the beginning of 1920, Kemal worked through his supporters, who formed their
own party, to apply pressure on the Sultan's government.
On 17 February 1920, the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies precipitated a
crisis by accepting Kemal's program that had become known at the Erzurum
Congress as the National Pact (Misak-i Milli). This vote in favor of uncon-
ditional independence flew in the face of the European Powers, who were still
determined to proceed with the partition of the country, and the Sultan, who
felt threatened by independent character of Kemal's movement. Both parties,
therefore, colluded in closing down the Ottoman Parliament in March 1920
and in arresting as many deputies as could be found, although many managed
to escape the police. Allied troops now occupied Istanbul removing any illusion
of an independent Turkish government. This drastic step served to discredit the
Sultan's government and dramatically shifted moral legitimacy to Kemal's
cause. Now Kemal could move to establish a nationalist government in Ankara.

Second Phase: The Grand National Assembly as Commander-in-Chief,

23 April 1920-5 August 1921
Mustafa Kemal seized the opportunity provided by the Sultan's closure of the
Ottoman Parliament to create a provisional government in Ankara, the capital
of the nationalist movement since December 1919. He invited all the deputies
from the dissolved Ottoman parliament to come to Ankara where he promised
the convening of a new assembly. Ninety-two deputies fled to Ankara, among
them the last president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, whose presence
symbolized continuity with the last legally elected Ottoman parliament. To
ensure proper representation from all areas of the country, Kemal ordered each
province to elect delegates to the assembly scheduled to meet in Ankara. The
general election, and by most accounts relatively 'open and honest', took place
according to the Ottoman electoral law with its indirect system of primary and
secondary electors.23
On 23 April 1920, the Grand National Assembly (Biiyiik Millet Meclisi)
opened with 115 deputies coming from around the country, the others j oining
 330 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

later. This parliament truly mirrored the social backgrounds and political
persuasions of society at large, including some 41 senior government officials,
such as ambassadors and governors; 51 army officers; 40 civil servants; 51
lawyers; 25 teachers; 17 college instructors; 15 doctors; 17 religious function-
aries; 13 newspapermen and writers; 27 merchants; eight leaders of religious
orders; six tribal chiefs; three bankers; two engineers; 31 farmers; one worker;
and 42 of unknown occupations.24 Naturally, such a diverse group spanned
the political spectrum from conservative religious to secular socialist, although
virtually all were united behind the idea of fighting to preserve the unity and
independence of Anatolia and Thrace.
With the creation of a nationalist parliament through elections, Kemal
gained the moral authority necessary to break formally with Istanbul and to
claim that the Assembly was the sole representative of the people. The
nationalists created a political system, reinforced later by the Constitution of
21 January 1921, based on the principle of a unity of powers {Kuvvetler birligi),
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which in effect meant the Grand National Assembly possessed both legislative
and executive authority and elected a council of ministers. The latter, first
referred to as 'The Committee of Executive Deputies', functioned as the
executive arm of the Assembly with 11 ministries, including those of defense,
foreign affairs, interior, and finance. The Assembly elected Kemal as its
President, thus making him the civilian head of the government.
Initially, everything seemed to work perfectly for Kemal in parliament, but
the honeymoon period proved brief indeed. Controlling a disparate group of
individuals would have taxed any man, and it certainly did a great deal one
such as Kemal, who apparently possessed some unrealistic expectations on
how the Grand National Assembly would actually function under his leader-
ship. When he had headed the Representative Committee, which never met
as an entire group, Kemal conviently made numerous decisions using its name,
a practise which disturbed even some of his supporters in the army.25 Perhaps
he expected a similar arrangement, but by mid 1921, nascent parties emerged
in the Grand National Assembly to challenge Kemal's authority so that during
parliamentary sessions Kemal frequently found lively debate and even outright
criticism of his leadership and policies. Thus, the Grand National Assembly
came to assert itself as a body for debating, formulating, and executing policy,
and one major area of contention concerned the conduct of the war.
In the first year of the nationalist struggle, Kemal lacked a large army to
mount a maj or war effort against the occupying forces. In western Anatolia, for
example, the Turks initially had only 2,000 regular troops to oppose the Greek
expeditionary force of 60,000 landing at Izmir in May 1919. So Turkish units
withdrew in the face of superior forces and employed guerrilla tactics. Owing
to the disparity in men and equipment, nationalist forces practised a strategy of
trading space for time. Fortunately for the Turks, the Allies lacked enough
manpower with which to occupy with large units the interior part of Anatolia.
The Grand National Assembly addressed the issue of an army in the law of
20 May 1920 which created the positions of chief of the General Staff, who
assumed responsibility for military operations and education, and the minister
for national defense, who handled administrative and logistical support for the
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 331

army. Fevzi Cakmak, who had been a war minister in Istanbul, became the
defense minister, and Ismet lnonu was chief of the General Staff; both men had
left Istanbul in 1920 to join the nationalist movement. Kemal actually exercised
control over the army through these two individuals, but in theory, and some-
times even in practise, the Assembly as a body was the commander-in-chief. The
Constitution of 20 January 1921 stated this clearly: 'the authority of command
and control [over the army resides] in the spiritual personality of the Grand
National Assembly'. To many senior commanders, including those concerned
that Kemal not establish a dictatorship, this arrangement in essence meant the
army lacked a head, which, in turn, undermined the imperative of unity of
purpose and command, one of the timeless principles of war. The chief of the
General Staff, as a member of the cabinet, for example, often found himself
debating with deputies in the capital instead of spending time at the fronts.26
While attempting to build a large national army, Kemal, in addition to
facing a military challenge from the occupation forces, had to deal with
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numerous rebellions throughout the country against the nationalist movement.

Thus, Kemal felt it imperative to absorb all independent militias into a single
army, but a number of powerful militia chiefs, who desired to maintain their
independence and power base, resisted the authority of regular officers in their
area. These individuals found allies in the Grand National Assembly who
successfully blocked attempts at altering the structure of the armed forces.
The main culprit in this endeavor was Ethem, whose own force in western
Anatolia numbered around 3,000 men. It finally took a failed military
operation, the Gediz Offensive of October 1920, in which militia forces refused
to coordinate their activities with regular army units, to convince the deputies
of the wisdom of Kemal's call for a single army. A majority of the members
in parliament now swung to KemaFs side, and at the end of December 1920,
the Grand National Assembly ordered all militias to submit to the authority
of the regular army.27 Implementation of this directive came about not
without some clashes between regular units and local militia.
At the beginning of 1921, nationalist prospects looked much improved com-
pared with the situation in May 1919. Not only did Kemal have his parliament
and a standing army, but some victories had occurred on the battlefield, in
particular in the east. There, the XV Army Corps commanded by Kazim
Karabekir defeated an Armenian army, thereby not only killing any chances of
an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia, but also allowing the transfer of much
needed units to the western front where the Greek expeditionary force had not
yet launched its major offensive from the environs around Izmir. The military
victory in the east brought with it an important diplomatic gain: on 16 March
1921, the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship directly with the nationalists,
thereby according them international recognition. Then, Italy abandoned her
designs in Anatolia on 2 July 1921 after the Turkish victory over the Greeks at
the Second Battle of lnonu (27 March-2 April 1921). These two treaties gave
the Ankara government an important measure of legitimacy on the inter-
national level, and they also left France, Britain, and Greece as the main
adversaries in Anatolia. Hope of further victories grew until the Greeks
mounted a major offensive aimed at the heart of the nationalist government.
 332 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Third Phase: Ataturk as the Commander-in-Chief, 5 August 1921-September

1922
The problem of carrying out an armed struggle with an elected assembly that
functioned as both the government and the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces created a constitutional crisis. In the end, Kemal re-evaluated his war
strategy which had placed so much emphasis on the institution of the consti-
tuent assembly as the means for mobilizing the entire population.
The darkest days of the War for Independence began with the second Greek
offensive of July 1921, an operation that nearly resulted in the destruction
of the Turkish army on the western front and the capture of Ankara. The
important cities of Eskisehir, Kutahya, and Afyon with their vital railway
connections quickly fell into Greek hands and forced the Turks to withdraw
their forces to the Sakarya River, close to Ankara. Many realized the next
battle would be for the life or death of the resistance movement, and with it
perhaps rested even the fate of the nation. Consequently, panic spread through
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the streets of Ankara as plans were made for the withdrawal of the seat of
government to a city further east.
Frightened by the distinct possibility of a crushing defeat, many deputies
now turned to Kemal for salvation, urging him to assume full responsibility
for the dire situation. In order to meet the grave military danger with every
available resource, Kemal went before the Grand National Assembly to request
extraordinary powers with the cogent argument that in this most critical hour
Turkish soldiers needed a single commander who possessed freedom to act
quickly and decisively without the restraints of parliamentary debate. After
some discussion, the Grand National Assembly agreed and passed on 5 August
1921, Law 144 appointing Kemal the Commander-in-Chief (Ba$komutari) of
the Turkish Armed Forces with the power and the authority to issue decrees
with the force of law in the name of the Grand National Assembly. But
the Assembly placed two restrictions on the commander-in-chief: the position
was limited to a period of three months, subject to renewal only by an
act of parliament, and the Assembly reserved the right to remove Kemal
if for any reason it saw fit to do so.28 Despite these two limitations, Law
144 fundamentally altered the political system of the nationalist government:
Kemal now possessed dictatorial powers, combining in his person both
political and military authority in the positions of president of the Assembly
and commander-in-chief.
Kemal made immediate use of Law 144 to reorganize the high command
for the purpose of ensuring unity of command and purpose under the direction
of the new commander-in-chief. Kemal placed the chief of the General Staff
and the defense minister directly under him, now distancing these individuals
somewhat from political vicissitudes of the Assembly. To exercise better
command and control over operations and training, he created a general head-
quarters that included a bureau of eight individuals called 'The Secretariat
of the Commander-in-Chief (Ba$komtanlik Kalemi) for ensuring the imple-
mentation of his directives.29
Kemal moved decisively and unequivocally to mobilize the entire population
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 333

behind the war effort. On 7/8 August 1921, the National Obligation Law
(Tekalif-i Milliye) required all Turks to place all available resources at the
disposal of the government, and the Ankara government requisitioned from
the civilian population such basic items as clothes, shoes, socks, gasoline,
transport vehicles, animals, rifles, guns, and ammunition for use by the army
according to the following formula:
1. every household provide a pair of shoes, socks, and underwear;
2. all men's clothing in stores be turned over to the army for later
compensation;
3. 40 per cent of all food and gasoline supplies be requisitioned;
4. owners of transport vehicles provide free transportation for the army;
5. 20 per cent of all farm animals and carts be handed over to the war
effort; and
6. owners of rifles, guns, and ammunition must surrender them.
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To ensure complete compliance wtih the new law, special courts, called
'Independence Courts', were created to punish deserters, conscript citizens
for the army, and try violators of the new law.
After obtaining dictatorial powers, Kemal informed his army commanders
that a total war pitting two regular armies in a decisive battle awaited the nation
and the army. On the day following the promulgation of Law 144, he issued
a circular stating that henceforth 'the only goal' (tek qaye) left was 'the
annihilation (imha) of the enemy's army'.30 Total war did not mean taking
the struggle into Greece or killing every Greek soldier on Turkish soil, but
rather decisively defeating the Greek expeditionary force so that the Turks
could dictate the final political terms of peace. But Kemal had to await a more
propitious moment to fight this decisive battle; first, he had to stop the Greek
offensive threatening the nationalist capital.
Law 144 also provided Kemal with the means to change the dynamics of
command on the battlefield, and so he personally went to the Sakarya River
to lead the Turkish army. But because there was no provision for Kemal to
have an official rank in the army other than that of being its commander-in-
chief, he chose to lead his troops at the front in a soldier's uniform without
rank or insignia. At Erzurum, Kemal had perhaps unthinkingly expected to
enter the first session of the regional congress with his military uniform but
had to remove it owing to a challenge from a deputy. Now, over a year later,
he departed Ankara dressed in the Assembly's mantle of military authority
which had been bestowed on him legally.
Then came the litmus test for the new commander-in-chief against the Greek
army threatening the nationalist capital. The fierce Battle of Sakarya lasted
from 23 August to 13 September 1921, pitting approximately 100,000 Turks
against 120,000 Greeks. Here, Kemal adopted defensive tactics that departed
from the linear defense system practised in much of the First World War.
Creating strongpoints atop hills and other suitable terrain, he adopted a mobile
type of defense, even allowing Greeks to make penetrations which he then
countered by employing his reserves. To his critics in the Assembly, who
perhaps found comfort in continuous trenches, Kemal explained his defensive
 334 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

strategy thus: 'There is no line of defense, but a area of defense. That area
of defense is the motherland'.31 This concept rested on flexibility of response
and rapidity of movement, not a rigidity of positional warfare. And the
Turkish defenses stubbornly held as Kemal always managed to reinforce
positions with his reserves. Eventually, the Greek offensive turned into a
retreat, saved from becoming a complete rout by the fact that Kemal lacked
the forces and logistics to pursue his adversary. Although the Greeks managed
to withdraw to defensive positions east of the cities of Eskisehir, Afyon, and
Kutahya, the victory of Sakarya permanently shifted the initiative to the
Turkish side (see Map 2).
The inhabitants of Ankara welcomed Kemal upon his return from Sakarya
as a national hero and the deputies of the Grand National Assembly awarded
him the military rank of Field Marshal (mu$ir) and the prestigious title of Gazi
or holy warrior, that is one who fights against the infidels in the name of the
Muslim faith. The victory at Sakarya also brought a diplomatic triumph, for
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on 20 October 1921, France, now convinced of the Turkish mettle, signed a

peace agreement with Kemal that resulted in the withdrawal of French troops
from the region of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia. Now only Britain and
Greece remained in contention for Turkish territory.
Kemal, despite his military and diplomatic successes, still found the
Assembly just as independent-minded as before Sakarya. Because the Turkish
army was unable to exploit its victory at Sakarya, the western front stabilized
with neither side launching any major operations for nearly a year. Matters
in Assembly, however, became somewhat heated as deputies agitated for
an offensive to break the stalemate, but Kemal adamantly resisted any rash
action, arguing that final victory would come only after the army increased
its manpower and supplies through an extended period of preparation.
Kemal methodically prepared the army through the holding of military
conferences and seminars; the intensification of military education and
training, both for officers and enlisted men; and the conduct of divisional
and corps size maneuvers.32 He cleverly concentrated his cavalry in a separate
corps, the 5th, of three divisions comprising over 10,000 officers and men.33
This force provide Kemal with the mobility necessary to outflank the Greek
army and break into its rear thereby causing its collapse. Most probably, Kemal
learned much from his painful experience of having to direct a humiliating
retreat in the face of Allenby's cavalry which had broken through the Turkish
lines during the Palestine campaign of 1918.
During this period of critical preparations, Kemal three times had to
renew his position as commander-in-chief, each time arguing a decisive
victory could only be achieved by decisive leadership. Essentially, his argu-
ments rejected the ability of Turkey's democratic institution to lead the nation
in the final phase of the war when, according to him, political and military
objectives, for all practical purposes at least, become one. In other words,
politics meant nothing without a major victory on the battlefield. On 6 May
1922, for instance, when requesting a third extension as commander-in-chief,
he stated that
 KEMAL ATATtiRK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 335
Map 2
Greek-Turkish Line After the Battle of Sakarya

Sea of Marmara
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One of the important words of Selahettin Bey is his view that our most
important duty is to make policy. No gentlemen. Our most important
and basic duty is not to make policy. The only duty that we and the
country have [before us] is to repulse with our bayonets the enemy which
is occupying our lands. If this is not done, politics remains a meaningless
word.34
 336 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

This line of reasoning to support a extension of dictatorial powers represented

a modification of the position Kemal held at the beginning of the national
struggle when the nation, the constituent assembly, and the army formed
the holy trinity for waging war. Now, the commander-in-chief in the person
of Kemal served as the inseparable link among the three entities (see Chart 1).
Chart 1
Mustafa Kemal's War Strategy

Phase 1 to Battle of Sakarya

\ NATION j — » — | ASSEMBLY | fr» -\ ARMY

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Phase 2 from Battle of Sakarya through the Great Offensive

| NATION } - » H ASSEMBLY |—>—\ CINC |—>—4 ARMY~1

Much had changed since May 1919: the nation was now mobilized through its
elected parliament, and the Greek army, composed of over 200,000 men,
occupied one-third of Anatolia without any prospect of withdrawing. Kemal
was too pragmatic to adhere to an idea rigidly if the situation called for new
tactics and strategy.
A year of dedicated preparation under the firm hand of Kemal at last
ushered in the day of reckoning on 26 August 1922 with the commencement
of the Great Offensive, or Biiytik Taarruz in Turkish historiography.
Commander-in-Chief and Field Marshal Kemal, located at a field headquarters
near the front, commanded a force of approximately 200,000 men - 16
infantry and five cavalry divisions - organized into two field armies,
one cavalry corps, and a special task force (see Chart 2). The Greeks,
dispersed along a front stretching from Eskisehir in the north of Afyon
in the south, possessed an army slightly larger in size, divided into corps,
each Greek corps being roughly equal in size to of a Turkish field army.
Kemal chose to make the main effort at Afyon rather than at Eskisehir,
as expected by the Greeks. He concentrated his forces on the southern flank
of the Greek forces of Afyon hoping to cut any retreat to Izmir by a penetration
of the 5 th Cavalry Corps into the rear at the Ahir Mountains. This cavalry
corps and the reinforced First Army would launch the main attack on 26
August 1922, while Second Army made a secondary attack all along the front
from Afyon to Eskisehir with the hope of delaying the Greeks into committing
of their reserves until it was too late. The plan carried a major risk in the north
at Eskisehir, where Kemal left 10,000 Turkish soldiers on the road to Ankara
facing a Greek army corps of over 40,000 men (see Map 3).
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 337

Chart 2
Organization of Turkish Army, 26 August 1922
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xix m m xxx

The plan proved brilliant, and the execution of it went extremely well.
To achieve the necessary surprise at the point of breakthrough, Kemal
succeeded in transfering at night without detection a large part of his army
from the north to the south while on the diplomatic front he made overtures
suggesting a new willingness to negotiate a peace. At the point of break-
through, the Turks achieved a five to one superiority with the 5th Cavalry
Corps positioned to strike deep and cut the railroad connection with Izmir.
On the first day of the battle, both field armies broke through the Greek
lines and then pursued the retreating Greek forces until they captured
the front commander and a number of his senior officers. Then, Kemal,
who followed events closely near the front, ordered the pursuit to the
sea, and units of Turkish cavalry reached Izmir by 9 September, travelling
a distance of 400 kilometers in nine days. Kemal could not allow the Greeks
to form new defensive positions, hence the blitzkrieg-like push to the Aegean
Sea. The Greek army corps at Eskisehir, strategically outflanked, had
no choice but to beat a quick retreat to Greece or face the prospect of
encirclement.35
What began as a quasi-inusrgency ended in a war of annihilation with a
decisive victory of the Turkish army over the Greek expeditionary force in
Anatolia. Greece and Turkey signed an armistice on 11 October 1922, but the
Turks still had to get the allied forces stationed in an around Istanbul out of the
 338 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Map 3
Disposition of Opposing Forces on 26 August 1922
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country. Diplomatic negotiations for a final settlement, however, dragged on

for over six months with Allied forces still in control of Istanbul and the Straits.
To head the Turkish delegation, Kemal selected Ismet Inonii, the front
commander for the Great Offensive, and his presence symbolized the un-
conditional victory achieved by the Turkish army over Allied Powers in
Anatolia. With a military victory and the support of the people demonstrated
 KEMAL ATATURK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 339

in the Grand National Assembly, Kemal presented an unbeatable position

to the European Powers: the Turkish nation had united and defeated the
imperialist designs of several European states determined to partition the
country, and the Grand National Assembly attested to the national will
in the spirit of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. Eventually,
the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) recognized the goals of the Kemalist
movement — the unity and independence of Anatolia and eastern Thrace.

Conclusion
The Turkish War of Independence stands as an early example in the twen-
tieth century of a quasi-insurgency movement brilliantly executed to attain
final victory. Mustafa Kemal, the architect of this triumph, conducted
a war strategy that sought to mobilize the entire nation in a defensive
war in order to remove all foreign troops from Turkish soil. In this endeavor,
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the political goal of establishing a constituent assembly overshadowed

the military need to build a large, regular army, for Kemal wisely perceived
the representative institution would serve as the link between the nation
and the army, galvanizing the former in support of the latter. After realizing
the creation of the Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920, Kemal
turned his attention to building a single, regular army as he fought on
several fronts.
The Grand National Assembly frequently clashed with Kemal's military
policies, but, in the final analysis, the Turkish parliament proved unable
to exercise effectively its authority as commander-in-chief when confronted
with a serious military threat to the nationalist capital. So in its darkest
hour, the Assembly turned to Kemal who demanded and received the
position of commander-in-chief with full authority to make decisions in
the name of parliament. With this parliamentary act, Kemal placed himself
as the link among the sacred trinity of the nation, the assembly, and the
army. Using his new powers, Kemal moved the nation from a war of attrition
to that of annihilation, forcing the Turkish people to make a total commit-
ment, with all available resources, to build a disciplined and well-trained
army. The final political triumph, however, was made possible only after
a stalwart defense at Sakarya and an offensive campaign with rapid move-
ment into the enemy's rear begun at Afyon.
For achieving all this, Kemal Atatiirk deserves recognition in the West as
one of the great military strategists and commanders of the twentieth century,
a soldier who understood well the relationship between politics and war,
between national will and military power, and between strategy and tactics.
Later, he directed a second revolution transforming Turkish society for which
he earned recognition as a great statesman. Few men in recent history have
accomplished so much in both political and military areas against such
overwhelming odds.
 340 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

NOTES

The views expressed are the author's alone and do not in any way reflect those of the Combat
Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.

1. For a discussion of the negative effects of this general violence on Turkish politics and society
during this period before the First World War see George W. Gawrych, 'The Culture and
Politics of Violence in Turkish Society, 1903-14', Middle Eastern Studies 22/3 (July 1986),
307-30.
2. Nurettin Tursan, Brigadier-General (retired), Atatürk 'ün Türk Kurtuluş Savası Stratejisi
(Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1983), pp. 37-8.
3. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam:. Mustafa Kemal' in Hayati, 1:1881-1919 (İstanbul:
Remzi, 1969), pp. 54-5.
4. Quoted in Muzaffer Erendil, Major-General (retired), Askeri Yönüyle Atatürk (Ankara:
Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1981), p. 6.
5. Gotthard Jaschke, 'Mustafa Kemal, Ein Geborener Soldat', Revue Internationale d'Histoire
Militaire 50 (Ankara, 1980), 107.
6. Erendil, Akseri Yönüyle Atatürk, p. 8 and Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, The
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Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984),

pp.48, 50.
7. Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk 'ün Askerliğe Dair Eserleri (Ankara: Doğuş, 1959).
8. Hamdi Ertuna, Brigadier-General (retired), 1911-1912 Osmanli-Italyan Harbi ve Kolağası
Mustafa Kemal (Ankara.: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1984). For the battle of Deme see pp. 176-8.
9. As cited in Lord Kinross, A tatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey
(New York: Morrow, 1965), p.111.
10. Gwynne Dyer, 'The Origins of the "Nationalist" Group of Officers in Turkey, 1908-18',
Journal of Contemporary History 8/4 (1973), 121-64.
11. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatiralari (İstanbul: Vatan, 1953), pp.37,124-5, 130,
132, 133.
12. For the document see Muzaffer Erendil, Major-General (retired), Çok Yönlü Lider: Atatürk
(Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1986), pp. 286-7.
13. Celal Erikan, General (retired), 'Atatürk et la Guerre Totale', Revue Internationale d'Histoire
Militaire 50 (Ankara, 1980), p. 146.
14. Tursan, Atatürk 'ün Türk Kurtuluş Savasi Stratejisi, 23; Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], A Speech
Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal: October /P27(Leipzig: Koehler, 1929), p. 522.1 have
made some minor changes in the English translation based on the Turkish version provided
by General Tursan.
15. Atatürk, Speech, p. 16.
16. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal'nin Hayati, II: 1919-1922 (Istanbul:
Remzi, 1971), p.234.
17. Atatürk, Speech, p.31.
18. Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatiralari, p. 100; Kazim Karabekir, istiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul:
Türkiye Basimevi, 1960), p. 73.
19. Atatürk, Speech, p. 43.
20. Karabekir, istiklal Harbimiz, pp. 83-4.
21. Text appears in Erendil, Çok Yönlü Lider: Atatürk, p. 295.
22. Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatiralari, p.254.
23. Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 424-5.
24. ŞukruErkal, Colonel (retired), Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Tarihi: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
Hükümeti Dönemi, Vol. IV, Part I (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1984), p.76. Unlike
the Ottoman Parliament, the Grand National Assembly comprised only one chamber, the
Senate having been abolished as the second chamber.
25. Karabekir, istiklal Harbimiz, pp.253, 395.
26. Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatiralari, pp.425, 449-50.
27. Izzet Öztoprak, 'Düzenli Ordunun Kuruluşu', ikinci Askeri Tarih Semineri: Bildiriler, edited
by the Directorate for Military History and Strategic Studies (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi,
1985), pp. 270-81.
 KEMAL ATATÜRK'S POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY 341

28. Text appears in Kamil Önalp (retired general), Türk istiklal Harbi: 2nd volume, Bati Cephesi,
5th part, 1st book: Sakarya Meydan Muharebesinden Önceki Olaylar ve Mevzi ilerisindeki
Harekat (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1972), p.307.
29. Atatürk, Speech, 519 Önalp, Türk istiklal Harbi: 2nd volume, Bati Cephesi, 5th part, p. 43.
30. Text in ibid., pp. 309-10.
31. Quoted in Tursan, Atatürk 'ün Türk Kurtuluş Savasi Stratejisi, p. 87.
32. Fahri Belen, General (retired), Büyük Türk Zaferi: Afyondan Izmire (Ankara: Doğuş, 1962),
p.21; Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, pp. 1110-11; Erkal, Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Tarihi, p.203.
33. Fahrettin Altay, 10 Yil Savası (1912-1922) ve Sonrası (istanbul: Insel, 1970), p.319. Altay
commanded this cavalry corps.
34. Quoted in Tursan, A tatürk 'ün Türk Kurtuluş Savaşi Stratejisi, p. 4.
35. For an excellent account of the planning and execution of the Greek Offensive and Pursuit
see Belen, Büyük Türk Zaferi, cited in note 32.
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