Kaplan - “The Coming Anarchy”

-counters idea that post-Cold War brings about new era of peace in world affairs
-Cold War was closest world would get to Utopia—new struggles are not neatly
ideological, but cultural and historical
-New tensions like population, urbanization, and resource depletion are
undermining government across dev world—uses sierra leone example –
demographic, environmental, societal stress – “state” is a western concept
-borders between states becoming meaningless
-transformation of war back to conventional fighting/crime

Kaldor – “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and War on Terror”
-Old war: between states, armed forces in uniform, decisive battles=state building
-New War: state and non-state actors unclear/without uniforms, violence against
civilians not battles, no distinction between criminality and legit violence,
undermine political community = state destroying
-Globalization and new information technology grafted onto old war ideals creating
new wars
Solutions: popular governance, international law, use militaries for conflict
prevention

Kalyvas – “New and Old Civil wars”

-overblown distinction between new and old wars – old wars might be more private,
violent to civilians, new wars are more popular, controlled violence
-“New” civil wars apparently lack justice-seeking motives but no distinction
between new and old wars
-removal of coherent political categories after Cold War exaggerating criminal
aspects of “new” civil wars
-information comes from faulty sources
-Old: collective grievances, broad popular support, controlled violence
-New: private loot, lack popular support, gratuitous violence

Collier – “Market for Civil War”

-Civil Wars don’t happen because of legitimate, grievances, but because rebel groups
can finance them when states are in poor shape economically – not about affecting
political change – you just want chnges that make you better off
-States at risk are recent civil war, large mountainous, resource dep, poor and
increasingly poor countries, unconsolidated regime, etc.
-Collier says democracy is not a solution – more likely to exploit
-Solutions: limit rebel groups finances, increase econ dev, military post-presence,
interntational law

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Huntington – “Clash of Civilizations”
-Next big conflict will occur between civilizational fault lines – civil wars will be less
intense – wont be fueled by ideology or economy (fueld by lang, hist, religion,
customs, institutions) – states with multiple civilizations will fall
-options: isolation, band-wagoning, balancing
-This is because 1) religion 2) West (BOP) 3) less mutable 4) basic 5) contact

Hitchens – “Narcissism of Small Difference”

-It’s small differences between people that cause conflict (ie hair color, skin color)
-Petty jealousies and perceived advantages cause conflict – they are very localized –
interpersonal animosities – doesn’t have to do with civilizational identity
-Conflict is inherent to our psychology – Freudian compulsion – conflict doesn’t have
to happen but because we are human we are likely to follow this path
-India vs. Pakistan in Punjab, Cyprus Turks vs. Greeks

Mueller – “The Banality of Ethnic War”

-The idea of ethnic warfare is not true – wars more closely resemble nonethnic
warfare- waged by small groups of combatants wanting to fight against some larger
entity
- Bosnia and Croatia: small bands of thugs hired by government when Yugoslav
army refused to fight (non-ideological), nationalist parties well-funded from abroad,
political identity is weak, fluid
-Rwanda: actual killers only totaled 200k, 98% of male Hutu population did not cary
out genocide against Tutsis
MYTHS: Old vs. new war, man v. man, ancient, irresolvable conflicts, REALITY:
limited, not inevitable, not nationalistic, violence occurs when led by violent
criminals who like victimizing groups
-Takeover, Carnival, Revenge, Occupation/Desertion
-Solution: international policing works/military interventions, don’t rely on
international community, democracy can breed instab first, then it may help

NYT: Congo: On the Trail of an AK-47

-AK-47 inflicted the most damage in congo – huge political instability because its
resource dependant
-Small arms trade in mountain provinces of Congo where corrupt militias roam
-Guns left over from USSR and coming from china, so china can get access to natural
resources in Africa

NYT: Arms and the man

-Victor Bout, largest arms trafficker
-UN arms embargos but no laws against arms trafficking
-States that produce arms want to keep their business going/governments want to
trade in arms to serve their national/geopolitical interests

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NYT: Thais seize notorious arms-deal suspect
-Bout seized for supplying FARC terrorists in Colombia
-Selling light weapons such as AK-47s, missiles, and grenades

NYT: US is arms bazaar for Mexican drug cartels”

-US putting guns in Mexican drug cartel hands – because gun control laws tougher in
Mexico—in US you can sell without having to report to government

Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism”

Chapter 1
-Terrorism: violence or the threat of violence used and directed in pursuit of a
political aim (planned, calculated, systematic)
-Connotation of terrorism flip flops between positive and negative depending on
era: French revolution (+) (-) after French revolution was brought down
-Takes on revolutionary, anti-State connotation with use of violence to generate
publicity/support
-Bosnian/serb nationalists – “Young Bosnia” – assassinated Ferdinand and started
WWI influenced KKK, Black hand – when “state-sponsored” terrorism gets
popular  changes meaning to become abuse of power (Colombia, Peru)
-After WW2: ‘terrorism’ regains revolutionary connotations because of anti-
colonialist groups in Asia, Africa
-1960s-70s – expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups – ie PLO,
FLQ – who wanted to attract international support
-1980s- terrorism was something meant to destabilize the Westconnoted with
weaker states confronting larger onesnarcoterrorism
-Gray area phenom changing definition, involves non state actors
-People used to not hide that they were terrorists now, Don’t function openly as
armed units, don’t hold territory, avoid outright confrontation with militaries, rarely
exercise widespread sovereignty (because they have less #s, $, resources)
-Terrorists distinct from guerillas, vigilantes, assassins want power
Chapter 2
-Ethnonationalist terrorism popular after 1945- starts with Singapore falling to
Japan (Sing. was a symbol of Western interests) – Asians wanted independence
-Ethnonationalist Terrorists: Irgun/Israel as model, Cyprus EOKA, Algeria FLN,
-Transnational terrorism – ie Palestinian PLO, PFLP, ASALA (Armenia in WW2)

NYT: The Making and Unmaking of a Child Soldier

-Ishmael Beah fought on the side of government in Sierra Leone civil war against
RUF (Revolutionary United Front)
-Criminal conflict over control of natural resources
-His experience: drug-induced stupor but not canon fodder, loss of childhood,
familial attachments to unit, high level of re-recruitment

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NYT: Children Carrying Guns for a US, Ally, Somalia
-US helping to pay soldiers in Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and is thus
indirectly paying to train and equip child soldiers
-In the quest to build a standing army and bolster a nonexistent government,
Somalia will take anyone
-US and Somalia have not ratified convention on rights of the child

UNICEF Factsheet on Child Soldiers

-Employing children under the age of 15 is a war crime
-Hard to correct use of child soldiers because their use is by armed, Non-gov groups,
where there is government breakdown
-Response: protective environment for demobilized child soldiers, rehabilitation,
reintroduction to communities, advocacy, and holding governments/non-gov actors
accountable

Singer – “Addressing the Global Challenge of Child Soldiers”

-A lot people are coming into contact with child soldiers – ie peacekeepers, and
there are more of them
-Demographic changes, global instability, SAWL, legacy of conflict all contribute to
child soldiering
-Use: cheap and easy way to get force, at-risk groups like orphans, street kids,
refugees, proliferation of SALW children can use, shields or cannon fodder
-Effects of Child Soldiers
1) Increase in violent conflicts due to ease of force generation – they’re easy, cheap
2) Declining value of ideology
3) Children in combat and greater price of war
4) Child soldiers increase likelihood of conflict recurrence—because they cant do
anything except fight
-Some international progress (ie convention on rights of child), but still a long way
to go
Solutions: We need to take advantage of post-conflict and use it for education, family
reunification, disarmament, rehabilitation, and reintegration into families, needs to
be sustained, child psychologists, youth houses, follow-up activities – psych and
social support,
-need local government committees at local level, and international legal framework
in the long term  integrate child soldier problem with other PKOs

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Outsourcing War—Shearer

-Increase in private military companies since 1990s

-defined by: foreign to conflict, motivated by money, participate in combat  diff approach – they are
corporate and professional – work only with legit govts
-Role: Improve client’s military capability, allowing client to function beter in water and deter conflict
more effectively
Benefits: coercion in conflict resolution limits loss of life ad hastens end to war – country support for
mercenaries depends on self interest/natnioanlism, unaffected by political constraints, BUT can also
hinder efforts to broker peace
-Inability of weak governments to counter internal violence PMCs
-PMC’s improve military capabilities, training, weapons
-act as proxies for government – ie MPRI
-also allows politicians to achieve goals without public approval

Problems:
-Lack of accountability when it comes to regulating them – they could work for rebel movements
-also they could pullout at any point because motivated by money
-don’t have to adhere to HR
-empirical efforts to control mercenaries failed
-Need to increase transparency – they are going offshore

-Collaboration between multilateral institutions and private military sector could work – it also
might undermine their effectiveness to accept a UN mandate OR Coupling multinational companies
with private security contractor gives foreigners powerful leverage over government and affairs – ie
western mining corporations – because mining company depends on security to protect its
investments and government needs security to shore up its rule

-Overall, PMC’s increase ability of government to control state, but don’t resolve long term conflicts

The privatization of security – avant

-Either affirming or challenging global governance/state system
-Increase in security but changes in political control of force – NSA taking over
governance, US executive over legislative

Effects on State control of force

1) Cheap flexibile security, enhances global governance
2) Also could be costly, eroding accountability and killing global governance

Disadvantages
1) elusive cost savings – ie MPRI
2) Kills accountability – kills cong ability to influence policy
3) Impact of private security hard to judge – could resolve or destabilize
Privatization and political change
-redistributes power to third parties
-can make deals offshore
-International organizations could ally with PSC to prevent channeling money into corrupt
governments
-privatization of security has Increased importance of market mechanisms and diffused control over
violence

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NYT: Report on Iraq Security Lists 310 Contractors
-Immunity of contractors affecting military/diplomacy in Iraq – weakly regulated
and very covert
-Contractors act on their own accord – ie Blackwater killing – killed Iraq trust in US
-Diffused contracts lacking coherent database

NYT: Blackwater Reaches Deal on US Export Violations”

-Exporting weapons to Afghanistan, training troops in Sudan, sniper training to
Taiwanese police
-Excessive use of force taints reputation but no criminal charges

Postel and Wolf: Dehydrating conflict

-Competition for fresh water may lead to conflicts in the future but there has been
little to no conflict over water thus far
-Intrastate instability of water system ownership, privatization, irrigation,
population increase, and downstream overtapped basins
-Regional tension and lac of cooperation between states that share rivers in
unilateral water-harnessing – ie india/Pakistan, china/thailand
-Solutions: increase productivity of water, stronger policies within states to regulate
groundwater use, act early and constructively at international level

NYT: Water Dispute increases india-pakistan tension

-India building hydroelectric dam in Himalayas on river that feeds Pakistani farms
-Lack of communication and no water conservation technology in Pakistan

Davis: Forests and Conflict in Cambodia

-Conflict timber – forests cause conflicts or harnessing timber resources/industries
to fund wars
-Use of forests as a political commodity by ruling elite: logging richest resource to
maintain off budget revenue flows to leadership in government coupled with
institutional weakness, corruption, and extortion
-Khmer Rouge (Cambodia) fringe movementCPP (Cambodian People’s Party) vs.
Funcinpec

NYT, "The Spoils: Congo's Riches, Looted by Renegade Troops"

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-Bisie, Congo: renegade army troops controlling tin ore mines allow them to perpetuate
activities
-Foreign investors have no direct access to mines but mines still feed into global market
-Would banning tin ore production cause more trouble than solve problems?

NYT, "The Spoils: Battle in a Poor Land for Riches Beneath the Soil"
-Niger: battle between native Tuareg and government for uranium deposits
-Civic activism comes with democratization of Africa

Reno, "How Sovereignty Matters"

-Dichotomy between internal and external sovereignty: local power in Africa has shifted
away from state because governments are weak and lacking international aid to
compensate for bureaucratic failures (no internal sovereignty), but foreign investors
projecting legitimacy (recognition of sovereignty in international arena) onto weak
governments by relaxing notion of sovereignty
-Leaders of weak states manipulate transnational commercial connections (act as
mediator between local and international) to gain and maintain power
-Political conflict in failing states shifts to control over markets when foreign aid shifts
from aid to states to aid to investors in Africa
-Weak state governments have an advantage over insurgents because of commercial
relationships  foreign investors only work with internationally recognized governments
because of repercussions of international judiciary AND weak leaders can use foreign
investors forces/contractors so that they don’t have to rely on armed rivals/military