[ G.R. No.

247610, March 10, 2020 ]

CYNTHIA S. DEL ROSARIO, FEDERICO N. VIRGO, JR., RENATO V. BALADAD, BEATRIZ A.

DIOSO, CORAZON MANALON DAVILA, LORETA N. ALSA, HIYA I. HASSAN, AND JOHN
VINCENT C. COLILI, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN, AND THE
PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

 The provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur are appealing
Republic Act No. 11259, alleging that it contradicts their charters. On April 5, 2019, the proposal
was signed into law, and it will take effect on May 20, 2019. In fact, said petitioners, a qualified
voters of Puerto Princesa, have not participated in the elections for provincial officials of
Palawan. According to petitioners, this constituted a violation of the political right of the people
of Palawan to participate in public consultations on matters affecting their interest.
 Respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Government of Palawan counter that the
assailed statute was developed in coordination with the various offices of the provincial
government, as well as the municipal mayors and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members of
Palawan. They also claim that petitioner Cynthia del Rosario was even present during one of the
deliberations of the House of Representatives on the matter.
 Respondents Commission on Elections and the Department of Budget and Management argue
that the passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public consultations
on matters of the public interest, for the creation of the proposed provinces still needs the
approval of the electorate of Palawan.

Sections 51 and 54 of the assailed law provide:

 SEC. 51 Plebiscite

Regardless of whether or not the amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be charged
against the appropriations of the present Province of Palawan.

 SEC. 54 Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa.

Regardless of whether or not the Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized city, will
not be eligible to vote in the plebiscite or for candidates for provincial elective positions.

ISSUES
Whether or not the reduction of validity by the court of appeal assailed law provide is proper? –YES

Whether or not until a city has been turned into a highly urbanized city (HUC), are the voters of a city
that used to be a component city of a province able to vote in a referendum for the partition of that
province? -Yes
HELD/DECISIONS

The petition claims that RA No. 11259 has three flaws that render it unconstitutional: firstly, it infringes
the people's right to participate in public activities by enacting it into law. Second, contrary to Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution, it does not allow the voters of the City of Puerto Princesa to vote in a
scheduled ballot; and third, it provides for a significant change in the distribution of proceeds from the
development and use of national wealth between the three new provinces and the cities directly under
the central government, as well as the existing bays.

Respondents Commission on Elections and the Department of Budget and Management argue that the
passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public consultations on matters of the
public interest, for the creation of the proposed provinces still needs the approval of the electorate of
Palawan.

Sections 51 and 54 of the assailed law provide

 SEC. 51 Plebiscite

Regardless of whether or not the amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be charged
against the appropriations of the present Province of Palawan.

 SEC. 52. Commencement of Corporate Existence.

The provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur shall commence its
corporate existence upon the election and qualification of its provincial governor, provincial vice
governor and majority of the members of the sangguniang panlalawigan. The election of the provincial
officials of the newly created provinces shall be held on the second Monday of May in the year 2022.
(Emphases supplied.)

 SEC. 54 Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa.

Regardless of whether or not the Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized city, will
not be eligible to vote in the plebiscite or for candidates for provincial elective positions.

Sections 51, 54, 58, 59, and 60 of the law can be considered to be in full force and effect, as these
provisions pertain to matters preparatory to the conduct of the plebiscite for the creation of the three
proposed provinces. These are the very provisions sought to be implemented by respondents as they
prepare for the conduct of the plebiscite this coming May. It is therefore premature for this Court to
make any declaration on the unconstitutionality of the law in toto, when most of the provisions of the
law have yet to take effect.

The Court agrees with the submissions of the respondents on the matter. Petitioners' long but vacuous
citation of various constitutional provisions and treaty instruments does not persuade. The records of
the case reveal that the proposed division of Palawan, as reflected in the assailed statute, was in fact
made in consultation with the people of Palawan, through their elected representatives: the municipal
mayors, municipal councilors, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as reflected in the
transcripts of the consultative meeting, Sangguniang Panlalawigan meetings, and resolutions from the
municipal councils of Palawan.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite for the
validity of a statute. Article XIII, Section 16, as cited by petitioners, is a protection against any action
which serves to abridge the right of people's organizations to "effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making."

The foregoing disquisitions make it abundantly clear that Puerto Princesa has become a distinct political
entity independent and autonomous from the province of Palawan, by virtue of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city in 2007. Hence, it can no longer be considered a "political unit directly affected" by
the proposed division of Palawan into three provinces; and perforce, the qualified voters of the city of
Puerto Princesa, including herein petitioners Cynthia S. Del Rosario, Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V.
Baladad, Beatriz A. Dioso, and Corazon Manalon Davila were properly excluded from the coverage of the
plebiscite scheduled by RA No. 11259. The petition must therefore be dismissed.
 [G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016]

CITY OF TAGUIG, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF MAKATI, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

 The facts of this case, in which various courts have delivered contradicting rulings on the same
topic, show this behavior, which causes annoyance to courts and parties-litigants. Respondent
City of Makati (Makati activities,)'s as represented by its counsels, appear to be a clumsy
attempt to obscure the settlement of issues through the misuse of legal processes.

 Petitioner City of Taguig (Taguig) suggests that the assailed rulings should be considered a
"denial of the relief sought"5 when the Court of Appeals, in its July 25, 2013 Resolution,
supposedly took no action on Taguig's prayer in a Motion for Clarification that the Court of
Appeals' April 30, 2013 Resolution "be reinforced with the pronouncement that respondent City
of Makati did commit forum shopping."

 GR. NO. 208393, June 15, 2016

FACTS:
On November 22, 1993, Taguig, fled before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a Complaint
against Makati. In this Complaint, Taguig asserted that the areas comprising the Enlisted Men's
Barangays, or EMBOs, as well as the area referred to as Inner Fort in Fort Bonifacio, were within
its territory and jurisdiction. In the Decision dated July 8, 2011, the Regional Trial Court, through
Judge Briccio C. Ygaña (Judge Ygaña), ruled in favor of Taguig. On July 28, 2011, Makati fled
before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. It assailed the Regional Trial Court's July 8, 2011 Decision as having
been rendered without jurisdiction and in violation of due process. It claimed that the July 8,
2011 Decision was rendered by Judge Ygaña after he had retired, and was merely antedated
(i.e., to make it appear that it was rendered before he retired). It prayed that this Decision be
annulled and set aside. Also following the Regional Trial Court's July 8, 2011 Decision, Makati
fled before the same court its Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the July 8, 2011

Decision.
Court of Appeals denied Taguig's Motion to Dismiss. In the Resolution dated December 18,
2012,[64] the Court of Appeals granted Taguig's Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed
Makati's Petition for Annulment of Judgment: (1) for being functus officio and/or moot; (2) for
being premature; and (3) for... forum shopping. The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that in fling
a Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Makati effectively split a
single cause of action and thereby engaged in forum shopping. Construing the Court of Appeals'
silence (in its July 25, 2013 Resolution) on the issue of forum shopping as a "denial of the relief
sought", petitioner City of Taguig comes to this Court through the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prays that the assailed Court of
Appeals' April 30, 2013 and July 25, 2013 Resolutions be modified by including a declaration that
respondent City of Makati is guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping and that appropriate
sanctions be imposed.

ISSUE: Whether respondent City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously

pursuing: first, a Petition for Annulment of the July 8, 2011 Regional Trial Court Decision; and
second, a Motion for Reconsideration (later Appeal) of the same July8, 2011 Decision.

HELD: Yes. Simultaneously pursuing an appeal (or motion for reconsideration) and a petition for
annulment of judgment is an act of forum shopping. Jurisprudence has recognized that forum
shopping can be committed in several ways:

(1) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been Finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of
causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). The
test for determining forum shopping is settled. In Yap v. Chua, et al. To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and
reliefs sought.

For its part, litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious." For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must concur: The
requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the
other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites
are satisfed:
(1) the former judgment is fnal; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the
frst and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
 [ G.R. No. 216092, December 09, 2020 ]

MUNICIPALITY OF ISABEL, LEYTE, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MERIDA, LEYTE,

RESPONDENT.


 NUEVA ERA VS. MARCOS
G.R No. 169435 February 27, 2008
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Marcos passed a resolution
claiming a portion of Nueva Era due to the creation of Marcos Town in the Province of
Ilocos Norte pursuant to the description of Marcos' eastern boundaries as stated in the
second paragraph of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753. Marcos submitted its claim to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte.
Petitioner Nueva Era, contended that its entire land area was an ancestral domain of
the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community, which must be protected and
therefore must be preserved as part of Nueva Era. In addition, according to petitioner,
Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras only and since R.A. No. 3753
specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which
should comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. On appeal
by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP. Uncontented, Marcos filed a
petition for review of the RTC decision before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the SP and RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE MODE OF APPEAL ADOPTED BY MARCOS IN BRINGING THE
CASE TO THE CA IS PROPER
RULING: Yes, Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under
Rule 42. Under Section 118 (b) of the Local Government Code, "boundary disputes
involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally
tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing municipalities fail to effect an
amicable settlement. The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the
parties. The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by Marcos
before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC judgment may still be
further appealed to the CA. The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary
dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision may
be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code.
However, the SC ruled that the CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate
jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.
Appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly
granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely
because the law allows it. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.