Claire Albertsen

PHIL 241 Final Paper

Block’s Response to the Higher Order Approach to Consciousness

In “The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct”, Ned Block discusses a

variety of perspectives of what the higher order (HO) theory may essentially pertain to when

discussing theories of consciousness and related phenomenon. Block emphasizes the fatal

problem regarding theories of consciousness, which is the idea that the target of a higher order

theory of thought does not exist, as well as the gap or change between conscious and

unconscious states (Block, p. 423). In what follows, I will argue that Block does not adequately

defend his series of arguments upon his idea of “the fatal problem” and may require a deeper

connection between consciousness and the representative theory of perception and thought

alike. I will also suggest that the connection Block makes between what-it-is-likeness and

consciousness as awareness via his ambitious HO theories of consciousness argument may not

provide a fulfilling explanation to these said higher order theories of consciousness.

Higher order theories are a partially definitive way of making sense of the relationship

between consciousness and awareness, and to what extent a given, live subject may

comprehend thoughts, perceptions, and what it is like to be aware of the situation they are in.

Block poses “the fatal problem”, in which the item or target that the higher order thought

(HOT) represents does not exist, and the question of whether this problem can be possible or

not. Rosenthal answers this question by suggesting that the target (first-order state) of the

thought can be of a different property than that of the given higher order state of awareness,

thus phenomenology is not reliant upon the first-order state (2004, p. 32). Then Block

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interprets Weisberg’s (2010) suggestion as “there is no such thing as a HOT with no object

because there is always an intentional object that is a conscious state, though sometimes a

non-existent one” (2011, p. 425). Block considers perspectives from both Rosenthal and

Weisberg regarding what-it-is-likeness HOT theories to formulate his personal elaboration upon

the ambitious higher order theory or form of view and how mental state types are derived from

both conscious and unconscious variations. According to the ambitious higher order theory, “if

a subject has a higher order thought of the right sort at t, then there is something it is like for

the subject at t, an episode or occurrence of what-it-is-likeness at t” (Block, p. 425). An example

further visualizing the concepts described above can be seen in the case, introduced by Karen

Neander (1998) regarding three triplets with different first-order (sensory) states and the same

higher order states. One triplet has a sensation of green, one has a sensation of red, and the

last has no relevant sensation at all; all three triplets exemplify the same what-it-is-likeness or

higher order thought or state. Each triplet has the same sense of what it is like for one to be

conscious of having or not having a given sensation, given the possibility that each of the

triplet’s thoughts and perceptions could be different due to ad hoc circumstances.

It can also be theorized that what-it-is-likeness (phenomenal consciousness) can be a

property of the higher order thought itself, which implies that the HOT is always self-reflexive

and a state of consciousness of itself. Although, this theory could be disregarded in the sense

that a state exists only if there is a phenomenal representation of that conscious state, which is

ad hoc. According to Block, the introduction of his ambitious higher order theory may allow for

theorists to answer questions regarding the relevancy of the causal origin of higher order

representations and the nature of consciousness as a relation between HOR and FOR. The

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ambitious HO theory is meant to emphasize the relevancy of the metaphysical reality, which is

not typically accounted for in the nature of consciousness or what-it-is-likeness. Moreover, this

theory would result in the irrelevance of the origin of the phenomenal representation for

higher order representations. Being that these were Block’s final statements made upon his

argument, I will begin with my personal implications of Block’s argument and personal

interpretations of the essence of [higher order theories of] consciousness.

As a sort of higher order theorist with metaphysical ambitions, I cannot disagree with

Block’s argument and rationale that had been used to build upon his ambitious higher order

theory in the sense that a higher order thought does not require the origin of the phenomenon.

However, I will acknowledge that not enough interpretation or understanding of the nature of

consciousness and what-it-is-likeness was implemented throughout “The higher order

approach to consciousness is defunct” by Ned Block, being that a majority of the rationale used

was from the higher order thought (HOT) perspective. Block also did not provide enough

elaboration upon his ambitious higher order theory and how this theory would “go deeper into

metaphysical reality” (2011, p. 428). Further examination into such perspectives could allude to

providing rationale relevant to more higher order perception scenarios, as well as more

relations to representationalism and intentionality. Block suggests that a higher order

representation occurs at the same time, or at least overlaps in time, as the first-order

representation in the same mind or mental state, which gives reason as to why “the origin of

phenomenal presentation does not matter” (2011, p. 428). Furthermore, a reflexive conscious

state cannot be represented without some kind of temporal overlap, which is an unreduced

notion of phenomenal [consciousness]. To eliminate this notion of nonreduction, the

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combination of both higher order theories of thought and perception can be implemented and

identified in the same instance as a way to make sense of, and possibly reduce, higher order

representations. Perceptions from an external environment and stimuli are described as the

result of experiencing a phenomenally conscious mental state with analogies or non-conceptual

intentional content. Furthermore, this higher-order sense of perception influences the higher

order thoughts and higher order representations that may result from the level of perception a

given conscious state may be experiencing. For example, a phenomenal conscious percept of

the same color red, as seen by three triplets, may be affected by each triplet’s differing levels of

color transparency. Moreover, a dispositional higher order theorist such as Peter Carruthers

(2000) may examine this combination of thought and perception as an example of the dual-

content theory: a conscious, first-order content of ‘red’ leads to the higher order content

‘seems red’ or ‘experience of red’.

With this all being said, it is reasonable to think that the combination of both higher

order thoughts and perceptions are simultaneously and equally significant in the analysis of the

higher order theory, whether it is ambitious or not. If one were to pursue this process when

approaching the higher order theory, it is likely that that theorist will also be more likely to

approach more reasonable concepts to the metaphysical reality without any ad hoc conditions

required. This approach may even lead to the discovery of the causal origins of higher order

thoughts that are created in the mind that are not reliant upon directly visual information or

data. Although my argument states that Block should elaborate more into his concept of what

an ambitious higher order theory may result in via combining higher order theories of thought

and perception alike, I have another deduction to make as an information realist. If theorists

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can approach this said theory as stated above, it may also be possible that a debate regarding

the relationship between [quantum] physics and its [philosophical] insights into the mind, given

that matter arises from information processing, may arise as well.

Word Count: 1268

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Reference List

Block, N. 2011. The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct. In Higher Order

Approach to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 71(3): 419-431. doi:

10.1093/analys/anr037.

Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Rosenthal, D. 2004. Varieties of higher order theory. In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness,

ed. R. Gennaro, 17-44. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Weisberg, J. 2010. Misrepresenting consciousness. In Philosophical Studies. Advance Access

published 12 May 2010, doi: 10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3.