Tañada vs.

Tuvera (146 SCRA 466)

April 24, 1985

Facts:
Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus compelling respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss the case filed by the petitioners
on the ground that the latter have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition as they are
not the aggrieved parties thereto. However, petitioners maintained that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
On the other hand, citing Article 2 of the Civil Code, respondents further contend that the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date of their effectivity, hence
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for them to take effect. The interpretation given by
the respondents is in accord with the Court’s construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary only on those cases where legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date as then the date of publication is material determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication – but not when the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 2 of the Civil Code preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette?

Judgment
The Supreme Court herein ruled that Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 further provides for that “there shall be published in the
Official Gazette all legislative acts, executive and administrative orders, and proclamations, all having
general applicability, decisions of the Supreme and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance, other documents or classes as the President of the Philippines shall determine
from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize to be published.
The provision therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty to give substance and reality to
the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern.
Since, the publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability is
mandated by law, then, the clear object of said provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way
of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. Also, it would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for transgression of a law of which he had no notice.
Consistent with the above provisions, the Court hereby orders the respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force or effect.

Occena vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 275)

(G.R. No. L-56350, April 2, 1981)

Facts:
On March 6 and 12, 1983, two suits for prohibition were filed respectively by petitioners, Samuel
Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, but now are suing as taxpayers. The two
prohibitions filed by petitioners is a challenge on the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments as well as it asserted that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law.
On March 10 and 13 respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from
notice. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26 by petitioners and
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent data in
amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
However, the Court, being duty-bound to uphold and apply the Constitution, dismissed the petitions
as it would be an exercise of futility to contend otherwise. To settle the petitioners’ assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Court cited the case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, in
which petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare the invalid the ratification of the Constitution has
been settled in the aforementioned case as it do so by a vote of six to four. The Court further concluded
that having acquired the vote of majority, there is no further obstacle to the 1973 Constitution being
considered in force and effect. This, being resolved at the outset, comes the next issue.

Issue:
Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the authority to propose constitutional amendments?

Judgment:
The Supreme Court herein ruled:
Yes. The Interim Batasang Pambansa as a constituent body, can propose amendments. Applying
the provisions of the 1976 Amendments, “the Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and
its members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges and disqualifications as the
Interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” Further, the
Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of a majority of its members to be
ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa
as the successor of the Interim National Assembly, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such impotence.
 Further, the Court, once and for all, settled the petitioners argument that the Interim Batasang
Pambansa acted beyond the limits of its authority by citing Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections stating
that: “whether the Constitution Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely
overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to
the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.”
Hence, whether the Constitution is amended or revised would become immaterial the moment the same is
ratified by the sovereign people.
In the capacity of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments or revisions vested to it
by the applicable provisions of the Constitution, majority of vote and the ratification within the period
provided thereto are necessary. Here, the three resolutions proposed by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
have obtained the vote of majority with: Resolution No. 1 by a vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 by a vote
of 147 to 5; and Resolution No. 3 by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.
As to the validity of the three Batasang Pambansa resolutions, they were approved by the Interim
Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period
provided by the Constitution.
Now therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa having acted upon the applicable provisions of the
Constitution has the authority to propose constitutional amendments. In this case, petitions are dismissed
for lack of merit.