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 CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
LE
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CO

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME

OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT
FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY
HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE
 Cornell University Library
U102 .C61 1873
v.1
On war;

3 1924 030 718 757

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FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY
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 Cornell University Library
U102 .C61 1873
v.1 -
On war;

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3 1924 030 718 757

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 32 Chuin Paul
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 ON WAR :
BY

GENERAL CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

TRANSLATED BY

COLONEL J. J. GRAHAM ,
FROM THE THIRD GERMAN EDITION.

THREE VOLUMES COMPLETE IN ONE. itin

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LONDON :
N. TRÜBNER & CO., 57 & 59 , LUDGATE HILL .
1873 .
 CORNELL
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PREFACE
S

> TO THE FIRST | EDITION .

It will naturally excite surprise that a preface by a female hand should accom
pany a work on such a subject as the present. For my friends no explanation
of the circumstance is required ; but I hope by a simple relation of the cause to
clear myself of the appearance of presumptionin the eyes also of those to whom
I am not known .
The work to which these lines serve as a preface occupied almost entirely
thelast twelve years of the life of my inexpressibly beloved husband , who has
unfortunately been torn too soon from myself and my country . To complete
it, was his most earnest desire ; but it was not his intention that it should
be published during his life ; and if I tried to persuade him to alter that inten
tion, he often answered, half in jest, but also, perhaps, half in a foreboding
of early death : “ Thou shalt publish it. " These words (which in those happy
days often drew tears fromme, little as I was inclined to attach a serious mean
ing to them ) make it now, in the opinion of my friends
band,incwith
me to introduce the posthumous works of my beloved, ahusduty umbent on
a few
prefatory lines from myself; and although there may be a difference of opinion
ha
this poin am
ons promptet,d still I sure ther willbe no mist
e ake as to the feeling which
overc timid
subordinate part so difficult for a woman make
ity whic
me to ome the h
. s
any
even in a , such appearance ,

It will be understood, as a matter of course, that I cannot have the most

remote intention of considering myself as thereal editress of a work which is
panion scope of my capacity: I onlystandatitssideas an affectionate
farcomabovethe
on its entrance into the world. This position I may well claim, as
a similar one was allowed me duringits formation and progress. Those who
are acquainted withour happy married life,andknow howwe shared every
thing with each other , not only joy and sorrow, but also every occupation ,
everyinterest of daily life will understand thatmy beloved husband couldnot
be occupied on a work ofthis kind without its being known to me.
Therefore,
Jah one can like me bear testimony tothe zeal, tothe love with whic h he
Labour ed onof itits,tothe
and time hope.ws hic
elaboration His hXeboundupwith it,asfromwellas
richly gifted mind had his early youth
the manner
 PREFACE ,
iv
longed for light and truth , and varied as were his talents, still he had chiefly
directed his reflections to the science of war, to which the duties of his profes
sion called him, and which are of such importance for the benefit of states.
Scharnhorst was the first to lead him into the right road, and his subsequent
appointment in 1810 as Instructor at the General War School, as well as the
honour conferred on him at the same time, of giving military instruction to
H.R.H. the Crown Prince, tended further to give his investigations and studies
that direction, and to lead him to put down in writing whatever conclusions he
arrived at. A paper with which he finished the instruction of H.R.H. the
Crown Prince contains the germ of his subsequent works. But it was in the
year 1816, at Coblentz, that he first devoted himself again to scientific labours
and to collecting the fruits which his rich experience in those four eventful
years had brought to maturity . He wrote down his views in the first place, in
short essays, only loosely connected with each other. The following, without
date, which has been found amongst his papers, seems to belong to those early
days.
“ In the principles here committed to paper, in my opinion, the chief
things which compose strategy, as it is called, are touched upon . I looked
upon them only as materials, and had just got to such a length towards the
moulding them into a whole.
“ These materials have been amassed without any regularly preconceived
plan. My view was at first, without regard to system and strict connection, to
put down the results of my reflections upon the most important points in quite
brief, precise, compact propositions. The manner in which Montesquieu has
treated his subject, floated before me in idea. I thought that concise, senten
tious chapters, which I proposed at first to call grains, would attract the
attention of the intelligent just as much by that which was to be developed from
them , as by that which they contained in themselves. I had therefore before
me in idea, intelligent readers already acquainted with the subject. But my
nature, which always impels me to development and systematising, at last
worked its way out also in this instance. For some time I was able to confine
myself to extracting only the most important results from the essays, which, to
attain clearness and conviction in my own mind, I wrote upon different subjects,
to concentrating in that manner their spirit in a small compass ; but afterwards
my peculiarity gained ascendency completely - I have developed what I could,
andthus naturally have supposed a reader not yet acquainted with the subject.
“ The more I advanced with the work, and the more I yielded to the spirit
of investigation, so much the more I was also led to system ; and thus, then,
chapter after chapter has been inserted .
 PREFACE.
V

. " My ultimate view has now been to go through the whole once more, to
establish by further explanation much of the earlier treatises, and perhaps to
condense into results many analyses on the later ones, and thus to make a
moderate whole out of it, forming a small octavo volume. But it was my wish
also in this to avoid everything common , everything that is plain of itself,
that has been said a hundred times, and is generally accepted ; for my ambition
was to write a book that would not be forgotten in two or three
which
once . "
morrse, than
any one interested in the subject would at all events take up yea and

In Coblenz, where he was much occupied with duty, he could only give
occasional hours to his private studies. It was not until 1818, after his appoint
ment as Director of the General Academy of War at Berlin, that he had the
leisure to expand his work, and enrich it from the history of modern wars .
This leisure also reconciled him to his new avocation, which, in other respects,
was not satisfactory to him, as, according to the existing organisation of the
Academy, the scientific part of the course is not under the Director, but con
ducted by a Board of Studies. Free as he was from all petty vanity , from
every feeling of restless, egotistical ambition, still he felt a desire to be really
useful, and not to leave inactive the abilities with which God had endowed him .
In active life he was not in a position in which this longing could be satisfied,
and he hadlittle hope of attaining to any such position : his whole energies
were therefore directed upon the domain of science , and the benefit which he
hoped tolay the foundation of by his work was the object of his life. That,
notwithstanding this, the resolution not to let the work appear until after his
death became more confirmed,isthe best proof that no vain,paltry longing for
praise and distinction, no particle of egotistical views, was mixed up with this
noble aspiration for great and lasting usefulness.
Thus he worked diligently on, until,in the spring of 1830, he was appointed
to the artillery, and his energies were calledinto activityin sucha different
spher give toupsucallh lit
least, e,to and degkree, obliged, for the present at
higryh wor
a era . that he was
He the
the separate packets, labelledthem, and n put
took sorrhisowfu
papl ers
leavine ofordethis empedloy
r, seal up
ment which he loved so much. He was sent to Breslau in August of the same
year,as Chief of the Second Artillery District, but in December recalled to
Berlin,and appointed Chief of the Staff to Field Marshal Count Gneisenau
forthe term
Commande Posencom
r toofhis . man
Whed).
n heIn Marrned
retu ,hee acco
ch,from1831ther mpanlauiedinhisNovreve
to Bres embred
er

after the melancholy event which hadtakenplace, he hoped Theto res

work , and perhaps complete it in the course of the winter. Almume his
ighty
vi PREFACE .

has willed it should be otherwise. On the 7th November, he returned to

Breslau ; on the 16th he was no more ; and the packets sealed by himself were
not opened until after his death .
The papers thus left are those now made public in the following volumes,
exactly in the condition in which they were found, without a word being added
or erased. Still, however, there was much to do before publication, in the way
of putting them in order and consulting about them ; and I am deeply indebted
to several sincere friends for the assistance they have afforded me, particularly
Major O‘Etzel, who kindly undertook the correction of the Press, as well as the
preparation of the maps to accompany the historical parts of the work. I
must also mention my much-loved brother, who was my support in the hour
of my misfortune, and who has also done much for me in respect of these
papers ; amongst other things, by carefully examining and putting them in
order, he found the commencement of the revision which my dear husband
wrote in the year 1827, and mentions in the Notice hereafter annexed, as a work
he had in view. This revision has been inserted in the place intended for it
in the first book (for it does not go any further ).
There are still many other friends to whom I might offer my thanks for
their advice, for the sympathy and friendship which they have shown me ;
but if I do not name them all, they will, I am sure, not have any doubts
of my sincere gratitude. It is all the greater, from my firm conviction that
all they have done was not only on my own account, but for the friend whom
God has thus called away from them so soon .
If I have been highly blessed as the wife of such a man during one-and
twenty years, so am I still, notwithstanding my irreparable loss, by the treasure
of my recollections and of my hopes, by the rich legacy of sympathy and
friendship which I owe the beloved departed, by the elevating feeling which
I experience at seeing his rare worth so generally and honourably acknow
ledged.
The trust confided to me by a royal couple is a fresh benefit for which I
have to thank the Almighty, as it opens to me an honourable occupation, to
which I cheerfully devote myself. May this occupation be blessed, and may
the dear little Prince who is now entrusted to my care, some day read this book,
and be animated by it to deeds like those of his glorious ancestors .
Written at the Marble Palace, Potsdam, 30th June, 1832.
MARIE VON CLAUSEWITZ,
Born Countess Brühl,
Oberhofmeisterinn to H.R.H. the Princess William .
 >

NOTICE .

I Look upon the first six books, of which a fair copy has now been made, as only
å mass which is still in a manner without form , and which has yet to be again
revised .
In this revision the two kinds of war will be everywhere kept more
distinctly in view, by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning, a more precise
direction, and a closer application . The two kindsof war are, first, those in which
the object is the overthrowof the enemy, whether it be that we aim at his destruction,
politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our
terms ; and next, those in which our object is merely to make some conquests on the
frontiers ofhis country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of
turning them to account as matter of exchange in the settlement of a peace. Transi
to exist, but the completely
other must certainly continueever
tion from one kind to thetend
different nature of the encies of the two must ywhere appear, and must
separate from each other things which are incompatible.
Besides establishing this real difference in wars, another practically necessary
poin
continua tion wofmus
t ofvie at the
statte poli same rtimmeae nsbe. established,whichis, that war is only a
cy by othe
This point
everywhere, will introduce muchmoreunity int of view being adhered to
consid era sub
things will be more easily disentangled from eacothe tion of the ject, and
h other. Although the chief appli
cation of this point of view does not commence until we get to the eighth book, still
itmust be completely developed in the first book,andalsolend assistance throughout
the revision of thefirst six books. Through such a revision the first six books
will getrid of agooddeal ofdross, many
ren and chasmsdistin
transtsforme will beclosedup,and
conceptions and
forms. that is of a general nature will be
much d into ct
Thedy seve
alrea e, isbook
madnth attacked asfora refl
on ider
to be- cons
the ecti chapsixth
diffonerenoftthe andmuch
ters, of sketcomp
whist be chesleteared
atonce, according to the above-mentioned more distinct points of view , so thatit
will require nofresh revision,but rather may serveas norm in the revision oftho
first six books.
viii NOTICE.

For the eighth book-on the Plan of a war, that is, of the organisation of a
whole war in general - several chapters are planned, but they are not at all to be
regarded as real materials, they are merely a track, roughly cleared, as it were,
through the mass, in order by that means to ascertain the points of most importance.
They have answered this object, and I propose, on finishing the seventh book, to
proceed at once to the working out of the eighth, where the two points of view
above-mentioned will be chiefly affirmed, by which everything will be simplified,
and at the same time have a spirit breathed into it. I hope in this book to iron
out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen , and at least to show
the object of action, and the real point to be considered in war.
Now, when I have brought my ideas clearly out by finishing this eighth book,
and have properly established the leading features of war, it will be easier for me
to carry the spirit of these ideas into the first six books, and to make these same
features show themselves everywhere. Therefore I shall defer till then the re
vision of the first six books.
Should the work be interrupted by my death, then what is found can only be
called a mass of conceptions not brought into form ; but as these are open to end
less misconceptions, they will doubtless give rise to a number of crude criticisms :
for, in these things, every one thinks, when he takes up his pen , that whatever
comes into his head is worth saying and printing, and quite as incontrovertible as
that twice two make four. If such an one would take the pains, as I have done,
to think over the subject, for years, and to compare his ideas with military history,
he would certainly be a little more guarded in his criticism.
Still, notwithstanding this imperfect form , I believe that an impartial reader,
thirsting for truth and conviction, will rightly appreciate in the first six books
the fruits of several years' reflection and a diligent study of war, and that, perhaps,
he will find in them some leading ideas which may bring about a revolution in the
theory of war .
Berlin , 10th July, 1827 .

Besides this notice, amongst the papers left, was found the following un
finished memorandum , which appears of very recent date :
The manuscript on the conduct of the Grande Guerre, which will be found
after my death, in its present state can only be regarded as a collection of
materials from which it is intended to construct a theory of war . With the greater
part I am not yet satisfied ; and the sixth book is to be looked at as a mere essay :
I should have completely remodelled it, and have tried a different line.
 NOTICE.
ix
But the ruling principles which pervade these materials I hold to be the right
ones : they are the result of a very varied reflection, keeping always in view the
reality, and always bearing in mind what I have learnt by experience and by my
intercourse with distinguished soldiers .
The seventh book is to contain the attack , the subjects of which are thrown
together in a hasty manner : the eighth, the plan for a war, in which I would have
examined war more especially in its political and human aspects.
The first chapter of the first book is the only one which I consider as
completed ; it will at least serve to show the manner in which I proposed to treat
the subject throughout.
The theory of the Grande Guerre, or strategy, as it is called , is beset with extra
ordinary difficulties, and we may affirm that very few men have clear conceptions
of the separate subjects, that is, conceptions carried up to the necessary in logical
connection. In real action most men are guided merely by the tact of judgment
which hits the object more or less accurately, according as they possess more or
less genius.
This is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly lay
their greatness and their genius , that they always hit upon what was right by this
tact. Thus also it will always be in action , and so far this tact is amply sufficient.
But when it is a question, not of acting oneself, but of convincing others in a
consultation, then all depends on clear conceptionsand demonstration of the inherent
relations, and so little progress has been made in this respect, that most delibera
tions are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either
in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual con
siderations of respect , a middle course, really without any value.
Clear ideas on these matters are therefore not wholly useless ; besides, the
human min d has a general ten
nece
dency to clearness, and always wants to be consistent
with the thi
ssary order of ngs.
Owing tothe great difficulties attending a philosophical construction of the art
of war, andthe many attempts at it that have failed, most people have come to the
conclusion that such a theory is impossible, because it concerns things which no
standing law can embrace. We should also join in this opinion and give up any
attempt at a theory, wereit not that a great number of propositions make them
selves evident without any difficulty, as, for instance, thatthe defensive form , with
a negative object, is the stronger form ,the attack with the positive object, the weaker
that great results carry the little ones with them — that,therefore, strategic effects
may be referred to certain centresof gravity — that a demonstration is a weaker
application of force than a real attack,that, therefore, there must be some special
reason for resorting to the former - that victory consists not merely in the conquest
on the field of battle, butin the destruction of armed forces, physically and
х NOTICE .

morally, which can in general only be effected by a pursuit after the battle is
gained– that successes are always greatest at the point where the victory has been
gained, that, therefore, the change from one line and object to another can only be
regarded as a necessary evil— that a turning movement is only justified by a supe
riority of numbers generally or by the advantage of our lines of communication
and retreat over those of the enemy — that flank positions are only justifiable on
similar grounds — that every attack becomes weaker as it progresses.

1
3

>

>
INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR.

That the conception of the scientific does not consist alone, or chiefly, in system,
and its finished theoretical constructions, requires now -a -days no exposition. System
in this treatise is not to be found on the surface, and instead of a finished building
of theory, there are only materials.
The scientific form lies here in the endeavour to explore the nature of military
phenomena to show their affinity with the nature of the things of which they are
composed. Nowhere has the philosophical argument been evaded, but where it
runs out into too thin a thread the Author has preferred to cut it short, and fall
back upon the correspon
ding results of experience ; for in the same way as many
plants only bear fruit when they do not shoot too high, so in the practical arts the
theoretical leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too far, but kept near to
experience, which is their
proper soil.
Unquestionably it woul d be a mistake to try to discover from the chemical
ingredients of a grain of corn the form of the ear of corn which it bears, as we have
only to go to the field to see the ears ripe . Investigation and observation, philosophy
and experience, must not despise one another or exclude one another ; they mutually
afford each other the rights of citizenship. Consequently, the propositions of this
book , with their arch of inherent necessity, are supported either by experience or by
abutconc
the epti
ments.* on of war itself as external points, so that they are not without

It is, perhaps, not impossible to write a systematic theory of war full of spirit
and substance, butours, hitherto,have been very much the reverse. To say nothing
of their unscientific spirit, in their striving after coherence and completeness of system ,
they overflow with common places, truisms, and twaddleof every kind. If we wanta
strik ing picture of them we have only toread Lichtenberg's extract from a code
of regulations in case of fire .
Ifa house takes fire , we must seek , above all things, to protect the right side
ofthe house standingonthe left,andontheother hand,the leftsideof the house
on the right; for if we, for example, should protect the left side of the house on the
left, then the right side ofthe house liestothe rightof theleft, and consequently as
realihatthi
preati s isnotthe
ngof war scientific works
itselfinacaseinthe ofmany milita
manner,isshown itamryawriter s especia
nyritestan ces,inllyofthosewho haveaimedat
which by their reaso ning,the
pe andcontraswalloweachother up so effectuallythatthere is no vestigeofthetailsovenwhich were
xii INTRODUCTION .

the fire lies to the right of this side, and of the right side ( for we have assumed that
the house is situated to the left of the fire ), therefore the right side is situated nearer
to the fire than the left, and the right side of the house might catch fire if it was not
protected before it came to the left which is protected. Consequently, something
might be burnt that is not protected, and that sooner than something else would be
burnt, even if it was not protected ; consequently we must let alone the latter, and
protect the former. In order to impress the thing on one's mind, we have only to
note if the house is situated to the right of the fire, then it is the left side, and if the
house is to the left it is the right side.
In order not to frighten the intelligent reader by such common places, and to
make the little good that there is distasteful by pouring water upon it, the Author
has preferred to give in small ingots of fine metal his impressions and convictions,
the result of many years reflection on war, of his intercourse with men of ability,
and of much personal experience. Thus the seemingly weakly -bound -together
chapters of this book have arisen, but it is ho they will not be found wanting
in logical connection. Perhaps soon a greater head may appear, and instead of
these single grains, give the whole in a casting of pure metal without dross.
>

>

>

>

BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ.

(BY TRANSLATOR .)

THE AUTHOR of the work here translated, Genəral Carl Von Clausewitz, was born
at Burg, near Magdeburg, in 1780 , and entered the Prussian army as Fahnen
junker, in 1792 . He served in the campaigns of 1793-94 on the Rhine,
after which he seems to have devoted some time to the study of the scientific
branches of his profession. In 1801 , he entered the Military School at Berlin as
an officer, and remained there till 1803. During his residence there he attracted
the notice of General Scharnhorst, then at the head of the establishment; and
the cepatrononaghise offututhis distinguished officer may probably have had some in
fluen re career .
his writi
that he ever afterwards continued to eventtain
At all enter
a high gatheem
s, we may este r from
for Schar nhorsngst,
In the campaign of 1806, he served as Aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of
Prussi a ; and, being wounded and taken prisoner, he was sent into France until
the close of that war.
On his return, he was placed on General Scharnhorst's
Staff, and employed in the work then going on for the re- organisation of the
army. He was also at this time selected as military instructor to the late King of
Prussia, then Crown Prince .
In 1812,
officers, having entered the Russian Clausew
service first with
, hisitz, several
appoint was asPrussia
ment other Aiden
de-camp to General Phul.
Afterwards while serving with Wittgenstein's army,
he assisted in negotiating the famous, convention with York . Of the part he
tookin that affair he has left an interestingaccount in his work on the “ Russian
Camp aign.” It is there stated that ordeinat
had been carried on with Yorkto, ain term the corr
r toionbrining one wayespo
or nden
anotceher,whic
theh
Author was despatched to York's head quarters with two letters,one was from
General d'Auvray, the Chief of the Staff of Wittgenstein's army, to General
Diebitsch, showing the arrangements madeto cut off York's corps from Mac
donald (this was necessaryin order togive York a plausible excuse for seceding
fromth Fren
Duke ofe Ba o. the other was an intercepted letter from Macdonaldtothe
ch);
ssan
With regard to the former of these, the Author says, “ it
xiv BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ ,

would not have had weight with a man like York, but for a military justifica
tion , if the Prussian court should require one as against the French, it was
important.”
The second letter was calculated at the least to call up in General York's mind
all the feelings of bitterness, which perhaps for some days past had been diminished
by the consciousness of his own behaviour towards the writer.
As the Author entered General York's chamber, the latter called out to him,
“ Keep off from me ; I will have nothing more to do with you ; your da
Cossacks have let a letter of Macdonald's pass through them, which brings me
an order to march on Piktrepöhnen, in order there to effect our junction. All
doubt is now at an end ; your troops do not come up ; you are too weak ; march
I must, and I must excuse myself from all further negotiation, which may cost
me my head.” The Author said that he would make no opposition to all this,
but begged for a candle, as he had letters to show the General ; and, as the latter
seemed still to hesitate, the Author added, “ Your Excellency will not surely place
me in the embarrassment of departing without having executed my commission ."
The General ordered candles, and called in Colonel Roeder, the chief of his staff,
from the ante-chamber. The letters were read. After a pause of an instant, the
General said, “ Clausewitz, you are a Prussian, do you believe that the letter
of General d'Auvray is sincere, and that Wittgenstein's troops will really be at
the points he mentioned on the 31st ? ” The Author replied, “ I pledge myself for
the sincerity of this letter upon the knowledge I have of General d'Auvray
and the other men of Wittgenstein's head-quarters ; whether the dispositions
he announces can be accomplished as he lays down I certainly cannot pledge
myself ; for your Excellency knows that in war we must often fall short of the line
we have drawn for ourselves.” The General was silent for a few minutes of
earnest reflection ; then held out his hand to the Author, and said, “ You have me,
Tell General Diebitsch that we must confer early to -morrow at the mill of
Poscherun, and that I am now firmly determined to separate myself from the
French and their cause ."
The hour was fixed for 8 A.M. After this was settled,
the General added, “ But I will not do the thing by halves, I will get you Mas
senbach also." He called in an officer who was of Massenbach's cavalry, and
who had just left them . Much like Schiller's Wallenstein , he asked , walking
up and down the room the while, “ What say your regiments ? ” The officer
broke out with enthusiasm at the idea of a riddance from the French alliance, and
said that every man of the troops in question felt the same.
“ You young ones may talk ; but my older head is shaking on my shoulders,”
replied the General. *
• “ Campaign in Russia in 1812 ; " translated from the German of General Von Clausewitz (by Lord
Ellesmere ).
 BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ .
XV

>
After the close of the Russian campaign Clausewitz remained in the service
of that country, but was attached as a Russian staff officer to Blucher's head
quarters till the Armistice in 1813.
In 1814 , he became Chief of the Staff of General Walmoden's Russo -German
corps, which formed part of the army of the north under Bernadotte . His
name is frequently mentioned with distinction in that campaign , particularly in
connection with the affair of Goehrde.
2
Clausewitz re- entered the Prussian service in 1815, and served as Chief of the
staff to Thielman's corps, which was engaged with Grouchy at Wavre, on the 18th of
June.

After the Peace, he was employed in a command on the Rhine. In 1818, he

became Major -General, and Director of the Military School at which he had been
previously educated.
In 1830, he was appointed Inspector of Artillery at Breslau, but soon after
nominated Chief of the Staff to the Army of Observation, under Marshal Gneisenau
on the Polish frontier.
The latest notices of his life and services are probably to be found in the
memoire of General Brandt, who , from being on the staff of Gneisenau's army, was
brought into daily intercourse with Clausewitz in matters of duty, and also
frequently met him at the table of Marshal Gneisenau , at Posen .
Amongst other anecdotes, General Brandt relates that, upon one occasion,
the conversation at the Marshal's table turned upon a sermon preached by a
priest, in which some great absurdities were introduced, and a discussion arose
asto whether the Bishop should not be made responsible for what the priest had
said. This led to the topic of theology in general, when General Brandt, speaking
of himself, says, “ I expressed an opinion that theology is only to be regarded
as an historical process, as a moment in the gradual development of the human
race. This brought upon me an attack from all quarters, but more especially
from Clausewitz, who ought to have been on my side, he having been an adherent
and pupil of Kiesewetter's, who had indoctrinated him in the philosophy of Kant,
certainly diluted,—Imight even say, in homeopathic doses.”This anecdote is
only interesting as the mention of Kiesewetter points to a circumstance in the life of
Clause
di stinguwitz that may have had
ish his writings.
an influence in forming those habits of thought which
" Theway,” says General Brandt, “ in which General Clausewitz judged of things,
drewconclusions from movementsand marches, calculated the times of the marches,
and the pointswhere decisions would takeplacewas extremely interesting. Fate
has unfortunately denied him an opportunity of showing his talents in highcom
mand ,butshedIhave
distingui a .firmAspersuas
himself iononthattheasfielda strategi
a leader st heon would
of battle, havegreatly
the other hand , he
xvi BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAISEWITZ .

would not have been so much in his right place, from a “ manque d'habitude du
commandement," he wanted the art “ d'enlever les troupes.”
After the Prussian Army of Observation was dissolved, Clausewitz returned to
Breslau, and a few days after his arrival was seized with cholera, the seeds of which
he must have brought with him from the army on the Polish frontier. His death
took place in November, 1831 .
His writings are contained in nine volumes, published after his death , but
his fame rests most upon the three volumes forming his treatise on “ War.” In
the present attempt to render into English this portion of the works of Clausewitz,
the translator is sensible of many deficiencies, but he hopes at all events to succeed
in making this celebrated treatise better known in England, believing, as he does,
that so far as the work concerns the interests of this country, it has lost none of the
importance it possessed at the time of its first publication.

1
 5

>

>

3
ERRATA .

VOL . I.
Page 13, line 4 from top of page, column 2, for subordniate read subordinate.
9933,
>
→ 44, » 11 from top, column 2, for and Riflemen read or Rifleman .
45, at top of page, for Book I. read Book II.
9 65,
90
22 from top , column 1, before administration read and.
17 from top, column 1, for possibilities. If read possibilities; it.
, 77,
9989,
7 from bottom , column 2, for belief road feeling.
109,
99
99
3 from bottom , colunın 1, before circuitous read a.
"
5 from bottom , column 2, a note as followsshould have been supplied in connection with this
, 133, 90
passage :- " See Chaps. xiii. and siv., Book III., and Chap. xxix. , Book VI.” — TR .
17 from bottom , column 2, for engage him in a sham fight read feign to give battle.

Page 10, top line, column 2, onit him . VOL. II .

12, line 4 fronı top, column 2, for ban read spell
,, 41, .
, 102, 18 from bottom , column 2, omit second and.
191,
99
9 from bottom, column 2, for milesis read miles is .
191, ? from top, column 1, afterChapters insert Third Book.
, 191 , 5 from top, column 2, that isthe resultantshould be within parentheses.
16 from top, column 2, for vom read vorn .

l'age 1, before Title, Book VII ., read Sketches VOL.

for. III.
, 42 , 99
99
., 1 , for actions read factions.
VIIIumn
, 58, line 24 from top, col

INDEX.
After Victory,for Vol. II. read Vol. I., pages 130, 131 , 115, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152.
 *

>

0 N W A Ꭱ.

VOL. I.
?
 ----
>

‫܀‬

>

CONTENTS – VOL. I.

CHAP . BOOK I. -ON THE NATURE OF WAR.

I. What is War ? AGE
II. End and Means in War : 1
III. The Genius for War 14
IV. Of Danger in War : 23
Bodil Exert War 36
V. Of y ion in
VI . Information in War . 37
VII . Friction in War 38
VIII. Concluding Remarks, Book I. 39
41

BOOK II. -ON THE THEORY OF WAR.

I. Branches of the Art of War
II. On the Theory of War 43
III . Art or Science of War 48
IV . Methodicism 61
V. Criticism 63
VI. On Examples 67
80

BOOK III . - OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL .

I. Strategy
II . Ele men ts of Str ate gy 85
III . Moral Fo rces 90
IV . The Chief Moral Powers . 91
V. Military Virtue of an Army 92
VI . Boldness . 93
VII. Perseverance 96
VII I. Superiority of Numbers
IX Th Surpri
. e se
99
100
X. Stratagem 103
XI. Assemblyof Forces in Space 106
XII .Ass embly of Forces in Time 108
XIII. Strategic Reserve 108
Economy of Forces
XIV. Geo 113
XV . metric Elem al ent 115
115
XVI
XV II.. On the Suspe
On the Characnsion
ter ofofthe ActWainrWarfare
Modern 117
XVIII. Tension and Rest 120
121
XX CONTENTS.- VOL . I.

BOOK IV.-THE COMBAT.

CBAP. PAGE
123
I. Introductory
11. Character ofthe Modern Battle 123
III . The Combat in General 125
IV. The Combat in GeneralContinuation 127
132
V. On the Signification of the Combat .
VI . Duration of the Combat . 134
VII. Decision of the Combat 135
139
VIII. Mutual Understanding as to a Battle 141
IX . General Action- Its Decision
X. Continuation - Effects of Victory 145
XI . Continuation - Use of the Battle 149
152
XII . Strategic Means of utilising Victory
159
XIII. Retreat after a Lost Battle

1
 >

?리
2

? WAR .
ON

BOOK 1.- ON THE NATURE OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.
2

WHAT IS WAR ?
1. Introduction .
WE
War therefore is an act of violence to com
propose to consider first the single our opponent
pelViolenc fulfil our
e armsto itself will.the inven
with
elements of our subject, then each branch tions of Art and Science in order to con
or part, and , last of all, the whole , in all tend against violence. Self- imposed
its relations — therefore to advance from
the simple to the complex. But it is no restrictions, almost imperceptible and
cessary for us to commence with of Inter
a glance hardl natiomenti
y worth oning, accom
nal Law, d usageits
termepany
at the nature of the whole, because it is without essentially impairing its power.
particularly necessary that in the con
the. whole Violenc e, that physical force
say forcewithout
sideration
should be kept of thelyparts
of anyconstant in view (for therei snois tomoral
the conception of states and law ),
is therefore the means ; the compulsory
submission of the enemy to our will is
2. Definition . the ultimate object. In order to attain
We shall not enter into any of the ab this object fully, the enemy must be dis
struse definitions of war used by public armed ; and this is, correctly speaking,
ists. We shall keep to the element of the the real aim of hostilities in theory. It
takes the place of the final object, and
buitaitself, toa duel. War is nothing puts it aside in amanner as something
but a duel on an extensiv
e scale . If we
would conceive asa unit the countless
number of duels which make up a war ,
not properly belonging to war.
we
selves
so bestersby supposing to our
shall do wrestl
Each strives by
3. Utmost use of force.
two . gine there is a skilful method of disarm
physical force compel other sub causing
the objecttois to
to : his first Now , philanthropists may easily ima
mit to his will great bloodshed , and that this is
throw his adversary,and rethus to render ing
the
and overcoming an enemy without
in
him capable of further sistance. proper tendency of the art of War.
However plausible this may appear, still
B
2 ON WAR. [BOOK 1.
it is an error which must be extirpated ; events, by any extreme hostility of feel
for in such dangerous things as war, the ing. Amongst savages views emanating
errors which proceed from a spirit of from the feelings, amongst civilised na
benevolence are just the worst. As the tions those emanating from the under
use of physical power to the utmost ex- standing, have the predominance; but
tent by no means excludes the co-opera- this difference is not inherent in a state
tion of the intelligence, it follows that he of barbarism , and in a state of culture
who uses force unsparingly, without re- in themselves it arises from attendant
ference to the quantity of bloodshed, circumstances, existing institutions, etc. ,
must obtain a superiority if his adversary and therefore is not to be found neces
does not act likewise. By such means sarily in all cases, although it prevails
the former dictates the law to the latter , in the majority. In short, even the
and both proceed to extremities, to which most civilised nations may burn with pas
the only limitations are those imposed by sionate hatred of each other.
the amount of counteracting force on each We may see from this what a fallacy
side. it would be to refer the war of a civilised
This is the way in which the matter nation entirely to an intelligent act on
must be viewed ; and it is to no purpose, the part of the Government , and to ima
and even acting against one's own in- gine it as continually freeing itself more
terest, to turn away from the considera- and more from all feeling of passion in
tion of the real nature of the affair, be- such a way that at last the physical
cause the coarseness of its elements masses of combatants would no longer
excites repugnance . be required ; in reality, their inere rela
If the wars of civilised people are less tions would suffice - a kind of algebraic
cruel and destructive than those of action .
savages, the difference arises from the Theory was beginning to drift in this
social condition both of states in them- direction until the facts of the last war
selves and in their relations to each taught it better. If war is an act of
other. Out of this social condition and force, it belongs necessarily also to the
its relations war arises, and by it war is feelings. If it does not originate in the
subjected to conditions, is controlled and feelings, it re -acts more or less upon
modified. But these things do not be- them , and this more or less depends not
long to war itself ; they are only given on the degree of civilisation , but upon
conditions ; and to introduce into the the importance and duration of the inte
philosophy of war itself a principle of rests involved .
Therefore, if we find civilised nations
moderation would be an absurdity .
The fight between men consists really donot put their prisoners to death, do
of two different elements, the hostile not devastate towns and countries , this
feeling and the hostile view . In our is because their intelligence exercises
definition of war, we have chosen as greater influence on their mode of carry
its characteristic the latter of these ing on war, and has taught them more
element s, because it is the most general. effectual means of applying force than
It is impossible to conceive the pas- these rude acts of mere instinct. The
sion of hatred of the wildest descrip- invention of gunpowder, the constant
tion, bordering on mere instinct, with- progress of improvements in the con•
out combining with it the idea of a struction of firearms are sufficient proofs
hostile intention . On the other hand, that the tendency to destroy the adver
hostile intentions may often exist without sary which lies at the bottom of the
being accompanied by any, or at all conception of war, is in no way changed
 CHAP. I.]
WHAT IS WAR ?
3
or modified through the progress of civi- another case of reciprocal action .
lisation .
We therefore repeat our proposition , hav As
to app
longe as the reh
ene mytha
end defeatdef
he may
ist not ed,eat
I
that war is an act of violence , which in me , then I shall be no longer my own
its application knows no bounds ; as one master , but he will dictate the law to
dictates the law to the other, there me as I did to him, This is the second
arises a sortof reciprocal action , which in reciprocal action and leads to a second
the conception, must lead to an extreme . extreme (second reciprocal action ).
This is the first reciprocal action , and the
first extreme with which we meet ( first 5.- Utmost exertion of powers .
reciprocal action ).

4.- The aim is to disarm the enemy . If we desire to defeat the enemy, we
must proportion our efforts to- his powers
alre is tosaidis of resi
pro ductstan expres
factsorsis whi
two Thi canby
not the
actihave
theWe on in warady d tha aimmyof,
the ene
armt the of ce. ch sed be
and we shall now show that this in theo separated, namely, the sum of available
retical conception at least is necessary. means and the strength of the will. The
If our opponent is to be made to estimaof
sum in aavamea
tedthe ble e,mea
ilasur dependbes
asnsit may
comply with our will,we must place him ( although not entirely) upon numbers;
in a situation which is more oppressive but the strength of volition, isonlmor
to him than the sacrifice which we difficult to determine, and can y bee
demand ; but the disadvantages of this
position must naturally not be of a tran estimated to a certain extent by the
sitory nature, at least in appearance , strength of the motives.
otherwise the enemy , instead of yielding, have obtained in this way an Granted we
approxi
will hold out,in the pro spe ct of a cha nge be con
mationten
to ded
the wit h,
streng we
th can
of thethe n
pow tak
er ea
to
for the better. Every change in this
position which is produced by a continu- incr ease the m so as to obta in a pre pon
ation of the war, should therefore be a review of our own means, and either
change for the worse , at least, in idea. derance , or in case we have not the
Theworst position in which a belligerent resou
by incre
rcesasing our mean
to effect this, sthen
as far pos
as best
do our
canbeedplace
disarm that ore
d istheref
. If, ofbeing compl is to sible. Butthe adversary does the same;
, the enemyetely
reduced submission
to either be posi
be , he must by tive act
of
an ly dis hancement, which in pure conception ,
therefore there is a new mutual en.
war
or placed
armedthre in suchacco
a position that must create a fresh effort towards an
heis atened with it rding to pro extreme. This is the third case of
bability. From this it follows thatthe
disarming overthro reciprocal action , and a third extreme with
w the enemy
or
whichever we callit, mustofalways be the, which we meet ( third reciprocal action ).
aim of warfare. Now war is always the
shock of two hostile bodies in collision, 6. — Modification in the reality.
not the action of a living power upon
an inanimate mass , because an absolute Thus reasoning in the abstract, the
state of endurance would not be mak mind cannot stop short of an extreme,
ing war ; therefore what we have just sbeca
elveuse itd has
obeyto
s,aanconfli
deal otheranbuextr
no with t theme,
eir
said as to the aim of action in war with ct iof
ng force s left to them
applies to both parties. Here then is own inner laws. If we should seek to
deduce from the pure conception of war
 ON WAR. [ BOOK 1.
4
an absolute point for the aim which we 7.- War is never an isolated act.

shall propose and for the means which With regard to the first point, neither
we shall apply, this constant reciprocal of the two opponents is an abstract person
action would involve us in extremes , which to the other, not even as regards that
would be nothing but a play of ideas pro factor in the sum of resistance, which
duced by an almost invisible train of logi does not depend on objective things, viz.,
cal subtleties. If adhering closely to the the will. This will is not an entirely un.
absol ute, we try to avoid all diffic ulties known quantity ; it indicates what it will
by a stroke of the pen , and insist with be to -morrow by what it is to -day. War
logical strictness that in every case the does not spring up quite suddenly, it
utmosme
extre t effort be the
must must exertted
be objec , and the does not spread to the full in a moment ;
in that
each of the two opponents can,therefore,
direction , such a stroke of the pen would form an opinion of the other, in a great 1
be a mere paper law, not by any means measure , from what he is and what he
Eveed
adapt n to realg world.
theosin
supp this extreme tension does ; instead of judging of him accord
of forces was an absolute which could ing to what he, strictly speaking, should
be or should do . But, now, man with
thatthe humartai
easily beasce ned, still
n mind wouldwe mus
hardl sub-t his incomplete organisation isalways be
t yadmi
low the line of absolute perfection, and
mit itself to this kind of logical chimera . thus these deficiencies, having an in
cessarywoul
There wasted be r, whic
in many
of powe h woul
cases d be fluence on both sides, become a modi
an unne
in opposition to other principles of state- fying principle.
craft ; an effort of will would be required
disproportioned to the proposed object, 8. - It does not consist of a single instan
and which therefore it would beimpossible taneous blow .
to real ise , for the
e hum an will doe s not
derive its impuls from logical subtleti .es The second point gives rise to the fol
But everything takes a different form lowing considerations :
when we pass from abstractions to reality. If war ended in a single solution , or a
In the former everything must be sub- number of simultaneous ones, then natu
ject to optimism , and we must imagine rally all the preparations for the same
the one side as well as the other, striving would have a tendency to the extreme,
n
after perfection and even attaining it. foran omissio could not in anyway be
Will this ever take place in reality ? repaired ; the utmost, then, that the
It will if
world of reality could furnish as a guide
1 , War becomes a completely isolated for us would be the preparations of the
act, which arises suddenly and is enemy, as far as they are known to us ;
in no way connected with the all the rest would fall into the domain of
previous history of the states ; the abstract. But if the result is made
up from several successive acts, then
2 , Iforit to
is limited
several tosimu
a single solution,
ltaneous solu- naturally that which precedes withure
all its
tions ; phases may be taken as a meas for
3, If it contains within itself the solu- that which will follow , and in this man .
tion perfect and complete, .free ner the world of reality here again takes
from any reaction upon it, through the place of the abstract, and thus modi
a calculation beforehand of the fies the effort towards the extreme.
political situation which will fol. Yet every war would necessarily re
low from it . solve itself into a single solution , or a
 OK 1 GIAP . I.]
WHAT IS WAR ?
sum of simultaneous results, if all the That this part of the means of resist5
means required for the struggle were ance , which cannot at once be brought
她 照做 . 叫叫 MW

raised at once, or could be at once raised ; into activity , in many cases is a much
for as one adverse result necessarily greater part of the whole than might at
hich diminishes the means , then if all the first be supposed, and that it often re
means have been applied in the first, a stores the balance of power , seriously
second cannot properly be supposed . All affected by the great force of the first
hostile acts which might follow would decision , will be more fully shown here
belong essential ly to the first, and form after . Here it is sufficient to show that
in reality only its duration .
But we have already seen that even in mea
a comp in a mom
nslete concent
entratio
of time all cont
n of, is avairadi
lablec
the
preparation for war the real world tory to the nature of war.
派 協 止

steps into the place of mere abs tract Now this, in itself, furnishes no ground
conception — a material standard into the for relaxing our efforts to accumulate
place of the hypotheses of an extreme strength to gain the first result, because
IN that therefore in that way both parties,:
by the influence of the mutual reaction ,
山 诚 eJ·臣 道

remain below the line of extreme effort,

an unfavourable issue is always a disad
vantage to which no one would pur
and therefore all forces are not at once posely expose himself, and also because
brought forward .
the first decision, although not the only
naturethat
the ation of these subse quentwillevent the great
s,the more er itself
it isence
influ on.
andalso
It lies theirinapplic
one, still have
forces , they
cannot all be brought into activity at the
same time. These forces are the armies expe But
ctat
result ionesposs
the
caus owi
men
ibil
ng toity of gain
the
to take ref
ing
repuuge acelate
gnanin , inr
that
actually on foot, the country , with its
superficial extent and its population, and the human mind, to making excessiv
the allies. e
efforts ; and therefore forces are not con
In point of fact the coun try, with its centrated and measures are not taken for
superficial area and the population , be the first decision with that energy which
sidesbeing
force thes sour
, constitute in ce f an mili
itselofall intetary
gral belligerent omits from weakness,becomes
would otherwise be used . Whatever one

the quan
efficr ient theatiti or limi a real obje,and
& of theeithe
part ding
provi tre esof inwarwar, tinghi
to the othesr ownefforts grou
ctive thu sagai
nd for
n,
exercising
the same. a considerable influence on through this reciprocal action, extreme
Now it is possible to bring all the move tend encies are brought down to efforts on
limited scale .
* able military forces of a country into a
operation atonce, but not all fortresses,
rivers, mountains, people, etc., in short
not the whole country, unless it is so 9. - The result in war is never absolute.
şınall that it may be completely embraced
bythe first actof the war . Further, the
3 Lastly, even the final decision of a
Co- operation of allies does not depend on whole war is not always to be regarded
thewill of the belligerents and from the
; ute. The conquered state often
nature of the political relations ofisstate
to each other, this co -operati
s as absol
on fre- psees ombinaa passi.ng H
calitconly
olitiin ow mwhich
evil, uch tmay
his
t
ions times by means of
be repaired in after
has com not afforded until after the war
quently
menc i
ed , or it may be ncrease
to restore the balance of power . d also must modify the degree of tension
and the vigour of the efforts made is evi
dent in itself.
6 ON WAR.. [BOOK I
10.—The probabilities of real life take the object, the less value shall we set upon it
place of the conceptions of the extreme and and the more easily shall we be inducei
the absolute. to give it up altogether,
In this manner the whole act of war is
Thus, therefore, the political object, a
the original motive of the war, will b
removed from under the rigorous law of the standard for determining both th
forces exerted to the utmost. If the ex aim of the military force, and also th
treme is no longer to be apprehended , and amount of effort to be made. This
no longer to be sought for , it is left to the cannot be in itself ; but it is so i
judgme ntbe
efforts to to made
determi ne the oflimits
in place for this
it ; and the
relation to both the belligeren t state
because we are concerne
d with rei
can
by the bes of
onlyfact done
the on
realthe d byfurnished
worldata the laws lities, not with mere abstractions. 01
and the same political object may pr
of probability . Once the belligerents are duce totally different effects upon di
no longer mere conceptions but individual ferent people, or even upon the san
states and an
no longer governments,
ideal, but once the war
a definite is
sub- people at different times ; we can , ther
stantial procedure , then the reality will fore, only admit the political object
the measure, by considering it in its effet
furnish the data to compute the unknown upon those masses which it is to mo
quantities which are required to be and consequently the nature of the
found . masses also comes into consideration .
From the character, the measures, the is easy to see that thus the result may
situation of the adversary , and the rela very different according as these mas
tions with which he is surrounded , each are animated with a spirit which will
side will draw conclusions by the law of fuse vigour into the action or otherwi
probability asto the designs of the other, It is quite possible for such a state
and act accordingly. feeling to exist between two states t
a very trifling political motive for
11. — The political object now reappears. may produce an effect quite disproj
Here, now, forces itself again into con- tionate, in fact, a perfect explosion,
sideration a question which we had laid This applies to the efforts which
aside ( see No. 2 ,
) that is, the politi cal politi cal object will call forth in the
object of the war. The law of the extreme, states, and to the aim which the milit
the view to disarm the adversary , to over- action shallprescribe for itself. At ti
throw him , has hitherto to a certain ex it may itself be that aim , as for exar
tent usurped the place of this end or the conquest of a province. At of
object. Just as this law loses its force, times, the political object itself is
the political object must again come for- suitable for the aim of military act:
ward. If the whole consideration is a then such a one must be chosen as
calculation of probability based on defi- be an equivalent for it, and stand is
nite persons and relations, then the poli place as regards the conclusion of pe
n to
tical object, being the original motive, But, also , in this, due attentio
must be an essential factor in theproduct. peculiar character of the states conce
The smaller the sacrifice we demand from is always supposed . There are cire
our opponent , the smaller it may be ex stances in which the equivalent mu
pected will be the means of resistance much greater than the political obje
which he will employ ;but the smaller order to secure the latter. The poli
his are, the smaller will ours require to object will be so much the more
be. Further, the smaller our political standard of aim and effort, and have:
 CHAP. I.] WHAT IS WAR ?
7
influence in itself, the more the masses this, its length , then we must assume , at
are indifferent, the less that any mutual first sight at least, that any expenditure
feeling of hostility prevails intherefore
the two of time beyond this length , that is, every
states from other causes, and, , suspension of hostile action appears an
there are caseswhere the political object absurdity ; with respect to this it must
almost alone will be decisive .
If the aim of the military action is an not be forgotten that we now speak not
equivalent for the political object, that opponen
of the progres
ts , buts ofofthe or otherprogres
onegeneral of the stwo
of
action will in general diminis h as the the whole action of the war .
political object diminishes, and that in a
greater degree the more the political 13. — There is only one cause which can sus
object dominates; and so is explained
how, without any contradiction in itself, pend the action, and this seems to be only
there may be wars of all degrees of im possible on one side in any case .
portance and energy, from a war of ex
termination, down to the mere use of an forIfstrifetwo ,parti feeli
thenesahave animoelves
d thems
ng of
arme sity
army of observation. This , however , leads must have moved them to it ; as long now
to a question of another kind which we
have hereafter to develop and answer. as they continue armed , that is do not
come to terms of peace, this feeling must
12.-A suspension in the action of war exist ; and it can only be brought to a
unexplained by anyt hing said as yet . standstill by either side by one single
motive alone, which is, that he waits for a
However insignificant the more favourable moment for action. Now at
claims mutually advanced , however weak
politi cal first sight it appears that this motive can
the means put forth , however small the never exist except on one side, becauseit ,
aim to which military action is directed, eo ipso, must be prejudicial to the other.
can this action be suspended even for a If the one has an interest in acting, then
moment ? This is a question which pene- the
ing; other must have an interest in wait
trates deeply into the nature of the sub
ject.
A complete equilibrium of forces can
Every transaction requires for its ac never produce a suspension of action , for
complishment a certain time which we during suspension he who has the
call its duration. This may be longer or positive this
object (that is the assailant) must
shorter , according
as the person acting imagine equilibrium in thiswe
continue anprogres sing ; for if way, that
should
throws
movementsmore or less despatc h into his
.
he who has the positive object, therefore
Aboutthi
trouble s morehereor. less
ourselves shall acts
Eachweperson not the commant dmotive
onlystronges , can atmeans
thelesser ,so that
the same time
in his own fashion ; but the slow person
the equation is made up by the product of
does not protract the thing because he the motive and the power, then we must
wishes spend more time about but
to it, say , if no alteration in this condition
because , by his nature , he requires more of equilibrium is to be expected, the
time, and if he made more haste, would two parties must make peace ; but if an
not do the thing
therefo re, depends So subjec
. tive causes , alteration is to be expected , then it can
on well This time, be favoudelay.
onlywithout rable toWeoneseeside,
and belongs to the length , so - called , of the act thethere
thatand
manifes interest
con
action . fore the other has a t to

If we allow now to every action in war ception of an equilibrium cannot explain

a suspension of arms, but that it ends in
 Zué
2AI2
8 ON WAR . ( BOOK 1.

the question of the expectation of a more action in war must be possible, that is no
favourable moment. We now proceed
contradiction in itself .
Let us suppose, therefore, that one of to show this, and how it is .
two states has a positive object, as, for
instance, the conquest of one of the ene 15. — Here, therefore, the principle of pola
my's provinces — which is to be utilised rity is brought into requisition .
in the tsettlement of lpeace. After this
conques his politica object is accom- As we have supposed the interests of
plished , the necessity for action ceases, one commander to be always antagonistic
to those of the other, we have assumed a
and for him a pause ensues. If the
adversary is also contented with this solu- true polarity. We reserve a fuller expla
tion he will make peace, if not he must nation of this for another chapter, merely
act. Now, if we suppose that in four making the following observation on it
weeks he will be in a better condition to at present.
act, then he has sufficient grounds for The principle of polarity is only valid
putting off the time of action . when it can be conceived in one and the
But from that moment the logical same thing, where the positive and its
course for the enemy appears to be to act opposite the negative, completely destroy
thathemay not give theconquered party each other. Ina battle both sidesstrive
the desired time. Of course, in this mode to conquer; that is true polarity, for the
of reasoning a complete insight into the victory of the one side destroys that of
state of circumstances on both sides, is the other. But when we speak of two
supposed different things, which have a common
relation external to themselves, then it is
14. — Thus a continuance of action will ensue not the things but their relations which
which will advance towards a climax . have the polarity.
If this unbroken continuity of hostile 16.— Attack and defence are things differing
operations really existed, the effect would in kind and of unequal force. Polarity 18,
be that everything would again be driven therefore, not applicable to them .
towards the extreme ; for irrespective of
the effect of such incessant activity in If there was only one form of war, to
inflaming the feelings and infusing into wit the attack of the enemy, therefore no
the whole a greater degree of passion, a defence ; or in other words, if the attack
greater elementary force, there would also was distinguished from the defence
follow from this continuance of action, a merely by thepositive motive, which the
stricter continuity, a closer connection one has and the other has not, but the
between cause and effect, and thus every fight precisely one and the same: then
single action would become of more im- in this sort of fight every advantage
portance, and consequently more replete gained on the one side would be a cor
with danger. responding disadvantage on the other,
But we know that the course of action and true polarity wouldexist.
in war has seldom or never this unbroken But action in war is divided into two
continuity, and that there have been forms, attack and defence , which, as we
many wars in which action occupied by shall hereafter explain more particularly,
far the smallest portion of time employed , are very different and of unequal strength.
the whole of the rest being consumed in Polarity, therefore , lies in that to which
inaction. It is impossible that this should both bear a relation, in the decision, but
be always an anomaly, and suspension of not in the attack or defence itself.
 CHAP. I. ] WHAT IS WAR ?
9
If the one commander wishes the solu- diction . The weaker the motives to
tion put off, the other must wish to action are, the more will those motives
hasten it; but certainly only in the same be absorbed and neutralised by this dif
form of combat. If it is A's interest not ference between attack and defence, the
to attack his enemy at present but four more frequently, therefore, will action in
weeks hence, then it is B's interest to be warfare be stopped, as indeed experience
attacked, not four weeks hence, but at teaches.
the present moment. This is the direct
antagonism of interests, but it by no 18.—A second ground consists in the imper
means follows that it would be for B's
interest to attack A at once . That is
fect knowledge of circumstances.
plainly something totally different. But there is still another cause which
may
stop actio
n in war, that is an incom
17;– The effect of Polarity is oftendestroye pleteviewof thesituati
by the superiority of the Defence overd on. Eachcom
mander can only fully know his own
the Attack , and thus the suspension of
action in war is explained .
be know
posi tion ;n that
to himof by reports, whic
his opponent
h are
can only
If the form of defence is stronger than wron judg
uncergtain mentmay,
; he respefore,
with there upona
ct to itform
that of offence, as we shall hereafter data of this description, and, in conse
show, the question arises, Is the advan- quence of that error, he may suppose that
tage of a deferred decision as great on
one side as the advantage of the the initiative is properly with his adver .
the ive form on the other ? If it is
defens sary when it is really with himself. This
overbalancite cannot by its counter-weight just
not,then perf
wantasofofte ect insi
n occa sionght untihtmelycertacti
an mig ainlony
the latter, and thus
influence the progress of the action as untimely inaction, and so it would in
of the war. Wesee, therefore, that the to accel
itself noerate contr
moreactio ibute
n in dela
war. toStill than
, yit must
impuls iveforce existing in the polarity always be regardedas one of the natural
of interests may be lost in the difference
between the strength of the offensive and causes which may bring action in war to a
defens
tual.
ive, and thereby become ineffec standstill without involving a contradic
tion . But if we reflect how much more we
If, therefore, that side for which the are inclined and induced to estimate the
present is favourable is too weak to be power of our opponents too high than
ableto dispense with the advantage of too low, becauseit lies in human nature
the defens ive, he must put upwiththe
unfavourable prospects which the future fect
to do insig ht into
so, we admit thatgener
shall factsin mustr
ouralimpe
holds out ; for it may still be better to contribute very much to stop action in
fight a defensive battle in the unpromis principle of
ing future than to assume the offensive war, and to modify the
action .
cocommake thatatthpresent
nvincedpeace ity o,fbeing
superi. orNow
eundersto Thethepossibil
the into action of of a new
itywar modifica
standsti tion ,
ll brings
defensive ( rightly od ) is very inasmuch as it dilutes that action with
great, and much greater than may ap the element of Time, checks the influ
pear at first sight,
greater number we conceive
periodsthat ence or sense of danger in its course , and
action which ocof
those
cur in war
of the
in increases the meansof reinstating a lost
explained without involving anyarecontra balance of force. The greater the ten
thus sion of feelings from which the war
springs, the greater, therefore, the onergy
10 ON WAR. [BOOK I.
with which it is carried on, so much the nature of war, that is at those powers
shorter will be the periods of inaction ; on with which it is carried on, it will appear
theother hand ,the weaker the principle of to us still more like a game. The ele
warlike activity, the longer will be these ment in which the operations of war are
periods : for powerful motives increase carried on is danger ; but which of all
the force of the will, and this, as we the moral qualitiesis the first in danger ?
know, is always a factor in the product Courage. Now certainly courage is quite
of force. compatible with prudent calculation, but
still they are things of quite a different
- Frequent
19.move periodsof inaction in war re kind, essentially different qualities of the
it further from the absolute, and make mind ; onthe other hand , daring reliance
on good fortune, boldness, rashness, are
it still more a calculation of probabilities. only expressions of courage, and all
But the slower the action proceeds in these propensities of the mind look for
war, the more frequent and longer the the fortuitous (or accidental), because it
periods of inaction, so much the more is their element.
easily can an error be repaired ; there We see therefore how from the com
fore so much the bolder a general will be mencement, the absolute , the mathema
in his calculations, so much the more tical as it is called, no where finds any
readily will he keep them below the line sure basis in the calculations in the art
of absolute, and build everything upon of war ; and that from the outset there is
probabilities and conjecture. Thus, ac a play of possibilities, probabilities, good
cording as the course of the war is and bad luck, which spreads about with
more or less slow , more or less time will all the coarse and fine threads of its
be allowed for that which the nature of web, and makes war of all branches of
a concrete case particularly requires, cal human activity the most like a game of
culation of probability based on given cards .
circumstances.
22. - How this accords best with the human
20. - It therefore now only wants the ele mind in general.
ment of chance to make of it a game, and
in that element it is least of all deficient. Although our intellect always feels
the foregoing how much itself urged towards clearness and cer
theWe see fromnature
objective of war makes it a tainty, still our mind often feels itself
calculation of probabilities ; now there attracted by uncertainty. Instead of
is only one single element still wanting threading its way with theunderstanding
to make it a game, and that element it along the narrow path of philosophical
certainly is not without : it is chance . investigations and logical conclusions, in
There is no human affair which stands order almost unconscious of itself, to
so constantly and so generally in close arrive in spaces where it feels itself a
connection with chance as war. But stranger , and where it seems to part
along with chance , the accidental, and from all well known objects, it prefers to
along with it good luck, occupy a great remain with the imagination in the
place in war. realms of chance and luck . Instead of
living yonder on poor necessity, it revels
21.- Aswar is a game throughits objective here
nature, so also is it through its subjective.
matedin thereby
thewealth of possibilities;
, courage ani.
then takes wings
to itself, and daring and danger make
If we now take a look at the subjective the element into which it launches
 CHAP . I.] WIAT IS WAR ?
11
itself
, as ma .
the strea
fearless swimmer plunges into nations — always starts from a political
Shall theory leave it here , and move condi tion,e. and
cal motiv is called
It is forth
therefore a politi politi.
by acal act.
on, self satisfied with absolute conclusions Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained and
and rules? Then it is of no practical absolute expression of force , as we had to
use. Theory must also take into account deduce it from its mere conception , then
the human element; it must accord a the moment it is called forth by policy it
place to courage, to boldness, even to would step into the place of policy , and as
2 rashness. The art of war has to deal something quite independent of it would
with living and with moral forces ; the set it aside, and only follow its own laws,
consequence of which is that it can just as a mine at the moment of explosion
never attain the absolute and positi
There therefore everywhere mar
ve. cannot be guided into any other direction
is a
gin for the accidental ; and just as than that which has been given to it by
much in the greatest things as in the thething hasarrange
preparatory mentsviewed
really been . This is how,
hitherto
smallest . As there is room for this acci- whenever a want of harmony between
dental on the one hand, so on the other policy and the conduct of a war has led
there must be courageand self- reliance
to theoretical distinctions of the kind.
in proportion to the room left. If these But it is not so, and the idea is radically
qualities are forthcoming in a high false . War in the real world , as we have
degree, the margin left may like- already seen, is not an extreme thing which
wise be great. Courage and self re- expends itself at one single discharge; it
liance are therefore principlesquite is the operation of powers which do not
essential to war; consequently theory develop themselves completely in the
must only set up such rules as allow same manner and same measure
in the ,
ample scope for all degrees and varieties but which at one time expand sufficiently
ofthese necessary and noblest of military to overcome the resistance opposed by
virtues. In daring there may still be
wisdom also , and prudence as well, only inertia or friction , while at another they
that they are
standard
estimated by a different are too e,weak
therefor to produce
in a certain an effect
measure ; it isn
, a pulsatio
value
of .
of violent force more or less vehement,
23.— War is always a serious means for a consequently making its discharges and
serious object. Its more particular defi- quicklysting
exhau , in other powersconduct
its words more ing
ormore
less

Suchis war ; such the commander or quickly

less long
lasting to the
enough to admitof alwayse
aim , butinfluenc
who conducts such the theory which being
it; is no pastime ; no mere exerted
rules it. But war in its course, soas to
passion for venturing and winning ; no give it this oronit
that direction, in short to
Work ofaforfree enthusiasm ; itisa seriousligen ce. Now
be subject to the will of a guiding
ifwereflect thatwarintel
has
means a serious object . All that
appearanchues it wears
e which fortune from the its rootly this
natural in a original object,which
political motive then
varying , all that it
assimilates into of
itself of the oscillations called it into existence should also con
passion, of courage, of
of enthusia imagination
of sm are only particular pro, tinue the
,
first and highest consideration
conduct
in the political
of it. Still the
perties of this means.
object is no despotic lawgiver on that
The war of a community
- of whole
account; it must accommodate itself to
nations and particularly of civilised the nature of the means, and through
that is often completely changed, but it
12 ON WAR . [ BOOK I.
always remains that which has a prior become diverted from its natural direc
right to consideration. Policy therefore tion, the political object diverge from
is interwoven with the whole action of the aim of an ideal war, and the war
war, and must exercise a continuous in appear to become political.
fluence upon it as far as the nature of But that the reader may not form any
the forces exploding in it will permit. false conceptions, we must here observe
that, by this natural tendency of war, we
24. - War is a mere continuation of policy by only mean the philosophical, the strictly
other means . logical, and by no means the tendencyof
forces actually engaged in conflict, by
Wesee, therefore,that waris not merely which would be supposedto be included
a political act, but also a real political in- all the emotions andpassions of the com
strument, a continuation of political com- batants. No doubt in some cases these
merce, a carrying
other means. All out of the
beyond this same
which by alsotomightbeexcited
is as to such a degree
be with difficulty restrained and
strictly peculiar to war relates merely to confined to the political road ; but in most
the peculiar nature of the means which cases such a contradiction will not arise,
it uses .That the tendencies and views because, by the existence of such strenu
of policy shall not be incompatible with
ous exertions a great plan in harmony
these means, the art of war in general therewith would be implied. If the
and the commander in each particular plan is directed onlyupona small object,
case may demand, and this claim is truly then the impulses offeeling amongstthe
not a trifling one. But however power masses will be also so weak, that these
fully this may reacton political views in masses will require to be stimulated
particular cases, still it must always be rather than repressed.
regarded as only a modification of them ;
for the political view is the object, war is
the means, and the means must always 26.— They may all be regarded as political
include the object in our conception . acts.

25.-- Diversity in the nature of wars. Returning now to the main subject,
although it is true that in one kind of
The greater and more powerful thewar the political element seems almost to
disappear, whilst in another kind it occu,
motives of a war, the more it affects the
whole existence of a people, the more piesa very prominent place, we may still
violent the excitement which precedes affirm that the one is aspolitical as the
the war, by so much the nearer will the other; for if we regard the state policy
war approach to its abstract form , so as the intellig ence of the personified state, 1
much the more will it be directed to the then amongst all the constellations in the
destruction of the enemy, so much the political sky which it has to compute,
nearer will the military and political ends those must be included which arise when
coincide, so much the more purely mili- the nature of its relations imposes the ne
tary and less political the war appears to cessity of a great war. It is only if we
be ; but the weaker the motives and the understand bypolicynot a true apprecia
tensions, so much the less will the natural tion of affairs in general, but the conven
direction of the military element — that is, tional conception of a cautious, subtle,
forcem
be coincident with the direction also dishonest craftiness, averse from vio
which the political element indicates; so lence, that the latter kind of war may
much the more must therefore the war belong more to policy than the first.
 CHAP. I.] WHAT IS WAR ?
13
27.- Influence of this view on the right and animosity, which may be looked
understanding of military history , and on upon as blind instinct ; of the play of
the foundations of theory.
probabilities and chance, which make it
We see, therefore, in the first place, a free activity of the soul ; and of the
that under all circumstances war isto be subordniate natu
re a of polit
ical ru inst
regarded not as an independent thing, ment, by which it belongs purely to the
but as a political instrument ; and it is reaso
Then . first of these three phases con

only by taking this point of view thatwe

2 canavoid finding ourselves in opposition cerns
the gener
more althe
and peopl
his e; the second more
all military history. This is the only the Government. arThe my;passi ons dwhich
the thir more
means of unlocking the great book and
making it intelligible. Secondly, just break forth in war must already have
this view shows us how wars must differ a latent existence in the peoples. The
incharacter accor
the motives and ding
circu natur
to cesthefrom
mstan which rangewhich
e of talent the display of courage and
s shall get in the realm of proba
they proceed . bilities and of chance depends on the par
Now, the first, the grandest, and most ticular characteristics of the general and
decisiveact of judgment whichthe states his army ;but the political objects belong
man and general exercises is rightly to to the Government alone.
understand in this respect thewar in These three tendencies, which appear
which he engages, not to take it for like so many different lawgivers, are
someth which, wish
ing, orto
something make ofit
by thetonature of its andat rootesame
deeplythe d in time
thenatureof the degree.
variable insubject,
relations , it is impossible for it to be. A theory which would leave any one of
This is, or any
prehensiveof allstrategicalquestionsn media
ng ofenterintothismoroumiyi
treatishall
front the plan of a war.
trarytely
relationbecobetween them,would
me invol ved insuch im a
contradi ction with the reality , that it
For the presentwe content ourselves might be regarded as destroyed at once
with having brought the subject up to by that alone.
this point , and having thereby fixed the The problem is, therefore, that theory
chief point of view from which war and shall keep itself poised in a manner be
its theory are to be studied . tween these three tendencies, as between
three points of attraction .
28. - Result for theory. The way in which alone this difficult
chameleon therefore, not only a true
War is, because problem can be solved we shall examine
, it changes its nature in the book on the “ Theory of War.”
in some degree in each particular case , In every case the conception of war, as
but it isalso, as a whole, in relation to here defined, will be thefirst ray of light
thepredominant tendenci es osed
whi chare which shows us the true foundation of
in theory, and which first separatesthe
it,a wonderful trinity, comp of the
original violence ofits elements, hatred great masses, and allows us to distinguish
them from one another.
 [ BOOK 1 .

14
ON TAR .

CHAPTER II .

END AND MEANS IN WAR .

HAVING in the foregoing chapter ascer- expression o destruction of the enemy's

tained the complicated and variable military power."
our-
nature of war, we shall now occupy The country must be conquered, for out
selves in examining into the influence of the country a new military force may
which this nature has upon the end and be formed .
means in war. But if even both these thingsare done,
If we ask first of all for the aim upon still the war, that is, the hostile feeling
which the whole war is to be directed, in and action of hostile agencies, cannot be
order that it may be the right means for considered as at an end as longas the
the attainment of the political object, we will of the enemy is not subdued also ;
shall find that it is just as variable as that is, its Government and its allies
are the political object and the particular forced into signing a peace, or the people
circumstances of the war . into submission ; for whilst we are in full
If, in the next place, we keep once more occupation of the country the war may
to the pure conception of war, then we break out afresh , either in the interior or
must say that its political object properlythrough assistance given by allies. No
doubt this may also take place after a
lies out of its province, forif war is an
act of violence to compel the enemy to peace, but that shows nothing more than
fulfil our will, then in every case all de- that every war does not carry in itself
pends on our overthrowing the enemy, the elements for a complete decision and
that is, disarming him, and on that alone. final settlement.
This object, developed from abstract con- But even if this is the case , still with
ceptions, but which is also the one aimedthe conclusion of peace a number of
at in a great many cases in reality, we sparks are always extinguished, which
would have smouldered on quietly, and
shall, in the first place, examine in this
reality. the excitement of the passions abates,
In connection with the plan of a cam- because all those whose minds are dis
paign we shall hereafter examine more posed to peace, of which in all nations
closely into the meaning of disarming a and under all circumstances, there is
nation, but here we must at once draw a always a great number, turn themselves
distinction between three things, which away completely from the road to resist
as three general objects comprise every ance . Whatever may take place subse
thing else within them. They are the quently, we nuust always look upon the
military power, the country, and the will of object as attained, and the business of
the enemy. war as ended, by a peace .
The military power must be destroyed, As protection of the country is that one
that is, reduced to such a state as not to of these objects to which the military
be able to prosecute the war. This is force is destined, therefore the natural
the sense in which we wish to be under- order is that first of all this force should
stood hereafter, whenever we use the be destroyed ; then the country subdued ;
 CHAP . II.]
END AND MEANS .
15
and through the effect of these two re- would not go far with our present social
> sults, as well as the position we then hold, condition in Europe . Therefore, if we
the enemy should be forced to make have seen wars take place between states
peace. Generally the destruction of the of very unequal power, that has been the
enemy's force is done by degrees , and in case because there is a ' wide difference
inst the same measure the conquest of between war in reality and its original
the country follows immediately . The conception.
two likewise usually react upon each There are two considerations, which as
other , because the loss of provinces occa- motives, may practically take the place
sions diminution
th orade
is by
of military force . But of inability to continue the contest . The
r is
on that accountno
it also necenot
meansdoes ssaralwa
y, and
ys firstexce
the ssivimpr
is the obab
e pric ilit
e of the. second is
y, ess
succ
take place. The enemy's army, before According to what we have seen in the
it is sensibly weakened , may retreat to foregoing chapter, war must always set
the oppositeside of the country, or even
quite out of the country. In this case, itself free from the strict law of logical
therefore, the greater part or the whole neces
tion of proba
sity, seek
andbilit iesaid fromasthethiscalcu
: and la
is so
of the country is conquered .
But this object of war in the abstract, muchhas
war more that
thea bias the way the mor
case,, from the
thee cir
this final means of attaining the political cumstances out of which it has arisen—
object in which all others are combined , the smaller its motives are and the ex
the disar ming the enemy , is by no means
general in reality, is not à condition citement how
ceivable raisof
it hasout ed-so
this it alsoioncon
is ulat
calc of
necessary to peace, and therefore can in probabilities even motives to peace may
no wise be set up in theory as a law.
There are arise. War does not therefore always
innumerable instances of require to be fought out until one party
treaties in which peace has bee nsettled isover thrown ; and we may suppose that,
before either party could be looked upon
as disa whe the motiprob
slignht, aweak vesabiland passions are
balan ce rmed inde rgon,even
had; undeed e anybefosens the
re ible ity willsuffic e to
alteration. Nay , further, if we look at move that side to which it is unfavourable
the case in the concrete, then we must to give way. Now , were the other side
say that in a whole class of cases the convinced of this beforehand, it is natural
that inste
ideaof a complete defeat of the enemy only adofstrive
he would for this
first tryin proba
g and makibilit
ngy
wouldb
espec imagi
e athemereenem y isnativ fligh
conseider ablyt, the y's ur ofa total destruction of the
enemdeto
superiially
or. if
army.
The reason why the object deduced
from the conception of war is not adapted
Still more general in its influence on
the resolution to peace is the considera
in genera
ence betwelto realwar,lies
en the two, whichinisthediffer-
tion of the expenditure red
discussed made ,and further requi
force alrea
of .Aswar no
is dy
in the preceding chapter. If it was as act of blind passion, but is dominated
pure conception gives it, then a war be over by the political object, therefore
tween states
two of very unequal military
the value of that object determi
strength would appear an absurdity ; measure of the sacrifices by whichnesitthe
is
therefore would be impossible At most
the inequality between the. physical, to be purchas ed.n . This will be the case,
regards duratio
forces might be such that it could be not only as regards extent, but also as
balanced by the moral forces, and that As soon, therefore,
as the required outlay becomes so great
that the political object is no longer
 ON WAR . [ BOOK I.
16
equal in value, the object must be given the conquest of the enemy's provinces is
up,and peace will be the result. quite a different measure if the object is
We see, therefore, that in wars where not the destruction of the enemy's army.
t
one canno compl etely disarm the other, In the latter case, the destruction of the
the motives to peace on both sides will army is the real effectual action, and the
rise or fall on each side according to the takinge of the provinces only a conse
probability of future success and the quenc e
of it ; to take them befor the
required outlay. If these motives were army had been defeated would always
equally strong on both sides, they would be looked upon only as a necessary evil.
meet in the centre of their political On the other hand , if our views are not
difference . Where they are strong on directed upon the complete destruction
one side , they might be weak on of the enemy's force, and if we are sure
the other . If their amount is only suffi- that the enemy does not seek but fears to
cient, peace will follow , but naturally to bring matters to a bloody decision, the
the advantage of that side which has the taking possession of a weak or defence
weakest motive for its conclusion . We less province is an advantage in itself,
purposely pass over here the difference and if this advantage is of sufficient im
which thepositive and negative character portance to make the enemy apprehensive
of the political end must necessarily pro- about the general result, then it may
duce practically ; for although that is, as also be regarded as a shorter road to peace.
we shall hereafter show, of the highest But now we come upon a peculiar
importance , still we are obliged to keep means of influencing the probability of
here to a more general point of view , be- the result without destroying the enemy's
cause the original political views in the army, namely, upon the expeditions
course of the war change very much, which have a direct connection with
and at last may become totally different political views. If there are any enter
just because they are determined by results prises which are particularly likely to
ble events.
break up the enemy's alliances or make
probacomes
andNow the question how to in- them inoperative, to gain new alliances
fluence the probability of success . In for ourselves, to raise political powers in
the first place, naturally by the same our own favour, etc. , etc., then it is easy to 6
means which we use when the object is conceive how much these may increase
the subjugation of the enemy, by the des. the probability of success , and become a
truction of his military force and the shorter way towards our aim than the
conquest of his provinces ; but these two routing of the enemy's army .
means are not exactly of the same import The second question is how to act
here as they would be in reference to that uponthe enemy's expenditure instrength ,
object. If we attack the enemy's army, that is, to raise the price of success .
it is a very different thing whether we The enemy's outlay in strength lies in
intend to follow up the first blow with a the wear and tear of his forces, conse
succession of others until the whole force quently in the destruction of them on our
is destroyed , or whether we mean to part, and in the loss of provinces, conse
content ourselves with a victory to shake quently the conquest of them by us.
the enemy's feeling of security, to con Here again, on account of the various
vince him of our superiority, and to in- significations of these means,so likewise
stil into him a feeling of apprehension it will be found that neither of them
about the future. If this is our object, will be identical initssignification, in
we only go so far in the destruction of all cases if the objects are different.
his forces as is sufficient. In like manner The smallness in general of this differ
 CHAP . II.]
END AND MEANS.
17
encemust not cause us perplexity, for in by the duration of the contest we must
reality the weakest motives, the finest content ourselves with as small objects
shades of difference, often decide in aspossible, for it is in the nature of the
favour of this or that method of apply- thing that a great end requires a greater
ing force. Our only business here is to expenditure of force than a small one ;
show that certain conditions being sup
posed, the possibility of attaining the posbute-to smasel
theour st obj
lleves thapas
ect ple
is sim t wesivcan priso
e res
aim different ways is no contradiction, tance, that is a combat without any
inity
absurd ,nor even error .
Besides these two means there are three mea tiveatta
posins vieinw.thei greate
Inrthis wayst, rela
theref val
tiveore ue,
, our
the
pecue liar
otherwast way of directly increasin and the
of the senemy's force . Theg Ho
refore the resultisbest secured.
w far now can this negative mode of
first is invasion,that is theoccupatio
the enemy's territory, not with a viewnof
proceeding be carried ? Plainly not to
to absolu passivit
te mer endura
y, for e nce
keeping it, but in order to levy contribu- would not be fighting : and the defen
tions there, or to devastate it. The imme- sive is an activity by which so much of
diate object is here neither the conquest the enemy's power must be destroyed,
ofthearmenemy's territormer
ynor the defeat of that he must give up his object. That
his ed force, but ely to do him
damagein a general way. Thesecond way act, aloneand thert ein
is wha consiat
we aim sts inthe negasing
each tivele
is to select for the object of our enter- nature of our object.
prises those points at which we can do
the
enemymost harm . Nothing is easier gleNo doub sonega
t this effec tiveobje
tive ct inposi
as the sin
its tive
concehiveourthan
toin whic diff empl
may beeren
forcetwo
directions objeact
t oyed
is not
ct in the same direction would be,
, the
first of which is to be preferred if our supposing it successful ; but there is this
object is to defeat the enemy's army , difference in its favour, that it succeeds
while the other is more advantageous if more easily than the positive, and there.
the defeat of the enemy is out of the ques . fore it holds out greater certainty of
tion .Accordingtothe usual mode of ofits singl
success e act,must
; what nggaine
is wantibe d throu
in the efficagh
cy
speaking we should say that thefirst time, that is,through the duration ofthe
amore military,the other more politi- contest, and therefore this negative inten
the highest point,both areequally mili puré defensive,isalsothe naturalmeans of
be elignei
tany,and
can ibletheunle
rtheonenorthe overcoming the enemyby the duration of
othcum
ss it suits the cir er
stancesim of thecase . Thethird, by far the the combat, that is of wearing him out.
most p
ortant, from thegre numb
at er Here lies the origin of that difference
out the enemy We chooseo thismeexpres
sion no onl .t exp whichprevailsoverthe whole province of
t y o lain ur aning ubje further than to observe that from
swar
in few words but because it represent this .ncetgWe
ativcanno ion prese
intetntat o bpursu
are tnt e dedeucthis
ed
the hing exactly , and is not so figura s
t all the advaenta and all the stronge
- g
tive as may at first appear. The idea of for of com
ms bat
ewhic are on th sidr
s
h e e
wearying out in a strug
g amou in
reality to a gradual exhaustiloe of thnetsphy- sophica dynam law which exists be
n
sicalpowers and of the will produced through l greatne
of the Defensiv e,icand in which that philo
tween the ss and the certaint y of
the long continuance of exertion .
Now if we want to overcome the enemy success is realised . We shall resume the
consideration of all this hereafter.
 ON WAR . [BOOK 1.
18
If then the negative purpose, that is formal considerations ? And least of all
the concentrationof all the means into a can they fail to appear in war, where
state of pure resistance , affords a supe- the personal character of the combatants
riority in the contest, and if this ad- plays such an important part, both in
vantage is sufficient to balance whatever the cabinet and in the field . We limit
superiority in numbers the adversary ourselves to pointing this out, as it would
may have, then the mere duration of the be pedantry to attempt to reduce such
contest will suffice gradually to bring the influences into classes. Including these,
loss of force on the part of the adversary we may say that the number of possible
to a point at which the political object ways of reaching the aim rises to infi
can no hlong er be an
e , equi valent, a point nity.
at whic , therefor he must give up the To avoid under -estimating these dif
contest . We see then that this class of ferent short roads to the aim , either
means , the wearying out of the enemy estimating them only as rare
ce
exceptions,
t
includes the grea num ber of cases in or holding the differen h
whic they
which the weaker resists the stronger . cause in the conduct of war as insignifi
Frederick the Great during the Seven cant, we must bear in mind the diversity
Years' War was never strong enough to of political objects which may cause a
re
war, -measu at a glance the distance
overthrow theAustrian monarchy ; and if
he had tried to do so after the fashion of which there is between a death struggle
Charles the Twelfth , he would inevitably for political existenc e
g , and a wareswhich a
have had to succumb himself. But forced or totterin alliance mak a mat
after his skilful application of the system ter of disagreeable duty. Between the two,
of husb anding his resources had shown gradations innumerable occur in reality.
the
powers allied against him , through a If we reject one of these gradations in
seven years' war, that the actual expen- theory ,we might
diture of strength far exceeded what they the whole, which with equalright reject
would be tantamount
had at first anticipated, they made peace. to shutting the real world completely out
Wetosee sight.
of These
ways the then
aim that
in warthere
; thatare
the many
com- are the circumstances in general
plete subjugation of the enemy is not connected with the aim which we have to
essential in every case, that the destruc
pur sue in war ; let us now turn to the
tion of the enemy's military force, the means .
conquest of enemy's provinces, the mere There is only one single means, it is the
occupation of them , themere invasion of Fight . Howeverdiversified this may be
them - enterprises which are aimed di in form , however widely it, may differ
rectlyat political objects — lastly a passive froma rough vent of hatred and ani
expectation of the enemy's blow, areall mosity in a hand-to-handencounter,whate
ever number of things may introduc
means which , each in itself, may be used
to force the enemy's will just according themselves which are notactual fighting,
still it is always implied in the conception
as the peculiar circumstances of the case
of war, that all the effects manifested
lead us to expect more from the one or
the other. We could still add to these a have their roots in the combat.
whole category of shorter methods of That this must also always be so in the
gaining theend, which might be called greatest diversity and complication ofthe
argu ments ad'hominem. What branch reality, is proved ina very simple mana
of human affairs is there in which these ner . All that takes place in war takes
made
s of indiv
spark their idual
appearance ,spirit have not
flying over all the
ugh armed
thros of war, i.e.,
placeforce forces,butwhere
armed men are
 CHAP. II .11. ]
END AND MEANS.
19
applied, there the idea of fighting must is, therefore , always the means to attain
of necessity be at the foundation .
All, therefore, that relates to forces of objec
theThis t oftthe
objec maycomb at.ise be the mere
likew
war — all that is connected with their destruction of the enemy's armed force ;
creation, maintenance and application , but that is not by any means necessary,
, ty
belongs to military activi .
Creation and maintenance are obviously When may, beforsomet
and itever insta as different.
nce, quite
hing
only the
object.
means, whilst application is the shown, the defeat of the enemwe
y ishave
not
Thecontest in war is not a contes
t of the only
objec mean
t, whene ver to attain
s there the politi
are other objeccal
ts
individ ual agains t individual, but an
organised whole consisting of manifold
, whichthen
war, pursu
mayitbefollo ws ed,
of as
itself in a
aim such
the that
parts ; in this great whole we may dis
tinguish units of two kinds, the one other objects may become the object of
determined by the subject ,the other by also
partithe objec
cular of comba
actstof ts . and, therefore,
warfare,
object
thetant
ba
army mass com
. In an the of
s rangesitself alway
an order
s into memb even
Butdinat
subor e acts, are comba
those in the whichsense
ts strict , as
of new units, which again form ers devot ed to the destruction of the enemy's
ofa higherorder. The combat of eachof fighting force, need not have that destruc
these members forms, therefore, also a
more or less distinct unit. Further , the tion itself as their first object.
motive it. fight; thereforeitsobject
s unthe
forms itof If we
great think
arme of the manif
dforce,of old parts
the numb of a
er ofcir
Now to each of these units which we cumstances
which comeinto ty when activi
distinguish inthe contest , we attach the it is employe d, then it is clear that the
name of combat. combat of sucha force must also require a
If the idea of combat lies at the foun manifold organisation, a subordinating of
dation of every application of arıned parts and formation . There may and
power, then also the application of armed must naturally arise for particular parts
force
de termin
general, is nothing
arrang more than the a number of objects which are not them
inin and
g mbat ing selves the destruction of the enemy's
number of co s. armed force, and which, while they cer
a certain
Every activity inwar , therefore , neces tainly contribute to increase that destruc
sarily relates to the combat either directly tion , do so only in an indirect manner .
or indirectly. The soldier is levied , If a battalion is ordered to drive the
clothed, armed, exercised, he sleeps, eats, enemy from a rising ground, or a bridge,
drinks and marches, all merely to fight at &c., then properly the occupationof any
the right time and place. such locality is the real object, the destruc
olily therefore
activity ,allthe
terminat threads
ein the military
combatof, we shall takes
tion ofplace only the armed
the,enemy's or seconda
means force, ry
which
grasp them all when we settle the order merel demon
matteyr. byIf athe strat , the
ionbe object is
enem y can drive n away
ofthecombats. Only from this order and
its execution proceedcondtheit effectprs ec; ed
never attained all the same ; but this hill or
directly from the ions ing bridge
them . Now , in the combat all the action is, in point of fact, only required
dest
is directed to the ruction of the enemy , as a means of increasing the gross amount
or rather of his fighting powers, for this of loss
battle inflicte
, much more the enemy's
d onmust it be so onarmed
the
lies in the conception of combat. The force . theatre
whole If thisofiswar,
the case
whereonnot fieldone
theonly of
destruction of theenemy's fighting power
army is opposed to another, but one State,
 ON WAR. [BOOK I.
20

one nation, onewhole country to another. plied, leads us into all the different ways
Here the number of possible relations, which the multiplicity of objects allows
and consequently possible combinations, of, so that we seem to have gained
is much greater, the diversity of measures nothing ; but that is not the case, for
increased, and by the gradation of objects from this unity of means proceeds a
each subordinate to another, the first thread which assists the study of the
means employed is further apart from subject, as it runs through the whole
web of military activity , and holds it
the ultimate object.
It is,
sible that thefore
there , fort of
objec many
a comb atnsis pos-
reaso not Buther
toget . have considered the destruc
we
the destruction ofthe enemy's force, that tion of the enemy's force as one of the
is, of the force opposed to us, but that objects which may be pursued in war,
this only appears as a means . But in all and left undecided what importance
such cases it is no longer a question of should be given to it amongst other ob
complete destruction , for the combat is jects. In certain cases it will depend on
here nothing else but a measure of circumstances , and as a general question
strength — has in itself no value except we have left its value undetermined . We
only that of the present result, that is, of are once more brought back upon it, and
its decision .
we shall be able to get an insight into
But a measuring of strength may be the value which must necessarily be ac
effected in cases where the opposing sides corded to it.
are very unequal by a mere comparative ty in
The combat is the single activiion
war ; in the combat the destruct of
estimate . In such cases no fighting will
take place, and the weaker will immedi the enemy opposed to us is the means to
the end ; it is so even when the combat
atelygiveway .
If the object of a combat is not always
the destruction of the enemy's forces
does not actually take place , because in
that case there lies at the root of the de
cisi on the supposition at all events that
theratta
be engaged
ein ined as well fitsout
— andiwith ct can
objethe ofte
com batn this destruction is to be regarded as
taking place at all, by merely making a beyond doubt . It follows, therefore,
resolve to fight, and by the circumstances that the destruction of the enemy's
to which that gives rise—then that ex- military force is the foundation - stono
plains how a whole campaign may be of all action in war, the great sup
carried on with great activity without the port of all combinations , which rest upon
actual combat playing any notable part it like the arch on its' abutments. All
in it . action, therefore, takes place on the sup
Tha t this may be so, mili tary hist
proves by a hundred examples. How arms ory position that if the solution by forceof
which lies at its foundation should
many of those cases had a bloodless deci- be realised, it will be a favourable one.
sion which can be justified, that is, with- The decision by arms is, for all operations
out involving a contradiction ; and whether in war, great and small, what cash pay
some of the celebrities who rose out of ment is in bill transactions. However
them would stand criticism we shall remote from each other these relations,
leave undecided , for all we have to do however seldom the realisation may take
wi th the matter is to show the possibility pl
of such a course of events in war.
ace, still it can never entirely fail to
occur .
We have only one means in war — the If thedecision by arms lies at the foun
battle ; but this means, by the infinite dation of all combinations, then it follows
variety of ways in which it may be ap- that the enemy can defeat each of them by
 CHAP. II .]
END AND MEANS .
21
gaining a successful decision with arms, only to avoid these that any other means
not merely if it is that one on which our
combination directly depends, but also taken
areThat .
this means must be costly stands
by any other, if it is only important to reason, for the waste of our own mili
enough for every important decision by tary forces must , ceteris paribus, always
arms— that is, destruction of the enemy's be greater the more our aim is directed
forces reacts upon all preceding it, be
themse like a liquid
cause, lves level
element, they bring upon
Butthethedestr uctio
dange r of enemys's.
themean
n ofthis lies in
to a .
Thus, the destruction of the enemy's thisseek
we , that just
reco ils on grea
theours ters, effic
elve therwhi
and acy che
efor
armed force appears, therefore, always hasworse consequences in case we fail of
asthe superior more effectua mea
and l ns,
to which all others must give way . success.

But certainly itis onlywhen there is costOthe r meth

ly whe odssucc
n they eed, ther
are, less efor less
dange,erou s
a supposed equality in all other condi- when they fail; but in this is neces
tions that we can ascribeto the destruc- sarily lodged the condition that they are
tion of the enem
effica
y's armed force a grea
woul therefore
ter only opposed to similar ones, that is,
grea t
cy. It d, , be a
thesconcl that the enemy enem the dsame
acts yonshoul chooseprin
the
mistak to drawfrom
that a eblind dash must italway gainusion
the ciple;for if the
victory over skill and caution . An un way of a great decision by arms, our
skilful attack would lead to the destruc means must on that account be changed against
will, in order to correspond with his.
tion ofour
force ownafore
, and there nd not thetenem
ofwha
is not y's our
is here Thenall depends on the issue of the act
of destruction ; but of course it is evident
meant
not to the meanssuperi
. The but or effica belongs
to the endcy, and we that, ceteris parib in this
us, act
we
comparing the effect of one must be at a disadvantage in all respects
are onlyd aim
realise with the other . because our views and our means had
If we speak of the destructioexpre ssly
been direc
n of the which is not caseupon
thepart
ted in with the objec
other enemts,
y.
enemy's armed force, we must
point out that nothing obliges Two differe objects of which one is not
us to con- part of the other exclude each other ;
timethethisideat
on contraryo, the morealphy
the mer is sic essfor
necal ly and, therefore,a force which maybe
arice;
implied well because both in fact are applicable for the one, may not serve for
as ,
interwoven with each other even in the the other. If, therefore, one of two
most minute details, and, therefore, can belligerents is determined to take the
not be separated. inevit
But it is just in con way of the great decision by arms ,
nection with the able effect which then he has also a high probability
has been referred to, of a great act of his opponent will not take that way,
destruction of success, as soon as he is certain
(a great victory ) upon all
other decisions by arms, that this moral
element is most fluid , if we may use that but follows a different object ; and
every one who sets before himself any
expression , and, therefore, distributes it such other aim only does so in a reason
palfAgaithe mosteasisuly throughallthe position that his adversaryhas aslittle
nst the far perior worth which eat deci
the destruction of the enemy's armed
gr
intentio asonhebyhas
n si arms
of. resorting to the
force has over all other means, stands the
But what we have here said of another
expense and risk of this means , and it is direction of views and forces relates only
to other positive objects, which we may
 ON WAR. [BOOK 1.
22
propose to ourselves in war besides the cluded from choosing the destruction of
destruction of the enemy's force, not by the enemy's military force as our object,
any means to the pure defensive, which and must prefer å bloodless solution .
may be adopted with a view thereby to The advantage which the negative effort
exhaust the enemy's forces. In the pure gives may certainly lead to that, but
defensive, the positive object is wanting, only at the risk of its not being the most
and, therefore, while on the defensive, advisable method , as that question is de
our forces cannot at the same time be pendent on totally different conditions,
directed on other objects ; they can only resting not with ourselves but with our
s way
be employed to defeat the intentions of opponents . This other bloodles
the enemy. cannot, therefore, be looked upon at
We have now to consider the opposite all as the natural means of satisfying
of the destruction of the enemy's armed our great anxiety to spare our forces ;
force, that is to say, the preservation on the contrary, when circumstances
of our own . These two efforts always are not favourable to that way, it would
go together, as they mutually act and be the means of completely ruining them .
Very many Generals have fallen into
re -act on each other ; they are integral
parts of one and the same view, and this error , and been ruined by it. The
we have only to ascertain what effect only necessary effect resulting from the
is produced when one or the other superiority ofthe negative effort is the
has the predominance . The endeavour delay of the decision, so that the party
to destroy the enemy's force has a acting takes refuge in that way, as it
ion of the decisive
ve object and leads to positive re were, in theexpectatequence
positi
sults, of which the final aim is the moment . The cons of that is
conquest of the enemy . The preser- generally the postponement of the action as
vation of our own forces has a negative much aspossible in time and also in space,
object, leads therefore to the defeat of in sofar as space is in connection with
it . If the moment has arrived in which
the enemy's intentions , that is to pure no longer be done without
resistance, of which the final aim can be this can
nothing more than to prolong the dura ruinous disadvantage, then the advan 7

tion of the contest, so that the enemy tage of the negative must be considered
shall exhaust himself in it. ed
as exhaust , and then comes forward
The effort with a positive object calls unchanged the effort for the destruction
into existence the act of destruction ; the of the enemy's force, which was kept
effort with the negative object awaits it. back by a counterpoise, but never dis
How far this state of expectation should carded.
and may be carried we shall enter into We have seen , therefore, in the fore
more particularly in the theory ofattack going reflections, that there are many
and defence, at the origin of which we ways to the aim , that is, to the attain
again find ourselves. Here we shall con ment of the political object; but that the
tent ourselves with saying that the await only means is the combat, and that con
ing must be no absolute endurance, and sequent ly everything is subject to
supreme law : which is the decision by
that in the action bound up with it the
destruction of the enemy's armed force en arms; that where this is really demanded
gaged inthis conflict may be the aim just by one,it is a redress which cannot be
as well as anything else. It would , there- refused by the other ; that, therefore, a
fore, be a great error in the fundame ntal belligerent who takes any other way
idea to suppose that the consequence of must make sure that his opponent will
the negative course is that we are pre or his
not take this means of redress,
 CHAP . III.] THE GENIUS FOR WAR.
23
cause may be lost in that supreme court ; no right to find fault with him , if the
that, therefore, in short, the destruction premises on which he acts
of the enemy's armed force amongst all found and re
ed requi justif succe
ied tobyreme
are well
still
ss ; that
the objects which can be pursued in war we must him mber
appears always as that one which over- he only travels on forbidden tracks,
rules all.
where the God of War may surprise
What may be achieved by combina- him ; that he ought alway s tokeep his
tions of another kind in war we shall eye on the enemy, in order that he may
only learn in the sequel, and naturally not have to defend himself with a dress
only by degrees. We conte nt ourselves rapier if the enemy takes up a sharp
herewith acknowledging in general their sword.
possibility as something pointing the
difference ,between the reality and theto con The consequences of the nature of war,
how end andmeans act in it, how in the
ception,and
circumsta to the influence of particul
nces avoid
ar modificationssometim
of reality it deviates some
. But we could not times more from its strict
es less
showing at once that the bloody solution of original conception, plays backwards and
, the effort for the destruction forwards, yetalways remains under that
the crisis
of the enemy's force, is the firstborn son strict conception as under a supreme
of war. If when polítical objects are un
important, motives weak , the excitement law : all this we must retain in idea, and
of forces small, a cautious commander tion constant
bear of in mind
each oflythe succeed conside, ra
the subjects
in ing if
tries in all kinds of ways , without great
crisesand bloody solutions, to twist him we would rightly comprehend their true
skilfully weaknes
characteristic into
self a peace through the relations and proper importance, and not
ses of his enemy become involved incessantly in the most
in the field and in the Cabinet, we have glaring contradictions with the reality,
and at last with our own selves .

CHAPTER III.

THE GENIUS FOR WAR.

EVERY Specialcalling in life , if it is to be rian, we must be allowed to keep to
qualifications of understanding and soul. and to understand by " genius ” a very
manifest themselves by extraordinary ments .
achievements the mind to which they be capacity
for certain employ
long is termed genius. We wish to stop for a moment over
Weknow very well that this word is this faculty and dignity of the mind, in
used in many significations , which are order to vindicate its title, and to
conceptionmorefully
mery different both in extent and nature, explain the meaning
. But weshall ofthen
not dwello
tions it is a verydifficulttask to define throughaverygreattalent,at genius
thefesessence
pro s to obef Genius
philosop; he properly so-caled, thatisa conception
butr noasrweneither
gramma
which has no defined limits, and what
24 ON WAR . [BOOK 1.
we have to do is to bring under con- in their armies. Now as this coincides in
sideration every common tendency of the such case with the higher degree of
powers of the mind and soul towards the civilisation , therefore from such nations
business of war, the whole of which com- have issued forth the most brilliant
mon tendencies we may look upon as military exploits, as the Romans and
The
the essence offor
“ common,” just genius.
military therein We say
consists the French
greatest nameshave exenıpli
in these
fied. other
and in all
military genius, that it is not one single nations that have been renowned in
quality bearing upon war, as, for in- war, belong strictly to epochs of higher
stance, courage, while other qualities culture.
of mind and soul are wanting, or From this we may infer how.great a
have a direction which is unserviceable share the intelligent powershave in supe
for war ; but that it is an harmonious asso- rior military genius. We shall now look
ciation of powers, in which one or other more closely into this point.
may predominate, but none must be in War is the province of danger, and
opposition . therefore courage above all things is the
If every combatant required to be more first quality of a warrior.
or less endowed with military genius, Courage is of two kinds; first, physical
then our armies would be very weak ; for courage, or courage in presence of danger
as it implies a peculiar bent of the in to the person : and next, moral cour
telligent powers, therefore it can only age, or courage before responsibility ;
rarely be found where the mental powers whether it be before the judgment-seat
of a people are called into requisition, and of external authority, or of the inner
trained in so many different ways. The power, the conscience. We only speak
fewer the employments followed by a here of the first.
nation, the more that of arms predomin- Courage before danger to the person,
ates, so much the more prevalent mili- again, is of two kinds. First, it may be
tary genius must also be found. But this indifference to danger, whether proceed.
merely applies to its prevalence , by no ing from the organism of the individual,
means to its degree, for that depends on contempt of death, or habit : in any of
the general state of intellectual culture in these cases it is to be regarded as a per
the country. If we look at a wild, war- manent condition .
like race, then we find a warlike spirit in Secondly, courage may proceed from
individuals much more common than in a positive motives; such as personalpride,
civilised people ; for in the former almost patriotism ,enthusiasm of anykind. In
every warrior possesses it ; whilst in the this case courage is not so much a nor
civilised , whole masses are only carried mal condition as an impulse.
away by it from necessity, never by incli We may conceive that the two kinds
nation. But amongst uncivilised people act differently . The first kind is more
we never find a really great general, and certain ,because it has become a second
y
very seldom what we can properl call a nature, never forsakes the man : the
military genius , because that requires a second often leads him further. In the
development of the intelligent powers first there is more of firmness, in the
which cannot be found in an uncivilised second of boldness. The first leaves the
state. That acivilised people may also judgment cooler , thesecond raises its
have awarlike tendency anddevelopment powerat times, butoftenbewilders it.
is a matter of course ; and the more this
is general, the more frequently also will perfecttwo
The combined
kind make
of courage. up the most
military spirit be found in individuals War is the province of physical exer
 CHAP. III.] THE GENIUS FOR WAR .
25
tion and suffering . In order not to be for immediate decision, and allow no
>
completely overcome by them, a certain time to look about for fresh data,
strength of body and mind is required , often not enough for mature considera
which, either natural or acquired , pro
duces indifference to them . With these that Butcorr
tion . the muconh of
it ecti morone
e ofte
prem happand
n ise, ens
qualifications unde r the guidance of the knowledge of chance events which
simply a sound understanding, have
at once a proper instrument for awar
man is arisen , our
overthrow are plans quite sufficient
not completely
; and to , but
these arethe qualifications so generally only suffice to produce hesitation . Our
to be met with amongst wild and half- knowledge of circumstances has in
civilised tribes. If we go further in the creased , but our uncertainty , instead of
demands which war makes on its votaries, having ' diminished has only increased
, .
then we find the powers of the under- The reason of this is, that we do not gain
standing predominating . War isthe pro
vince of uncertainty : three- fourths of grees ; soexper
all our our ience at once
determinat but by
ions, conti nue de
to
those things upon which action in war be assailed incessantly by fresh experi
must be calcul ated, are hidden more or ence ; and the mind, if we may use the
less in the clouds of great uncertainty.
Here, then, above all a fine and penetra expression, must always be under arms.
tingmind called to grop Now,
perpe tualif confli
it is to get safeley throu
unexpgh this,
truth by theis tact for,judg
of its menteoutthe
. ct withth ected
A common understanding may , at one two qualities are indispensable : in the first
understand
accide, perha
time extrauponthi place an tofthis
nt: anpshit the mids inte which , eveny, in
ingnseobscurit
courage by
ordinary struth
, at is
another time, may compensate for the not without some traces of inner light,
want of this tact : but in the majority of which lead to the truth , and then the
lightthetheaverage
tocases result
deficient will alwaysbring
understanding . first is figuratively
courage to follow thisexpressed
faint light.by the
The
War is the province of chance. In no French phrase coup d'æil. The other
sphere of human activity is such a margin is resolution . As the battle is the feature
to be left for this intruder, because none in war to which attention was originally
is so much in constant contact with him chiefly directed, and as time and space are
on all sides. He increases the uncer important elements in it, and were more
tainty ofevery circumstance , andde. particul
ranges the course of events . fapiddecisions were the
arly so when chiefwith
cavalry arm,the
their
From this uncertainty of all intelli idea of rapid and correct decision related
instance
first element
in the two to the estimation of
andionsupposit
onceposit
inter ions
of chance actorcontinu
, this
, the in waral these s
constantly finds things different to his actually , and to deno the
points to a correct tejudg
expectations; and this cannot fail to idea an only
expression was adopted which
have an influence on his plans, or at ment by eye. Many teachers of the art
the presumptions
least plans
these on
connected with of war also then gave this limited signifi
. If this influence is so great cation as the definition of coup d'ail.
as to render
completel y nugatory -determined
the prethen
,
plan
, as rule,
a a
But it is undeniable that all able de
soon came underst
cisions to be
formed in the ood by
moment ofthe ex
action
but at the moment the necessary data
are often wanting for this, because in pression, asfor instance thehittingupon
circumstances
the course of action the right the
point of attack, etc.is meant
It is,
press frequently mental eyewhich
therefore, not only the physical, but more
 VELLE
1

ON WAR . [ BOOK 1.
26
in coup d'æil. Naturally, the expression, of language about this little misapplica
like the thing, is always more in its place tion, our observation is only intended to
in the field of tactics : still, it must not remove wrong objections.
be wanting in strategy, inasmuch as in This resolution now, which overcomes
it rapid decisions are often necessary , the state of doubting, can only be called ol
If we strip this conception of that which forth by the intellect and in fact by a
the expression has given it of the over peculiar tendency of the same. We
figurative and restricted , then it amounts maintain that the mere union of a su
simply to the rapid discovery of a truth, perior understanding and the neces
which to the ordinary mind is either not sary feelings are not sufficient to make
visible at all or only becomes so after up resolution. There are persons who
long examination and reflection . possess the keenest perception for the
Resolution is an act of courage in most difficult problems, who are also not
single instances, and if it becomes a cha- fearful of responsibility , and yet in cases
racteristic trait, it is a habit of the mind. of difficulty cannot come to a resolution .
But here we do not mean courage in Their courage and their sagacity operate
face of bodily danger, but in face of independently of each other, do not give
responsibility , therefore to a certain each other a hand, and on that account
extent against moral danger. This has do not produce resolution as a result.
been often called courage d'esprit, on the The forerunner of resolution is an act of
ground that it springs from the under- the mind making evident the necessity
standing ; nevertheless, it is no act of of venturing , and thus influencing the
the understanding on that account ; will. This quite peculiar direction ofthe
it is an act of feeling. Mere intelli- mind , which conquers every other fear in
gence is still not courage, for we man by the fear of wavering or doubting,
often see the cleverest people devoid of is what makes up resolution in strong
resolution . The mind must , therefore, minds : therefore , in our opinion, men
first awaken the feeling of courage, and who have little intelligence can never be
then be guided and supported by it, resolute. They may act without hesita
because in momentary emergencies the tion under perplexing circumstances, but
man is swayed more by his feelings than then they act without reflection . Now of
course, when a man acts without reflec
hisWe ghts
thouhav e . assigned to resolution the tion he cannot be at variance with him
office of removing the torments of doubt, self by doubts, and such a mode of action
and the dangers of delay, when there are no may now and then lead to the right point ;
sufficientrupu ves for guidance. Through
motilous we say now as before, it is the average
but lt
the unsc use of lang uagewhich resu which indicates the existence of
is prevalent, this term is often applied to military genius . Should our assertion
the mere propensity to daring, to bravery , appear extraordinary to any one, because
boldness , or temerity . But, when there heknows many a resolute hussar -officer
are sufficient motives in the man , let them who is no deepthinker, we must remind
be objective or subjective, true or false, him that the question here is about a
we have no right to speak of his resolu- peculiar direction of the mind, and not
tion ; for, when we do so, we put our- abou t great thinking powers.
selves in his place , and we throw into the We belie ve, therefore, that resolution
scale doubts which did not exist with him . is indebted to a special direction of the
Here,thereisno question of anything mind for its existence, adirection which
butofstren gthandweakness. We are not belongstoa strong Inhead, rather
cor thann to
roboratio of
pedantic enough to dispute with the use
brillianta one.
 CHAP . III
1.. ] THE GENIUS FOR WAR.
27
> we may add efforts, uncertainty, and chance, it is easy
this genealogy of resolution insta
that there have been many nces of conceive that a great force of mind and
to
men who have shown the greatest reso
lution in an inferior rank , and have lostunderst
make anding
way are requisit
with safety e to beamongst
and success able to
> it in a higher position. While on the such opposing elements, a force which,
one hand they are obliged to resolve , on
the other they see the dangers of a according to the different modifications
arising by
wrong decision, and as they are sur- termed of circums
outmilitary tances,
writers we finds
and annalist
rounded with things new
their understanding loses itstoorigthem as enerand
inal, mind firmness,
gy, chara staunchness,e stre
cter . All thes maningth
fes
of
force, and they become only the more
timid the more they become aware of the tatio
gardensd ofasthe
one andc natur
heroi e mighpowe
the same t ber re
of
danger of the irresolution into which volition, modified according to circum
they have fallen , and the more they have
formerly been in the habit of acting on stances ; but nearly related as these
thespur of the moment. things are to each other, still they are
From the coup d'ail and resolution , not one and the same, and it is desirable
we are naturally led to speak of its for us to distinguish here a little more
kindred quality, presence of mind, which closely at least action of the powers
in relation
in a region of the unexpected like of In soulfirst
thethe them.the
place, totomake concep
war must act a great part, for it is indeed
nothing but a great conquest over the tion clear, it is essential to observe that
unexpected. As we admire the weight, burden , resistance, or what
of mind in a pithy answer to anythin
presencge ever it may be called , by which that force
said unexpectedly, of the soul in the general is broughtto
expedient 80 we admire it in a
sudden danger light, is only in a very small measure the
ready on .
Neither the answer nor the expedient enemy's activity, the enemy's resistance,
need be in themselves extraordinary, if the enemy's action directly. The enemy's
they only hitthe point ; for that which as activity only affects the general directly in
the result of mature reflection would be the first place in relation to his person,
without disturbing his action as
nothingunusual, therefore insignificant mander com

inits impres insta

sionon us,mayasan nta- . Iftheenemy,
hours,resist instecomm
sforfour, the andetwor
ad of
ieousactof
impres sion . the expreprodu
Themind pleas
ssionce “a ing instead of twohours is four hoursin
of mind ” certainly denotes verypresence
fitly the danger ; this is a quantity which plainly
readiness and rapidity of the help ren diminishes the higher the rank of the
dered by the mind. commander. What is it for one in the
Whether this noble quality of a man post of commander - in - chief ? It is
is to be ascribed more to the peculiarity nothing
Secondly,although the opposition offered
feelings, depends on equanimitym
ofhismindortothe
his of by the enemy hasadirecteffectonthe
the nature of
the case , although neither of the two can commanderthrough the loss of means aris
be entirely wanting. A telling repartee responsibility connected with that loss,
bespeaks rather a ready wit, a ready ex ing from prolonged resistance, and the
pedient on suddendanger implies more and his force of will is first tested and
particularly a well -balanced mind.
called forth by these anxious considera
tions ; stillburden
heaviest
If we take ageneralviewofthe four bear, we maintain
farthat
by only this is not the
whichhe
elements composing the atmosphere in because he has himself tohas to
settle
which war moves, of danger , physical with . All the other effects of the enemy's
28 ON WAR. [BOOK 1.
resistance act directly upon the combat- must rise in proportion to the height of
ants under his command , and through the station .
them re- act upon him. of good courage Energy in action expresses the strength
As long as a troop full of the motive through which the action
fights with zeal and spirit , it is seldom is excited, let the motive have its origin
necessary for the chief to show great in a con on of the understanding, or
energy of purpose in the pursuit of his in an impulse. But the latter can hardly
object. But, as soon as difficulties arise ever be wanting where great force is to
—and that must always happen when show itself.
great results are at stake — then things Of all the noble feelings which fill
no longer move on of themselves like a the human heart in the exciting tu
t
well-oiled machine, the machine itself mult of battle, none, we mus ad
then begins to offer resistance , and to mit, are so powerful and constant as
overcome this , the commander must have the soul's thirst for honour and renown ,
a great force of will. By this resistance , which the German language treats so
we must not exactly suppose disobedience unfairly, and tends to depreciate by
and murmurs, although these are frequent the unworthy associations in the words
enough with particular individuals ; it is Ehrgeiz (greed of honour) and Ruhmsucht
the whole feeling of the dissolution (hankering after glory ). No doubt it is
of all physical and moral power, it is just in war that the abuse of these proud
the heart-rending sight of ther bloody aspirations of the soul must bring upon
sacrifice which the commande has to the human race the most shocking
contend with in himself, and then, in all outrages ; but by their origin, they
others who directly or indirectly transfer are certainly to be counted amongst the
to him their impressions, feelings, anxie- noblest feelings which belong to human
ties and desires . As the forces in one indi . nature, and in war they are the vivifying
vidual after another become prostrated , principle which gives the enormous body
and can no longer be excited and sup- a spirit. Although other feelings may be
ported by an effort of his own will, the more general in their influence, and many
whole inertia of the mass gradually rests of them — such as love of country, fa
its weight on the will of the commander : naticism , revenge, enthusiasm of every
by the spark in his breast, by the
s
lightof kind — may seem tostand higher, the
his spirit, the spark of purpose , thelight thirst for honour and renown still re
of hope must be kindled afresh in others : mains indispensable . Those other feel
in so far only as he is equal to this, he ings mayrouse the great masses in
stands above the masses, and continues general, and excite them more power
toence
beceases
their master ; whenever that influ- fully, but they do not give the leader
and his own spirit is no longer a desire to will more than others,
strong enough to revive the spirit of all which is an essential requisite
e
in his
elf
others, the masses drawing him down position, if he to mak hims dis
with them sink into the lower region of tinguished in it. They do not, like a
animal nature, which shrinks from danger thirst for honour , make the military act
and knows not shame.Thesearethe specially theproperty ofthe leader,which
weightsswhich thecourage and inte lligent he strives to turn to the best account;
facultie of the military commander have where he ploughs with toil, sows with
to over come , if he is to make his name care, that he mayreap plentifully. It is
illustrious. They increase with themasses, through these aspirations we have been
and, thereforee,if the forcesinquestion speaking of in commanders, from the
are to continu equal to the burden , they highest to the lowest, this sort of energy,
 CHAP. III.] THE GENIUS FOR WAR .
29
this spirit of emulation , these incentives, heart itself. It is, in point of fact,
that the action of armies is chiefly ani- another feeling, which, in strong minds
mated and made successful. And now balances the excited passions without
as to that which specially concerns the destroying them ; and it is only through
head of all, we ask , Has there ever been this equilibrium that the mastery of the
a great commander destitute of the love understanding is secured. This counter
of honour, or is such a character even poise is nothing but a sense of the dig
conceivable ?
Firmness denotes the resistance of the deepl nity of
y -seate thate noble
mand, desir pride,
of thest soul thats
, alway
will
blow ,
in relati
staunc on
hness to the force
relati of a singl e to act as a bein g endue d
on to a con- standing and reason. We may, therer
with unde
in
tinuance of blows. Close as is the ana
logy between the two, and often as the fore, not
does a stron
that its
say lose balan mind
g ce is one
even which
under the
one is used in place of the other, still most violent excitement .
there is a notable difference between If we cast a glance at the variety to be
them which cannot be mistaken , inas- observed in the human character in
much as firmness against a single power
ful impression may have its root in the peopl e whohavevery
respect find, excita
to feeling, welittle first,bility
some,
mere strength of a feeling , but staunch- who are called phlegmatic or indolent.
ness must be supported rather by the
understanding, for the greater the dura- whos e feelin
Secon dly, gssome very overs
still never excittep certabut
able, in
tionofa
delibe n action
ration is conne more
thected syste
with it, matic
and limits, andwhoare thereforeknownas
from this staunchness partly derives its men full of feeling, but sober-minded.
power . Thirdly, those who are very easily
If we now turn to strength of mind or roused, whose feelings blaze up quickly
soul, then the first question is, What are and violently like gunpowder, but do not
we to understand thereby ? las t.
Plainly it is not vehement expressions beFourthl
moved y, lastly,
slight
by and those
causes, andwho cannot
who gene
of feeling,nor easily excited passions, for rally ate nottobe roused suddenly
lang uage ; butcont
thatwouldbe the rary listusag
r of the
powetoall to only gradually ;but whose feelings,but
eningeof be
reaso n in the midst the most intense last
ment, in the stoof
ing . powerful, and are much more
excite rm of the most vio- come
passiovery
ns , lyi
The melat
p and
ngsedeeare n ent.
with strong
lent passions. Should this power depend
This difference of character lies, pro
nustre it. Theunder
doubt ngthof factstand theralone
that ing e are
?Wemen bably , closeon the confines of thephy
of the greatest intellect who cannot com sical powers which move the human organ
mand themselves, certainly proves no ism, and belongs to that amphibious
thing to the contrary ; for we might say organisation which we call the nervous
thatit perhaps requires an understand system , which appears to be partly mate
ing of a powerful rather than of com rial, partly spiritual.
a With our weak
prehensive nature : but we believe we
shall be nearer the truth if we assume philosophy, we shall not proceed further
in this mysterious field . * But it is im
the power of submitting
that control underst oneself to portant
anding for us to spend a moment over
the of the , even the effects which these different natures
in moments of the most violent excite
have on action in war , and to see how far
mentof the feelings, that power which a great strength of mind is to be expected
we call self- command, has its root in the from them .
Indolent men cannot easily be thrown
 1
ON WAR . [BOOK I.
30
out of their equanimity ; but we cannot frequently lose head, and that is the
certainly say there is strength of mind worst phase in their nature as respects
where there is a want of all manifesta . the conduct of war. But it would be

tion of power. At the same time it is contrary to experience to maintain that

not to be denied that such men have a very excitable spirits can never preserve 11

certain peculiar aptitude for war, on ac- a steady equilibrium , that is , to say that
count oftheir constant equanimity . They they cannot do so even under the strongest 1

often want the positive motive to action, excitement . Why should they not have
impulse , and consequently activity, but the sentiment of self -respect, for, as a 3

they are not apt to throw things into rule , they are men of a noble nature ?
disorder.
This feeling is seldom wanting in them ,
but it has not time to produce an effect.
The peculiarity of the second class is, 1

that they are easily excited to act on After an outburst they suffer most from a
trifling grounds; but in great matters feeling of inward humiliation. If through
they are easily overwhelmed . Men of education, self-observance , and experi
this kind show great activity in helping ence of life, they have learned , sooner or
an unfortunate individual; but by the later, the means of being on their guard,
distress of a whole nation they are only so that at the moment ofpowerful excite
inclined to despond, not roused to action . ment they are conscious, betimes, of the
Such people are not deficient in either counteracting force within their own
activity or equanimity in war : but they breasts, then even such men may have
will never accomplishtualanything greats great strength of mind.
unless a great intellec force furnishe Lastly, those who are difficult to move,
the motive, and it is very seldom that a but on that account susceptible of very
strong, independent mind is combined deep feelings ; men who stand in the
with such a character. same relation to the preceding as red heat
Excitable, inflammable feelings, are in to a flame are the best adapted by means
themselves littlesuited forpracticallife, of
and therefore they are not very fit for
their Titanic strength to roll away the
enormous masses , by which we may figu
war. They have certainly the advantage ratively represent the difficThulties which
e effect of
of strong impulses, but that cannot long beset command in war.
sustain them . At the same time , if the their feelings is like the movement of a
excita bility in such men takes the direc- great bodgh
y, slower ,but more irresistible .
tion of courage, or a sense of honour ; Althou such men are not so likely to
they may often be very useful inferior be suddenly surprised by their feelings
positions in war, because the action in and carried away, so as to be afterwards
war over which commanders in inferior ashamed of themselves like the preceding,
positions have control, is generally of still it would be contrary to experience to
shorter duration . Here one courageous believe that they can never lose their
resolution, one effervescence of the forces equanimity, or be overcome by blind pas
of the soul, will often suffice. A brave sion ; on the contrary , this must always
attack , a soul-stirring hurrah , is the work happen whenever the noble pride of
of a few moments ; whilst a brave contest self-controlis wanting.or as often as it
on the battle- field is the work of a day, has not sufficient weight. Wesee exam,
and a campaign the work of a year. ples of this most frequently in men of
Owing to the rapid movement oftheir noble mindsbelonging to savagenations,
feelings , it is doubly difficult for men where the low degreeof mental cultiva
ofthisdescript ion to preserve the equi- tion favours alwaysthedominance ofthe
librium of the mind ; therefore they passions . But even amongst the most
 CHAP . III . )
THE GENIUS FOR WAR .
31
civilised classes in civilised states, life is has entered upon, to make him doubt
full of examples of this kind of men himself and others, than in any other
carried away by the violence of their human activity:
passions, like the poacher of old chained The harrowing sight of danger and
to the stag in the forest.
sufferin
ascenda ncy leads
g easily to the
over the feelings
convicti on ofgain
the
We,istherefore
mind thatonce
not one, say is merely
strong
more asuscep ing
tible of strong excitement, but one which underst
surrounanding ; and
ds everyth ing, twilight
in athedeep clearwhich
view
can maintain its serenity under the most is so difficult, that a change of opinion is
powerful excitement; so that, in spite of more conceivable and more pardonable.
the storm in the breastwith perception It is, at all times, only conjecture or
, theperfect
and judgment can act free
dom ,'like the needle of the compass in guesses at truth which we have to act
the storm - tossed ship . upon. This is why differences of opin
By the term strength of character, or ion are nowhere so great as in war,
simply character, is denoted tenacity of er tostrea
and the
count ownimpre
m of
one's ssion
convi ctionss actin
neverg
conviction, let it be the result of our own ceases to flow . Even the greatest impas
or of others' views, and whether they are sibility of mind is hardly proof against
principles, opinions, momentary inspira-
tions, or any kind of emanations of the
them , because the impressions are power
ful in their nature, and always act at the
understanding ; but this kind of firmness same time upon the feelings.
certainly cannot manifest itself if the When the discernment is clear and
views themselvesfrequ
change This
areentsubje ct to frequent deep ,none but general principles and
change need not
.
be the consequence of external influences ; can
views of actio
be the resultn ;from thesestand
a high
and on princpoint
iples
itmay proceed from the continuous acti- theopinion in each particular case im
indicates a ownmind
vityofour adiness of mediatelyunder consideration lies
whichcaseit
, inunste
characteristic
mind. Evidently we should not say of a were, at anchor. But to keep to, these as it
manwho changes his views every moment, results of bygone reflection in opposi
however much the motives of change may tion the stream
to enawhi
phenom opinions
ch theofpresen and
tbrings
originate with himself , that he has cha
with it is just the difficulty. Between
raster. Only those
said to havethis therefor
men whose
quality on the particular case and the principle
e can be
convicti
is very constant, either because it is there is often a wide space which can
deeply rooted and clear in itself, little not always be traversed on a visible
liable to alteration, or because,as in the chain of conclusions, and where a certain
case of indolent men , there is a want of faith in self is necessary, and a certain
mental activity, and therefore a want of amount of scepticism is serviceable.
motives to change; or lastly, because an Here often nothing else will help us but
explicit act of the will , derived from an an imperative maxim which , independent
imperative maxim of the understanding, of reflection , at once controls it : that
refuses
certain pany
change of opinion up to a maxim is, in all doubtful cases to adhere
oint.
Now in war owing to the
to the first opinion , and not to give it up
, many and until a clear conviction forces us to do so.
is exposed , and, in the uncertainty of all undermust
We thedazzlinginfluence the superior
firmly believe in ofmomentary
knowledge and of all science, more things
occur to distract a man from the road he events not forget that their value is of
an inferior stamp. By this preference
 ON WAR . (BOOK I.
32
which in doubtful cases we giveto first con- Having in these high attributes of a
victions, by adherence to the same our ac- great military commander made ourselves
tions acquire that stabilityand consistency acquainted with those qualities in which
which make up what is called character. heart and head co- operate, we now come
It is easy to see how essential a well to a speciality of military activity which
balanced mind is to strength of character ; perhaps may be looked upon as the most
therefore, men of strong minds generally marked if it is not the most import
have a great deal of character. ant, and which only makes a demand
Force ofcharacter leads us to a spurious on the power of the mind, without regard
to the forces of feelings. It is the con
It ty
varie is ofoften very acy
it- obstin .
difficult in concrete nection which exists between war and
cases to say where the one ends and the country or ground.
other begins ; on the other hand , it does This connection is, in the first place, a
not seem difficult to determine the differ- permanent conditionof war, for it is im
ence in idea. possible to imagine our organised armies
Obstinacy is no fault of the under- effecting any operation otherwise than in
standing ; we use the term as denoting a some given space ; it is, secondly, of the
resistance against our better judgment, most decisive importance, because it modi
and it would beinconsistent to charge that fies, at times completely alters, the action
to the understanding , as the understand- of all forces; thirdly, while on the one
ing is the power of judgment. Obstinacy hand it often concerns the most minute
is a fault of the feelings or heart. This features of locality, on the other, it may
inflexibility of will, this impatience of apply to immense tracts of country.
contradiction, have their origin only in În this manner a great peculiarity is
a particular kind of egotism , which given to the effect of this connection
sets above every other pleasure that of war with country and ground. If we
of governing both self and others by think of other occupations of man which
its own mind alone. We should call it have a relation to these objects, on hor
a kind of vanity were it not decidedly ticulture, agriculture, on building houses
something better. Vanity is satisfied and hydraulic works, on mining, on the
with mere show, but obstinacy rests chase,and forestry, they are all confined
upon the enjoyment of the thing. within verylimited spaces which may be
We say therefore, force of character soon explored with sufficient exactness.
degenerates into obstinacy whenever the But the commander in war must commit
resistance to opposing judgment proceeds the business he has in hand to a corre
bettertrust
not froma more
upon
ctionys or
conviworth a mrelia
maxi
nce vey,
, but
ing spac
spondwhich ewhichhis eye cannot sur
the keenest zeal cannotalways
from a feeling of opposition. If this de- explore, and with which , owing to the
finition, as we have already admitted, is constant changes taking place, he can
of little assistance practically, still it will also seldombecomeproperlyacquainted.
prevent obstinacy from being considered Certainlythe enemy generally is in the
merely force of character intensifie , d same situation ; stiil, in the first place,
whilst it is something essentially different the difficulty, although common toboth,
-something which certainly lies close to
--SO is not the less a difficulty, and he who by
it and is cognate to it, but is at the same talent and practice overcomes it will
time so little an intensification of it that have a great advantage on his side ; se
there are very obstinate men who, from condly, this equality of the difficulty on
want of understanding, have very little both sides ismerelyanabstract supposi
force of character . tion which is rarely realised in the par
 CHAP. III.] THE GENIUS FOR WAR.
33
ticular case, as one of the two opponents
have much to do with it, is not to be
(the defensive) usually knows much more denie d. Puysegur, the famous Quarter
of the locality than his adversary. master -General of the famous Luxem
This very peculiar difficulty must be burgh, used to say that he had very little
overcome by a natural mental gift of a
confiden hims fetchresp
3 special kind which is known by the- first, beca in if
ceuse hadintothis
heelf theectPa
at
too restricted — term of ( Ortsinn) sense of role from a distance he always lost his
locality. It is the power of quickly forn
ing a correct geometrical idea of any way .
natural that scope for the exer
portionof countryand consequentlyof ciseIt ofis thistalen tshould increasealong
beingabletofin
any time.
done'splace initexactly with rank . If theHussarandRiflemen
This is plainly an act of in command of a patrol, must know well
the imagination.
Thebyper
doubt is formed partly mecep no all the highways and by -ways, and if for
anstioofn the
that rvat
physical eye , partly by the mind , which obse ionmar
a few icielimi
a few
ks, suff
are nt ; ted powers of
fillsupwhatis wantingwith ideasderived other hand theChiefofan so
armymust
on the
from knowledge and experience, and out
make himself familiar with the general
ofthe frag
s ment
eye forma whols e;visib thethisphysical geog
butletothat raphical featuresofa Provinceand
should present itself vividly to thewho on , of a Country ; must always have vividly
reasle
become
shouldn map a pictureure shou before his eyes the direction of the
draw , that this pict,a mental ly
ld be roads, rivers, andhills,without at the
same time being
fixed,that the details should never again the narrowe r " senseof dispens
able tolocality with
” e (Ort
separated bythemselv
effecte es facultycan
the menta—lallthat
onlywebe sinn). No
which doubt information
of
call imagination. If some great Poet or kinds as to objects in gener al, vario
Mapsus,
Painter Books, ceMemoirs, and for details the
should ssfeelsuch
from his godde office ; if he assistanofhisStaf
hurt anthatwerequire
,f are agreathelp
shrugs his shoulder s at the notion that a to him ; but it is neverthe less certain
that if he has himself a talent for form .
sharp gamekee permust necessa rilyexcel
in imagination ,we readily grant that we ingan idealpictureof a countryquickly
onlyspeak here of imagination in a limited and distinctly, it lends to his action an
sense, of its service in a really menial ca easier and firmer step, saves him from a
pacity. But however slight this service, certain mental helplessness, and makes
still it must be the work of that natural himless dependent on others.
gift, for if that gift is wanting, it would If this talent then is to be ascribed to
be difficult to imagine things plainly in imagination, it is also almost the only
all the completeness ofthe visible. That service which military activity requires
awe good memory isa great assistance from that erratic goddess whose influence
freely allow but whether memory
; more hurtful
is than useful in other re.
is to be considered as an independent spects.
faculty ofthe mind in thiscase, or whether thinkmanifest
Wethose
view we haveations
now of the powers
passed in re
itisjust ofimaginat
powerthings
thatthese ion which
better on requires human nature. Everywh ere
here fixes the of mind from
and soul which military activity
memory, we leave undecided, asin many
respects it seems difficult upon the whole Intellect appears as an essentia co -opera
to conceive these two mental powers apart how the work of war, althoughl so plain
tive force ; and thus we can understand
from each other.
That practice and mental acuteness
andconducted
be in itsdistinguished
simple with effects, can success
never

D
 ON WAR. [ BOOK I.
34
by people without distinguished powers routine duties has produced a decided
poverty of mind as a man of failing in
of the understanding.
When we have reached this view, then tellect; and, with all respect for his
we need no longer look upon such a bravery, to laugh at his simplicity. It
natural thing as the turning an enemy's is not our object to gain for these brave
position , which has been done a thousand men a better lot ; that would contribute
times, and a hundred other such like nothing to their efficiency, and little to
things, as the result of a great effort of their happiness ; we only wish to repre
genius . sent things as they are, and to expose
Certainly one is accustomed to regard the error of believing that a mere bravo
the plain honest soldier , as the very without intellect can make himself dis
oppositensof the man of reflectio n, full of tinguished in war.
inventio and ideas, or of the brilliant As we consider distinguished talents
spirit shining in the ornaments of refined requisite for those who are to attain
education of every kind. This antithesis distinction, even in inferior positions, it
is also by no means devoid of truth ; but naturallyfollowsthat we think highly
it does not show that the efficiency of the of those who fill with renown the place
soldier consists only in his courage, and of second in command of an army ; and
that thereis no particular energy and ca- their seeming simplicity of character as
d
pacity of the brain require in additio nto compared with a polyhistor, with ready
make a man merely what is called a true men of business, or with Councillors
soldier. We must again repeat that of State, must not lead us astray as to
there is nothing more common than to the supe
rior nature of their intellec
hear of men losing their energy on being tual activity. It happens , sometimes,
raised to a higher position, to which they that men import the fame gained in an
do not feel themselves equal; but we must inferior position into a higher one, with
also remind our readers that we are out, in reality, deserving it in the new
speaking of pre-eminent services, of such position : and then if they are not much
employed , and therefore not much exposed
as give renown in the branch of activity
to which they belong . Each grade of to therisk of showing their weak points,
command in War therefore forms its the judgment does not distinguish very
own stratum ofrequisite capacity of exactly what degree of fame is really
Fame and Honour . due to them ; and thus such men are
An immense space lies between a often the occasion of too low an estimate
general, that is, one at the head of a being formed of the characteristics re
whole war, or of a theatre of war, and quired to shinein certain situations.
his second in command, for the simple For each station , from the lowest up
reason that the latter is in more imme wards, to render distinguished services in
diate subordination to a superior autho war, there must be a particular genius.
, But the title of genius , history and the
restricted to a more limitedsphere of judgme nt of posterity onlyconfer,in
independent thought. This is why com general, on those minds which have shone
mon opinion sees no room for the exercise in the highest rank , that of commanders
of high talent except in high places, and in - chief. The reason is thathere, in point
the demand on the reasoning and
cient for all beneath : this is whypeople offact,
intellectual powersgenerallyis much
are rather inclined to look upon a sub greater .
ordinate general grown grey in the ser To conduct a whole war, or its great
vice, and in whom constant discharge of acts, which wecall campaigns, to a sic
 CIIAP. III.)
THE GENIUS FOR WAR .
35
cessful termination, there must be an powers of the mind is a sense of unity, and
intimate knowledge of state policy in its a judgment raised to such a compass as to
higher relations. The conduct of the give the mind an extraordinary faculty of
war, and the policy of the State, here vision, which, in its range, allays and sets
coincide; and the general becomes, at aside a thousand dim notions which an
2 the same time, the statesman .
We do not give Charles XII. the name ordi
to nary
ligh undegrea
t with rstatndin
efforgt,coul
andd over brinhg
only whic
of a great genius, because he could not it would exhaust itself But this higher
make the power of his sword subservient activity ofthe mind, this glance of genius
to a high judgmentit and philosop woul stillnot become matter of history
could not erattain by to a glorious hyob-, if thed qual ities of temperament and cha
ject. We do not give that title to racter of which we have treated did not
Henry IV ., because he did not live long give it their support.
enough to set at rest the relations of Truth alone is but a weak motive of
different States byhis military activity, action with men, and hence thereis
and tooccupy himself in that higher fiel alwaysa greatdifference between know
where noble feelings and a chivalrousing and willing, between science and art.
disposition haveless to do in mastering The man receives the strongest impulse -
dissension. than in
theenemy overcomi ng internal to action through the feelings, and the
In order that the reader may appre most powerful succour, if we may use
ciate all that must be comprehended and the expression, through those mixtures
judged of correctly at a glance by a of heart and mind, which we have made
general, we refer to the firstchapter. ness, perseceveran
acquaintan ce, asandresol
with, force cha
utionof, firm
We say, the general becomes a states
man , but he must not cease to be the racter.
general. He takes into view all the If, however, this elevated condition of
relations of the State on the one hand ; heart and mind in the General did not
maniing itselit,and
festfrom coulgene
can other knownsexac sult f in the
in the he must effec
hiswha accetspted
ralbe
at tly
re
he do with the mea dist d only
posal. on trust and faith, then it would rarely
As the diversity and undefined limits of become matter of history.
all the circumstances bring a great num All that becomes known of the course
berof things into consideration in war , of events in war is usually very simple,
estima most
as the ted accord ing eto thin
of thes gs can only be
probability , there- has aives
perce t same
greathe ness
diffic appe
aran
in conne
ulties no
ce ;with
cted
one on the mere relation of such
fore if the chief of an army does not them whic h had to be overc ome . event
It is
s
bring to bear upon all this a mind with only now and again in the memoirs of
an intuitive perception of the truth, a
Generals, or of those in their confidence,
placein themidst ofwhich thejudgment orinquiry
Buonbeco
will me bewildered . In this sense by reason of some special historical
directed toa particulcir
ar cum
aparte
wasright when he said that compo that atheporti
stancesing on of
whole the ismany
web threa
broug ht ds
quest to
many ofthe
a genera l for ionsonwhichco
decisi pro light.The reflections , mental doubts
mebefore
would make
blems mathematical calculation
unwortfor
hy aof the powers of Newton, not
or and conflicts which precede the execution
Euler. of great acts are purposely concealed be
What is here required from the higher cause they
because theyaffect been
political interests , as
looked or
tionofthem accidentupon
the recollec have is ally lost
36 ON WAR. [BOOK 1. 21.
mere scaffolding which had to be removed closest to military genius ? then a look at
on the completion of the building . the subject as well as at experience will
If, now, in conclusion , without ventur tell usthat searching ratherthan inventive
ing upon a closer definition of the higher minds, comprehensive minds rather than
powers of the soul, we should admit a such as have a specialbent, cool ratherthan
distinction in the intelligent faculties fiery heads are those to which in time of
themselves according to the common war weshould prefer to trust the welfare
ideas established by language,and ask of our brothersand children, the honour
ourselves what kind of mind comes and the safety of our fatherland .

91.5
CHAPTER IV .

OF DANGER IN WAR .

USUALLY before we have learnt what the bursting of shells is so frequent that
danger really is we form an idea of it the seriousness of life makes itself visible
which is rather attractive than repulsive. through the youthful picture of imagina
In the intoxication of enthusiasm , to fall tion. Suddenly some one known to us
upon the enemy at the charge - who falls — a shell makes its way into the
cares then about bullets and men falling ? crowd and causes some involuntarymove
The eyes shut for a moment, to throw ments ; we begin to feel that we are no
oneself against cold death, uncertain longer perfectly at ease and collected,
whether we or another shall escape him, even the brave st is at least to some de
and all this close to the golden aim of gree confused. Now, a step further into
victory, close to the rich fruit which am- the battle which is raging before us like
bition thirsts for - can this be difficult ? a scene in a theatre , we get to the nearest
It will not be difficult, and still less will General of Division ; here ball follows
it appear so. But such moments, which, ball , and thenoiseof ourown guns in,
however, are not the work of a single creases the confusion . From the General
pulse -beat as is supposed, but rather like of Division to the Brigadier. He a man
doctors' draughts, must be taken dilutedofacknowledged bravery, keepscarefully
and spoilt by mixture with time - such behind a rising ground, a house, ora
moments, we say , are but few . tree - a sure sign ofincreasing danger.
Let us accompany the novice to the Graperattles onthe roofs of the houses
and in the fields ; cannon balls howl
battle - field. As we approach , the thunder
of the cannon becoming plainer and over us, and plough the air in all direc
plainer issoon followed by the howlingof tions,and soon there isafrequentwhist
shot,whic h attracts the attention ofthe ling of musket balls ; a stepfurther to
inexperienced . Balls begin to strike the wards the troops, to that sturdy Infantry
ground close to us, before and behind . which for hours has maintained its firm
We hasten to the hill where stands the ness under this heavy fire ; here the air
General and his numerous Staff. Here is filled with the hissing of balls which
the close striking of the cannon balls and announce their proximity by a short
 CHAP. V.] OF BODILY , EXERTION IN WAR . 37

sharp noise as they pass within an inch ordinary character never attains to com
ofthe ear, the head , or the breast. plete coolness, and the natural elasticity
To add to all this, compassion strikes of mind ; and so we perceive that
thebeating heart with pity, at the sight here, again, ordinary qualities will not
of the maimed and fallen. The young suffice ;a thing which gains truth, the
soldier cannot reach any of these different wider the sphere of activity which is to
be filled. Enthusiastic, stoical, natural
strata of danger, without feeling that the
light of reason does not move here in the bravery, great ambition, or also long
same medium , that it is not refracted in familiarity with danger, much of all this
the same manner as in speculative con there must
templation. Indeed, he must be a very in be if all the effects produced
resistant medium are not to fall
extraordinary man who , under these im- farthis
short of that which , in the student's
pressions
the for the first time,doesnot lose chamber, may appear only the ordinary
power of making any instantaneou
decisions. It is true that habit soosn
standard .

blunts such impressions ; in half-an - hour a correct

Dangeridea of itbelongs
in war friction
to its for
is necessary truth;
we begin to be more or less indifferent of perception, and therefore it is brought
to all that is going on around us : but an under notice here,

CHAPTER V.

OF BODILY EXERTION IN WAR .

If no one was allowed to pass an opinion
on the events of war, except at a moment Amongst the many things in war for
be fixed, .bodily
tariff can reckoned
which no specially effort
whenheis benumbed byfrost, sinking maybe Provided
from heatand thirst,or dying
withhunger
and fatigue, we should certa inly have there is nowaste, itisaco-efficientof
fewer judgments correct objectively ; but all the forces, and no one can tell exactly
they would be so subjectively , at least; to what remarka
extent it may be carried . But
that is, they wouldcontain inthemsel ves what is ble is, that just only as
the exact relation between the person a strong arm enables the archer to stretch
giving the judgment and the object. the bowstring to the utmost extent, so
also in war it is only by means of a great
We can perceivethis by observiho
ng w forces
directing
modestly subdued , even spiritless and willspirit,that we tocantheexpec
be stretched tthet.
utmos
despon ding ,is the opinion passed upon
the results of untoward events , by those For it is one thing if an army, in conse
who have been eye-witnesses, butespe quence of great misfortunes, surrounded
cially ifthey havebeen parties concerned. with danger, falls all to pieces like a wall
that has been thrown down, and can only
the influence
ofexercises the allowance to be bodily strength ;itis anotherthingen
, and of whichbodilyFatiguo
made for it in matters of opinion. tirely when a victorious army, drawn on
by proud feelings only, is conducted at
38 ON WAR. [BOOK 1 ,
the will of its chief. The same effort to the fundamental causes of friction,
which , in the one case, might at most and because its indefinite quantity makes
excite our pity, must, in the other call it like an elastic body, the friction of
forth our admiration, because it is much which is well known to be difficult to
more difficult to sustain. calculate. ?
By this comes to light for the inex- To check the abuse of these con
perienced eye, one of those things which siderations, of such a survey of things
put fetters in the dark, as it were, on the which aggravate the difficulties of war,
action of the mind, and wear out in secretnature has given our judgment a guide
the powers of the soul. in our sensibilities. Just as an indivi
Although here strictly, the question is dual cannot with advantage refer to his
only respecting the extreme effort re- personal deficiencies if he is insulted and
quired by a commander from his army, ill-treated, but may well do so if he has
by a leader from his followers, therefore successfully repelled the affront, or has
of the spirit to demand it, ofthe art of fully revenged it, so no Commander or
getting it; still the personal physical army will lessen the impression of a dis
exertion of generals and of the chief com- graceful defeat by depicting the danger,
mander, must not be overlooked. Having the distress, the exertions, things which
brought the analysis of war conscien- would immensely enhance the glory of a
tiously up to this point, we could not but victory. Thus, ourfeeling, which after
take account also of the weight of this all is only a higher kind of judgment,
small remaining residue. forbids us to do what seems an act of
We have spoken here of bodily effort, justice to which our judgment would be
chiefly because, like danger, it belongs inclined .

CHAPTER VI .

INFORMATION IN WAR .

By the word " Information ,” we denote scription of knowledge in which writers

all the knowledge which we have of the of systems and compendiums take refuge
enemy and his country ; therefore, in for want of anything better.
fact, the foundation of all our ideas and Great part of the information obtained
actions. Let us just consider the nature in war is contradictory, a still greater
of this foundation ,its want of trustworthi- part is false, and by far the greatest part
ness, its changefulness, and we shall soon is of a doubtful character. What is re
feelwhat a dangerous edifice war is, how quired of an officer is a certain power of
easily it may fall to pieces and bury us discrimination,which only knowledge of
in its ruins. For although it is a maxim
in all books thatweshouldtrustonly men
give. andThe
things
law and good judgment
ofprobabil ity mustcan
be
certain information , that we must be his guide. This is not a trifling difficulty
always suspicious ; that is only a miser even in respect of the first plans, which
able book.comfort, belonging to that de can be forined in the chamber outside the
 CHAP. VII .) FRICTION IN WAR .
39
real sphere of war ; but it is enormously from the side of fear to that of hope;
increased when in the thick of war itself only by that means will he be able to
one report followshard upon the heels of preserve his balance. This difficulty
another ; it is then fortunate if these of seeing things correctly, which is
reports in contradicting each other, show one of the greatest frictions in war makes
a certain balance of probability, and things appear quite different towhat was
thus themselves call forth a scrutiny. expected. The impression of the senses
It is much worse for the inexperienced is stronger than the force of the ideas
whenaccident does not render him this resultin from methodic refl ection, and
service, but one report supports another, this goesg so far that no al
important under-
confirms it, magnifies it, finishes off the taking was ever yet carried out without
picture with fresh touches of colour, until the Commander having to subdue new
necessity in urgent haste forces from us doubts in himself at the time of com
aresolution which willsoon be discovered mencing the execution of his work . Or
folly, all those reportshaving been dinary men who follow the suggestions
to beexag
lies, gera
tions, errors, &c., &c. In of others become, therefore, generally
a few words, most reports are false, and undecided on the spot ; they think that
thetimidity of menactsasa multiplier theyhave found circumstances different
of lies and untruths . As a general rule
every one is more inclined to lend cre- gains they had
to whatstrengt h byexpecte and this
their d,again view
yielding
dencetothe bad than thegood Every tothe suggestions ofothers. Buteven
one is inclined to magnify the. bad in the man who has made his own plans
somemeasure , and although the alarms when he comes to see things with his own
which are thus propagated ,like the waves
often think he has done wrong.
Firm will
of the sea, subside into themselves, eyes, relianc e on self must make him
still, like them , without any apparen t proof against the seeming pressure of
cause they rise again . Firm in reliance
the moment ; his first conviction will
hisown betterrock
mmuststand convictions, the chief in end prove true, when the fore
the scenery
like a against whichthe
sea breaks its fury in vain . The role is
ground which fate has pushed on
not easy he who
; isnot by nature of a to the stage of war, with its accompani
buoyant disposition , or trained by expe ments of terrific objects is drawn aside,
and the horizon extende d . This
is one
of
mience
inwar,
may let maturtoeddoinviole
and rule
it be his judgnce
mentto, the great chasms which separate concep
his own natural conviction by inclining tion from execution .

CHAPTER VII.

FRICTION IN WAR .
As long
, we no personal know-
ar have
ledge ofas wwe required in a general have really to do.
where those diffic lie ofconceive
cannot
ulties which All appears so simple, all the requisite
so much is said, and what that genius , branches of knowledge appear so plain,
and those extraordinary mental powers all the combinations so unimportant, that,
in comparison with them, the easiest pro
40 ON WAR . (BOOK I. i

blem in higher mathematics impresses us battalion by its discipline is glued to

with a certain scientific dignity. Butif gether into one piece, and the chief must
we have seen war, all becomes intelli be a man of acknowledged zeal, thebeam
gible ; and still, after all, it is extremely turns on an iron pin with little friction .
difficult to describe what it is which But it is not so in reality , and all that is
brings about this change, to specify this exagger ated and false in such a concep
invisibl e and complet ely efficient Factor. tion manifests itself at once in war . The
Everything is very simple in war, but battalion always remains composed of a
the simplest thing is difficult. These number of men, of whom, if chance so
difficulties accumulate and produce a wills, the most insignificant is able to
friction, which no man can imagine occasion delay, and even irregularity.
exactly who has not seen war. Suppose The danger which war brings with it,
now a traveller, who , towards evening, the bodily exertions which it requires,
expects to accomplish the two stages at augment this evil so much, that they may
the end of his day's journey, four or five be regarded as the greatest causes of it.
leagues, with post horses, on the high This enormous friction, which is not
road - it is nothing. He arrives now at concentrated, as in mechanics, at a few
the last station butone, finds no horses, points,istherefore everywhere brought
or very bad ones ; then a hilly country, into contact with chance, and thus facts
bad roads ; it is a dark night, and he is take place upon which it was impossible
glad when, after a great deal of trouble, to calculate, their chief origin being
he reaches the next station , and finds chance. As an instance of one such chance,
there some miserable accommodation. take the weather. Here, the fogprevents
So in war, through the influence of an the enemy from being discovered in time,
infinity of petty circumstances, which a battery from firing at the right mo
cannot properly be described on paper, ment, a reportfrom reaching the general;
things disappoint us, and we fallshort of there, the rain prevents a battalion from
the mark. A powerful iron will over- arriving, another from reaching in right
comes this friction, it crushes the obsta- time, because, instead of three, it had to
cles, but certainly the machine along from
march perhapsg eight hours
with them . We shall often meet with this ;the cavalry
chargin effectively because it is
result. Like an obelisk , towards which stuck fast in heavy ground.
the principal streets of a place converge, These are only a few incidents of detail
the strong will ofa proud spirit, stands by way of elucidation, that thereader
prominent and comman ding , in the mid may be able to follow the author, for
dle of the art of war.
Friction is the only conception which, in
whole volumes might be written on these
difficulties. To avoid this, and still to
a general way,corresponds tothatwhich
distinguishes
give a clear conceptionof the host of
realwar from war on paper, small difficulties to be contended with in
The military machine, the army and all war, we might go on heaping up illustra
belonging to it, is in fact simple ; and tions, if we were not afraid of being tire
appears , on this account, easy to manage . some . But those who have already
But let us reflect that no part of it is in
one piece, that it is composed entirely of comprehended
a few more.
us will permit us to add
individuals, each of which keeps up its Activity in war is movement in a re
own friction in all directions. Theoreti
cally all sounds very well; the commander sistant medium . Just as a man in water
of a battalion is responsible for the execu is unable to perform with ease and regu.
tion of the order given ; and as the larity the most natural and simplest
movement, that of walking, so in war,
 CHAP . VIII.] CONCLUDING REMARKS, BOOK I.
41
with ordinary powers , one cannot keep aware of it that he may overcome it,
even the line of mediocrity. This isthe
reason that the correct theorist is like
where that is possible ; and that he may
not expect a degree of precision in results
a swimov
mmieme master, who tea uirsedon dry whi
chis imposs
ible on accoun of this
t
land
ngnts whi are reqche
ch the
in very friction . Besides, it can never be
water, which must appear grotesque and learnt theoretically ; and if it could, there
ludicrous to those who forget about the would still be wanting that experience of
water.

who haveThis alsogedwhy

neveisr plun theoristess, judgment which is called tact, and which
in themselv ,
or who cannot deduce any generalities innum
is alway
erabl
s more neces
e small divers
andsary a fieldobjec
in ified fullts,
of
from their experience, are unpractical than in great and decisivo cases, when
and even absurd, because they only one's own judgment may be aided by
teach what every one knows —how to
walk .
consultation with others. Just as the

Further everywaris rich particularme

man the world
ntofwhich
, , at the same timein, each is an
facts ; while
throu
has ,beco tact, of
meghhabit judg
spea ks,
unexplored sea, full of rocks, which the acts,
sion, and move
so the r, exper
s only
office as ience in occa
suits dthe war,
general may have a suspicion of, but
which he has never seen with his eye , will always, in great
and small mat
and round which , moreover, he must ters, at every pulsation of war aswemay
steer in the night. If a contrary wind say, decide and determine suitably to the
occasion. Through this expermin
also spring
accid event that
ental s up,decl aresisitsel adverse
, ifany
f greatot prac come his iencedofit
tice,the idea s to and

him,thenthe
presence most consummate skill, self,
of mind and energy , are re
hewill easilyso place
so and
thatnot himself
will not suit. And thus
in a posi
quired ; whilst to those who only look tion by which he is compromised, which,
distance , all seemsto
it fromthe autmostease foundat ions
if it often
proceed extreme of confide
occurs nce,shakes
in war, all the
and become s
with friction chief . The
part
knowled
that
geof
often
ly dangero us.
this is a of so
talked of, experience in war, which is It is, therefore, this friction, or what is
meeuiredin
he is not thebest general
a goodgeneral Certainmind
in.whose ly, appears
so termed here, which
easyin war difficult
makes thatreality
in which.
it assumes the greatest dimensions, who As we proceed, we shall often meet with
is the most overawedanxious this includes
by it (generals this subject again, and it will hereafter
that
whom
classof
there
over - , of become plain that, besides experience and
are so many amongst the
experienced ); but a general must be a strong will, there are still many other
rare qualities of the mind required to
make a man a consummate general.

CHAPTER VIII .

CONents
THOSE things which as elem CLUDIN
meeG REMARKS, BOOK I.
t to
gether in the atmosphere of war and
make it a resistant medium for every ac terms danger, bodily effort ( exertion ),
tivity, we have designated under the information, and friction. In their im
pedient effects they may therefore be
comprehended again in the collective no
42 ON WAR . [ BOOK I.
tion of a general friction . Now is there, when seen for the first time, set him in
then, no kind of oil which is capable of astonishment and perplexity ; if he has
diminishing this friction ? Only one, and only met with them one single time be.
that one isnot always available at the fore, even by that he is half acquainted
will of the Commander or his army. It with them . This relates even to bodily
is the habituation of an army to war. fatigues. They should be practised less
Habit gives strength to the body in to accustom the body than the mind
great exertion, to the mind in great to them. In war the young soldier
danger, to the judgment against first im- is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as
pressions. By it a valuable circumspec- the consequence of faults, mistakes, and
tion is generally gained throughout embarrassment in the conduct of the
every rank, from the Hussar and Rifle- whole , and to become distressed by that.
man, up to the General of Division , This would not happen if he had been
which facilitates the work of the chief prepared for that beforehand by exercises
Commander. in peace .
As the human eye in a dark room di- Another less comprehensive but still
lates its pupil draws in the little light very important means of gaining habitua
that there partially distinguishes ob- tion to war in time of peace is to invite
jects by degrees, and at last knows them into the service officers of foreign armies,
quite well, so it is in war with the expe- who have had experience in war. Peace
rienced soldier, whilst the novice is only seldom reigns over all Europe, and never
met by pitch dark night. in all quarters of the world. A State
Habituation to war no General can which has been long at peace should ,
give his army at once ; and thecamps of therefore, always seek to procure some
mane uvre ( peace exercises sh
) furni but officers who have done good service at
a weak substitute for it, weak in compari- the different scenes of warfare ; or to
son with real experience in war, but not send there some of its own, that they
weak in relation to other armies in which may get a lesson in war.
the training is limited to mere mechanical However small the number of officers
exercises of routine. So to reg ate the of this description may appear in propor
exercises in peace time as to include tion to the mass, stili their influence is
some of these causes of friction, that very sensibly felt. Their experience , the
the judgment , circumspection, even re- bent of their genius , the stamp of their
solution of the separate leaders may character, influence their subordinates
be brought into exercise, is of much and comrades ; and besides that, if they
greater consequence than those believe cannot be placed in positions of superior
whodo not know thething byexperience. command, they may always be regarded
It is of immense importance that the as men acquainted with the country, who
soldier, high or low, whatever rank he may be questioned on many special occa
has, should not have to encounter for the sions.
first time in war those things which,
 43

BOOK II. - ON THE THEORY OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR .

mea
War inits literal ningiscienfigt hti
for fighting alone is the effi pring,
n.
bec aus mere wrestling is also fight
ing . e
ciple in the manifold activity which , in a
wide sense , is called war . Fighting has determined everything
is a trial of strength of theBut
moral ing appertaining to arms and equipment, and
fightand
physical forces by means of the latter. these in turn modify the modeof fighting ;
That the moral cannot be omitted is evi there is, therefore reciprocity of action
dent of itself, for the condition of the between the two . , a
mind has always the most decisive influ Nevertheless, the fight itself remains
ence on the forces employed in war . still an entirely special activity, more
particularly because
The necessity of fighting very soon led firelyspecial elementit,moves
namelyin, an en
in the
men special inventions to turn
vantatoge in it in their own favour ; the ad
in con element of danger.
hequenceofthatthe modeof fighting forIf,drawi
thenng
, there anywhere
alineis betwe a necessity
en twodifferent
s itimport
is hereance order to see
whatever way it isconducteditsconcep- activitie
clearlythe ; andofin this idea,we
tion remainsunalter
cons
that which titutesedwa r . fightingis needonlyjust to calltomind how often
, and
The inventions have been from the eminent persona fitness
weapons and equipments for the in-
first pedantry in the lother. in one field has
dividual combatants. These have to be turned out nothing but the most useless
provided, andtheuse of them learnt be It is also noways difficult to separate
fore the towarthebegins
suitable . They
nature are made
of the fighting , in idea the one activity from the other,
consequently if we look at the combatant forces fully
ngaruled
are
activity ething applplainl
byhit ; but y armed and equipped as a given means
this ea different d in tthe
gefrom esefight ia nces; the profitable use of which requires
itself
nothing more than a knowledge of their
itis
not thly e prucept arofatiothnefosratmhe.e combat , general
on e cothnd results.
arming and equipping The art of war is, therefore, in its
conception That
to the of fighting
are not is plain ,
essential proper means
given sense, the art of making
in fighting, usecannot
and we of the
give it a better name than the “ Conduct of
 ON WAR . (BOOK 1.
44
War.” On the other hand , in a wider the majority which has brought us to it.
sense certainly, all activities which have On the other hand, we look upon the
their existence on account of war, there- arbitrary, unnatural definitions of these
fore the whole creation of troops, that is conceptions sought to be established by
levying them , arming, equipping, and some writers, as not in accordance with
។
exercising them , belong to the art of theAcco
general
rdingusage
to our the terms.
of class ification there .
war .
To make a sound theory it is most es- fore, tactics is the theory of the use ofmili
sential to separate these two activities, tary forces in combat. Strategy is the theory
for it is easy to see that if every art of of the use of combats for the object of the war.
war is to begin with the preparation of The way in which the conception of
military forces, and to pre -suppose forces a single or independent combat ismore
so organised as a primary condition for closely determined , the conditions to
conducting war, that theory will only be which this unit is attached, we shall only
applicable in the few cases to which the be able to explain clearly when we con
force available happens to be exactly sider the combat; we must content our
suited . If, on the other hand, we wish selves for the present with saying that
to have a theory which sha suit most in relation to space, therefore in combats
cases , andwill not bewholly useless in taking place atthe same time, the unit
any case, it must be founded on those reaches just as far as personal command
ns whictoh are and reaches ; but in regard to time, and
mea
in respect these moston
in only theral
gene use,
actual re- therefore in relation to combats which
follow each other in close succession it
Thespringi
sults ng of
conduct from
war is, .therefore, the
them reaches to the moment when the crisis,
formation and conduct of the fighting which takesplace in every combat, is en
If this
woul d be noingneces
fight wassity
a singl e act,furth
for any there
er tirely
Thatpass ed .
here doubtful cases may occur,
n ; less cases , for instance , in which several com
a greavisio
subdi ter or but the
numfight
ber ofis comp osed
single of
acts, bats may perhaps be regarded , also, as a
complete in themselves , which we cali single one,will notoverthrow the ground
ats
comb , as we have shown in the first of distinctionwe have adopted, for the
chapter of the first book , and which forin same is the case with all grounds of dis
newunits. From thisarises thetotally tinction,of real thingsuall whicharediffer
entiated by a grad y diminishing
different activities, that of the formation scale. Ther e may,
and conduct of these single combats in be acts of activity inthere fore, certainly
themselves, and the combination of them warwhich, with
with one another, with a view to the out any alteration in the point of view,
ultimate object of the war . The first is may just as well be counted strategic as
called tactics, the other strategy. tactical, for example, very extended posi
tions resemblingachain of posts, the
isnowinalmostgeneral use;andevery preparations for thepassageofa river at
s bly
one know tolera h
well under whic several points, &c. on reaches and covers
sificati
head to place any single fact, without Our clas
knowing very distinctly the grounds on only the use ofthe military force. But
now there are in war a number of activi.
which the classification is founded . But
when such divisions are blindly adhered ties which are subservient to it, and
to in practice,theymust have some deep still arequitedifferent from imes it;somer
root. We have searched for this root, and times closely allied , somet less near
All these activities
we might say that it is just the usage of in their affinity.
 CHAP, I.] BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR .
45
relate to the maintenance of the military ent situations of troops, and where troops
force. The same as its creation and train- are supposed , there the idea of the com
ing precedes its use, so its maintenance is bat must always be present.
always by its side , a necessary condition . The other subjects, which only belong
But strictly viewed, all activities thus to the maintenance, are subsistence, care of
connected with it are always to be re
garded only as preparations for fighting
they are certainly nothing more than
, the sick,
equip . supply and repair of
mentthe arms and
Marches are quite identical with the
activities which are very close to the
of the March
troops.evoluti combat,y
on,inisthecertainl
action;so thatthey run through the hos- use
general ly called
tile act alternate in importance with the not properly the use of weapons ; but it
forces. We have, therefore, a
use of theexclude
right to them as well as the other iswith it, that ely
so complet it forms an integral
and necessar partof
ily combin ed
preparatory activities from the art of war
in its restricted sense , from the conduct march
that which a combat.
callcombat
we the
outside the
But but
is nothing
ofwar properly so called ; and we are the execution of a strategic measure.
obliged to do so ifwewould comply with By thestrategicplanissettled,When,
the firstofprinciple
nation ofall theory theelimi- where, and with what forcesabattle isto
all heterogeneous, elements.
Who would include in the real “ conduct be delivered ? -- and to carry that into
of war ” the whole litany of subsistence execution the march is the only means.
administration, because it is admitted to The march outside of the combat is,
stand in constant reciprocal action with therefore, an instrument of strategy, but
the useof the
essentially troops,
different ? something ofstrategy, for as the armed force which
frombutit is
.

We have said, in the third chapter of executes it constitutes a possible combat

our first book, that as the fight or com at any moment, therefore its execution
stands also under tactical as well as
batis
therefotheonly directlyeffective
re the threa ds of all other s , as, strategicrules.If we prescribe toa
activity
they end are included in it. By this column its route on particular side of a
in it, a
We meant to say, that to all others an river or of a branch of a mountain , then
object was thereby appointed which ,in ac that is a strategicmeasure, for it contains
cordance peculiar
with the laws to thom the intention of fighting on that particu
selves they mustseek to attain . Here we lar side of the hill or riverin preference
must go a little closer into this subject. to the other, in case a combatshould be
The subjects which constitute the acti necessary during the march .
vities outside ofthe combat areof various But if a column, instead of following
kinds.
the road through a valley,marches along
The one part belongs ,in one with
to the combat itself, is identical
respect
it;, the several ridge
into parallel then or,
ofheights,
columns, for are
these the
whilst serves anotherrespect forthe convenience ofmarching, divides itself
it ofinthe military
maintenance
force. The
other part belongs purely to the subsis . tactical arrangements, for they relate to
the manner in which we shall use the
tence,and has only , in consequence of the troops in the anticipated combat.
reciprocal action ,a limitedinfluence on The order inof itsmarch
particulartactical in
is for
the combats by its results . The subjects bat, is therefore nature,
constant relation with readiness for com
which respect
, in one marches
fighting , belong to the
itself, are ,camps, and can
tonments, for they suppose so many differ itliminary
may
disposition for the battle which
is nothing
possibly more than the first or pre
take place.
 ON WAR .
46
As the march is the instrument by
which strategy apportions its active ele-
ments, the combats, but these last often
only appear by their results and not in
the details of theirreal course, it could not
fail to happen that in theory the instru-
ment has often been substituted for the
efficient principle. Thus we hear of a deci-
sive skilful march , allusion being thereby
[BOOK II
to cantonments or quarters, are a state
of rest, therefore, of restoration ; but
they are at the same time also the stra
tegic appointment of a battle on the spot
chosen ; and by the manner in which
they are taken up they contain the fun
damental lines of the battle, a condition
from which every defensive battle starts ;
they are , therefore, essential parts of 4

made to those combat- combinations to both strategy and tactics.

which these marches led. This substitu- Cantonments take the place of camps
tion of ideas is too natural, and concise- for the better refreshment of the troops.
ness of expression too desirable to call They are , therefore, like camps, strategic
subjects as regards position and extent;
for alteration ; but still it is only a con-
densed chain of ideas in regard to which tactical subjects as regards internalorga
we must never omit to bear in mind the nisation , with a view to readiness to fight.
full meaning, if we would avoid falling The occupation of camps and canton .
into error . ments no doubt usually combines with
We fall into an error of this descrip- the refreshment of the troops another
tion if we attribute to stratetgical combi- object also, for example, thecovering .
ns
natio a force indep endenof tactical district of country, the holding a posi
. , Marc hes and mancuvres are tion ; but it can very well be only the
combisned
result the object ed attain , and at the first. We remind our readers that stra
same time not a word about combat from tegy may follow a great diversity of
which the conclusion is drawn that there objects, for everything which appears an
are means in war of conquering an enemy advantage may be the object of a com
without fighting . The
t
prolific nature of bat, andthe preservation of the instru.
this error we canno show until here- ment with which war is made must
after . necessarily very often become the object
But altho ugh a march can beregarded of If, partial
its there combi nations
absolutely as an integral part of the com- fore, in such a. case gy
strate
bat, still there are in it certain relations ministers only to the maintenance of the
which do not belong to the combat, and troops , we are not on that account some
therefore are neither tacticalnor strategic. are
what out of dthe field of strategy, we
To these belong all arrangements which still engage with the use of the mili,
concern only the accommodation of the tary force, because every disposition of
troops, the construction of bridges, roads , that force upon any point whatever of the
&c . These are only conditions ; under theatre of war is such a use .
many circumstances they are in very But if the maintenance of the troops
close connection,and may almost identify in camp or quarterscalls forth activities;
themselveswiththe troops, as inbuilding whichare noemployment of the armed
a bridge in presence oftheenemy;but force, such as theconstruction of huts,
inthemselvestheyarealways extraneous pitching of tents,subsistence andsanitary
activities, the theory of which does not services in camps orquarters, then such
form part of the theory of the conduct of belong
war .
neither to strategynor tactics.
Even intrenchments, the site and pre
paration
Camps,by which we mean every dis- order
positionof troops in concentrated, there.
h areforetactical
ofwhicthere
of battle, plainly partsubjec
of the
ts,
fore, in battle order, in contradistinction do not belong to the theory of the con
 CHAP. I. ] BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR.
47
duct of war so far as respects the execu-
cases these subjects may be really of de
tion oftheir construction, the knowledge cisive importance. Thmune distance of hos
and skill required for such work , being, pitals and depôts of itions may very
ima
in point of fact, qualities inherent in the easily be gined as the sole cause of
natu of an organi army ; the theory
re sed ver import
y ant strate
gic decision
s. We
of the combat takes them for granted. do not wish either to contest that point
Amongst the subjects which belong to or to throw it into the shade. But we
the mere keeping up of an armed force, are at present occupied not with the par
because noneof the parts are identified ticular facts of a concrete case, but with
with the combat, the victualling of the abstract theory ; and our assertion, there
troops themselves comes first, as it must fore, is that such an influence is too rare
bedone almost daily and for each indi- to give the theory of sanitary measures
vidual. Thus it is that it completely and the supply of munitions and arms an
permea
titutes milita action in parthe parts importance in the theory of the conduct
cons ting straterygy — we say tscon
stituting strategy, because during a inclu
of war
de such as to
in the make
theor worth
y ofit the while
condu to
ct of
battle the subsistence of troops will
rarely have any influence modifying war
in and consi
ways the systederat ion ofthéthe
mswhich differ
above theoent
the plan, although the thing is conceiv.
ries may furnish, in the same way as is
ableenough.The care for the subsist certainly necessary in regardto victual
ence of the troops comes therefore into ling troops.
recipro cal action chiefly with strategy,
and thereis nothingmore commonthan sults If of our reflecti
wehave clearly thentheoodactivitie
ons,underst the res
for theleading strategic features of a cam
paign and war to be traced out in con belonging towar divide themselves into
nectionwith
howe ant two
however imp.ortBut
uent and thissupply
ver freqaviewto only*'Preparat
principa l ions
classes, into such as are
these views to supply may be , the subsist " War itself.”
fo
ThisrWar andinthere
division” must to the
ence of the troops always remains a com . fore also be made in theory.
pletely different activity from the use of The knowledge and applications of skill
the troops, and the former has only an in the preparations for war are engaged in
influence on the latter by its results. the creation, discipline and maintenance
The other branches of administrative of all the military forces ; what general
activity which we have mentioned stand names should be given to them we do
much further apart from thewo use of not fortifenter n eleme
icatiointo ; butntary
we seetactic
that artillthey
dedof, administ , of the various,as
ery,
thethly
hig roopims.poTh
rteanca
t as
sickforanth
reofit is, unod
d e go ra
are called,tithe
on whole organisation and s armed
an army, directly affects it only ina small
parationthereoffore has onlyalsacompos
the, individu ing itin Butthetheory of war itself occupiesit
forces, and all such things are included.
and, weak and
direct influence upon the useof the rest,. self with the use of these prepared means
arms
completing replacingartic
ment , except so far les
The and equipand of for the object of the war. It needs of
as by knowledge of the principal properties of
the organism of theforces it constitutes the first only the results, that is, the
continuous activity
atakes inherent in them the means taken in hand for use . This
place only periodically and
, there
we call “ The Art of War " in a limited
fore seldom affects strategic plans.
We must, however , here guard our sense, or “ Theory of the Conduct of
selves against a mistake. War,” or “ Theory of the Employment
of Armed Forces, " all of them denoting
In certain for us the same thing.
 ON WAR . [ BOOK II.
48
The present theory will therefore treat But the first business of every theory is
the combat as the real contest, marches, to clear up conceptions and ideas which
camps, and cantonments as circumstances have been jumbled together, and, we may
which are more or less identical with say, entangled and confused ; and only
it . The subs iste nce of the troo will when a right understanding is established
ps
only come into consideration like other as to names and conceptions, can we hope
given circumstances in respect of its results, to progress with clearness and facility,
not as an activity belonging to the com- and be certain that author and reader will
always see things from the same point of
bat. Art of War thus viewed in its

12
The view . Tactics and strategy are two
limited sense divides itself again into activities mutually permeating each other
tactics and strategy . The former occu- in time and space, at the same time
pies itselfwith the form of the separate essentially different activities, the inner
combat, the latter with its use. Both laws and mutual relations of which can
connect themselves with the circumstances not be intelligible at all to the mind
of marches, camps, cantonments only until a clear conception of the nature of
through the combat, and these circum- each activity is established .
stances are tactical or strategic according He to whom all this is nothing must
as they relate to the form or to the signi- either repudiate all theor etical considera
ing
tion, or his understand has not as yet
fication of the battle.
No doubt there will be many readers been pained by the confused and perplex
who will consider superfluous thiscareful ing ideas resting on no fixed point of
separation of two things lying so close to- view, leading to no satisfactory result,
gether as tactics and strategy, because it sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic ,some
has no directeffect ontheconduct itself times floating in vague generalities ,which
of war
We admit, certainly, that it we are often obliged to hear and read on
would . be pedantry to look for direct the conduct of war, owing to the spirit
effects on the field of battle from a theo . of scientificinvestigation having hitherto
retical distinction . been little directed to these subjects.

CHAPTER II .

ON THE THEORY OF WAR.

1. The first conception of the “ Art of pattern and preparation and the mode of
War”was merely the preparation of the using arms, the construction of fortifica
Armed Forces. hments
tions and entrenc ,theorganism of
an army, and the mechanism of its move
FORMERLY by the term “ Art of War," orments, were the subjects ofthese branches
“ Science of War,” nothing was under. of knowledge and skill above referred to,
stood but the totality
ofthose branchesof andtheendand aim of them allwas the
knowledge and those appliances of skill lishment
estab dforce fit for
of an arme
occupied with material things. The use in war . All this concerned merely
 CHAP. II.]
ON THE THEORY OF WAR .
49
things belonging to the material world is intended to unwind its activities like a
and a one-sided activity only ; and it piece of clockwork .
was in fact nothing but an activity ad
vancing by gradations from the lower
occupations to a finer kind of mechanical 4. - The real conduct of War only made its
art. The relation of all this to war itself appearance incidentally and incognito.
was very much the same as the relation The conduct of war properly so called,
of the art of the sword cutler to the art
that is, a use of the prepared means
ofusingthe sword. The employment of adapted to themostspecial requirements,
the moment of danger and in a statein was not considered as any suitable sub
constant
cular reciproca
energies l action
of mind and of in the ject for theory, butone
theparti-
spirit whichshould
be
direction proposed to them was not yet left to natural talents alone. By degrees,
even mooted . as war passed from the hand to hand en
counters of the middle ages into a more
regular and systematic form , stray reflec
appears
2. – True var firstSieges.
tionsmen's
in the Art of into pointa,lso
onthis minds forced themselves
but they mostly ap
Inthe art of sieges we first perceive a peared only incidentally in memoirs and
certaindegree of guidance of the combat, narratives, and in a certain measure in
something the action of the intellectual
faculties of cognito.
up
under theironcothe
ntromaterial nerallyplaced
l, but geforces only 5.— Reflections on Military Events brought
so far that it very soon embodied itself about the want of a Theory.
again in new material forms, such as
approaches, trenches, counter approaches, As contemplation on war continually
batteries, etc., and every step which this increased , and its history every day as
action of the higher faculties took was sumed more of a critical character, the ur
marked by some such result ; it was only gentwantappeared of the support of fixed
the thread that was required on which to maxims and rules, in order that in the con
string these material inventions in order . troversies naturally arising about mili
As the intellect can hardly manifest tary events, the war of opinions might
itself in this kind of war , except in such brought towhich
be opinions,
of some one point.revolved
neither on
This whirl
things, therefore nearly all
necessarysowas done in that way
that was
. any central pivot, nor according to any
appreciable laws, could not but be very
3. — Then tactics tried to find its way in distasteful to people's minds.
that direction .
Afterwards, tactics attempted to give 6. - Endeavours to establish a positive
mechanism joints the charac Theory.
to the ofits
terofa general disposition , built upon the There arose, therefore, an endeavour
peculiar properties ofthe instrument, to establish maxims, rules, and even sys
which character leads indeed to the tems for the conduct of war. By this
battle-field , but instead of leading to the , without view was
intoobject the
proposed
the attainment of ataking
positive
free activity
made like an of
automaton by its
an army
mind , leads torigid
for .
endless difficulties which the conduct of
mations and orders of battle, which, presents in that respect. The con
moveable only bythe word of command , war
duct of war, as we have shown, hås no
definite limits in almost any direction,
E
 ON WAR . [BOOK II.
50 .
while every system has the circumscribing arrived at definite figures, but at figures
nature of a synthesis, from which results which rested on a number of arbitrary
an irreconcileable oppositionbetween such calculations, and which, therefore, could
a theory and practice.
not stand the test of practical applica
tion .
7. - Limitation to Material Objects. 10. – Base .
Writers on theory felt the difficulty of An ingenious author tried to concen
the subje
thems ct entitl
elves soon edenoug h, and
to get thoug
rid of ht
it by trate in a single conception, that of a Base,
a whole host of objects, amongst which
uponting
direc their
mater maxismsand
ial thing anda one
syste
-sided ac- sundry relations even with immaterial
ms only

*A
forces found their way in as well. The list
tivity. scienaim
as in theTheir was
ce for reach
thetoprepa ratio s,
n for
resultcomprised the subsistence of the troops,
war, entirely certain and positive,and the keeping them complete in numbers and
therefore only to take into consideration equipment, the security of communica
that which could be made matter of cal.
tions with the homecountry, lastly, the
security of retreat in case it became ne
culation . cessary, and, first of all, he proposed to
8. — Superiority of Numbers. substitute this conception of a base
for all these things ; then for the
The superiority in numbers being a base itself to substitute its own length
material condition , it was chosen from (extent); and, last of all, for that to sub
amongst all the factors required to pro stitute the angle formed by the army with
duce victory,because it could be brought thisbase :all this wasdone merely to
under mathematical laws through combi obtain a pure geometrical result utterly
nations of time and space. It was thought useless . This last is, in fact, unavoid
possi ble toleaveoutofsightall other able,if wereflect thatnoneof these sub
circumstances, by supposing them to be stitutions could be made without violating
equal on each side, and therefore to neu . truth and leaving out some of the things
tralise one another . This would have cont ned in the original conception.
been very well if it had been done to The idea of a base is a real necessity for
gain a preliminary knowledge of this one strategy, and to have conceived it is meri
factor, according to its relations ; but to torious ; but to make such a use of it as
make it a rule for ever to consider supe. wehave depicted is completely inadmis
riority of numbers as the sole law : to sible, and could not but lead to partial
see the whole secret of the art of war in conclusions which have forced these
the formula - in a certain time, at a cer theorists into a direction opposed to
tain point, to bring up superior masses common sense, namely , to a belief in the
was a restriction overruled by the force decisive effect of the enveloping form of
of realities . attack .
9. - Victualling of Troops. 11.- Interior Lines.
By one theoretical school an attempt As a reaction against this false direc
was made to systematize another material tion , another geometrical principle,
element also, by making the subsistence of the so-called interior lines, wasthen
oftroops, according to a previously esta ted to the throne. Although this
elevaiple
blished organism of the army, the su princ rests on a sound found ation
, on
prem e legisl ator in the highe r cond uct the truth that the combat is the only
of war .
In this way, certainly,they effectualmeans in war ; still,it is just on
 CHAP. II.]
ON THE THEORY OF WAR.
51
account of its purely geometrical nature
14. — The difficulty of Theory assoon as moral
nothing but another case of one - sided quantities come into consideration .
theory which can never gain ascendancy
in the real world .
Every theory becomes infinitely more
difficult from the moment that it touches
12. - All these attempts are exceptionable. on the province of moral quantities.
Architecture and painting know quite
well what they are about as long as they
inAllthes attemptsl atparttheto
their eanalytica ory are
be onl
cony hav e only to do withmatte no
sidered as progress in the province of dispute about mechanic al ror;there
optical is
con
struction. But as soon as the moral ac
truth ; but in their synthetical part, in tivities begin their work, as soon as
their precepts and rules, as quite unser
viceable moral impressions and feelings are pro
.
duced , the whole set of rules dissolves
They strive after determinate quanti
ties, whilst in war all is undetermined, into vague ideas.
The science of medicine is chiefly en
withcalcu
and the
made purelatio n has
ly vary ing quan ys esto. bé gagedwith bodily phenomenaonly'
alwatiti ; its
business is with the animal organism
They point the attention only upon which , liable to perpetual change, is
material forces , while the whole mili
tary action is penetrated throughout by This
never exactly the same for two moments.
makes its office very difficult, and
intelligent forces and their effects.
They only pay regard to activity on one places the judgment of the physician
side , whilst war is a constant state of above his science ; but how much more
difficult the case is if a moral effect is
recipro
mutual.cal action, the effects of which are adde d, and how much higher we place
the physician of the mind ?

13.-As a rule they exclude genius. 15. - The moral quantities must not be
excluded in war .
was not
that philos
All ble
misera att ain
ophy, the abl su
e bying ch
offspr of direct solely
But now theagain
ed stmatte
activi it isisalway
ty in r,war nevers
of
tial views, lay outside the precincts
parscience
- was the field of genius, which telligent force which gives life to this
at the same time directed against the in
raises itself above rules ,
Pity the warrior who is contented to matter, and to separate the two from each
crawl ab outin this beggardom of rules, other is impossible
which are too bad for genius, over which visible to the inner. eye, and this is dif
But the intellig
ent forces are only
itcan set itself superior, over which it
can perchance makemerry ! What genius in the same person at different times.
does must be just the best of all rules, ferent in each person, and often different
and theory cannot do better than to show As danger is the general element in
how and why it is so .
which everything moves in war, it is also
Pi ty the theory which setscannot
itself in feeling of one's
position to the mind ! It repair chiefly
ently influenced . It the
by courage, is to a certain ex
this contradiction by any humility, and
op own power that the judgment is differ
the humbler it is so much the sooner will
ridicule and contempt drive it out of real tent the crystalline lens through which all
life. appearances pass before reaching the
understanding
And yet we cannot doubt that these
 ON WAR . [BOOK 11.
52

cle
things acquire a certain objective value hostile feeling frequently resolves itself
into merely a hostile view ; and there is
Everythrough
simply one know s thence
experie . effect of a
moral usually no innate hostile feeling residing
surprise, of an attack in flank or rear.
in individual against individual. Never
Every one thinks less of the enemy's theless, the combat never passes off with
courage as soon as he turns his back , out such feelings being brought into
and ventures much more in pursuit activity. National hatred, which is
than when pursued . Every one judges seldom wanting in our wars, is a sub
of the enemy's general by his reputed stitute for personal hostility in the breast
talents, by his age and experience, andof individual opposed to individual.
shapes his course accordingly. Every But where this also is wanting, and at
one casts a scrutinising glance at the first no animosity of feeling subsisted, a
spirit and feeling of his own and the hostile feeling is kindled by the combat A

enemy's troops. All these and similar itself ; for an act of violence which any
effects in the province of the moral na- one commits upon us by order of his
ture of man have established themselves superior, will excite in us a desire to
by experience, are perpetually recurring, retaliate and be revenged on him , sooner
and, therefore, warrant our reckoning mandonthetheactsuper
them as real quantities of their kind . than
ior power atwhose com
was done. This is human ,
W e
And what could we do with any theory or animal if we will ; still it is so.-
which should leave them out of conside are very apt to regard the combat in
ration ? theory as an abstract trial of strength ,
without any participation on the partof
But, certainly, experience is an indis-
pensable title for these truths. With the feelings , and that is one of the
psychological and philosophical sophis- thousand errors which theorists delibe
tries, no theory , no General should rately commit, because they do not see
meddle . consequences
itsBesid es that . excitation of feelings
16.- Principaldifficulty of a Theory for the ther
natureally arising fromthe combat itself,
are others also which do not essen
Conduct of War. tially belong to it, but which , on account
In order to comprehend clearly the of their relationship, easily unite with it
difficulty of the proposition which is con ambition, love of power , enthusiasm of
tained in a theory for the conduct of war, every kind, &c ., & c.
and thence to deduce the necessary cha
racteristics of such a theory, we must
take a closer view of the chief particulars 18. — The impressions of danger.
which make up the nature of activity in ( Courage).
war. Finally the combat begets the ele
ment of danger, in which all the activi
17. – First Speciality . - Moral Forces and ties of warmust live and move, like
their Effects. the bird in the air, or the fish in the
water . But the influences of danger all
( Hostile Feeling .) pass into the feelings, either directly
The first of these specialities consists that is, instinctively — orthrough Th
thee
in the moral forces and effects .
medium of the understanding.
The combat is, in its origin , the ex effect in the first case wouldbea desire
pression of hostile feeling ; but in our to escape from the danger, and, if that
great combats, which we call wars, the cannotbedone, fright and anxiety. If
 CHAP . II.]
ON THE THEORY OF WAR .
53
this effect does not take place, then it is enough. Certainly, we may say that
tourage, which is a counterpoise to that many a petty action of the passions is
instinct. Courage is, however, by no silenced in this serious business of life ;
means an act of the understanding, but but that holds good only in respect to
likewise a feeling , like fear; the latter those acting in a lower sphere ; who,
looksto the physical preservation, courage hurried on from one tate of dang and
to the moral preservation . Courage, exertion to another, lose sight of theer rest
then, is a nobler instinct. But because of the things of life, become unused to
it is so, it will not allow itself to be used deceit, because it is of no avail with
as a lifeless instrument, which produces death ; and so attain to that soldierly
itseffects exactly according to prescribed simplicityof character which has always
measure .
Courage, is, therefore, no been the best representative of the mili
mere counterpoise to danger in order to tary profession. In higher regions it is
neutralise the latter in its effects, but a
peculiar power in itself. otherwise ; for the higher a man's rank,
the more he must look around him : then
arise interests on every side, and a mani
19.- Extent of the influence of danger. fold activity of the passions of good and
But to estimate exactly the influence humil Env
bad. ity y and
, Gerce nessgener
andosity , pride
tende rness, and
all
of danger upon the principal actors in
war, we must not limit its sphere to the may appear as active powers in this
physical danger of the moment . It domi great drama.
nates over the actor, not only by threat
ening him, but also by threatening all 21. — Peculiarity of mind .
entrusted to him , not only at the moment
in which it is actually present , but also The peculiar characteristics of mind in
through the imagination at all other the chief
actor have, as well as those of
moments, which have a connection withthe feelings, a high importance. From
the present ; lastly, not only directly by an imaginative, flighty, inexperienced
head, and from a calm , sagacious under
sibility also indirectlit y,bearbytherespon
dibile,butwhichmakes standindg,. differentthingsare
with tenfold expecte tobe
weight on the mind ofthe chief actor.
Who
battle,could advise,orresolve
without uponmore
feeling his mind or 22. – From the diversity inmental indi
agreat
less wrought upor perplexed by thedan vidualities, arises the diversity of ways
ger and responsibility which such a great leading to the aim .
action carries
estofthatdecision
say so farWe
in warin, initself! is individuality
asmitay It is this great diversity in mental
influenceof whichisto
real action, not a mere condition, is never be supposed,asthe chiefly felt in the higher
out of the sphere of danger. ranks, because it increases upwards,
which chiefly produces the diversity of
20. - Other powers of feeling . ways leading to the end, noticed by us in
the first book, and which gives over to
If welook upon these affections, which the play of probabilities and chance, such
are excited by hostility and danger as an unequal share in events.
peculiarly belonging to war, we do not ,
therefore, exclude from it all others
accompanying man in his life's journey. 23. - Second peculiarity, living reaction .
They will alsofind room here frequently living second, peculiarity
The reaction and the reciprocalaction
in war is the
 ON WAR . [BOOK II. .
54
resulting therefrom . We do not here in which he is thrown upon his talent he
speak of the difficulty of estimating that would find himself away from this scaf
reaction, for that is included in the diffi. folding of theory, and in opposition to it,
culty before-mentioned , of treating the and, however many-sided it might be
moral powers as quantities ; but of this, framed, the same result would ensue of
that reciprocal action, by its nature, which we spoke when we said that talent
opposes anything like a regular plan. and genius act beyondthe law , and theory
The effect which any measure produces is in opposition to reality.
upon the enemy is the most distinct
11
of all the data which action affords ; but 26. - Means left by which a theory is pos
every theory must keep to classes (or sible.
take sup
group ) ofthephen omen a, and cancase
never
reall y indiv idual in ( The difficulties are not everywhere equally
itself : that must everywhere be left to great ) .
judgment and talent. It is, therefore, Two means present themselves of get
natural that in a business such as war, ting out of this difficulty. In the first
which in its plan - built upon general place, what we have said of the nature
circumstances — is so often thwarted by appl y inary
of milit theactio
n in gener
same man
al, the
ner to doesnot
action
unexpected and singular accidents, more
must generally be left to talent ; and less of every one, whatever may be his stand
use canbe made of a theoretical guide self-sacrifice
ing. Înthe lower ranks the spirit of
is called more into request,
than in any other. but the difficulties which the understand.
24. — Third peculiarity — uncertainty of all ing and judgmentmeet with are infinitely
less. The field of occurrences is more
data . confined. Ends and means are fewer in
Lastly, the great uncertainty of all number . Data more distinct ; mostly
data in war is a peculiar difficulty, be- also contained in the actually visible.
cause all action must, to a certain extent, But the higher we ascend the more the
be planned in a mere twilight, which in difficulties increase ; until, in the com
addition not unfrequently ,like the effect mander -in - chief, they reach their climax:
of a fog or moonshine - gives to things so that with him almost everything must
exaggerated dimensions and an un be left to genius.
natural appearance . Further, according to a division of the
What this feeble light leaves indistinct subject in agreement with its nature, the
to the sight, talent must discover, or must. difficulties are not everywhere the same,
be left to chance. It is therefore again but diminish the more results manifest
talent, or the favour of fortune, on which themselves in the material world ; and
reliance must be placed,for wantof moral, e thebeco
increasand more
me theypassintothe
motives which influ
objective knowledge. ence the will. Therefore it is easier to
determine, by theoretical rules , the order
25. - Positive theory is impossible. and conduct of a battle, than theYouse to
With materials of this kind we can be made of the battle itself. nder
only say to ourselves , that itis a sheer physical weapons clash with each other,
impossibility to construct for the artof and although mind is notwantingtherein,
war a theory which, like a scaffolding, matter must have its rights. But in the
shall ensure to the chief actor an external effects to be produced by battles when
support on all sides. In all those cases the material results become motives, we
 CHAP. I.] ON THE THEORY OF WAR.
55
have only to do with the moral nature. educates his judgment, and shields him
In a word, it is easier to make a theory from error .
for tactics than for strategy.
If a man of expertness spends half his
life the endeavour
in to clear up
an ob
27. — Theory must be of the nature of observa scure subject thoroughly, he will pro
tion , not of doctrine
. bably know more about it than a person
seeks to master it in a short time.
The second opening for the possibility who
Theory is instituted that each person
of a theoryliesin thepoint of viewthat in succession may not have to go through
it does not necessar ily require to be a
direction for action . As a general rule, the same labour of clearing the ground
>

whenever an activity is for the mostpart

occupied with
thingtoiling
and through light
in order,and it, but may find
admitte donthe
it.
thesame objects over and
over again , with the same ends and It should educate the mind of the future
means , althoug h there onding leader
trifling self- in war,
instruct rather
ion,orbut not guide himnyinhim
accompa his
alteration s, and a correspmay benumber
ofvarieties of combination ,suchthings to andbattle
the field of
tutorforms enlight ens as
: just sensible
thea opening
arecapableof becominga subjectof mind of a youth without, therefore,keep:
studyfort reasoningfaculties part his
such study ishejust the most essential.But
inghi
life.min leading strings all through
of every theory, and has a peculiar title to
namo.
that of
tion is an analytic
the Itsubject al investig
that leads to ana- selvesfrom the
consideresult
If maxims and rules rationsof which
them

exact knowledge ; and if brought to bear theory institutes, if the truth concretes
onthe results of experien ce which our itselfin that form of crystal, then theory
military ,history in
case would be , to a will not oppose this natural law of the
thorough familiarity with it. The nearer mind ; it will rather, if the arch ends in
theoryattainsthe latter objectso much the such a keystone, bring it prominently
Forme it passes overfromthe objective out
form of knowledge into the subjective ; buttoitshow
insatisfy
order does distin
the philosophi
this ctly
only the
in order to
point to
callawofreason,
one skill action and much the
of in ; so
more, therefore, it will
circumstances prove itself effec which the lines all converge, not in order
tive when
decision allow ofno other to form out of it an algebraical formula
butthat of personal talents ; it
for the battle - field : for even these maxims
will show its effects in that talent itself. and rules also are more to determine in
If theory investigates the subjects which
the reflecting mind the leading outline of
constitute war ; ifitseparates more dis
tinctly that which at first sight seems its habitual movements, than to serve as
amalgamated ; if landmarks indicating to it the way in the
it explains fully the
properties of themeans act of execution .
; if it shows their
probable effects makes evident the
nature of objects;if itit brings bear
; if to all 28.-— By this point of view Theory becomes
of war the light of essen
over the field investigation possible, and ceases to be in contradiction
tiallycritical ,—then it has this point of view , there is a
to practice.
Taking
fulfilbecomes du
chief tiesof its
led the then prov
ince.
It , , a guide to him who
wishes to make himself acquainted with possibility afforded of a satisfactory, that
war from books ; it lights up the whole is, ofreality,
the it into the conduct
willofonly
andtheory
a useful of
on
dependwith
war, never coming opposition
road for him , facilitates his progress,
rational treatment to bring it so far into
56 ON WAR . [BOOK II.
harmony with action , that between theory 31.- Locality.
shall no
and practice there which longer be that The locality, which we prefer leaving
absurd difference an unreasonable
for solution, under the head of Country
theory, in defiance
often produce common
d, butofwhich, justsense , has
and Ground ,' might, strictly speaking,
as often,
narrow -mindedness and ignorance have be without any influence at all if the
used as a pretext for giving way to their combat took place on a completely lovel
natural incapacity. and uncultivated plain.
In a country of steppes such a case
29. - Theory, therefore, considers the nature may occur, but in the cultivated coun
of ends and means – Ends and means in tries of Europe it is almost an imaginary
Tactics. idea. Therefore, a combat between
civilised nations, in which country and
Theory has, therefore, to consider the ground have no influence , is hardly con
nature of the means and ends. ceivable .
In tactics the means are the disciplined
armed forces which are to carry on the
.contest. The object is victory . The pre 32.- Time of Day.
cise definition of this conception can be The time of day influences the combat
better explained hereafter in the conside by the difference between day and night;
ration of the combat . Here we content
but the influence naturally extends further
ourselves by denoting the retirement of than just to the limits of these divisions, as
the enemy from the field of battle as the every combat has a certain duration, and
signofvictory .Bymeans ofthis victory great battleslast for several hours.It
strategy gains the object for which it ap the preparations for a great battle, it
pointed the combat, and which constitutes makes an essential difference whether
itsspe cialsignification. This significa- it beginsin the morning or the evenings
tion has certainly some influence on the At the same time certainly many battles
nature of the victory . A victory which may be fought, in which the question of
is intended to weaken the enemy's armed the time of day is quite immaterial, and
forces is a different thing to one which in the generality ofcases its influence is
is designed only to put us in possession
of a position . The signification of a only trifling.
combat may therefore, have a sensible
influence on the preparation and conduct 33.– Weather.
of it, conse quently will be also a subject Still more rarely has the weather any
of consi deration s
in tactic ,
decisive influence,and it is mostly
Mwal
only
30.- Circumstances which always attend the by fogs that it plays a part.
application of the Means.
As there are certain circumstances 34.- End and Means in Strategy.
which attend the combat throughout, and Strategy has in the first instance only
have more or less influence upon its re the victory, that is, thetactical result,as
sult, therefore these must be taken into a means to its object, and , ultimately,
consideration in the application of the those things which lead directly to peace.
armed forces . The application of itsmeans to this ob
These circumstances are the locality of ject is at thesame timeattended bycir
the combat (ground ), the time of day, cumstances which have an influence
and the weather, thereon more or less.
 CHAP. II.] ON THE THEORY OF WAR . 57

Circumstances which attend the appli- which the logical necessity of the con
35.— .cation
of theMeans Strate
of gy .
duct of war and its theory exclude
. It,
These circumstances are country and therefore, turns to experience, and directs
ground ; the former including the terri its attention on those combinations which
tory and inhabitants of the whole theatre military history can furnish . In this
of war ; next the time of the day and the manner, no doubt, nothing more than a
time of the year as well ; lastly, the limited circumstances
only suitstheory suchasd,
can be obtaine are pre which
weather, particularly any unusual state
of the same, severe frost, &c. sented in history . But this incompl ete
ness is unavoidable ; because in any case
theory must either have deduced from ,
36. — These form new Means. or have compared with, history, what
By bringing these things into
nation with the results of a combat,
combi it advances with respect to things. Be
sides this incompleteness in every case is
strategy gives this result , and , therefore, more theoretical than real.
the
before it a particular
signification, places that
combat— a special object Onetheory
greatcannot lose ofitself
advantage abstruseis
thisinmethod
. But when
this object is not that which leads disquisitions, subtleties, and chimeras,
directly to peace, therefore a subordinate butmust always remain practical.
one , it is only to be looked upon as a
means; and, therefore, in strategy we
maylook upon the results of combats 38. - How far the analysis of the means
or victories different
, in all their signifi should be carried .
cations, as means .
The conquest of a
Another
position is such a resultofacombatap- should go inquestion is, How
its.analysis far theory
ofthemeans?
aliedtoground.
different combats Butnot are theto
onlyobjects
with special Evidentig only so farasthe elements in
be considered as means , but also every a separate form present themselves for
highercombination
aim which we may have in view consideration in practice. The range and
in the of battles directed on effect of different weapons is very impor
a common object, is to be regarded as a tant to tactics ; their construction, al
means. A winter campaign is a combi though these effects result from it, is a
nation of this kind applied to the season , matter of indifference ; for the conduct of
remainwhich
Therethings
those , therefore
may,asbeobjects,only war
supposed out ofis and
phur,
not making powder
a givenquantity
saltpetre
,of
and cannon
of charcoal
copper ,sul
andtini
as leading directly to peace . Theory in
vestigates all these ends and means ac the given quantities for the conduct
cording to the nature of their effects and of war are arms in a finished state
their mutual relations. and their effects. Strategy makes
use of plans without troubling itself
37.— Strategy deduces only from experience about triangulations
quire how ; it does
the country not en
is subdivided
the Ends and Means to be examined .
into departments and provinces, and how
The firstquestionis,
arrive at a Howdoes strategy
things ? order to attain the best military results;
leading to an absolute result, it would but it takes things asit the
become entangled in all those difficulties bort i takty ofinteropean states,and ob
have a notable
serves influence
where very on war.
different conditions
 3
58 ON WAR. [ BOOK 11.
39.- Great simplification of the knowledge direction given to its ideas. Only what
required. is great can make it great ; the little can
That in this manner the number of only make it little, if the mind itself does
subjects for theory is much simplified , not reject it as something repugnant.
and the knowledge requisite for the con
duct of war much red d , is easy to per 41.- Former contradictions.
ceive. The very great mass of knowledge
and appliancesof skill which ministerto Because this simplicity of knowledge
the action of war in general, and which requisite in war was not attended to,but
are necessary before an army fully that knowledge was always jumbled up
equipped can take the field, unite in a with the whole impedimenta of subordi
few great results before they are able to nate sciences and arts ; therefore the
reach, in actual war, the final goal of their palpable opposition to the events of real
activity; just as the streamsofa country lifewhich resulted, could not be solved
unite themselves in rivers before they otherwise than by ascribing it all to
fall into the sea . Only those activities genius, which requires no theory, and
emptying themselves directly into the sea for which no theory could be prescribed.
of war, have to be studied by him who is
to conduct its operations. 42.- On this account all use of knowledge
was denied, and everything ascribed to
40.- This explains the rapid growth of natural talents.
great generals, and why a general is not a
man of learning. People with whom common sense had
the upper hand, felt sensible of the im
This result of our considerations is in mense distance remaining to be filled up
fact so necessary, that any other would betweenageniusofthehighest order and
have made us distrustful of their accu. a learned pedant; and they became free.
racy. Only thus is explained how so thinkers in a manner,rejected all belief
often men have madewartheir appearance in theory, and affirmed the conduct ofwar
with great success in , and indeed in to be a natural function of man , which
the higher ranks, even in supreme com he performs more or less well according
mand , whose pursuits had been pre as he has brought with him into the
viously of a totally different nature ; world more or less talent in that direction .
indeed how, as a rule, the most distin- It cannot be denied that these were
guished generals have never risen from nearer to the truth than those who placed
the very learned, or really erudite class a value on false knowledge : at the same
of officers, but have been mostly men n
time it may besoo seen that such a view
who,from the circumstances oftheir posi- is nothing butan exaggeration. Noapa
g
tion, could not have attained toany great tivity of the human understandin is
amo unt of kno
those who
wledge. On
have consider that
ed it acco
nece ssar y , possible without a certain stock ofideas ;
unt
or even beneficial to commence the educa but these are, for thegreater part at least,
tion of a future generalbyinstructionin not his innate but. acquired,
knowledge and constitute
Theonly questionthere
all details, have always been ridiculed as fore is, of what kind should these ideas
absurd pedants. It would be easy to show
be ; and we think we have answered it if
the injurious tendency of such a course, we saythat they should be directed on
becausethe human mindistrained by those
the knowledge imparted to it, and the dealthing whichman has directly to
s war.
with in
 CHAP. I.] ON THE THEORY OF WAR.
59
43.The knowledge must be made suitable He need not understand anything about
to the position .
the make of a carriage, or the harness of a
Inside this field itself of military ac Battery horse, but he must know how
tivity, the knowledge required must be to calculate exactly the march ofa column,
different according to the station of the under different circumstances, according
Commander. It will be directed on smaller to the time it requires. These are things
and more circumscribed objects if he the knowledge of which cannot be forced
holds an inferior, upon greater and more out by an apparatus of scientific formula
compre hensive ones ifheholds higher and by the exerc
situation . There are Field Marshaals who in the obser
machi iseo
nery : they accur
anare
fn of ateto judg
only ment
be gaine
vatio thing s and of men,d
>
at the head of a caval ry regim ent woul d
not have shone, and vice versa . aided by a special talent for the appre
hension of both ,
44.-butThenotKnowl edge war, isveryveryeasysimple necesmili
Theionin
posit knowl
sarytary edge isforthere
a high
, at the samein time . ,
action fore
But although the knowledge in war distinguished by this, that, by observa
is simple, that is to say directed to so tion, thereforeattai by study and reflection,
it is only to be ned, through a special
theirfinal resulttakin
inlow,subjects,and g upthose
s, theart tion talent, which asan intellectual instinct
of execuonly
is not, at the same time, easy on that ac understands how to extract from the
phenomena of life only the essence or
count. Of thedifficulties to which activity spirit, as bees do the honey from the
inwar issubjectgenerally,wehave alrea dy flowe rs;and thatitisalsot
spokethings
those nin thefirstbook
which can only ; wehereomi
be overcomet by
exper ienceoflifeaswelloasbegained
by study
by courage, and maintain that also and reflection. Life will never bring
forth a Newton or an Euler by its rich
properl stations, teachings,butitmay bring forthgreat
only simple and easy in inferiory calledis
theactivityofmind
but increases difficulty with increase calculators in war , such as Condé or
in
of rank, and in the highest position, Frederick .
in that of Commander-in -chief, is to It is, therefore, not necessary that, in
be reckoned among the mostdifficult order to vindicate the intellectual dignity
which there is for the human mind . of military activity, we should resort to
untruth and silly pedantry. There never
has been a great and distinguished com
45. — Of the nature of this knowledge. mander of a contracted mind ; but very
The Commander of an army neither numerous are the instances of men who,
requires to be a learned explorer of his. after serving with the greatest distinc
versed in the higher affairs of State ; he tion in inferior positions,remained below
ciency of intellectual capacity . That
must know and be able to judge correctly
of traditional tendencies, interests at even amongst those holding the post of
stake, the immediate questions at issue, Commanders-in - Chief there may be a
and the charac tersoflead pers
ing ons; he difference according to the degree of
need not be a close observer of men , a
sharp dissector of human character, but their plenitude of power is a matter of
course .
hemust know the character, the feelings ,
the habits, the peculiar faults and incli 46.- Science must become Art.
nations of thosewhom he is to command . Now we have yet to consider one con
dition which is more necessary for the
60 ON WAR . [BOOK IT.
knowledge of the conduct of war than for everything is ascribed to natural talent.
any other, which is, that it must pass We say natural talent, in order thereby
completely into the mind and almost to distinguish it from that which is
completely cease to be something objec- formed and matured by observation and
tive. In almost all other arts and occu- study.
pations of life the active agent can make We think that by these reflections we
use of truths which he has only learnt have explained the problem of a theory
once, and in the spirit and sense of which of the conduct of war, and pointed out
he no longer lives, and which he extracts the way to its solution .
from dusty books. Even truths which Of the two fields into which we have
he has in hand and uses daily may con- divided the conduct of war, tactics and
tinue something external to himself. If strategy, the theory of the latter contains
the architect takes up a pen to settle the unquestionably, as before observed, the
strength of a pier by a complicated cal- greatest difficulties, because the first is
culation, the truth found as a result is no almost limited to a circumscribed field of
emanation from his own mind. He had objects, but the latter in the direction of
first to find the data withlabour, and objects leading directly to peace, opensto
then to submit these to an operation of itself an unlimited field of possibilities.
the mind, the rule for which he did not But as for the most part the Commander
discover, the necessity of which he is per- in -Chief only has to keep these objects
haps at the moment only partly conscious steadily in view , so therefore, the part of
of,butwhichhe applies, forthe mostpart, strategy in which he moves is also that
as if by mechanical dexterity. But it is which is particularly subject to this diffi
never so in war. The moral reaction, culty .
the ever- changeful form of things, makes Theory, therefore, especially where
it necessary for the chief actor to carry it comprehends the highest services,
in himself the whole mental apparatus will stop much sooner in strategy than
of his knowledge, that anywhere and at in tactics at the simple consideration
every pulse -beat he may be capable of of things, and content itself to assist
giving the requisite decision from him- the Commander to that insight into
self. Knowledgemust, bythis complete things which , blended with his whole
assimilation
converted
withhis ownmind and life, thought, makes his course easier and
be into real power . This is surer, never forces him into opposition
the reason why everything seems so easy with himself in order to obey an objec
with men distinguished in war, and why tive truth .
 CHAP. III.] ART OR SCIENCE OF WAR . 61

CHAPTER III .

ART OR SCIENCE OF WAR .

3
1.- Usage still unsettled . track out their line of separation in man
( Power and Knowledge. Science when mere himself .
knowing ; Art, when doing is the object. )
The choice between these terms seems
2. - Difficulty of separating perception from
to be still undecided , and no one seems judgment.
to know rightly on what grounds it
should be decided, and yet the thing (Art of War ).
is simple. We have already said else
where that knowing is something dif
ferent from doing The two are
All thinking is indeed art. Where the
. logician draws the line, where the pre
different that they should not easily be
SO mises stop which are the result of cog
mistaken the one for the other. The nition — where judgment begins, there
doing cannot properly stand in any book , art begins. But more than this : even
and therefore, also, Årt should never be the perception of the mind is judgment
the title of a book . But because we again , and consequently art; and at last,
have once accustomed ourselves to com even the perception by the sensesas well.
bine in conception, under the name of In a word, if it is impossible to imagine
theory of Art, or simply Art, the branches a human being possessing merely the
of knowledge (which may be separately faculty of cognition, devoid of judgment
pure sciences ), necessary for the practice or the reverse, so also art and science
of an art : therefore, it is consistent to can never be completely separated from
continue this ground of distinction , and each other. The more these subtle ele
to call everything Art when the object is ments of light embody themselves in the
to carry out the doing (being able ), as outward forms of the world, so much the
for example, Art of building ; Science, more separate appear their domains ; and
when merely knowledge is the object; now once more, where the object is crea
as Science of Mathematics, of Astronomy. tion and production, there isthe province
Thatin every art certain complete sciences of art ; where the object is investiga
is intelligible of itself, tion and knowledge science holds sway.
may be includedperplex
and should not us . - After all this itresults of itself, that it
issciworth obser ving that thereBut still it is more fitting to say art of war than
ence without a mixture of is als
art no
mathematics , for instance , the useo In. scien ce of war.
of do So witho ut these
much conce
for this, ptions. weBut
because cannot
now
figures and of algebra is an art , but that
is only one amongst many instance s we come forward with the assertion, that
The reason is, thať however plain and war is neither an art nor a science in the
palpable the difference is between know. real signification, and that it is just the
ledge and power in the composite results setting out from that starting-point of
of human knowledge , yet itis difficult to ideas which has led to a wrong direction
being taken , which has caused war to be
 27
62 ON WAR. [BOOK II.

put on a par with other arts and sciences, 4. - Difference.

and has led to a number of erroneous The essential difference consists in this,
analogies. that war is no activity of the will, which
This has indeed been felt before now, exerts itself upon inanimate matter like
and on that account it was maintained the mechanical arts ; or upon a living,
that war is a handicraft; but there was but still passive and yielding subject, like
more lost than gained by that, for a the human mind and the human feelings
handicraft is only an inferior art, and as
such is also subject to definiteandrigid inandthere-acting
ideal arts ; but against a living
force.How littlethecate
laws. In reality the art of war did go gories of arts and sciences are applicable
on for sometime in the spirit of a handi to such an activity strikes us at once ;
craft ; we allude to the times of the Con
and we can understand, at the same time,
dottieri ; but then it had that direction,
not from intrinsic but from external how that constant seeking and striving
after laws like those which may be deve
causes
little it; was
and at
military history shows
that timein how
accordance
loped out of the dead, material world,
could not but lead to constant errors.
with the nature of the thing, or satis And yet it is just the mechanical arts that
factory. some people would imitate in the art of
war. The imitation of the ideal arts was
3. - War is part of the intercourse of the quite outof the question, because these
human race . themselves dispense too much with laws
and rules, and those hitherto tried always
acknowledged as insufficient and one
We say therefore, war belongs not to sided, are perpetually undermined and
the province of arts and sciences, but to washed away by the current of opinions,
the province of social life. It is a con- feelings, and customs.
flict of great interests which is settled by Whether such a conflict of the living,
bloodshed , and only in that is it differ- as takes place and is settled inwar rests,
ent from others . It would be better, subject to general laws, and whether
instead of comparing it with any art , to these are capable of indicating a useful
liken it to trade,whichis alsoa conflict line of action , willbe partly investigated
s es
of human interest and activiti ; and it in this book ; but so much is evident in
is still more like State policy,which again, itself, that this, like every other subject
on its part, may be looked upon as a kind which does not surpass our powers of
of tradeon agreat scale . Besides,State understanding, may be lighted up, and
policy is the womb in which war is deve be made more or less plain in its inner
lie hiddens in relations byan enquiring
loped, in whichits outlines mind, and that
a rudimentary the qualitie
state, like nt
of alone is sufficie to realise the idea of a
living creatures in their germs. theory.
 CHAP. IV .] METHODICISM .
63

CHAPTER IV.

METHODICISM .
In order to explain ourselves clearly as of Law, and then means the same as
2 tothe conception of method and method Principle, for we say “ no Rule without
of action which play such an important
part in war, we must be allowedto cast witho
exceput excep
tions,” tions
but sign
we,'doanot say that
66 with
no Law
hastyh glance
athroug which,at the logical hierarchy Rulewe retain to ourselves more freedom
as through regularly con,
stituted official functionaries, the world applicat
of In ion.meaning Rule is the means
another
of action is governed.
used of discerning a recondite truth in a
parti
Law , in the widest sense strictly apply. cular sign lying closeathand, in
ing to perception as well as action , has order to attach to this particular sign the
plainly something subjective and 'arbi. lawofaction directed upon thewhole
trary in its literal meani ng , and still truth . Of this kind are all the rules of
expresses just that on which we and games of play, all abridged processes in
those things external to us are dependent. mathematics, & c.
As a subjec t of cognit ion, Law is the
relation of things and their effects to one Directions and instructions are deter
another ; as a subject of the will it is a minations of action which have an in
itioisn. then equivalent stances too numerous unimpor
of daction fluence upon a number and
tomotive tant
of minor circum
comman or proh, iband
Principle is likewise such a law for for general laws.
action,except that
definite meaning, but theformai
is only the
ithasnot Lastly,
always
spirit of recurrin
several Method,g proceed
possible
mode of
ones ; and selected
ingacting, out
an
is ism
Methodic

judgmentmorefreedom of applicat
when the diversity of the real ion minedby Methods instead of by general
world can
not be laid hold of under the definite principl or particular prescriptions. By
formitself Law .st As the judgment must this theescases whichessent
of asugge placed
are ial under
of the cases in which the posed metho in their parts. As
principle applicable
such alike ds must necessaril y be sup
is not
therefore becom , the latter they cannot all be this, then the point is
es in that way a real
aid or guiding star for the person act
ing. that at least as many as possible should
be ; in other words that Method should
Principle is objective when it is the be calculated on the most probable cases.
result of objective truth, and consequently Methodicism is therefore not founded
of equalvalue for all men ; it is subjec on determined particular premises, but
tive, andthen generallycalledMaxim if on the average probability of cases one
are subjectiv
there therefore e relations in it, and with another ; and its ultimate tendenc
if it has certain value
a only stant and uniform applicat ion of whichy
is to set up an average truth , the con
forthe personhimself who makes it.
Rule is frequently taken in the sense soon acquires something of the nature
of a mechanical appliance, which in
64 ON WAR . (BOOK 11.
the end does that which is right almost stance that conclusion is drawn which
unwittingly. ion corresponds with the same.
The concept of Law in relation to If it is a rule to attack the enemy with
perception , is not necessary for the renewed vigour, assoon as he begins to
conduct of war, because the complex limber up his artillery in the combat,
phenomena of war are not so regular then on this particular fact depends a
and the regular are not so complex that course of action which is aimed at the
we should gain anything more by this general situation of the enemy as inferred
conception than by the simple truth . from the above fact, namely, that he is
And where a simple conception and lan- about to give up the fight, that he is 3

guage is sufficient, to resort to the com- commencing to draw off his troops, and
plex becomes affected and pedantic . is neither capable of making a serious
The conception of law in relation to stand while thus drawing off, nor of
action cannot be used in the theory of making his retreat gradually in good
the conduct of war, because owing to the order.
variableness and diversity of the pheno- Regulations and methods bring prepara
mena there is in it no determination tory theories into the conduct of war,
of such a general nature as to deserve in so far that disciplined troops are in
the name of law. oculated with them as active principles.
But principles , rules, prescriptions, and The whole body of instructions (for for
methods areconceptions indispensable to mations, exercise, and field service, are 't

a theory of the conduct of war, in sofar regulations and methods ; inthe exercise
as that theory leads to positive doctrines ; instrictions the first predominate, in the
because in doctrines the truth canonly field service instructions the latter. To
crystallise itself in such forms. these things the real conduct of war
As tactics is the branch of the conduct attaches itself; it takes them over, there
of war in which theory can attain the fore, as given modes ofproceeding, and
nearest to positive doctrine, therefore as such they must appear in the theory
in these conceptions will appear most of the conduct of war.
frequently. But for those activities retaining free
Not to use cavalry against unbroken dom in the employment of these forces,
infantry except in somecase ofspecial nite
therecann ot beregulations, that is ,defi
emergency ; only to use firearms within instructions, because they would do
effective range in the combat; to spare dom
away with free on Methods,
of acti .
the forces as much as possible for the on the other hand, as a general way
final strugglet, hese are tactical prin- of executing duties as they arise, calcu
ciples. None of them can be applied lated , as we have said, on an average
absolutely in every case, but they must of probability, or as a dominating in,
always be present to the mind of the fluence of principles and rules carried
, inorder that thebenefit of the through to application , maycertainly
chief
truth contained in them may not be lost appear in the theory of the conduct
in cases where that truth can be of advan of war, provided only they are not
tage. represented as something different to
If from the unusual cooking by an what they are, not represented as the
enemy's corps his movement is inferred , absolute and necessary modes of action
if the intentional exposure of troops in a (systems), but as the best of general
combat indicates a false attack, then this forms which may be used as shorter
way of discerning the truth is called rule, ways in place of a particular disposi
because from a single visible circum tion for the occasion at discretion.
 CHAP . III .] METHODICISM . 65
But the frequent application of methods Method will therefore be the more
will be seen to be most essential and un- generally used, become the more indis
avoidable in the conduct of war, if we
reflect how much action proceeds on mere pensable, the further down the scale of
conjecture, or in complete uncertainty, rank
and on posit
thethe ion hand
other , itsactive
of the agent
use will di;
becauseone side is prevented from learn- minish upwards, until in the highest
ing all the circumstances which influence position it quite disappears. For this
the dispositions of the other, or because,
even if these circumstances which in- reason is more
than initstrategy. in its place in tactics
fluence the decisions of the one were
really known, there is not, owing to their War in its highest aspects consists not
of an infinite number of little events, the
extent and the dispositions they would diversities in which compe each
entail, sufficient time for the other other, and which , therefore, nsate
by a bette r
necessary
to carry out alltheref count
eracting or worse method are better or worse
measures — that oremeasu res in war
must always be calculated on a certain governewhich
events of separate
d, but must withdecisive
great
be dealt sepa
number of possibilities. If we reflect how
numberless arethe trifling things belong rately. It is not a field of stalks which,
ing to any single event,andaccount
which there without anyregard to the particular form
fore should be taken into along. of each stalk, will be mowed better or
with it, and that therefore there is no worse , according as the mowing instru
othermeans but to suppose the one coun ment is good or bad ; but large trees,
teracted by the other , and to base our to which the axe must be laid with judg
arrangements only upon what is of a ment, according to the particular form
general natureand probable ; if we reflect inclinat
and separate
ion of each trunk .
lastly that,owing to the increasing num How high up in military activity the
ber of officers aswe descend the scale of admissibility of method in action reaches
rank , less must be left to the true dis naturally determines itself, not according
cernment and ripe judgment of indi to actual rank, but according to things;
viduals the lower the sphere of action ; highest position in
and it affects the s a
and that when we reach those ranks where less degree, only because these positions
we forno other
can lookregulati notions havethe. most
butthose activity comprehorder
A constant ensiveofsubjects
battle, of
a
which the
experi af
ons of the service and
ence ford , constant formation of advanced guards
the methodic forms borderi
we must ngthem with
help and outposts, are methods by which a
regulations. This will serve both
on those
as a general ties not only his subordinates'
hands, but also his own in certain cases.
areport judgment and
to theirextravagant
againstthose abarrier Certainly,they may have beendevised
and erroneous
views which are so especially to be dreaded by himself, and may be applied by him
experience is so costly;
in a sphere whereabsolute according to circumstances; but they may
Besides this need of method also be a subject of theory, in so far as
in action , we mustalso acknowledge that they are based on the general properties
ithas a positive
through advantage
the constant repetiti on ofisthat
,which hand,any
a for-, for method
wars or bywhichdefinite
campaig plans
ns are to be given
mal exercise, a readiness, precision , and
firmness attained the movement
is in of out all ready made as if from a machine
troops, which diminishes the natural are absolutely worthless.
friction, and makes the machine move As long as there exists no theory
ea
sier.
which can be sustained, that is no en
lightened treatise on the conduct of war,
66
ON WAR . [BOOK 11.
method in action cannot but encroach nently a great Commander does things,
beyond its proper limits in high places, there is always something subjective in
for men employed in these spheres of the way he does them ; and if he has a
activity have not always had the oppor .
tunity of educating themselves, through certain
vidualitymanner, a largeinit,
is contained sharewhich
of his indi
does
study and through contactwiththehigher not always accord with the individuality
interests : in the impracticable and in- of the person who copies his manner.
consistent disquisitions of theorists and At the same time it would neither be
critics they cannotfind their way, their possible nor right tobanish subjective
sound common sense rejects them , and as methodicism or manner completely from
they bring with them no knowledge but the conduct of war :it is rather to be
that derived from experience ; therefore,
in those cases which admit of,and regarded as a manifestation
fluencewhich of that of
the generalcharacter in
require a free individual treatment, they
readily make use of the means which a war
to hassatisfaction
which upon its separate
can onlyevents,
be doneand
in
experience gives them , that is an imita
tion of the particular methods practised that way if theory is not abletoforesee
thisconsiderations
by great Generals, by which a method of its general character, and morenatural
. Whatis include it in
action then takes place of itself. If we
800 Frederick the Great's Generals al. than that its
tion had the own
war of
waytheofFrench Revolu?
doing things
ways making their appearance in the so- and what theory could ever have included
called oblique order of battle, the Gene
rals of the French Revolution always that peculiar method ? The evil is only
using turning movements with a long that such a manner originating in a
extended line of battle, and Buonaparte's special case, easily outlives itself, be
Lieutenants rushing to the attack with cause it continues whilst circumstances
the bloody energy of concentrated imperceptibly change. Thisis what the
masses,
then we recognise in the recurrence ory should prevent by lucid and rational
of
the mode of proceeding evidently an criticism . When in the year 1806 the
adopted method, and see therefore that Prussian Generals, Prince Louis at Saal
method of action can reach up to regions
feld, Tauentzien on the Dornberg near
bordering on the highest. Should an Jena, Grawert before and Rüchel behind
improved theory facilitate the study of Kappeldorf, all together threw them
the conduct of war , form the mind and selves into the open jaws of destruction,
judgment of men who are rising to the with the oblique order of Frederick the
highest commands, then also Method in Great, and managedto ruinHohenlohe's
action will no longer reach so far, and so army in a way that no army was ever
much of it as is to be considered indis ruined, even on thefield of battle. All
pensable will then at least be formed had outlived its day, together withthe
from theory itself, and not take place out this was done througha manner which
of mere imitation .
However preemi- most ism ever ledstupidity
thodicdownright . to which me
 CHAP. V.]
CRITICISM .
67

he is
CHAPTER V.

CRITICISM.
Tue influence of theoretical principles
upon reallife
criticism
way,orthat
is produced more through tion
than through doctrine, for as . arbitrary assump
is, onionsome
supposit
criticism is an application of abstract As respects the tracing of effect to
cause, that is often attended
truthto real events,therefore it notonly superabledifficulty that the with
real the in
causes
brings truth of this description nearer to
life, but also accustoms the understand- of
arelife known
notdoes none of thehappen
this. soIn frequently relations
as
ing more to such truths by the constant
repetition of their application . in war, where events are seldom fully
therefore, think it necessaryto fixWe, known, and still less motives, the latter
thé have been, perhaps purposely,asconce aled
point
fo eoryview for criticism next tothat bythe chief actor,orhavebeenofsuch a
r thof
From the simple narration of an histo- transient beenaccidental
they haveand character that
lost for history , For
rical occurrence which places events in this reason critical narration must gene
chronological order,or,atmost
touches on their ,only, rallyproceedhand in hand withhistori
more immediate causes
we separate the critical. cal investigation, and still such a want of
In this critical, three different opera connection between cause and effect will
tions of the mind may be observed. often present itself that it does not seem
First, the historical investigation and justified in considering effects as the ne
determining of doubtful facts. This is cessary results of known causes . Here,
properly historical research , and has therefore, voids must occur , that is, his
nothing in common with theory . torical results, which cannot be made use
Secondly, the tracing of effects to of for teaching. All that theory can de
critical inquiry mand is, that the investigation should be
itisuses. This is thereal
indispensable to theory , for every; rigidlyconducted up tothat pointand
thing which in theory isto beestablished , there leave off without drawing conclu
sions. A real evil springs up only if the
supported, , or even merelyexplainedby known is made perforce to suffice asan
Thirdly can
theonly be settled
testing of the way. explanation of effects, and thus a false
in thismeans
employed., This is criticism , properly importance is ascribed to it.
speaking, in which praise and censure is Besides this difficulty, critical inquiry
contained . Thisis where theory helps also meets, with
trinsicone whichanother
is, thatgreat and in
the progress
history,
rived fror rather
om it . , the teaching to be de of events in war seldom proceeds from
In these two last strictly critical parts one simple cause, but from several in
of historical study, all depends on common , and that it therefore is not
tracing sufficient to follow up a series of events
to their primary elements, to
that is things
to say , up to undoubted truths, spirit,
theirbut thatinita iscandid
origin and necessary
then also impartial
and not , as is so often done, resting half
to apportion to each contributing cause
 1
68 ON WAR. [BOOK II.
its due weight. This leads, therefore, to of a sensible theory, to attain to that
a closer investigation of their nature, and point at which it commences chieflyto be
thus a critical investigation may lead instructive, that is, where it becomes
into what is the proper field theor
of y. demonstration, both convincing and sang
The critical consideration, that is, the réplique.
testing ofthe means, leads to the ques- But it would be a visionary hope to
tion , which are the effects peculiar to believe in the possibility of a theory
the means applied, and whether these applicable to every abstracttruth, leaving
effects were comprehended in the plans nothing forcriticism to do but to place
of the person directing ?
The effects peculiar to the means lead the case
would be ridiculous appropriate
under its pedantry to laylaw : it
down,
to the investigation of their nature , and as a rule for criticism, that it must al
thus again into the field of theory . ways halt and turn round on reaching
We have already seen that in criticism the boundaries of sacred theory. The
all depends upon attaining to positive same spirit of analytical inquiry, which
truth ; therefore , that we must not stop is the origin of theory, must also guide
at arbitrary propositions which are not the critic in hiswork ; and it can and
allowed by others, and to which other , must therefore happen that he strays,
perhaps, equally arbitrary assertions beyond the boundaries of the provinceof
mayagainbeopposed, so that thereis theory, and elucidates those pointswith
no end to pros and cons.; the whole is which he is more particularly concerned.
without result, and therefore, without It is more likely, on the contrary, that
instruction ,
degencompletely
object ifitwould
We have seen that boththe search for criticism mechainnical
erated intoa fail its
causes, and the examination of means , application of theory. All positive re
lead into the field of theory ; that is, into
thefield of universaltruth, whichdoes sults
rules of theoreti
, and methods , are the, morewanting
cal inquiry ali principles,
not proceed solely from the case immedi
ately under examination . If there is a in generality and positive truth the more
theory which can be used , then the criti- they become
exist to positive doctrine.
offer themselves for use asThey
re
cal consideration will appeal to theproofs quired, and it must always be leftfor
there afforded, and the examination judgment to decide whether they are
may suitable
there stop . But where no such theoretical or not .
truth is to be found, the inquiry must be Such results of theory
pushedup to the original elements . If this must never be used in criticism as rules
necessity occurs often, it must lead the his or norms for a standard, but in thesame
torian according toadetails
into a (labyrinth of
expression
commonHethen ) them , that is, merely as aids to judg
. has way as the person acting should use
his hands full, and it is impossible for ment. If it isan acknowledged principle
him to stop to give the requisite atten the usualorderof battle
in tactics that in
tion everywhere ; the consequence is, cavalry should be placed behind infantry,
that in order to set bounds to his investi
not in line with it, still itwould be folly
gation , he adopts some arbitrary assump on this account to condemn every devia
tions which , if they do not appear so to
tion from this principle. Criticism must
evident in themselves investigatethegrounds of the
appeal deviation,
principles
orcapable ofessen
sound theory therefore
proof that
an
and it onlya rightto
it ishas incase these aretoinsufficient
A is
tial foundation for criticism , and it is laid down in theory . If it is further
impossible for it, without the assistance established in theory that a divided at
tack diminishes the probability of suc:
 CHAP . V.] CRITICISM . 69

cess, still it would be just as unreason- nection of the parts with the whole,
able, whenever there is a divided attack and only look at things in that relation .
and an unsuccessful issue, to regard the But in war, as generally in the world,
latter as the result of the former, without there is a connection between everything
further investigation into the connection which belongs to a whole ; and, therefore,
between the two, or where a divided however small a cause may be in itself,
attack is successful, to infer from it the its effects reach to the end of the act of
fallacy of that theoretical principle. The warfare, and modify or influence the
spiritof investigation which belongs to final result in some degree, let that
criticism cannot allow either . Criticism degree be ever so small. In the same
therefore supports itself chiefly on the
results of the analytical investigation of manner means
everyobject
the ultimate . must be felt up to
theory ; what has been made out and
determined by theory does not require We can, therefore, trace the effects of
a cause, and
to be demonstrated over again by criti- noticing as long events
in theassame wayare
we worth
must
cism, and it is so determined bytheory not stop at the testing of a means for
that criticism
strated .
may find it ready demon
the immediate object, but test also this
as a means to a higher one, and
This office of criticism , of examining object
thus ascend the series of facts in succes
the effect produced by certain causes,and
Whether means applied has answered
sion, until we cometo one so absolutely
a
its object, will be easy enough if cause necessary in its nature as to require no
and effect, means and end , are all near examination or proof. In many cases,
together. particularly in what concerns great and
If an army is surprised , and therefore decisive measures, the investigation must
be carried to the final aim, to that which
cannot make a regular and intelligent leads immediately to
use of its powers and resources, then peace.
the effect of the surprise is not doubtful.- It is evident that in thus ascending,
If theory has determined that in a battle at every new station which we reach , a
the convergent form of attack is calcu new point of view for the judgment is
attained ; so that the same means which
produce
lated to, then
results greater butless
the question certain
is whether appeared advisableatonestation,when
he looked at from the next above it, may
who employsthat convergent form had haveto be rejected .
in view chiefly that greatness of result The search for the causes of events,
as his object; if so the proper means
were chosen But if by this form he and the comparison of means with ends
intended to. make the result more must always go hand in hand in the
certain, and that expectation was founded critical review of an act ; for the investiga
not on some exceptional circumstances tion of causes, leads us first to the dis
(in this case), but on the general nature covery of those things which are worth
of the convergent form , as has happened examining.
a hundred times, then he mistook the This following of theclue up and down
nature of the means and committed an is attended with considerable difficulty,
error . for the further from an event the cause
Here the work of military investigation lies which we are looking for, the greater
ind criticism iseasy, and itwillalways must
which be
musttheatthe
number of other causes
sametime be kept in
birso when confinedtotheimmediate
effects and objects . This can be done view ,andallowed for inreference to the
quite at option,ifwe abstract the con share which they have in the course of
events, and then eliminated , because the
70 ON WAR . [ BOOK IT.
higher the importance of a fact, the sages of the Norican Alps. Now to
greater will be the number of separate what use could Buonaparte turn this for
forces and circumstances by which it is tunate event? To penetrate into the
conditioned . If we have unravelled the heart of the Austrian empire itself, to
causes of a battle being lost, we have facilitate the advance of the Rhine armies
certainly also ascertained a part of the under Moreau and Hoche, and open com
causes of the consequences which this munication with them ? This was the view
defeat has upon the whole war, but only takenbyBuonaparte, and from thispoint
a part, because the effects of other causes, of view he was right. But,now , ifcriti
more or less according to circumstances, cism places itself at a higher point of
will flow into the final result.
view-namely, that of the French Direc
The same multiplicity of circumstances tory, which body could see and know
is presented also in the examination of that the armies on the Rhine could not
the means the higher our point of view ; commence the campaign for six weeks,
for the higher the object is situated, the then the advance of Buonaparte over the
greater must be the number of means Norican Alps can only be regarded as an
employed to reach it. The ultimate extremelyhazardousmeasure; for if the
object of the war is the object aimed at Austrians had drawn largely on their
by all the armies simultaneously, and it Rhinearmiestoreinforce their army in
is therefore necessary that the considera- Styria, so as to enable the Archduke to
tionshould embrace allthat eachhas fall upon the army ofItaly, not only
done or could have done.
It is obvious that this may sometimes would thatcampaign
the whole army have
lostbeen routed, but
. This conside
lead to a wide field of inquiry, in which ration , which attracted the serious atten:
it is easy to wander and lose the way,
of Buonaparte at Villach, no doubt
and inwhich this difficulty prevails — that tion
induced him to sign the armistice of
a number of assumptions or suppositions Leoben with so much readiness.
must be made about a variety of things If criticism takes a still higher position,
which do not actually appear, but which and if it knows
thatthe Austrians had no
in all probability did take place , and reserves between the army of the Arch
therefore cannot possibly be left out of duke Charles and Vienna, then we see
consideration .
that Vienna
When Buonaparte, in 1797,* at the advance of thebecame
army ofthreatened
Italy, by the
head of the army of Italy, advanced from
the Tagliamento against the Archduke theSupposing
Charles , he did so with a view to force
capitalwasthatBuonaparte
thusuncovered,knew that
and knew
that he still retained the same superiority
that general to a decisive action before in numbers overtheArchdukeas he hadin
the reinforcements expected from the Styria, then his advance againstthe heart
Rhinehad reached him .Ifwe look only of the AustrianStates was no longer
at the immediate object, the means were
well chosen and justified by the result, without purpose, and its value depended
for the Archduke was so inferior in num on the value which the Austrians might
bers, that he only made a show of resist place on preserving their capital. If that
the Tagliamento, and when
ance onadversary was would
he they so great that,therather
accept than oflose
conditions it,
peace
saw his so strong and resolute,
yielded ground,and left open the pas- them Buon
apartewasready
which, it became tooffer
an object of the first
* Compare 66 importance
Hinterlassene Werke,” 2 Auflage, parte to threaten
had any reason toVienna. IfBuona
know this, then
Bd. iv, S. 276 ff .
criticism may stop there ; but if this
 CHAP. V ] CRITICISM . 71

point was only problematical, then criti- even the moderate treaty of Campo For
cisni must take a still higher position, mio, and therefore it could not have been
and ask what would have followed if the their object in making their bold advance
Austrians had resolved to abandon Vien- if two considerations had not presented
na, and retire further into the vast themselves to their view, the first of
dominions still left to them . But it is which consisted in the question, what
easy toedseewitho
answer thatutthis quest
bring ing ion
cannot be degree of value the Austrians would
into the con attach to each of the above -mentioned
sideration the probable movements of the results ; whether, notwithstanding the
Rhinearmiesonbothsides.Through
the decided superiority of numbers on
probability ofa satisfactory result in
either of these cases, would it be worth
the sideof the French — 130,000 to 80,000 while to make the sacrifices inseparable
-there could belittle doubt ofthe result; froma continuance of thewar, when they
but then nextarisesthe question,What couldbe spared those sacrificesbya peace
use would the Directory make of a vic on termsnot too humiliating ? The second
tory; whether they would follow up their consideration is the question whether the
successto the opposite frontiers ofthe Austrian Government, instead seriously
Austrian monarchy, therefore to the com weighing the possible of
plete breaking up or overthrow of that results of a resist
ance pushed to extremities, would not
pother orwhether they would be satisfied prove completely disheartened by the
with theconquest a considerable
tion to serve as aof security
por-
for peace ?
impression of their present reverses.
The consideration which forms the
The probable result in each case must be subject ofthe firstquestion isnoidle
estimated, in order to come toaconclu . pieceof subtle argument,butaconsidera
sionas the probable determination of
to
the Directory. Supposing the result of tion of such decidedly practical impor
these considerations to be that the tance that it comes up whenever the plan
French forces were much too weak for of pushing war to the utmost extremity
is mooted, and by its weight in most
thenacomplete
mo rc
hy,
subjugation of the Austrian cases restrains the execution of such
80 that the
completely reverse attempt might
the respective posi. plans.
The second consideration is of equal
tions the conquest and armies,
even ofthecontending andthat
occupation of a importance, forwe do not makewarwith
considerable district of country would anabstraction but with a reality, which
we must always keep in view , and we
may be sure that it was not overlooked
tions towhichtheynaturall
that resultmust were not"equa e the by the boldBuonaparto - that is that
y influencl,then he was keenly alive to the terror which
estimateof
Italy the position
and compel army ofa the appearanceofhissword inspired.
of the expect
ittolowerits
tions,. And this it was no doubt which It was reliance
Moscow. Thereonit that which
led him intoleda scrape.
him to
infuenced Buonaparte , although fully The terror of him had been weakened
Archduke
Aware of ,thestill
helpless'
to signconditionofthe by the giganticstruggles whichhe
the peace of had been engaged ; in thein
year 1797 it
Campo Formio , which imposed no greater
sacrifices on the Austrians than the loss was still fresh , and the secret of a resist
of provinces which , even if the campaign ance pushed
discover ed ; to extremit
neverthe ieseven
less in been
had not 1797
took the most favourable turn for them , his boldness might have led to a negative
they could not have reconquered . But
the French could not have reckoned on result if, as already said, he had not
with a sort of presentiment avoided it
72
ON WAR . [BOOK II.
by signing the moderate peace of Campo When Buonaparte on 30th July , 1796,*
Formio .
determined to raise the siege ofMantua,
We must now bring these considera- in order to march with his whole force
tions to a close—they will suffice to show against the enemy, advancing in separate
the wide sphere, the diversity and em- columns to the relief of the place, and to
barrassing nature of the subjects em- beat them in detail, this appeared the
braced in a critical examination carried surest way to the attainment of brilliant
to the fullest extent , that is to those victories . These victories actually fol
measures of a great and decisive class lowed, and were afterwards again re
which must necessarily be included. It peated on a still more brilliant scale on
follows from them that besides a theo- the attempt to relieve the place being
retical acquaintance with the subject, again renewed. We hear only one opin
natural talent must also have a great achievements
ion on these , that of un
influence on the value of critical exami- mixed admiration .
nations , for it rests chiefly with the lat-
At the same time Buonaparte could
ter to throw the requisite light on the not have adopted this course on the 30th
interrelations of things, and to distinguish July without quite giving up the idea of
from amongst the endless connections the siege of Mantua, because it was im
of events those which are really essen
tial. possible to save the siege train, and it
But talent is also called into requisition could not .be replaced
campaign by another
Infact, the in this
siege wascon
in another way. Critical examination is verted into a blockade, and the place,
not merely the appreciation of those which if the siege had continued must
means which have been actually em
ployed, but also of all possible means, have very shortlyfallen, held out for six
which therefore must be suggested in months
in the
in spite of Buonaparte's victories
the first place — that is — must be dis- open field
Criticism has . generally regarded this
covered, and the use of any particular
means is not fairly open to censure until as an evil
critics beenunavoidable,
not was
havethat because
able to suggest any
a better is pointed out. Now, however better course .
small the number of possiblecombina Resistance to a relieving
army withinsuch
fallen linesdisrepute
of circumvallation had
contempt
tions may be in most cases , still it must into and
be admitted that to point out those
which have not been used is not a mere that it appears to have entirely escaped
consideration as a means.
analysis of actual things, but a spon And yet in
taneous creation which cannot be pre the reign of Louis XIV, that measure
scribed, and depends on the fertility was so often used with success that we
of genius . can only attribute to the force of fashion
We are far from seeing a field for great the fact that a hundred years later it
genius in a case which admits only of the never occurred to anyone even to propose
application of a few simple combinations, such a measure . If the practicability of
such a plan had even been entertained
andwe think it exceedingly ridiculous to for a closer consider
a moment, wouldhave
circumstances ation of
hold up, as is ofteninventi
done,theturning of
on showing the
shown that
a position as an
highest genius ; still nevertheless this 40,000 of the best infantry in the world
creative self -activity on the part of the under Buonaparte, behindstrong lines of
critic is necessary , and it is one of circumvallation round Mantua, had so
the points which essentially determine
the value of critical examination . * Compare “ Hinterlassene Werke, ” 2 Auflage,
Bd. iv. , S. 107 ff.
 CIIAP . V.] CRITICISM . 73

little to fear from the 50,000 men coming vinced that it would have completely
to the relief under Wurmser that was
, it changed the course of the campaign, and
very unlikely that even any attempt would that the allied army, instead of marching
be made upon their lines . We shall not to Paris, would have retired behind the
seek here to establish this point ; but we
believe enough has been said to show Rhine. We do not ask others to share
that this means was one which had a our conviction,
stands the thing but
will no one at
doubt, who
theunder
mere
right to a share of consideration . Whe- mention of this alternative course, that it
ther Buonaparte himselfeverthoughtof one which should notbe overlooked in
such a planwe leave undecided ; neither is criticism .
in his memoirs nor in other sources is
In this case the means of comparison
there any trace tobe found of his having lie much more on thesurface than in the
done so ; in no critical works has it been
touched upon , the measure being one
foregoing ,but they have been equally
overlooked, because one-sided viewshave
which the resuscitating
mind had lostsightof. The prevailed , and there has been nofreedom
merit of the idea of this of judgment.
means is not great, forit suggests itself
at once to anyone who breaksloose from better the necessity
Frommeans of pointing
which might have out
beena
the trammels fashion Still
of . neces
it is
sary that it should suggest itself for us to used in place of those which are con
bring it into consideration, and compare demned, has arisen the form of criticism
it with the means which Buonaparte em almost exclusively in use, which contents
ployed. Whatever may be the result of itself with pointing out the better means
without demonstrating in what the supe
the comparison
not be omitted ,byitcriticism
is one .whichshould riority consists. Theconsequence isthat
some are not convinced ; that others start
When Buonaparte , in February, 1814 ,* and do the same thing ; and that thus
after gaining the battles at Etoges, up discussion arises, which is without any
Champ
Bl -Aubert,
ücher' and Montmirail, left fixed basis for the argument. Military
s
army, and turning upon
Schwartzenberg literature abounds with matter of this sort.
, beat his corps at Mon The demonstration we require is al
tereau and Mormant, everyone
filled with admiration, because Buona the ways necessary when the superiority of
was

means propounded is not so evident

parte
te firstthrowing
rce thus
d ,foby upon his concentra as to leave no room for doubt, and it
one opponent, consists in the examination of each of the
then upon another , made a brilliant means on its own merits, and then of its
mistakes which
use of the committed his adver- comparison with the object desired .
dividing
saries had in their
When once the thing is traced back to a
forces If thesebrilliant
ferent. directions failed to strokes , it simple truth, controversy must cease,or
indif
save him
was generally considered to be no fault at all events a new result is obtained,
whilst by the other plan the pros and cons.
of his, at least. No one has yet asked go
the question, Whatwould have been the on for everconsuming each other.
result if, instead of turning from Blu tentShould we, for example, not rest con
with assertion in the case before
ther upon Schwartzenberg," he had mentioned,and wish to prove that the
tried him to blow
sued another the Rhine con persistent pursuit of Blücherwould have
? We are pur.
at Blücher,and been more advantageous than the turning
on Schwartzenberg, we should support
Compare Hinterlassene Werke," 2 Auflage , the arguments on the following simple
Bd . vii., 8. 193,“ ff.
truths :
74
ON WAR . (BOOK 11.
1. In general it is more advantageous There are people, no doubt, who will
to continue our blows in one and the not be convinced on these arguments ;
same direction, because there is a loss of but at all events they cannot retort by
time in striking in different directions; saying, that “ whilst Buonaparte threat
and at a point where the moral power is ened Schwartzenberg's base by advan
already shaken by considerable losses, cing to the Rhine, Schwartzenberg at the
there is the more reason to expect fresh same time threatened Buonaparte's com
successes ; therefore in that way no part munications with Paris ; » because we
of the preponderance already gained is have shown by the reasons above given
left idle .
that Schwartzenberg would never have
2. Because Blücher, although weaker thought of marching on Paris .
than Schwartzenbergwas, on account of With respect to the example quoted
his enterprising spirit, the more impor- by us from the campaign of 1796, we
tant adversary ; in him , therefore, lay should say : Buonaparte looked upon the
the centre of attraction which drew the plan he adoptedas the surest meansof
othersalong in the same direction . beating the Austrians ; but admitting
3. Because the losses which Blücher that it was so, still the object to be at
had sustained almost amounted to a tained was only an empty victory, which
defeat, which gave Buonaparte such a could have hardly anysensible influence
preponderance over him as to make his on the fall of Mantua. The way which
retreat to the Rhine almost certain , and we should have chosen would , in our
at the same time no reserves of any con- opinion, have been much more certain to
sequence awaited him there .
4. Because there was no other result ifprevent the relief
we place of Mantua ; but even
ourselves
inthe position of
the French general and assume that it
which would be so terrific in its aspects,
would appear tothe imagination in such was not so, and look upon the certainty
gigantic proportions,an immense advan- of success to have been less, the question
tage in dealing with a staff so weak and then amounts to a choice between a more
irresolu te as that of Schwartzenberg certain but less useful,and therefore less
notoriously was at this time. What important victory on the one hand, and
had happened to the Crown Prince a somewhat less probable but far more
of Wurtemberg at Montereau , and to decisive and important victory on the
Count Wittgenstein at Mormant, Prince other hand.
Schwartzenberg musthaveknownwell boldness mustPresented in this form ,
havedeclared for the
enough ; but all the untoward events on
Blücher's distant and separate line from second solution, which is the reverse of .
the Marne to the Rhine, would only took place,
superficially
what viewed . the thing was only
when
reach him by the avalanche of rumour . Buonaparte cer
The desperate movements which Buona tainly was anything butdeficient in bold
parte made upon Vitry at the end of ness ; and we may be sure that he did
March , to see whatthe Allies would do if not see as
quences whole
thefully andcase and as
clearly conse
its we can
he threatened turn them strategically
to ,
were evidently done on the principle of now at the present time.
working on their fears ; but it was done Naturally the critic, in treating of the
underfar different circumstances ,in history as experience
means,, must is of more
often appeal valuein
to military
consequence of his defeat at Laon and
Arcis, and because Blücher , with 100,000 the art of war than all philosophical
men , was then in communication with truth.
Schwartzenberg history issubject certain conditio
But this toexemplification ns,
from
of which we shall treat in a special chap
 CHAP . v.] CRITICISM . 75

ter; and unfortunately these conditions cult, and, in fact, can never be completely
are so seldom regarded, that reference to done with regard to things really essential.
history generally only serves to increase Let us take first the result. If it has
the confusion of ideas .
not proceeded from accidental circum
We have still amost importantsubject stances it is almost impossible that the
to consider, which is, How far criticism knowledge of it should not have an effect
in passing judgments on particular events on the judgment passed on events which
is permitted , or in duty bound ,to make have preceded it, for we see these things
use of its wider view of things, and there- in the light of this result, and it is to a
fore also of that which is shown by certain extent by it that we first become
results ; or when and where it should acquainted with them and appreciate
leave out of sight these things in order them. Military history, with all its
to place itself, as far as possible , in the events, is a source of instruction for cri
exact position of the chief actor ?
If criticism dispenses praise or censure ticism itself, and it is only natural that
it should seek to place itself as nearly as criticism should throw that light on things
which it has itself obtained from the con
possible atthe same point of view as the sideration of the whole. If, therefore, it
person acting, that is to say, to collect might wish in some cases to leave the
all he knew and all the motives on which result out of the consideration, it would
he acted, and , on the other hand , to be impossible to do so completely.
leave out of the consideration all that But it is not only in relation to the re
thepersonacting could
know, and above all, thenotresult
ordid not sult,thatis,with whattakes place at
. But the last, that this embarrassment arises ;
this is only an object to aim at, which
can never be reached because the state the sameoccurs in relation to preceding
of circumstances from which an event events ; therefore with the data which
furnished the motives to action. Criticism
proceeded can neverbe placed before the has before it, in most cases, more infor
eye of the critic exactly as it lay before mation on this point than the principal in
the eye of the person acting. A number the transaction. Now it may seem easy to
of inferior circumstances, which must dismiss from the consideration everything
hareinfluenced
lost to sight , andtheresult,arecompletely
many a subjective mo ofthis nature, butit is not so easy as we
tive has never come light
to . may think. The knowledge of preced
ing and concurrent events is founded not
The latter can onlybe learnt from the only on certain information ,but on a
memoirsof thechief actor, or from his number of conjectures and suppositions ;
things of this kind are often treatedof mation respectingthings not purelyacci
misrepresented . Criticism
fore, always forego much which pre suppositions or conjectures destined to
wasthere
' must,
take the place of certain information in
sent
cr
in the minds of those whose acts are
iticised . case such should never be supplied. Now
is it conceivable that criticism in after
On theto other
difficult leave hand is much
, itsight more andbefore
which has
times,preceding it as facts
concurrent all
circum
out of that which the
criticism knows in excess.
This is
etely easyas regards accidental Circum thereby influenced when itasks itselfthe
hances that circumstances
, mixed
have been is,up, but are in nowhich
way question, Whatportiono fthecircum
necessarily related ." But it is very diffi stances, which at the moment of action
were unknown, it would have held to be
76 ON WAR. [ BOOK IT .
probable? We maintain that in this case, it only doesso if the critic pushes him
as in the case of the results, and for the self forward, and speaks in a tone as if
same reason, it is impossible to disregard all the wisdom which he has obtained by
allthese things completely . an exhaustive examination of the event
If therefore the critic wishes to bestow under consideration were really his own
praise or blame upon any single act , hetalent. Palpable as is this deception, it
can only succeed to a certain degree in is one which people may easily fall into
placing himself in the position of the through vanity, and one which is natu
person whose act he has under review . rally distasteful to others. It very often
In many cases he can do so sufficiently happens that although the critic bas no
near for any practical purpose, but in such arrogant pretensions, they are im.
many instances it is the very reverse, puted to him by the reader because he
and this fact should never be overlooked . has not expressly disclaimed them , and
But it is neither necessary nor desir-then follows immediately a charge of a
able that criticism should completely want of the power of critical judgment.
identify itself with the person acting. In If, therefore, a critic points out an
war as in all matters of skill there is a error made by a Frederick or a Buona
certain natural aptitude required which parte, that does not mean that he who
is called talent. This may be great or makes the criticism would not have com
small . In the first case it may easily be mitted the same error ; he may even be
superior to that of the critic ; for what ready to grant that had he been in the
critic can pretend to the skill of a Frede- place of these great generals he might
rick or a Buonaparte! Therefore, if cri- have made much greater mistakes; he
ticism is not to abstain altogether from merely sees this error from the chain of
offering an opinion where eminent talent events, and he thinks that it should not
have escaped the sagacity of the general.
is concerned , it must be allowed to make
use of the advantage which its enlarged This is, therefore, an opinion formed
horizon affords. Criticism must not, through the connection of events, and
therefore,treat the solution of a problem therefor
by a great General like a sum in arith-
e through theresult. But there is
another quite different effect of the result
metic ; it is only through the results and
itself upon the judgment, that is if it is
through the exact coincidences of events,
used quite alone as an example for or
that it can recognise with admiration against the soundness of a measure. This
how much is due to the exercise of may be called judgment according to the
genius, and that it first learns the es- result. Such a judgment appears at first
sential combination which the glance of sight inadmissible,and yet it is not.
that genius devised . When Buonaparte marched to Mos.
But for every, even the smallest, act of cow in 1812, alldepended upon whether
genius it is necessary that criticism should the taking of the capital, and the events
take a higher point of view , so that, hav- which preceded the capture, should force
ing atcommand many objective grounds the Emperor Alexanderto make peace,
of decision, it may be as little subjective
as he had been compelled to do after
as possible , and that the critic may not
take the limited scope of his own mind the battle Francis
Emperor of Friedland in and
1805 in1807,1809
andafter
the
as a standard .
Austerlitz not
This elevated position of criticism , its partedid andobtain
Wagram ; foratif Moscow
a peace Buona,
praise and blame pronounced with a full there was no alternative but to return,
knowledge of all the circumstances, has
in itself nothing which hurts our feelings; athat is, there was nothing for him but
strategic defeat. We shall leave out
 CHAP. v. ] CRITICISM . 77

of the question what he did to get to out otherwise, lies in something un

Moscow, and whether in his advance natural, for we cannot regard the firm
he did not miss many opportunities of ness of Alexander as something un
bringing the Emperor " Alexander to natural.
peace ; we shall also exclude all con- What can be more natural than to say
sideration of the disastrous circumstances that in the years 1805 , 1807, 1809,
which attended his retreat, and which Buonaparte judged of his opponents cor
perhaps had their origin in the general rectly, and that in 1812 he erred in that
conduct of the campaign . Still, the poi
question remains the same; for however fore,nt.he On rigfor
wasthe ht, mer occasi
in the theng,
er , wro
lattons re
much more brilliant the course of the and in both cases we judge by the result.
campaign up to Moscow might have been, All action in war, as we have already
still there was always an uncertainty said, is directed on probable, not on
whether the Emperor Alexander would be
intimidat ed into making peace ; and then , certain results. Whatever is wanting
even if a retreat did not contain in itself fate,certainty
in call always
or chance,must it whichbeyou
leftwill.
to
the seeds of such disasters as did occur , still
We may demand that possible,
it would never be anything elsethan a left should be as little as what is but
SO

greatstrategic
Alexander agreed to a peace
Emperor
defeat. If thewhich was
only in relation to the particular case,
disadvantageous to him , the campaign of that is, as little as is possible in this one
case, but
1812 would have ranked with those of least notto
is left that the case
chance, in which
is always to the
be
Austerlitz Friedlan they had. preferred . That would be an enormous
, andif Wagram
ns d also,
But these, campaig error, as follows from all our theoretical
not led to peace, would in all probability views. Thereare cases in which the
have ended
Whatever , therefor e, ofr catastrophes
insimila genius, skill., greatest daring is thegreatest wisdom .
and energy the conqueror of the world chanceNow in everything
by the which
chief actor, hisispersonal
left to
applied to the task , this last question ad
dressed to fate * remained always the merit, and therefore his responsibility as
same . Shall we then discard the cam well, seems to be completely set aside ;
paigns of 1805 , 1807 , 1809 , and say on nevertheless we cannot suppress an in
ward feeling of satisfaction whenever
accountof the campaignof 1812that expectation realises itself, and if it dis
theywere acts of imprudence ; that the appointsus ourmindisdissatisfied ; and
and
foundthatin
vent for1812 strategi
itself c justice
in opposit blind shouldnot be meant by the judgment
ion toatlast
chance ? That would be an unwarrant which we form from the mere result, or
able conclusion , a most arbitrary judg rather that we find there.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that
ment
human, a case
eye can half proved
onlytrace , because
the thread no. the
.of the encessatisfaction
at success, the our
which painmind
caused by
experi
necessary connection of events up to the
determination ofthe conquered princes. failure, proceed from a sort of myste
Still less can we say the campaign of rious belief, we suppose between that
1812 merited the same success ascribed to good fortune and the
others , and that the reasonsuccess why it as the
turned genius of the chief a fine connecting
thread, invisible to the mind's eye, and
the supposition gives pleasure. What
from" ScFrage TR . Schicksal," a familiar quotation
hiller.an- der tends to confirm this idea is that our
sympathy increases, becomes more de
78 ON WAR . [BOOK II.
cided, if the successes and defeats of the We have said in our observations on
principal actor, areoften repeated . Thus the theory of the conduct of war that it
it becomes intelligible how good luck in should educate the mind of the Comman
war assumes a much noblernature than der for war, or that its teaching should
good luck at play. In general, whena for. guide his education ; also that it is not
tunate warrior does not otherwise lessen intended to furnish him with positive doc
our interest in his behalf, we have a plea- trines and systems which he can use
sure in accompanying him in his career. like mental appliances. But if the con
Criticism, therefore, after having struction of scientific formula is never re
weighed all that comes within the sphere quired or even allowable in war to aid
of human reason and conviction, will let the decision on the case presented, if
the result speak for that part where the truth does not appear there in a syste
deep mysterious relations are not disclosed matic shape, if it is not found in an in
in any visible form , and he will protect direct way, but directly by the natural
this silent sentence of a higher authority perception of the mind, then it must be
from the noise of crude opinions on the the same also in a critical review .
one hand, while on the other he prevents It is true that we have seen that wher
the gross abuse which might be made of ever complete demonstration of the na
this last tribunal. ture of things would be too tedious, cri
This verdict of the result must, there- ticism must support itself on those truths
fore, always bring forth that which hu- which theory has established on the
man sagacity cannot discover ; and it will point. But, just as in war, the actor
be chiefly as regards the intellectual obeys these theoretical truths rather be
powers and operations that it will be cause his mind is imbued with them than
called into requisition, partly because because he regards them as objective in
they can be estimated with the least cer- flexible laws, so criticism must also make
tainty, partly because their close connec- use of them , not as an external law or an
tion with the will isfavourable to their algebra icformula, of which fresh proof
is notrequired each time they are ap
exercising over it an important influence.
When fear or bravery precipitate the plied, but it must always throw a light
decision, there is nothing objective inter- on this proof itself, leaving only to
vening between them for our considera- theory the more minute and circumstan
tion, and, consequently, nothingby which tial proof. Thus it avoids a mysterious
sagacity and calculation might have met unintell igiblephraseology, and makesits
the probable result. ess
progr age
in plain langu , that is, with
We must now be allowed to make a a clear and always visible chain of
few observations on the instrument of ideas .
criticism , that is, the language which it Certainly this cannot always be com
uses, becausethat is to a certainextent pletely attained, but it mustalways be
connected with the action in war ; for the the aim in critical expositions. Such ex
critical examination is nothingmorethan positions must usecomplicated formsof
the deliberation whichshouldprecede scienceassparingly as possible, and
action in war. We, therefore, think it never resort to the construction of scien
very essentialthat the language used in tific aids as of a truth apparatus ofitsown,
criticism should have the same character but always be guided by the natural and
as that which deliberation in war must
have, for otherwise it would cease to be unbiassed impressions of the mind.
But this pious endeavour, if we may
practical, and criticism could gain no ad use the expression, has unfortunately
mittance in actual life . seldom hitherto presided over critical
!

CHAP. V. ] CRITICISM .
79
examinations : the most of them have he reads, are brimful of these technical
rather been emanations ofa speciesof terms, which form dark points of inter
vanit
ideas .
y — a wish to make a display of ference where author and reader part
frequently they arehollow
The first evil which we constantly company. Butbeing
thing worse,
stumble upon is a lame, totally inadmis-
nothing but some
shells without any kernel. The author
sible application of certain one -sided himself has no clear perception of what
systems as of a formal code of laws . But he means, contents himself with vague
itis never difficult to show the one-sided- ideas, which, if expressed in plain lan
ness of such systems, and this only re
quires to be done once to throw dis guage, would be unsatisfactory even to
credit for ever on critical judgments himself.
which are based on them . Wehave here of A third fault
Historical in criticism
Examples the misuse
, and ais display of
to deal with a definite subject, and as the
number of possible systems after all can great reading or learning. What the
be but small history of the Art of War is we have
themselves therefore
the, lesser evil, . also, they are already said, and we shall further explain
examplesspecial military
our views on
Much greater the evil which lies in history
is
the pompous retinue
in general in and onchapters .
scientificexpressionsof technical terms- One fact merely touched upon in a very
and metaph ors, which
systems have in their train , and which like cursory manner may be used to support
a rabble - like the baggage of an army the most opposite views, and three or
brokenawayfrom its chief hang about four such facts of the most heterogeneous
descript ion brought togethe
in all directions. Any critic –who has not most distant, lands and remoteroutof the
times and
adopteda system , either because he has heapedup, generally distract and bo
not found one to please him , or because
he has not yet beenable to make himself wilder the judgment and understanding
master of one, will at least occasionally without demonstrating anything ; for
make use of a piece of one, as one would when exposed to the light, they turn out
use a ruler, to show the blunders com . to be only trumpery rubbish, made use
mitted by a general. The most of them of to show off the author's learning.
But what can be gained for practical
areaincapable
as reasoning
hereofand
help military without
theresome using
shreds of life by suchobscure, partly false, con
scientific theory . is
The smallest fusedgained, that conceptions
, arbitrary theory on ?account of
So little
ofthese fragments
scientific words consisting in often
and ,metaphors, are mere of practice, and frequently a subject of
them has always been a true antithesis
nothing more than ornamental flourishes ridicule to those whose soldierly qualities
of critical narration . Now it is in the
nature of things that all technical and it is are
the field
in But above question
impossible .
that this could
scientific expressions
system their
which belong to a
, lose propriety , if they ever have been and
language, the case, if theory
by natural in simple
treatment of
had
,
andusedasgen
crystal talismans,era axihav
whil ch e morast
oms,or osmer
e pow ali making war,hadmerelysoughtto estab
of demonstration
Thus has come
than simple speech . lish just so much as admits of being
it to pass that our theo- sions and irrelevant
established; display
if, avoiding of scientific
all false preten
straightforwardintelligibledissertations forms andhistorical parallels, ithadkept
,
which author always knows at close to the subject, and gone hand in
in
least whatthe
he says and the reader what hand
in thewith
fieldthose whoown
by their mustnatural
conductgenius.
affairs
80 ON WAR . [BOOK IT.

CHAPTER V I.

ON EXAMPLES .

EXAMPLES from history make everything That an iron ball, to which powder has
clear, and furnish the best description of given a velocity of 1,000 feet in a second,
proof in the empirical sciences. This smashes every living thing which it
applies with more force to the Art of war touches in its course, is intelligible in it
than to any other. General Scharnhorst, self; experience is not required to tell us
whose hand-book is the best ever written that ; but in producing this effect how
on actual war, pronounces historical many hundred circumstances are con
examples to be of the first importance, cerned, some of which can only be
and makes an admirable use of them learnt by experience ! And the physical
himself. Had he survived the war in is not the only effect which we have to
which he fell, the fourth part of his re- study, it is the moral which we are in
vised treatise on artillery would have search of, and that can only be ascer
given a still greater proof ofthe observ- tained by experience ; and there is no
ing and enlightened spirit in which he other way of learning and appreciatinge
experience
sifted matters of . it but by experience. In the middl
But such use of historical examples is ages, when firearms were first invented ,
rarely made by theoretical writers ; the their effect, owing to their rude make,
way in which they more commonly make was materially but trifling compared to
use of them is rather calculated to leave what it now is, but their effect morally
the mind unsatisfied , as well as to offend was much greater. One must have wit
the understanding . We therefore think it nessed the firmness of one of those masses
important to bring specially into view the taught and led by Buonaparte, under the
use and abuse ofhistorical examples. heaviest and most unintermittent can
Unquestionably the branches of know- nonade, in order to understand of what
ledge which lie at the foundation of the troops, hardened by long practice in the
Art of War come under the denomination field of danger, can do, when by a career
of empirical sciences ; for althoughthey of victory they have reached the noble
are derived in a great measure from the principle ofdemanding from themselves
nature of things, still we can only learn their utmost efforts. În pure conception
this very nature itself for the most part no one would believe it. On the other
from experience ; and besides that, the hand it is well known that there are
practical application is modified by so troops in the service of European powers
many circumstances, that the effects can at the present moment who would easily
never be completely learnt from the mere be dispersed by a few cannon shots.
nature of the means .
But no empirical science, consequently
The effects of gunpowder, that great also no theory of the art of war, can
agent in our military activity, wasonly always corroborate its truths by his
learnt by experience ; andup to this hour torical proof ; it would also be, in some
experiments are continually in progress measure, difficult to support experience
in order to investigate them more fully. by single facts. If any means is once
 CHAP. V.] EXAMPLES . 81

found efficacious in war it is repeated ; For the first of these purposes all that
one copies another, the thing becomes is generally required is a cursory notice
the fashion, and in this manner it comes
of is a used
; as it is only
the case correctness partially.
into use, supported by experience , and Historical secondary con
takes its place in theory, which contents sideration ; a case invented might also
itself with appealing to experience in serve the purpose as well, only historical
general in order to show its origin, but
1
not as a verification of its truth . ones are always to be preferred, because
But it is quite otherwise if experience they bring the idea which they illustrate
is to be used in order to overthrow some nearer to practical life.
means in use, to confirm what is doubtful, The second use supposes a more cir
or introduce something new ; then par cumstantial relation of events, but histor .
ical authenticity is again of secondary
importance
ticular
quoted as proofs. from history mustbe
examples and inrespect to this point
,
the same is to be said as in the first case .
Now, if weconsider closely the use of For the third purpose the mere quota
historical proofs, four points of view tion of an undoubted fact is generally
readily present themselves for the pur sufficient. If it is asserted that fortified
pose .
may fulfil
positionsconditions,
First, they may be used merely as an certain it is onlyobject
their under
necessary to
explanation of an idea . In every abstract
consideration it is very easy to be mis mention the position of Bunzelwitz in
understood, or not to be intelligible atsupport of the assertion .
all: when an author is afraid of this, an But if, through the narrative of a case
in history, an abstract truth is to be
exemplification from history serves to demonstrated ,then everything inthecase
throwthelight whichiswanted on his bearingonthedemonstration mustbe
idea,and to ensure his beingintelligible analysed in themostsearchingandcom
plete manner ; it must, to a certain ex
Secondly, it may serve as an applica-
tion of an idea, because by means of an
tent, develop itselfcarefully before the
eyes of the reader. effectually
example thereisan opportunity of show this is done the weakerTheless
will be the proof,
ing the action of those minor circum
and the more necessary it will beto sup
stances which cannotallbecomprehended ply the demonstrativo proof whichis
of anexplained
and idea ; forininany general
that consistsexpression
, indeed , wanting inthesingle case by anumber
the difference between theory and expe
rience.
of cases, because we have a right to sup
pose that the more minute details which
Both these cases belong to we are unable to give neutralise each
examples properly speaking thetwo fol
lowing belong to historical ,proofs . other in their effects in a certain number
of cases .
Thirdly , a historical fact may be re
If we want to show by example derived
ferred to particularly,in ordertosupport from experience,that cavalry arebetter
what one hasadvanced. This is in all placed behind thaninalinewithin
thses sufficient,of ifa we
thepossibility fact haveonly without
or effect. to prove fantry; that it is very hazardous
a decided preponderance of numbers to
Lastly, in the fourth place , from the attempt an enveloping movement, with
circumstantial
and detailof
by collecting ahistoricalevent
together widelyof separated
, field
several of battle or incolumns, either
the theatre on a
of war,
them ,we
therefore may deduce someth eory , which
has its true proof in this testi- that is,
then either
in the firsttactically
of theseorcases
strategically
it would;
mony itself.
not be sufficient to specify some lost bat
G
82 ON WAR . [ воок п .
tles in which the cavalry was on the same appearance on each side, and in
flanks, and some gained in which the which the details of its parts cannot be
cavalry was in rear of the infantry ; and distinguished . Such examples have, in
in the latter of these cases it is notsuffi- reality, served to support the most con.
cient to refer to the battles ofRivoli and tradictory opinions. To some, Daun's
Wagram , torethe attack of the Austrians campaigns are smodels of prudence and
on the theat of war in Italy, in 1796, skill. To other , they are nothing but
or of the French upon the German theatre examples of timidity and want of resolu
of war in the same year. The way in tion. Buonaparte's passage across the
which these orders of battle or plans of Noric Alps in 1797, may be made to
attack essentially contributed to disas. appear the noblest resolution, but also as
trous issues in those particular cases must an act of sheer temerity. His strategic
be shown by closely tracing out circum- defeat in 1812 may be represented as
stances and occurrences. Then it will the consequence either of an excess or of
appear how far such forms or measures a deficiency of energy. All these opin
are to be condemned , a point which it is ions have been broached, and itis easy
very necessary to show , for a total con- to see that they might very well arise,
demnation would be inconsistent with because each person takes a different
truth . view of the connection of events. At the
It has been already said that when a same time these antagonistic opinions
circumstantial detail of facts isimpossible, cannotbe reconciledwitheach other, and
the demonstrative powerwhich isdeficient therefore one of the two must be wrong.
may, to a certain extent, be supplied by Much as we are obliged to the worthy
the number of cases quoted ; but this is a
Fenquières for the numerous examples
very dangerous method of getting out of introduced in his memoirs — partlybecause
the difficulty, and one which has been a number of historical incidents have
much abused . Instead of one well ex
thus been preserved which might other
plained example, three or four are just wise have beenlost, and partly because
touched upon , and thus a show is made he was one of the first to bring theo
of strong evidence. But there are mat- retical, that is, abstract ideas, into con
ters where a whole dozen of cases brought nection with the practical in war, in so
forward would prove nothing ; if for in- far that the cases brought forward may
stance, they are facts of frequent occur
be regarded as intended to exemplify and
rance , and therefore a dozen other cases
confirm what is theoretically asserted
with an opposite result might just as yet,
easily be brought forward. If any one
inthe opinion of an impartial reader,
will instance a dozen lost battles in which he will hardly be allowed to have at
the side beaten attacked in separate con tained the object he proposed to himself,
verging columns, we can instance a dozen that of proving theoretical principles by
that have been gained , in which the same historical examples. For although he
sometimes relates occurrences with great
order was adopted . It is evident that in minuteness, still he falls short veryoften
this way no result is to be obtained . of showing that the deductions drawn
Upon carefully considering these dif. necessarily proceed from the inner rela
ferent points , it will be seen how easily tions of these events .
examples may be mis -applied . Another evil which comes from the
An occurrence which , instead of being superficial notice of historical events, is
carefully analysed in all its parts , is
superficially noticed , is like an object that some readers are either wholly igno
seen at a great distance , presenting the rant ofthe events, or cannot call them to
remembrance sufficiently to be able to
1

CHAP. VI .] ON EXAMPLES. 83

grasp the author'smeaning, so that there colour and life, like a worn out or dark
is no alternative between eitheraccepting ened picture ; so that perhaps at last
blindly what is said, or remaini
ng un only the large masses and leading fea
convinced .
tures remain, which thus acquire undue
It isextremely difficult to put together proportions,
or unfold historical events before the eyes
of a reader in such a way as is necessary, If we look at the present state of war
fare, we should say that the wars since
be ablevery
in ordertowriter to usethem asproofs'; that of the Austriansuccession are almost
often wants the the only ones which, at least as far as
for the
means, and can neither afford the time armament, have still a considerable simi
nor the requisite space ;
that whenthe object isbut
to we maintain
establish a larity to the present, and which, notwith
standing the many important changes
new or doubtful opinion, one single which have taken place both great and
example,
more instructive than analysed
thoroughly , isfar
ten which are
small, are stillcapable of affording much
superficially treated . The great mis- instruction. It is quite otherwise with
the war of the Spanish succession, as the
chief of these superficial representa use of fire -arms had not then 80 far
tions is not that the writer puts his
story forward as a proof when it has advanced towards perfection, and cavalry
only a false title, but that he has not still continued the most important arm.
The farther we go back, the less useful
made himself properly acquainted with becomes military history, as it gets so
the subject, and that from this sortof much the more meagre andbarren of
slovenly, shallow treatment of history, detail . The most useless of all is that of
a hundred false views and attempts at the old world.
the construction of theories arise , which But this uselessness is not altogether
would nover havemade
if the writerhad appearance
lookedtheir
upon it as his absolute,it relates only to those subjects
which depend on a knowledge of minute
duty to deduce from the strict connec details, or on those things in which the
tion of events everything new which he
Although
tronghtto market, and sought to prove tactics weknowverylittleaboutthe
in the battles between the Swiss
When we are convinced of these diffi and the Austrians, the Burgundians and
culties in theuse of historical examples, French, still we find in them unmistake
and at the same time of the necessity able evidence that they were the first in
(of making use of such examples ), then which the superiority of a good infantry
we shall also come to the concīusion that over the best cavalry was displayed. A
the latest military history is naturally the general glance at the time of the Condot
best field from which to draw them , inas tieri teaches us how the whole method of
much
and deas itedalone
tail . is sufficiently authentic conducting war is dependant on the in
strument used ; for at no period have the
In ancient times, circumstances con forces used in war had somuch the cha
nected with war, as well as the method racteristics of a special instrument, and
of carrying it on, were different; there been a class so totally distinct from the
events are of less use to us either
theoreits
fore
tically rest of the national community. The
or practically ; in addition memorable way in which the Romans in
to which military history, like every the second Punic War attacked the Car
other, naturallyofsmalltraits
time a number foses in the and thaginian
e of while
courslinea possessions in Spain andfrica,
Hannibal still maintained Ahimse lf
ments originally to be seen, loses in in Italy, is a most instructive subject to
84 ON WAR . ( BOOK II.

study, as the general relations of the only look upon such quotations and re
states and armies concerned in this indi- ferences as embellishments to fill up gaps
rect act of defence are sufficiently well and hide defects.
known. It would be an immense service to
But the more things descend into teach the art of war entirely by historical
particulars, and deviate in character examples, as Fenquières proposed to do;
from the most general relations, the less but it would be full work for the whole
we can look for examples and lessons of life of a man, if we reflect that he who
experience from very remote periods, for undertakes it must first qualify himself
we have neitherthe means ofjudging for thetask by a long personalexperience
properly of corresponding events, norcan
in actual war .
we apply them to our completely different Whoever, stirred by ambition, under
method of war. takes such a task, let him prepare him
Unfortunately, however, it has always self for his pious undertaking as fora
been the fashion with historicalwriters long pilgrimage; let him give up bis
to talk about ancient times. We shall time, spare no sacrifice, fear notemporal
not say how far vanity and charlatanism rank or power, and rise above all feelings
may have had a share in this, but in of personal vanity, of false shame, in
general we fail to discover any honest order, according to the French code, to
intention and earnestendeavour toin- speak the Truth, thewholeTruth, and
struct and convince, and we can therefore nothing but the Truth.
 85

BOOK III.- OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL.

CHAPTER I.

STRATEGY .

The edconcinepti
settl tegyterhasofbee
ofondstrachap
theon_sec the aining to deta
n pertbeforehand, ils cannot be made at
second book. It is the employment of all it follows, as a matter of
course, that strategy must go with the
the battle to gain the object of the war. army to the field in order to arrange par
Properly speaking it has to do with no ticulars on the spot, and to make the
thing but the battle, but its theory must modifications in the general plan which
include in this consideration the instru- incessantly become necessaryin war.
ment of this real activity — the armed Strategy can therefore nevertake its
foresin
tions, for the and inits
itselfbattle principal
is fought byit, rela-
and handfromthe work for a moment.
That this however has not been always
shows its effects uponit in turn. It must the view taken , generally, is evident from
beas far
wellacquaint ed with the battle itself the former custom
as relates to its possible results,
ofkeeping strategy ina
the army,
the cabinet and not with
and those mental and moral thing only allowable if the cabinet is so
are the most important powers which
in the use of the near to the army that it can be taken for
same,

Strategy is the employment of the theTheory

chief head - quarters of the army.
will therefore attend on stra
battle to gain the end of the war ; it must tegy in the determination of its plans, or,
therefore give an aim to the whole mili. as we may more properly say, it will
tary action , which must be in accord throw a light on things in themselves,
ance with the object of the war ; in other and in their relations to each other, and
words, strategy forms the plan of the bring out prominently the little that there
war, and to the said aim it links the is ofprinciple or rule.
series of acts which are to lead to the If we recall to mind from the first
same, that is to say , it makes the plans chapter how many things of the highest
for the separate campaigns, and regu importance war touches upon , we may
lates the combats to be fought in each. conceive that a consideration of all re
As these are all things which to a great quires a rare grasp of mind.
extent can only be determined on conjec A prince or general who knows exactly
tures, some of which turn out incorrect,
how to organise his war according to his
while a number of other arrangements object and means, who does neither too
86 ON WAR . [BOOK III.
little nor too much, gives by that the respect to them , it is only in the highest
greatest proof of his genius. But the branches of strategy that moral compli
effects ofthis talent are exhibited not so cations and a great diversity of quantities
much by the invention of new modes of and relations are to be looked for, only
action , which might strike the eye imme- at that point where strategy borders on
diately, as in the successful finalresult of political science, or rather where the
the whole. It is the exact fulfilment of two become one, and there, as we have
silent suppositions, it is the noiseless before observed, they have more influ
harmony of the whole action which we ence on the “ how much ” and “ how
should admire, and which only makes little " is to be done than on the form
itself known in the total result .
of execution. Where the latter is the
The inquirer who, tracing back from principal question, as in the single acts
the final result, does not perceive the both great and small in war, the moral
signs of that harmony is one who is apt quantities are already reduced to a very
to seek for genius where it is not, and small number .
where it cannot be found .
The means and forms which strategy Thus,
very then,butinnot
simple, strategy
on thateverything is
account very
uses are in fact so extremely simple, so easy. Once it is determined from the
well known by their constant repetition, relations of the state what should and
that it only appears ridiculous to sound may be done by war, then the way to it ‫ܝܐ ܀‬
common sense when it hears critics so is easy to find ; but to follow that way
frequently speaking of them with high- straightforward, to carry out the plan
flown emphasis . Turning a flank, which
has been done a thousand times, is re without being obliged to deviate from it
garded here as a proof of the most bril a thousand times by a thousand varying
liantgenius,there as a proof of themost influences,
strengthof that requires,
character , greatbesides
clearnessgreat
and
profound penetration , indeed even of the steadiness of mind, and out of a thou
most comprehensive knowledge. Can sand men who are remarkable, some for
there be in the book -world moreabsurd mind,others for penetration, others again
productions ?
It is still more ridiculous if, in addition for boldness
not or strength
one will combine of will, all
in himself perhaps
those
to this, we reflect that the same critic, in qualities which are required to raise a
accordance with prevalent opinion , ex
cludes all moral forces from theory, and man above mediocrity in the career of a

V79375
will not allow it to be concerned with general.
anything but the material forces, so that It may sound strange, but for all who
all must be confined to a few mathe know war in this respect it is a fact
matical relations of equilibrium and pre beyond doubt, that much more strength
ponderance, of time and space , and a few of will is required to make an impor
lines and angles. If it were nothing tant decision in strategy than in tactics.
more than this, then out of such a miser In the latter we are hurried on with
able business there would not be a scien the moment ; a commander feels himself
tific problem for evena schoolboy. borne along in a strong current, against
But let us admit : there is no question which he durst not contend without the
here about scientific formulas and most destructive consequences, he sup
pro- presses the rising fears, and boldly ven,
blems ; the relations of material things
are all very simple ; the right compre tures further. În strategy, where all
hension of the moral forces which como goes on at a slower rate, there is more
into play is more difficult . Still, even in room allowed for ourown apprehen
sions and those of others, for objections
 CHLAP. I.) STRATEGY. 87

and remonstrances, consequently also for make him deviate from his course, and
unseasonable regrets; and as we do not this course alone it is which brought him
see things in strategy as we do at least to a fortunate termination of the contest.
half of them in tactics, with the living These few words do but scant justice
eye, but everything must be conjectured to this phase of the genius of the great
and assumed , therefore the convictions general; the eyes must be fixed care
produced are less powerful. The conse- fully on the extraordinary issue of the
quence is,
should act, that most generals whenthey struggle, and the causes which out,
remain stuck fast in bewilder- about that issue must be traced brought
in
ing doubts. order thoroughly to understand that
Now let us cast a glance at history , nothing but the king's penetrating
it lights upon Frederick the Great's cam eye brought him safely out of all his
paign of 1760, celebrated for its fine dangers.
marches and mancouvres :
a perfect mas- This is one feature in this great com
terpiece of strategic skill as critics tell mander which we admire in the campaign
us. Is there really anything to drive us of 1760—and in all others, but in this es
out of our wits with admiration in the pecially because in nonedid he keep the
king's first tryingto turn Daun'sright balance even against such a superior
flank, then hisleft, then againhisright, hostile force,
& c. ? Are we to see profound wisdom in withsuch a small sac
relates to the difficulty
Another feature
this? No, that we cannot, ifwe areto ofexecution . Marchesto turn a flank ,
naturally
decide we
What rather and
admire aboveaffectation.
without all is the rightorleft, are easily combined ; the
idea of keeping a smallforce always well
sagacity of the king in this respect, that concentrated to be able to meet the ene
while pursuing a great object with very my on equal terms atany point, to mul
limitedmeans, he undertook nothingbe tiply aforce by rapid movement,isas
yond his powers, and justenough togain easilyconceived as expressed ;themere
bject.notThis
ishisovisible onlysagacity of the general
in this campaign contrivance
, but cannot in these points,therefore,
excite our admiration, and with
througho ut all the threewarsof the respect tosuch simple things, there is
great king
! nothing further than to admit that they
To bring Silesia into the safe harbour are simple .
of a well guaranteed peace, was his
object. But let a general try to do these things
like Frederick the Great. Long after
At the head of a small state , which wards authors, who were eye witnesses,
was like other states in most things, and have spoken ofthe danger, indeed of the
only aheadationof ;them
administr not branche
in some
hecould
s of imprudence, oftheking's camps, and
be an Alex
ander ,and,as
like him have Charles
XII.
broken , he .would
his head Weonly thedangerappearedthreetimesasgreat
find, as afterwards.
therefore, in thewhole of his conduct It was the same with his marches, un
ofwar, a controlled power , always well der the eyes, nay often under the cannon
balanced, and never wanting in energy, of the enemy's army ; these camps were
which in the most critical moments rises
taken up , these marches made not from
to astonishing deeds , and the next mo want of prudence,but because in Daun's
dination toates
montoscill play yofonthe
thequietl again in subor
most system , in his mode
subtil army, ofdrawing up his
political influences
in the responsibility which pressed
upon him , and in his character, Fre
. Neith er
vanit y
thirst for glory, nor vengeance could, derick found that security which justi
 88
ON WAR . [ BOOK III.
fied his camps and marches. But it
of execution
miracles But whichtowe should
required the king's boldness, determina- admire. it is impossible realise all
tion, and strength of will to see things this in its full forcewithout a foretaste
in this light, and not to be led astray of it by experience. He who only knows
and intimidated by the danger of which war from books or the drill ground can
thirty years after people still wrote and not realise the whole effect of this coun
spoke. Few generals in this situation
would have believed these simple strate terpoise in action ; we beg him, there
gic means to be practicable . fore, to accept from us on faith and trust
all thatl he
Again, another difficulty in execution persona is unable
experie supply
to his
nces of own.from any
is that the king's army in this campaign We wished by this illustration to give
was constantly in motion . Twice it more clearness to the course of our ideas,
marched by wretched cross roads , from and in closing this chapter briefly observe
the Elbe into Silesia , in rear of Daun that in our exposition of strategy we shall
and pursued by Lascy ( beginning of describe after our fashion those separate
July, beginning of August ). It required
to be always ready for battle, and itssubjects which
portant, appear
whether of a tomoral
us theor most im
material
marches to be organised with a degree nature ; weshall proceed from thesim
necessarily
of skill which called forth a
proportionate degree of exertion . Al. ple tothe
with theinner
complex, and shall
connection conclude
of the whole
though attended and delayed by thou- act of war, in other words with the plan
sands of wagons , still its subsistence was for a war or campaign .
extremely difficult. In Silesia for eight
days before the battle of Leignitz it had
constantly night marches , defiling alter Observation .
nately right and left in front of the ene
my : — this costs great fatigue, this re In an earlier manuscript ofthe second
quires great privations. book are the following passages en
Is it to be supposed that all this could dorsed by the author himself to be used
have been done without producing a for the first Chapter of the second Book :
great friction in the machine ? Can the the projected revision of that chapter
mind of a commander elaborate such not having been made, the passages
movements with the same ease as the referred to are introduced here in full.
hand ofa land surveyor uses the astro
labe ? Does not the sight of the suffer By the mere assemblage of armed forces
ings of their hungry, thirsty comrades
pierce the hearts ofthe commander and at a particular point, à battle there be
place.
comes possible, possibility
Isthat but does notnow tobetake
always re
his generals a thousand times ?
not the murmurs and doubts which Must
these garded as a reality and therefore an
cause reach his ear? Has an ordinary effectiv
man the courage to demand such sacri
e thing ? theseeffects
itsresults,and Certainly, it is so by
fices, and wou ld not such effor ts most they may be, can never fail.
, whatever
certainly demoralise the army, break
up the bands of discipline, and , in 1.- Possible combats are on account of their
short, undermine its military virtue, if
firm reliance on the greatness and infal- Ifresults
a to be looked
detachm ent isupon real ones.
sentas away to cut
‘ libility of the commander did not com- off the retreat of a flying enemy,andthe
pensate for all ? Here , therefore, it is
that we should pay respect ; it is these enemy surrenders in consequence without
further resistance,stillit isthrough the
i

CHAP. I.] STRATEGY . 89

combat which is offered to him by this bridges, magazines, &c., may be the im .
detachment sent after him that he is mediate object of a battle, but never the
brought to his decision . ultimate one. Things of this description
If a part of our army occupies an can never be looked upon otherwise than
enemy's province which was undefended, as means of gaining greater superiority,
and thus deprives the enemy of very so as at last to offer battle to the enemy
considerable means of keeping upthe in such a way that it will be impossible
strength of hisarmy, it is entirely through for him to accept it. Therefore all these
the battle which our detached corps gives things must only be regarded as inter
the
enemy to expect, in case he seeks to mediate links, steps as it were, leading
recover the lost province, that we remain up to the effectual principle, but never as
in possession of the same . that principle itself.
In both cases therefore, the mere
possibility of a battle has produced
results, and is therefore to be classed 3. - Example.
amongst actual events . Suppose that in In 1814 by the capture of Buonaparte's
these cases the enemy has opposed our capital the object of the war was attained.
corps with others superior in force, and The political divisions which had their
thus forced ours to give up their object roots in Paris came into active operation ,
without a combat, then certainly our andan enormoussplit left the power of
plan has failed, but the battle which we the Emperor to collapse of itself . Never
offered at ( either of ) those points has theless the point of view from which we
not on that account been without effect,
for it attracted the enemy's forces to that must look atall this is, that through these
point. And in case our whole under causes the forces and defensive means of
were suddenly very much
taking has done us harm , it cannot be Buonaparte
diminished , the superiority of the Allies,
said that these positions , these possible just in the same measure in
battles, have been attended with no re therefore,
creased, and any further resistance then
sults ; their effects, then , are similar to became impossible. It was this impos
those of a lost battle.
sibility which
If we produced
In this manner we see that the de- France. theforces
peaceofwith
suppose the the
struction of the enemy's military forces, Allies at that moment diminished to a
the overthrow of the enemy's power,is like extent through external causes;- -if
only to be done through the effect of a the superiority vanishes, then at the same
battle whether it be that it actually takes time vanishes also all the effect and
place,
merely offered, and importance of the taking of Paris.
not acceorptthat
ed. it is We have gone through this chain of
argument in order to show that this is the
2. - Twofold object of the combat . natural and only true view of the thing
But these effects are of two kinds, direct from which it derives its importance .
and indirect; they are of the latter,ifother It leads always back to the question,
things intrude themselves, and become What at any given moment of the war
the object of the combat - things which or campaign will be the probable result
of the great or small combats which the
cannot be regarded as the destruction of two sides might offer to each other ? In
enemy's force, but only leading up to it
certainly by circuitous road , but with the consideration of a plan for a campaign
so much the greater effect. The posses or war, this question only is decisive as
to the measures which are to be taken
sion of provinces, towns, fortresses, roads, all through from the very commencement .
90 ON WAR . [BOOK III.

4. — When this view is not taken ,then afalse themerchant cannot set apart and place
value given other things.
is to in security gains from one single trans
action byitself, so in war a single ad
If we do not accustom ourselves to look vantage cannot be separated from the °. ;
upon war, and the single campaigns in a result of the whole. Just as the former
war, as a chain which is all composed of must always operate with the whole bulk
battles strung together, one of which of his means, justso in war, only the 時光,
always brings on another ; if we adopt sum total will decide on the advantage or
the idea that the taking of a certain disadvantage of each item.
geographical point, the occupation of an If the mind'sofeye is always
undefended province, isin itself anything ; upon the series combats, sofardirected
as they
then we are very likely to regard it as can be seen beforehand, then it is always
an acquisition which we may retain; and looking in the right direction to theaim ,
if we look at so, and
it not as a term in and thereby the motion of the force
the whole series of events, we do not ask acquires that rapidity, that is to say,
ourselves whether this possession may willing and doing acquire that energy
not leadto greater disadvantages here- whichis suitable to the matter, andwhich
after. How often we find this mistake is not to bethwarted or turned aside by
recurring in military history. extraneous influences.
We might say that, just as in commerce

CHAPTER II .

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY.
The causes which condition the use of
the combat in strategy , may be easily etc. all
for The separation
in the of these
mind does goodthings once
in giving
divided into elements of different kinds , clearness to the ideas of things, andhelp
such as the moral, physical, mathematical, ing us to estimate at once, at a higher or
geographical and statistical elements .
The first class includes all that can be lower value, the different classes as we
pass onwards.
called forth by moral qualities and effects; separately , manyFor, in considering
loseof themselves them
their
to the second class belong the whole borrowed importance ; onefeels
, forin
mass of the military force, its organisa- stance, quite plainly that the valueof a
tion, the proportion of the three arms, base of operations, even if we look at
the thirdclass,
etc.; toons'
etc., operati the angle of nothing in it but theposition of the line
the line, the concentrio and
eccentri c movements in as faras their of operations,
simple form ondepends muchical
the geometr lessin that
element
geometrical nature has any value in the
calculation; tothe fourth the influences of another
of , than which
the angle natureform
onthe they withroads
ofthe one
country, as commanding points, hills,
rivers , woods, roads, etc., etc.; lastly to and the country through which they
the fifth , all the means of supply , etc., pass.
But to treat upon strategy according
CHAP. III.] MORAL FORCES . 91
to these elements would be the most un- to the real world . Heaven preserve every
fortunate idea that could be conceived, theorist from such an undertaking ! We
for these elements are generally mani- shall keep to the world of things in their
fold, and intimately connected with each totality, and not pursue our analysis fur
other in every single operation of war. ther than is necessary from time to time
We should lose ourselves in the most to give distinctness to the idea which we
soulless analysis, and as if in a horrid wish to impart, and which has come to
dream , we should be for ever trying in us, not by a speculative investigation,
vain to build up an arch to connectthis but through the impression made by the
base of abstractionswith facts belonging realities of war in their entirety.

CHAPTER III .

MORAL FORCES.

We must return again to this subject, they belong to the theory of the art of
whichis touched uponin the third chap- war, aswellaseverything else which
ter of the second book (p. 62), because the constitutes war. For I must here once
moral forces are amongst the most impor more repeat that it is a miserable philo
tantsubjects
which in war.
permeate the They
wholeareelement
thespirits sophyif,according
of establish tothe old plan, we
rules and principles wholly re
War,and which fasten themselves soonest
and with the greatest affinity to the will gardless ofall moral forces, and then, as
soon as these forces make their appear
whole puts in
which motion and guides the ance, we begin to count exceptions which
mass of powers, unite with it as it we thereby establish as it were theoreti
were
force inone
itself. stream,because
Unfortunatelyit they
is a moral cally,that
seek resort is,makeinto rules; or ifwe
to an appeal to genius, which is
to escape from all book -knowledge, for above all rules, thus giving out by impli
they will neither be brought into num cation, not only that rules were only
þers nor into classes, and want only to made for fools, but also that they them
be seen and felt. selves are no better than folly.
The spirit and other moral qualities Even if the theory of the art of war
which animate an army, a general, or does no more in reality than that it calls
governments, public opinion in provinces these things toremembrance,showsthe
in which awar is raging,the moraleffect necessity ofallowingto the moralforces
ofavictoryorofadefeat, are things theirfullvalue,and of always taking
theirnature,andwhichalso,according fact
astheystandwithregardtoourobject extended its borders byestablishing
of immaterialforces,and over
theregion
in differrelations,may
andour ent ways.
that point of view, has condemned before
have an influence hand every one who would endeavour to
saidAltho ugh thesethingsinbooks,stili
about little or nothing can be bytho
justify merephysic
himself befor
al erelati
its judg ment seat
ons offorces.
92
ON WAR .
[BOOK III .
But also out of regard to all other 80- their frequently incredible influence, are
called rules, theory cannot banish the best exemplified by history, and this is
moral forces beyond its frontier, because the most generous and purest nourish
the effects of the physical forces and the ment which the mind of the general can
moral are completely fused, andare not extract from it. At the same time it is
to be decomposed like a metal alloy by a to be observed, that it is less demonstra
l process.
chemicaphysica In every rule relating tions, critical examinations, and learned
to the l forces, theory must pre- treatises, than sentiments, general im
sent to the mindat the same timethe pressions, and single flashing sparksof
share which the moral powers will have truth, which yield the seeds of know .
in it, if it would not be led to categorical ledge that are to fertilise the mind.
propositions, at one time too timid and
contracted, at another too dogmatical and We might
portant moralgophenomena
through the in most im
war, and
wide. Even the most matter of fact with all the care of a diligent professor
theories have, without knowing it, strayed try what we could impart about each,
over into this moral kingdom ; for, as an either good or bad. But as in such a
example, the effects of a victory cannot method one slides too much into the
in any way be explained without taking
intoconsideration impressions
the moral . common place and trite, whilst real
And therefore themostof the subjects mind
sis,theendis makes its escape
quickly thatonegets in analy
imperceptibly
which we shall go through in this book to the relation of things which everybody
are composed half of physical, half of
moral causes and effects, and we might knows. prefer,
here moreWethan therefore,
usually to remain
incomplete and
say the physical are almost no more than rhapsodical, content to have drawn at
the wooden handle , whilst the moral are tention to the importance of the subject
the noble metal, the real bright - polished ina general way ,and to have pointed
weapon .
The value of the moral powers , and out the spirit in which the views given
in this book have been conceived .

CHAPTER IV .

THE CHIEF MORAL POWERS .

THEY are The Talents of the Commander ;
The Military Virtue of the Army ;Its Na
tional feeling. Which of these is the most
important no one can tell in a general
way, for it is very difficult to say any
thing in general of their strength , and
still more difficult to compare the strength
of one with that of another. The best
plan is not to undervalue any of them, a
fault which human judgment is prone to
sometimes on one side, sometimes
on
another, in its whimsical oscillations. It
is better to satisfy ourselves of the un
deniable efficacy of these three things
by sufficient evidence from history .
It is true, however, that in modern
times the armies ofEuropean states have
got very much to a par as regards disci
pline and fitness for service, and that
the conduct of war has — as philoso
 CHAP. IV.] THE CHIEF MORAL POWERS. 93

phers would say — 80 naturally deve- soldier is left to himself. On this account,
loped itself, thereby become a method, a mountainous country is the best cam
common as it were to all armies, that paigning ground for a people in arms.
even from commanders there is nothing Expertness of an army through train
further to be expected in the way of ap- ing, and that well tempered courage
plication of special means of art, in the which holds the ranks together as if they
limited sense (such as Frederick the had been cast in a mould, show their su
Second's oblique order). Consequently periority in an open country.
it cannot be denied that, as matters now The talent of a general has most room
stand, there is so much the greater scopo to display itself in a closely intersected,
afforded for the influence of National undulating country. In mountains he
spirit and habituation of an army towar. has too little command over the separate
A long peace may alter again all this. parts, and the direction of all is beyond
Thenational spirit of an army(enthu- his powers ; in open plains it is simple
siasm, fanatical zeal, faith, opinion ,) dis- and does not exceed those powers.
plays itself most in mountain warfare, According to these undeniable elective
where every one down to the common affinities, plans should be regulated .

CHAPTER V.

MILITARY VIRTUE OF AN ARMY.

This is distinguished from mere bravery, capable of bearing arms, exercise this
andstill war . from enthusiasm forthe calling,
more
business of still it always continuesto
be), different and separate from the
The first is certainly a
necessary constituent part of it, but in the other pursuits which occupy the life of
man . To be imbued with a sense of the
same way as bravery , which is a natural
gift insome men, may arise inasoldier make
spirit use
andof,nature ofthisbusiness, to
to rouse, to assimilate into
as a part of an army from habit and cus
tom, 80 with him it must also have a the system the powers which should be
different direction from that which it has active in it, to penetrate completely
with others. It must lose that impulse to into the nature of the business with the
d
unbridle activity and exercise of force understanding
which is its characteristic in the indi confidence and, through exercise to gain
expertness. in it, to be
, andsubmit itself todemandsof completely givenuptoit,topassoutof
vidual
a higher kind, to obedience , order, rule the man into the part which it is assigned
,
and method . Enthusiasm for the pro to us to play in war, that is the military
fession gives life and greater fire tothe virtue of an army in the individual.
military virtue of an army, but does not However much pains may be taken to
necessarily constitute a part of it. combine the soldier and the citizen in
Warisa special business (and however one and the same individual, whatever
general its relations may be, and even may be done to nationalise wars, and
if all the male population of a country, however much we may imagine times
94 ON WAR . [ BOOK III. 21
have changed since the days of the old therefore, say that a successful war with
Condottieri, never will it be possible to out it cannot be imagined ; and we draw
do away with the individuality of the especial attention to that point, in order
business ; and if that cannot be done, then the more to individualise the conception
those who belong to it, as long as they whichis here brought forward, that the
generalisa
will alwayslook
belongasto ait,kind
selve
upon them-
of guild, in the regula- thatdissolve
and not
tion, may
idea it mayinto
nota be thought
tions, laws and customs of which the that military virtue is in the end every
spirits of war fix themselves by prefer- thing. It is not so. Military virtuein
ence . And so it is in fact. Even with the
most decided inclination to look at war an army is a definite moral power which
from the highest point of view, it would may
fluencebeofsupposed wanting, and be
theesti
in
which may therefore
be very wrong to look down upon this cor instrument
porate spirit ( esprit de corps) which may mated
which —may calculated . the power of
any
likebe
and should exist more or less in every .
army. This corporate spirit forms the Having
ceed thus characterised
to consider what can be it,predicated
we pro 21
bond of union between the natural forces
which are active in that which we have of gaining
of its influence, and what
its assistance. are the means
called military virtue. The crystals of Military virtue is for the parts, what
military virtue have a greater affinity for the genius of the commander is for the
whole. The general can only guide the
the spirit of a corporate body than for
anything else.
whole,
An army which preserves its usual he notguide
cannot each separate
the part,part,
thereandmilitary
where
formations under the heaviest fire, virtue must be its leader. A general is
which is never shaken by imaginary chosen by the reputationofhis superior
fears, and in the face of real danger dis- talents, the chief leaders of large masses
putes the ground inch by inch , which , after careful probation ; but this proba
proudin the feeling ofits victories, never tion diminishes as we descend the scale
losesand sense of obedienceleaders
its confidence , its respect
even
of rank, and in just the same measure
for in its ,
under the depressing effects of defeat; we
vidual whatless
but and
reckon; less
maytalents upon indi
is wanting in
anarmy with all its physicalpowers,in- this respectmilitary virtue should supply.
likethe muscles of an athlete ; anarmy The justthispart : ofa
play naturalqualities bravery , aptitude
warlike people
which looks upon all its toils as the powers of endurance and enthusiasm . ,
means to victory , not as a curse which
hovers over its standards, and which is These properties may therefore supply
always reminded of its duties and virtues the placeof military virtue, and vice versa,
by the short catechism of one idea, namely from which
duced : the following may be de
the honour of its arms ;-- Such an army is

.ަ”
‫މރ‬.ޫަ‫މހ‬
imbued with the true military spirit. 1. Military virtue is a quality of stand
ing armies only, but they require it the
ީ‫މ‬71
Soldiers may fight bravely like the
Vendéans, and do great things likethe place isIn supplied
most. national bynaturalqualities
risings and wars, its,
Swiss, the Americans, or Spaniards,
without displaying this military virtue. rapidly
which .develop themselves there more
A commander may also be successful at
the head of standingarmies,like Eugene ing2.Standing
armies ,cán armies
more easily
opposed to stand
and Marlborough , without enjoying the dispense with
benefit of its assistance ; we must not, it, than a standing army opposed to a
national insurrection, for in that case, the
OHAP , V.
v. ] MILITARY VIRTUE OF AN ARMY. 95

troops are more scattered, and the di- the highest pitch . Only by these, does
visions left more to themselves. But where the soldier learn to know his powers.
an army can be kept concentrated, the The more a general is in the habit of
genius of the general takes a greater demanding from his troops, the surer
place, and supplies what is wanting in he is, that his demands will be answered .
the spirit of the army. Therefore gene- The soldier is as proud of overcoming
rally military virtue becomes more neces- toil, as he is of surmounting danger.
sary the more the theatre
of operations Therefore it is only in the soil ofincessant
and other circumstances make the war activity and exertion that the germ will
complicat
scattered . ed, and
cause the forces to be thrive, but also only in the sunshine
From these truths thé only lesson to of victory. Once it becomes a strong tree,
it will stand against the fierceststorms
be derived is this, that if an army is of misfortune and defeat, and even
deficient thisquality, every endeavour
should bein made to simplify against the indolentinactivity of peace,
the opera at least for a time. It can therefore only
tions of the war as much as possible, or be created in war, and under great
tointroduce doubleefficiency
nisation of the army
in theorga- generals, but no doubt it may lastat
some other
in re least for several generations, even under
spect, and not to expect from the mere generals of moderate capacity, and
name standing army, what only the through considerable periods of peace.
veritaof athi
ble ng can give.
The military virtue of an army is there- of With this generous and noble spirit
union in a line of veteran troops,
fore, one of the most important moral covered with scars and thoroughly inured
powers in war , and where it is wanting to war, we must not compare the self
we either see its place supplied by one esteem and vanity of a standing army,
of the others, such as the great supe
held together merely by the glue of ser
riority of generalship, or popular en vice-regulations and å drill book ; a
thusiasm , or we find the results not com certain plodding earnestness and strict
mensuratewiththeexertionsmade. - How discipline may keep up military virtue
muchthat isgreat,this spirit,thissterling itfora longtime,but cannever create
; these things therefore have a cer
into the polished metal,has alreadydone, tain value,but mustnotbeover-rated.
we see in the history of the Macedonians Order, smartness, good will, also a certain
under Alexander,the Roman legions degree of prideand highfeeling, are qua
under theSpani
Cesar,Farnese
Alexander
shinfantryunder
, the Swedes under
lities of an armyformedin time of peace
which are to be prized , but cannot stand
Gustavus Adolphusand
the Prussians Charles
under Frederick XII.,,
the Great alone. The whole retains the whole,and
and the French under Buonaparte . as with glass too quickly cooled, a single
We crack breaks the whole mass. Above all,
must purposely shut our eyes against thehighest spiritin the world changes
the historical proof,ifwe do notadmit, onlytooeasily-atthe first check intode
that the astonishingsuccessesofthese pression, and one mightsay into a kind of
efnerals,andtheirgreatness in situations rhodomontadeof alarm ,the French sauve
ofwithextreme
armiesdifficulty
,wereonlypossible
possessing this virtue. que peut. Such an army can only achieve
something through its leader, never by
This spiritcanonlybegenerated from itself. It must beled with doublecaution,
two sources,and only by these two con
jointly : the first is a succession of wars until by degrees, in victory and hardships,
the strength grows into the full armour.
and great victories ; the other is, an Beware then of confusing
activity of thearmy carried sometimes to army with its temper. the spirit of an
96 ON WAR . [ BOOK II .

CITAPTER VI .

BOLDNESS.

The place and part which boldness takes Amongst large masses, boldness is a
in the dynamic system of powers, where force, the special cultivationof which can
it stands opposite to Foresight and pru. never be to the detriment of other forces,
dence, has been stated in the chapter on because the great mass is bound to a
the certainty of the result, in order thereby higher will by the frame-work and joints
to show , that theory has no right to of the order of battle and of the service,
restrict
er
it by virtue of its legislative power
and therefore is guided by an intelligent
which is extraneous. Boldness is
pow .
But this noble impulse, with which the therefore here only like a spring held
human soul raises itself above the most down until its action is required.
formidable dangers , is to be regarded as The higher the rank the more neces
an active principle peculiarly belonging to sary it is that boldness should be accom
war .
In fact, in what branch of human panied by a reflective mind, that it may
activity should boldness have a right of not be a mere blind outburst of passion
citizenship if not in war ? to no purpose ; for with increase of rank
From the train - driver and the drum- it becomes always less a matter of self
mer up to the general, it is the noblest sacrifice and more a matter of the preser
of virtues , the true steel which gives the vation of others, and the good of the
weap on its edge and brilliancy. whole. Where regulations of the service
Let us admit in fact it has in war even as a kind of second nature prescribe for
its own prerogatives. Over and above the masses , reflection must be the guide
the result of the calculation of space, ofthe general, and in his case individual
time, and quantity , we must allow a cer- boldness in action may easily become a
tain per-centage which boldness derives fault. Still, at the same time, it is a
from the weakness of others, whenever it fine failing, and must not be looked at
gains the mastery. It is therefore, vir- in the same light as any other. Happy
tually, a creative power. This is not the army in which an untimely boldness
difficult to demonstrate philosophically. frequently manifests itself ; it is an exu.
As often as boldness encounters hesita- berant growth whieh shows a rich soil.
tion, the probability of the result is of Even foolhardiness, that is boldness with
necessity in its favour, because the very
out an object, is not to be despised ; in
state of hesitation impliesaloss ofequi- point of fact it is the same energyof
librium already. Itis only when it feeling, only exercised as a kind of pas
encounters cautious foresight — which we sion without any co-operation of the in;
maysay is just as bold, at all events just telligent faculties. It is only when it
as strong and powerful as itself - that strikes at the root of obedience, when it
it is at a disadvantage ; such cases, how- treats with contempt the orders of supe,
ever, rarely occur. Out of the whole rior authority, that it must be repressed
multitude ofprudent men in the world, as a dangerous evil, not on its own ac
the great majority are so from timidity. count but on account of the act of disobe
 ' :

CHAP . VI. ] OF BOLDNESS IN WAR . 97

dience, for there is nothing in war which he is bold ; if he makes the same leap
is of greater importance than obedience. pursued by a troop of head -chopping
The reader will readily agree with us Janissaries he is only resolute. But the
that, supposing an equal degree of dis- farther off the necessity from the point
cernment to be forthcoming in a certain of action, the greater the numberof rela
number of cases, a thousand times as tions intervening which the mind has to
many of them will end in disaster through verse in order to realise them , by so
over - anxiety as through boldness. much the less does necessity take from
One would suppose it natural that the boldness in action. If Frederick the
interposit ion of a reasonab object Great, in the year 1756, saw that war
should stimulate boldness, andletherefore
lessen its intrinsic merit , and yet the was inevitable, and that he could only
reverse is the case in reality . escape destruction by being beforehand
The intervention of lucid thought or himwith his enemies, it became necessary for
to commence the war himself, but at
the general supremacy of mind deprives the same time itwas certainly verybold :
the emotional forces of agreat part of for fewmen in his position would have
their power. Onthat account boldness made up their minds to do so.
becomes of rarer occurrence the higher we
ascend the scale ofrank, for whether the dis Although strategy is only the province
cernment and the understanding do or of generals in chief or commanders in
do not increase with these ranksstill the the higher positions, still boldness in
commanders, in their several stations as all the other branches of an army is
as little a matter of indifference to it as
they rise, become pressed more and more their other military virtues. With an
severely by objective things, by relations army belonging to a bold race, and in
and claims fromwithout,"so that they which thespirit of boldness has been
becomethemore
the perplexed
degree of their individual lower.
theintelli always nourished , very different things
gence. This so far as regards war is may be undertaken than with one in
the chief foundation of the truth of the which this virtue is unknown ; for that
French proverb : reason we have considered it in connec
tion with an army. But our subject is
" Tel brille au second qui s'éclipse au premier.” specially the boldness of the general,
Almost all the generals who are repre and yet we have not much to say about
sented in history it after having described this military
tained to mediocrity merely
as, and having in
as wanting at- virtue in a general way to the best of
decision when in supreme command , are ourability
men celebrated in their antecedent career The higher we rise in a position of
for their boldness and decision . command, the more do the mind, under
In those motives to bold action which standing, and penetration predominate
arise from the pressure of necessity we which
in is a the
activity, of the feelings,
more therefore
property kept
is boldness,
must make a distinction. Necessity has
its degrees of intensity . If it liesnear at itin so
subjection, and for that reason we find
rarely in the highest positions, but
also then so much the more to be admired.
suit of his object drivenintogreat dan- Boldness, directed by an overruling in
es in order to escape othersequally telligence
great, ,then admire
onlyalso its value. , isthe stamp ofthe hero : this
lution whichwestill
canhas his resoIf boldnessagainst
directly does not consist of
the nature inthings,
venturing
in a
inyoung man toshow hisskill inhorse- downrightcontemptofthe laws ofpro
manship leapsacross a deep clift,then babilities, but,ifan Choice is once made,in
H1
98 ON WAR . [BOOK III
the rigorous adherence to that higher genius be on the wing, the higher will
calculation which genius, the tact of be its flight. The risks become always
judgment, has gone over in the speed greater, but the aim grows with them.
of lightning, and only half consciously. Whether its lines proceed out of and get
The more boldness lends wings to the their direction from a distant necessity,
mind and the discernment, so much the or whether they converge to the keystone
farther they will reach in their flight, so of a building which ambition has planned,
much the more comprehensive will be the whether Frederick or Alexander acts, is
view, the more exact the result, but cer- much the same as regards the critical
tainly always only in the sense that with view. If the one excites the imagina
greater objects greater dangers are con- tion more because it is bolder, the other
nected. The ordinary man, not to speak pleases the understanding most, because
of the weak and irresolute, arrives at an
exact result so far as such possible
it has in it more absolute necessity.
We have still to advert to one very
without ocular demonstration, at most important circumstance.
after diligent reflection in his chamber, The spirit of boldness can exist in an
at a distance from danger and responsi- army, either because it is in the people,
bility. Let danger and responsibility draw or because it has been generated in a
close round him in every direction , then successful war conducted by able gene
he loses the power of comprehensive rals. In such case it must of course be
vision, and if he retains this in any mea- dispensed with at the commencement.
sure by the influence of others, still he Now in our days there is hardly any
will lose his power of decision, because other means of educating the spirit of a
there no one can help him. people in this respect, except by war,and
We think then that it is impossible to that too under bold generals. By it alone
imagine a distinguished general without can that effeminacy of feeling be coun .
boldness, that is to say, that no man can teracted, that propensity to seek for the
become such whois not born with this enjoyment of comfort, which cause de
power of the soul, and we therefore look generacy in a people rising in prosperity
upon it as the first requisite for such a ca- and immersed in an extremely busy com
reer. How much of this inborn power, merce.
developed and moderated through educa- A nation can hope to have a strong
tionand thecircums
when the
tances of life, is left positionin the political world only if its
man has attained high posi. charact and
a er practice in actual war mu
tion, is the second question. The greater tually support each other in constant
this power still is, the stronger will reciprocal action .
 CHAP . VII 99
11. ]
, PERSEVERANCE .

CHAPTER VII.

PERSEVERANCE .

The reader expects to hear of angles and from ill will, true or falso sense of
lines, and finds, instead of thesecitizens duty, indolence or exhaustion , of acci
of the scientific world, only people out of dents which no mortal could have for
common life, such as he meets with every seen . In short, he is the victim of a
day in the street. And yet the author hundred thousand impressions, of which
cannotmake up his mind to become a the most have an intimidating, the fewest
hair's breadth more mathematical than an encouraging tendency. By long ex
the subject seemsto him to require, and perience in war, the tact is acquired of
he
the isnot may showat. the surprisewhich readilyappreciating the value of these
reader alarmed
incidents ; high courage and stability
In war more than anywhere else in of character stand proof against them ,
differently
the world things happen to as the rock resists the beating of the
what we had expected, and look diffe waves . Hewould
who would
rently when near, to what they did at a impressions never yield
carrytooutthese
an
distance. With what serenity the archi-
tect can watch his work graduallyrising
undertaking, and on that accountper
and growing into his plan . The doctor, severance
as there inis the proposed reason
no decided object, as long
against
although much more atthe mercy of it, is a most necessary counterpoise
mysterious agencies and chances than Further, there is hardlyany celebrated.
the architect,
forms stillknows
and effects enough
of his means . of the enterprise in war which was not achieved
In war, by endless exertion , pains, and priva
on the other hand, the commander of an tions ; and as here the weakness of the
immense whole finds himself in a con
physical and moral man is ever dis
stant whirlpool of falseandtrueinfornia- posed to yield, therefore only an immense
tion, of mistakescommitted through fear, force of will which manifests itselfin
through of his precipita-
negligence, through
tion, of contraventions authority, perseverance, admired by presentand
either from mistaken or correct motives , future generations, can conduct us to the
aim .
100 ON WAR [ BOOK III.

CHAPTER VIII .

SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS.

This is in tactics, as well as in strategy, which influences in a different manner

the most general principle of victory, and the result of the combat as well as its
shall be examined by us first in its gene consequences . Therefore we shall only
rality, for which we may be permitted get acquainted with this also by degrees,
the following exposition : that is, through the subjects which de
Strategy fixes the point where, the termine more closely the application.
time when, and the numerical force with If we strip the combat of all modifica
which the battle is to be fought. By this tions which it may undergo according to
triple determination it has therefore a its immediate purpose and the circum .
stances from which it proceeds, lastly if
very essential influence on the issue of the
combat . If tactics has fought the battle, we set aside the valour of the troops,
because that is a given quantity, then
if the result is over, let it be victory or
defeat, strategy makes such use of it as there remains only the bare conception
can be madein accordance with the great of the combat,thắt is a combat without
object of the war. This object of the form , in which we distinguish nothing
war is naturally often a very distant one, but the number of the combatants.
seldom does it lie quite close at hand. A This number will therefore determine
series of other objects subordinate them . victory. Now from the number of things
selves to it as means .
which are at the same time These
means to a above deducted to get
objects, to this point, it is
shown that the superiority in numbers
higher object, may be practically of vari- ina battle is only one of the factors
ous kinds;eventhe ultimate aim of the employed to produce victory; that there
whole war is a different one in every war. fore so far from having with the supe
We shall make ourselves acquainted with riority in number obtained all, or even
these things according as we become only the principal thing, we have perhaps
got very little by it, according as the
acquainted with the separate objects circumstances other
which they come in contact with; and it which co- operate happen
is not our intention here to embrace the to be so, or so.
whole subject by a complete enumeration But this superiority has degrees, it
of them , even ifthatwere possible.We it may be imagined, twofold , threefold
therefore let the employment of the
battle stand over for the present. or four times as many, etc., etư., and every
Even those things through which stra one sees, that by increasing in this way,
tegy has an influence on the issue of the itelse.must (at last) overpower everything
combat, inasmuch as it establishes the In such an aspect we grant, that the
same, to a certain extent decrees them , superiority in numbers is the most im
are not so simple that they can be em- portant factor in the result of a combat,
braced in onesingleview . For as strategy only itmust be sufficiently great tobea
appoints time, place and force, it cando counterpoise to all the other co-operating
so in practice in many ways, each of circumstances . The direct result of this
CHAP. VIII .] SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS. 101

is, that the greatest possible number of cases, in small as well as great combats,
troops should be brought into action at an important superiority of numbers, but
decisive
the point . which need not be over two to one, will
Whether the troops thus brought are be sufficient to ensure the victory, how
sufficient or not, we have then done in ever disadvantageous other circumstances
this respect all that our means allowed. may be. Certainly, we may imagine a
This is the first principle in strategy, defile which even tenfold would not suf
therefore in general as now stated, it is fice to force, but in such a case it can be
justaswellsuited for Greeks and Persians, no question of a battle at all.
or for Englishmen and Mahrattas, as for We think therefore, that exactly in
French and Germans. But we shall take our relations, as well as in all similar
a glance at our relations in Europe, as ones, the superiority at the decisive point
respects war, in order to arrive at some is a matter of capital importance, and
more definite idea on this subject. that this subject, in the generality of
Here we find armies much more like one cases, is decidedly the most important of
anotherin equipment, organisation, and all. The strength at the decisive point
There only depends on the absolute strength of the
of every kind .difference
practical skill alternately
remains still a in army, and on skill in making use of it.
the military virtue of armies, and in the The first rule is therefore to enter the
talent of generals. If we go through the field with an army as strong as possible.
military history of modern Europe , we This sounds very like a common place,
find no example of a Marathon . but still is really not so.
Frederick the Great beat 80,000 In order to show that for a long time
Austrians at Leuthen with about 30,000 the strength of forces was by no means
men, and at Rosbach with 25,000 some regarded as a chief point, we need only
50,000 allies; these are however the observe , that in most,and even in the
onlyinstances of victories gained against most detailed historiesof thewars,in
an enemy double, or more than double the eighteenth century, the strength of
in numbers. Charles XII. , in the battle the armies is either not given at all,
of Narva, we cannot well quote, the or only incidentally, and in no case is
Russians were at that time hardly to be any special value laid upon it. Tem
regardedas Europeans , also the prin- pelhofinhis history ofthe Seven Years'
cipal circumstances even of the battle, War is the earliest writer who gives
ira but too little known. Buonaparte it regularly, butat thesametime he
had at Dresden 120,000 against 220,000,
therefore not the double . does it only verysuperficially:
Even Massenbach, in his manifold
Frederick theGreatdid not succeed,with critical observations on the Prussian
30,000 against
Buonaparte
50,000Austrians,neither campaigns of 1793-94 in the Tosges, talks
in the desperate battle of a great deal about hills and valleys,
Leipsic , where he was 160,000 strong, roads and footpaths, but does not say a
against 280,000, the superiority therefore syllable about mutual strength .
considerably less than double. Another proof lies in a wonderful
From this we may infer, that it is very notion which haunted the heads of many
difficult in the present state of Europe, critical historians, according to which
for the most talented general to gain a there was a certain size of an army
victoryover an enemy double his sstrength. which was the best, a normal strength,
Now if we see double number , such a beyond which the forces in excess were
weight in the scale against the greatest burdensome rather then serviceable . *
generals,we may be sure, that in ordinary * Tempelhof and Montalembert are the first wo
102 ON VAR . [ BOOK III
Lastly, there are a number of instances although it lies universally at the founda
to be found, in which all the available tion of strategy, and is to a certain extent
forces were not really brought into the its daily bread, is still neither the most
battle, or into the war, because the difficult, nor the most decisive one.
superiority of numbers was not considered If we take an unprejudiced glance at
to have that importance which in the instances
military history, we shall find that the
in which mistakes in such a cal
nature of things belongs to it.
If we are thoroughly penetrated with culation have proved the cause of serious
the conviction that with a considerable losses are very rare , at least in strategy.
superiority of numbers everything pos- But if the conception of a skilful com
sible is to be effected , then it cannot fail bination of time and space is fully to
that this clear conviction reacts on the account for every instance of a resolute
preparations for the war, so as to make us and active commander beating several
appear in the fieldwith as many troops separate opponents with one and Buo the
as possible, and either to give us our- same army ( Frederick the Great,
selves the superiority, or at least to guard naparte), then we perplex ourselves un
For the sakewith
againsttheenemy obtaining it. So much necessarily
for what concerns the absolute force with
conventional
of clearness language.
and the profit
which the war is to be conducted . able use of conceptions, it is necessary
The measure of this absolute force is that things should always be called by
determined by the government; and their right names.
although with this determination the real The right appreciation of their oppo
action of war commences, and it forms nents (Daun, Schwartzenburg ), the au
an essential part of the strategy of the dacity to leave fora short space of time
war, still in most cases the general a small force only before them , energy in
who is to command these forces in the forced marches, boldness in sudden at
war must regard their absolute strength tacks, the intensified activity which great
as a given quantity, whether it be that souls acquire in the moment of danger,
he has had no voice in fixing it, or that these are the grounds of such victories;
circumstances prevented a sufficient ex- and what have these to do with the
pansion beinggiven to it. ability to make an exact calculation of
Thereremains nothing, therefore ,where two such simple things as time and
an absolute superiority is not attainable, space ?
but to produce a relative one at the ricochetting play of
decisive point, by making skilful use of forces,
what we have.
whenthis
But even the victories at Rosbach
The calculation of space and time ap- and Montmirail give the Montereau,"
tories at Leuthen and
impulse to vic
to
pears as the most essential thing to thiswhich great generals on the defensive
end, and this has caused that subject to
be regarded as one which embraces nearly have often trusted, is still, if we would be
the whole art of using military forces. clear and exact, only a rare occurrence
in history.
Indeed , some have gone so far as to ascribe
to great strategists and tacticians a mental Much more frequently the relative su
organ peculiarly adapted to this point. periority — that is,the skilful assemblage
But the calculation of time and space , of superior forces at the decisive point
has its foundation in the right apprecia
recollect as examples — the first in a passage of his tion of those points, in the judicious
first part, page 148 ; the other in his correspondence direction which by that means has been
relative to the plan of operations of the Russians in given to the forces fromthe very first, and
1759 .
in the resolution required to sacrifice the
CHAP. IX.] THE SURPRISE . 103

unimportant to the advantage of the im- necessary condition of victory,would be a

portant — that is, to keep the forces con- complete misconception of our exposition ;
centrated in an overpowering mass . In in the conclusion to be drawn from it
this, Frederick theGreat and Buonaparte there lies much rather nothing more
than the value which should attach to
are particularly characteristic.
We think we have now allotted to the numerical strength in the combat. If
superiority in numbers the importance that strength is made as great as possible,
which belongs to it; it is to be regarded then the maxim is satisfied; a review of
as the fundamental idea, always to be the total relations must then decide whe
aimed
But atto beforeallandas
regard it on thisfaraccount
as possible. combat is to be avoided
ther or notof the
as a for want sufficient force.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SURPRISE .

From the subject of the foregoing chap- and which in the tactical defence parti
ter, the general endeavour to attain a ly cular is a great chief point.
We say , surprise lies at the foundation
relativvour
endeaas gener
whichmust quently er
e superiority, there follows anoth
conse be ofonlyallinunde rtakings out tion
just al in its natur e :thisis the verydifferentwith
degrees excep
according,
surprise of the enemy . It lies more or to the nature of the undertaking and other
less at the foundation of all undertakings, circumstances.
This difference, indeed, commences in
for without itthe preponderance at the
decisive point is not properly conceivable. the properties or peculiarities of the
army and its commander, in those even
The surprise is, therefore, the medium
the government.
to numerical superiority; but it is besides of Secre
ded asnta substantivle cy and rapidity are the two fac
that
princialso
ple to be regar
in itself, on accou ofits mora tors of this product; and these suppose in
effect . When it is successful in a high the government and the commander -in
degree, confusion and broken courage in chiefy great energye, andontary the part of the
the enemy's ranks are the consequences ; arm a high sens of mili duty. With
andofthe degree towhich these multiply effeminacy andlooseprinciplesit isin
a success,there are examples enough, vain to calc ulate upon a surprise. But
great and small. We are not, on this so general, indeed so indispensable, as is
account, speaking now of theparticular this endeavour, and trueasitve is that it
surprise which belongs to the attack,but is neverwholly unproducti of effect,
oftheende
and avourby
especiall measudistribu
y by the tionlly,to
resgenera stillitis not the
succeeds toa remarka ble degree, itseldom
lesstruethat and that
the thing. We
the nature of ous
forces, to surprise the enemy, which can this is in errone idea if we
be imaginedjust aswell in the defensive , should form an
104 ON WAR . [ BOOK III.
believed that by this means chiefly there we may justly conclude that inhe
is much to be attained in war . In idea rent difficulties lie in the way of their
it promises a great deal; in the execution success .
it generally sticks fast by the friction of Certainly, whoever would consult his
the whole machine.
tory such steeds
sundryon battle must
points of not depend on
critics,
In tactics the surprise is much more at historical
home, for the very natural reason that on their wise dicta and self complacent
all times and spaces are on a smaller terminology, but look at facts with his
scale. It will, therefore , in strategy be own eyes. There is, for instance, a cer
the more feasible in proportion as the tain day in the campaign in Silesia, 1761,
measures lie nearer to the province of which, in this respect, has attained a
tactics, and more difficult the higher up kind of notoriety. It is the 22nd July,
they lie towards the province of policy. on which Frederick the Great gained on
The preparations for a war usually Laudon the march to Nossen, near Neisse,
occupy several months; the assembly of by which, as is said , the junctionof the
an army at its principal positions requires Austrian and Russian armies in Upper
generally the formation of depots and Silesia became impossible, and, therefore,
magazines, and long marches, the object a period of four weeks was gained by the
of which can be guessed soon enough. King. Whoever reads over this occur
It therefore rarely happens that one rence carefully in the principal histories, *
State surprises another by a war, or by and considers it impartially, will
the direction which it gives the mass of march of the 22nd July, never find , inthe
this
its forces. In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries , when war turned importance ; and generally
of the fashionable logic oninthis
thesubject,
whole
very much upon sieges,it was a frequent he will see nothing but contradictions ;but
aim , and quite a peculiar and important in the proceedings of Laudon, in this re
chapter in the art of war , to invest a nowned period of manœuvres, much that
strong place unexpectedly, and even that is unaccountable. How could one, with
only rarely succeeded. thirstsuch
aaccept truth and
for historical clear conviction ,
On the other hand, with things which evidence ?
can be done in a day or two, a surprise When
is much more conceivable, and, therefore, we promise ourselves great
also it is often not difficult then to gain effects in a campaign
of surprising , we from the principle
a march upon the enemy , and thereby a think upon great
position, a point of country, a road, etc. activity, rapid resolutions, and forced
But it is evident that what surprise gains marches, as the means of producing
in this way in easy execution , it loses in them ; but that these things, even when
the efficacy, as the greater the efficacy the forthcoming in a very high degree, will
greater always the difficulty of execu not always produce the desired effect,
tion . Whoever thinks that with such sur we see in examples given by two
prises on a small scale, he may connect generals, who may be allowed to have
great results — as,for example, the gain of had the greatest talent in the use of
these means, Frederick the Great and
a battle, the capture of an important ma
gazine - believes in something which it is Buonaparte. The first when he left
certainly very possible to imagine, but Dresden so suddenly in July, 1760, and
which there is no warrant for in history ; falling upon Lascy, then turned against
for there are upon the whole very few
instances where anything great has * Tempelhof, The Veteran, Frederick the Great.
resulted from such surprises; from which Compare also (Clausewitz) “ Hinterlassene Werke, "
Bd. X. , S. 158.
 CHAP. IX.] THE SURPRISE . 105

Dresden, gained nothing

that intermezzo, by theplaced
but rather wholehis
of just
duringbefore
the night a position
taken up. which he had
Laudon was
affairs in a condition notably worse , through this completely surprised, and
as Glatz fell in the mean time.
lost 70 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men.
In 1813,
from DresdenBuonaparte turned
twice against suddenly
Blücher, to
AlthoughFrederick the Great had at
this time adopted the principle of moving
say nothing of his incursion into Bohemia backwards and forwards in order to make
from Upper Lusatia, and both times a battle impossible, or at least to dis
withoutintheleastmeasureattaining
his concert
object They were blows in the air tion the enemy's plans, still the altera
of position on the night of the 14
which only cost him time and force, and 15 was not made exactly with that inten
might have placed him in a dangerous tion, but as the King himself says,
position in Dresden . because the position of the 14th did not
Therefore, evenin this field, a surprise .
does not necessarily meet with great suc pleasehim Here,therefore, alsochance
was hard at work ; without this happy
cess through the mere activity, energy, conjunction of the attack and the change
and resolution of the commander ; it must of position in the night, and the difficult
be favoured by other circumstances. But nature of the country, the result would
we by no means deny that there can be not have been the same.
success; weonly connectwith it a necessity Also in the higher and highest province
of favourable circumstances, which , cer of Strategy there are some instances of
tainly, donot occur very frequently,and surprisesfruitfulin results . We shall
whichthe
about himscommander
elf. can seldom bring great
only cite thebrilliantmarches of the
elector against the Swedes from
Just those two generals afford each a Franconia to Pomerania, and from the
striking illustration of this . We take Mark (Brandenburg) to the Pregel in
firstBuonaparteinhisfamous enterprise 1757, andthecelebratedpassage of the
against Blucher's army in 1814 ,when it Alps by Buonaparte,1800. In the latter
was separated from the Grand Army, and case an army gave up its whole theatre
descending the Marne . It would not be of war by a capitulation, and in 1757
a two days’march
easy to find productive
theenemy to surprise
of greater another
results its army was very near giving up
theatre of war and itself as well .
than this ; Blücher's army, extended over Lastly, as an instance of a war wholly
a distance of three days march, was unexpected, we may bring forward the
beaten in detail , and suffered a loss invasion of Silesia by Frederick the
nearly equal to that of defeat in a great
. This wascompletely theeffectof results everywhere, butsuchevents are
battle
a surprise, for if Blücher had thought of not common in history if we do not
such a near, possibility of an attack from confuse with them cases in which a state,
Buonaparte he would have organised his for want of activity and energy (Saxony
march quite differently . To this mistake 1756, and Russia , 1812 ), has not com
of Blücher'
Buo pleted its preparations.
s the result is to be attributed.
naparte did not know all these Now there still remains an observation
circumstances,
of good fortuneandso therewas
that mixed itselfa up
piecein Awhich
surprconcerns
ise can the essence
only of the
be effect ed bything:
that
his favour.
party which gives the law to the other ;
It is the same with the battle of and he, who is in the right gives the law.
Liegnitz,1760. Frederick the Great Ifwesurprisethe adversary by a wrong
gainedthisfine victory through altering measure,then insteadofreaping good
106 ON WAR . [ BOOK III.

results, we may have to bear a sound the worst case into a good one for the
blow in return ; inany case the adversary
need not trouble himself much about our side they favour, and do not allow the
other to make any regular determination .
surprise, he has in our mistake the We have here in view more than any
means of turning off the evil. As the where else not only the chief com
offensive includes in itself much more mander, but each single one, because a
positive action than the defensive, so the surprise has the effect in particular of
surprise is certainly morein its place greatly loosening unity,so that the
with the assailant, but by no means individuality of each separate leader
invariably, as we shall hereafter see. easily comes to light.
Mutual surprises by the offensive and Much depends here on the general
defensive may therefore meet, and then relation inwhich the two parties stand
that one will have the advantage who to each other. If the one side through a
has hit the nail on the head the best.
general moral superiority can intimidate
So should it be, but practical life does and outdo the other, then he can make
not keep to this line so exactly , and that use of the surprise with more success,
for a very simple reason. The moral effects and even reap good fruit where properly
which attend a surprise often convert he should come to ruin .

CHAPTER X.

STRATAGEM .

STRATAGEM implies a concealed intention, stratagem is a sleight of hand with

and therefor straight
e is opposed to for- actions.
ward dealing , in the same way as wit is At first sight it appears as if strategy
the opposite of direct proof.It has there- had not improperly derived its name
forenothing in common with means of from stratagem ; andthat, with all the
persuasion,of self- interest, of force, but a the
great deal to do with deceit, because that real and
whole apparent
character war has which
of changes undergone
likewise conceals its object. It is itself since the time of the Greeks, this term
a deceit as well when it is done, but still points to its real nature.
still it differs from what is commonly If we leave to tactics the actual
called deceit, in this respect that there is
no direct breach of word . The deceiver delivery of the blow, the battle itself, and
by stratagem leaves it to the person him look upon strategy as theart ofusing
self whom he is deceiving to commit the this means with skill, then besides the
errors of understanding which at last, forces of the
ambition whichcharacter,
always such as burning
presses like a
flowing into one result, suddenly change
the nature of things in his eyes. We spring, a strong will which hardly bends ve
may therefore say, as wit is a sleight of etc. , etc., there seems no subjecti
hand with ideas and conceptions, so quality so suited to guide and inspire
strategic activity as stratagem . The
CHAP. X.] STRATAGEM . 107

generaltendency to surprise, treated of few demonstrations, so-called,in strategy,

in the foregoing chapter , points to this effect the object for which they are de
conclusion, for there is a degree of stra- signed. Infact, it is dangerous to de
tagem , be it ever so small, which lies at tach large forces for any length of time
the foundation of every attempt to sur merely for a trick , because there is always
prise. the risk of its being done in vain, and
But however much we feel a desire to then these forces are wanted at the deci.
see the actors in war outdo each other sive point.
in hidden activity, readiness, and stra- The chief actor in war is always tho
tagem , still we must admit that these roughly sensible ofthis sober truth, and
qualities show themselves but little in therefore he has no desire to play at
history, and have rarely been able to tricks of agility. The bitter earnest
work their way to the surface from ness of necessity presses so fully into
amongst the mass of relations and cir- direct action that there is no room for
cumstances. that game. In a word, the pieces on the
The explanation of this is obvious, strategical chess-board want that mobi
and it isofalmost
matter identical withthesubject litywhichisthe element of stratagem
the preceding chapter. and subtilty.
Strategy knows no other activity than The conclusion which we draw , is that
the regulating of combat with the mea a correct and penetrating eye is a more
sures which relate to it. It has no con necessary and more useful quality for a
cern, like ordinary life ,with transactions general than craftiness, although that
which consist merely of words — that is, also does no harm if it does not exist at
in expressions, declarations, etc. But the expense of necessary qualities of
these , which are very inexpensive, are the heart, which is only too often the case.
chiefly the means with which the wily But the weaker the forces become
onetakes in those he practises upon . which are under the command of stra
That which there is like it in war , tegy, so much the more they become
plans and orders given merely as make adapted for stratagem , so that to the
believes, falsereports senton purpose to quitefeeble and little, forwhom nopru
the enemy — is usually of solittleeffect dence,nosagacity isanylongersufficient
in the strategic field that it is only re at the point whereemall art seems to for
sorted to in particular cases which offer sake him , stratag offers itself as a last
of themselves, therefore cannot be re resource . The more helpless his situa
garde d as spontaneous action which ema tion, the more everything presses to
nates from
the leader
. wards one single, desperate blow, the
But such measures as carrying out more readily stratagem comes to the aid
the arrangements for a battle, so far as of his boldness . Let loose from all fur.
to impose upon the enemy, require a ther calculations, freed from all concern
considerable expenditure of time and for the future, boldness and stratagem
power ; of course, the greater the im intensify each other, and thus collect at
pression to be made, the greater the ex one point an infinitesimal glimmering
penditure in these respects . And as this of hope into a single ray, which may
likewise serve to kindle a flame.
is usually not given for the purpose , very
108 ON WAR . [BOOK III.

CHAPTER XI .

ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN SPACE .

The best strategy is always to be very but that these are different according to
strong, first generally, then at the deci the means and end.
sive point. Therefore, apart from the It seems incredible, and yet it has
energy which creates the army, a work happened a hundred times, that troops
which is not always done by the general, have been divided and separated merely
there is no more imperative andsimpler through a mysterious feeling of conven
law for strategy than to keep theforces con tionalmanner, without any clear percep
centrated . — No portion is to be separated tion of the reason .
from the main body unless called away If the concentration of the whole force
by some urgent necessity . On this is acknowledged as the norm , and
maxim we stand firm , and look upon it every division and separation as an ex
as a guide to be depended upon. What ception which must be justified, then
are the reasonable grounds on which a etelys
not only will that folly be complneou
detachment of forces may be made we avoided , but also many an erro
shall learn by degrees. Then we shall ground for separating troops will be
also see that thisprinciple cannot have barred admission .
the same general effects in every war,

CHAPTER XII .

ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME.

We have hereto deal with a conception makes the simultaneous application of all
which in real life diffuses many kinds of forces intended for the shock appear as a
illusory light, a clear definition and deve- primordial law of war .
lopment ofthe idea is therefore necessary,
so far as
So it is in reality, but only reality
and we hope to be allowed a short the struggle resembles also in a
analysis. shock, but when it consists in
War'is the shock of two opposing mechanical
forcesinthecollision with eachother aforces
lasting mutual action of destructive
from which it follows as a matter of course
, certainly imagine
, then we can a
that the stronger not only destroys the successive action of forces. This is the
case in tactics, principally because fire
other , but carries it forward with it in its
movement. This fundamentally admits arms form
also for thereasons
other basis as
of well.
all tactics,
If in but
fire
of no successive action of powers , but combat 1000 men are opposed to 500,
CHAP . XII .] ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME. 109

then the gross loss is calculated from the employment of too many forces in com
amount of the enemy's force and our bat may be disadvantageous ; for what
own ; 1,000 fire twice as many shots as ever advantages the superiority may even
500, but more shots will take effect on the give in the first moment, we may have to
1,000 than on the 500 because it is assumed pay dearly for in the next .
that they stand in closer order than the But this danger only lasts as long as
other. If we were to suppose the num the disorder, the state of confusion and
ber of hits to be double , then the losses weakness lasts, in a word, up to the crisis
on each side would be equal. From the which every combat brings with it even
500 there would be for example 200 dis for the conqueror. Within the duration
abled , and out of the body of 1,000 like- of this relaxed state of exhaustion, the
wise the same ; now if the 500 had kept appearance of a proportionate number of
another body of equal number quite out fresh troops is decisive.
of fire, then both sides would have 800 But when this disordering effect of
effective men ; but of these , on the one victory stops, and therefore only the
side there would be 500 men quite fresh, moral superiority remains which every
fully supplied with ammunition , and in victory gives, then it is no longer possible
their full vigour ; on the other side only for fresh troops to restore the combat,
800 all alike shaken in their order , in they would only be carried along in the
want of sufficient ammunition and weak general movement ; a beaten army can
ened in physical force . The assumption not be brought back to victory a day
that the 1,000 men merely on account of after by means of a strong reserve.
their greater number would lose twice as Here we find ourselves at the source of
many as 500 would have lost in their a highly material difference between tac
place, is certainly not correct ; therefore tics and strategy .
the greater loss which that side suffers The tactical results, the results within
which has placed the half of its force in the four corners of the battle, and before
reserve, must be regarded as a disadvan its close, lie for the most part within the
tage in that original formation ; further limits of that period of disorder and
itmustbe admitted , that in the generality weakness. But the strategic result, that
of cases the 1,000 men would have the is to say, the result of the total combat,
advantage at the first commencement of of the victories realised , let them be
being able to drive their opponent out small or great, lies completely (beyond)
of his position andforce him to a retro outside of that period. It is only when
grademovement ; now , whether these two the results of partial combats have bound
advantages are a counterpoise to the dis themselves together into an independent
advantage of finding ourselves with 800 whole, that the strategic result appears,
men to a certain extent disorganised by but then, the state of crisis is over, the
the combat,opposed to an enemy who is forces have resumed their original form ,
not materially weaker in numbers and and are now only weakened tothe extent
who has 500 quite fresh troops , is one of those actually destroyed (placed hors de
that cannot be decided by pursuing an
analysis further, we must here rely upon combat) .
The consequence of this difference is
experience, and there will scarcely be an that tactics can make a continued use of
officer experienced in Warwhowill not forces, strategy only a simultaneous one.
in the generality of cases assign the ad If I cannot,in tactics, decide all by the
vantage to that side which has the fresh first success, if I have to fear the next
troops. moment, it follows of itself that I employ
In this way it becomes evident how the only so much of my force for the success
110 ON WAR . [BOOK III. 1

of the first moment as appears sufficient kept in view , and the results of their influ
for that object, and keep the rest beyond ence brought into the consideration also.
the reach of fire or conflict of any kind, Fatigue, exertion, and privation consti
in order to be able to oppose fresh troops tute inwar a special principle of destruc
to fresh, or with such to overcome those tion, not essentially belonging to contest,
that are exhausted . But it is not so in but more or less inseparably bound up
strategy. Partly, as we have just shown, with it, and certainly onewhich especially
it hasnot so much reason to fear a reac- belongs to strategy. They no doubt
tion after a success realised, because withexist in tactics as well, and perhaps there
that success the crisis stops ; partly all in thehighest degree ; but as the duration
the forces strategically employed are not of the tactical acts is shorter, therefore
necessarily weakened . Only so much of the small effects of exertion and privation
them as has been tactically in conflict on them can come but little into consi.
with the enemy's force, thatis, engaged deration . But in strategy on the other
in partial combat, is weakened by it ; hand, where time and space are on a
consequently, only so much as was un- larger scale, their influence is not only
avoidably necessary, but by no means always very considerable, but often quite
all which was strategically in conflict decisive. It is not at all uncommon for
with the enemy, unless tactics has a victorious army to lose many more by
expended unnecessarily. Corps which, sickness than on the field of battle.
on account of the general superiority in If, therefore, we look at this sphere of
numbers, have either been little or not destruction in strategyin the same manner
at all engaged, whose presence alone has as we have considered that of fire and
assisted in the result, are after the deci. close combat in tactics, then we may well
sion the same as they were before, and imagine that everything which comes
for new enterprises as efficient as if they within its vortex will, at the end of the
had been entirely inactive. How greatly campaign or of any other strategic
such corps which thus constitute our period, be reduced to a state of weak
excess may contribute to the total suc- ness, which makes the arrival of a
cess is evident in itself ; indeed, it is not fresh force decisive. We might there
difficult to see how they may even dimi. fore conclude that there is a motive in
nish considerably the loss of the forces the one case as well as the other to strive
engaged intactical conflict on our side. for the first success with as few forces as
If, therefore,in strategy the loss does possible ,in orderto keep up this fresh
not increase with the number of the force for the last .
troops employed , but is often diminished In order to estimate exactly this con
by it, and if, as a natural consequence, clusion, which, in many cases in practice,
the decision in our favour is, by that will have a great appearance of truth,
means, the more certain, then it follows we must direct our attention to the sepa
naturally that in strategy we can never rate ideas which it contains. In the first
employ too many forces,and consequently place,
we mustnotconfusethe notion of
also that they must be applied simul- reinforcement with that of fresh unused
taneously immediate purpose.
to the troops. There are few campaigns at the
But wemust vindicate this proposition endof which a new increase of forceis
upon another ground . We have hitherto not earnestly desired by the conqueror
only spoken of the combat itself ; it is as well as the conquered, and indeed
the realactivity in war, but men ,time,and should appear decisive ; but that is not
space, which appear as the elements of the pointhere, for that increase of force
this activity, must, at the same time, be could not be necessary if the force had
CHAP . XII.] ASSEMBLY OF FORCES IN TIME. 111

been that much larger atthe first. But camps. Both these wants will no doubt
it would be contrary to all experience to be greater in proportion as the number
suppose that an army coming fresh into of men on onespot is greater. But does
the field is to be esteemed higher in point not the superiority in force just afford
of moral value than an army already in also the best means of spreading out and
the field , just as a tactical reserve is more finding more room, and therefore more
to be esteemed than a body of troops means of subsistence and shelter ?
which has been already severely handled If Buonaparte, in his invasion of Russia
in the fight. Just as much as an unfortu- in 1812, concentrated his army in great
nate campaign lowers the courage and masses upon one single road in a manner
moral powers of an army, a successful one never heard of before, and thus caused
raises these elements in their value. In privations equally unparalleled, we must
the generality of cases, therefore, these ascribe it to his maxim that it is impossible
influences are compensated, and then to be too strong at the decisive point. Whe
there remains over and above as clear ther in this instance he did not strain the
gain the habituation to war. Weshould principle too far is a question which
besides look more here to successful than would be out of place here ; but it is cer
to unsuccessful campaigns, because when tain that, if he had made a point of avoid
the greaterprobability ofthelatter may be
seen beforehand, without doubt forces are
ingthedistress which was by thatmeans
brought about, he had only to advance
wanted, and, therefore, the reserving a por on a greater breadth of front. Room was
tion for future use is out of the question. not wanted for the purpose in Russia,
This point being settled, then the and in very few cases can it be wanted.
question is, Do thelosses which a force Therefore, from this no ground can be
sustains
increase inthrough fatigues
proportion and privations
to thesize of the
deducedto prove
employmentof that the simultaneous
very superior forces must
force,asisthe
that we answer case
" No.ina
" combat ? And to produce greater weakening. But now,
supposing that in spite of the general
The fatigues ofwar result in a great
measure from the dangers with which
relief afforded by setting aparta portion
of the army, wind and weather and the
every moment of the act of war is more toils of war had produced a diminution
orless impregnated. To encounter these even on the part which as a spare force
dangers atallpoints, to proceed onwards had beenreserved for later use, still we
with security in the execution of one's must take a comprehensive general view
plans, that gives employment to a mul of the whole, and therefore ask,Will this
titude of agencies which make up the diminution of force suffice to counter
tactical and strategic service of the army. balance the gain in forces, which we,
Thisserviceismore difficulttheweaker through our superiority innumbers, may
an army is, and easier as its numerical be able to make in more ways than one ?
superiority over that of the enemy in
creases . But there still remains a most impor
Who can doubt this ? A cam tant point to be noticed. In a partial
paign against a much weaker enemy will combat, the force required to obtain a
one strong orrstronger
just ascostsmalle
therefore thanagainst
efforts . greatresult, which has beenproposed,
can be approximately estimated without
So much for the fatigues. It is some much difficulty, and, consequently, we can
whatdifferent withtheprivations
consistchieflyof two things,
food, and the want the wantof strategy ideaof
; they forman
of shelter for the because
becsaidissuperfluous.In
thismaywhat to be impossible,
the strategi result has no such
troops, either in quarters or in suitable well -defined object and no such circum
112 ON WAR . [BOOK III.
scribed limits as the tactical. Thus what a material degree. The destructive effects
can be looked upon in tactics as an excess which are also produced upon the forces
of power, must be regarded in strategy as in strategy by time, are partly diminished
a means to give expansion to success, if through their mass, partly made good
opportunity offers for it ; with the magni- in other ways, and, therefore, in strategy
tude of the success the gain in force itcannot be an object to make time an
increases at the same time , and in this ally on its own account by bringing troops
way the superiority of numbers may soon successively into action .
reach a point which the most careful We say on “ its own account,” for the
economy of forces could never have influence which time, on account of other
attained . circumstances which it brings about but
By means of his enormous numerical which are different from itself can have,
superiority , Buonaparte was enabled to indeed must necessarily have for one of
reach Moscow in 1812 , and to take that the two parties, is quite another thing, is
central capital . Had he by means of anything but indifferent or unimportant,
and will be the subject of consideration
just this superiority succeeded in com-
pletely defeating the Russian army, he hereafter.
would, in all probability, have concluded The rule which we have been seeking
a peace in Moscow which in any other to set forth is, therefore, that all forces
way was much less attainable. This which are available and destined for a
example is used to explain the idea, not to strategic object should be simultaneously
proveit, which ration
would require a circum- appliedtoit;and this application will
stantial demonst , for which this is be so much the more complete the more
not the place . * everything is compressed into one act
All these reflections bear merely upon and into one moment.
the idea of a successive employment of But still there is in strategy a renewal
forces, and notupon the conception of a of effort and a persistent action which, as a
reserve properly so called, which they, chief means towards the ultimate success ,
no doubt,come in contactwith throughout, is themore particularly not to be over
the continual development of
but which, as we shall seein the following looked , it isThis
chapter is connected with some other is also the subject of
new forces.
considerations. another chapter, and we only refer to it
What we desire to establish here is, herein orderto prevent the reader from
that if in tactics the militaryforce through having somethi ng in view of which we
the mere duration of actual
employ ment have been speaking
not :
suffers a diminution of power, if time , We now turnto a subject very closely
therefore, appears as a factor inthe which ed withour
connectmust
result, this is not the case in strategy in
presentconsiderations,
be settled before full light
can be thrown on the whole, we mean
* Compare Bd . vii. , 2te Auflage, S. 56 . the strategic reserve.
 CHAP. XIII. ] STRATEGIC RESERVE . 113

CHAPTER XIII .

STRATEGIC RESERVE .

A RESERVE has two objects which are linked to the tactical. In strategy also
very distinct from each other, namely, many a measure is first adopted in
first, the prolongation and renewal of the consequence of what is actually seen, or
combat,
unforeseand
secondly for use in case of
en events . ,
in consequence of uncertain reports
implies the utility The of afirst object
successive
arriving from day to day, or even from
hour to hour, and lastly, from the actual
application of forces, and on that account results of the combats ; it is, therefore,
cannot occur in strategy. Cases in which an essential condition of strategic com
à corps is sent to succour a point which mand that, according to the degree of
supposed to be about to fall are plainly uncertainty, forces must be kept in reserve
to be placed
object
in the categoryof thesecond
as the resistance which has to be
against future contingencies.
In the defensive generally, but par
offered here could
not a corps
sufficiently foreseen But have which
been ticularly in the defence of certain obstacles
. of ground, like rivers, hills, &c. , such
destined
iscombat, expresslyto prolong the contingencies,asiswellknown, happen
and with that object in view is constantly:
placed in rear, would be only a corps But this uncertainty diminishes in
placed out of reach of fire, butunder the as the strategic activity has
command and at the disposition of the proportion
less of the tactical character, and ceases
general commanding in the action , and almost altogether in those regions where
accordingly would be a tactical and no it borders on politics.
strategic reserve . The direction in which the enemy
But the necessity for a force ready for leads his columnsto thecombat canbe
eventsmay alsothere
unforeseen
strategy, and consequently takeplacein
may also
perceived by actualsight only;wherehe
intends to pass a river is learnt from a
bea strategic
unforeseen reserve,
events but only where
are imaginable . few preparations which are made shortly
In before ; the line by which he proposes to
tactics , where the enemy's measures are invade our country is usually announced
generally first ascertained by directsight
and where they may be concealed by every, by
allthe newspapersbefore a pistolshot
Wood, every
we must fold ofundulating
naturally ground,
always be alive ofthemeasure
more enemy the less it will takethe
by surprise. Time and space are so
or less to the possibility of unforeseen considerable, the circumstances out of
events, in order to strengthen, subse which the action proceeds so public and
quently, those points which appear too
therank, and, in fact
the disposition to modify
of ,our troops, so as to coming
generally eventis eithermadeknownin
good time, or it can be discovered with
nd y
enemy.it correspo bettertothat of the certaint .
make
On the other hand the use of a reserve
directly in this province
Suchcasesmust alsohappen in strategy,
because the strategic act is of strategy, even if one
were available, will alwaysbeless efficaci
I
114 ON WAR. [BOOK III.

ous the more the measure has a tendency lies in the supreme decision . Employment
towards being one of a general nature . must be given to all the forces within
We have seen that the decision of a the space of the supreme decision, and
partial combat is nothing in itself, but every reserve (active force available)
that all partial combats only find their which is only intended for use after that
complete solution in the decision of the decision is opposed to common sense.
total combat. If, therefore, tactics has in its reserves
But even this decision of the total the means of not only meeting unforeseen
combat has only a relative meaning of dispositions on the part of the enemy, 3
many different gradations, according as but also of repairing that which never
the force over which the victory has can be foreseen , the result of the combat,
been gained forms a more or less great should that be unfortunate ; strategy on
and important part of the whole. The the other hand must, at least as far as
lost battle of acorps may be repaired by relatesto the capital result, renounce the
the victory of the army. Even the lost use of these means . As a rule, it can
battle of an army may not only be coun- only repair the losses sustained at one
terbalanced by the gain of a moreim- point by advantages gained at another,
portant one, but converted into a fortu in a few cases by moving troops from
nate event (the two days of Culm , 1813 ) . one point to another ; the idea of pre
No one can doubt this ; but it is just as paring for such reverses by placing forces
clear that the weight of each victory (the in reserve beforehand, can never be en
successful issue of each total combat) is tertained in strategy.
so much the more substantial the more We have pointed out as an absurdity
important the part conquered, and that the idea of a strategic reserve which is not
therefore the possibility of repairing the to co -operate in the capital result, and
loss by subsequent events diminishes in as it is so beyond a doubt, we should
the same proportion. In another place nothave been led into such an analysis as
we shall have to examine this more in we have made in these two chapters, were
detail ; it suffices for the present to have it not that, in the disguise of other ideas,it
drawn attention to the indubitable exist- looks like somethingbetter, andfrequently
ence of this
progression . makes its appearance. One person sees
If we now add lastly to these two con sagacity and
siderations the third ,which is,thatifthe inforesit ight anothofer strategic
the ;acme rejects it,and withit
persistent use of forces in tactics always theidea ofany reserve ,consequently
shifts the great result to the end of the tactical
even of a one. This confusion
whole act, the law of the simultaneous of ideas is transferred to real life,and if
use of the forces in strategy, on the conwe would see a memorable instance of it
trary, lets the principal result (which
need not be the final one) take place we have lefta
in 1806 only to call toofmind
reserve thatmen
20,000 Prussia
can
almost always at the commencement of toned in theMark, under Prince Eugene
the great (or whole) act, then in these
three results we have grounds sufficient of Wurtemberg,
reach which could
the Saale intime to benot possibly
of any use,
to find strategic reserves always more
superfluous, always more useless, always and thattoanother
longing forceremained
this power of 25,000 men be
inEastand
more dangerous the more general their
destination. South Prussia , destined only to be put on
But the point where the idea of a a war-footing afterwards as a reserve.
strategic reserve begins to become incon After these examples we cannot be
sistent is not difficult to determine : it accused of having been fighting with
windmills.
CHAP. XV] . GEOMETRICAL ELEMENT. 115

CHAPTER XIV.

ECONOMY OF FORCES .

The road of reason, as we have said,

seldom allows itself to be reduced to a
allyother
in overwords,
the co-operation
of keepingofconstantly
all forces, in
or
mathematical line by principles and view that no part of them should ever be
opinions. There remains always a cer: idle. Whoever has forces where the
tain margin. But it is the same in all enemy does not give them sufficient em
thepractica l arts of life. For the lines ployment,whoever has part of his forces
ofbeauty there are no abscisses and on the march—that is, allows them to lie
ordinates ; circles and ellipses are not dead — while the enemy's are fighting,he
describedby meansof theiralgebraical is a bad manager of his forces. In this
formula . The actor in war therefore soon sense there is a waste of forces, which is
finds he must trust himself to the delicate even worse than the employment to no
tact of judgment which, founded on purpose. If there must be action, then
natural quickness of perception , and edu- the first point is that all parts act, because
cated by reflection,almost unconsciously the most purposeless activity still keeps
seizes upon the right; hesoonfinds that employed and destroys a portion of the
at one time he must simplify the law (by enemy's force, whilst troops completely
reducing it) to some prominent charac- inactive are for the moment quite neu
teristic points which form his rules; that tralised. Unmistakably this idea is
at another the adopted method must be bound up with the principles contained
come the staff on which he leans. in the last three chapters, it is the same
As one of these simplified characteris- truth, but seen from a somewhat more
comprehensive
tic points as a mental appliance,welook densed point ofview and con
upon theprinciple of watching continu- into a single conception.

CHAPTER XV .

GEOMETRICAL ELEMENT .

The length to which the geometrical tactics it plays a great part. It is the
element or form in the disposition of basis of elementary tactics, or of the
military force in war can become a pre theory of moving troops ; but in field
dominant principle, we
offortification,where geometry.Looks positions, andoftheir attack,itsangles
afterthe great andthe little. Also in
and lines rule like lawgivers who have to
116 ON WAR . [BOOK III. 291
decide the contest. Many things here were such an important factor in thet actical
at one time mis -applied, and others were product.
mere fribbles ; still, however in the tactics In strategy this is only faintly reflected ,
of the present day, in which in every on account of the greater space and time.
combat the aim is to surround the enemy , We do not fire from one theatre of war
the geometrical element has attained upon another ; and often weeks and
anew a great importance in a very simple, months must pass before a strategic
y
certainl , but constantly recurring ap- movement designed to surround the
plication. Nevertheless,in tactics, where enemy can be executed . Further, the
all is more movable , where the moral distances are so great that the probabi
forces, individual traits, and chance are lity of hitting the right point at last, even
more influential than in a war of sieges, with the best arrangements, is but small.
the geometrical element can never attain In strategy therefore the scopefor such
to the samedegree ofsupremacy as in combinations, that is for those resting on
the latter . But less still is its influence the geometrical element, is much smaller,
in strategy ; certainly here, also, form in and for the same reason the effect of an
the disposition of troops, the shape of advantage once actually gained at any
countries and states iscalof great impor. point ismuch greag ter. Such advantage
tance ; but the geometri element is not ħas time to brin all its effects to ma
decisive here, as in fortification , and not turity before it is disturbed, or quite
near so important as in tactics .—The neutralised therein, by any counteracting
manner in which this infl uence exhibits apprehensions. We thereforeheddo not
f wn
itsel , can only be sho by degr eesat tate to regard as an establis truth,
hesi
those places where it makes its ap- that in strategy more depends on the
pearance, and deserves notice. Here we number and the magnitude of the vic
wish more to direct attention to the torious combats, than on the form of the
difference which there is between tactics great lines by whichthey are connected .
and strategy in relation to it. A view just the reverse has been a
favourite
In tactics time and space quickly cause
dwindle to their absolute minimum . If a
theme of modernwas
a greater importance
theory, be
supposed

9-131747
body of troops is attacked in flank and to be thus given to strategy, and, as
rear by the enemy,it soon gets to a point the higher functions of themind were
where retreat no longer remains; such seen in strategy , was thought by that
a position is very close to an absolute means to ennoble war, and , as it was
impossibility of continuing the fight; said — through a new substitution of ideas
it must therefore extricate itself from it, to make it more scientific . We
or avoid getting into it. This gives hold it to be one
to all combinations aiming at this pal uses of a completeof theo
from the first commencement a great effi
princi
thery open ly
ciency, which chiefly consists in the to expose such vagaries geo
, and as the idea
metricalelement is the fundamental
disquietude which it causes the enemy from which theory usually proceeds,
as to consequences . This is why the therefore
geometrical disposition of the forces, is this point we have expressly
in strong relief. brought out

4
 CHAP. XVI. ] ON TIE SUSPENSION OF THE ACT IN WARFARE . 117

CHAPTER XVI .

ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACT IN WARFARE .

If one looks at war as an act of mutual of necessity be assumed politically to

destruction,
we must of necessity imagine be the aggressor, because no war could
both parties in a generalway as making
some progress ; but at the same time, as
take place from defensive intentions on
both sides. But the aggressor has the
regards the existingmoment, we must positive object the defender merely
,
almost just as necessarily suppose the negative one. To the first then belongsa
one party in a state of expectat ion, and the positive action, for it is only by that
only the other actually advancing, for means that he can attain the positive
be exactly the
circumstances can nevercontinue object; therefore, in cases where both
same on both sides or , so In parties
.
time a change mustensue,from which re in precisely similar circum
it stances, the aggressor is called upon to
follows that the present moment is more
favourable to one side than the other . act by virtue of his positive object.
Therefore, according to this manner of
Now ifa wesuppose
have full
that both
knowledge of
commanders
this circum viewingit,' a suspensionin theact of
stance, then the one has a motive for warfare, strictly
diction with the speaking, in contra
nature ofisthe thing ;
action, which at the same time is a
motive for the other to wait ; therefore, because two armies, being two incompati
ble elements, ,just
shouldasdestroy one another
accordingof toboth
interest thisit cannot be for the unremittingly
at the same time to ad
fire andwater can
Vance, nor can waiting be for the interest never
act andput themselves
react upon oneinanother,
equilibrum, but
until one
ofboth atthe sametime. This oppo- quite disappears. What would be said
of two wrestlers who remained clasped
notdeducedherefromthe principle of round each other forhours without mak
generalpolarity,and thereforeisnot in ingamovement. Actioninwar,there
opposition to the argument in the fifth fore, like that of a clock which is wound
chapter of the second book ; itdepends up, should go on running down inregular
on the fact that here in reality the same
thing is at oncean incentive or motive motion . - But wild as is the nature of war
it still wears the chains of human weak
toboth commanders
improving, namely the proba-
impairing ness , and the contradiction we seehere,
bility of or
position future action
their
by . that man seeks and creates dangers which
he fears at the same time will astonish no
But even if we suppose the possibility
circumstances
ofa perfect equality of in one .

If we cast a glance at military history

that through imperfect knowledgeof oppositeofan incessant advancetowards
their mutualpositionsuch an equality theaim ,that standing still and doing
subsist, still tothethe
mayappear two commanders
difference of political nothingofisanquite
to dition armyplainly
in thethe normal
midst con
of war,

oof suspension . One of the parties must raise a doubt as to the correctness of our
118 ON WAR . [ BOOK III.
conception. But if military history has the head, who feels himself in war in his
this effect by the great body of its events, natural element, as much as a fish in the
80 also the latest series of them redeems ocean , or if there is not the pressure
our view. The war of the French Re- from above of some great responsibility,
volution only shows too plainly its reality, then standing still will be the order of the
and only proves too plainly its necessity. day, and progress will be the exception.
In that war, and especially in the cam- The second cause is the imperfection
paigns of Buonaparte, the conduct of war of human perception and judgment,
attained to that unlimited degree of which is greaterinwar than anywhere,
energy which we have represented as the because a person hardly knows exactly
natural law of the element. This degree his own position from one moment to
is therefore possible ,and if itis possible another, and can only conjectureon slight
then it is necessary . grounds that of the enemy, which is
How could any one in fact justify in purposely concealed ;this often gives rise
the eyes of reason the expenditure of to the case of both parties looking upon
forces in war, if acting was not the one and the same object as advantageous
the object? The baker only heats his oven for them, while in reality the interest of
if he has bread to put into it ; the horse one must preponderate ; thus then each
is only yoked to the carriage if we mean may think he acts wisely by waiting
to drive ; why then make the enormous another moment , as we have already said
effort of a War if we look fornothing inthefifth chapter of the second book:
The third cause which catches hold, like
s
else by it but like effort on the part of
the enemy ? a ratchet wheel in machinery , from time
So much in justification ofthegeneral to timeproducing a complete stand still,
principle : now as to its modifications, as is the greater strength ofthedefensive
farasarethey
and indelieinthe
pendent ofnature of thething
special cases . form .whi
from Amay
ch it feel
doestoo
notweak
followto that
attackB, B,is
Therearethreecausestobenoticed strong enough for anattackonA.The
here,whichappear as innate counterpoises addition of strength ,which the defensive
and prevent the over-rapid oruncontroll- givesisnot
able movement of the wheel -work . e,
merely lost by assumingthe
offensiv but also passes to theenemy
Thefirst, which produces aconstant justas, figuratively expressed , the dif
tendency to delay, and is thereby a re- ference of a + b and a_6 is equal to 25.
tarding principle, is thenaturaltimidi ty Therefore it may sohappenthat both
on
and want of resoluti in thehuman parties,at oneand the same time,not
mind, a kind of powerof gravity ind the onlyfeelthemselves too weak to attack,
ch
moral world , butwhi is produce not are so in reality .
but also
by attractive, but by repellent forces, Thus even in the midst of the art of
that is to say, by dread of danger and war itself, anxious sagacity and the ap
responsibility prehension of too greatdanger find van
In the burning element of War, ordi tage ground, by means of which they can
nary natures appear to become heavier ; exert their power, and tame the elemen
the impulsion given must therefore be tary impetuosity of war.
stronger and more frequently repeated However, at the same time these causes
if the motion is to be a continuous one.
without an exaggeration of their effect,
The more idea of the object for which would hardlyexplainthelong states of
tywhich
arms have been takenup is seldom suffi- inactivi military
took place in
cient to overcomethis resistant force ,and operations, in former times,in warsunder
if a warlike enterprising spirit is not at taken about interests of no great import
 CHAP. XVI. ] ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACT IN WARFARE . 119

ance, and in which inactivity consumed nothing, with positions and marches,
nine- tenths of the time that the troops which afterwards are designated asskilful
remained under armis. This feature in only because their infinitesimally small
these wars, is to be traced principally causes are lost, and common sense can
to the influence which the demands of make nothing of them , here just on this
the one party, and the condition, and very field many theorists find the real
feeling of the other, exercised over the art of war at home : in these feints,
conduct of the operations,
already observed as hasbeen
in the chapter on the
parades, half andquarter thrusts of
essence and object of war. former wars, they find the aim of all
theory, the supremacy of mind over mat
These things may obtain such a pre- ter, and modern wars appear to them
ponderating influence as to make ofwar mere savage fisticuffs , from which
a half-and-half thing. A waris often nothing is to be learnt, and which must
nothing more than an armed neutrality, be regarded as mere retrograde steps
or a menacing attitude to support nego , towards barbarism . This opinion is as
tiations or an attempt to gain some small frivolous as the objects to which it relates.
advantage by small exertions and then Where great forces and great passions
,
to wait the tide of circumstances, or a
are wanting, it is certainly easier for a
fulfilled in the most obligation,
disagreeabletreaty whichposis practiseddexterity to show its game;
niggardly way
sible . but is then the command of great forces,
the steerage in storm and tempest, not
Inallthese cases in which the impulse initself a higher
ligent faculties ? Isexercise of theintel
then that kindof
given byinterestis slight,and the prin- conventional
ciple ofhostility feeble,inwhich there is sword-exercise not com .
nodesireto do much, and alsonotmuch prisedinand belonging to the other
to dread from the enemy ; in short, where mode of conducting war? Does it not
no powerful motives press and drive
cabinets will not risk much in the game ,;
bear the same relation to it as the motions

hence this tame mode of carrying on upon a ship to the motion of the ship
itself ? Truly
it can take
war, in which the hostile spirit of real under the tacit condition that place only
the adver
war is laid irons
in . sary does no better. And can we tell,
The more war becomes in this manner how long he may choose to respect those
a half-and -half thing , so much the more conditions ? Has not then the French re
its theory becomes destitute of the neces volution fallen upon us in the midst of
sary firm pivots and buttresses for its the fancied security of our old system of
reasoning ; the necessary is constantly war, and driven us from Chalons to
diminishing,the accidental constantly in Moscow ? And did not Frederick the
creasing
Nevertheless in this kind of warfare, Great in like manner surprise the
there is also a certain shrewdness, indeed, Austrians reposing in their ancient habits
of war , and make their monarchy trem
itsaction is perhaps morediversified, and
extensive
ble ? Woe to the cabinet which, with
more than in the other. Hazard a shilly -shally policy, and a routine-rid
played with rouleaux of gold seems den military system , meets with an adver
changed into a game ofcommerce with sary who, like the rude element, knows no
groschen. And on this field, where the other law than that of his intrinsic force .
conduct ofwar spins outthe timewith a Every deficiency in energy and exertion
es
number of small flourish , with skir is then a weight in thescales in favour
mishes at outposts, half in earnest half in
jest, with long dispositions which end in change from theFencing postureinto that
120 ON WAR . [ BOOK III.
of an athlete, and a slight blow is often ing, during which both parties fallinto
sufficient to knock down the whole. the defensive, and also that usually a
The result of all the causes now ad- higher object causes the principle of
duced is, that the hostile action of a cam
paign does not progress by a continuous, aggression
and thus · to predominate
leaves on oneinside,
it in general an
but by an intermittent movement , and advancing position, by which then its
that, therefore, between the separate proceedings become modified in some
bloody acts, there is a period of watch- degree.

CHAPTER XVII .

ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR .

THE attention which must be paid to

the character of war as it is now made, ther, since ( 1813) has ; fur
over to the offensiveshown
then springs Prussia
has a great influence upon all plans, that sudden efforts may add to an army
especially on strategic.
sixfold
Since all methods formerly usual were this by means
militia is just of
as the militia,
fit for serviceandabroad
that
upset by Buonaparte's luck and boldness, as in its own country ;-since all these
and first- rate powers almost wiped out events have shown what an enormous
at a blow ; since the Spaniards by their factor the heart and sentiments of a
stubborn resistance have shown what the nation may be in the product of its poli
general arming of a nation and insurgent tical and military strength, in fine, since
measures on a great scale can effect, in governments have found out all these
spite of weakness and porousness of indi- additional aids, it is not to be expected
vidual parts ; since Russia, by the cam- that they will let them lie idle in future
paign of 1812 has taught us, first, that wars, whether it be that danger threatens
an empire of great dimensions is not to
be conquered (which might have been their
bitionown existence,
drives them on.or that restless am
easily known before ), secondly, that the
probability of final success does not in all That a war which is waged with the
cases diminish in the same measure as whole weight of the national power on
battles, capitals, and provinces are lost each sidemust be organised differently
(which was formerly an incontrovertible inprinciple to those where everything is
principle with all diplomatists, and there- calculated according
standing armies to the
to each otherrelations of
, it is easy
fore made them always ready to enter at
once into some bad temporary peace ), to perceive. Standing armies once re
but that a nation is often strongest in sembled fleets, the land force the sea
the heart of its country, if the enemy's force in their relations to the remainder
offensive power has exhausted itself, and of the State, and from that the art of war
with what enormous force the defensive on shore had in it something of naval
tactics which
, it has now quite lost.
CHAP. XVIII .] TENSION AND REST . 121

CHAPTER XVIII.

TENSION AND REST .

The Dynamic Law of War. then either a state of rest takes place or
a new tension with a decision, and then
We have seen in the sixteenth chapter of a new movement, in most cases in the
this book (page 117), how, in most cam opposite direction .
paigns, much more time used to be spent This speculative distinction between
in standing still and inaction than in ac- equilibrium , tension , and motion is more
tivity.Now,
ing
although, as observed in the essential for practical action than mayat
preced ent
chapter, we seequite a differ r
first sight appea .
character in the present form ofwar, still In a state of rest and of equilibrium a
itiscertainupted
thatrealaction will always varied kind of activity may prevail that
be interr more or less by long is one that results from opportunity, and
pauses; and this leads to the necessity does not aim at a great alteration . Such
of our examining more closely the nature an activity may contain important com
of these two phases of war. bats - even pitched battles - bứt yet it is
If there is a suspension of action in still of quite a different nature, and on
war, that is, if neither party wills some- that account generally different in its
thing positive, there is rest, and conse effects .
quently equilibrium , but certainly an If a state of tension exists, the effects
equilibrium in the largest signification, of the decision are always greater, partly
inwhich
war-forces,notonly
but all the
moral and
relations andinterests
physical, great
becausea
er pressgreater force mstan
ure of circu of will
ces anda
mani
come into calculation . As soon as ever one fest themselves therein ; partly because
of the two parties proposes to himself a everything has been prepared and ar
new positive commences
object, and acranged for a great movement. The de
tivesteps towards
preparations
it, even if it is onlyby cisioninsuch casesresembles the effect
, and as soon as the adver- of a mine well closed and tamped, whilst
sary opposes this, there is a tension of an event in itself perhaps just as great,
powers ; this lasts until the decision in a state of rest is more or less like a
takes place — that is, until one party mass of powder puffed away in the open
either gives up his 'object or the other air.
has conceded it to him . At the same time, as a matter of course,
This decision — the foundation of which the state of tension must be imagined in
lies alwaysin the combat- combinations different degrees of intensity, and it may
which are made on each side - is fol
lowedbyamovementin
direction oneorother the
stepstowardsthestate of rest, so thatat
last there is a very slight difference
When this movement has exhausted between them .
itself, either in the difficulties which Now the real use which we derive from
hadto beovercome, as upon its own these reflections is the conclusion that
friction, or through new resistant forces, every measure which is taken during a
 122
ON WAR . [ BOOK III.
state of tension is more important and That a commander should thoroughly
more prolific in results than the same understand these states, that he should
measure could be in a state of equi- have the tact to act in the spirit of them ,
librium, and that this importance in- we hold to be a great requisite, and we
creasesimmensely in the highest degrees have had experience in the campaign of
of tension .
1806 how far it is sometimes wanting.
The cannonade of Valmy decided more In that tremendous tension , when every
than the battle of Hochkirch . thing pressed on towards a supreme de
In a tract of country which the enemy cision,and that alone with all its conse
abandons to us because he cannot defend
quences should have occupied the whole
it, we can settle ourselves differently soul of the commander, measures were
from what we should if the retreat of the proposed and even partly carried out
enemy was only made with the view to a (such as the reconnaisance towards Fran
decision under more favourable circum- conia ), which at the most might have
stances. Against a strategic attack in given a kind of gentle play ofoscillation
course of execution, a faulty position, in a state of equilibrium . Over these
a single false march, may be decisive blundering schemes and views, absorbing
initsconsequence
equilibrium ; whilst in a state of
such errors must be of a
the activity of thearmy, the really neces
sary means, which could alone save, was
very glaring kind, even to excite the lost.
activity of the enemy in a general way .
But this speculative distinction our
Most bygone wars, as we have already we have made is also necessary forwhich
said, consisted , so far as regards the further progress in the construction of
greater part of the time, in this state of our theory, because all that we have to
equilibrium , or at least in such short ten- say on the relation of attack and defence,
sions with long intervals between them , and on the completion of this double
and weak in their effects, that the events sided act, concerns the state of the crisis
to which they gave rise were seldom in which the forces are placed during the
great successes, often they were theatri- tension and motion, and because all the
cal exhibitions, got up in honour of a
activity which cantake place during the
royal birthday (Hochkirch ), often a mere condition
satisfying of the honour of the arms of equilibrium can only be re
( Kunersdorf ), or the personal vanity of garded and treated as a corollary; for
the commander ( Freiberg ). that crisis is the real war and this state
of equilibrium only its reflection.
 123

BOOK IV . - THE COMBAT.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY .

Having in the foregoing book examined minor objects we shall not learn until
the subjects which may be regarded as hereafter . But these peculiarities are in
the efficient elements of war, we shall now comparison to the general characteristics
turn our attention to the combat as the of a combat mostly only insignificant, so
real activity in warfare , which , by its that most combats are very like one
physical and moral effects, embraces another,and, therefore, in orderto avoid
ng
sometimes more simply, sometimes in a repeati which is general at every
that
more complex manner, the object of thestage, we are compelled to look into it
whole war. In this activity and in its before taking up the subject of more
effects these elements must,therefore, special
re- appear . In theapplicat ion . therefore, we shall
first place,
Theformation of the combat is tactical the in thenextchapt
givecharac er, in afew words,
teristics of the modern battle
in its nature ; we only glance at it here in
a generalway in order to getacquainted in its tacticalcourse ,because that lies at
with it in its aspect asawhole. In practice thefoundation of our conceptions of
theminor ormoreimmediateobjectsgive battle.
every combat a characteristic form ; these

CHAPTER II.

CHARACTER OF THE MODERN BATTLE .

ACCORDING to of the former is changed, that change
the notion we have have an influence on the latter. If
formed oftactics and strategy, it follows, must al ly
as a matter of course, that if the nature tactic facts in one case are entire
 124
ON WAR .
( BOOK IV.
different from those in another, then the to have been observed in ourselves and
strategic must be so also , if they are to in the enemy are collected into one single
continue consistent and reasonable .
It is therefore important to characterise springsimpression, out of which there
total
the resolution to quit the field or
a general action in its modern form to renew the combat on the morrow .
before we advance with the study of its
employment in strategy. This description, which is not intended
What do we do now usually in a great as a finished picture of a modern battle,
but only anddefensive,
battle ? We place ourselves quietly in offensive to give its tone,
andsuits
the for the
special
great masses arranged contiguous to and traits which are given by the object
behind another
one . We deploy rela- proposed , the country ,etc., etc.
, may be
tively only a small portion of thewhole, introduced into it without material ly
and let it wring itself out in a fire-combat altering this tone.
which lasts forseveral hours, only inter- But modern battles are not so by
rupted now and again, and removed accident; they are so because the parties
hither and thither by separate small find themselves nearly on
level as
shocks from charges with the bayonet regards military organisationa andthe
and cavalry attacks. When this line knowledge ofthe artofwar, and because
has gradually exhausted part of its the warlike element inflamed by great
warlike fire in this manner, and there national interests has broken through
remains nothing more than the cin- artificial limits and now flows in its
ders, it is withdrawn and replaced by natural channel. Under these two
another .
In this manner the battle on a modified conditi battles
ons, er
this charact . will always preserve
principle burns slowly away like wet This general idea of the modern battle
powder, and if the veil of night commands will be useful to us in the sequel in more
neither party can any places than one, if we want to estimate
it to stop, becauseneither
longer see, and chooses to run the value of the particular co -efficients of
the risk of blind chance, then an account strength , country , etc., etc. It is only for
is taken by each side respectively of the general, great,and decisivecombats, and
masses remaining , which can be called such as come near to them that this des
still effective, thatis, which have not yet cription stands good ; inferior ones have
quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes ; changed their character also in the same
account is taken of the ground gained or direction but less than great ones.
lost, and ofhowstands thesecurity of proof of this belongs to tactics we shall
therear; these results with thespecial however, have an opportunity; hereafter,
The

impressions as to bravery and cowardice, of making

ability and stupidity, which are thought particulars.
this subject plainer by a few
 CHAP. III. ] THE COMBAT IN GENERAL . 125

CHAPTER III.

THE COMBAT IN GENERAL .

The Combat is the real warlike activity , the root of that always lies the idea of
everything else is only its auxiliary ; combat. We may therefore reduce every
let us therefore take anattentive lookat
its nature.
military activity inthe province of strat
Combat is fight, and in this the de- egyonly tooccupy the objectand
ourselves with combats,
the unit of single of
struction or conquest of the enemy is the this last ; we shall only get acquainted
object, andthe enemy in the particular we
combat is the armedforce which stands
these special
withcometo objects by degrees as
speak of the causes which
opposed to us .
produce
This isthe simple idea; we shall return with them ; here we content ourselves
saying that every combat, great
to it, but before we can do that we must or small, has its own peculiar object in
insert a series of others .
subordination to the main object. If
If we suppose the state and its mili- this is the case then, the destruction and
tary force asa unit, then themost natural conquest of the enemy is only to be re
idea is to imagine the war also as one
garded as theunquestionably
great combat,and in the simple relations ject; so it is means of gaining
, this ob
of savage nations it is also not much But this result is true only in its form ,
otherwise. Butour wars are made up and important only on account of the
of a number of great and small simul- connection which the ideas have be
taneous or consecutive combats, and this
tween themselves, and we have only
severance of the activity into so many sought it out to get rid of it at once.
separate actions is owing to the great What is overcoming the enemy ?
multiplicityo th usrelations
War arises wifthe . out of which Always simply the destruction ofhis
military force , whether it be by death , or
In pointof fact, the ultimate object of wounds, or any means ;whether it be
our
quitewars, the political one, isnot always completelyoronlytosuch a degree that
a simple one ; and even were it so,
still the action is bound up with such he can no longer continue the contest ;
therefore as long as we set aside all
a number conditions
of and consider- special objects of combats, we may look
ations to be taken into account, that the
complete or partial destruction
object can no longer be attained by one uponthetheenemy
șingle great act, but only through a num of as the only object of all
combats.
berofgreater or smaller actswhich are Now we maintain that in the majority
bound up into a whole ; each of these
of cases, and especially in great battles,
separate acts is thereforea
a whole, has consequently
partof the special object by which the battle is
a special ob
ject by which it is bound to this whole . individualised and bound up with the
We have already said that every great whole is only a weak modification
of that general object, or an ancillary
strategic
idea of a act be referredtothe
can, because
combat it is an em
objectbound up with it,important enough
to individualise the battle, but always
ployment of the militaryforce, and at only insignificantincomparison with
126 ON WAR . [ BOOK IV.
that general object ; so that if that an- thatthismode ofproceeding isto be viewed
cillary object alone should be obtained, as a great shortening of the road ? Un
only an unimportant part
of the combat is fulfilled . ofIfthe purpose doubtedly a battle at one point is of more
this asser value than at another. Undoubtedly
tion is correct, then we see that the there is a scientific arrangement of battles
notion, according to which the destruc- amongst themselves, even in strategy,
tion of the enemy's force is only the which is in fact nothing but that art ;
means, and something else always the to deny that is not our intention, but we
object, can only be true in form , but that assert that the direct destruction of the
it would lead to false conclusions if we enemy's forces is everywhere predomi
did not recollect that just this destruc- nating; we contend here for the over
tion of the enemy's force is comprised in ruling importance of this destructive
that object, and that this object is only principle and nothing else.
a weak modification of it .
Forgetfulness of this led to completely weWemust, however, call to mind that
are now engaged with strategy, not
false views before the wars of the last with tactics, therefore we do not speak
period, and created tendencies as well as of the means which the former may have
fragments of systems, in which theory of destroying ata small expense a large
thought it raised itself so much the more body of the enemy's forces, but that
above handicraft, the less it supposed under direct destruction we understand
itself to stand in need of the useof the the tactical results, and that, therefore,
real instrument, that is the destruction of our assertion is that only great tactical
the enemy's force. results can lead to great strategical ones,
Certainly such a system could not have or , aswe have already once before
arisen unless supported by other false more distinctly expressed it, the tactical
suppositions, and unless in place of the successes are of paramount importance
dėstruction of the enemy, other things in the conduct of war.
had been substituted to which an efficacy The proof of this assertion seems to us
was ascribed which did not belong to simple enough, it lies in the time which
them . We shall attack these falsehoods
every complicated (artificial) combination
whenever occasionrequires, butwecould requires. Thequestionwhether asimple
nottreat of the combatwithout claiming attack,or one more carefully prepared,
for it the real importance and value more artificial,will producegreater effects,
which belong to it, and givingwarning may undoubtedly bedecided in favour of
the latter as long as the enemy is assumed
against the errors to which merely formal
truth might lead.
passive.
quiteattack But every
But now how shall we manage to show to be an object
carefully combined requiresmore
that in most cases, and in those of most time, and thistime must be allowed
importance , thedestruction
of the enemy's without a counterstroke on one of the
army is the chief thing ? How shall we
tions upsetting
manage to combat that extremely subtle parts the whole. inthe
for its execution Now,prepara
if the
idea, which supposes it possible , through enemyshould decide upon some simpler
the use of aspecial artificial form , to effect attack, which can be executed in a shorter
by a small directdestruction of the time,then he gains the initiative,and des
enemy's forces a much greater destruction troys the effect of the great plan. There
indirectly, or by means of small but ex
fore, along
tremely well directed blows to produce plicated the expediency ofall
withwemustconsider
attack a com
the
such paralysation
of the enemy's forces,
such a command over the enemy's will, dangers which we run during its pre
paration, and we should only adopt it if
CHAP . IV .] THE COMBAT IN GENERAL . 127

thereis no reason to fear that the enemy moderate degree of courage joined to
will disconcert our scheme by a shorter great ability will produce greater effects
one. Whenever this is the case we must than moderate ability with great courage.
ourselves choose the shorter, and lower But unless we suppose these elements in
our views in this sense as far as the a disproportionate relation, not logical,
character, the relations of the enemy, we have no right to assign to ability this
and other circumstances may render advantage over courage in a field which
necessary. If we quit the weak impres- is called danger, and which must be
sions of abstract ideas and descend to the regarded as the true domain of courage.
region of practical life, then it is evident After this abstract view we shall only
that a bold, courageous , resolute enemy add thatexperience, very far from leading
will notlet us have timeforwide-reaching to a different conclusion, is rather the
skilful combinations, and it is justagainst sole cause which has impelled us in this
such a one we should require skill the direction, and given rise to such reflec
most. By this it appears to us that the tions.
advantage of simple and direct results Whoever reads history with a mind free
over those that are complicated is con from prejudice cannot fail to arrive at a
clusively shown . conviction that of all military virtues
Our opinion is not on that account that energy in the conduct of operations has
the simple blow is the best, but that we always contributed the most to glory and
must not lift the arm too far for the room success of arms.
given to strike, and that this condition How we make good our principle of
will always lead more to direct conflict the regarding the destruction of the enemy's
more warlike our opponent is. There- force as the principal object, not only in
fore, far from making it our aim to gain the war as a whole but also in each
upon the enemy by complicated plans, separate combat, and how that principle
We must rather seek' always to be before suits all the forms and conditions
hand
dir with
ection .
him just in the opposite necessarily demanded by the relations
out of which war springs, the sequel will
If we seek for the lowest foundation show . For the present all that we desired
stones of these converse propositions we was to uphold its general importance,
find that it is in theone, ability, in the and with this result we return again to
courage. Now ,there
other, attractive is something
notion that
the combat.
very in the a

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMBAT IN GENERAL . – CONTINUATION .

In the last chapter we stopped shortat the point that this is true in the majority
the destruction of the enemy being the of cases, and in respect to the most
objectofthe combat, andwehavesought important
to show by a special consideration of of battles, because thedestruction
the enemy's army is always the pre
128 ON WAR . [BOOK 14,
ponderating object in war. The other Therefore the overcoming theenemy, that
objects which may be mixed up with this is, placing him in such a position that he
destruction of the enemy's force, and may must giveup the fight, counts for nothing
have more or less influence, we shall in itself, and for that reason cannot come
describe generally in the next chapter, under the definition of object, and so
and become better acquainted with by there remains then, tas we have said,
degrees afterwards; here we divest the nothing over excep the direct gain
combat of them entirely, and look uponwhich we have made in the process of
the destruction of the enemy as the destruction ; but to this belong not only
complete and sufficient object of any the losses which have taken place in the
combat. course of the combat, but also those
What are we now to understand by which, after the withdrawal of the con.
destruction ofthe enemy's army ? A dimi- quered part, take place as direct con
nution of it relatively greater than that sequences of the same.
on our own side. If we have a great Now it is known by experience, that
superiority in numbers over the enemy, the losses in physical forces in the course
then naturally the absolute
same of a battle seldom present a great dif
amount of loss on both sides is for ference between victor and vanquished
us
a smallerone than forhim, and respectively, often none at all, sometimes
consequently may be regarded in itself as even one bearing an inverse relation,
an advantage. As we are here consider- and that the most decisive losses on the
ing the combat as divested of all ( other) side of the vanquished only commence
objects, therefore we must also exclude with theretreat, that is, those which the
from our consideration that one where conqueror does not share with him. The
the combat is used only indirectly for a weak remains of battalions already in
greater destruction of the enemy's force ; disorder are cut down by cavalry, ex,
consequently also only that direct gain hausted men strew the ground , disabled
which has been made in the mutual pro guns and broken caissons are abandoned ,
cess of destruction is to be regarded as the others in the bad state of the roads can
object, for this is an absolute gain , which not be removed quick enough, and are
runs through the whole campaign,and
at the end of it will alwaysappear as pure
captured by the enemy's troops during
the night, numbers lose their way,and
gain . But every other kind of victory fall defenceless into the enemy's hands,
over our opponent will either have its and thus the victory mostly gains bodily
motive in other objects, which we have after it is already decided.
completely excluded here,or it will only substance
Here would be a paradox, if itdid
yield a temporary relative advantage. An notsolve itself in the following manner.
example will make this plain. The loss in physical force is not the
If by a skilful disposition we have only one whichthetwo sides sufferin
reduced our opponent to such dilemma,
that he cannot continue the combat with the course of the combat ; the moral
out danger, and after some resistance he forces also are shaken, broken, and goto
retires, then we may say, that we have ruin. It is not only the loss in men,
conquered him at that point; butifin horses and guns, but in order, courage,
confidence, cohesion and plan , which
this victory we have expended just as come into consideration when it is a
many forces as the enemy, then in question whether the fight can be still
closing the accountof the campaign, there
is no gain remaining from this victory , continued or not. It is principally the
if such a result can be called a victory , moral forces which decide here, and it
was these alone in all cases in which
 CILAP . IV.] THE COMBAT IN GENERAL . 129

the conqueror has lost just as much as point at the close of the whole act ; it is
the conquered. therefore also the means of making that
The comparative relation of the phy- gain in the destruction of the enemy's
sical losses is difficult to estimate in a force which was the real object of the
battle, but not so the relation of the combat. The loss of order and unity
moral. Two things principally make it often makes the resistance of individual
known. The one is the loss of the ground parts very injurious ; the spirit ofthe
on which the fight has taken place, the whole is broken ; the original excitement
other the superiority of the enemy's re about losing or winning, through which
serve .The more our reserves have danger was forgotten, is spent, and to the
diminish
the
ed as compared with those of majority danger now appears no longer
enemy, the more force we have used an appeal to their courage, but rather
to maintain the equilibrium ; in this at the endurance of a cruel punishment.
once
an evident proof of the moral Thus the instrument in the first moment
superiority of the enemy is given which of the enemy's victory is weakened and
seldom fails to stir up in the soul ofthe blunted, and therefore no longer fit to
commander acertain bitterness of feeling, repay danger by danger.
and a sort of contempt for his own This period the conqueror must usein
troops. But the principal thing is, that order to make the real gain in the de
continuancehave
men,who of time are more orfor
beenengaged a long
less like struction of physical forces; onlyso much
of these as he attains remains secure to
dead cinders ; their ammunition is con him ; the moral forces of the enemy will
sumed ; they have melted away to a cer recover themselves by degrees, order will
tain extent; physical and moral energies be restored , courage will revive, and in
are exhausted, perhaps their courage bro the majority of cases there remains only
ken as well. Such a force, irrespective of a small part of the superiority obtained,
the diminution inits number, if viewed as often none at all, and in some cases,
anorganicwhole,is
what it was before thevery differentfrom
combat althoughrarely,the
; and thus intensif spiritbring
ied hostility may of revenge
about and
an
byloss
isthat the
itmeasured moral force may be opposite result.
theofreserves that have
On the other hand,
r whateve is gained in killed , wounded ,
been used asif it were on a foot rule . and prisoners, and guns captured, can
Lost ground and want of fresh reserves, never disappear from the account.
are, therefore, usually the principal causes The losses in a battle consist more in
which determine a retreat ; but at the killed and wounded ; those after the
same time we by no means exclude or battle, more in artillery taken and
desire to throw in the shade other rea prisoners. The first the conqueror shares
sons, which may lie in the interdepen with the conquered, more or less, but the
dence of parts of the army, in the gene second not ; and for that reason they
ral plan , etc. usually only take place on one side of the
andEvery
destrucomba t is therengfore
ctivemeasuri thestren
of the conflict, at least, they are considerably in
bloodgthy excess on one side .
Artillery and prisoners are therefore at
bethe
both leftclose hasthegrea
th
is e co nq ue ro test
r. amou nt of alltimes regarded asthe truetrophies of
victory, as well as its measure, because
In the combat the loss of moral force through these things its extentis declared
given,thislossecontinues superioritymay be better judged of by
increasewas
toafterthat until itreacheditsculminating them than byany other relation,especially
K
130 ON WAR. [BOOK IV .

if the number of killed and wounded is gether. A great fire attainsquite a dif
compared therewith ; and here arises a ferent heat from several small ones.
newpower increasing the moral effeets. Another relation which determines the
We have said that the moral forces, moral value of a victory is the numerical
beaten to the ground in the battle and relation of the forces which have been in
in the immediately succeeding move- conflict with each other. To beat many
ments , recover themselves gradually, and with a few is not only adoublesuccess, but
often bear no traces of injury ; this is shows also a greater, especially a more
the case with small divisions ofthe whole, general superiority,which the conquered
less frequently with large divisions ; it must always be fearful of encountering
may, however, also be mthe case with the again. At the same time this influence
main army, but seldo or never in the is in reality hardly observable in such a
state or government to which the army case . In the moment of real action, the
belongs . These estimate the situation notions of the actual strength of the
more impartially and from a more ele- enemy are generally so uncertain, the
vated point of view , and recognise in the estimate of our own commonly so incor
number of trophies taken by the enemy, rect, that the party superior in numbers
and their relation to the number of killed either does not admit the disproportion,
and wounded, only too easily and well or is very far from admitting the full
the measure of their own weakness
inefficiency. and truth, owing to which, he evades almost
entirely the moral disadvantages which
In point of fact, the lost balance of would spring from it. It is only here
moral power must not be treated lightly after inhistorythat the truth, long
because it has noabsolute value,and be suppressedthroughignorance, vanity,
cause it does not of necessity appear in or a wise discretion, makes its appear
ance, and then it certainly casts alustre
all cases in the amount of the results at
the final close ; it may become of such on the army and its leader, but it
excessive weight as tobring down every can thene do nothing more by its moral
thing with an irresistible force. On that influenc for events longpast.
account it may often become a great aim If prisoners and captured guns are
of the operations ofwhich we shall speak those things bywhi chthe victory prin
elsewhere.Herewe havestilltoexamine cipally gains substance,its truecrystalli:
some of its fundamental relations. sations,then the plan of the battle should
The moral effect ofavictory increases, havethose things specially in view ;
notmer elyin proporti on tothe extent of the destruction oftheenemy by death
the forces engaged ,b utin a progres sive and wound sappears here as a pure
ratio — that is to say, not only in extent, means .
but also in its intensity . In a beaten
division order is easily restored . As a How far this may influence the dis
positions in the battle is not an affair of
singlefrozenlimbiseasily revived
the rest of the body, so the courage byof a strategy, buttheappointment itselfof
defeated divisionis easily raisedagain the battle is already in connection with
it, namely ,by themeasures forsecurity
by the courage of the rest of the army as
soonasit rejoinsit. If are
effects of a small victory therefor the enemy's. Onthis point, the numberof
not e,com
pletely done away with, still they are prisoners and captured guns depends
partly lost to the enemy. This is not the very much, and it is a point which, in
many cases, tactics alone cannot satisfy,
caseif the army itselfsustains a great particularly if the strategic relations are
defeat ; then one with the other fail to- too much in opposition to it.
CHAP. IV .] THE COMBAT IN GENERAL . 131

The danger of having to fight on two The returns made up on each side of
sides, and the still more dangerous posi- losses in killed and wounded, are never
tion of havin retrea
g no line of t left open , exact, seldom truthful, and in most cases,
paralyse the movements and the power full of intentional misrepresentations.
of resistance, and influence the alterna- Even the statement of the number of tro
tive of victory or defeat ; further, in case phies is seldom to be quite depended on ;
ofdefeat, they increase the loss, often consequently , when it is not considerable
raising it to its extreme point, that is , to it may also cast a doubt even on the
destruction. Therefore, the rear being reality of the victory. Of the loss in
endangered makesdefeatmoreprobable, moralforces there is no reliable measure,
and, at the same time, more decisive. except in the trophies : therefore, in
From this arises, in the whole conduct many cases, the giving up the contest
of the war, and especially in great and is the only real evidence of the victory.
small combats, a perfect instinct, which is It is, therefore, to be regarded as a
the security of our own lineofretreat and confession of inferiority - as the lowering
the seizure of the enemy's ; this follows of the flag, by which, in this particular
from the conception of victory, which , as instance, right and superiority are con
we have seen, is something beyond mere coded to the enemy, and this degree of
slaughter.
humiliation and disgrace, which , how
In this effort we see, therefore , the ever, must be distinguished from all
first immediate purpose in the combat, the other moral consequences of the
and one which is quite universal. No loss of equilibrium , is an essential
combat is imaginable in which this effort, part of the victory. It is this part
either in its double or single form ,is not alone which acts upon the public opinion
to go hand in hand with the plain and outside the army, upon the people and
simple stroke of force. Even the smallest the government in both belligerent
troop will not throw itself upon its enemy states, and upon all others in any way
without thinking of its line of retreat, concerned.
and, in most cases, it will have an eye But now the giving up the general
upon that of the enemy. object is not quite identical with the
howWeshould havetodigre
often this instinct ss toshow
is prevent ed from battle of battle,even
fieldvery
quittinghasthebeen when the
obstinate and long
going the directroad, howoftenit must kept up ;noone saysofadva nced posts,
yield in the difficulties arising from when they retire after an obstinate combat,
more important considerations : weshall, that they have given up their object; even
therefore, rest contented with affirming it in combats aimed at the destruction of the
to be a general naturallawof the combat. enemy's army, the retreat from the battle
It is, therefore, active ; presses every field is not always to be regarded as a
where with its natural weight, and so relinquishment of this aim , as for instance,
becomes the pivot on which almost all in retreats planned beforehand, in which
tactical and strategicmanquvres turn . the ground is disputed foot by fuot; all
If we now take a look at the concep this belongs to that part of our subject
tion of victory
three elements :as a whole, we find init where we shall speak of the separate
object of the combat ; here we only wish
ph1. Thepogreater loss of the enemy in
ysic to draw attention to the fact that in most
al wer. cases the giving up the object is very
2. In moral power . difficult to distinguish from the retire
open avowal of this by the re ment from the battle - field, and that the
3. Hisment
linquish of his intentions . impression produced by the latter, both
132 ON BAR. [ BOOK IV.
in and out of the army, is not to be of other successes were likewise required,
treated lightly. namely the battle at Katholisch Hen
For generals and armies whose repu- nersdorf, in Lusatia, and the battle of
tation is not made, this is in itself one of Kesseldorf, before this peace took place,
the difficulties in many operations , justi- still we cannot say that the moral effect
fied by circumstances when a succession of the battle of Soor was nil.
of combats, each ending in retreat, may If it is chiefly the moral force which ***

appear as a succession of defeats, without

is shaken by thevictory,and if the num
being so really, and when that appear- ber of trophies by thatmeans mounts up
ance may exercise a very depressing to an unusual height, then the lost com
influence . It is impossible for the re- bat becomes a rout, which therefore is
treating general by making known his not the exact opposite of every victory.
real intentions to prevent the moral As the moral force of the conquered is
effect everywhere, for to do that with shaken to a much greater degree in
effect he must disclose his plans com- such a defeat, there often ensues a com
pletely,which ofl course would run counter plete incapability of further resistance,
to his principa s
interest to too great a and the whole action consists of giving
degree . way, that is of flight.
In order to draw attention to the Jena and Belle Alliance were routs,
special importance of this conception of but not so Borodino.
victory, we shall only refer to the battle Although without pedantry we can
of Soor, the trophies from which were not here give no single line of separation,
important (a few thousand prisoners and because the difference between the things
twenty guns), and where Frederick pro. is one of degrees, yet still the retention
claimed his victory by remaining for five of the conception is essential as a central
days after onthe field of battle, although pointtogiveclearnessto our theoretical
his retreat into Silesia had been pre- ideas, and it is a want inour terminology
viously determined on, and was a measure that for a victory over the enemy tanta
natural to hiswhole situation . According
to his own account, he thought he
mountto a rout, and a conquest of the
enemy only tantamount to a simple
would hasten a peace by the moral effect victory, there is only one and the same
of his victory . Now although a couple word to use.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE COMBAT .

Having in the preceding chapter ex
amined the combat in its absolute form ,
as the miniature picture of the whole
war, as it were, we now turn to the re
lations which as a part of a great whole
it bears to the other parts. First we en
quire what is more precisely the significa
tion of a combat.
As war is nothing else but a mutual
process of destruction, then the most
natural answer in conception , and perhaps
also in reality, appears to be that all
CIIAP. V.] ON THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE COMBAT . 133

thepower
s ofeach party unite in one great OFFENSIVE . DEFENSIVE.
volume, and all resultsin one great shock 2. Conquest of a 2. Defence of a
of these masses . There is certainly much place. place.
truth in this idea, and it seems upon the 3. Conquest of 3. Defence of some
whole to be very advisable thatwe should some object. object.
adhere to it, and that we should on that These motives, however, do not seem
account look upon small combats at first to embrace completely the whole of the
only as necessary loss,liketheshavings subject ,if wes recollect that theres are
from acarpenter’s plane.Still however, reconnaissance and demonstration , in
the thing is never to be settled so which plainly none of these three points
easily . is the object of the combat. In reality
That a multiplication of combats should we must, therefore, on this account be
arise from a fractioning of forces is a allowed a fourth class. Strictly speaking,
matter of course, andthe moreimmedi- inreconnaissancesinwhichwe wishthe
ate objects of separate combats will enemy to show himself, in alarms by
therefore come before us in the subject which we wish to wear him out, in
of a fractioning of forces; but these ob- demonstrations by which we wish to
, and together with a general
jects
mass of combats may in them ,thewhole
way
preventhis leaving some point or to draw
him off to another, the objects are all
be brought under certain classes , and such as can only be attained indirectly
the knowledge of these classes will con and under the pretext of one of the three
tribute to make our observations more objects specified in the table, usually of the
intelligible.
second ; for the enemy whose aim is to
Destruction of the
in reality
enemy'sof all
the object military
com reconnoitre mustdraw forcedefeat
up hisand as if
bforces
ats ; is d
he really intende to attack
but other objects may be joined to us, or drive us off, etc. , etc. But this
that,andtheseothero
the same time predomi bjects we be
nant;may must pretend
at our ed object isnot therealone, and
present question is only as to the
therefore draw a distinction between latter ; therefore, we must to the above
those in which the destruction of the three objects of the offensive further add
enemy's forces is the principal object, a fourth , which is to lead the enemy to
and those in which it is more the means. make a false move, or, in other words, en
Besidesthe
force, destruction
the possession oftheenemy's gagehimonly
of a place or the means inaaresham fight. That offensive
conceivable in connection
posession of some object may be the with this object, lies in the nature of the
general motive for a combat, and it may thing.
be either one of these alone or several On the other hand we must observe
together, in which case still usually one that the defence of a place may be of two
is the principalmotive. Now the two kinds,either absolute,ifasageneral
principal forms of War, the offensive question the pointisnotto be given up,or
anddefensive,of
speak, whichwtheeshallshortly
do not modify relative' The
first of these time. if itisonly required for a certain
latter happens perpetually in
motives, but they certainly do modify the the combats of advanced posts and rear
other two , and therefore ifwearrange guards.
thus : in a scheme they would appear
them That the nature of these different
intentions of a combat must have an
OFFENSIVE :
DEFENSIVE
. essential influence on the dispositions
1. Destruction of 1. Destruction of which are its preliminaries, is a thing
enemy's force . enemy's force. clear in itself. We act differently if our
134 ON WAR . [ BOOK IV .
object is merely to drive an enemy's post which touch upon these objects. Here
out of its place from what we should if we have only a few general observa
our object was to beat him completely ; tions to make, first, that the importance
differently, if we mean to defend a place of the object decreases above,
nearly inthere
the.
to the last extremity from whatwe should order as they stand
do if our design is only to detain the fore then, that the first of these objects
enemy for a certain time. In the first must always predominate in the great
case we trouble ourselves little about the battle ; lastly, that the two last in a
line of retreat, in the latter it is the defensive battle are in reality such as
principal point, &c. yield no fruit, they are, that is to say,
But thesereflections belong properly purely negative,andcan, therefore, only
to tactics, and are only introduced here be serviceable, indirectly, by facilitating
by way of example
greater clearness .
for
What
the sake
strategy of
has
something else which is positive. It
is, therefore, a bad sign of the strategic
to say on the different objects of the
situation if battles of this kind become too
combat will appear in the chapters frequent.

CHAPTER VI .

DURATION OF THE COMBAT .

If we consider the combat no longer bound up with its essential relations.

in itself but in relation to the other forces These relations are absolute magnitude
of war, then its duration acquires a special of force ,relation offorce and (of the
importance. different) arms mutually, and nature of
This duration is to be regarded to a the country. 20,000 men do not wear
certain extent as a secondsubordinate themselves out upon one another as
success.
For the conqueror the combat quickly as 2,000 ; we cannot resist an
can never befinished too quickly, for the enemy double or three times our strength
vanquished , it can never last too long. as long as one of the same strength ;
A speedy victory is a higher power of a cavalry combat is decided sooner than
victory, a tardy decision is, on the side of an infantry combat; and a combat
the defeated , some compensation for the
loss. between infantry only, quicker than if
there is artillery as well; in hills and
This is in general true, but it acquires forests we cannot advanceas quickly as
a practical importance in its application on a level country; all this is clear
to those combats, the object of which is
a relative defence , enough.
From this follows, therefore, that
Here the whole success often lies in
the mere duration . strength , relation of the three arms, and
This is the reason
why we have included it amongst the position, must be considered if the com
strategic elements. bat is to fulfil an object by its duration;
The duration of a combat is necessarily but to set up this rule was of less import
ance to us in our present considerations
CHAP. VII .] DECISION OF THE COMBAT. 135

than to connect with it at once the chief times. Therefore the masses may be
results which experience gives us on left to themselves for that length of time,
the subject. and no separate combat takes place if
Even the resistance of an ordinary di- within that time other forces can be
vision of 8,000 to 10,000 men of all arms brought up, whose co-operation mingles
even opposed
superior to an enemyconsi
in numbers,
derably then atonce
will last several results
into one stream with the
of the combat which has taken
hours, if the advantages of country are place.
not too preponderating, and if the enemy These calculations are the result of ex
isonlya little,or notwill
numbers, the combat at all,superiorin perience; but it isimportantto usatthe
last half a day. same time to characterise more particu
A corpsof three or four divisions will larly the moment of thedecision, and
prolongit to double the time;anarmy consequently thetermination.
of 80,000 or 100,000 to three or four

CHAPTER VII .

DECISION OF THE COMBAT.

No battle is decided in a single mo 1806 , at Jena, with 35,000 men opposed

to from 60,000 to 70,000 , under Buona
ment, although in every battle there are
moments ofgreat importance ,which parte, had accepted battle ,andlost it 0
chiefly bring about theresult. Theloss that the 35,00
but lost it in such a way
, a gradualfalling might beregardedasdissolved — General
ofof athebattle But fore
scale.is,there there is in every com Rüchel undertook to renew the fight
bat a point of time when it may be re with about 12,000 ; the consequence was
garded as decided , in such a way that that in a moment his force was scattered
the renewal of the fight would be a new in like manner .
On the other hand, on the same day at
battle, not a continuation of the old one.
Tohaveaclear notion on this pointof Auerstadt,thePrussians maintained a
whether,with theprompt whohad28,000,untiỉ mid-day, without
abletodeci
assistanc e ofdereinforcements, the combat force
success , it is true, but still without the
being reduc ed to
can again be resu med e
with advantag . a state of dis
Often in combats which are beyond solution without
the enemy, whoeven
er
great lossthan
was very defi cient in
restoration new forces are sacrificed in
vain; often through neglect it might rese
cision has not been turned whenthede-
lry ;-of andthey
cavarve undeecte
18,000 , negl d ousethe
t
r Gene ral Kalk
easily have been done. Here are two reuth, to restore the battle which , under
examples, which could not be more to the these circumstances, it would have been
point : impo
Eacssib le tobat
h com losise.
a whole in which the
When the Prince of Hohenlohe , in
136 ON WAR . [BOOK IV .
partial combats combine themselves into whilst our forces are, more or less, disor
onetotalresult. In thistotalresultlies ganisedthroughout, is also not tobe
the decision of the combat. This suc- retrieved ; and just as little if the enemy
cess need not be exactly a victory such has recovered his efficiency .
as we have denoted in the sixth chapter, The smaller, therefore ,that part of a
have forceis which has really been engaged,
for often the preparations for thatoppor
not been made, often there is no the greater that portion is which as re
tunity if the enemy gives way too soon, serve has contributed to the result only
and in most cases the decision , even when by its presence , so much the less will
the resistance has been obstinate , takes any new force of the enemy wrest again
place before such a success as essentially the victory from our hands, and that
comes up to the idea of a victory. commander who carries out to the fur
We therefore ask, Which is commonly thest with his army the principle of con:
the moment of the decision, that is to say, ducting the combat with the greatest
effective
that moment when a fresh, , of economy of forces, and making the most
course not disproportionate force, can no of the moral effect of strong reserves,
longer turn a disadvantageous battle ? goes the surest way to victory. We
If we pass over false attacks, which in that the French, in modern
times, allow
accordance withtheir natureare properly must especially when led by Buonaparte,
without decision , then
1. If the possession of a moveable have shown the
Further, a thorough
moment mastery
when thein crisis
this.
object was the object of the combat, the stage of the combat ceases with the con
loss of the same is always the decision . queror,and his original state of order is
2. If the possession of ground wasthe restored , takes place sooner thesmaller
object of the combat, then the decision the whole is. A picket of cavalry pur
generally lieslikewise in theloss ofthat; suing an enemy atfull gallop will in a
still not always, that is only if this few minutes resume its proper order,and
ground is of peculiar strength , ground the crisisalso ceases: a whole regiment
which is easy to pass over, however ofcavalryrequires for this a longertime ;
important it may be in other respects, it lasts still longer with infantry, if ex,
can be re -taken without much danger. tended in single lines of skirmishers, and
3. But in all other cases, when these longer again with divisions of all arms,
two circumstances have not already when it happens by chance that one part
decided the combat, therefore, particularly has taken onedirection and another part
in case the destruction of the enemy's therefor
another e directio
force is the principal object, the decision n, and the combat has
caused a loss of the order of for
lies in the moment when the conqueror mation, which usually becomes stillworse
ceases to feel himself in a state of from no part knowingexactly where the
disintegration, that is, of unservi ceable- otheris . Thus , therefore, the pointof
nessto a certain extent, thereforewhen time whenthe conqueror has collected
there is nofurther advantagein using
the successive efforts spoken
the instruments he has been using ,and
of in the
which, the
twelfth chapter of the third book. On order mixed up
aremoment partlyinout
andhehas
when of
some
this ground we have given the strategic
unity of the battle its place here . measure rearranged them and put them
A battle, therefore, in which the in their proper places, and thus brought
assailant has not lost his condition of the battle-workshop
mom
into a little order,
order and perfect efficiency at all, or , at this ent , we say, is always later, the
least, only in a small part of his force, greater
Againthe total
, this force.comes later if night
moment
CHAP. VII.] DECISION OF THE COMBAT. 137

overtakes the conqueror in the crisis, and, upon the decision itself. Now as concerns
lastly, it comes later if the country is bro- the retrieving a battle,the first thing to
ken and thickly wooded . Butwith regard be arrived at above all is a favourable
to these two points, we must observe that decision and not magnitude of success.
ofprotec- In this view one would therefore think
night is also a great meansthat
tion, and it is only seldom circum- that a force which comes to re-establish
stances favour the expectation of a suc our combat is of less assistance if it falls
cessful result from a night attack , as on upon the enemy in flank and rear, there
the 10th March, 1814, at Laon, where fore separated from us, than if it joins
York against Marmont gives us an exam- itself to us directly; certainly, cases are
ple completely in place here. In the not wanting where it is so, but we must
same way a wooded and broken country say that the majority are on the other side,
will afford protection against a reaction and they are so on account of the second
to those who are engaged in thee long point which is here important to us.
crisis of victory. Both, therefor , the This second point is the moral effect of
night as well as the wooded and broken the surprise, which, as a rule, a reinforce
country are obstacles which make the ment coming up to re- establish a combat has
renewal the sameingbattle
instead ofof facilitat it.
moredifficult generally inis itsalways
а heighte
the effect of
favour. Nowned
if it takes
Hitherto, we have considered assistance place in the flank or rear, and an enemy
arriving for the losing side as a mere completely engaged in the crisis of victory
increase of force, therefore, as a reinforce- in his extended and scattered order, is
ment coming up directly from the rear, less in a state to counteract it. Who does
which is the most usual case . But the not feel that an attack in flank or rear,
case is quite different if these fresh forces which at the commencement of the battle,
come upon the when the forces are concentrated and pre
enemy in flank or rear.
On theeffect of flank or rear attacks, pared for suchanevent, would er
beof little
tance,
so far as they belong to strategy, we shall impor anoth weight
gains quite
speak in another place : such an one as in We
the last moment of the combat.
must, therefore, at once admit that
we have here in view , intended for the
restoration of the combat,belongschiefly in most cases a reinforcement coming up
to tactics, mentioned
and is only because on the flank or rear of the enemy will
we are here speaking of tactical results, be more efficacious, will be like the same
our ideas, therefore, must trench upon weight
province tactics
atthe end ofa longer lever, and
therefore that under these circumstances,
the of .
Bydirecting a force against the enemy's we may undertake to restore the battle
flank and rear its efficacy may be much with the same force which in a direct way
intensified ; but this is so far from being would be quite insufficient. Here results
anecessary result always that the efficacy almost defy calculation, because the
may on the other hand be just as much
weakened .
moral forces gain completely the ascen
The circumstances under dancy. Hereis, then ,the right field for
which the combat has taken place decide boldness and daring. fore
upon this part ofthe plan as well as upon The eye must, there , be directed
s, all these moments of
on all these object
every other, without our being able to g forces must be taken into
enter thereupon here. But, at the same co-operatin
ation eto de
time, there are in ittwothingsofimpor. cons ider
doubtful
if we hav deci in
cases whether or not it is still
tance for our subject : first, flank and rear
attacks have, asa rule, a morefavourable possi ble to restore acombat which hus
taken an unfavourable turn.
effect on the consequences of thedecision thun
138 ON WAR . [ BOOK IV .
If the combat is to be regarded as not the greater, therefore, also will be the
yet ended , then the new contest which is crisis for the enemy, and the more con
opened by the arrival of assistance be- siderable will be the superiority of our
comes one with the former ; therefore they fresh troops. If now the total result
flow together into one common result, turns in ourfavour, if we wrest from the
and the first disadvantage vanishes then enemy the field of battle and recover all
completely out of the calculation . But the trophies again, then will all the forces
this is not the case if the combat was which he has sacrificed in obtaining them
already decided ; then there are two become sheer gain for us, and our former
results separate from each other. Now defeat becomes a stepping stone to a
if the assistance which arrives is only greater triumph. The most brilliant
of a relative strength , that is, if it is not feats which with victory the enemy would
in itself alone a match for the enemy, have so highly prized that the loss of
then a favourable result is hardly to be forces which they cost would have been
expected from this second combat: but disregarded, leave nothing now behind
if it is so strong that it can undertake butregret at the sacrifice of those forces.
the second combat without regard to the Such is the alteration which the magic
first, then it may be able by a favourable of victory and the curse of defeat pro
issue to compensate or even overbalance duces in the specific weight of the same
the first combat, but never to make it elements .
disappear altogether from the account. Therefore, even if we are decidedly
superior in strength, and arebyableto
Atthe battleof Kunersdorf, Frederick pay re
a greater
the Great at the first onset carried the the enemy his victory
left of the Russian position, and took 70 still, it is always better to forestall the
pieces of artillery ; at the end of the conclusion of a disadvantageous combat,
battle both were lost again, and the if it is of proportionate importance, so
whole result of the first combat was as to turn its course rather than to deliver
wiped out of the account. Had it been a second battle .
possible to stop at the first success, and Field -marshal Daun attempted in the
to put off the second part of the battle to year 1760 to come to the assistance of
the coming day, then, even if the king General Laudon at Leignitz, whilst the
hadlost it, the advantages of the first battle lasted ; but when he failedin that
would always have been a set off to the the king next day, al
he did not attack
second.
though he did not want for force to do so.
But when a battle proceeding disad- For these reasons serious combats of
vantageously is arrested and turned be- advanced guards which precede a battle
fore its conclusion, its minus result on are to be looked upon only as necessary
our side not only disappears from the evils, and when not necessary they are
account, but also becomes the foundation to be avoided .
of a greater victory. If, for instance, We have still another conclusion to
we picture to ourselves exactly the tac- examine.
tical course of the battle, we may easily
a regular
If thing it doespitched battle isa motive
not constitute a set
see that until it is finallyconcluded all tled
successes in partial combats are only de- for determining on a new one. The
cisions in suspense, which by the capi tal determination for this new one must pro
decision
may not only be dest royed
, but ceed from the other relations. This con
changed into the opposite . The more
clusion,
our forces have suffered , the more will forc however,
e, whi is topposed
ch we mus take into a moral
byacco unt:
the enemy have expended on his side ; it is the feeling of rage and revenge.
CHAP. VIII.] MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS TO A BATTLE . 139

From the oldest field -marshal to the suffered the penalty of his erroneous
youngest drummer -boy this feeling is calculation .
general, and, therefore , troops are never On the duration of the combat and the
in better spirits for fighting than when moment of its decision depend the dis
they have to wipe out a stain. This is, tances from each other at which those
however, only on the supposition that masses should be placed which are in
the beaten portion is not too great in pro tended to fight in conjunction with each
portion to the whole, because otherwise other. This disposition would be a tac
the above feeling is lost in that of power tical arrangement in so far as it relates
lessness. to one and the same battle ; it can ,
There is therefore a very natural however, only be regarded as such, pro
tendency to usethismoralforce to repair vided the position of the troops is so
the disaster on the spot,and on that compact that two separate combats cannot
account chiefly to seek another battle if be imagined, and consequently that the
other circumstances permit. It then lies space which the whole occupies can be
in the nature of the casethat this second regarded strategically astly
battle must be an offensive one.
a mere point.
But in war, cases frequen oceur where
In the catalogue of battles of second- even those forces intended to fight in
rate importance there are manyexamples unison mustbe so far separated from each
to be found of such retaliatory battles ; other that while their union for one
but great battles have generally too many common combat certainly remainsrence
the
other determining causes to bebrought princ ipal object, still the occur
of separate combats remains possible.
on by this weaker motive.
Such a feeling must undoubtedly have Such a disposition is therefore strategic.
led the noble Blücher with his third Dispositions of this kind are : marches
corps to the field of battle on the 14th in separate masses and columns, advanced
February, 1814 , when theothertwohad are
guard s, andside-corps reserves,which
intended to serve as supports for more
been beaten three days before at Mont
mirail. Had he known that he would than one strategic point; the concentra
have come upon Buonaparte in person , tion of several corps
s
from widely ex
then, naturally, preponderating reasons tended cantonment , etc., etc.ly We can
would have determined him to put off see that they may constant happen ,
his revenge to another day :but he and constitute something like the small
hoped to reven
and instead gehimselfon reward
ofgainingthe
Marmont, changeinthe strategic economy,whilst
of thecapital battles,andall that rankwith
his desire ofhonourable satisfaction, he them are the gold and silver pieces.

CHAPTER VIII .

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS TO A BATTLE .

Nobattle can take place unless by the rootalofwriters,
mutual consent; and in this idea, which historic a certainwhich
phraseo logy usedby
leads to many
constitutes the whole basis of a duel, is indefinite and false conceptions .
 140 ON WAR . [ BOOK IV.
According to the view of the writers In the early period of modern armies, 2
to whom we refer, it has frequently hap- the relations were similar in great 1
pened that one commanderhas offered combats and battles. That is great
battle to the other, and the latter has not masses were brought into action ,and
accepted it.
managedbattle,which
orderof
But the battle is a very modified duel, great of
by ameans
throughout itlike an
help
and its foundation is not merely in the less whole more or less required a level
mutual wish to fight, that is consent, plain, and was neither suited to attack,
but in the objects which are bound up nor yet to defence in en,
very brokThe
with the battle : these belong always to close or even mountainousa country.
a greater whole, and that so much the defender therefore had here also to some
more so, as even the whole war con extent the means of avoiding battle.
sidered as a
combat-unit” has political These relations although gradually be
objects and conditions which belong to coming modified , continued until the first
a greater whole. So therefore the mere Silesian War, and it was not until the
desire to conquer each other, falls into Seven Years ' War that attacks on an
quite a subordinate relation, or rather it enemy posted in a difficult country gra
ceases completely to be anythingof itself, dually became feasible, and of ordinary
and is only to be regarded asthe nerve occurrence : ground did not certainly now
which lends motion to the higher will. cease to be a principle of strength to
Amongst the ancients, and then again those making use of its aid, but it was
during the early period of standing no longer a charmed circle, which shut
armies, the expression that we had of- out the natural forces of war.
fered battle to the enemy in vain, had During the past thirty years war has
more sense in it than it has now . By the perfected itself much more still in this
ancients everything was constituted with respect, and there is no longer anything
a view to measuring each others ' strength which stands in the way of a general who
in the open field free from anything in is in earnest about a decision by means
the nature of a hindrance, and the whole of battle ; he can seek out his enemy, and
art of war consisted in the organisation, attack him : if he does not do so he can
and formation of the army, that is in the not take credit for having wished to
order of battle .
Now as their armies regularly en- battle his expression
and the
fight, which opponent did offered
he not accept,a
trenched themselves in their
therefore the position in a camp camps,
was therefore
that now
he did notmeans nothing moreadvan
find circumstances than
regarded as something unassailable, and
a battle did not become possible untiltageous enough for a battle, an admission
which thewhic
the enemy left hiscamp, and placed him- suit,but above exprestrive
h it only doesthrow
ssions to not
self in a practicable country, as it were a veil over .
entered the lists.
true the
It is refuse defensi ve side no
can still
If therefore we hear about Hannibal longer a battle, yet he may
having offered battle to Fabius in vain,
that tells us nothing more as regardsthe avoid it by giving up his position, and
latter than that a battle was not part of his the rôle with which that position was
plan, and in itself neitherproves the phy- conne
for thected : this
offen howe
sive isside veranhalf
, and ackn victodg
a owle ry
sical nor moral superiority of Hannibal ; ment of his superiority for the present.
but with respect to him the expression is This idea in connection with the car
still correct enough in the sense that tel of defiance can therefore no longer be
Hannibal really wished a battle .
made use of in order by such rhodomon
1

CHAP. IX. ] GENERAL ACTION . 141

tade to qualify the inaction of him whose of the enemy, and only some special ob
part it is to advance, that is, the of. stacles in the nature of the country
fensive. The defender who as long as can cause serious difficulties in the
he does not give way, must have the operation .
credit of willing the battle, may certainly One example of this kind might be
say,
if that is not understood of itself.
the battle of Neresheim , fought by the
hehas offered it ifhe is not attacked, Archduke
Charles with Moreau in the
But on the other hand , he who now Rauhe Alp, 11th August, 1796, merely
wishes to, and can retreat cannoteasily with a view to facilitate his retreat,
be forced to give battle. Now as the although we freely confess we have
advantages aggressor
tothe from this never been able quite to understand the
retreat areoften not sufficient, and a sub- argument of the renowned general and
stantial victory is a matter of urgent author himself in this case.
necessity for him , in that way the few The battle of Rosbach is another
means which there are to compel such an example, if we suppose the commander
opponent also to give battle are often of the allied army had not really the
intention of attacking Frederick the
sought for and applied with particular Great.
The principal means for this are — first Of the battle of Soor, the king himself
surroundingtheenemy so as to make his says that it was only fought becausea
retreat impossible,or at least so difficult retreat in the presence of the enemy
that it is better for himto accept battle ; appeared to him a critical operation; at
and, secondly, the surprising him . This the same time the king has also given
last way, for whichtherewasamotive other reasons for the battle .
formerly in the extreme difficulty of all On the whole, regular night surprises
movements, has become in modern times excepted, such cases will always be of
very inefficacious. From thepliability rare occurrence, and those in which an
in the presentday, onedoesnothesitate surrounded ,willhappen mostlyto single
to commence a retreat even insight corpsonly, like Finks' at Maxen.

CHAPTER IX .

GENERAL ACTION .
ITS DECISION .

What is a general action ? A conflict of with the principal object in a general

the main body,butnotan unimportant tones
action,ofanditwill take many different
colour from the circumstances
one about a secondary object,nota mere
attempt which is given up when we see out of which it originates, for a general
betimes that our object is hardly within action belongs also to a greater whole
our reach : it is a conflict with all our of which it is only a part ; but be
might for a real victory . cause the essence of war is conflict, and
Minor objects may also be mixed up the general action is the conflict of the
 2
142 ON WAR . [ BOOK IV.
main body, it is always to be regarded as That geometrical as well as this geo
ten
the real centre of gravityof thewar, and graphical principle which had a
it is therefore, its distinguishing character dency to place an army in a state of
ingeneral, that it happens more than any
other battle on its own account.
crystallising tension which did notallow
This has an influence on the manner
of the available powers being made use
of up tothe last man, have at least so far
of its decision, on the effect of the victory lost their influence that they no longer 4

contained in it, and determines the value predominate. Armies are still led into
which theory is to assign to it as battle in a certain order, but that order
a
means to an end. On that account we is no longer of decisive importance; ob 1

make it the subject of our special con- stacles ofground are also still turned to
sideration, and at this stage before we account to strengthen a position, but
enter upon the special ends which may they are no longer the only support.
be bound up with it, but which do not We attempted in the second chapter
essentially alter its character if it really of this book to take a general view of
deserves to betermed a general action . the nature of the modern battle. Accord
If a general action takes place princi- ing to our conception of it, the order of
pally on its own account, the elements of battle is only a disposition of the forces
its decision must be contained in itself; suitable to the convenient use of them,
in other words, victory must be sought and its course a mutual slow wearing
for in it as long as a possibility of that away of these forces upon one another,
remains , and it must not, therefore, be to see which will have soonest exhausted
given up on account of secondary circum- hisadversary:
stances, but only and alone in the event The resolution therefore to give up .the
of the forces appearing completely in- fight arises , in a general action more than
sufficient. in any other combat, from the relation
Now how is that precise moment to be of the fresh reserves remainingavailable ;
described ? for only these still retain all their moral
If a certain artificial formation and vigour, and the cinders of the battered,
cohesion of an army is the principal knocked -about battallions, already burnt
condition under which the bravery of the out in the destroying element, must not
troops can gain a victory, as was the case be placed on a level with them ; also
during great part of the period of the lostground as we have elsewhere said, is a
modern art of war, then the breaking up of standard of lost moral force ; it therefore
this formation is the decision . A beaten comes also into account, but more as a sign
wing which is put out of joint decides the of loss suffered than for the loss itself, and
fate of all thatwas connected with it. If the number of fresh reserves is always
as was the case at another time the essence the chief point to be looked at hy both
of the defence consists in an intimate alli- commanders .
anceof the army with the ground on which In general, an action inclines in one
it fights and its obstacles, so that army and direction from the very commencement,
position are only one,then the conquestof but in a manner little observable. This
an essential pointin this position is the de- direction is also frequently given in a
cision. It is said the key oftheposition very decided manner by the arrangements
is lost, it cannot therefore bedefended which have been made previously, and
any further ; the battle cannot be con- then it is a want of descernment in that
tinued. In both cases the beaten armies general who commences battle under
are very much like the broken strings of these unfavourable circumstances without
an instrument which cannot do theirwork being aware ofthem . Even when this
CHAP. IX.] GENERAL ACTION . 143

does not occur it lies in the nature of but they are rare , not usual; these ex
things that the course of a battle re- ceptional cases, however, are reckoned
sembles rather a slow disturbance of upon by every general against whom
equilibrium which commences soon, but fortune declares itself, and he must
as we have said almost imperceptibly at reckon upon them as long as there re
first, and then with each moment of time mains a possibility of a turn of fortune.
becomes stronger and more visible, than He hopes by stronger efforts, by raising
an oscillating to and fro, as those who are the remaining moral forces, by surpass
misled bymendacious descriptionsusually ing himself, or also by some fortunate
suppose . chance that the next moment will bring a
But whether it happens that the balance change, and pursues this as far as his
is for a long time little disturbed, or that courage and his judgment can agree. We
even after it has been lost on one side it shall have something more to say on this
rightsside,
other itselfitagain, andatisallthen
is certain lostthat
events onthein subject, butbeforethat wemust show
what are the signs of the scales turning.
most instances the defeated general fore- The result of the whole combat consists
sees his fate long before he retreats, and in the sum total of the results of all par
that cases in which some critical event acts tial combats ; but these results of separate
with unexpected force upon the course of combats are settled by different things.
the whole have their existence mostly in First by the pure moral power in the
the colouring with which every one de mind of the leading officers. If a gene
picts his lost battle. ral of division has seen his battalions
We can only here appeal to the de- forced to succumb, it will have an influ
cision of unprejudiced men of experience, ence on his demeanour and his reports,
who will, we are sure, assent towhat we and these again will have an influence on
have said, and answer for us to such of the measures of the commander - in - chief;
our readers as do not know war from therefore even those unsuccessful partial
their own experience. To develop the combats which to all appearance are
necessityofthiscourse
of the thing would lead from thefarnature
us too retrieved,
into the arenot lost in theirresults, and
impressions from them sum them
the provinc e of tactics, to which this selves up in the mind of the commander
subject belongs ; we are here only con without much trouble, and even against
cerned with its results . his will.
If we say that the defeated general Secondly, by the quicker melting away
foreseesthe unfavourableresult usually ofourtroops, which in the slow little
some time before hemakes up his mind tumultuary course
to give up the battle, we admit that there easily estimated . of our battles can be
are also instances to the contrary, because Thirdly, by lost ground.
otherwise we should maintain a propo All these things serve for the eye of
sition contradictory in itself. If at the the general as a compass to tell the course
moment of each decisive tendency of a of the battle in which he is embarked .
battle it should be considered as lost, If whole batteries have been lost and
then also no further forces should be used none of the enemy's taken ; if battalions
to give it a turn, and consequently this have been overthrown by the enemy's
decisive tendency couldnotprecedethe cavalry,whilst thoseofthe enemy every
retreatby any lengthof of
there are instances time. which
battles Certainly whereoffire
after line presentimpenetrablemasses; ifthe
from his order of battle wavers
having taken a decidedturn to one side involuntarily from one point to another ;
if fruitless efforts have been made to gain
have still ended in favour of the other ;
144
ON WAR. [BOOK IV.
certain points, and the assaulting batº estimating correctly the still remaining
talions each time been scattered by well- reserves on both sides is an affair of skil
directed volleys of grape and canister ; ful practical ability, which does not in
-if our artillery begins to reply feebly any way belong to this place; we keep.
to that of the enemy;-if the battalions ourselves to the result as it forms itself
under fire diminish unusually fast, be- in his mind. But this conclusion is still
cause with the wounded crowds of un- not the moment of decision properly, for
wounded men go to the rear ; —if single a motive which only rises gradually does
divisions have beencutoffand madepri- notanswer to that, but is only a general
soners through the disruption of the plan motive towards resolution, and the reso,
of thebattle ; – ifthe line of retreat
begins lution itselfrequiresstill some special
to be endangered : then by all these things immediate causes. Of these there are
the commander may tell very well in two chief ones which constantly recur,
which direction he is going with his that is, the danger of retreat, and the
battle . The longer this direction con- arrival night of .
tinues , the more decided it becomes , so If the retreat with every new step
much the more difficult will be the turn- which the battle takes in its course be
ing , so much the nearer the moment
when he must give up the battle. We comes constantly in greater danger, and
shall now make some observations on if thethey
that reserves
are noarelonger
so much diminished
adequate to get
this moment.
We have already said more than once breathing room, then there isnothing left
that the finaldecision but to retreat
submit to fate, and by a well-con
savewhat,
i of the mostlyby
the relative number sruled fresh re
ducted to by alonger
serves remaining at the last ; that com- would ending
delay be lost.
in flight and disaster,
mander who sees his adversary is de
But night as a rule puts
cidedly superior him this respect battles,becauseanight
to in an end
combat to out
holds all
makes up his mind to retreat. It is just
no hopecircumstances
the characteristic of modern battles that ticular of advantage,; except
and asunder
nightpar
is
all mischances and losses which take better suited for a retreat than the day,
place in the course of the same can be so, therefore, the commander who must
retrieved by fresh forces, because the look at the retreat as a thing inevitable,
arrangement of the modern order of
battle, and the way in which troops are or as most probable, will prefer to make
brought into action, allow of their use use of the night for hispurpose.
That there are,causes
almost generally, and in each position. usualandchief besides the abovetwo
, yetmanyothers
So long ,therefore,as that commander also,which are less ormoreindividual and
againstwhom the issue seems to declare
itself still retains a superiority in reserve not to be overlooked, is a matter of course;
force, he will not give up the day. But for the more
complete upsetaofbattle tends towards
equilibrium themorea
fromthe moment that hisreserves begin sensible is the influence of each partial
to becomeweakerthan his enemy's ,the resultin hasteningtheturn. Thus the
regardepen
decision maybedoes dedas settled , and loss of a battery, a successful charge ofa
what he now ds partly on
special circumstances, partly on the de. couple of regiments of cavalry, may call
gree of courage and into life the resolution to retreat already
perseverance
personallypossesses whichwhich
may ripening.
he , and
degenerate into foolishobstinacy. How must a conclusion
As dwell to this
for a moment subject,
on the pointawet
a commander can attain to the power of which the courage ofthe commander en
 CHAP . X.] GENERAL ACTION . 145

gages in a sort of conflict with his ever little prospect there is of victory to
reason .
him who cannot resolve to seek it by the
If , on the one hand, the overbearing exertion of all his power, still there is a
pride ofa victorious conqueror, if the in- point beyond which perseverance can
flexible will of a naturally obstinate only be termed desperate folly, and there
spirit, if the strenuous resistance of noble fore can meet with no approbation from
feelings will not yield the battle - field , any critic. In the most celebrated of all
where they must leave their honour battles, that of Belle-Alliance, Buona
yet on the other hand, reason counsels parte used his last reserve in an effort to
not to give up everything, not to risk the
lastupon the
retrieve a battle which was past being
game, but to retain as much retrieved. He spent his last farthing,
over as is necessary for an orderly re- and fled then as a beggar from the
treat. However highly we must esteem battle -field and the empire .
courage and firmness in war , and how .

CHAPTER X.

CONTINUATION.
EFFECTS OF VICTORY.

Just according to the point from which chapter that the magnitude of a victory
our view is taken, we may feel as much as .
increases not merely in the same measure
tonished at the extraordinary results of as
some great battles the want
the vanquished forces increase in
as at of re number, but in a higher ratio. The moral
sults in others. We shall dwell for a
moment on the nature of the effect of a effects resulting from the issue of a great
great victory. battle are greater on the side of the con
quered than on that of the conqueror :
Three things may easily be distin . they lead to greater losses in physical
guished here : the effect upon the instru force, which then in turn re- act on the
ment itself, that is, generals and their moral, and so they go on mutually sup
armies; the effect upon the states inte porting and intensifying each other. On
rested in the war ; and the particular moral effect we must therefore lay
result of these effects as manifested in this
special weight. It takes an opposite direc
the subsequent course of the war. tion on the one side from that on the other ;
If we only think of the trifling differ- as it undermines the energies of the con
ence which
victor there usually
and vanquished in killedisbetwe
en queredsoit elevatesthepowers and energy
, wounded, ror.
of theconque effect is
But its chief
prisoners, and artillery lost ences
on the field upon the vanquished , because here it is
of battle itself, the consequ which the direct cause of fresh losses, and be.

point
andyetseemusually,
oftenquite incomprehensib
everything
les danger, withthefatigues ,thehardships,
with all those embarrassing
qu na,tu
ite ra lly. onlyhappens andgenerally
circumstances by which war is surrounded,
We have already said in the seventh therefore enters into league with them
L
146 ON WAR. [ BOOK IV .
and increases by their help, whilst with decide more than certain special disposi
the conqueror all these things are like tions or mere chance.
weights which give a higher swing to his A single fault committed may be re
courage. It is therefore found, that the paired nexttime; from good fortune and
vanquished sinks much more below the chance we can hope for more favour
original line of equilibrium than the con- another time ; but the sum total ofmoral
queror raises himself above it ; on this and physical powers cannot be so quickly
account, if we speak of the effects of vic- altered, and, therefore, what the award
tory we allude more particularly to those of a victory has decided over it appears
which manifest themselves in the van. of much greater importance for all
quished army. If this effect is more futurity. Very probably , of all concerned
powerful in an important combat than in battles, whether in or out of the army,
in a smaller one, so again it is much more very few have given a thought to this
powerful in a great general action than difference,but the course of the battle
in a second- rate battle. The great battle itself impresses on the minds of all
takes place for the sake of itself, for the present in it such a result, and the
sake of the victory which itis to give, relation of thiscourse in public docu
and which is sought for in it with the ments, however muchit may be coloured
utmost effort. Here on this spot, in this by twisting particular circumstances;
shows also , more or less, to the world
very hour, to conquer the enemy is the
purpose in which the plan of the war at large that the causes were more of a
which general than of a particular nature.
with all its threads converges, inings
all distant hopes, all dim glimmer of He who has not been present at the
the future meet ; fate steps in before us to loss of a great battle will have difficulty
. his in forming for himself a living or quite
give an answer to the bold question T
is thecomman
state of
der
mental tension not only of trueideaofit, andthe abstract notions
the but of his whole army of this or that small untoward affair will
down to the lowest wagon -driver, no doubt never come up to the perfect conception
in decreasing strengthbut also in decreas- of a lost battle. Let us stop a moment
ing importance . at the picture.
According to the nature of the thing, The first thing which in an unsuccessful
aangreat battle hasneverat anytimebeen battle overpowers the imagi
unprepared, unexpected , blind routine
nation and
also the under
we may indeed
say,
service, but a grand act, which, partly of standing — is thedim inution ofthe masses
mander , stands out from amongst the then
place the
alwaloss of ground, which
ys,more or less,and,theretakes
fore,
mass of ordinary works , sufficiently to on the side of the assailant also, if he is
raise the tension of all minds to a
not fortunate ; then the rupture of the
higherdegree. Butthe higher this ten originalformation ,thejumbling together
respect
sion with issue,
to the more
the of divisions, the risks of retreat, which ,
powerful must be the effect of that with few exceptions, may always be seen
issue .
Again , the moral effect of victory in sometimes in a less sometimes in a greater
our battles is greater than it was in the degree ; next the retreat, the most part
earlierones ofmodernmilitaryhistory of which commences at night, or, at least,
. If, goes on throughout thenight. On this
the former are as we have depicted them
a real struggle of forces to the utmost, first march wemust atonce leave behind
then the sum total ofall these force ,of aandscattered
number of about
men , completely worn out
often just thebravest,
the physical as well as the moral, must who have been foremostinthe fight, who
 CHAP. x . ] GENERAL ACTIO.V . 147

held out the longest : the feeling of being dition, lookedat as an instrument, is
conquered, which onlyseized the superior weakened ! How can we expect that
officers on the battle field, now spreads when weakened to such a degree that,
through all ranks, even down to the as we said before, it finds new enemies
common soldiers, aggravated by the in all the ordinary difficulties of mak
horrible idea of beingobliged to leave in ing war, it will be able to re
the enemy's hands so many brave com- cover by fresh efforts what has been
rades, who but a momentsince were ofsuch lost ! Before the battle there was a
value tousin the battle, andaggravated by real or assumed equilibrium between the
a rising distrust of the chief commander , two sides ; this is lost, and, therefore,
to whom, more or less, every subordinate some external assistance is requisite to
attributes as a fault the fruitless efforts restore it ; every new effort without such
hehasmade ; and this feelingof being external support can only lead to fresh
conquered is no ideal picture over which losses.
one might become master ; it is an Thus, therefore, the most moderate
evident truth thatthe enemy is superior victory of the chief army must tend to
to us ; a truth of which the causes might
before
cause a constant sinking
of the scale,
have been so latent that they were until new external circumstances bring
not to be discovered , but which , in the about a change. If these are not near,
issue, comes out clear and palpable, or if the conqueror is an eager opponent,
whichwasalso, perhaps, before suspected, who, thirsting for glory, pursues great
butwhich in the want ofanycertainty, aims, then a first-rate commander,and
wehad to oppose by the hope of chance , the army a true military spirit, hard
reliance on good fortune, Providence or in
ened by many campaigns,are required,
bold attitude. Now ,all this has proved in order to stop the swollen stream of
, andthe earnest truth meets prosperity from bursting completely
insufficient
us harsh and imperious. through, and to moderate its course by
All these feelings are widely different smallbut reiterated acts of resistance,
from a panic, which in an army fortified until the force of victory has spent itself
bymilitary virtue never , and in any other at the goal of its career.
only exceptionally, follows the loss of a And now as to the effect of the victory,
battle. They must arise even in the best out of the army, upon the nation and
ofarmies, and although long habituation to government ! It is the sudden collapse
warmmand victory and great confidencein a of
co hopes stretched to the utmost, the
ander
may modify them a little here downfall of all self -reliance. In place of
andthethere,they
in are never
first moment entirely wanting theseextinct forces , fear, with its de
. Also, they are not
the structive properties of expansion, rushes
thesepure
areconsequences
usually lost atofalost
latertrophies
period,; into the vacuum left, and completes the
prostration . It is a real shock upon the
and the loss of them does not become nerves, which one of the two athletes re
generally known so quickly ; they will ceives by the electric spark of victory.
therefore not fail to appear even when And that effect, however different in its
the scale turns in the slowest and most degrees here and there, is never com
gradual manner, and they constitute that pletely wanting. Instead of every one
effect of a victory upon which we can hastening with a spirit of determination
always count in every case.
to aid in repairing the disaster, every
We have already said that the number one fears that his efforts will only be in
of trophies intensifies this effect . vain, and stops, hesitating with himself,
How much now an army in this con when he should rush forward ; or in
148 ON WAR . [BOOK IV .

despondency he lets his arm drop, leav- Pro

ing everything to fate.
which Contra.
is begotten a mutually devouring
et
The consequences which this effect Certainly that effect is perfectlyneces
of victory brings forth in the course of sary , for it has its foundation in the
the war itself depend in part on the cha- nature of things, and it exists, even if
racter and talent of the victorious gene- we find means to struggle against it ; just
ral, but more on the circumstances from as the motion of a cannon ball is always
which the victory proceeds, and to which in the direction of the terrestrial,although
it leads. Without boldness and an en- when fired from east to west part of
terprising spirit on the part of the the general velocity is destroyed by this
general, the most brilliant victory will opposite motion.
lead to no great success, and its force All war supposes human weakness,
exhausts itself all the sooner on circum- and against that it is directed .
stances , if these offer a strong and stub- Therefore, if hereafter in another place
born opposition to it. How very differently we examine what is to be done after the
from Daun,Frederick the Greatwould lossof a greatbattle, if we bringunder
have used the victory atesCollin ; and review the resources which still remain,
what different consequenc France, in even in the most desperate cases,ifwe
place of Prussia, might have given a should express a belief in the possibility
e
battl of Leuthen !
The conditions which allow us to not be all,
of retrieving
must supposed we such
even in therebyit
meana case;
expect great results from a great victory that the effects of such a defeat can by
we shall learn whenwecome to thesub- degreesbe completely wiped out, for the
jects with which they are connected ; forces and means used to repairthe dis
then it will be possible to explainthe astermighthavebeenappliedto the reali
disproportion which appears at first sight sation of some positiveobject; andthis
betweenthe magnitude of a victoryand applies both tothemoral and physical
forces.
which
its results, and is only too readily
attributed to a want of energy on the Another question is, whether, through
part of the conqueror. Here,where we the loss of a great battle, forces are not
have to do withthe great battle in itself, perhaps roused into existence, which
we shall merely say that the effects now otherwise would never have come to life.
depicted never fail to attend a victory, This case is certainly conceivable, and
that they mount up with the intensive it is what has actually occurred with
strength of the victory - mount up more many nations. But to produce this in
the more the battle is a general action, province
that is, the more the whole strength of tensified art ,iswhich
reaction
of military cantheonly
beyond take
the army has been concentrated in it,
the more the whole military power of account of it where it might be assumed
the nation is contained in that army, as a possibility.
and the state in that military power. If there are cases in which the fruits
of a victory appearratherof a destruct ive
But then thequestion may be asked, naturein consequence of the reaction of
Can theoryaccept this effect of victory the forces which it had the effect ofrous
as absolutely necessary ?--- must itnot ing into activity — cases which certainly
rather endeavour to find out counter
acting means capable of neutralising are very exceptional — then it must the
these effects ? It seems quite natural to more surely be granted, that there is a
answer this question in the affirmative ; difference in the effects which one and the
but heaven defend us from takingthat same victory
character of the produce
maypeople oraccording the
state ,whichto has
wrong course of most theories, out of been conquered .
 CHAP. XI.] GENERAL ACTION . 149

CHAPTER XI .

CONTINUATION .
TIE USE OF THE BATTLE .
WHATEVER shape the conduct of war dominant in importance as an object
may take in particular cases, and what-
but as a general rule it remains a para
ever we may also have to admit in the mount truth, that general actions areonly
sequel as necessary respecting it: we fought with a view to the destruction of
haveonly to refer totheconceptionof
war to be convinced of what follows : the enemy's
tion can only be and
army, that thisdestruc
effected by a great
1. The destruction of the enemy's battle.
military force, is the leading principle of The general action may therefore be
war, and for the whole chapter of regarded as war concentrated, as the
positive action the direct way to
centre of gravity of the whole war or
2. This destruction of the enemy's campaign.As the sun's rays unite in
force, must be principally effected by the focus of the concave mirror in a
means of battle.
perfect image, and in the fulness of
3. Only great and general actions can their heat ; so the forces and circum
produce great results . stances of war, unite in a focus in the
4. The results will be greatest when great battle for one concentrated utmost
combats unite themselves in one great effort.
battle .
The very assemblage of forces in one
5. Itis
that the only in a-ingreat
general - chiefcommands greatwhole
general actionin less , which takes place more or
in all wars, indicates an intention to
person, and it is in the nature of things , strike a decisive blow with this whole,
thatselhef. should place most confidence in either voluntarily as assailant, or con
him
From these truths a double law follows, strained by the opposite party as de
fender. When this great blow does
the parts of which mutually support each not follow , then some modifying, and
other; namely,that the destructionof retardingmotives have attachedthem
the enemy'smilitary force is to besought selves to the original
motiveofhostility,
forprincipally by greatbattles, andtheir andhave weakened,altered or completely
results ; and thatthechiefobjectofgreat incheckedthemovement.
battles must be the destruction of the But also, even
this condition of mutual inaction which
enemy's military force. has been the key -note in so many wars,
No doubt the annihilation -principle is the idea of a possible general action
to be found more or less in other means serves always for both parties as a point
granted there are instances in which of direction, a distant focus in the con
through favourable circumstances in a struction of their plans. The more war
minor combat, the destruction of the is war in earnest, the more it is a
or venting of animosity and hostility, a
dispropor-
enemy's forces hashas been
tionately great (Maxen ), anddisprop
been on the mutual struggle to overpower, so much
other hand in a generalaction,the taking the more will all · activities join in
or holdin g deadly contest, and also the more pro
a single post may be pre
150 ON WAR .
minent in importance becomes a general
action .
In general, when the object aimed at is
of a great and positive nature, one there-
fore in which the interests of the eneny
are deeply concerned , the general action
offers itself as the most natural means ; it
is, therefore, also the best, as we shall
show more plainly hereafter : and, as a
rule, when it is evaded from aversion to
the great decision, punishment follows.
The positive object belongs to the of-
fensive, and therefore the general action
is also more particularly his means. But
without examining the conception of of-
fensive anddefensive more minutely morbid paroxysm to which a regular
here, we must still observe that, even for prudent system ofwar would neverlead:
the defender in most cases, there is no
other effectual means with which to meet
the exigencies of his situation, to solve
the problem presented to him.
The general action is the bloodiest
way of solution . True , it is not merely
reciprocal slaughter, and its effect is more
a killing of the enemy's courage than of
the enemy's soldiers, as we shall see
more plainly in the next chapter,- but
still blood is always its price, and slaugh .
ter its character as well as name ; from
this the man in the general recoils with
horror .
But the soul of the man trembles
still more at the thought of the deci
sion to be given with one single blow.
In one point of space and time all action
is here pressed together , and at such a
moment there is stirred up within us a
dim feeling as if in this narrow space all
our forces could not develop themselves
and come into activity, as if we had al
ready gained much by mere time , although
this time owes us nothing at all. This
is all mere illusion , but even as illusion
it is something , and the same weakness
which seizes upon the
man in every other
momentous decision may well be felt
more powerfully by the general, when he
must stake interests of such enormous
weight upon one venture .
[BOOK 1v.
Thus, then, statesmen and generals
have at all times endeavoured to avoid
the decisive battle, seeking either to at
tain their aim without it, or dropping
that aim unperceived. Writers on his
tory and theory have then busied them
selves to discover in some other feature
in these campaigns and wars not only an
equivalent for the decision by battle
which has been avoided, but even a higher
art. In this way, in the present age, it
came very near to this, that a general
action in the economy of war was looked
upon as an evil, rendered necessary
through some error committed , as a
only who
rels hows were
general
thoseknew to carry deserve
to on lau .
war with
out spilling blood , and the theory of war
—a real business for Brahmins— was to
be specially directed to teaching this.
Contemporary history has destroyee ed
this illusion, but no one can guarant
that it will not sooner or later reproduce
itself, and lead those at the head of affairs
to perversities which please man's weak
ness, and therefore have the greater af
finity for his nature. Perhaps, by-and
bye, Buonaparte's campaigns and battles
will be looked upon as mere acts of bar
barism and stupidity, and we shall once
ce
more turn with satisfaction and confiden
to the dress-sword of obsolete and musty
institutions and forms. If theory gives
a caution against this, then it renders a
real service to those who listen to its
warning voice. May we succeed in lend
ing a hand to those who in our dear
native land are called upon to speak with
authority on these matters, that we may
be their guide into this field of inquiry,
and excite them to make a candid exami
nation of the subject.
Not only the conception of war but
experience also leads us to look for a
great decision only in a great battle.
From time immemorial, only great vic
tories have led to greatsuccesses on the
 CHAP. XI. GENERAL ACTION . 151

offensive side in the absolute form , on the

defensive side in manner more or less
according to its relations, is more or
a less, but always in some degree, to be re
80. Even Buonaparte would not have garded as the leading means and central
seen the day of Ulm, unique in its kind , point of the whole system . The more a
if he had shrunk from shedding blood ; general takes the field in the true spirit
it is rather to be regarded as only a of war as well as of every contest, with
secondcrop from the victorious events in the feeling and the idea that is the con
his preceding campaigns. It isnotonly viction that he mustand will conquer,
bold ,rash, and presumptuous generals the more he will strive to throw every
who have sought to completetheirwork weight into the scalein the firstbattle,
by the great venture of adecisivebattle, hopeandstrive to win
but also fortunate ones as well ; and we Buonaparte hardly everything byit.
ever entered upon a
may rest satisfied with the answer which war without thinking of conquering his
they have thus given to this vast question . enemy at once in the first battle ; and
Let us not hear of generals who con. Frederick the Great, although in a more
quer without bloodshed . If a bloody limited sphere, and with interests of less
slaughter is a horrible sight,then thatis magnitudeat stake, thought the same
a ground for paying more respect to war, when, at the head of a small army, he
but not for making the sword we wear sought to disengage his rear from the
blunter and blunter by degrees from feel Russians or the Federal Imperial Army.
ings of humanity, until some one steps in The decision which is given by the
with one that is sharp and lops off the great battle, depends, we have said , partly
arm from our body . on the battle itself, that is on the number
We look upon a great battle as а of troops engaged, and partly on the
principal decision, but certainly not as magnitude of the success.
the only one necessary for a war or a How the general may increase its im
campaign. Instances of a great battle portanceinrespect to the first point is
deciding a whole campaign , have only evident in itself, and we shall merely
been frequent in modern times, those observe that according to the importance
which have ofdecided
to the class rare exceptions ofthegreat
. belong which
a whole war, battle,the number of cases
are decided along with it increases,
A decision which is brought about by and that therefore generals who, confident
a great battle depends naturally not on in themselves have been lovers of great
the battleitself,that ison the mass
combatants engaged
of decisions, have alwaysmanagedto make
on
in it, and the use of the greater part of their troops
intensity of the victory, but also on a in it without neglecting on that account
number of other relations between the essential points elsewhere .
military forces opposed to each other, As regards the consequences, or speak
andbetween the states to which these ingmore correctly, the effectiveness of a
forces belong. But atthe same time victory,thatdepends chieflyon fourpoints:
that the principal mass of the force 1. - On the tactical form adopted as the
available is brought to the great duel, order of battle.
a great decision is also brought on, the 2.- On the nature of the country.
extent of which may perhaps be foreseen 3. — On the relative proportions of the
in many respectst, houghnot inall,and three arms.
which although not the only one, still is 4.-On the relative strength of the
the first decision , and as such, has an two armies.
influence on those which succeed . There A battle with parallel fronts and with
fore a deliberately planned great battle , out any action against a flank will seldom
 152 ON WAR . [BOOK IV .
yield as great success as one in which event in the skilful determination of
the defeated army has been turned , or place and time, and direction of troops,

D2
compelled to change front more or less. and in the good use of success .
In a broken or hilly country the successes
But it does not follow from the im
are likewise smaller, because the power of portance of these things that they must
the blow everywhere
is less.

22
be of a; very
all'iscomplicated andsimple,
recondite

do
d'I
Ifthe cavalry of the vanquished is equal nature here rather the

'
or superior to that of the victor, then art of combination by no means great ;
the effects of the pursuit are diminished , but there is great need of quickness in
and by that great part of the results of judging of circumstances, need of energy;
victory are lost.
steady resolution
Finally it is easy to understand that enterprise — heroic, qualities
a youthful spirit weof
, to which 19

if superior numbers are on the side of the shall yet have often to refer. There is,
conqueror, and he uses his advantage therefore, but little wanted here of that
in that respect to turn the flank of his
which can be taught by books, and there
adversary,or compel himto change front,
greater results will follow than if the is much
must that,
come if it general
to the taught atsome
can be through all,
conqueror had been weaker in numbers other medium than printer's type.
than the vanquished . The battle of
Leuthen may certainly be quoted as a The impulse towards a great battle,
practical refutation of this principle,but the voluntary,
proceed from a sure progress
feeling to it,power
of innate must
we beg permission for once to say what and a clear sense of the necessity ; in
we otherwise do not like,no rule without
an exception . other words, it must proceed from inborn
In all these ways, therefore, the com courage and from perceptions sharpened
mander has the means of giving his by contact with the higher interests of
battle a decisive character ; certainly he life .
thus exposes himself to an increased Great examples are the best teachers,
amount ofdanger whole law but it is certainly
of theoretical a misfortune
prejudices if a cloud
action is subjectto, but
the moral world .
thathis
dynamic line ofof for eventhe sunbeam iscomesbetween
refracted and;
There is then nothing in war which tinted by the clouds. To destroy such
can be put in comparison with the great
prejudices, which many a time rise and
battle in point of importance , and the
spread themselves like a miasma, is an
acme of strategic ability is displayed in
imperative duty of theory, for the misbe.
the provision of means for this great gotten offspring of human reason can

also be in turn destroyed by pure reason .

CHAPTER XII .

STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY.

THE more difficult part, that of perfectly mended. Brilliant and full of renown it
preparing the victory, is a silent service
ofwhi ch the merit belong
s to strate
gy,
and yet for which it is hardly com appears by turning to good account a
victory gained .
What may be the special object of a
CHAP. XI. ] STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY. 153

battle, how it is connected with the whole the defeated force is only a detached
system of a war, whither the career of portion of the enemy's army, or if it has
victory may lead according to the nature otherwise to expect a considerable rein
of circumstances, where its culminating forcement, then the conqueror may easily
point lies — all these are things which run into the obvious danger of having
we shall not enter upon until hereafter. to pay dear for his victory, and this con
But under any conceivable circumstances sideration, in such a case, very soon puts
the fact holds good, that without a pur an end to pursuit, or at least restricts it
suit no victory can have a great effect, very much. But even when a strong
and that, however short the career of accession of force by the enemy is not to
pictory may be, it must always lead be feared , the conqueror finds in the
beyond the first steps in pursuit ; and in above circumstances a powerful check to
order to avoid the frequent repetition of the vivacity of his pursuit. There is no
this, we shall now dwell for a moment reason to fear that the victory will be
on this necessary supplement of victory snatchedaway,
in general.
but adverse combats are
still possible, and may diminish the
The pursuit of a beaten army com- advantages which up to the present
mences at the moment that army, giving have been gained. Moreover, at this
up the combat,leaves
previous movements in
position;ai
its one direction moment thewholearmy,
sensuous in an
all thatandis
weightitsof wants
and another belong not to that but to weaknesses, are dependent on the will
theprogress of the battle itself.Usually ofthe commandeand
victory at the moment here described ,
r. All the thousands
under his comm require rest and
still sas yetsmalí refreshment, and long to see a stop put to
even if it is certain, isrtion
and weak in its propo , and would toil and danger for the present ; only a
not
tive rank an event
advanastage any eted posi-
if notof complgreat few, formi
by a feel
ng tion
an excep , can see and
beyond the present moment ; it is
pursuit on the first day. Then it is only amongst this little number that
mostly, as we have before said, that the there is sufficient mental vigour to think,
trophies which give substance to the after what is absolutely necessary at the
victory begin to be gathered up. Of moment has been done, upon those re
this pursuit we shall speak in the next sults which at such a moment only
place. appear to the rest as mere embellish
Usually both sides come into action ments of victory — as a luxury of triumph.
with theirphysicalpowersconsiderably
deteriorated, for the movements imme- Butall
ds
these thousan have a voice in
the council of the general, for through
diately preceding have generally the the various steps of the military hier
character of very urgent circumstances. archy these interests of the sensuous
The efforts which the wringing out a creature have their sure conductor into
great combat costs, completethe exhaus- the heart of the commander. He him.
tion
toriou; fromthisit
s party is verycomesthat thevic- self, through mental and bodily fatigue,
little less disorgan- is more or less weakened in his natural
than andout
ised of his original formation activity andthusit
the vanquished, and therefore re mostly, from happensthenthat,
these causes, purely inci
quiresissue
and re-formammunition
to fresh ,to collectstragglers
to those who, dental to
than mighthuman
have nature,less is done
been done, and that
arewithout.All these things placethe generally whatis done istobeascribed
conquero r have already spoken.ofIfcrisis to thethirst
ofwhich wehimself inthestate pow entirely also
indeed for glory,
the hardhear the ofenergy,
tedness the
154 ON WAR. [ BOOK IV .
general-in -chief. It is only thus we can positions as a country usually offers on
explain the hesitating manner in which the mere show of an attack , or of an
many generals follow up a victory which intention to turn his flank ; and the rear
superior numbers have given them. The guard will be still less likely to engage
first pursuit of the enemy we limit in gene- in an obstinate resistance.
ral to the extent of the first day, including In all three cases the night, if itsets in
the night following the victory. At the before the conclusion of the whole act,
end of that period the necessity of rest our usually puts an end to it, and the few
selves prescribes a halt in any case. instances in which this does not take
This first pursuit has different natural place, and the pursuit is continued
degrees. throughout the night, must be regarded
The first is, if cavalry alone are as pursuits in an exceptionally vigorous
employed ; in that case it amounts form .
usually more to alarming and watching If we reflect that in fighting by night
than to pressing the enemy in reality, everything mustbe, more or less, aban
because the smallest obstacle of ground doned to chance, and that at the conclu
is generally sufficient to check the pursuit. sion of a battle the regular cohesion
Useful ascavalrymay be against single and order of things in an army must
bodies ofbroken demoralised troops,still inevitably be disturbed, we mayeasily
opposedtheto auxiliary
only the wholearmit becomes
, becauseagain conceive
the to the reluctance
carrying of both generals
on their business in the
troops in retreat can employ fresh obscurity of night. If a complete dis
reserves to cover the movement , and, solution of the vanquished army, or a
therefore, at the next trifling obstacle of rare superiority of the victorious army in
ground,
can makebya combining
stand with all arms. they
success military virtue
The everything does
would in anot ensurebesuccess
manner given,
only exception to this is in the case of an up to fate, which can never be for the
army in actual flight in a complete state interest of any one , even of the most fool.
of dissolution . hardy general . As a rule, therefore,
The second degree is, if the pursuit is night puts an endto pursuit, even also
made by a strong advanced guard com when the battle has only been decided
posed of all arms, the greater part shortly before itscommencement. This
consisting naturally of cavalry. Such a allows the conquered either time for rest
pursuit generally drives the enemy as far andto rally immediately, or, if he retreats
as the nearest strong position for his rear during the night it gives him a march in
guard, or the next position affording advance .After this break the conquered
space for his army. For either an oppor is decidedly in a better condition ; much
tunity is not usually found at once, and, of that which had been thrown into
therefore, the pursuit can be carried confusion has been brought again into
further ; generally, however, it does not order, ammunition has been renewed,
extend beyond the distance of one or at
most a couple of leagues, because other the whole has been put into a fresh
formation . Whatever further encounter
wise the advanced guard would not feel now takes place with the enemy is a new
itself sufficiently supported. battle, not a continuation of the old, and
Thethird
when and mostvigoro
the victorious army itself continues
althoughit may be far frompromising
us degree is absolute
its advance as far as the physical powers success, still it is a fresh combat,
can endure . In this case the beaten and not merely a gathering up of the
débris by the victor.
army will generally quit such ordinary When, therefore, the conqueror can
 11.. ]
CHAP . XII STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY . 155

continue the pursuit itself throughout which representations of the exhaustion

the night, if only with a strong advanced of all powers,and physical impossibility
guard composed of all arms of the of continuing the struggle , obtained
service, the effect of the victory is im- readier entrance and greater weight.
Certainly the sparing one's own n instru
mensely increased, of which the battles of ment
Leuthen and BelleAlliance * are examples. of victory is a vital questio if we
The whole action of this pursuit is only possess this one, and foresee that
e when it will
mainly tactical, and we only dwell upon soon the time may arriv
it here in order to make plain the not be sufficient for all that remains to
difference which through it may be be done, for every continuation of the
produced in the effect of a victory . offensive as a rule leads ultimately to
ion was still so
This first pursuit, as far as the nearest that. But this calculat
stopping -point, belongs as a right to every far false, as the further loss of forces by
conqueror, and is hardly in any way a continuance of the pursuit could bear
connected with his further plans and no proportion to that which the enemy
combinations. These may considerably must suffer. That view , therefore, again
diminish the positive results of a victory could only exist because the military
gained with the main body of the army, forces were not considered the main
buttheycannot make this firstuse of it thing. And sowe find that in former
wars real heroes only — such as Charles
impossible; at least cases of that kind, if
conceivable at all, must be so uncommon XII., Marlborough, Eugene, Frederick
thatthey should have no appreciable the Great - added a vigorous pursuit to
influence on theory. And here certainly their victorieswhen theywere decisive
We must saythattheexample afforded enough , and that othergenerals usually
by modern wars opens up quite a new conte nted themselves with the possession
field for energy of the field of battle . In modern times
In preceding wars, the greater energy infused into the con
resting on a narrower basis, and altoge
ther more circumscribed in their scope, duct of wars through the greater import
of the circumstances from which
thereweremanyunnecessary conventional ance
Testr ictio ns in vari ousways, but part icu- they hav e proceeded has throwndown
larly in this point. The conception, Honour these conventional barriers ; the pursuit
of Victory seemed to generals so muchby has becomean all-importantbusinessfor
far the chief thing, that they thought the conqueror ; trophies have on that
account multiplied in extent, and if there
the less of the complete destruction of are cases also in modern warfare in which
the enemy's military force , as in point of
this has not been so, still they belong to
fact that destruction of force appeared to
them only as one of the many means in the list of exceptions, and are to be ac
war, not by any means as the principal , counted for by peculiar circumstances.
much less as the only means ; so that At Görschen and Bautzen nothing but
they the more readily putthe sword in the superiority of the allied cavalry pre
its sheath the moment the enemy had vented a complete rout, at Gross Beeren
Dennewitz the ill-will of the Crown
lowered his. Nothing seemed more na and ce den, at Laon the enfeebled
tural to them than tostop the combat as Prin of Swe
foon as the decision was obtained,and pers
But Boro
itioisn of
onal conddino oldanBlüc
also
her. on to
illustrati
to regard all further carnage as unneces
sarycruelty. Even if this false philo- the point here, and we cannot resist say,
sophy did not determine their resolutions ing a few more words about it, partly
entirely, still itwasa point of view by beca use we donotconsider thecircum
• Waterloo .
stances are explained simply by attach
156 ON WAR. [BOOK IV .
ing blame to Buonaparte, partly because reckoned amongst those in which, through
it might appear as if this, and with it a the general relations, the general is in
great number of similar cases, belonged terdicted the first following up of his
to that class which we have designated victory, for there never was in his case
as so extremely rare, cases in which the any question of mere pursuit. The vic.
general relations seize and fetter the gene- tory was decided at four o'clock in the
ral at the very beginning of the battle. afternoon, but the Russians still occupied
French authors in particular, and great the greater part of the field of battle;
admirers of Buonaparte ( Vaudancourt, theywere not yet disposed to give up the
if the attack had been re
Chambray, Ségur ), have blamed him ground, and would
decidedly because he did not drive the newed, they still have offered a
Russian army completely off the field, most determined resistance, which would
and use his last reserves to scatter it, have undoubtedly ended in their complete
because then what was only a lost battle defeat, but would have cost the conqueror
would have been a complete rout. We much further bloodshed. We must there
should be obliged to diverge too far to fore reckon the Battle of Borodino as
describe circumstantially the mutual situ- amongst battles, like Bautzen, left un
ation of the two armies; but this much is finished. At Bautzen the vanquished
evident, thatwhen Buonaparte passed the preferred to quit the field sooner; at
Niemen with his army the same corps which Borodino the conqueror preferred to con
afterwards fought at Borodino numbered tent himself with a halfvictory, not be
300,000 men, of whom now only 120,000 cause the decision appeared doubtful, but
remained , he might therefore well be ap- because he was not rich enough to pay
prehensive that he would not have enough for the whole.
left to march upon Moscow , the point on Returning now to our subject, the
which everyth
victory
ing
which he seemed to depend. The deduction from our reflections in
had just gained gave relation to the first stage of pursuit is,
him nearly a certainty of taking that that the energy thrown into it chiefly
capital, for that the Russians would be determines the value of the victory ; that
in a condition to fight a second battle this pursuit is a second act of the victory,
within eight days seemed in the highest in many cases more important also than
degree improbable ; and in Moscow he the first, and that strategy, whilst here
hoped to find peace . No doubt the com- approaching tactics to receive from it
plete dispersion of the Russian army the completed work, exercises the first
would have made this peace much more act of her authority by demanding this
certain ; but still the first consideration completion of the victory .
was to get to Moscow , that is, to get there But further, the effects of victory
with a force with which he should appear
are very seldom found to stop with this
pursuit
dictator over the capital, and through first ; now firstbegins the real
that over the empire and the government.
The force which he brought with him to career to which victory lent velocity.
This course is conditioned as we have
Moscow was no longer sufficient for that, already said, by other relations of which
as shown in the sequel, but it would have
been still less so if, in scattering the it is not yet time to speak. But we must
here mention, what there is of a general
Russian army, he had scattered his own
at the same time. Buonaparte was tho character in the pursuit, in order to
avoid repetition when the subject occurs
roughly alive to all this, and in our eyes again.
he stands completely justified . But on In the further stages of pursuit, again,
that account this case is still not to be we can distinguish threedegrees : the
 CHAP. XII. ] STRATEGIC MEANS OF UTILISING VICTORY.
157
simple pursuit , a hard pursuit, and a main body of the army, or for the rear
parallelmarch to intercept.
The simple following or pursuing àguard,
night the conquered
march, must
or alter his either make
position in
causes the enemy to continue his retreat, the night, retiring further away, which is
until he thinks he can risk another much the same thing ; the victorious
battle. It will therefore in its effect party can on the other hand pass the
suffice to exhaust the advantages gained , night in quiet.
and besides that, all that the enemy can- The arrangement of marches, and the
not carry with him , sick, wounded , and choice of positions depend in this case
disabled from fatigue, quantities of also upon so many other things especially
baggage, and carriages of all kinds, will on the supplying of the army, on strong
fall into our hands, but this mere fol- natural obstacles in the country , on large
lowing does not tend to heighten the towns, etc. , etc., that it would beridiculous
disorder in the enemy's army, an effect pedantry to attempt to show by a geo
which is produced by the two following metrical analysis how the pursuer , being
degrees.
able to impose his laws on the retreating
If for instance,instead of contenting enemy, can compel him to march atnight
ourselves with taking up every day the while he takes his rest. But nevertheless
camp the enemy has just vacated , oc- it is true and practicable that marches
cupying just as much of the country as in pursuit may be so planned as to have
he chooses to abandon , we make our this tendency, and that the efficacy of
arrangements so as every day to encroach the pursuit is very much enhanced there
further, and accordingly with our advanced by. Ifthis is seldom attended to in the
guard organised for the purpose , attack execution, itis because such a procedure
his rearguard every time it attempts to is more difficult for the pursuing army,
halt, then such a course will hasten his than a regular adherence ordin
to ary
retreat, and consequently tend to in, marches in the day time. To start in
crease his disorganisation. This it will good time in the morning, to encamp at
principally effect by the character of midday, to occupy the rest of the day
continuous flight, which his retreat will in providing for the ordinary wants of
thus
assume. Nothing has such the army, and the night for repose,
e on the soldier, as is a much moreto use
a
depressing influenc convenient method than
the sound of the enemy's cannon afresh to regulate one's movements exactly ac
at the moment when after
, forced
march he seeks some rest ; ifathis ex- cording
to to those
determine of the
nothing till the last therefore
enemy, moment,
citement is continued from day to day
to start on the march, sometimes in the
for sometime, it may lead to a complete morning,sometimes in the evening, to
panic. There lies in it a constant admis . be always for several hours in the pre
sion of being obliged to obey the law of sence of the enemy, and exchanging
the enemy , and of being unfit for any cannon shotswith him, and keeping up
resistance , and the consciousness of this skirmishing fire, to plan manquvresto
cannot do otherwise than weaken the
turn him , in short, to make the whole
moraleof an armyin
effect of pressing the ahigh
degree.
enemy in The outlay of tactical meanswhichsucha
this way course renders necessary. All that
attains a maximum when it drives the naturally bears with a heavy weight
enemy to make night marches. Ifthe on the pursuing army, and in war,
conqueror scares away the discomfited where there are so many burdens to be
opponent at sunset from a camp which borne, men are always inclined tostrip
has just been taken up either for the off those which do not seem absolutely
158 OV WAR. [BOOK IV .
necessary. These observations are true, wants, and it easily leads to immoderate
whether applied to a whole army or as in efforts on the part of the troops, by which
the more usual case, to a strong advanced- enormous losses are sustained, in strag
guard. For the reasons just mentioned, kinds.
glers, broken guns, and carriages of all
this second method of pursuit, this con
tinued pressing of the enemypursued is The third way is to make a detour,
rather a rare occurrence ; even Buonaparte and get round the nearest point of inter
at a
in his Russian campaign, 1812, practised ception, to march with more ease and
it but little, for the reasons here apparent, greater distance from the enemy,
that the difficulties and hardshipsof this thus to render the haste required less
campaign, without that, threatened his damaging. This last way is the worst of
army with destruction before itcould all, it generally turns out like a new debt
reach its object other
; on the hand the contracted by an insolvent debtor, and
French in their other campaigns have leads to greater embarrassment. There
distinguished themselves by their energy are cases in which this course is advisable;
in this point also. others where there is nothing else left;
Lastly, the third and most effectual also instances in which it has been suc
form of pursuit is, the parallel march to cessful; but upon the whole it is certainly
the immediate aim of the retreat .
true that its adoption is usually influenced
Every defeated army will naturally less by a clear persuasion of its being
have behind it, at a greater or less distance , the surest way of attaining the aim than
some point, the attainment of which is by another inadmissible motive -this
the first object in view, whether it be motive is the dread of encountering the
that failing in this its further retreat might enemy. Woe to the commander who gives
be compromised, as in the case of a defile, in to this ! However much the morale
or that it is important for the point itself of his army may have deteriorated, and
to reach it before the enemy , as in the casehowever well founded may be his appre
of a great city, magazines, etc., or, lastly,hensions of being at a disadvantage in
that the army at this point will gain new any conflict with the enemy, the evil will
powers of defence, such as å strong only be made worse by too anxiously
position , or junction with other corps.
avoiding every possible risk of collision.
Now if the conqueror directs his march Buonaparte in 1813 would never have
lateral road , itis brought over the Rhine with himthe
on this point by a quicken
evident how that may the retreat 30,000 or 40,000 men who remained
of the beaten army in a destructive after the battle of Hanau, if he had
manner, convert it into hurry, perhaps avoided that battle and tried to pass the
into a flight. The conquered has only Rhine at Mannheim or Coblenz. It is
three ways to counteract this : the first is
to throw himself in front of the enemy , just by means of small combats carefully
in order by an unexpected attack to gain prepared and executed, and in which the
that probability of success which is lost defeated army being on the defensive,
to him in general from his position ; this has always the assistanceof the ground
plainly supposes an enterprising bold ofit is just by these that the moralstrength
general , and an excellent army, beaten the army can first be resuscitated.
but not utterly defeated ; therefore, it The beneficial effect of the smallest
can only be employed by a beaten army successes' is incredible ; but with most
in very few cases. generals the adoption of this plan implies
The second way is hastening the re great self-command. The other way,that
treat ; but this is just what the conqueror of evading all encounter, appears atfirst
so much easier, that there is a natural
CHAP . XIII 159
1.. ] RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE.
preference for its adoption. It is therefore can be adopted, it acts also like a great
usually just this system of evasion which mechanical power . The losses of the
best promotes the view of the pursuer, beaten army from sickness and fatigue
and often ends with the complete down . are on such a disproportionate scale,
fall of the pursued ; we must, however, the spirit of the army is so weakened
recollect here that we are speaking of and lowered by the constant solicitude
a whole army,not of a single division , impending
about ruin, that at last any
which, having been cut off, is seeking to thing like a well-organized stand is
join the main army by making a detour ; out of the question ; every day thou.
in such a case circumstances are different, sands of prisoners fall into the enemy's
and success is not uncommon . But there hands without striking a blow. In
is one condition requisite to the success such a season of complete good for
of this race of two corps for an object , tune, the conqueror need not hesitate
which is that a division of thepursuing about dividing his forces in order to draw
army should follow by the same road into the vortex of destruction everything
which the pursued has taken , in order to within reach of his army, to cut off
pick up stragglers, and keep up the detachments, to take fortresses unprepared
impression which the presence of the for defence, to occupy large towns, etc. ,
enemy never fails to make. Blücher etc. He may do anything until a new
neglected this in his, in other respects un- state of things arises, and the more he
exceptionable, pursuit after Belle Alliance . ventures in this way the longer will it be
Such marches tell upon the pursuer as
well as the pursued , and they are not before Therethatis change
no wantwilloftake place. of
examples
advisable if the enemy's army rallies brilliant results from grand decisive vic
itself upon another considerable one ; tories, and of great and vigorous pursuits
if it has a distinguished general at its in the wars of Buonaparte . We need only
head,andif itsdestruction is not already quote Jena, Ratisbonne, Leipsic, and
well prepared. But when this means Belle - Alliance.

CHAPTER XIII.

RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE .

In alostbattle the power of an army is by the protection of strong fortresses,or

broken, the moral to a greaterdegree by great divisions ofthecountry, or by
than the physical . A second battle un
, a separation of the enemy's force. The
less fresh favourable circumstances come
into play, would lead to a complete defeat, magnitude
extent of of
the the lossesbut
defeat, sustained, the
still more
perhaps, to destruction , This is a the character of the enemy, will bring
military axiom . According to the usual
course the retreat is continued up to
nearer or put off the instant of this
equilibrium . How many instances may
restored, eitherbyequilibrium
isthatpointwherethe of forces
reinforcements , or be found of abeatenarmyralliedagain
at a short distance, without its circum
160 ON WAR . ( BOOK IV.
stances having altered in any way A strong rear guard composed of
since the battle. The cause of this pickedtroops, commanded by the bravest 1

may be traced to the moral deficiency general, and supported by the whole
of the adversary, or to the prepon- army at critical moments, a careful
derance gained in the battle not hav. utilisation of ground, strong ambuscades
ing been sufficient to make a lasting wherever the boldness of the enemy's
impression. advanced guard, and the ground, afford
To profit by this weakness or mistake opportunity; in short, the preparation
of the enemy, not to yield one inch and the system of regularsmall battles,
breadth more than the pressure of these are the means of following this
circumstances demands, but above all principle.
things, in order to keep up the moral The difficulties of a retreat are natu
forces to as advantageous a point as pos- rally greater or less according as the
sible, a slow retreat, offering incessant battle has been fought under more or
resistance , and bold courageous counter- less favourable circumstances, and accord
strokes, whenever the enemy seeks to ing as it has been more or less obstinately
gain any excessive advantages, are abso- contested. The battle of Jena and Belle
lutely necessary Retreats of great Alliance show how impossible anything
generals and of armies inured to war like a regular retreat may become , if the
have always resembled the retreat of a last man is used up against a powerful
wounded lion, and such is, undoubtedly, enemy.
also the best theory.
Now and again it has been suggested
It is true that at the moment of quitting ( Lloyd Bülow ) to divide for thepurpose of
a dang erou s position we hav ofte seen retreating , therefore to retreat in separate
e n
trifling formalities observed which caused divisions or even eccentrically. Such a
a waste of time, and were, therefore , separation as is made merely for con
attended with danger , whilst in such venience, and along with which con
cases everything depends on getting out centrated action continues possible and
of the place speedily . Practised generals is kept in view, is not what we now
reckon this maxim a very important refer to : any other kind is extremely
one . But such cases must not be con- dangerous, contrary to the nature of the
founded with a general retreat after a thing, and therefore a great error. Every
lost battle. Whoever then thinks by a lost battle is a principle of weakness and
few rapid marches to gain a start, and disorganisation ; and the first and imme
more easily to recover a firm standing, diate desideratum is to concentrate, and in
commits a great error . The first move .
concentration to recover order, courage,
ments should be as small as possible , and confidence. The idea of harassing the
and it is a maxim in general not to suffer
ourselves to be dictated to by the enemy . enemy by separate corps on both flanks
moment whenperfect
This maxim cannot be followed without at histhevictory ,is a he is following
anomaly ;up
a
bloody combats with the enemy at our
heels, but the maxim is worth the faint-hearted pedant might be overawed
sacrifice ; without it we get into an by his enemy in that manner, and for
accelerated pace which soon turns into such a case it may answer ; but where
á headlong rush, and costs merely in we are not sure of this failing in our
opponent it is better let alone. If the
stragglers more men than rear-gua rd strategic relations after a battle require
combats would besides
have cost, and that we should cover ourselves right
that extinguishes the last remnants of and left by detached corps, so much
courageous spirit.
must be done, as from circumstances iß
 CHAP . XIV . 161
:] NIGHT COMBAT.
unavoidable, but this fractioning must of Brienne, sent Marmont back to the
always be regarded as an evil, and we Aube, whilst he himself passed the Seine,
are seldom in a state to commence it and turned towards Troyes ; but that
the day after the battle itself. disaster
in tance , was solely
If Frederick the Great after the battle owing the end
this didtonot circums that the Allies,
of Collin , and the raising of the siege of instead of pursuing, divided their forces
Prague retreated in three columns,that in like manner, turned with the one part
was done not out of choice, but because ( Blücher) towards the Marne, while
with the other ( Schwartzenberg ), from
the position of his forces, and the neces-
sity of covering Saxony, left him no fear of being too weak, they advanced
alternative. Buonaparte after the battle quite slowly .

CHAPTER XIV .

NIGHT COMBAT.

The manner of conducting a combat at forehand ; and could not escape notice in
night, and what concerns the details of his reconnaissances , and enquiries ; that
its course , is a tactical subject ; we only on the other hand the measures of the
examine it here sofar as inits totality assailant,being onlytakenatthe moment
it appears as a special strategic means . of execution, cannot be known to the
Fundamentally every night attack is
enemy.the the lastand
But case, not always
still isless
of these is the
only a more vehement form ofsurprise. quite
Now at the first look of the thing such first. If we are not so near the enemy
an attack appears quite pre- eminently as to have him completely under our
advantageous, for we suppose the enemy
the Austrians Frederick
had of the,
to be taken by surprise , the assailant Greatasbefore
eye, the battle Hochkirch
naturally to be prepared for every thing then allthat we know of his position
which can happen . "What an inequality? must always be imperfect, as it is
Imagination paints to itselfa picture of obtained by reconnaissances, patrols,
the most complete confusion on theone information prisoners and spies,
from ,
side, and on the other side the assailant sources on which no firm reliance can
only occupied in reaping the fruits of be placed because intelligence thus
this stateofthings. Hence the constant obtained is always more or less of an
creation of schemes for night attacks old date, and the position of the enemy
by those who have not to lead them,
may have been altered in the mean
and have no responsibility , whilstthese time. Moreover, with the tactics and
attacks seldom take place in reality.
These ideal schemes are all based on mode of encampment of former times it
was much easier than it is now to
the hypothesis that the assailant knows examine the position of the enemy.
the A
arrangements of the defender because line of tents is much easier to distinguish
they havebeen made and announced be
than a line of huts or a bivouac ; and an
M
162 ON WAR . [ BOOK IV .
encampment on a line of front, fully and e may attack
We a portion of the enemy's
regularly drawn out, also easier than army with a very superior force, con
s, sequently enveloping it with a view
one of divisions formed in column
t
the mode often used at presen . We either to take the whole, or to inflict
may have the ground on which a division very severe loss on it by an unequal
bivouac s in that manner completely under combat, provided that other circum
our eye, and yet not be able to arrive stances are in our favour. But such a
at any accurate idea . scheme can never succeed except by a
But the position again is not all that great surprise, because no fractional part
we want to know ; the measures which the of the enemy's army would engage in
defender may take in the course of the such an unequal combat , but would
combat are just as important, and do not retire instead . But a surprise on an
by any means consist in mere random important scale except in rare instances
shots. These measures alsomake night ina very close country, can only be
attacks more difficult in modern warseffected at night. If therefore wewish
than formerly, because they have in these to gain such an advantage as this from
wars an advantage over those already thefaulty disposition of a portion of the
taken. Inour combats the position of the enemy's army, then we must make use
defender is more temporary than defin- of the night, at all events , to finish the
itive, and on that account the defender preliminary part even if thecombat
in our wars is better able to surprise his itself should not open till towards day
adversary with unexpected blows, than break. This is therefore what takes
he could formerly. place in all the little enterprisesby night
Therefore whatthe assailantknows of againstoutposts, and other smallbodies,
the defensive previous to a night attack, the main point being invariably through
seldom
iswant ornever sufficient to supply the superior numbers, and gettinground his
of direct observation .
But the defender has on his side an
position, to entangle him unexpectedly
in such a disadvantageous combat,that
other small advantage as well, which is he cannot disengage himself without
that he is more at home than the assail great loss.
ant, on the ground which forms his posi The larger the corps attacked, the
tion, and therefore, like the inhabitant of more difficult the undertaking, because
a room , will find his way about it in a strong corps has greater resources
the dark with more ease than a stranger .
He knows better where to find each within itself to maintain the fight long
part of his force, and therefore can more enough for help to arrive.
Onthat account the whole ofthe enemy's
readily get at it than is the case with
the assailant . army can never in ordinary cases be the
From this it follows, that the assailant object of such an attack , for although it
in a combat at night wants his eyes has no assistance to expect from any
just as much as the defender, and that quarter outside itself, still, it contains
therefore , only particular reasons can within itself sufficient means of repelling
make a night attack advisable . attacks from severalsides particularlyin
Now these reasons arise mostly in our day, when every one from the com
connection with subordinate parts of an mencement is prepared for this very
usual form of attack . Whether the
army, rarely with the army itself; hence enemy can attack us on several sides
it follows that a night attack also as a
rule can only take placewith secondary with success, depends generally on con
ditions
combats, and seldom with great battles . quite differentfromthat ofits
being done unexpectedly ;without enter
 CHAP . XIV .] NIGHT COMBAT. 163

ing here into the nature of these con. battle on both sides is also more perfect :
ditions, we confine ourselves to observing, on the other hand, in former wars it was
that with turning an enemy, great results,
a frequentpractice for armies to take up
but also great dangers are connected ; camps in sight of each other, when they
that therefore, if we set aside special had no other object but that of mutually
circumstances, nothing justifies it but holding each other in check,consequently
great superiority, just such as we should for a longer period. How often Frederick
use against a fractional part of the the Great stood for weeks so near to the
enemy's army, Austrians, that the two might have ex
But the turning and surrounding a changed cannon shots with each other.
small corpsof the enemy, and particularly But these practices, certainly more fa
in the darkness of night, is also more vourable to night attacks, have been dis
practicable for this reason, that whatever continued in later wars ; and armies being
we stake upon it, and however superior now no longer in regard to subsistence
the force used may be, still probably it and requirements for encampment, such
constitutes only a limited portion of our independent bodies complete in them
army, and we can sooner stake that than selves, find it necessary to keep usually a
the whole on the risk of a great venture. day's march between themselves and
Besides, the greater part or perhaps the enemy. If we now keep in view specially
wholeserves as a support and rallying the night attack of an army, it follows
point for the portion risked, which again that sufficient motives for it can seldom
very much diminishes the danger of the occur, and that they fall under one or
enterprise.
other of the following classes.
Not only the risk , but the difficulty of 1. An unusual degree of carelessness
execution as well confines night enter- or audacity which very rarely occurs,
prises to small bodies . As surprise is and when it does is compensated for by
the real sense of them so also stealing a great superiority in moral force.
through is the chief condition of execu- 2. A panic in the enemy's army, or
tion: but this is more easily done with generally such a degree of superiority
small bodies than with large, and for the in moral force on our side, that this is
columns of a whole army
seldom
cable. For this reason such practi- sufficient to supply the place of guid
enterprises ance in action.
are in general only directed against 3. Cutting through an enemy's army of
single outposts, and can only be feasible superior force,which keeps us enveloped ,
against greater corps if they are without because in this all depends on surprise,
sufficient outposts, like Frederick the and the object ofmerely making a passage
Great at Hochkirch . This will happen byforce, allows a much greater concen
seldomer in future to armies themselves tration of forces .
than to minor divisions.
4. Finally, in desperate cases, when our
In recent times, when war has been forces have such a disproportion to the
carried on withso much more rapidity enemy's, that we see no possibility of
and vigour, it has in consequence often success, except through extraordinary
happened certainly that armies have daring.
encamped very close to each other, with- But in all these cases there is still the
out havi ng
a very strong
posts, because system of out-
those circumstances have condition that the enemy's army is under
our eyes, and protected by no advanced
generally occurred just at the crisis guard.
which precedes a great decision . But As for the rest, most night combats
then at such times the readiness for are so conducted as to end with day light,
164 ON WAR. [BOOK IV.
so thatonly the approach, and the first his adversary ; and combats of this des
attack are made undercoverof darkness, cription which do not commence until dayis
because the assailant in that manner can break, in which the night therefore
better profit by the consequences of the only made use of to approach, are not
state of confusion into which he throws to be counted as night combats.

7
ON WA R.

VOL. II.

-
 CONTENTS.- VOL. II.

BOOK V .--MILITARY FORCES .

mack
CHAP , PAGE
I. General Scheme 1
II. Theatre of War, Army, Campaign
III. Relation of Power
1
3
IV. Relation of the Three Arms 5
V. Order of Battle of an Army 11
VI. General Disposition of an Army 16
VII. Advanced Guard and Out - posts 20
VIII . Mode of Action of Advanced Corps 25
IX. Camps 28
X. Marches 30
Marches (continued)
XI. March 35
XII . conti
es ( nued ) 37
XIII. Cantonments 39
XIV. Subsistence 43
XV . Base of Operations 54
XVI. Lines of Communication 58
XVII. On Countryand Ground 60
XVIII. Command of Ground 64

BOOK VI. - DEFENCE .

1. Offence and Defence 67
II. TheRelations of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics 70
72
III. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Strategy
IV. Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defence . 75
V. Character of Strategic Defensive 78
VI. Extent of the Means of Defence 79
VII. Mutual Action and Re-actionof Attack and Defence 84
VIII. Methods of Resistance 85
IX. Defensive Battle 95
X. Fortresses 98
XI. Fortresses (continued) 105
108
XII . Defensive Position
112
XIII. Strong Positions and Entrenched Camps
XIV. Flank Posi tions 117
XV. Defenceof Mountains 119
124
XVI . Defence of Mountains ( continued) 130
XVII . Defence of Mountains ( continued) 133
XVIII. Defence of Streams and Rivers.
144
XIX. Defence of Streams and Rivers (continued )
1
iv CONTENTS . - VOL . II .

CHAP . PAGE
XX . A .-- Defence of Swamps . 146
B .-- Inundations 147
XXI . Defence of Forests . 150
XXII . The Cordon 151
XXIII . Key of the Country 154
XXIV. Operating against a Flank 157
XXV. Retreat into the Interior of the Country 164
XXVI . Arming the Nation . 173
XXVII. Defence of a Theatre of War 178
XXVIII . Defence of a Theatre of War ( continued ) 181
XXIX . Defence of a Theatre of War (continued ) —Successive Resistance 191
XXX. Defence of a Theatre of War (continued )—When no Decision is sought for 193
 ON WA R.

BOOK V : -MILITARY FORCES.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL SCHEME .

We shall consider military forces : an army, which only come under the
and As regards .their numerical
1. organisation strength head of necessary conditions of fighting,
but do not constitute the fight itself.
2. In their state independent of fight Theystand in more orless close connec
ing.
tion with and react upon the fighting,
3. In respect of their maintenance ; and therefore, in considering the appli
and , lastly, cation of the combat they must often
Inoutheir general relations to country appear ; but we must first consider each
an4.d gr nd .
by itself, as a whole, in its essence and
Thus we shall devote this book to the peculiarities.
consideration of things appertaining to

CHAPTER II .

THEATRE OF WAR, ARMY, CAMPAIGN.

The nature of the things does not allow we may not sometimes be quite misun
of a completely satisfactory definition of derstood , we must try to make somewhat
these three factors, denoting respectively, plainer the usual meaning of theseterms,
space, mass, and time in war ; but that to which we shall in most cases adhere.
VOL. II.
B
2 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
ways have a proportionate degree of in
1.- Theatre of War. dependence.
This term denotes properly such a por The mere absolute numerical strength
tion of the space over which war prevails of a body of troops is less decisive on the
ashas its boundaries protected,and thus subject than might at first appear. For
possesses akind of independence. This where several Armies are acting under
protection may consist in fortresses, or one command, and upon one and the
important natural obstacles presented by same Theatre of War, they are called
the country, or even in its being sepa- Armies, not by reason of their strength,
rated by a considerable distance from but from the relations antecedent to the
the rest of the space embraced in the war. war ( 1813 , the Silesian Army, the Army
-Such a portion is not a mere piece of of the North, etc. ) , and although we
divide
should to
the whole, but a small whole complete tended a great mass of troops in
remain in the same Theatre into
in itself ; and consequently it is more or
less in such a condition that changes corps, we should never divide them into
which take place at other points in the Armies, at least, such a division would
seat of war have only an indirect and no be contrary to what seems to be the mean
direct influence upon it. To give an ing which is universally attached to the
adequate idea of this, we may suppose term , On the other hand, it would cer
that on this portion an advance is made, tainly be pedantry to apply the term
whilst in another quarter a retreat is Army to each band of irregular troops
taking place, or that upon the one an acting independently in a remote pro
army is acting defensively, whilst an vince : still we must not leave unnoticed
offensive is being carried on upon the that it surprises no one when the Army
other. Such a clearly defined idea as of the Vendeans in the Revolutionary
this is not capable of universal applica- War is spoken of, and yet it was not
tion ; it is here used merely to indicate much stronger.
the line of distinction . The conceptions of Army and Theatre
of War therefore, as a rule, go together,
2.- Army . and mutually include each other.
With the assistance of the conception
of a Theatre of War, it is very easy to 3. – Campaign .
say what an Army is : it is, in point of Although the sum of all military events
fact, the mass of troops in the same
Theatre of War. But this plainly does which happen in all the Theatresof War
n,
not include all that is meant by theterm in one year is often called a Campaig
still, however, it is more usual and more
in its common usage. Blücher and Wel
lington commanded each a separate army exact to understand by theterm the
in 1815, althoughthe two were in the itevents in onestill
isworse single Theatre of notion
to connectthe War. But
of a
same Theatre of War . The chief com
mand is, therefore, another distinguish Campaign with the period of one year,
ing signforthe conception ofanArmy. for wars no
naturally longer divide ofthemselves
intoCampaigns a year's
At thesame timethissign is very nearly duration byfixedandlong periods in
allied to thepreceding ,for where things winter quarters. As, however ,the events
are well organised, there should only ina Theatre of Warof themselves form
exist one supreme command in a Theatre
of War , and the commander - in - chief in
certain great chapters — if,for instance,
a particular Theatre of War should al- thedirect effects
great catastrophe of some
cease more
, and less
newor com
 CHAP. III.) THEATRE OF WAR, ARMY, CAMPAIGN . 3

binations begin to develop themselves -
thorefore these natural subdivisions must
be taken into consideration in order to
allot to each year(Campaign)its complete
share of events . No one would make the
Campaign of 1812 terminate at Memel,
where the armies were on thelst January,
and transfer the further retreat of the
French until they recrossed the Elbe to
the campaign of 1813, as that further
retreat was plainly only a part of the
whole retreat from Moscow.
That we cannot give these conceptions
any greater degree of distinctness is of
no consequence, because they cannot be
used as philosophical definitions for the
basis of any kind of propositions. They
only serve to give a little more clear
ness and precision to the language we
use .

CHAPTER III .

RELATION OF POWER .

In the eighth chapter of the third book art of war developing itself in an effort
we have spoken of the value of superior to make a skilful use of ground on great
numbers in battles, from which follows general principles, and by such means
as a consequence the superiority of num- here and there we find one general gaining
bers in. general in strategy. So far the great advantages over another ; but even
importance of the relations of power is this tendency has disappeared, and wars
established : we shall now add a few
now go on in a simpler and more natural
more detailed considerations on the sub manner. r . - If, divesting ourselves of any
ject .
preconceived notions, we look at the ex
An unbiassed examination of modern periences of recent wars, we must admit
military history leads to the convictionthat there are but little traces of any of
that the superiority in numbers becomes the above influences, either throughout
every day more decisive ; the principle any whole campaign, or in engagements
of assembling the greatest possible num- of a decisive character — that is, the great
bers for adecisivebattle maytherefore battle,respectingwhich term we refer to
be regarded as more important than ever. the second chapter of the preceding book.
Courage and the spirit of an army Armies are in our days so much on a
have,inall ages,multiplied itsphysical par in regard to arms,equipment, and
powers, and will continue to do so equally drill, that there
in future; but we find also that at certain
notable
is no very dif
ference between the best and the worst
periods in history a superiority in the
organisation and equipment of an army in these things. A difference may still
has given a great moral preponderance ; be observed, resulting from the superior
instruction of the scientific corps, but in
we find that at other periods a great su general it only amounts to this, that one
periority in mobility had a like effect; at is the inventor and introducer of im
one timewe
brought see ;a atnewanother
to light systemweoftactics proved lyappliances,which
see the mediate imitates . Eventhetheotherim
subor
4 ON WAR . (BOOK V.

dinate generals, leaders of corps and strength, an occurrence by no means un

divisions, in all that comes within the common in former times. Buonaparte,
scope of their sphere, have in general the greatest general of modern times, in
everywhere the same ideas and methods, all his great victorious battles — with one
so that, except the talent of the com- exception, that of Dresden, 1813 — had
mander-in -chief — a thing entirely de- managed to assemble an army superior
pendent on chance, and not bearing a in numbers, or at least very little inferior,
constant relation to the standard of edu- to that of his opponent, and when it was
cation amongst the people and the army- impossible for him to do so, asat Leipsic,
there is nothing now but habituation to Brienne, Laon, and Belle -Alliance , he
war which can give one army a decided was beaten.
superiority over another. The nearer we The absolute strength is in strategy
approach to a state of equality in all generally a given quantity, which the
these things, more decisive becomes
the commander cannot alter. But from this
the relation in point of numbers. it by no means follows that it is impos
The character of modern battles is the sible to carry on a war with a decidedly
result of this state of equality. Take inferior force. War is not always a volun
for instance the battle of Borodino, tary act of state policy, and least of all
where the first army in the world, the is it so when the forces are very unequal:
French,measured its strength with the consequently , anyrelation of forces is
Russian, which , in many parts of its imaginable in war, and it would be a
organisa tion, and in the education of its strangetheory ofwar which would wish
e it is most
special branches, might be considered to give up its office just wher
the furthest behindhand . In the whole wanted .
battle there is not one single trace of However desirable theory may consider
superior art or intelligence, it is a mere a proportionate force, still it cannot say
trial of strength between the respective that no use can bemade ofthe most dis
armies throughout ; and as they were proportionate. No limits can be pre
nearly equal in that respect, the result scribed in this respect.
could not be otherwise than a gradual The weaker the force the more mode
turn of thescalein favour of that side rate mustbetheobject it proposes to it
where there was the greatest energy on self, and the weaker theforce the shorter
the part of the commander , and the most time it will last. In these two directions
experience in war on the part of the there is a field for weakness to give
troops. We have taken this battle as an way, if we may use this expression. Of
illustration, because in it there was an the changes which the measure of the
equality in the numbers on each side force producesin the conduct of war, we
such as is rarely to be found. can only speak by degrees, as these
in
We do not mainta that all battles
exactly resemble this, but it shows the
things present themselves ; at present
dominant tone of most of them . it is sufficient to have indicated the gene
In a battle in which the forces try ral point of view , but to complete that
shall add one more observation.
their strength on each other so leisurely weThe more that an army involved in an
and methodically, an excess of force on unequal combat falls short of the number
one side must make the result in its
favour much more certain . And it is a of its opponents,the greater must be the
fact that we may search modern military tension of its powers,the greater its
history in vain for a battle in which an energy when danger presses . If the re
army has beaten another double its own verse takes place, and instead of heroic
desperation a spirit of despondency en
 CHAP. IV .] RELATION OF THE THREE ARMS. 5

sues, then certainly there is an end to bable continuance of the danger is so

every art of war. great that the greatest economy of our
If with this energy of powers is com- powers can no longer suffice to bring us
bined a wise moderation in the object to our object, then the tension of our
proposed , then there is that play of powers should be concentrated for one
brilliant actions and prudent forbear- desperate blow ; he who is pressed on
ance which we admire in the wars of all sides expecting littlehelp from things
Frederick the Great .
But the less that this moderation and which
and promise
only reliancenone,
in thewill place
moral his last
ascendancy
caution can effect, the more must the ten- which despair gives to courage, and look
sion and energy of the forces become upon the greatest daring as the greatest
predominant . When the disproportion wisdom , —at the same time employ the
of forces is so great that no modification assistance of subtle stratagem , and if he
of our own object canensureus safety doesnotsucceed, will find in an honour
from a catastrophe, or where the pro- able downfall the right to rise hereafter.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATION OF THE THREE ARMS.

Weshall only speak of the three princi- hand, it possessesthe latter in an especial
pal arms: Infantry, Cavalry, and Artil manner. It is therefore only suited for
lery.
attack. Infantry has especially the pro
Wemustbe
following excused
analysis making the perty of standing firm , butis not alto
whichforbelongsmore
necessary to give dis gether without mobility.
tactics, but isideas
totinctness From this division of the elementary
to our . forces of war into different arms, we have
The combat is of two kinds, which are as a result, the superiority and general
essentially
principle of different: the destructive utilityof Infantry as compared withthe
fire, and the hand to hand other two arms, from its being the only
or personal combat . This latter, again , arm which unites in itself all the three
is either attack or defence. ( As we here elementary forces. A further deduction
speak of elements, attack and defence to be drawn is, that the combination of
are to be understood in a perfectly abso the three arms leads to a more perfect
luto sense .) Artillery , obviously, acts use of the forces, by affording themeans
only with thedestruc
fire. Cavalry
tive principle
only with personal of strengthening
combatof. one at pleasureeitherthe
or the other of the principles which
Infantry with both. are united in an unalterable manner in
In close combatthe essence of defence Infantry.
consists in standing firm , as if rooted to The destructive principle of fire is in
ismovemen
cient
t. Cavalryyis; entirel
inthefirstqualit
y other yondmeasure
on the dedi themost
theless, theclose effective;toman,
combat,man never
 31
6 ON WAR. [BOOK V.
is just as plainly to be regarded as thus ascertained to each individual case
11
the real basis of combat. For that of a particular combat. A battalion on
reason , therefore, an army of artillery outpost service or on a retreat may, per
only would be an absurdity in war, but haps, choose to have with it a squadron
an army of cavalry is conceivable , only in preference to a couple of guns. A 12
itforce.
wouldAnpossess very little intensity of body of cavalry with horse artillery,sent
army of infantry alone is not in rapid pursuit of, or to cut off, a flying
only conceivable but also much the strong- enemy wants no infantry , etc. , etc.
est of the three. The three arms, there If we summarise the results of these
fore, stand in this order in reference to considerations they amount to this.
independent value - Infantry, Cavalry, 1. That infantry is the most independ
Artillery. ent of the three arms.
But this order does not hold good if 2. Artillery is quite wanting in inde
applied to the relative importance of each pendence.
arm when they are all three acting in 3. Infantry is the most important in
conjunction . As the destructive princi- the combination of the three arms.
ple is much more effective than the prin- 4. Cavalry can the most easily be dis
ciple of motion, therefore the complete pensed with .
want of cavalry would weaken an army 5. A combination of the three arms
less than the total want of artillery. gives the greatest strength .
An army consisting of infantry and Now, if the combination of the three
artillery alone, would certainlyfind itself gives the greatest strength, it is natural
in a disagreeableposition if opposed to to inquire what is the best absolute pro
an armyitcomposed
if what lacked inofcavalry
all threewasarms; but portion of each , but that isa question
compen
which it is almost impossible to answer:
sated for by a proportionate increase of If we could form a comparative esti.
infantry, it would still, by a somewhat mate of the cost of organising in the first
different mode of acting ,be able todo instance, and then provisioning and
very well with its tactical economy. Its maintaining each of the three arms;
outpost service would cause some embar- and then again of the relative amount of
rassment ; it would never be able to pur- service rendered by each in war, .we
sue a beaten enemy with great vivacity, should obtain a definite result which
and it must make aretreatwith greater would give the best proportion in the
bardships and efforts ; but these incon- abstract. But this is little more than a
venienc es wouldstill never besufficient playofthe imagination . The very first
in themselves to drive it completely out termin the comparison is difficult to de
of the field. — On the other hand, such termine, that is tosay,one of the factors:
an army opposed to one composed of in the cost in money , is not difficult tofind ;
fantry and cavalry only would be able but another, the value of men's lives,
to play a very good part, while it is
hardly conceivable that the latter could is a computation
readily try to solve which no . one would
by figures
keep the field at all against an army Also the circumstance that each of the
made up of all three arms .
Of course these reflections on the rela three arms chiefly depends on a different
element of strength in the state - Infan
tive importance of each single arm result
try on the number of the male popula
only from a consideration of the gene tion
rality of events in war, where one case , cavalry on the number of horses,
compensates another; and therefore it artillery
introduceson into
available financial means
thecalculation some hete
is not our intention to apply the truth
rogeneous conditions, the overruling influ
CHAP . IV.] RELATION OF THE THREE ARIS. 7

ence of which may be plainly observed particular arm as compared with the
in the great outlines of the history of same arm in the enemy's army.
different people at various periods. Artillery increases the destructive prin.
As, however, for other reasons we can- ciple of fire ; it is the most redoubtable of
not altogether dispense with some stan- arms, and its want, therefore, diminishes
dard of comparison, therefore, in place of very considerably the intensive force of
the whole of the first term of the com- an army On the other hand, it is the
parison we must take only that one of least moveable, consequently, makes an
its factors which can be ascertained, army more unwieldy ; further, it always
namely,
point it the cost in money.
is sufficient for ourNow onthis
purpose requires
to it a force forits support, because
is incapable of close combat ; if it is
assume that, in general, a squadron of too numerous, so that the troops appointed
150 horsemen, a battalion of infantry for its protection are not able to resist
800 strong, a battery of artillery consist- the attacks of the enemy at every point,
ing of 8 six-pounders, cost nearly the it is often lost, and from that follows a
same, both as respects the expense of fresh disadvantage, because of the three
formation of maintenance
and . arms it is the only one which in its
With regard
son
to the other member of principal parts, that is guns and carriages ,
the compari , that is, how much ser- the enemy can soon use against us.
vice the one arm is capable of rendering Cavalry increases the principle of
as compared with the others, it is much mobility in an army. If too few in
less easy to find any distinctquantity. number the brisk flame of the elements
Thething mightperhaps be possible if of war istherebyweakened, because
it depended inerely on the destroying everything must be done slower (on
principle ; but each arm is destined to foot), everything must be organised with
its own particular use , therefore has its more care ; the rich harvest of victory,
own particular sphere ofaction , which, instead of being cut with a scythe, can
again, is not so distinctlydefined that it only be reaped with a sickle.
might not be greater or less through An excess of cavalry can certainly
modifications only in the mode of con never be looked upon as a direct diminu.
ducting the war, without causing any tion of the combatant force, as an organic
decided disadvantage. disproportion , but it may certainly be so
We are often told of what experience indirectly, on account of thedifficultyof
teacheson this subject, and it is supposed- feeding that arm , and also if we reflect
that military history affords the informa that instead of a surplus of 10,000
tion necessary for a settlement of the horsemen not required we might have
question, but every one must look upon 50,000 infantry.
all thatas nothing more than a way of These peculiarities arising from the
talking, which , as it is not derived from preponderance of one arm are the more
anythingofa primary and necessary sense,
importaasntthat
to the art of warinitslimited
art teaches the use of what
nature, does not deserve attention in an
analytical examination . ever forces are forthcoming ; and when
Now although a fixed ratio as repre forces are placed under the command of
senting the best proportion between the a general, the proportion of the three
three arms is conceivable, but is an a arms is also commonly already settled
which it is impossible to find, a mere without his having had much voice in
imaginary quantity, still it is possible to the matter .
If we would form an idea of the
appreciate the effects of having a great character of warfare modified by the pre
superiority or a great inferiority in one
8 ON WAR. [BOOK V.
ponderance of one or otber of the three direct to the centre of force in the enemy's
arms it is to be done in the following army - these are the natural tendenciesor
manner :
principles in such cases.
An excess of artillery leads to a more These different forms which warfare
defensive and passive character in our takes according as one or other of the
measures ; our interest will be to seek
three arms preponderates,
security in strong positions , great natural an influence so complete seldom have
and decided
obstacles of ground, even in mountain as alone, or chiefly to determine the
positions, in order that the natural direction of a whole undertaking.
impediments we find in the ground may Whether we shall act strategically on
undertake the defence and protection of the offensive or defensive, the choice of
our numerous artillery, and that the a theatre of war, the determination to
enemy's forces may come themselves and
seek their own destruction . The whole fight a great battle, or adopt some other
war will be carried on in a serious formal means of destruction, are points which
minuet step : must be determined by other and more
not the considerations
essential
On the other hand, a want of artillery
is , at least,
case, it is much this
to be iffeared
will make us prefer the offensive, the that we have mistaken minor details for
active, the mobile principle ; marching, the chief consideration . But although
fatigue, exertion, become our special this is so, although the great questions
weapons , thus the war will become more must be decided before on other grounds,
diversified , more lively, rougher ; small
change is substituted for great events . there still always remains à certain
With a very numerous cavalry we margin armthe
deratingfor influence
, for of the prepon
in the offensive we can
seek wide plains, and take to great
always be bold
movements . Ata greater distance from defensive prudentand
andenterprising
methodical,, inetc.;
the
the enemy we enjoy morerest and greater etc., through all the different stages and
conveniences without conferring the same gradations of the military life.
advantages on our adversary . We may On the other hand , the nature of a war
venture on bolder measures to outflank
may
him , and on more daring movements proportions have aof notable
the threeinfluence
arms. on the
generally, as we have command over
space. In as far as diversions and inva First, a national war, kept up by militia
sions are true auxiliary means of war we
shall be able to make use of them with
and a general levy (Landsturm ), must
naturally bring into the field a very nu
greater facility. merous infantry; for in such wars there
A decided want of cavalry diminishes is a greater want of the means of equip
the forceof mobility in an army without consequently
ment is confined
than of men, and as the equipment
to what is in
increasing its destructive power as an
excess of artillery does. Prudence and disputably necessary, we may easily ima
method become then the leading charac gine, that forevery battery ofeightpieces,
teristics of the war . Always to remain might
not only raised
beone, buttwo
. orthree battalions
near the enemy in order to keep him
constantly in view — norapid ,stiil less Second, one
powerful if a cannot take opposed
weak state refuge into aa
hurried movements , everywhere a slow
pushing on of well concentrated masses general call of the male population to
-a preference for the defensive and for regular military service, or in a militia
broken country , and, when the offensive system resembling it, then the increase
must be resorted to, the shortest road of its artillery is certainly the shortest
way of bringing up its weak army nearer
CHAP. Iv.] RELATION OF THE THREE ARMS. 9

to an equality with that of the enemy, although always very much weaker actu.
for it saves men, and intensifies the es- ally in numbers, it was still always looked
sential principle of military force, that upon as the chief thing, infantry was
is, the destructive principle. Anyway, little valued , hardly spoken of ; hence has
such a state will mostly be confined to a arisen the belief that its numbers were
limited theatre, and therefore this arm few. No doubt it happened oftener than
will be better suited to it. Frederick the it does now, that in incursions of small
Great adopted this means in the later importance in France, Germany, and
period of the Seven Years' War. Italy, a small army was composed entirely
Third, cavalry is the arm for movement of cavalry ; as it was the chief arm , there
and great decisions ; its increase beyond is nothing inconsistent in that; but these
the ordinary proportions is therefore im- cases decide nothing if we take a general
portant if the war extends over agreat view , as they are greatly outnumbered by
space, if expeditions are to be made in cases of greater armies of the period
various directions, and great and decisive constituted differently. It was only when
blows are intended . Buonaparte is an the obligations to military service im
example of this. posed by the feudal laws had ceased,
That the offensive and defensive do and wars were carried on by soldiers
not properly in themselves exercise an enlisted, hired, and paid, when, there
influence on the proportion of cavalry fore, wars depended on money and
will only appear plainly when we come enlistment, that is, at the time of
to speakofthese two methods ofacting the Thirty Years'War, and the wars of
inwar; in themeantime,we shall only LouisXIV.—that this employment of
remark that both assailant and defender great masses of almost useless infantry
as a rule traverse the same spaces in war, was checked, and perhaps in those days
andmay have also,at least inmany theymighthavefallenintotheexclusive
cases, the same decisive intentions . We use of cavalry, if infantry had not just
remind
1812 . our readersof the campaign of prove importance bythrough
mentsininfire-arms,
thenrisen whichthe ims
mean
It is commonly believed that, in the it maintained its numerical superiority in
middle ages, cavalry was much more nu proportion to cavalry ; at this period, if
merous inproportion to infantry, and infantry was weak, the proportion was
that the difference has been gradually on as one to one, if numerous as three to
se
the decrea ever since. Yet this is a one .
mistake, at least partly. The proportion Since then cavalry has always de
of cavalry was, according to numbers, on creased in importance according as im
theaverage perhaps, notmuch greater; provements intheuse of fire.armshave
ofthis we may convince ourselves by advanced . Thisis intelligible enoughin
tracing, through thehistory ofthemiddle itself,but theimprovement we speak of
ages, the detailed statements the armed does not relate solely to the weapon itself
of
forces then employed . Let us only think and the skill in handling it ; we advert
of the masses of men on foot who com also to greater ability in using troops
posed the armies of the Crusaders, or the armed with this weapon. At the battle
masses whofollowedtheEmperors of Ger of Mollwitz the Prussian army had
many on theirRoman expeditions. It was brought the fire of their infantry to such
tion
in realitytheimportance of the cavalry a state of perfec , that there has been
which was so much greater in those days ; no improvement since then in that sense .
it was the stronger arm , composed ofthe
flower of the peoplsomuch80that,
e, broken groundandas skirmishers has
10 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
been introduced more recently, and is to auxiliary arms, as they cost him more in
be looked upon as a very great advance money than in men. Besides this, it
in the art of destruction. stands to reason that in military enter
Our opinion is, therefore, that the rela- prises of such enormous extent as his,
tion of cavalry has not much changed as cavalry must have a greater value than in
far as regards numbers, but as regards ordinary cases.
its importance, there has been a great Frederick the Great it is well known
alteration. reckoned carefully everyrecruitthat could
This seems to be a contra-
diction , but is not so in reality. The be saved to his country ; it was his great
infantry of the middle ages, although business to keep up the strength of his
forming the greater proportion of an army, as far as possible at the expense of
army, did not attain to that proportion other countries. His reasons for this are
by its value as compared to cavalry, but easy to conceive , if we remember that
because all that could not beappointed his small dominions did not then include
to the very costly cavalry were handed Prussia and the Westphalian provinces .
over to the infantry ; this infantry was, Cavalry was kept complete by recruit
therefore, merely a last resource ; and if ment more easily than infantry, irres
the number of cavalry had depended pective of fewer men being required;
merely on the value set on that arm , it
in addition to which, his system of war
couldnever have been too great. Thus was completely founded on the mobility
we can understand how cavalry, in spite of his army, and thus it was, that while
of its constantly decreasing importance, hisinfantry diminished in number, his
may still , perhaps, have importance cavalry was always increasing itselftill
enough keep its numerical relation at the end of the Seven Years' War. Still at
to
that point which it has hitherto so con- the end of that war it was hardly more
stantly maintained . than a fourth of the number of infantry
It is a remarkable fact that, at least that he had in the field .
since the wars of the Austrian succession , period s,referred
theinstance
At of to there is no
the proportion of cavalry to infantry has want also of armies entering
changed very little, the variation being the field unusual ly weak in cavalry, and
constantly between a fourth , a fifth or yet carrying off the victory. The most re
a sixth ; this seems to indicate that markable is the battle of Gross-görschen.
those proportions meet the natural re If we only count the French divisions
quirements of an army, and that these
numbers give the solution which it is which took part in the battle, Buonaparte
impossible to find in a direct manner . was 100,000 strong, of ywhich 5,000 were
We doubt, however, if this is the case , cavalry , 90,000 infantr ; theAllies had
cavalry and
and we find the principal instances of the 70,000 ,of which 25,000 wereplace
employment of a numerous cavalry suffi 40,000 infantry. Thus, in of the
ciently accounted for by other causes . 20,000 cavalry on the side of the Allies in
Austria and Russia are states which excess of the totalof the French cavalry,
have keptup a numerous cavalry ,because Buonaparte had heoughtto
infantry when only 50,000 have
additional
had
they retain in theirpoliticalcondition
the fragments of a Tartar organisation . 100,000. As he gained the battle with
Buonaparte for his purposes could never that superiorityininfantry,wemayask
be strong enough in cavalry ; when he whether it was at all likely that he would
had made use of the conscription as far havelost it if the proportions had been
140,000 to 40,000.
as possible, he had no ways of strength
ening his armies, but by increasing the Certainly the great advantage of oursu
periority in cavalry was shown imme
CHAP. T.] ORDER OF BATTLE OF AN ARMY. 11

diately after the battle, for Buonaparte notablygreater, perhaps three, four, orfive
gained hardly any trophies by his vic- guns per 1,000 men. Whether this is the
tory. The gain of a battle is therefore natural proportion, or that the increase of
not everything,but is it not always the artillerymay be carried still further, with
chief thing ? out prejudice to the whole conduct of war,
If we put together these considerations, must be left for experience to decide .
we can hardly believe that the numerical The principal results we obtain from
proportion between cavalry and infantry the whole of these considerations, are
which has existed for the last eighty 1. That infantry is the chief arm , to
years is the natural one, founded solely which the other two are subordinate.
on their absolute value ; we are much 2. That by the exercise of great skill
rather inclined to think, that after many and energy in command, the want of the
fluctuations, the relative proportions of two subordinate arms may in some
these arms will change further in the measure be compensated for, provided
same direction as hitherto, and that the that we are much stronger in infantry ;
fixed number of cavalry at last will be and the better the infantry the easier
considerably less. this may be done.
With respect to artillery, the number
of 3. That it is more difficult to dispense
guns has naturally increased since its with artillery than with cavalry, because
first invention, and according as it has it is the chief principle of destruction,
been made lighter and otherwise im- and its mode of fighting is more amal
proved ; still since the time of Frederick gamated with that of infantry.
the Great, it has also kept very much to 4. That artillery being the strongest
the same proportion of two or three guns arm , as regards destructive action, and
per 1,000 men , we mean at the com- cavalry the weakest in that respect, the
mencement of a campaign ; for during question must in general arise, how much
its course artillery does not melt away as artillery can we have withoutinconveni
fast as infantry, therefore at the end of ence, and what is the least proportion of
a campaign the proportion is generally cavalry we require ?

CHAPTER V.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF AN ARMY.

The order of battle is that division and the permanent peace organisation of the
formation of the different arms into sepa army ; adopts as units certain parts,
rate parts or sections of the whole Army, such as battalions, squadrons, and bat
and that form ofgeneral position or dispo teries, and with them forms units of a
sition of those parts which is to be the norm higher order up to the highest of all, the
throughout the whole campaign or war. whole army, according to the require
It consists, therefore, ina certain mea ments of predominating circumstances.
sure, of an arithmetical and a geometri In like manner, the form of disposition
cal element, the division and the form comes from the elementary tactics, in
of disposition. The first proceeds from which the army is instructed and exer
12 ON WAR . [ BOOK V.
cised in time of peace, which must be my, and this perpetual theft only escaped
looked upon as a property in the troops severe punishment through one circum
that cannot be essentially modified at the stance, which was, that the enemy lay
moment war breaks out, the disposition under the same ban .
connects these tactics with the conditions Hence, when, in the latter half of the
which the use of the troops in war and in eighteenth century, it was discovered that
large masses demands, and thus it settles cavalry would serve just as well to pro 1
in a general way the rule or norm in con- tect a wing if it stood rear of the army
formity with which the troops are to be as if it were placed on the prolongation
drawn up for battle. of the line, and that, besides this, it
This has been invariably the case when might be applied to other purposes than
great armies have taken the field, and merely fighting a duel with the enemy's
there have been times when this form cavalry, a great step in advance was
was considered as the most essential part made, because now the army in its prin
of the battle . cipal extension or front, which is always
In the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- the breadth of its order of battle (posi
turies, when the improvements in the fire- tion), consisted entirely of homogeneous
arms of infantry occasioned a great in- members, so that it could be formed of
crease of that arm, and allowed of its any number of parts at pleasure, each
being deployed in such long thin lines, part like another and like the whole.
the order of battle was thereby simplified, In this way it ceased to be one single
but, at the same time it became more piece and became an articulated whole,
difficult and more artificial in the carrying consequently pliable and manageable :
out, and as no other way of disposing of the parts might be separated from the
cavalry at the commencement of a battle whole and then joined on again without
was known but that of posting them on difficulty, the order of battle always re
the wings, where they were out of the fire mained the same. - Thus arose the corps
and had room to move, therefore in the consisting of all arms, that is, thus such
order of battle the army always became an organisation became possible,
a closed inseparable whole. If such an want of it had been felt long before. for the
army was divided in the middle, it was That all this relates to the combat is
like an earthworm cut in two: the wings very natural. The battle was formerly
had still life and the power of motion ,
but they had lost their natural functions. the whole war, and will always continue
The army lay , therefore, in a manner to be the principal part of it; but, the
under aspell of unity , and whenever any order of battle belongs generally more
to tactics than strategy,and it is only
parts of it had to be placed in a sepa troduced in
here to show how tactics in or
rate position , a small organisation and
ganising the whole into smaller wholes
disorganisation became necessary . The
marches which the whole army had to made preparations for strategy.
make were a condition in which , to a cer The greater armies become, the more
tain extent, it found itself out of rule . they are distributed over wide spaces
and the more diversified the action and
If the enemy was at hand, the march had
to be arranged in the most artificial man reaction of the different parts amongst
ner, and in order that one line or one themselves, the widerbecomes the field of
wing might be always at the prescribed strategy, and, therefore, then the order
distance from the other , the troops had of battle, in the sense of our definition,
to scramble over everything : marches had must also come intoa kind of reciprocal
also constantly to be stolen from the ene action with strategy, which manifests
itself chiefly at the extreme points where
 CHAP . v. ] ORDER OF BATTLE OF AN ARMY. 13

tactics and strategy meet, that is, at if we take one part for an advanced guard
those moments when the general distri- as a constant necessity, three for the
bution of the combatant forces passes main body, that is a right wing, centre
into the special dispositions for the com- and left wing, two divisions for reserve,
bat.
and one to detach to the right, one to
We now turn to those three points, the left. Without pedantically ascribing
the division , combination of arms, and a great importance to these numbers
order of battle (disposition) in a strategic andfigures, we certainlybelieve that they
point of view. usual and frequently
represent the most
recurring strategic disposition, and on
1 .-- Division . that account one that is convenient.
Certainly it seems that the supreme di
In strategy we must never ask what rection of an army (and the direction of
is to be thestrength of a division or a every whole) mustbe greatly facilitated if
corps, but how many corps or division there are only three or four subordinates
an army should have. There is nothing to command, but the commander -in -chief
more unmanageable than an army divided must pay dearly for this convenience in a
into three parts, except it be one divided twofold manner . In the first place, an
into only two, in which case the chief order loses in rapidity , force, and exact
command must be almost neutralised .
ness if the gradation ladder down which it
To fix the strength of great and has to descend is long, and this must be
small corps, either on the grounds of the case if there are corps -commanders
elementary tactics or on highergrounds, between thedivision leadersand the
leaves an incredibly wide field for arbi- chief ; secondly, the chief loses generally
trary judgment, and heaven knows what in his own proper power and efficiency
strangemodes of .reasoning
in this wide field On thehavesported the wider the
other hand , immediate spheres of
subordinates action of
become. A his
ge
the necessity offorming an independent neral commanding 100,000men
whole (army) into a certain number of divisions exercises a power which is
in eight
parts is a thing as obvious as itis posi. greater in intensity than if the 100,000
tive, and this idea furnishes real strate- men were divided into only three corps.
gic motives for determining the number There are many reasons for this, but the
of the greater divisions of an army, con . most important is that each commander
sequently their strength , whilst the looks upon himself as having a kind of
strength of the smaller divisions, such proprietary right in his own corps, and
as companie s, battalions, etc., is left to be
ned by always opposes the withdrawal from him
determi tactics . of any portion of it for a longer or shorter
We can hardly imagine the smallest time. A little experience of war will
independent body in which there are not make this evident to any one.
at least three parts to be distinguished, But on the other hand the number of
that
vanc
one part may be thrown outin ad-
e,,
divisions must not be too great, otherwise
and another part be left in rear : disorder will ensue. It is difficult enough
that four is still more convenient follows to manage eight divisions from one head
of itself, if we keep inviewthat the quarter, and the number should never be
middle part, being the principal division, allowed to exceed ten. But in a division
ought to be stronger than either of the in which the means of circulating orders
others ; in this way, we may proceed to are much less, the smaller normal number
make out eight, which appears to us to four, or at most five, may be regarded as
be the most suitable number for an army the more suitable.
14 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
If these factors, five and ten, will not is a weak brigade, of which, in this
answer, that is, if the brigades are too manner, there are eighty, whereas the
strong, then corps d'armée must be intro- first formation has only fifty, and is
duced ; but we must remember that by therefore simpler. All these advantages
so doing, a new power is created, which at are given up merely for the sake of hav
once very much lowers all other factors. ing only to send orders to half as many
But now, what is too strong a bri- generals. Of course the distribution into
gade ? The custom is to make them from corps is still more unsuitable for smaller
2,000 to 5,000 men strong, and there armies.
appear to be two reasons for making the This is the abstract view of the case.
latter number the limit ; the first is that The particular case may present good
a brigade is supposed to be a subdivision reasons for deciding otherwise. Likewise ,
which can be commanded by one man we must admit that, although eight or
directly, that is, through the compass of ten divisions may be directed when
his voice:thesecond isthat any larger united inalevel country, in widelyex
tended mountain positions the thing
body of infantry should not be left with .
might perhaps be impossible. A great
out artillery, and through this first com-
bination of arms a special divisionof riverwhichdivides an army into halves,
itselfis formed . makes a commander for each half indis
We do not wish toinvolve ourselves pensable ; in short, thereare a hundred
in these tactical subtilties , neither shall
weenter upon the disputed point, where local and character
decisive particular, objects of themost
before which all
and in what proportions the combination rules must give way.
of all three arms should take place, But still, experience teaches us, that
whether with divisions of 8,000 to 12,000
these abstract grounds come most fre
men, or with corps which are 20,000 to quently into use and are seldomer over
30,000 men strong. The most decided op- ruled by others than we should perhaps
ponent ofthese combinations will scarcely suppose .
take exception at the mere assertion, that We wish further to explain clearly
nothing but this combination of the three
the
scope of the foregoing consideratio
ns
arms can make a division indepen dent, by a simple outline, for which purpose
and that therefore, for such as are we now place the different points of most
intended to be frequently detached se importance next to each other.
parately, it is at least very desirable. As we mean by the term numbers, or
0
Anarmy of200,00 menin ten divi-
sions , the divisions composed of five
parts of awhole,onlythose which are
brigades each , would give brigades 4,000 made by the primary, therefore the im
strong. We see here no dispropor mediate division, we say.
1. If a whole has too few menibers it
tion. Certainly this army might also be
divided into five corps, the corps into is unwieldy.
four divisions,and the division into four 2. If the parts of a whole body are
brigades, which makes the brigade 2,500 too large, the power of the superior will
men strong ; but the first distribution , is thereby weakened.
looked at in the abstract, appears to us 3. With every additional step through
preferable, for besides that, in the other, which an orderhas
in twoways: to pass,it is weakened
in onewaybythelossof
there is one more gradation of rank,five force, which it suffers in its passage
parts are too few to make an army ma
nageable ; four divisions, in like manner, through an additional step ; in another
are too few for a corps , and 2,500 men way by the longer time in its trans
mission .
CHAP. v. ] ORDER OF BATTLE OF AN ARMY . 15

The tendency of all this is to show
that the number of co-ordinate divisions
should be as great, and the gradational
steps as few as possible ; and the only
limitation to this conclusion is, that in
armies no more than from eight to ten,
and in subordinate corps no more than
from four or at most six, subdivisions can
be conveniently directed .
2.- Combination of Arms.
perhaps distant point before cavalry can
be brought to the support of infantry
to say nothing of the confusion which
takes place.
The details of the combination of the
three arms, how far it should extend,
how low down it should be carried,
what proportions should be observed,
the strength of the reserves of each to
be set apart — these are all purely tactical
considerations.

For strategy the combination of the 3. — The Disposition.

three arms in the order of battle is only
important in regard to those parts of The determination as to the relations
the army which, according tothe usual in space, according to which the parts of
order of things, are likely to be frequently an army amongst themselves are to be
employed in a detached position , where drawn up in order of battle, is likewise
they may be obliged to engage in an completely a tactical subject, referring
independent combat. Now it is in solely to the battle. No doubt there
the nature of things, that the members is also a strategic disposition of the
ofthe first class,and for themostpart parts ;but it depends almost entirelyon
only these, are destined fordetached posi- determinations and requirements of the
tions, because , as we shall seeelsewhere , moment, and what there is in it of the
detached positions are most generally rational, does not come within the mean
adopted upon the supposition and the ing of the term “ order of battle .” We
necessity of a body independent in itself. shall therefore treat of it in the follow
In a strict sense strategy would there- ing chapter under the head of Disposition
fore only require a permanent combina- of an Army.
tion of arms in army corps , or where The order of battle of an army is
these do not exist, in divisions, leaving it therefore the organisation and disposi
to circumstances to determine when a tion of it in mass ready prepared for
provisional combination of the three battle. Its parts are united in such a
arms shall be made in subdivisions of an manner that both the tactical and strate
inferior order .
gical requirements of the moment can be
But it is easy to see that, when easily satisfied by the employment of
corps are of considerable size, such as single parts drawn from the general
30,000 or 40,000 men, they can seldom mass. When such momentary exigency
find themselves in a situation to take up has passed over, these parts resumetheir
a complete
Wi
ly connected position in mass. original place, and thus the order of
th corps
of such strength, a combina- battle becomes the first step to, and
tion of thearmsin the divisions is there principal foundation of, thatwholesomo
fore necessary. No one who has had any methodicism which, like the beat of
experience in war, will treat lightly the a pendulum , regulates the work in war,
delay which occurs when pressing mes and of which we have already spoken in
sages have to be sent to some other the fourth chapter of the Second Book.
 16 ON WAR . [ BOOK V.

CHAPTER VI .

GENERAL DISPOSITION OF AN ARMY .

BETWEEN the moment of the first as only measure of security which was then
sembling of military forces, and that of taken , of course,in the sense of the mode
the solution arrived at maturity when of conducting war in that day, for such
strategy has brought the army to the à measure was quite inconsistent with
decisive point, and each particular part the possibility of being compelled to fight
has had its position and rôle pointed out in that position. But there was little
by tactics, there is in most cases a long reason for apprehension on that score,
interval ; it is the same between one because the battles generally depended
. decisive catastrophe and another. on a kind of mutual understanding, like
Formerly these intervals in a certain a duel, in which the parties repair to a
measure did not belong to war at all. convenient rendezvous. As armies, partly
Take for example the manner in which on account of their numerous cavalry,
Luxemburg encamped and marched. which in the decline of its splendour was
Wesingle out this general because he is stillregarded, particularly by the French,
celebrated for his camps and marches, as the principal arm , partly on account
and therefore may be considered a re
of the unwieldy organisation of their
fromtheHistoiredelaofFlandremilitaire order of battle, could not fight in every
descriptionof country anitarmyin a close
we know more about him than about , broken country was ,as were under
other generals of the time. the protection of a neutral territory, and
The camp was regularly pitched with as it could itself make but little use
its rear close to a river, or morass , or a
of broken ground, therefore, it was
deep valley, which
in the present day
would be considered madness . The
deemedpreferable go
to meetan
to
direction in which the enemy lay had so enemy seeking battle. We know, indeed,
little to do with determining the front of that
the army, that cases are very common in
Luxemburg's
Stienkir battles
k , and Neerwi nden,atwere
Fleurus,
comia
ceived in a different spirit
whichthe rear was towards theenemy spirit had onlyjust then underthis ; but this
and the front towardstheirowncountry. great generalfreed itself from the old
now unheardofmode
Thisperfectly ofproceeding method , and it had notyet reactedon
unintelligible unless
is , we
suppose that in the choice of camps the the method of encampment. Alterations
convenience ofthe troops was the chief, in the of
matters art aofdecisivenature
war originate, always in
andthen
indeed
almost the only consideration, and lead by degrees to modifications in other
therefore look upon the stateofbeing things. Theexpression il va àla guerre,
outside of the action usedin reference to a partizan setting
in camp as a statewithd
of war , a kind of rawal behind the
scenes, where one is quite at ease . out to watch the enemy, shows how little
The practice of always resting the rear the state of an army in camp was con
upon some obstacle may be reckoned the sidered to be a state of real warfare.
It was not much otherwise with the
 CHAP . VI. ] GENERAL DISPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 17

marches, for the artillery then separated a superior and more comprehensive
itself completely from the rest of the measure, determining as respects camps,
army, in order to take advantage of cantonments, and marches.
better and more secure roads , and the If we look at the disposition of the
cavalry on the wings generally took the forces in a general way , that is, leaving
right alternately, that each might have out of sight any special object, we can
in turn its share of the honour of only imagine it as a unit, that is, as a
marching on the right. whole, intended to fight all together, for
At present ( that is, chiefly since the any deviation from this simplest form
Silesian vars) the situation out of battle would imply a special object. Thus
is so thoroughly influenced by its connec- arises, therefore, the conception of an
tion with battle that the two states are
army, let it be small or large.
in intimate correlation , and the one Further, when there is an absence of
can no longer be completely imagined any special end, there only remains as the
without the other. Formerly in a cam- sole object the preservation of the army
paign the battle was the real weapon , itself, which of course includes its se
the situation at other times only the curity. That the army shall be able
handle — the former the steel blade , the to exist without inconvenience, and that
other the wooden haft glued to it, the it shall be able to concentrate without
whole therefore composed of heteroge difficulty for the purpose of fighting,
neous parts,
-now the battle is the are, therefore, the two requisite con
edge, the situation out of the battle the ditions. From these result, as desirable,
back of the blade, thewhole to belooked thefollowing points more immediately
uponasmetal
in which it is completely
impossiblewelded together,
any longer to applying to subjects concerning the exist
distinguish where thesteelends and the ence and security of the army.
iron begins. 1. Facility of subsistence.
2. Facility of providing shelter for the
This state in war outside of the battle is troops.
now partly regulated by the organisation 3. Security of the rear.
and regulations with which the army 4. An open country in front.
comes prepared from a state of peace , 5. The position itself in a broken
partly by the tactical and strategic country.
arrangements of the moment . The three 6. Strategic points d'appui .
situations in whichan army may be 7. A suitable distribution of the troops.
placed are in quarters, on a march , or in Our elucidation of these several points
camp. Allthreebelong as much to tactics is as follows:
bordtoerstrategy
as
ing
, and these two branches, The first two lead us to seek out culti
on each other here in many vated districts, and great towns and roads.
ways, often seem to, or actually do, They determine measures in general
incorporate themselves with each other, rather than in particular.
80 that many dispositions may be looked In the chapter on lines of communica
uponat gic. same time as both tactical
the
and strate tion will be found what we mean by
security of the rear. The first and most
We shall treat of these three situations important point in this respect is that
of an armyoutsideof the combat in a the centre of the position should be at a
general way,before
come into any specialobjects
connection with them ; but we rightanglewith the principal line of
retreat adjoining the position .
must, first of all, consider the general Respecting the fourth point, an army
dispositi on of the forces, because thatis certainlycannotlookover an expanse of
VOL . II .
18 ON WAR. [BOOK V,
country in its front as it overlooks the an army usually requires a separate dis
space directly before it when in a tactical position of particular corps.
position for battle. But the strategic By this covering it is not at all meant
eyes are the advanced guard , scouts and that a portion ofthe army is to be de
patrols sent forward, spies, etc., etc., and tached to defend the space round its
the service will naturally be easier for wings, in order to prevent the enemy
these in an open than in an intersected from approaching these weak points, as
country. The fifth point is merelythe they are called : whowould then defend
reverse of the fourth . the wingsof these flanking corps ? This 1

Strategical points d'appui differ from kind of idea, which is so common, is

tactical in these two respects, that the complete nonsense, The wings of an
army need not be in immediate contact army are in themselves not weak points
with them, and that, on the other hand, of anarmyfor this reason, that the enemy
they must be of greater extent. The cause also has wings, and cannot menace ours
ofthis is that, according to the nature of without placing hisown in jeopardy,
the thing, the relations to time and space
in which strategy moves are generally on
It is only if circumstances are unequal,
a greater scale than those of tactics. If, if the enemy's army is larger than ours,
if his lines of communication are more
therefore, an army posts itself at a dis
tance of a mile from the seacoast or the secure
banks of a great river , it leans strate
(see that
onlythen Lines of Communication ), it is
the wings becomeweak
gically on these obstacles, for the enemy parts; but of these special cases we are
cannot make use of such a space as this not now speaking, therefore, neither of
to effect a strategic turning movement. a case in which aflanking
ion
corps is ap
pointed in connect with other combi
Within its narrow limits he cannot adven
ture on marches miles in length , occupy nations to defend effectually the space
ing days and weeks. On the other hand , on our wings, for that no longer belongs
in strategy, a lake of several miles in to the category of general dispositions.
But although the wings are not par.
circumference is hardly to belookedupon ticularlyweakparts stillthey areparti
; in its proceedings,afew
asan obstacleright cularly important, because here, on
miles to the not of much
or left are account of Aanking movements the de
consequence . Fortresses will become
strategic points d'appui, according as fence is not so simple as in front, mea
they are large, and afford a wide sphere sures are more complicated and require
of action for offensive combinations. more time and preparation. For this
The disposition of the army in separate reason is tonecessary
rity of itcases in the
protect the wingsmajo
spe
masses may be done with a view either cially against unforeseen enterprises on
to special objects and requirements, or to
those of a general nature ; here we can the part of the enemy, and this is done
only speak of the latter. by placing stronger masses on the wings
The first general necessity is to than would be required for mere pur:
advanced guard and poses
push forward therequired these of observation
masses , even. if they
To press heavily
oppose no
the other troops to watch the
enemy. very serious resistance, more time is re
The second is that, with very largequired, and the stronger they are the
armies, the reserves are usually placed more the enemy
and his must
intentions develop
, and his means
by that forces
several miles in rear, and consequently the object ofthe measure isattained ;
occupy a separate position .
Lastly, the covering of both wings of what is to be done
the particular further
plansof thedepends on.
moment
 CHAP. VI .] GENERAL DISPOSITION OF AN ARIY. 19

We may therefore regard corps placed of arms and country have a great in
advanced
on the wings as lateral guards, fluence.
intended to retard the advance of the The distance of the advanced guard is
enemy through the space beyond our the easiest to fix, as in retreating it falls
wings and give us time to make disposi- back on the main body of the army, and,
tions to counteract his movement.
therefore, may be at all events at a dis
If these corps are to fall back on the tance of a long day's march without in
main body and the latter not to make curring the risk of being obliged to fight
a backward movement at the same time,
then it follows of itself that they must an independent battle . But it should
not be sent further in advance than the
not be in the same line with the front of security of the army requires, because
the main body, but thrown out somewhat the further it has to fall back the more
forwards, because when a retreat is to it suffers .
be made, even without being preceded by Respecting corps on the flanks, as we
a serious engagement, they should not have already said, the combat of an or
retreat
tion.
directly on the side of the posi- dinary division of 8000 to 10,000 men
From these reasons of a subjective na forusually lasts for several hours, even
half a day before it is decided ;
ture, as they relate to the inner organisa
tion of an army , there arises a natural on that account,
no hesitation in therefore, therea need
placing such be
division
system of disposition , composed of four or at a distance of some leagues or one
five parts according as the reserve remains or two miles, and for the same reason ,
with the main body or not.
As the subsistence and shelter of the
corps of three or four divisions may be
detached a day's march or a distance
troops partly decide also
the choice of aposi- ofthree orfour miles.
tion general
in , so they contribute From this natural and general disposi
to a disposition in separate divisions. tion of the main body, in four or five
The attention which they demand comes divisions at particular distances, a certain
into consideration
considerations abovealong with the other
mentioned ; and we
method has arisen of dividing an army
in a mechanical manner whenever there
seek to satisfy the one without prejudice are no strong special reasons against
to the other. In most cases , by the divi this ordinary method .
sion of anarmy into five separate corps , But although we assume that each of
the difficulties of subsistence and quar
tering will be overcome , and no great these distinct parts of an army shall be
competent to undertake an independent
alteration
acco will afterwards be required on
their unt. combat, and it may be obliged to engage
We have still to cast a glance at the in one, it does not therefore by any means
distances at which these separated corps follow that the real object of fractioning
an army is that the parts should fight
may be allowed to be placed , if we are separately ; the necessity for this distri
to retain in view the advantage of mutual bution of the army is mostly only a con
support, and, therefore, of concentrating dition of existence imposed by time. If
for battle On this subject
. we ren nd the enemy approaches our position to
our readers of what is said in the chap try the fate of a general action, the stra
ters on the duration and decision of the tegic period is over, everything concen
combat, according to which no absolute trates itself into the one moment of the
distance, but only the most general, as battle, and therewith terminates and
it
average rules can bestrength
were, absolute given, vanishes the object of the distribution of
because and relative the army. As soon as the battle com
20 ON WAR. [ BOOK V.

mences, considerations about quarters and best criterion of skill in the disposition of
subsistence are suspended ; the observa an army lies in the proof that the distri
tion of the enemy before our front and on bution has been considered merely as a
our flanks has fulfilled the purpose of condition , as a necessary evil, butthat
checking his advance by a partial resist- united action in battle has ed
been consider
ance, and now all resolves itself into the the object of the disposition .
one great unit — the great battle. The

CHAPTER VII .

ADVANCED GUARD AND OUT - POSTS.

THESEtwo bodies belong to that class of gencies, the method of making war,even
subjects into which both the tacticaland chance, are all pointswhich havean in
strategic threads run simultaneously. fluence in the matter ; and, therefore, we
On the one hand we must reckon them cannot wonder that military history, in
amongst those provisions which give form
of furnishing methodofusingada
to thebattle and ensure the execution of stead
ple outlines of the any definite and sim
tactical plans; onthe otherhand,they vancedguards and outposts , onlypresents
frequently lead to independent combats, the subject in a kind of chaos of exam
and on account of their position , more or ples of the most diversified nature .
less distant from the main body, they
are to be regarded as links in the strate
Sometimes we see the security of an
gic chain, and it is this veryfeature army
which obliges us to supplement the pre
intrusted to a corps regularly
appointed to the dutyof advanced guard ;
cedingchapter by devoting at another time a long line of separate
to their consideration .
a few moments outposts ; sometimes both thesearrange
Every body of troops, when not com ments co-exist, sometimes neither one
pletely in readiness for battle, requires nor the other ; at one time there is only
the approach one
an advanced guard to learnfurther advanced
whole oftheguard in common
advancing for; the
columns at
ofthe enemy, and to gain parti
culars respecting his force before he another time, each column has its own
comes in sight, for the range of vision , as advanced guard. We shall endeavour to
the subject
arule, does not go much beyond the really
range of firearms. But what sort of man
is, and thenofseewhat
get a clear idea whether we can
arrive
would he be who could not see farther plication at. some principl es capable of ap
than his arms can reach ! The foreposts
are the eyes of the army, as we have al the nttroopsmor
If chme are on the march, a
readysaid .The want of them , however,is deta
formsitsvan of e or less strength
or advanced guard, andin
not always equally great; it has its degrees .
strength of armies and theextent case
Theground rever sedthe
of ,t movement
his same detac hment willbeing
ofthearmy form
of theycover contin
, time , place,
the rearguard . Ifthetroops are in
CHAP . VII 21
11.. ] ADVANCED GUARD AND OUT -POSTS.
cantonments or camp, an extended line a few thousand horse, generally furnished
of weak posts, forms the vanguard, the by the cavalry on the flanks of the first
outposts. It is essentially in thenature of line, formed his advanced guard, and at
things, that, when the army is halted , the end of the march rejoined the main
a greater extent of space can and must body. He very seldom had any corps
be watched than when the army is in permanently employed as advanced
motion, and therefore in the one case guard.
the conception of a chain of posts, in When it is the intention of a small army,
the other that of a concentrated corps by using the whole weight of its mass
arises of itself.
with great vigour and activity, to make
The actual strength of an advanced the enemy feel the effect of its superior
guard, as well as of outposts, ranges discipline and the greater resolution of
aconsiderable
fromorganisation corps, composedof its commander, then almost every thing
an of all three arms, to a
must be done sous la barbe de l'ennemi, in
regiment of hussars, and from a strongly the same wayas Frederick the Great did
entrenched defensive line, occupied by when opposed to Daun. A system of
portions of troops from each arm of holding back from the enemy, and a very
the service, to mere outlying pickets, formal, and extensive systemof outposts
and their supports detachedfrom the would neutralise all the advantages of
camp. The services assigned to such the above kind of superiority. The cir.
vanguards range also from those of mere cumstance that an error of another kind,
observation toan offer of opposition or and the carrying out Frederick's system
resistance to the enemy, and this oppo too far, may lead to a battle of Hochkirch ,
sition may not only be to give the is no argument against this method of
mainbody to prepare for time
it requires ofthearmythe acting;wasweonly
which there
battle,but should rathersay,that as
one battle of Hochkirch
also to make the enemy develop his in all the Silesian war, we ought to
plans,andintentions, which consequently recognisein this system a proof of the
makes the observation far more im- King's consummate ability.
portant. Napoleon, however, who commanded
According as more or less time is an army not deficient in discipline and
required to tobegained,
opposition according
be offered asthe
is calculated firmness,and whodid not want forre
solution himself, never moved without a
uponand intended
measures of to meet
the enemy the special strong advancedguard. There are two
, so accordingly reasons for this.
must the strength of the advanced guard The first is to be found in the altera
and outposts be proportioned . tion in tactics. A whole armyis no longer
Frederick the Great, a general above led into battle as one body by mere
allothersever ready forbattle,and word ofcommand, to settle the attairlike
who almost directed his army in battle a great duel by more or less skill and
by word ofcommand, never required bravery ;thecombatants oneachside
strong outposts. We see him therefore now range their forces more to suit the
constantly encamping close underthe peculiarities ofthegroundand circum
eyesof the enemy,without anygreat stances, so that theorderofbattle,and
apparatus of outposts, relying for his consequently the battle itself, is a whole
security, at one place on a hussar re ofmany parts , from which there
gime nt,at anotheron a lighbtattalion, follows, that thesimple determinationto
cor perhaps onthe pickets, and supports fight becomesa regularly formed plan,
furnishedfrom the camp. On themarch, andtheword of commanda more or less
22 ON VAR. [BOOK V. 20

long preparatory arrangement. For this also easily serve for the advanced guard,
time and data are required .
The second cause lies in the great size and
flanktherefore
columnsbe covered by it,
naturally then the
require no
of modern armies. Frederick brought special covering.
thirty or forty thousand men into battle ; But those corps which are moving at
Napoleon from one to two hundred great distances, in reality as detached
thousand .
We have selected these examples be corps,must provide their own van -guards.
cause every one will admit, that two The same applies also to any of those
corps which belong to the central mass,
such generals would never have adopted andowing to the direction that the roads 999
any systematic mode of proceeding with may happen to take, are too far from the
out some good reason. Upon the whole, centre column. Therefore there will be
there has been a general improvement
in the use of advanced guards and out- as manyvirtually
columns advancedseparated
guards, asfrom
thereeach
are
posts in modern wars ; not that every other ; if each of these advanced guards
one acted as Frederick , even in the is much weaker than one general
Silesian wars, for that time the
at
Austrians had a system of strong out one would be, then they fall more into
posts, and frequently sent forward a the there ofis other
and class no advanced dispositions,
tactical guard in the
corps as advanced guard, for which they strategic tableau. Butif the main body
had sufficient reason from the situation or centre has a much larger corps for its
in which they were placed . Just in the advanced guard , then that corps will
same way we find differences enough in appear as the advanced guard of the
the mode of carrying on war in more
modern times. Even the French Mar- whole, and will
But what can be many respects.
be sotheinreason for giving
shals Macdonald in Silesia , Oudinot
and Ney in the Mark ( Brandenburg ), ad the centre avan - guard so much stronger
vanced with armies of sixty or seventy than the wings ? The following three
thousand men , without our reading of reasons .
1. Because the mass of troops com
their having had any advanced guard. – posing the centre is usually much more
We have hitherto been discussing ad
vanced guards and outposts in relation considerable.
to their numerical strength ; but there is 2. Because plainly the central point
another difference which we must settle . of a strip of country along nded
which the
front of an arm y is exte must
It is that, when an army advances or
retires on a certain breadth of ground, always be the most important point, as
it may have a van and rear guard in all the combinations of the campaign
common for all the columns which are relate mostly to it, and therefore the
marching side by side, or each column field ofbattle isalso usually nearer to it
may have one for itself. In order to form than to the wings.
a clear idea on this subject, we must look 3. Because, although a corps thrown
at it in this way . forward in front of the centre does not
The fundamental conception of an directly protect the wings as a real van
advanced guard , when a corps is so guard, it still contributes greatly to
designated, is that its mission their
speciallysecurity the enemy indirectly.
cannot
security in ordinary instance,
Forcases pass
is the of the main body or
centre of the army. If this main body by ordera corps
in such any enterprise
within
to effect a certain distance
of im
is marching
roads
upon several contiguous portance against one of thewings,be
so close together that they can
cause he has to fear an attack in flank
 CHAP. VII.] ADVANCED GUARD AND OUT- POSTS. 23

and rear. Even if this check which a move quicker, arriving later at its
corps thrown forward in the centre bivouac , and moving earlier in the
imposes on the enemy is not sufficient to morning than the whole mass.
constitute complete security for the wings, 5. Lastly, on a retreat, as rearguard,
it is at all events sufficient to relieve the to be used in defending the principal
flanks from all apprehension in a great natural obstacles of ground. In this
many cases. respect also the centre is exceedingly
The van -guard of the centre, if much important. At first sight it certainly
stronger than that of a wing, that is to appears as if such a rearguard would be
say, if it consists of a special corps as constantlyin danger of having its flanks
advanced guard , has then not merely turned. But we must remember that,
the mission of a van-guard intended to even ifthe enemy succeeds in overlapping
protect the troops in itsrear from sudden the flanks to some extent, he has still to
surprise ; it alsooperates in more general march the whole way from there to the
an army corps
strategic relations as centre before he can seriously threaten
thrown forward in advance .
the central mass, which gives time to
The following are the purposes for the rearguard of the centre to prolong
which such a corps may be used, and its resistance, and remain in rear some
therefore those which determine its what longer. On the other hand, the
duties in practice. situation becomes at once critical if the
1. To insure a stouter resistance, and centre falls back quicker than the wings ;
make the enemy advance with more there is immediately an appearance as if
caution ; consequently to do the duties the line had been broken through, and
of a van-guard on a greater scale, when- even the very idea or appearance of that
ever our arrangements are such as to is to be dreaded . At no time is there a
require time before theycan be carried greater necessity for concentration and
into effect . holding together, and at no time is this
2. If the central mass of the army is more sensibly felt by every one than on a
very large, to be able to keep this retreat. The intention always is, that the
unwieldy body at some distance from wings in case of extremity should close
the enemy, while we still remain close upon thecentre ; and if, on account of sub
to him with a more moveable body of sistence and roads, the retreat has to be
troops. made on a considerable width (of country ),
3. That we may have a corps of ob- still the movement generally ends bya
servation close to the enemy, if there are concentration on the centre . If we add
any other reasons which require us to to these considerations also this one, that
keep the principal mass of the army at a the enemy usually advances with his
considerable distance. principal force in the centre and with the
The idea that weaker look - out posts, greatest energy against the centre, we
mere partisan corps, might answer just must perceive that the rear guard of the
as well for this observation is set aside centre is of special importance.
at once if we reflect how easily a weak Accordingly ,therefore, a special corps
corps might be dispersed , and how very should always be thrown forward as an
limited also are its means of observation advanced guard in every case where one
as compared with those of a consider- of the above relations occurs . These
able corps. relations almost fall to the ground if the
4. Inthe pursuit of the enemy. A single centre is not stronger than the wings,
corps as advanced guard , with the greater as, for example, Macdonald when he
part of the cavalry attached to it, can advanced against Blücher, in Silesia, in
 24
ON WAR . [BOOK V. 11

1813 , and the latter, when he made his be immediately before the front of the
movement towards the Elbe. Both of army. If we find that in most cases
them had three corps, which usually between one and three miles is the
moved in three columns by different distance chosen, that shows certainly
roads, the heads of the columns in line. that circumstances have usually pointed
On this account no mention is made of out this distance as the best ; but we
their having had advanced guards . cannot make of it a rule by which we are
But this disposition in three columns to be always guided .
of equal strength is one which is by no In the foregoing observations we have
means to be recommended, partly on that lost sight altogether of outposts, and
account, and also because the division therefore we must now return to them
of a whole army into three parts makes again.
it very unmanageable, as stated in the In saying, at the commencement, that
fifth chapter of the third book.
When the whole is formed into a the relations between outposts and
stationaryadvanced
centre with two wings separate from it, between is similar
troops guards to that
and troops in
which we have represented in the pre- motion , our objectwas to refer the con
ceding chapter as the most natural ceptions back to their origin, and keep
formation as long as there is no par
ticular object for any other, the corps them distinct in future ; but it is clear
formingsimplest
the advanced
notion
guard, according that if wewe
the words confine
shouldourselves strictlythanto
getlittle more
to the case
of the , will
have its place in front of the centre, and a pedantic distinction .
thereforebefore the line which forms toIf an army
resume the march
the onmarch halts at ,night
next morning the
the front of the wings ; but as the first
object of corps thrown out on the flanks advanced guard must naturally do the
istoperformthe sameoffice for the sides same, andalways
duty, required bothorganise the outpost
for its ownsecurity
as the advanced guard for the front , it
will very often happen that these corps and that of the main body, without on
will be in line with the advancedguard, that accouguard
advanced into achan
nt being lineged from an
of outposts
or
even still furth er throw
according to circumstances. n forw ard, To satisf y the notio n of that trans forma.
With respect to the strength of an tion, theadvanced guard would have to
advanced guard we have little to say , as be completely brokenup into a chain of
now very properly it is the general small posts, having either only a very
custom todetailforthat duty oneor small
proaching
force,toora mass.
none atInallother
in awords
form ,the
ap
more component parts ofbythearmy
the first class , reinforced of ideaof a line of outposts must predomi
part of the
cavalry : sothat it consists ofa corps, if nate over that of a concentrated corps .
the armyis formed in corps ; of a division, The shorter the time of rest of the
if the organisation is in divisions. army, the less complete does the covering
It is easy to perceive that in this of the army require to be, for the enemy
respectalso thegreat number ofhigher
members or divisions isan advantage. what is covered
has hardly learnwhat
timetoand day toThe
fromisnot. day
How far the advanced guard should be longer the halt is to be the more com
pushed to the front must entirely depend plete must be the observation and cover
oncircumstances ; there are cases in which ing of all pointsof approach. As a rule,
it may be more than a day's march in therefore, when the halt is long, the van
advance, and others in which it should guard becomes always more and more
extended into a line of posts. Whether
CHAP. VIII.] MODE OF ACTION OF ADVANCED CORPS. 25

the change becomes complete, or whether Lastly, in winter quarters, the rigour
the idea of a concentrated corps shall of the season may also be a reason for
continue uppermost depends
, chiefly on breaking up the advanced guard into a
two circumstances . The first is the line of posts, because it is easier to find
proximity of the contending armies, the shelter for it in that way.
second is the nature of the country. The use of a reinforced line of out
If the armies are very close in com- posts was brought to great perfection by
parison to the width of their front, then the Anglo -Dutch army, during the cam
it will often be impossible to post a van- paign of 1794 and 1795, in the Nether
guard between them , and the armies are lands, when the line of defence was
obliged tooutplace their dependence on a formed by brigades composed of all
chain of posts. arms, in single posts, and supported by
A concentrated corps, as it covers the a reserve. Scharnhorst, who was with
approaches to the army less directly, that army, introduced this system into
generally requires more time and space the Prussian army on the Passarge in
to act efficiently; and therefore, if the army 1807. Elsewhere in modern times, it has
covers a great extent of front, as in canton- been little adopted, chiefly becausethewars
ments, and a corps standing in mass is to have been too rich in movement. But even
cover all the avenues of approach , it is ne when there has been occasion for its use
cessarythat we should be ata considerable it has been neglected, as for instance, by
distance from the enemy ; on this account Murat,atTarutino. A wider extension of
winter quarters, for instance, are gene his defensive line would have spared
rally covered by a cordon of posts. him the loss of thirty pieces of artillery
The second circumstance is the nature in a combat of out-posts.
of the country; where, for example , any It cannot be disputed that in certain
formidable obstacle of ground affords circumstances, great advantages may be
the meansof forming a strong line of derived from this system . We propose
posts with but few troops, we should not to return to the subject on another
neglect to take advantage of it. occasion .

CHAPTER VIII .

MODE OF ACTION OF ADVANCED CORPS.

We have just seen how the security of and therefore a peculiar mode of using
the army is expected, fromthe effect them is required, that they may fulfil the
which an advanced guard and flank corps purpose for which they are intended ,
produce on an advancing enemy. Such without incurring the risk of the serious
corps are always to be considered as very loss which is to be feared from this dis
weak whenever we imagine them in proport
conflict with the main body of the enemy
ion in strength..
The object of a corps of this descrip
,
26 ON WAR. [BOOK V.
tion, is to observe the enemy, and to advantage
advantage as
as we might anticipate in
delay his progress .
other cases through the disproportion in
For thefirst of these purposes a smaller the strength
body would never be sufficient, partly be- chief dangerof in the forces with
a contest engaged. The
a superior
cause it would be more easilydriven back , enemy consists always in the possibility
partly because its means of observation- of being turned and placed in a critical
that is its eyes — could not reach as far. situation by the enemy enveloping our
But the observation must be carried to position ; but in the case to which our
a high point ; the enemy must be made to attention is now directed, a risk of this
develop his wholestrength beforesuch description isverymuchless, owing to the
a corps, and thereby revealto a certain ex advancing enemy never knowing exactly
tent, notonlyhis force,but alsohisplans. hownear thereofmaybesupport from
For this its mere presence would be the main body his opponent's army
sufficient, and it would only be necessary itself, which may place hisadvan ced
to wait and see the measures by which column between two fires. The conse
the enemy seeks to drive it back, and
then commence its retreat at once . quence is, that the enemy in advancing
nearlythe columns
his single only
heads ofinline,and as
But further, it must alsodelaythe ad- keeps as possible begins
vance of the enemy, and that implies very cautiously to attempt to turnone or
actual resistance .
Nowhowcan we conceive this waiting other wing after he has While
connoitred
until the last moment , as well as this
ourposition. sufficiently
theenere
resistance , without such a corps being in my is thus feeling about and moving
constant danger of serious loss ? Chiefly guardedly, the corps we have thrown for
in this way, that the enemy himself is ward has time
any serious to fall back before it is in
danger.
preceded by an advanced guard, and
Therefore does not advance once with
at As for the length of the resistance which
all the outflanking and overpowering such a corps
in front, theagainstthe
gainstoffer
orashould attack
commencement
weight whole force. Now, this
of his if
advance guard is also from the commence of any turning movement, that depends
ment superior to our advanced corps, as chiefly on thenature of the ground and
we may naturally suppose it is intended the proximity of the enemy's supports.
it should be, and if the enemy's main If this resistance is continued beyondits
body is also nearer to his advanced guard natural measure, either from want ofjudg
than we are to ours, and if that main body , ment or from a sacrifice being necessary
in requires
beingalready on the march , will soonbe it giveconsequence
order to, the the main body
mustthealways
time
on the spot tosupport attack
the of his
advanced guardwith all his strength, still be a very considerable loss.
It is only
this firstact,in which our advanced especially when someinstances,
in rare and is
local obstacle more
fa
corps
advanced to contendwith
has guard the enemy's vourable, that the resistanceactually
, that is with a force not
much excee ding its own , ensures at oncemade in such a combat can be of import
a certain gain of time , and thus allows of ance, and the duration of the little battle
our watching the adversary's movements ofsuch a corps would in itself be hardly
for some time without endangering our sufficient to gain the timerequired ; that
own retreat. time is really gained in a threefold
But even a certain amount of resistance thing , vizwhich
manner, .: lies in the nature of the
which such a corps can offer in a suitable
position is not attended with such dis- quently
1. Byslower advance
the more enemy
of the and
cautious, conse
.
CHAP. VIII .] MODE OF ACTION OF ADVANCED CORPS . 27

2. By the duration of the actual turally have an influence on the duration

resistance offered . of the resistance, as all the time that
3. By the retreat itself. prudence requires for the security of the
This retreat must be made as slowly retreat is so much takenfrom the resist
as is consistent with safety. If the country
ance, and therefore diminishes its amount.
affords good positions they should be There is a marked difference in the time
made use of,as that obliges the enemy gained by the resistance of an advanced
to organise fresh attacksand plans for corps when the enemy makes his first
turning movements, and by that means appearance after midday ; in such a case
more time is gained . Perhaps in a new the length of the night is so much addi
position a real combat even may again tional time gained, as the advance is
be fought. seldom continued throughout the night.
We see that the opposition to the Thus it was that, in 1815 , on the short
enemy's progress by actual fighting and distance from Charleroi to Ligny , not
the retreat are completely combined with more than two miles, * the first Prus
one another, and that the shortness of sian corps under General Ziethen, about
the duration of the fights must be made 30,000 strong, against Buonaparte at
up for by their frequent repetition . the head of 120,000 men, was enabled to
This is the kind of resistance which gain twenty-four hours for the Prussian
an advanced corps should offer. The army then engaged in concentrating.
degree of effect depends chiefly on the The first attack was made on General
strength of the corps, and the configu- Ziethen about nine o'clock on the
ration of the country ; next on the morning of 15th June, and the battle of
length of the road which the corps Ligny did not commence until about
has to march over, and thesupport twoon theafternoon of16th. General Zie
which it receives . then suffered, it is true, very considerable
A small body, even when the forces on loss, amounting to five or six thousand
both sides are equal can never make as men killed, wounded or prisoners.
long a stand as a considerable corps ; If we refer to experience the following
for the larger the masses the more time are the results, which may serve as a
they require to complete their action, basis in any calculations of this kind .
of whatever kind it may be. In a A division of ten or twelve thousand
mountainous country the mere marching men, with a proportion ofcavalry, a day's
is of itself slower, the resistance in the march of three or four miles in advance
different positions longer, and attended in an ordinary country, not particularly
with less danger, and at every step fa- strong, will be able to detain the enemy
vourable positions may be found. ( including time occupied in the retreat)
As the distance to which a corps is about half as long again as he would
pushed forward increases so will the otherwise require to march over the same
leng e also ground , but if the division is onlyamile
th of its retreat, andthereforstan
the absolute gain time of resi ce
by its ; nce
in adva my
, then the ene t ough to be de
buts as such a corps by its position has tained about twice or three times as long
les
power of resistance in itself, and as he otherwise would be on the march.
is less easily reinforced, its retreat must Therefore supposing the distance to
bemade more rapidly in proportion bea march offourmiles, for which
are required, then
than if it stood nearer the main body, usually ten hours
and had a shorter distance to traverse .
The support and means of rallying
afforded to an advanced corps must na
* Here, as well as elsewhere, by the word mile,
the German mile is meant. -TR.
28 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
from the moment that the enemy appears province of immediate application. The
in force in front of the advanced corps , simplest way is to look upon them as
we may reckon upon fifteen hours before advanced guards placed on the sides,
he is in a condition to attack our main which being at the same time thrown
body. On the other hand, if the ad. out somewhat in advance, retreat in an
vanced guard is posted only a mile in oblique direction upon the army
advance, then the time which will elapse As these corps are not immediately
before our army can be attacked will be in the front of the army, and cannot
more than three or four hours, and may be so easily supported as a regular
very easily come up to double that, for advanced guard , they would, therefore,
the enemy still requires just as much time be exposed to greater danger if it was
to mature his first measures against our not that the enemy's offensive power in
advanced guard, and the resistance offered most cases is somewhat less at the outer
by that guard in its original position will extremities of his line, and in the worst
be greater than it would be in a position cases such corps have sufficient room to
further forward .
give way without exposing the army so
The consequence is, that in the first of directly to danger as a flying advanced
these supposed cases the enemy cannot guard would in its rapid retreat.
easily make an attack on our main body The most usual and best means of
on the back supporting an advanced corpsis by a
same day that he pressesexactly
the advanced corps, and this for which
considerable body of cavalry,
coincides with the results of experience. reason , when necessary from the distance
Even in the second case the enemy must
succeed in driving our advanced guard atcavalry
whichthe corps is advanced, the reserye
posted between the main body
isadvanced
from its ground in the first half of the and the corps .
day to have the requisite time for a The conclusion to be drawn from the
general action . preceding reflections is, that an advanced
As the night comes to our help in the corps effects more by its presence than
first of these supposed cases, we see how
much time may be gained by an advanced by its efforts, less by the combats in
guard thrown further forward . which it engages than by the possibility
With reference to corps placed on the of those in which it might engage: that
sides or flanks, the object of which we it should never attempt to stop the
have before explained, the mode of action enemy's movements, but only serve like
is in most cases more or less connected a pendulum to moderate and regulate
with circumstances which belong to the them , so that they may be made matter
of calculation .

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPS .
We are now considering the three situa
tions of an army outside of the combat are conditioned by place, time, and the
only strategically, thatis, so far as they number
subjects ofwhich
the effective force. All those
relate to the internal
CHAP . IX.] CAMPS. 29

arrangement of the combat and the better for an army of 100,000 men to
transition into the state of combat belong have, in place of 6,000 tent horses,
to tactics. 5,000 additional cavalry, or a couple of
The disposition in camps, under which hundred extra guns, partly it has been
we mean every disposition of an army found that in great and rapid operations
except in quarters, whether it be in a load of tents is a hindrance, and of
tents, huts, or bivouac, is strategically little use.
completely identical with the combatwhich But this change is attended with two
is contingent upon such disposition. drawbacks, viz., an increase of casualties
Tactically, it is not so always, for we can, in the force, and greater wasting of the
for many reasons, choose a site for en- country.
camping which is not precisely identical However slight the protection afforded
with the proposed field of battle. Having by a roof ofcommon tent cloth , -it cannot
already said all that is necessary on the be denied tbat on a long continuance it is
disposition of an army, that is, on the great relief to the troops. For a single
position of the different parts, we have day the difference is small, because a
only to make some observations on camps tent is little protection against windand
in connection with their history. cold, and does not completely exclude
In former times, that is, before armies wet ; but this small difference, if repeated
grew once more to considerable dimen- two or three hundred times in a year,
sions, before wars became of greater becomes important. A greater loss
duration, and their partial acts brought through sickness is just a natural result.
into connection with a whole or general How the devastation of the country is
plan, and up to the time of the war of increased through the want of tents for
the French Revolution , armies always the troops requires no explanation.
used tents. This was their normal state . One would suppose that on account
With the commencement of the mild of these two reactionary influences the
seasonof the year theyleft their quarters, doing away with tents must have
and did not again take them up untiſ diminished again the energy of war in
winter set in. Winter quarters at that another way, that troops must remain
time must to a certain extentbe looked longer in quarters, and from want of the
upon as a state of no war, for in them the requisites for encampment must forego
forces were neutralised ,the whole clock- many positions which would have been
work stopped, quarters to refresh an possible had tents been forthcoming.
army which preceded the real winter This would indeed have been the case
quarters, and other temporary canton- had there not been, in thesame epoch of
ments, for a short time within ed
contract time, an enormou
s onrevoluti in war
limits were transitional andexceptional generally, which swallownate
conditions
ed upin itself
. smaller subordi
all these influences.
This is not the place to enquire how The elementary fire of war has become
such a periodical voluntary neutralisation so overpowering , its energy so extra
of power consisted with, or is now con- ordinary, that these regular periods of
rest also have disappeared , and every
sistent with the object and being of war ;
presses forward with persistent
we shall come to that subject hereafter. power towards
Enough that it was so. force the great decision, which
Since the wars of the French Revolu- will be treated of more fully in the ninth
tion, armies have completely done away book. Under these circumstances, there
with the tents on account of the encum fore, any question about effectson an army
brance theycause. Partly it isfound from the discontinuance of the use of
30 ON WAR. [BOOK V.
tents in the field is quite thrown into on the conduct of war ; but that this
the shade. Troops now occupy huts, or reaction will ever be strong enough to
bivouac under the canopy of heaven, bring back the use of tents is very
without regard to season of the year, doubtful, because now that much wider
weather, or locality, just according as limits have been opened for the elements
the general plan and object of the cam- of war it will never return within its old
paign require.
Whether war will in the future con. narrow bounds, except
certain time and underoccasionally for a
certain circum .
tinue to maintain, under all circumstances stances, only to break out again with the
and at all times, this energy, is a ques- all-powerful force of its nature. Perma
tion we shall consider hereafter ; where nent arrangements for an army must,
this energy is wanting, the want of tents therefore, be based only upon that
is calculated to exercise some influence nature .

CHAPTER X.

MARCHES.
MARCHES are a mere passage from one result of this is the need of a division
position to another under two primary quite irrespective of that division of an
conditions.
The first is, the due care of the troops, army in separate parts which belongs
80 that no forces shall be squandered
to its position ; therefore, although the
division into columns of march ori
uselessly when they might be usefully ginates in the strategic disposition in
employed ; the second, is precision in general, it does not do so inevery par
the movements , so that they may fit ticular case .A great mass which is to
exactly. If we marched 100,000 men be concentrated at any one point must
in one single column, that is, upon necessarily be divided for the march.
one road without intervals of time, the But even if a disposition of the army in
rear of the column would e
never arriv at
divisions,parts a march
causesthe in separate
the proposed destination on the same separate sometimes conditionsof the
day with the head of the column ; we
must either advance at an unusually slow primitive disposition, sometimes those of
pace, or the mass would, like a thread of ifthethe
march, are paramount.
disposition For instance,
of the troops is one
water, disperse itself in drops ; and this made merely for rest, one in which a
dispersion , together with the excessive
exertion laid upon those in rear owing battle
of theismarch
not expected, then the
predominate conditions
, and these
to the length of the column, would conditions are chiefly the choice of good,
soon throw everything into confusion.
If from this extreme we take the well-frequented roads. Keeping in view
opposite direction , we find that the this difference, we choose a road in the
one case
smaller the mass of troops in one column on account of the quarters
the greater the ease and precision with and camping ground, in the other we
which the march can be performed . The take the quarters and camps suchas they
are, on account of the road. When a
CHAP. X.] MARCIES. 31

battle is expected,and everything depends of a quarter of a mile from each other ?

on our reaching a particular point with a The cavalry on the wings had to en .
mass of troops, then we should think counter the same difficulties when the
march was direct to the front. There
nothing
the of getting tonecessary
worstby-roads,if that point
; if,byoneven
the was other difficulty with the artillery,
other hand, we are still on the journey to which required a road for itself, pro
the theatre of war, then the nearest great tected by infantry ; for the lines of
roads are selected for the columns, and infantry required to be continuous
we look out for the best quarters and lines, and the artillery increased the
camps that can be got near them . length of their already long trailing
Whether the march is of the one kind columns still more, and threw all their
or the other, if there is a possibility of a regulated distances into disorder. It is
combat,that is within the whole region only necessaryto read thedispositions
of actual war, it is an invariable rule in for marches in Tempelhof's History of the
the modern art of war to organise the Seven Years' War, to be satisfied of all
columns so that the mass of troops com these incidents and of the restraints thus
posing each column is fit of itself to en- imposed on the action of war.
gage in an independent combat. This But since then the modern art of war
condition is satisfied by the combina- has subdivided armies on a regular
tion of the three arms, by an organised principle, so that each of the principal
subdivision of the whole, and by the parts forms in itself a complete whole, of
appointment of a competent commander. small proportions, but capable of acting
Marches, therefore , havebeen the chief in battle precisely like the great whole,
except nin one respect, which is, that the
cause of thenew order of battle, and they duratio of its action must be shorter.
profit most by it. The consequence of this change is, that
When the middle the last century,
of
especiallyinin the theatre of war in which even when it is intended that the whole
Frede rick II. was engag ed, generals force should take part in a battle, it
ment is no longer necessary to have the
beganpleto belon
princi lookging to move
upon fighting , and a
as to columns so close to each other that they
think of gaining the victory by the effect may unite before the commencement of
of unexpected movements , thewantof the combat;itis sufficient now if the
an organised order of battle caused the concentration takes place in the course of
most complicated and laborious evolu- the action .
tions on a march . In carrying out a The smaller a body of troops the more
movement near the enemy , an army easily it can be moved , and therefore the
requires that subdivision which is
ought to be always ready to fight ; but not ait result
less
of the separate disposition,
at that time they were y
never read to
fight unless the whole army was collec- but of the unwieldiness of the mass.
tively present, because nothingtelessthan
ted acomple whole. A small body, therefore, can march upon
the army constitu one road , and if it is to advance on
In a march to a flank, the second line, several lines it easily finds roads near
inorder to be always'attheregulated each other which are as good as it
distance, that is abouta quarter ofa mile requires. The greater the mass the
ing,becomes
greater
fromthe first, had to march up hill and divid the necessity for sub
the greater becomes the number
down dale,
ertion, which
as well a greatedstock
as demand immens e ex of columns , and the want of made roads,
of local
knowledge ; for where can one find two or even great high roads, consequently
good roads running parallel at a distance also the distance of the columns from
32 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
each other. Now the danger of this suh- four divisions and a reserve of cavalry,
division is — arithmetically expressed- even on indifferent roads, generally gets
in an inverse ratio to the necessity for it. over a march of three miles in eight
The smaller the parts are, the more hours ; now, if WᎾ reckon for each
readily must they be able to render division one league in depth, and the
assistance to each other ; the larger they same for the reserve cavalry and artillery,
are, the longer they can be left todepend then thewhole march will last thirteen
on themselves. If we only call to mind hours. This is no great length of time,
what has been said in the preceding book and yet in this caseforty thousand men
on this subject, and also consider that in would have marched over the same road .
cultivated countries at a few miles But with such a mass as this we can
distance from the main road there are make use of lateral roads, which are to be
always other tolerably good roads run- found at a greater distance, and there
ning in a parallel direction, it is easy to fore easily shorten the march. If the
see that, in regulating a march , there are mass of troops marching on the same
no greatdifficulties which make rapidity road is still greater than above supposed,
and precision in the advance incompatible then it is a case in which the arrival of
with the proper concentration of force.- the whole on the same day is no longer
In a mountainous country parallel roads indispensable, for such masses never give
are both scarce, and the difficulties of battle now the moment they meet, usually
communication between them great ; but not until the next day.
the defensive powers of a single column We have introduced these concrete
are very much greater. cases, not as exhausting considerations of
In order to make this idea clearer let this kind, but to make ourselves more
us look at it for a moment in a concrete intelligible, and by means of this glance
form .
at the results of experience to show that
Adivision of8,000men ,with its artillery in the present mode of conducting war
and other carriages,takes up , as we know the organisation of marches no longer
byexperience in ordinary cases, a space of offers such great difficulties; that the
one league; if, therefore, two divisions most rapid marches, executed with the
march one after the other on the same road, greatest precision, no longer require
the second arrives one hour after the first ;either that peculiar skill or that exact
but now, as said in the sixth chapter of knowledge of the country which was
the fourth book, a division of this strength needed for Frederick's rapid and exact
is quite capable of maintaining a combat marches in the Seven Years' War.
for several hours, even against a superior Through the existing organisation of
force, und, therefore, supposing the armies, they rather go on now almost of
worst, that is, supposing the first had to themselves, at least without any great pre
commence a fight instantaneously, still paratory plans. In times past,battles were
the second division would not arrive too
late. Further, within a league right and conducted by required
but marches mere word of command,
a regular plan,
left of the road on which we march , in
the cultivated countries of central Europe now the order
ter, and for a ofbattle
march therequires
word the lat
of com
there are, generally, lateral roads which mand almost suffices .
can be used for a march , so that there is
no necessity to go across country, as was As is well known, allmarches are either
so often done inthe Seven Years' War. perpendicular [ to thefront] or parallel.
The latter, alsocalled flank-marches, alter
divisions;
Again, it is known by experience the geometrical position ofthe
tion were
that thehead of a column composed of those parts which,inposi , in
CHAP . X. ] MARCHES. 33

line, will follow one another, and rice other. If an army in four divisions, of
versa. Now, although the line of march which three form the front line and the
may be at any angle with the front, fourth the reserve, is to march against
still the order of the march must de- the enemy in that order, then it is natural
cidedly be of one or other of these to assign a road to each of the divisions
classes .
in front, and cause the reserve to follow
This geometrical alteration could only the centre. If there are not three roads
be completely carried out by tactics, and at a suitable distance apart, then we need
by it only through the file -march as not hesitate at once to march upon two
itis called, which, with great masses, is roads, as no serious inconvenience can
impossible. Far less is it possible for stra- arise from so doing.
tegy to do it. The parts which changed It is the same in the opposite case, the
their geometrical relation in the old flank march .
order of battle were only the centre and Another point is the march off of
wings; in the new they are the divisions columns from the right flank or left.
of the first rank - corps, divisions, or In parallel marches (marches to a flank )
even brigades, according to the organisa- the thing is plain in itself. No one
tion of the army. Now , the consequences would march off from the right to
above deduced from the new order of make a movement to the left flank . In
battle have an influence here also, for as it a march to the front or rear, the order of
is no longer so necessary , asformerly, march should properly be chosen accord
that the whol army shou be assemble ing to the direction of the lines of roads
befo acti e commences,ld therefore thed in respect to the future line of deploy
re on
greater care is taken that those troops ment . This may also be done frequently
which march together form one whole in tactics , as its spaces are smaller, and
(a unit).
that If two
one form ed the rese s wer
divisionrve to ethe
thertion
plac rela
so otheed
r,
a surv
eforse can of the geom takecal
beeymore easily etri n.
andthat the y wer e to adva nce agai nst In strategy e and
impossible, and
it is quithave
the enemy upon two roads, no one would therefor although we e seen here
think of sending a portion of each divi- there a certain analogy brought over
sion by each of theroads , but a road into strategy from tactics, it was mere
would at once be assigned to each divi- pedantry. " Formerly the whole order
sion ; they would therefore march sideby ofmarch was a purely tactical affair,
because the army on a march re
side, and each general of division would
beleftto provide a reservefor himselfin mained always an indivisible whole,
case of a combat. Unity of command is and looked to nothing but a combat
muchmore importantthan theoriginal
geometrical relation divisions
of the whole ; yet neverthelessSchwerin,
; if the for example, when he marched off from
reach their new position without a com his position near Brandeis, on the 5th of
bat, they can resume their previous re
lations.
May, could not tell whether his future
Much less if two divisions, fieldof battle would be on his right or
standing together, are to make aparallel
( lank) march upon two roads should we
left, and on this account he was obliged
to make his famous countermarch .
think of placing the second line or re If an army in the old order of battle
serve of each division on the rear road ; advanced against the enemy in four
instead of that, we should allot to each columns, the cavalry in the first and
of the divisions one of the roads, and second lines on each wing formed the
therefore during the march consider one two exterior columns, the two lines of
division as forming the reserve to the infantry composing the wingsformed the
VOL . II .
D
34 ON WAR. [ BOOK V.
two central columns. Now these columns and can only take place accidentally . An
could march off all from the right or all advance from the centre by one and the
from the left, or the right wing from the same column in strategy is, in point of
right, the left wing from the left, or the fact, nonsense, for it supposes a double
left from the right, and the right from the road .
left. In the latter case it would have The order of march belongs, more
been called “ double column from the over, more to the province of tac
centre." But all these forms, although tics than to that of strategy, for it
they ought to have had a relation directly is the division of a whole into parts,
to the future deployment, were really all which, after the march, are once more
quite indifferent in that respect. When to resume the state of a whole. As,
Frederick the Great entered on the battle however , inmodern warfare the formal
of Leuthen, his army had been marched connection of the parts is not required to
off by wings from the right in four be constantly kept up during a march,
columns, therefore the wonderful transi. but on the contrary, the parts duringthe
tion to a march off in order of battle, as march may become further separated,
described by all writers of history, was and therefore be left more to their own re
done with the greatest ease, because it sources, therefore it is much easier now for
happened that the king chose to attack independent combats to happen in which
the left wing of the Austrians; had he the parts have to sustain themselves, and
wanted to turn their right, he must have which, therefore must be reckoned as
countermarched his army, as he did at complete combats in themselves, and on
Prague. that account we have thought it neces
If these forms did not meet that ob sary to say so much on the subject.
ject in those days, they would be mere Further, an order of battle in three
trifling as regards it now. We know parts in juxtaposition being, as wehave
now just as little as formerly the situa- seen in the second* chapter ofthis book,
tion of the future battle - field in refer- the most natural where no special object
ence to the road we take; and thelittle predominates, from that results also that
loss of time occasioned by marchi ng off theorderofmarch inthree columns is
in inverted order infinitely
is now less im- the most natural.
portant than formerly . The new order of It only remains to observe that the
battle has further a beneficial influence in
notion of a column in strategy does not
this respect , that it is now immaterial found itself mainly on the line of march
which division arrives first or which of one body of troops. Theterm is used
brigade is brought under fire first. te
in strategy to designa masses of troops
Under these circumstances the march marching on the same roadondifferent
off from the right or left is of no conse days as well . For the division into
quence now, otherwise than that when it columns is made chiefly to shorten and
is done alternately it tends to equalise the
fatigue which the troops undergo. This, facilitate the march, as a small number
which is the only object, is certainly an marches quicker and more conveniently
important one for retaining both modes than large bodies. But this end may,
of marching off with large bodies. be attained by marching troops on
The advance from the centre as a de different days, as well asby marching
finite evolution naturally comes to an end them on different roads.
on account of what has just been stated,
6th Chap. ? -TR.
CIIAP . XI. ] MARCHES. 35

CHAPTER XI .

MARCHES ( CONTINUED ).
RESPECTING the length of a march and of whole divisions at once, from one camp
the time it requires, it is natural for us to another, for that is the usual form of
to depend on the general results of ex- marches made on a theatre of war. When
perience. several divisions are to march in one
For our modern armies it has long column, the first division to move is as
been settled that a march of three miles sembled and marched off earlier than
should be the usual day's work which, the rest, and therefore arrives at its
on long distances, may be set down as camping ground so much the sooner.
an average distance of two miles per day, At the same time this difference can still
allowing for the necessary rest days, to never amount to the whole time, which
make such repairs of all kinds as may corresponds to the depth of a division on
be required . the line of march, and which is so well ex
Such a march in a level country, and pressed in French, as the time it requires
on tolerable roads will occupy a division for its découlement (running down). The
of 8,000 men from eight to ten hours ; in soldier is, therefore, saved very little
ahilly
If several divisions are united in one
every march is
country from ten to twelve hours. fatigue in this way,nedand duratio
very much lengthe in n in pro
will occupya couple moved
column, the marchwithout as the number
portionincreases. of troops to be
To assemble and march
of hours longer, taking into ac
count the intervals which must elapse inofflike
thedifferent brigadestimes,
manner at different of a isdivision
seldom,
between departure
the of the first and
succeeding divisions . practicable, and for that reason we have
Wesee,therefore,that the dayis pretty taken thedivision sitselfas the unit.
well occupied with such a march; that the In long distance , when troops march
fatigue endured by a soldier loaded with from one cantonment into another, and
his pack for ten or twelve hours is not to go over the road in small bodies, and
be judged of by that of an ordinary without points of assembly , the distance
journey ofthree miles on foot which a they go over daily may certainly be in
person, on tolerable roads, might easily creased, and in point of factit is so, from
get over in five hours. the necessary detours in getting to quar
The longest marches to be found in ex- ters .
ceptional instances are of five, or at most But those marches, on which troops
six miles a day ; for a continuance four, have to assemble daily in divisions, or
Amarch of five miles requires ahalt perhaps in corps,and have an additional
for several hours ; and a division of 8,000 move to get into quarters, take up the
men will not do it, even on a good road, most time, and are only advisable in rich
countries,andwhere themassesoftroops
in less than sixteen hours. If the march are not too large, as in such cases the
is one of six miles, and that there are greater facilility of subsistence and the
several divisions in the column , we may
reckon upon at least twenty hours. advantage of the shelter which the troops
We here mean the march of a number obtain compensate sufficiently for the
36 OV WAR . [BOOK V.
fatigue of a longer march. The Prussian to be a direct impediment, no further
army undoubtedly pursued a wrong sys- trouble was taken about it, whatever
tem in their retreat in 1806 in taking up damage it might suffer in that way.
quarters for the troops every night on Marches, therefore, took place in the
account of subsistence . They could have Seven Years' War, which even now
procured subsistence in bivouacs, and the cannot be surpassed ; as an instance we
army would not have been obliged to cite Lascy's march in 1760 , when he had
spend fourteen days in getting over fifty to support the diversion of the Russians
miles of ground, which, after all, they on Berlin, on that occasion he got over
only accomplished by extreme efforts. the road from Schweidnitz to Berlin
If a bad road or a hilly country through Lusatia, a distance of forty-five
has to be marched over, all these miles , in ten days, averaging, therefore,
calculations as to time and distance 4 miles aday,which,fora corpsof
undergo such modifications that it is 15,000, would be an extraordinary march
difficult to estimate , with any certainty, even in these days .
in any particular case, the time required On the other hand, through the new
for a march ; much less, then , can any method of supplying troops the move
general theory be established . All that ments of armies have acquired a new
theorycan doisto direct attention to the retardingprinciple .If troops have partly
liability to error with which we are here to procure supplies for themselves , which
beset. To avoid it the most careful cal
often happens, then they require more
culation is necessary, anda large margin time for the service ofsupply than would
for unforeseen delays. The influenceof benecessarymerely to receive rations
weather and condition of the troops also from provision wagons , Besides this,
come into consideration . on marches of considerable duration
Sincethedoingaway with tents and troopscannot be encamped in such large
the introduction of the system of subsistnumbers at any one point; the divisions
ing troops by compulsory demands for must be separated from one another, in
provisions onthe spot,the baggage of an order themore easily to manage for
army has been very sensibly diminished , them . Lastly, it almost always happens
and as
natural and most important thatitisnecessary to place part of
consequence we look first for an accelerathe army, particularly the cavalry, in
tion in themo vement s ofan army, and,
therefore, of course, an increase in the
quarters. Allthis occasionson the whole
a sensible delay. We find , therefore,
length of the day's march . This, how. that Buonaparte in pursuit of the
ever, is only realised under certain Prussians in 1806, with a view to cut
circumstances .
Marches within the theatre of war off their retreat, and Blücher in 1815 , in
of the French , with a like object,
have been very little accelerated by this pursuit
only accomplished thirty miles in ten
means, for it is well known that for days, a rate which Frederick the Great
many years whenever the object required was able to attain in his marches from
marches of unusual length it has always Saxony, to Silesia and back , notwith
behind or send it onleave the baggage
been thepracticeto beforehand standing all the train that he had to
, and , carry with him .
generally, to keep it separate from the
troops during the continuance of such At the same time the mobility and
movements , and it had in general no handiness, if we may use such an
influence on the movement, because as expression, of the parts of an army, both
soon as it was out of the way, and ceased great and small, on the theatre of war
have very perceptibly gained by the
 MARCHES. 37
CHAP. XII.]
diminution of baggage. Partly, inasmuch talions and companies, could not be
as while the number of cavalry and guns effected now in presence of even the most
is the same, there are fewer horses,and timid adversary .
therefore, there is less forage required ; On long marches, as from the Tagus
partly, inasmuch as we are no longer so to the Niemen , that lightening of the
much tied to any one position, because army is more sensibly felt, for although
we have not to be for ever looking the usual measure of the day's march
after a long train of baggage dragging remains the same on account of the car
after us . riages still remaining, yet, in cases of
Marches such as that, which, after great urgency, we can exceed that usual
raising the siege of Olmütz, 1758 , measure at a less sacrifice.
Frederick the Great made with 4,000 Generally the diminution of baggage
carriages, the escort of which employed tends moreto a saving of power than to
half his army broken up into single Þat- the acceleration of movement.

CHAPTER XII.

MARCHES (CONTINUED) .
We have now to consider the destructive occur if these were quarters taken up on
influence which marches have upon an the march, and the want of air and exer
cise can never be the cause of such sick
army. as
garded is active
It an so great that ite of
principl be re nesses, as it is so easy to give the soldier
maydestruc-
tion, just as much as the combat. both by means of his exercises.
One single moderate march does not Only think for a moment, when the
wear down the instrument, but a succes organism of a human being is in a
sion of even moderate marches is certain disordered and fainting state, what a
difference it must make to him whether
to tellwill,
ones succe
and ado
uponofit,course, ssion of
so much severe
sooner. he falls sick in a house or is seized in
At the actual scene of war,wantof the middle of a high road, up to his
food and shelter, bad broken -up roads, knees in mud, under torrents of rain, and
andthe necessity of being in a perpetual loaded with a knapsack on his back ;
state of readiness for battle, are causes even if he is in a camp he can soon be
of an excessive strain upon our means, sent to the next village, and will not
by whichionmen, cattle, s ofruined.
carriageare every be entirely without medical assistance,
descript as well as clothing whilst on a march he must be for hours
It is commonly said that a long rest without any assistance, and then be made
does notthat
suitat the physical health of an to drag himself along for miles as a
such a time there is more straggler. How many trifling illnesses
army;
that means become serious, how
sickness than during moderate activity . by many serious ones become mortal . Let
No doubt sickness will and does occur
if soldiers are packed too close in confined us consider how an ordinary inarch in
quarters ; but the same thing would the dust, and under the burning rays of
38 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
a summer
sun may produce the most unfavourable may amount to something
excessive heat, in which state, suffering incredible.
from intolerable thirst, the soldier then Only a couple of examples in order to
rushes to the fresh spring of water, to illustrate our ideas.
bring back for himself sickness and When Buonaparte crossed the Niemen
death . on 24th June, 1812, the enormous centre
It is not our object by these reflections of his army with which he subsequently
to recommend less activity in war ; the marched against Moscow numbered
instrument is there for use, and if the 301,000 men . At Smolensk , on the 15th
use wears away the instrument that is August, he detached 13,500 , leaving, it is
only in the natural order of things ; we to be supposed, 287,500. The actual state
only wish to see every thing put in its of his army however at that date was
right place, and to oppose that theore- only 182,000 ; he had therefore lost
tical bombast according to which the 105,000 .* Bearing in mind that up to
most astonishing surprises the most that time only two engagements to speak
rapid movements , the most incessant of had taken place, one between Davoust
activity cost nothing, and are painted as ion, -Osterm
other between
rich mines which the indolence of the and Tolstoy the
Murat Bragath
and an , we may
general leaves unworked . It is very put down the losses of the French army
much the same with these mines as with in action at 10,000 men at most, and
those from which gold and silver are ob- therefore the losses in sick and stragglers
tained ; nothingis seen but the produce within fifty-two days on a march of about
and no one asks about the value of the,
work which has brought this produce to seventy miles direct to his front, amounted
light . to 95,000, that is a third part of the
whole army.
On long marches outside a theatre of Three weeks later, at the time of the
war, the conditions under which the battle of Borodino, the loss amounted to
march is made are
no doubt
easier , and theaccount
daily usually 144,000
losseswith
smaller, (including
battle ), and the after
eight days casualties in the
that again,
but on that men the at Moscow, the number was 198,000. The
slightest sickness are generally lost to losses of this army in general were at the
the army for some time, as it is difficult for commencement of the campaign at the
convalescents to overtake an army con
stantly advancing. rate of šo daily, subsequently they rose
Amongst thecavalry the number of to and inofthe
two, to
creased last period
theoriginal they .in
strength
lame horses and horses with sore backs
The movement of Napoleon from the
rises inan increasing ratio, and amongst passage ofthe Niemen up to Moscow
the carriages many break down or
certainly may
requirerepair . Itneverfails therefo
that at the end of a march of ,100 milesre,
or still,we must benotcalled a persistent
forget one ;
that it lasted
more, an army arrives much weakened, eighty-two
accomplisheddays, in which time he only
120miles,and thatthe
particularly
train .
as regards its cavalry and French army upon two occasionsmade
If such marches are necessary on the regular halts, once at Wilna for about
theatreof war, that is under the eyes of fourteen days,about
Witebsk for and elevendays
the other ,time at
during
the enemy , then that disadvantage is
added to the other , and from the two which periods many stragglers had time
combined the losses with large masses
of troops, and under conditions otherwise * All these figures are taken from Chambray.
Vergl. Bd. vii. 2te Auflage, $ 80, ff.

CHAP . XIII.] CANTONMENTS.
to rejoin. This fourteen weeks' advance
was not made at the worst season of the
year, nor over the worst of roads, for
it was summer, and the roads along
which they marched were mostly sand.
It was the immense mass of troops
collected on one road, the want of suf-
ficient subsistence, and an enemy who
was on the retreat, but by no means in
flight, which were the adverse conditions .
Of the retreat of the French army
from Moscow to the Niemen, weshallsayingto that their losses from other causes
nothing, but this we may mention, that
the Russian army following them left
Kaluga 120,000 'strong, and reached
Wilna with 30,000. Every one knows
how few men were lost in actual combats
during that period.
One more example from Blücher's
campaign of 1813 in Silesia and Saxony,
39
a campaign very remarkable not for any
long march but for the amount of march
ingto and fro. York's corps of Blücher's
army began this campaign 16th August
about 40,000 strong, and was reduced to
12,000 at the battle of Leipsic, 19th Oc
tober. The principal combats which this
corps fought at Goldberg, Lowenberg,
on the Katsbach, at Wartenburg, and
Mockern (Leipsic) cost it on the authority
of the best writers, 12,000 men. Accord
in eight weeks amounted to 16,000, or
two - fifths of the whole.
We must, therefore, make up our minds
to great wear and tear of our own forces,
if we are to carry on a war rich in move
ments, we must arrange the rest of our
plan accordingly and above all things
the reinforcements which are to follow .

CHAPTER XIII .

CANTONMENTS .

ce eme t h ld
In the modern system of war cantonments quen of this extr effor , whic shou
havebecome again indispensable, because be called an extravagance , if that term
neither tents nor a complete military train was not much more applicable to the
make an army independent ofthem . Huts political conces ptionfere
of theenterprise !
and open -air camps ( bivouacs as they are Two thing inter with the occupa
called), howevd,er far such arrangemen ts tion of cantonments — the proximity of
may be carrie can still never become the the enemy, and the rapidity of movement.
usual
way
oflocating troops without sick- For these reasons they are quitted as
ness gaining the upper and
hand,gth prema soon as the decision approaches, and can
turely exhausting their stren , soone r or not be again taken up until the decision
later, according to the state of the weather is over.
In modern wars, thatis, in all campaigns
or climatofe . The
isone the campa in Russia in
few inignwhich,in a 1812
very during thelast twenty-five years whichoc
cur to usat this moment, the military ele
severe climate, the troops, during the six ment has acted with full
months that it lasted hardly ever lay in all that was possible hasenergy. Nearly
generally been
cantonments. But what was the conse
40 ON VAR . [BOOK V.
done in them , as far as regards activity the main point or only a secondary con
and the utmost effort of force ; but all sideration. If the disposition of the
these campaigns have been of short dura- troops in the course of a campaign is
tion , they have seldom exceeded half a regulatedby grounds purely tactical and
year ; in most of them a few months suf- strategical, and if, as is done more espe
to a crisis ,that is,
ficed to bring matters vanquished ciallywith cavalry, they are directed for
to a point where the enemy their comfort to occupy the quarters
saw himself compelled to sue for an ar- available in the vicinityof the point of
mistice or at once for peace, or to a point concentration of the army, then the quar,
where, on the conqueror's part, the im- ters are subordinate considerations and
petus of victory had exhausted itself. substitutes for camps ; they must, there
During this period of extreme effort there fore, be chosen within such a radius that
could be little question of cantonments, the troops can reach the point of assembly
for even in the victorious march of the in good time. But if an army takes up
pursuer, if there was no longer any dan- quarters to rest and refresh, then the
ger, the rapidity of movement made that housing of the troops is the main point,
kind of relief impossible . and other measures, consequently also
But when from any cause the course the selection of the particular point of
of events is less impetuous , when a more assembly, will be influenced by that
even oscillation and balancing of forces object.
takes place, then the housing of troops The first question for examination here
must again become a foremost subject for is as to the general form of the canton
attention . This want has some influence ments as a whole. The usual form is
even on the conduct of war itself, partly that ofa very long oval, a mere widen
in this way, that we seek to gain more ing as it were of the tactical order of
time and security by a stronger system battle. The point of assembly for the
of outposts, by a more considerable ad- army is in front, the head-quarters in
vanced guard thrown further forward ; rear. Now these three arrangements
and partly in this way, that our measures are, in point of fact, adverse, indeed
are governed more by the richness and almost opposed, to the safe assembly of
fertility of the country than by the tacti- the army on the approach of the enemy.
cal advantages which the ground affords The more the cantonments form a
in the geometrical relations of lines and square, or rather a circle, the quicker the
points. A commercial town of twenty or troops can concentrate at one point, that
thirtythousand inhabitants ,aroad thickly isthecentre. The further the placeof
studded with large villagesorflourishing assembly is placed inrear,thelongerthe
towns give such facilitiesfor theassem will be in reaching it, andssemble
, there
bling in one position large bodiesof enemyfore, themore time is left us toa .
troops, and this concentration gives such A point of assembly in rear of the can
a freedom and such a latitude for move
ment as fully compensate for the advan tonments can never be in danger. And,
tages which the better situation of someon the other hand, the farther the head
point may otherwise present . quarters are in advance, so much the
On the form to be followed in arrang sooner reports arrive, therefore so much
ing cantonments
servationstomakewehave only a few ob- the better is the commander informed of
everything . At thesame time,the first
, as thissubject belongs named arrangements are not devoid of
for the most part to tactics .
The housing of troops comes under points which deserve some attention.
By the
two heads, inasmuch asit can either be width, extension of the
we haveinview cantonments
protection in
of
CHAP . XIII .] CANTONMENTS. 41

the country which would otherwise be laid the army in general, applies here also ;
under contributions by the enemy. But therefore corps detached from the main
this motive is neither thoroughly sound, body, right and left, although intended
nor is it very important. It is only sound to fight in conjunction with the rest, will
as far as regards the country on the ex- have particular points of assembly of their
tremity of the wings, but does not apply own in the same line with the main body.
at all to intermediate spaces existing be- Now, if we reflect that the nature of
tween separate divisions of the army, if a country, on the one hand, by favour
the quarters of those divisions are drawn able features in the ground determines
closer round their point of assembly, for the most natural point of assembly, and
no enemy will then venture into those on the other hand, by the positions of
intervals of space . And it is not very towns and villages determines the most
important, because there are simpler suitable situation for cantonments, then
means of shielding the districts in our we must perceive how very rarely any
vicinity from the enemy's requisitions geometrical form can be decisive in
than scattering thearmy itself. our present subject. But yet it was
The placingof the point of assembly necessary to direct attention to it, be
in front is with a view to covering the cause, like all general laws, it affects
quarters, for the following reasons : the generality of cases in a greater or less
In the first place, a body of troops, sud- degree.
denly called to arms, alwaysleaves be What now remains to be said as to an
hindit in cantonments a tail ofstragglers advantageous position for cantonments is
-sick, baggage, provisions, etc., etc.- that they should be taken up behind
which may easily fall into the enemy's some natural obstacle of ground afford
hands
in rear .
of assembly is placed ing cover, whilst the sides next the enemy
if the pointsecond
In the place, we have to can be watched by small but numerous
apprehend that if the enemy with some detached parties ; or they may be taken up
bodies of cavalry passes by the advanced behind fortresses, which , when circum
guard, or if it is defeated in any way, he stances prevent any estimate being formed
may fall upon scattered regiments or of the strength of their garrisons, impose
battalions If he encounters a force upon the enemy a greater feeling of re
drawn up in good order, although it is spect
weak, and in the end must be over-
and and caution..
We reserve the subject of winter quar
powered, still he is brought to a stop, ters, covered by defensive works for a
and in that way time is gained. separate article .
As respects the position of the head- The quarters taken up by troops on a
ters
quar , it is gene rall y supp osed that it march differ from those called standing
cannot be made too secure . cantonments in this way , that, in order
According to these different considera- to save the troops from unnecessary
tions, wementmay conclude that thebest
ents
marching , cantonments on a march are
arrange for districts of cantonm the
taken up as much as possible along
is where they take an oblong form , ap lines of march , and are not at any con
siderable distance on either side of these
proaching the square
point of assemb ly in the centre,have
or circle, the roads;
and the if their extension in this sense does
head -quarters placed on the front line , not exceed a short day's march , the ar
Well protected byconsiderablemassesof rangement is not one at allunfavourable
troops. to the quick concentration of the army.
What we have said as to covering of In all cases in presence of the enemy,
the wingsin treating of thedisposition of according tothetechnical phrase in use,
42 ON WAR . [BOOK V,
that is in all cases where there is no con. strength nine men to a billet, therefore
siderable interval between the advance still not very close quarters. On the
guards of the two armies respectively, the other hand, if the advanced guard is
extent of the cantonments and the time only one mile in front, we could only
required to assemble the army determine occupy a space of four square miles ;
the strength and position of the advanced for although the time gained does not
guard and outposts ; but when these must diminish exactly in proportion as the
be suited to the enemy and circumstances , distance of the advanced guard dimin
then, on the contrary, the extent of the ishes, and even with a distance of one
cantonments must depend on the time mile we may still calculate on a gain of
which we can count upon by the resist- six hours, yet the necessity for caution
ance of the advance guard. increases when the enemy is so close.
In the third* chapter of this book, we But in such a space an army of 50,000
have stated how this resistance , in the men could only find partial accommoda
case of an advanced corps , may be tion, even in a very thickly populated
estimated . From the time of that resist- country.
ance we must deduct the time required From all this we see what an impor
for transmission of reports and getting tantpartis played here by great or at
the men under arms, and the remainder least considerable towns, which afford
only is the time available for assembling convenience for sheltering 10,000 or even
at the point of concentration 20,000 men almost at one point.
We shall conclude here also by estab- From this result it follows that, if we
lishing our ideas in the form of a result, are not very close to the enemy, and have
such as is usual under ordinary circum- a suitable advanced guard wemight re
stances . If the distance at which the main in cantonments, even if the enemy
advanced guard is detached is the same is concentrated , as Frederick the Great
as the radius of the cantonments, and did at Breslau in the beginning of the
the point of assembly is fixed in the year 1762, and Buonaparte at Witebsk
centre of the cantonments , the time in 1812. But although by preserving a
which is would
advance checkineg forthetheenemy's
gainedbebyavailabl trans
right distance and by suitable arrange
ments we have no reason to fear not
mission of intelligence and getting under being able to assemble in time, even op:
arms, and would in most cases besuffi- posite anenemy whois concentrated, yet
cient, evenalthough thecommunication we must not forget that anarmy engaged
is not made by means of signals, cañnon in assembling itself in all haste can do
shots, etc., but simply by relays oforder- nothing else in thattime;that it is there
lies, the only really sure method .
Withan advanced guard pushed fore, for a time at least, not in a con
forward three miles in front, our dition to avail itself in an instant of for
cantonments might therefore cover a tuitous opportunities, which deprives it
of the greater part of its reallyefficient
space of thirty square miles. In a power. The consequence of this is, that
moderately -peopledcountry there would
an army should only break itself up com
be 10,000 houses inthis space, which pletely in cantonments under some one
for army 50,000 after deducting
an of , or other of the three following cases :
the advanced guard, would be four men
to a billet, therefore very comfortable 1. If the enemy does the same.
quarters ; and for an army of twice the 2. If the condition
it unavoidable . of the troops makes
* 8th Chap . ?-TR. 3. If the more immediate object with
the army is completely limited to the
 SUBSISTENCE . 43
CHAP. XIV .]
maintenance of a strong position, and concentrate at Sombreff before the attack
therefore the only point of importance is of the enemy. Certainly, on the night
concentrating the troops at that point in of the 14th, that is, twelve hours before
good time. Ziethen was actually attacked, Blicher
received information of the advance of
The campaign of 1815 gives a very
remarkableexample of theassembl y of the enemy, and began to assemble his
an army from cantonments. General army ; but on the 15th at nine in the
Ziethen, with Blücher's advanced guard, morning, Ziethen was already hotly en
30,000men ,was posted at Charleroi, only gaged, and it was not until the same
two milesforfrom Sombreff the place ap moment that General Thielman at Ciney
pointed the assembly, of the army. first received orders to march to Namur.
The farthest cantonments of the army He had therefore then to assemble his di
were about eight miles from Sombreff, visions, and to march six and a half miles
that is, on the one side beyond Ciney, to Sombreff, which he did in 24 hours.
and on the other near Liége. Notwith- General Bulow would also have been able
standing this, the troops cantoned about to arrive about the same time, if the order
Ciney were assembled at Ligny several had reached him as it should have done .
hours before the battle began, and those But Buonaparte did not resolve to
near Liége (Bulow's Corps) would have make his attack on Ligny until two in
been also, had it not been for accident the afternoon of the 16th. The appre
and faulty arrangements in the commu- hension of having Wellington on the one
nication of orders and intelligence. side of him, and Blücher on the other, in
Unquestionably, proper care for the other words, the disproportion in the
security of the Prussian army was not relative forces, contributed to this slow
ness ; still we see how the most resolute
taken;
that thebutarran gementstion
in explana must atsay
werewemade a commander may be detained by the cau
time when the French army was still tious feeling of the way which is always
dispersed over widely extended canton- unavoidable in cases which are to a cer
ments, and that the real fault consisted tain degree complicate d.
in not altering them the moment the Some of the considerations here raised
ved the enemy's are plainly more tactical than strategic
first news
troops in recei
werewas movementthat
, and that Buo- in their nature ; but we have prefer
red rather to encroach a little than to
naparte had joined the army.
Still it remains noteworthy that the run the risk of not being sufficiently
Prussian armywas able in any way to explicit.

CHAPTER XIV.

SUBSISTENCE .
This subject has acquired much greater than those of the middle ages, and even
importance in modern warfare from two those of the old world ; for, although
causes in particular. First, because the fomerly armies did appear here and there
armies in general are now much greater which equalled or even surpassed modern
44 OV WAR . [BOOK V.
ones in size, still these were only rare provinces in order to subsist them the
and transient occurrences, whilst in mo- more easily ; in the Silesian war that ; beauty
dern military history, since the time of was no longer done.
Louis XIV. , armies have always been This systematic and connected form of inte
very strong in number. But the second carrying on war only became possible
cause is still more important, and belongs when states took regular troopsinto their
entirely to modern times . It is the very service in place of the feudal armies.
much closer inner connection which our The obligation of the feudal law was
wars have in themselves , the constant then commuted into a fine or contribu
state of readiness for battle of the belli- tion : personal service either came to an
gerents engaged in carrying them on . end, enlistment being substituted, or it
Almost all old wars consist of single was only continued amongst the lowest
unconnected enterprises, which are sepa classes, as the nobility regarded the fur
rated from each other by intervals during nishing a quota of men (as is still done
which the war in realityeither completely in Russia and Hungary) as a kind of
rested , and only still existed in a political tribute, a tax in men . In every case, as
sense, or when the armies at least had re- we have elsewhere observed, armies be
moved so far from each other that each ,
came henceforward, an instrument of the
withoutany care aboutthe army opposite, cabinet, their principal basis being the
only occupied itself with its own wants . treasury or the revenue of the govern
Modern wars, that is, the wars which ment.
have taken place since the Peace of West- Just the same kind of thing which took
phalia, have, through the efforts of re- place in the mode of raising and keep,
spective governments, taken a more up an establishment of troops could
systematic connected form ; the military ing
not but follow in the mode of subsisting
object, in general , predominates every- them . The privileged classes having
where, and demands also that arrange been released from the first of these ser
ments for subsistence shall be on an ade
quate scale . Certainly there were long vices on payment of a contribution in
periods of inaction in the wars of the money, the expense of the latter could
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, al- easily. The imposed
not beagain on them
cabinet and quite so
the treasury
most amounting to a cessation of war ; had thereforeto provide forthe subsistence
these are the regular periods passed in of the army, and could not allow it to be
cantonments ; still even those periods
were subordinate to the military object ; maintained in its own country at the ex
they were caused by the inclemency of pense of the people. Administrations
the season , not by any necessity arising were therefore obliged to look upon the
out of the subsistence of the troops , and subsistence of the army as an affair for
as they regularly terminated with the which they were specially responsible.
return of summer , therefore we may say The subsistence thus became more diffi
at all events uninterrupted action was the cult in two ways : first, because it was an
rule affair belonging
of war during the fine season of because the forces required toand
to government, be next,
per
the year .
As the transition from one situation or manently embodied to confront those
method of action to another always takes kept up in other states.
place gradually so it was in the case
before us.
Thus arose a separate military class
In the wars against Louis in the population, with an independent
XIV . the allies used still to send their organisation provided forits subsistence,
troops into winter cantonments in distant and carried out to theutmost possible
perfection.
CHAP. XIV.) SUBSISTENCE. 45

Not only were stores of provisions col. consequence of a wretchedly bad system ,
lected,eitherby purchaseor by deliveries in or of a parsimonious abstract calculation
kind from the landed estates (Dominial- of the smallest ration that a man can
lieferungen ), consequently from distant exist upon . When such is the case the
points, and lodged in magazines, but they powers of the men individually will
were also forwarded from these by means always deteriorate physically and morally.
ofspecial wagons, baked near the quarters What Frederick the Great managed to
of the troops in ovens temporarily es do with his soldiers cannot be taken as a
tablished, and from thence again carried standard for us, partly because he was
away at last by the troops, by means of opposed to those who pursued a similar
another system of transport attached to system, partly because we do not know
the army itself. We take a glance at how much more he might have effected
this system not merely from its being if he had been able to let his troops live
characteristic of the military arrange as Buonaparte allowed his whenever cir .
ments of the period, but also because it cumstances permitted .
is a system which can never be entirely The feeding of horses by an artificial
done away ; some parts of it must con- system of supply is, however, anexperi
tinually reappear. ment which has not been tried, because
Thus military organisation strove per-
petually towards becoming more inde- forage is much more difficult to provide
on account of its bulk. A ration for a
pendent of people and country. horse weighs about ten times as much as
The consequence was that in this man- one for a man, and the number of horses
ner war became certainly a more syste- with an army is more than one-tenth the
matic and more regular affair, and more number of men, at present it is one
subordinated to the military, that is the fourth to one-third, and formerly it was
political object; but it was at the same one - third to one-half, therefore the
time also much straitened and impeded weight of the forage required is three,
in its movement,and infinitely weakened four,or five times as much as that of the
in energy. For now an army was tied soldier's rations required for the same
to its magazines, limited to the working period of time; on this account the
powers of its transport service, and it shortest and most direct means were
naturally followed that the tendency of taken to meet the wants of an army in
everything was to economise the subsist- this respect, that is by foraging expedi
ence of the troops. The soldier fed on a tions. Now these expeditions occasioned
wretched pittance of bread, moved about great inconvenience in the conduct of
like a shadow , and no prospect of a war in other ways , first by making it a
change for the better comforted him principal object to keep the war inthe
under his privations. enemy's country ; and next because they
Whoever treats this miserable way of made it impossible to remain very long
feeding soldiers as a matter of no moment, in one part of the country. However,
and points to what Frederick the Great at the time of the Silesian war, foraging
did with soldiers subsisted in this manner , expeditions were much less frequent,
only takes a partial view of the matter. they were found to occasion a much
Thepower of enduring privations is one greater drain upon the country, and
of the finest virtues in a soldier , and much greater waste than if the require
without it no army is animated with the ments were satisfied by means of re
true milita
must ry spiritrary
be of atempo suchpriva
;butkind, tiond quisit
commande Whenions the Frencts
and impos h. Revolution sud
by the forceofcircumstances, and notthe denlybrought again upon the war
16 ON WAR . (BOOK v.

stage a national army, the means which of consumers only, there must always be
governments could command were found provisions enough to last for several
insufficient, and the whole system of days, we may easily see that the most
war, which had its origin in the limited densely populated place can furnish food
extent of these means, and found again and quarters for a day for about as many
its security in this limitation, fell to troops as there are inhabitants, and for
pieces, and of course in the downfall a less number of troops for several days
of the whole was included that of the without the necessity of any particular
branch of which we are now speaking, previous preparation. In towns of con
the system of subsistence. Without siderable size this gives a very satis
troubling themselves about magazines, factory result, because it enables us to
and still less about such an organisation subsista large force at one point. But
as the artificial clockwork of which we in smaller towns, or even in villages, the
have spoken, by which the different supply would be far from sufficient; for
divisions of the transport service went a population of 3,000 or 4,000 in a
round like a wheel, the leading spirits of square mile which would be large in
the revolution sent their soldiers into the such a space, would only suffice tofeed
field, forced their generals to fight, sub- 3,000 or 4,000 soldiers, and if the whole
sisted, reinforced their armies, and kept mass of troops is great they would have
alive the war by a system of exaction, to be spread over such an extent of
and of helping themselves to all they country at this rate as would hardly be
required by robbery and plunder. consistent with other essential points.
Between these two extremes the war But in level countries, and even in small
under Buonaparte, and against him , towns, the quantity of those kinds of
preserved sort of medium , that is to provisions which are essential in war is
say, it just made use of such means as generally much greater ; the supply of
suited it best amongst all that were bread which a peasant has is generally
available; and so it will be also in adequate to the consumption of his
future. family for several, perhaps from eight
The modern method of subsisting to fourteen days ; meat can be obtained
troops, that is, seizing every thing daily, vegetable productions are gener
which is to be found in the country ally forthcoming in sufficient quantity to
without regard to meum et tuum may be last till the following crop. Therefore
carried out in four different ways : that in quarters which have never been occu
is, subsisting on the inhabitant, contri- pied there is no difficulty in subsisting
butions which the troops themselves troops three or four times the number of
look after, general contributions and the inhabitants for several days, which
magazines. All four are generally ap- again is a very satisfactory result. Ac
more together,
plied than one generally
the others cording2,000
prevailing about
: still it sometimes or, wherethe
to this populationis
3,000 per square mile,
happens that only one is applied entirely and if no large town is included , a
by itself. column of 30,000 would require about
four square miles, which would be ea
length of side of two miles. Therefor
1.—Living on the inhabitant , or on the for an army of 90,000, which we may
community , which is the same thing. reckon at about75,000 combatants, if
If we bear in mind that in a community marching in three columns contiguous
consisting even as it does in great towns, to each other, we should require to take
up a front six miles in breadth in case
CHAP . XIV
v..] SUBSISTENCE . 47

three roads could be found within that except upon the inhabitants,and without
breadth . ever suffering want. As their undertak
If several columns follow one another ings depended on moral and physical
into these cantonments, then special superiority, as they were attended with
measures must be adopted by the civil certain results, and were never delayed
authorities, and in thatway there can be by indecision or caution, therefore their
no great difficulty in obtaining all that progress in the career of victory was
is required for a day or two more. generally that of an uninterrupted march.
Therefore if the above 90,000 are fol- If circumstances are less favourable,
lowed the day after by a like number, if the population is not so great, or if
even these last would suffer no want ; it consists more of artisans than agri
this makes up the large number of culturists, if the soil is bad, the country
150,000 combatants. already several times overrun — then of
Forage for the horses occasions still course the results will fall short of
less difficulty, as it andneither must what
requires we have supposed. Still,wemust
grinding nor baking, as there remember that if the breadth of the
be forage forthcoming in sufficient quan front of a column is extended from two
tity to last the horses in the country miles to three, we get a superficial ex
until next therefore
harvest, even where tent of country more than double in
there is little stall-feeding, still there size, that is,instead of four we command
should be no want, only the deliveries of nine square miles, and that this is still
forage should certainly be demanded an extent which in ordinary cases will
fromthe communityat large, not from alwaysadmitof concentration for action ;
we see therefore that even under un
the inhabitants individually. Besides, it
is supposed that some attention is , of favourable circumstances this method of
course, paid to the nature of thecountry subsistence will still be always com
in making arrangements for a march, so patible with a continuous march.
as not tosend cavalry mostly into places But if a halt of several days takes
of commerce and manufactures, and place, then great distress must ensue if
preparations have not been made before .
into districts where there is no forage.
The conclusion to be drawn from thisħand for such an event in other ways.
hasty glance is, therefore, that in a Now these preparatory measures are of
moderately populated country, that is, a two kinds, and without them a consi
country of from 2,000 to 3,000 souls per derable army even now cannot exist.
square mile, an army of 150,000 com- The first is equipping the troops with
batants may be subsisted by the inhabi- a wagon train, by means of which bread
tants and community for one or twodays or flour, as the most essential part of
within such a narrow space as willnot their subsistence, can be carried with
interfere with its concentration forbattle, them forafew , thatis, for three or four
that is, therefore, that such an army days ; if to this we add three or four
can be subsisted on a continuous march days rations which the soldier himself
without magazines or other prepara can carry, then we have provided what
tion. is most indispensable in the way of
On this result were based the enter-subsistence for eight days.
prises of the French army in the revo- The second arrangement is that of a
Jutionary war , and under Buonaparte. regular commissariat, which whenever
They marched from the Adige to the there is a moment's halt gathers provi
Lower Danube, and from the Rhine to the sions from distant localities, so that at
Vistula, with little means of subsistence any moment we can pass over from the
48 ON WAR . [BOOK V.

system of quartering on the inhabitants hurry is not of sufficient extent to furnish

to a different system . the whole of what is required. What
Subsisting in cantonments has the im- could be done in the way of supplying
mense advantage that hardly any trans- 30,000 men, within a circle of a mile in
port is required, and that it is done in diameter, or from an area of three or
the shortest time, but certainly it sup four square miles ? Moreover it would
poses as a prior condition that canton- seldom be possible to collect even what
ments can be provided for all the troops . there is, for the most of the nearest ad.
jacent villages would be occupied by small
2.- Subsistence through exactions cnforced bodies of troops,who wouldnot allowany
by the troops themselves. thing to be removed. Lastly, by such a
measure there would be the greatest
If a single battalion occupies a camp, waste, because some men would get more
this camp may be placed in the vicinity than they required, whilst a great deal
of some villages, and these may receive would be lost, and of no benefit to any one.
notice to furnish subsistence ; then the The result is, therefore , that the sub
method of subsistence would not differ sistence of troops by forced contributions
essentially from the preceding mode. in this manner can only be adopted with
But, as is most usual, ifthe mass of troops success when the bodies of troops are not
to be encamped at some one point is too large, not exceeding a division of
much larger, there is no alternative but
make collection
8,000 or 10,000 men , and even then it is
to a in common within only to be resorted to as an unavoidable
the circle of districts marked out for the
evil .
purpose, collecting sufficient for the sup It cannot in general be avoided in the
ply of one of the parts of the army, a case of troops directly in front of the
brigade or division, and afterwards to enemy, such as advanced guards and
make a distribution from the common outposts, when the army is advancing,
stock thus collected. because these bodies must arrive at points
The first glance shows that by such where no preparations could have been
amode of proceeding the subsistence made, and they are usually too far from
of a large army would be a mat the stores collected for the rest of the
ter of impossibility. The collection made army ; further, in the case ofmoveable
from the stores in any given district lastly,
in the country will be much less than if columns
in all cases where by chanceandthere
actingindependently; is
the troops had taken up their quarters neither time nor means to procure sab
in the same district, for when thirty or sistence in any other way .
forty men take possession of a farmer's The more troops are accustomed to
house they can if necessary collect the live by regular requisitions, the more
last mouthful, but one officer sent with
a few men to collect provisions has neither time andcircumstances permit the adop
time nor means to hunt out all the pro tion of that way of subsisting, then the
visions that may be stored in a house,
more satisfactory will be the result. But
often also he has not the means of trans time is generally wanting, for what the
troops get for themselves directly is got
port ; he will therefore only be able to col much quicker.
lect a small proportion of what is actually
forthcoming. Besides, in camps the troops
are crowded together in such a manner at 3. — By regular requisitions.
one point, that the range of country from This is unquestionably the simplest *
which provisions can be collected in a and most efficaciousmeans of subsisting
CHAP . XIV :. ] SUBSISTENCE . 49

troops, and it has been the basis of all over which the contributions can be levied
modern wars. increases as the squares of the distances
It differs from the preceding way gained. If on the first day only four
drawn upon, on
chiefly by its having the co-operation of square miles have beenhave
the localauthorities. The supply in this the next day we shall sixteen, on
case must not be carried off forcibly just the third, thirty-six ; therefore on the
from the spot where it is found, but be second day twelve more than on the first,
regularly delivered according to an equit- and on the third day twenty more than
able division of the burden . This divi- on the second .
sion can only be made by the recognised Of course this is a mere rough esti.
official authorities of the country . mate of what may take place, subject to
In this all depends on time. The more many modifying circumstances which may
time there is, the more general can the intervene, of which the principal is, that
division be made, the lesswill it press on one district may not be capable of con
individuals,and themore regular will be tributinglike another. Buton the other
theresult. Even purchases may be made hand, wemust also remember that the
with ready, money to assist, in which way radius within which we can levy may in
it will approach the mode which follows crease more than two miles a day in
next in order ( Magazines). In all as- width, perhaps three or four, or in many
semblages of troops in their own coun- places still more.
try there is no difficulty in subsisting The due execution of these requisitions
by regular requisitions ; neither, as a is enforced by detachments placed under
rule, is there any in retrograde move the orders of the official functionaries,
ments. On the other hand, in all move- but still more by the fear of responsi.
montsinto a country of which we are not bility, punishment, and ill - treatment
in possession, there is very little timefor which, insuchcases,like a generalweight,
such arrangements, seldom more than presses on the whole population.
However, it is not our intention to
the one day which the advanced guard is
in the habit of preceding the army. enter into details - into the whole ma
With the advanced guard the requisitions chineryof commissariat and army sub
in view .
are sent to the local officials, specifying sistence; we have only resultsfrom
how many rations they are to have ready The result to be derived a com
at such and such places. As these can mon-sense view of all the circumstances
only be furnished from the immediate in general, and the view which the expe
neighbourhood, that is,within a circuit of rience of thewars sincethe Frenchrevo
a couple of milesround each point,the lution tends to confirm is,—that even the
nearly
ns so made
collectiosufficien t for inanhaste
armywill never be- visions
of consider largest army, if it carries withitpro
for a few days, may undoubtedly
able strength, and consequently, if the be subsisted by contributions which, com
troops do not carry with them enough mencing at the moment of entering a
forseveral days, they will run short. It country, affect at first only the districts
is therefore the dutyof the commissariat in the immediate vicinity of the army,
to economise what is received , and only to but afterwards, in the course of time, are
issue to thosetroops who have nothing. levied on a greaterscale, over a range of
With eachsucceeding day, however, the country always
embarrassment diminishes ; that is to say,
increasing, and with an
ever increasing weight of authority .
if the distances from which provisions can This resource has no limits except
be procured increase in proportion to the those of the exhaust ion, impoverishment,
number of days, then the superficial area and devastat ion of the country. When
VOL. II. E
 50 ON WAR . [ BOOK V.
the stay of an invading army is of some of 130 miles upon almost a single road ,
duration, the administration of this sys- and that through countries such as Poland
tem at last is handed over to those in the
highest official capacity ; and they natu- and Russia, and shortly before the season
of harvest; and in the next place, any
rally do all they can to equalise its pres- means of supply attached to an army in
sure as much as possible, and to alleviate such cases, may be looked upon as only
the weight of the tax by purchases ; at an assistance in case of need, the con
the same time, even an invader, when tributions of the country being always
his stay is prolonged inbarbarous
his enemy's regarded as the groundwork of the whole
country, is not usually so and system of supply.
reckless as to lay upon that country the Since the first campaigns of the French
entire burden of his support; thus the revolutionary war, the requisition system
system of contributions of itself gradu- hasformedconstantly the mainstayof
ally approaches to that of magazines, at their armies, the armies opposed to them
the same time without ever ceasing alto . were also obliged to adopt the same
sensibly
gether, orwhich
influence losing any of oper
it exercises on the
that system , and it isnot at all likely that it
will ever be abandoned . There is no
ations of the war ; for there is a wide other which can be substituted for it
difference between a case in which some with the same results, both as regards
of the resources which have been drawn
its simplicity and freedom from restraint,
from a country are replaced by supplies andalso as respects energy in the pro
brought from more distant parts (the secution of the war. As an army is
country, however, still remaining sub- seldom distressed for provisions during
stantially the source on which the army the first three or four weeks of a cam
depends for its supplies), and the case
paign whatever direction it takes, and
of an army which - as in the eighteenth afterwards can be assisted by maga
century - provides for all its wants from zines, we may verywell say that by
its own resources , the country in which this method war has acquired the most
it is operating contributing, as a rule,
nothing towards its support
perfect freedom of action. Certainly
.
The great difference consists in two difficulties
tion than inmay be greater
another, and that may direc
in one carry
things,-namely, the employmentof the weightin preliminary deliberation ; but
transport of the country , and its ovens. we can never encounter an absolute im
In thisway, that enormousburden of any possibility , and the attentionwhich is
army that incubus which
, is always de
stroying its own work , a military trans due to the subject of subsistence can
port train, is almost got rid of. never decide a question imperatively. To
It is true that even now this there is only one exception, which is
no army
can do entirely without some subsistence
a retreat through an enemy's country.
In such a case
wagens, but the number is immensely connected with many of the inconveniences
subsistence meet together.
diminished operation isoneof a continuous
required nature
, andlittle
than sufficient more issurplus
to carrythe of The , generally carriedon without a
one day on till the next. Peculiar cir
cumstances, as in Russia in 1812, may halt worth speaking of ; there is, there
even again compel an army to carry an fore, no time to procure provisions; the
enormous train , and also field -ovens; but circumstances under which the operation
in the first place these are exceptional commences
it is therefore necessary unfavourable
are generally to keep the,
cases; for how seldom will it happen troops in masses,anda dispersion in can
that 300,000 men make a hostile advance tonments , or even anyconsiderable ex
2
CHAP . XIV .] SUBSISTENCE . 51

tension in the width of the column cannot But here naturally arises the question :
be allowed ; the hostile feeling of the shall the war prescribe the system of
country precludes the chance of any col- subsistence, or shall the latter dictate the
lection of contributions by mere orders nature of the war ? To this we answer :
issued without the support of a force ca- the system of subsistence will control the
pable of executing the order ; and, lastly, war, in the first place, as far as the other
the moment is most auspicious for the conditions on which it depends permit ;
inhabitants to give vent to their feelings but when the latter are encroached upon,
by acts of hostility. On account of all the war will react on the subsistence sys
this, an army so situated is generally tem, and in such case determine the same.
obliged to confine itself strictly to its A war carried on by means of the
previously prepared lines of communica- system of requisitions and local sup
tion and retreat. plies furnished on the spot has such an
When Buonaparte had to retreat in advantage overone carried on in depend
1812, it was impossible for him to do so ence on issues from magazines, that the
by any other line butthe oneupon which latterdoes not look at all like the same
instrument. No state will therefore ven
he had advanced, on account of the sub ture to encounter the former with the
sistence of his army; and if he had
attempted any other he would only have latter ; and if any war minister should
plunged into more speedy and certain be so narrow -minded and blind to cir
destruction ; all the censure therefore cumstances as to ignore the real relation
passed on him by even French writers which the two systems bear to each other,
as well as by others with regard to this by sending an army into the field to live
point is sheer nonsense . m, force of circum
upon the old syste the
stances would carry the commander of
that army along with it in its course, and
4. – Subsistence from Magasines. the requisition system would burst forth
of itself. If we consider besides, that the
If we are to make a generic distinction great expense attending such an organisa
between this method of subsisting troops tionmustnecessarily reduce theextentof
and the preceding, it mustbeby an or- the armament in other respects, including
ganisation such as existed for about of course the actual number of combatant
thirty years at the close of the seven- soldiers, as no state has a superabundance
teenth and during the eighteenth cen of wealth, then there seems no proba
tury. Can this organisation ever re bility of any such organisation being
appear ? again resorted to unless it should be
Certainly we cannot conceive how it adopted by the belligerents by mutual
can be dispensed with if great armies are agreement, an idea which is a mere play
to be bound down for seven, ten, or of the imagination.
twelve years long to one spot, as they Wars therefore may be expected hence
have been formerly in the Netherlands, forward always to commence with the
on the Rhine, in Upper Italy, Silesia, requisition system ; how much one or
and Saxony; for what country can con other government will do to supplement
tinue for such a length of time to endure the same by an artificial organisation to
the burden of two great armies, making spare their own country, etc.,etc., remains
it the entire source of their supplies, to be seen ; that it will not be overmuch
without being utterly ruined in the end, we may be certain , for at such momentst
and therefore gradually becoming unable the tendency is to look to the most urgen
to meet the demands ? wants, and an artificial system of sub
 ON WAR . [ BOOK V.
52
sisting troops does not come under that consumption is large, the provision to
y.
meet that consumption is also large; and
categor
But now, if a war is not so decisive in in the next place, because as a rule a
its results, if its operations are not so large population produces also largely.
comprehensive as is consistent with its From this we must certainly except dis
real nature, then the requisition system tricts peopled chiefly by manufacturers,
will begin to exhaust the country in particularly when, as is often the case,
which it is carried on to that degree that such districts lie in mountain valleys
either peace must be made, or means surrounded by unproductive -land ; but
must be found to lighten the burden on in the generality of cases it is always very
the country, and to become independent much easier to feed troops in a well popu
of it for the supplies of the army. The lated than in a thinly inhabited country.
latter was the case of the French army An army of 100,000 men cannot be sup
under Buonaparte in Spain, but the first ported on four hundred square miles
happens much more frequently. In inhabited by 400,000 people , as well as
most wars the exhaustion of the state it would be on four hundred square miles
increases to that degree that , instead of with a population of 2,000,000 inha
thinking of prosecuting the warat a still bitants , even supposing the soilequally
greater expense , the necessity for peace good in the two cases. Besides, theroads
beco mes so urgent as to be imperative. and means of water -carriage are much
Thus from this point of view the mo- better in rich countries and afford a greater
dern method of carrying on war has a choice, being more numerous , the means
e ndant , the
tendency to shorten the duration of wars . of transport are mor abu
At the same time we shall not posi- commercial relations easier and more cer
tively deny the possibility of the old sys- tain . In a word , there is infinitely less dif
tem of subsistence reappearing in future ficulty in supporting an army in Flanders
s ; it will perhaps be resorted to by than in Polanduen
warlig .
bel erents hereafter, where the nature The conseq ce is, that war with its
of their mutual relations urge them to it, manifold suckers fixesitselfby preference
and circumstances are favourable to its along high roads,nearpopuloustowns,in
adoption ; but we can never perceive in the fertile valleys of largerivers, oralong
that system a natural organisation ; it is such sea-coastsas are well frequented.
much rather an abnormal growth per This shows clearly how the subsistence
mitted by circumstances, but which can of troops may have a general influence
never spring from war in its true sense . upon the direction and form of military
Still less can we consider that form orundertakings, and upon the choice of a
system asany improvement in war on the theatre of war and lines of communi
ground of its being more humane, for war cation .
itself is not a humane proceeding . The extent of this influence, what
Whatever method of providing sub- weight shallattach to the facility of
sistencemaybechosen , it is butnatural difficulty of provisioning thetroops,all
that it should be more easily carried out that in the calculation depends very
in rich and well- peopled countries, than much on theway in which the war is to
in the midst of a poor and scanty popu be conducted. If it is to be carried on
lation . That the population should be in its real spirit, that is, with the un
taken into consideration , lies in the bridled force which belongs to its
double relation which that element bears element, with a constant pressing for
to the quantity of provisions to be found ward to, or seeking for the combat and
in a country : first because, where the decisive solution, then the sustenance of
CHAP . XIV .] SUBSISTENCE . 53

the troops although an important, is but upon as an established principle, that

a subordinate, affair ; but if there is privation and want, however far they
to be a state of equilibrium duringwhich may be carried , should never be other.
the armies move about here and there wise regarded than as transition -states
in the same province for several years, which should be succeeded by a state
then the subsistence must often become of abundance, indeed even by super
the principal thing, the intendant the fluity. Can there be any thing more
commander-in -chief, and the conduct of touching than the thought of so many
the war an administration of wagons. thousand soldiers, badly clothed, with
There are numberless campaigns of packs on their backs weighing thirty or
this kind in which nothing took place; forty pounds, toiling over every kind of
the plans miscarried, the forces were road, in every description of weather,
used to no purpose, the only excuse for days and days continually on the
being the plea of a want of subsistence; march, health and life for ever in peril,
on the other hand Buonaparte used to and for all that unable to get a sufficiency
say “ Qu'on ne me parle pas des vivres ! " of dry bread . Any one who knows how
Certainly that general in the Russian often this happens in war, is at a loss to
campaign provedthat such recklessness know how it does not oftener lead to a
may be carried too far, for not to say refusal of the will and powers to submit
that perhaps his whole campaign was any longer to such exactions, and how the
ruined through that cause alone, which mere bent constantly given to the imagi
at best would be only a supposition, nation of human beings in one direction,
still it is beyond doubt that to his want is capable of first callingforth, and then
of regard to the subsistence of his troops supporting such incredible efforts.
he was indebted for the extraordinary Let any one then, who imposes great
melting awayof his tions on hismen because great
army on his advance, privats
and for its utter ruin onthe retreat . objec demand such a trial of endurance,
But while fully recognising in Buona- always bear in mind as a matter of
parte the eager gambler who ventures prudence, if not prompted to it by his
on many a mad extreme, we may justly own feelings, that there is a recompence
for such sacrifices which he is bound to
say that he and the revolutionary pay at some other time.
generals who precede d him dispelle
powerful prejudice in respect to the d a We have now to consider the difference
subsistence of troops, and showed that it which takes place in respect to the
should never be looked upon in any question of subsistence in war,according
other light than as a condition of war, as the action is offensive or defensive.
never as an object. The defensive is in a position to make
Besides , it is with privation in war uninterrupted use of the subsistence
just as with physical exert ion and which he has been able to lay in before
danger; the demands which the general tinues. ashisdefe
longdefensiv
hand, asThe nsiveactcon
e side therefore can
can make on his army are without any
defined bounds ; an iron character de- hardly bein want of the necessaries of
mands more than a feeble sensitive man ; life, particularly if he is in his own
also the endurance of an army differs in country; but even in the enemy's this
degree, ng holds good. The offensive on the other
confidenaccordi habit,military
ce in andas affectio spirit,
n towards the hand is moving away from his resources,
commander, or enthusiasm for the cause and as long as he is advancing, and
even during the first weeks after he
of fatherland, sustain the will and energy stops, must procure from day to day what
of the soldier. But this we may look
54 ON WAR . [ BOOK V.
he requires, and this can very rarely be whose feelings are hostile . What an
done without want and inconvenience enormous difference between a line of
being felt. communication from Wilna to Moscow,
This difficulty is felt in its fullest on which every carriage must be forcibly
force at two particular periods, first in seized, and a line from Cologne by
the advance, before the decisiontakes Liége, Louvain, Brussels, Mons, and
place ; then the supplies of the defensive Valenciennes to Paris, where a mercan
side are all at hand, whilst the assailant tile contract or a bill ofexchange would
has been obliged to leave his behind ; suffice to procure millions of rations.
he is obliged to keep his masses con Frequently has the difficulty we are
centrated, and therefore cannot spread now speaking of resulted in obscuring
his army over any considerable space ; the splendour of the most brilliant
even his transport cannot keep close to victories, reduced the powers of the
him when he commences his movements victorious army, rendered retreat neces
preliminary to a battle . If his prepara sary, and then by degrees ended in
tions havenot been verywell made, it producing all the symptoms of a real
may easily happen at this moment that defeat.
his army may be in want of supplies for Forage , of which , as we have before
several days before thedecisivebattle, said ,there is usually at first the least
which certainly is not a means of bring- deficiency , will run short soonest if a
ing themeffici the fight in thehighest country begins to become exhausted ,for
intoency
state of .
Thesecond time a state of want arises itfrom
is the most difficult supply to procure
a distance , on account ofits bulk,
is at the end of avictorious career , if the and the horse feels the effect of low
lines of communication begin to be too feeding much sooner than the man . For
long, especially if the war edis carried this reason , an over-numerous cavalry
on in a poor, sparsely -populat country, and artillery may become a real burden,
and perhaps also in the midst of a people and an element of weakness to an army.

CHAPTER XV.

BASE OF OPERATIONS.

If an army
whether sets out on any expedition, in the
it be to attack the enemy and to
intensit and extent in proportion
sizeyof the army. But now it
his theatre of war , or to take post on its
own fronti er, it conti nues in a state of is neither always possible nor requi
necessary dependence on the sources site that the army should continue
from which it draws its subsistence and in direct communication with the whole
reinforcements , and must maintain its of its own country ; it is sufficient if
communication with them , as they are it does so with that portion immedi
the conditions of its existence and ately and which
in its rear, byits
sequentlycovered is . con
position In
preservation . This dependence increases this portion of the country then, as
 BASE OF OPERATIONS. 55
CHAP. XV ].
far as necessary, special depôts of pro- country ; the second, as a rule, can only
visions are formed , and arrangements be furnished by our own country, for
and almost all
are made for regularly forwarding rein- example men, arms,
forcements and supplies. This strip of munitions of war. Although there are
territory is therefore the foundation of exceptions to this classification in certain
cases, still they are few and trifling, and
the army and of all its undertakings, the distinction we have drawnis of
and the two must be regarded as form .
ing in connection only one whole. If standing importance, and proves again
the supplies for their greater security that the communication with our own
are lodged in fortified places, the ideaof country is indispensable.
a base becomes more distinct; but the Depôts of provisions and forage are
ideadoes not originate in any arrange- generally formed in open towns, both in
ment of that kind, and in a number of the enemy's and in our own country,
cases no such arrangement is made. because there are not as many fortresses
But a portion of the enemy's territory as would be required for these bulky
may also become a base for our army, stores continually being consumed, and
or, at least, form part of it ; for when wanted sometimes here, sometimesthere,
an army penetrates into an enemy's and also because their loss is much
land, a number ofits wants are supplied easier to replace; on the other hand,
from that part of the country which is stores to keep the army complete, such
taken possession of ; but it is then a as arms, munition of war, and articles
necessary condition that we are com of equipment are never lodged in open
pletely masters of this portion of terri- places in the vicinity of the theatre of
tory, that is, certain of our orders being war if it can be avoided, but are rather
obeyed within its limits. This certainty, brought from a distance, and in the
however,seldomextendsbeyondthereach enemy's countrynever storedanywhere
of our ability to keep the inhabitants in but in fortresses. From this point,
awe by smallgarrisons, and detachments again, it may be inferred that the base is
moving about from place to place,
and of more importance in relation to sup
that is not very far in general. The con- plies intended to refit an army than in
sequence is, that in theenemy's country, relation to provisions for food.
Now, the more means of each kind are
the part
draw ofies
suppl is yseldom
territor from which we can
of suffic ient collected together in great magazinesbe
extent to furnish all the supplies we fore being brought into use, the more,
require, and we must therefore still therefore, all separate streams unite in
depend on our own land for much, great reservoirs , so much the more may
and this brings us back again to the these be regarded as taking the place of
importance ofthatpartof ourterritory the wholecountry,
ption
and so much the more
immediately in rear of our army as an will the conce of a base fix itself
ble ofporti upon these great depôts of supply ; but
Thepensa
indis wants an on of our
army maybase.
be divided this must never go so far that any such
intotwo classes, firstthosewhichevery place becomes looked upon as constitut
cultivated country can furnish ; ined
and from base in itself alone.
next ing a thes
those which can only be obta If e sources of supply and refit
ment are dant, that is, if the tracts
those localities where they are prduced. of territorabun
y are wide and rich, if the
The first are chiefly provisions, the stores are collec ted in great depôts to be
second the means of keeping an army more speedily bro ught into use, if these
compl ete in every way. The first can depôts are covered in a military sense in
therefore ined
be obta in the enem y's
 기
56 ON WAR . [BOOK V.
one way or another, if they are in close things which otherwise could only be
proximity to the army and accessible by obtained from a long distance ; in an C
good roads, if they extend along a con- other case we are obliged to get even
siderable width in the rear of the army food from a long distance. Sometimes
or surround it in part as well — then fol- the nearest fortresses are great arsenals,
lows a greater vitality for the army, ports, or commercial cities, which con
as well as a greater freedom in its tain all the military resources of a whole
movements. Attempts have been made state, sometimes they are nothing but
to sum up all the advantages which an old, feeble ramparts, hardly sufficient for
army derives from being so situated in their own defence.
one single conception, that is, the extent The consequence is that all deductions
of the base of operations. By the rela- from the length of the base of operations
tionwhich this base bears to the object and its angles, and the whole theory of
of the undertakings, by the angle which war founded on these data, as far as its
its extremities make with this object geometrical phase, have never met with
(supposed as a point), it has been at- any attention in real war, and in theory
tempted to express
advantages and disadva ntagessum
the whole of the they have only caused wrong tendencies.
which ac- But as the basis of this chain of reason.
crue to an army from the position and ing isa truth ,and only the conclusions
nature of itssources of supply and equip- drawnare false , this same view, will
ment;but it is plain this elegant piece easily and .frequently thrust itself for
of geometrical refinement is merely a ward again
play of fancy, as it is founded on a series We think, therefore, that we cannot
of substitutions which must all be made gobeyond acknowledging generally the
at the expense of truth . As we have influence of a base on military enter
seen, the base of anionarmy
formation in connect is a triple prises, that at the same this there
with the situa- means of framing out oftime are no
maxim any
tion in which an army is placed : the serviceable rules by a few abstract ideas;
resources of the country adjacent to but thatin each separate case the whole
the position of the army, the at par- must
of stores which have been made depôts of thebe things which we have specified
kept in view together.
ticular points , and the province from
which these stores are derived or col-
When once arrangements are made
within a certain radius to provide the
lected . These three things are separated
means of subsisting an army and keep;
in space, and cannot be collected into one ing it complete in every respect, and
whole, and least of all can we substitute with a view to operations in a certain
for themof the
width e whichis
alinbase nt
to represe the
, a line which is gene
direction, then ,even in our own country,
rally imagined in a manner perfectly ar this district only is to be regarded as the
base of the army; and as any alteration
bitrary, either from one fortress to an of a base requires time and labour,
otheror fromone capital of a province thereforean armycannot changeits
to another, or along a political boundary base every day , even in its own country,
of a country. Neither can we determine
and in
precisely themutualrelationof thesethree less thistheagain limits
direction ofititsope
always more. If,
rations or
steps in the formationof a base, for in then, in operating against anenemy's
reality they blend themselves with each country we take the wholeline ofourown
other alwaysmore or less. In one case frontier, where it forms a boundary be
the surrounding country affords largely tweenthetwo countries asourbase,we may
the means of refitting an army with do so in a general sense , in so far that we
 BASE OF OPERATIONS. 57
CHAP . xv .]
might make those preparations which it can easily be transplanted , but this
constitute a base anywhere on that fron- becomes more difficult as it increases in
tier ; but it will not be a base at any size. A small body of troops has also
moment if preparations have not been al- its channels, from which it draws the
ready made everywhere. When the Rus- sustenance of life, but it strikes root
sian army retreated before the French in easily where it happens to be ; not soa
1812, atthe beginning of the campaign large army. When, therefore, we talk
the whole of Russia might have been of the influence of the base on the oper
considered as its base, the more so be. ations of an army, the dimensions of
cause the vast extent of the country the army must always serve as the scale
offered the army abundance of space in by which to measure the magnitude of
any direction it might select. This is that influence.
no illusory notion, as it was actually Further it is consistent with the nature
realised ata subsequent time, when other of things that for the immediate wants
Russian armies from different quarters
of the present hour the subsistence is the
entered the field ; but still at every period main point, but for the general efficiency
throughout the campaign the base ofthe of the army through a long period of
Russian army wasnot so extensive ; it time therefitment and recruitment are the
was principally confined to the road on more important, because the latter can
which the whole train of transport to only be done from particular sources
and from their army was organised. While the former may be obtained in
This limitation prevented the Russian many ways; this again defines still more
army, for instance, from making the fur- distinctly the influence of the base on
ther retreat which became nccessary after the operations of the army.
the three days' fighting at Smolensk in However great that influence may be,
any direction but that of Moscow , and we must never forget that it belongs to
those things which can only show a
80 hindered their turning suddenly in decisive effect after some considerable
the direction of Kaluga, as was pro time, and that therefore the question
posed in order to drawthe enemy away
from Moscow. Such a changeof direc- always remains what may happenin
țion could
having beenonlyprepared
have been possible
for long by thattime.
before- The value of a base of ope
rations will seldom determine the choice
hand . of an undertaking in the first instance .
We have said that the dependence on Mere difficulties which may present them
the base increases in intensity andextent selves in this respect must be put side
with the size ofthe army, which iseasy by side and compared with other means
to understand . An army is like a tree. actually ate our command ; obstacles of
this natur often vanish before the force
From the ground out oftwhic h
it draws its nourishmen ; if it itis grows
small of decisive victories.
58 ON WAR . ( BOOK V.

CHAPTER XVI .

LINES OF COMMUNICATION .

The roads which lead from the position ral direction , and their direction specially
of an army to those points in its rear as regards the army, their nature as
where its depôts of supplyand means of roads ,difficulties of ground, the political
recruiting and refitting its forces are relations and feeling of local population , and
principally united , and which it also in lastly, on the protection they derive from
all ordinary cases chooses for its retreat, fortresses or natural obstacles in the
have a double signification ; in the first country.
place, they are its lines of communication But all the roads which lead from
for the constant nourishment of the com- the point occupied by an army to its
batant force, and next they are roads of sources of existence and power, are not
retreat.
on that account necessarily lines of
We have said in the preceding chapter, communication for that army. They
that, although according to the present may no doubt be used for that purpose,
system of subsistence, an army is chiefly and may be considered as supplementary
fed from the district in which it is of the system of communication, but
operating, it must still be looked upon that system is confined to the lines
as forming a whole with its base. The regularly prepared for the purpose.
lines of communication belong to this Only those roads on which magazines,
whole; they form theconnection between hospitals , stations, posts for despatches
the army and its base, and are to be and letters are organised under com
considered as so many great vital ar- mandants with police and garrisons, can
teries. Supplies of every kind , convoys
of munitions, detachments moving back- be looked upon as real lines of commu
nication. But here a very important
wards and forwards, posts , orderlies, difference between our own and the
hospitals, depôts, reserves of stores, enemy's army makes its appearance, one
agents of administration , all these objects which is often overlooked . An army,
areconstantly making use of these roads,
even of
and the total value of these services is lines in its own country, ,hasbutitsitprepared
communication isnot
of the utmost importance to the army.
These great channels of life must there completely limited to them , and can in
fore neither be permanently severed , nor case of need change its line, taking
must they be of too great length , or beset some other which presents itself, for it
withdifficulties is every where at home, hasofficials in
,because there is always authority, and the friendly
a loss of strength on a long road , which
feeling of
tends to weaken the condition of an army. the people. Therefore, although other
By their second purpose , that is as roads may not be as good as those at
lines of retreat, they constitute in a real first selected there is nothing to prevent
sense the strategic rear of the army. their being used, and the use of them
For both purposes the value of these is not to be regarded as impossible in
roads depends on their length, their case the army is turned and obliged
number, their situation , that is their gene- to change its front. An army in an
enemy's country on the contrary can as
 LINES OF COMMUNICATION . 59
CHAP . XVI.]
a rule only look upon those roads as an enemy's country than in our own,
lines of communication upon which it where it is at least possible ; and it also
has advanced ; and hence arises through follows that the army is more restricted
small and almost invisible causes a great in its movements, and must be much
difference in operating. The army in more sensitive about any demonstrations
the enemy's country takes under its against its communications.
protection the organisation which, as But the choice and organisation of
it advances, it necessarily introduces to lines of communication is from the very
form its lines of communication ; and in commencement subject also to a number
general, inasmuch as terror, and the pre- of conditions by which it is restricted .
sence ofan enemy's army in the country Not only must they be in a general sense
invests these measures in the eyes of the good high roads, but they will be the
inhabitants with all the weight of un- more serviceable the wider they are, the
alterable necessity, the inhabitants may more populous and wealthy towns they
even be brought to regard them as an pass through, the more strong places
alleviation ofthe evilsinseparable from there are which afford them protection.
war. Small garrisons left behind in dif- Rivers, also, as means of water com
ferent places support and maintain this munication, and bridges as points of
system . But if these commissaries, com- passage, have a decisive weight in the
choice. It follows from this that the
us fieldposts,
mandants of stations, police,
and the rest of the apparat ofadmini- situation of a line of communication, and
stration, were sent to some distant road consequently the road by which an army
upon which the army had not been seen, proceeds to commence the offensive, is
the inhabitants then would look upon only a matter of free choice up to a cer
such measures as a burden which they tain point, its situation being dependent
would gladly get rid of, and if the most on certain geographical relations.
complete defeats and catastrophes had All the foregoing circumstances taken
not previously spread terrorthroughout together determine the strength orweak
of the communication of an army
the land, the probability is that these ness
with its base, and this result , compared
functionaries would be treated as ene
mies,anddriven awaywith very rough with onesimilarly obtained with regard
usage. Therefore in the first place it to the enemy's communications, decides
would be necessa ry to establish garrisons which of the two opponents is in a posi
te
to subjuga the new line, and these tion to operate against the other's lines
garrisons would require to be of more of communication , or to cut off his re
than ordinary strength, andstill there treat, that is, intechnical language to
would always be a danger of the inha- turn him . Setting aside all considera
bitants rising and attempting to over tions of moral or physical superiority,
powerthem . In short, an armymarching that party can only effectually accom
intoan enemy's country is destitute of plish this whose communications arethe
themechanism through which obedience enem
stronge st of the two,for otherwise the
y saves lf est
himse in the short mode,
is rendered ; it has to institute its officials
into
by atheir s, whic
placehand
strong h can
, and bedone
thisonlycannot be byNow
a counterstroke.
this turning can, by reason of the
effected thoroughly without sacrifices double signification of these lines, have
also two purposes. Either the communi
and difficulties, nor is it the work of a cations may be interfered with and in
moment - From this it follows that a
chan thesystem
ge oflesseasy of communication terrupted, that the enemymay melt away
is much of accomplishment in bydegrees from want, andthusbe com
60 ON WAR . [BOOK V.

pelled to retreat, or the object may be enemy's retreat, we must not be over
directly to cut off the retreat. confident in this respect either of the
With regard to the first, we have to consequences of threatening or closing
observe that a mere momentary inter- the enemy's lines of retreat, as recent
ruption will seldom have any effect while experience has shown that, when troops
armies are subsisted as they now are ; a are good and their leader resolute, it is
certain time is requisite to produce an more difficult to make them prisoners, than
effect in this way in order that the losses it is for them to cut their way through
of the enemy by frequent repetition may theforce opposed to them.
compensate in number for the small The means of shortening and protect
amount he suffers in each case. One ing long lines of communication are very
single enterprise against the enemy's limited . The seizure of some fortresses
flank, which might have been a decisive adjacent to the position taken up by the
stroke in those days when thousands of army, and on the roads leading to the
bread - waggons traversed the lines of rear-or in the event of there being no
communication, carrying out the sys- fortresses in the country, the construc
tematised method then in force for sub tion of temporary defences at suitable
sisting troops,would hardly produce any points — the kindtreatmentofthe people
effect now, if ever so successful ; one of the country, strict discipline on the
convoy at most might be seized, which military roads, good police, and active
would cause the enemy some partial measures to improve the roads, are the
damage, but never compel him to re only means by which the evil may be
treat . diminished, but it is one which can
The consequence is, that enterprises never be entirely removed.
of this description on a flank , which Furthermore,what we said when treat
have always been more in fashion in ing of the question ofsubsistence with
books than in reaļ warfare, now ap- respect to the roads which the army
pear less of a practical nature than ever, should chose by preference, applies also
andwemay
no safelysay
danger in this respect thatthere
to any lines is
of particularly tolinesofcommunication.
The best lines of communication are
communication but such as are very
roads leading through the most flourish
long, and otherwise unfavourably circum- ing towns and the most important pro
stanced, more especially by being exposed vinces ; they ought to be preferred, even
everywhere and at any moment to attacks
from an insurgent population. if considerably longer, and in most cases
With respect to the cutting off an they exercise an important influence on
the definitive disposition of the army.

CHAPTER XVII.

ON COUNTRY AND GROUND .

IRRESPECTIVE quite of their influence as to the business of war, which is their do
regards the means of subsistence of an cisive influence on the battle, both upon
army, country and ground, bear another what concerns its course, as well as upon
most intimate and never - failing relation the preparation forit, and the use to be
CHAP . XVII.] ON COUNTRY AND GROUND. 61

made of it. We now proceed to consider If we keep in view the great mass of
country and ground in this phase, that topographical phenomena we find that
is, inthe full meaning of the French ex- countries deviate from the idea of per
pression “ Terrain .” fectly open level plains principally in
The wayto make use of them is a sub- three ways : first by the form of the
ject which lies mostly within theprovince ground, that is, hills and valleys; then by
of tactics, but the effects resulting from woods, marshes, and lakes as natural
them appear in strategy ; a battle in the features ; and lastly, by such changes as
mountains is, in its consequences as well have been introduced by the hand of
as in itself, quite a different thing from man . Through each of these three cir
a battle on a level plain . cumstances there is an increase in the
But until we have studied the distinc- influence of ground on the operations of
tion between offensive and defensive, and war . If we trace them up to a certain
examined the nature of each separately distance we have mountai nous country,
and fully, we cannot enter upon the con- a country little cultivated and covered
sideration of the principal features of the with woods and marshes, and the well
ground in their effects; we must there- cultivated . The tendency in each case
fore for the present confine ourselves to is to render war more complicated and
an investigation of its general properties. connected withofart.
There arethree properties throughwhich The degree influence which cultiva
the ground has an influence on action in tion exercises is greater or less according
war ; that is, as presenting an obstacle to to the nature of the cultivation ; the
approach, as an obstacle to an extensive system pursued in Flanders, Holstein,
view , and as protection against the effect and some other countries, where the land
of fire -arms ; all other effects may be is intersected in every direction with
traced back to these three. ditches, dykes, hedges, and walls, inter
Unquestionably this threefold influence spersed withs many single dwell ings and
of ground has a tendency to make war- small wood est
has the great on effect
and more
fare more scient ified, ,for
diversific theycompl
more plaindly,
are icate
war .
The conduct of war is therefore of the
three more quantities which enter into easiest kind in a level moderately - cul
tivated country. This however only
military combinations.
A completely level plain,quite open at holdsgood inquite a general sense, leav
the sametime, thatis,atractof country ing entirely out ofconsiderationthe use
which cannot influence war at all, has nowhich the defensive can make of obstacles
existence except in relation to small of ground.
bodies of troops, and with respect to Each of these three kinds of ground has
an effect in its own way on movement,
them only for the duration of some given on
moment of time. When larger bodies the range of sight, and in the cover it
are accidrned
time,conce ents, of a longe
andgroun r durat
d mix themsion In dsa. thickly -wooded country the ob
of affor
elves
up with the action of such bodies, and it stacle to sight preponderates ; in a moun .
is hardly possible in the case of a whole tainous country, the difficulty of move
army to imagine any particular moment, ment presents the greatest obstacle to an
enemy ; in countries very much cultivated
such as a battle, when
uence
the ground would both these obstacles exist in a medium
not make its infl felt.
This influence is therefore never in
ger or Ås e.
degre thick woods render great portions
abeyanceaccordi
weaker theinly
, but itngis tocerta stronof
nature the of ground in a certain manner impracti
country. cable for military movements, and as, be
62 ON WAR [ BOOK V.
sides the difficulty which they oppose to the
movement they also obstruct the view,
less an undivided control is possible,
so much the more are subordinates left
thereby preventing the use of means to to themselves ; that is self -evident. Cer
clear a passage, the result is that they tainly when the partition of a force is
simplify the measures to be adopted on greater, then through the diversity of
one side in proportion as they increase the actionand greater scope in the useof
difficulties
with which the other side has means the influence of intelligence must
to contend. Althou gh it is difficult prac. increase, and even the commander-in
tically toconcentrate e
forces for action in chiefmay showhis talents to advantag
aforces
wooded country, still a partition of under such circumstances ; but we must
does not take place to the same here repeat what has been said before,
extent as it usually does in a mountainous that inwar the sum total of singleresults
country, or in a country very much inter- decides morethanthe form or method in
sectedwith canals, rivers, &c. : in other whichthey are connected , and therefore,
words, the partition of forces in such a if we push our present considerations to
country is more unavoidable but not so an extreme case, and suppose a whole
great. army extended in a line of skirmishers
In mountains, the obstacles to move so that each private soldier fights his
ment preponderate and take effect in two own little battle, more will depend on
ways,because in someparts the country the sum of single victories gained than on
is quite impassable, and where it is prac- the form in which they are connected ;
ticable wemust move slower and with for the benefit of good combinations can
greater difficulty. On this account the only follow frompositive results, not from
rapidity of all movements is much dimin- negative. Therefore in such a casethe
ished in mountains, and alloperations courage,the dexterity , and the spirit of
are mixedup with a larger quantity of individuals will prove decisivo. It is
the element of time. But theground in only whentwo opposing armiesare ona
mountains has alsothespecialproperty paras regards military qualities,or that
peculiar toitself, thatone pointcommands their peculiar properties hold the balance
another. Weshall devote thefollowing even, that thetalent andjudgment of the
chapter to the discussion general
commanding
of thelysubject commander becomeagain decisive. The
of heights , and consequence is that national armies and
shallonlyhere remark that it is this insurgent levies,etc.,etc., inwhich,at
y
peculiarit which causes the great parti- least in theindividual,the warlike spirit
tion of forces in operations carried on
amongst mountainsforpar is highly excited, although they are not
, ticular points super ior in skill andbravery ,arestill
thus acquire importance from the influ- able to maintain asuperiority by a great
ence they haveuponother points in ad- dispersion of their forces favoured by a
dition to any intrinsic value which they difficultcountry
have in themselves.
, and that they canonly
As we have elsewhere observed , each maintain themselves for a continuance
of these three kinds of ground in propor upon that kind of system , because troops
tion as its own special peculiarity
has a of this description are generally destitute
tendency to an extreme, hasinthe same ofindispensable
all the qualities and virtueswhich are
when tolerably large num
degree tendency
a to lower the influence
of the supreme command, increasing in bersare required to act as a united body.
in the nature of forces there are
Alsogradationsbetween
like manner the independent action of many
subordinates down to the private soldier .
one ofthese
The greater the partitionofanyforce, extremesandthe other, for the
cumstance of beingengage d invery
the cir
de
 63
(DUET CHAP. XVII.] ON COUNTRY AND GROUND.

-posle fence of its own country gives to even their forces in Spain, and the Spaniards,
a regular standing army something whilst defending their country by means
of the character of a national army, of an insurgent population, were obliged
and makes it more suited for a war to try the fate of great battles in the open
erity waged by an army broken up into de- field with part of their forces.
tachments . Next to the connection which country
Now the more these qualifications and and ground have with the general, and
influences are wanting in an army, the especially with the political, composition
greater they are on the side of its oppo. of the forces engaged, the most important
FILE pent, so much tbe more will it dread point is the relative proportion of the
ther being split into fractions, the more it three arms.
In all countries which are difficult to
will avoid a broken country ; but to
avoid fighting in such a description of traverse, whether the obstacles are moun
country is seldom a matter of choice ; we tains, forests, or a peculiar cultivation, a
cannot choose a theatre of war like a numerous cavalry is useless : that is
piece of merchandise from amongst seve- plain in itself; it is just the same with
ral patterns, and thus we find generally artillery in wooded countries; there will
that armies which from their nature fight probably be a want of room to use itwith
with advantage in concentrated masses, effect, ofroads to transport it, and of forage
exhaust all their ingenuity in trying to for the horses. For this arm highly cul
actal carry out their system as far as possible tivated countries are less disadvantageous,
in direct opposition to the nature of the and least of all a mountainous country.
country. They must in consequence sub- Both, no doubt, afford cover against its
the mit toother disadvantages, such as scanty fire, and in that respect they are unfa
initat and difficult subsistence for the
bad quarters, and in the combat troops, vourable
numerous to an armwhich depends entirely
on its fire : both also often furnish means
It is
attacks from all sides ; but the disadvan- for the enemy's infantry to place the
Ithe
tage of giving up their own special heavy artillery in jeopardy, as infantry
advantage would be greater. can pass anywhere ; but still in neither
ofthe Thesetwo tendencies in opposite di- is there in general any want of space for
rections, the one to concentration the the use of a numerous artillery , and in
other to dispersion offorces,prevail mountainous countriesit hasthis great
more or less according as the nature of advantage, that its effects are prolonged
pini
the troops engaged incline them more to and increased in consequence of the
one side or the other, buthoweverdecided movements of the enemy being slower.
still
the tendency, the one side cannot always But it is undeniable that infantry has
TE
remain with his forces concentrated, a decided advantage over every other
by neither can the other expect success by arm in difficult country, and that, there
following his system of warfare in scat- fore, in such a country its number may
al tered bodies on all occasions . The French considerably exceed the usual propor
378 were obliged to resort to partitioning tion.

dr
64 ON WAR . [ DOOK V.

CHAPTER XVIII.

COMMAND OF GROUND.

THE word " command " has a charm in that is the second ; and the better com
the art of war peculiar to itself, and in mand of view which this elevated position
fact to this element belongs a great part,affords is the third advantage which stra
perhaps half the influence which ground tegymay derive in thisway.
exercises on the use of troops. Here many Of these elements is composed the
of the sacred relics of military erudition power of dominating, overlooking, com
have their root, as, for instance,com- manding ; from thesesources springs the
manding positions, key positions, strate sense of superiority and security which
gic manoeuvres, etc. We shall take as is felt in standing on the brow of a hill
clear a view of the subject as we can and looking at the enemy below, and the
without prolixity, andpass in review the feeling of weakness and apprehension
true andthe false, reality and exaggera
tion.
which pervades the minds of those below.
Perhaps the total impression
made is at
Every exertion of physical force if the same time stronger than it ought to
made upwards is more difficult thanif it be, because the advantageof the high
is made in the contrary direction (down- er ground strikes the senses more than
wards ); consequently it must be so in the circumstances which modify that ad
fighting ; and there are three evident rea- vantage. Perhaps the impression made
sons whyit is so. First, every height may surpasses that which the truth warrants,
be regarde d as an obstacle to approach'; in which case the effect of imagination
h d
secondl , althoug the range is not per- must be regarde as a new element,
y
ceptibly greater in shooting down from which exaggerates the effect produced
a height, yet, all geometrical relations by an elevation of ground.
being taken into consideration, we have At the same time the advantage of
a better chance of hitting than intheop- greater facility of movement is not ab
posite case ; thirdly, an elevation gives aand not
solute,ccupyi in favour of the
alwaysher
bettercommand ofview .Howallthese sideo ng thehig position ;it is
advantages unite themselves together in only so when his opponent wishesto
battle we are not concerned with here ; attack him ; it is not if the combatants
we collect the sum total of the advan
tageswhich tacticsderives fromelevation isa separated by a great valley, and it
arectually
of position and combine them in one
in favour ofthearmyonthe
whole which we regard as the first stra lower ground if both wish to fight in
tegic advantage. the plain battle of Hohenfriedberg ).
But the first and last of these advan Also the power of overlooking , or com
tages that have been enumerated must mand of view , has likewise great limita
appear once more as advantages of stra tions. A wooded country in the valley
tegy itself, for we march and reconnoitre the below, and often the very
mountainsthemselves on masses
which weof
in strategy as well as in tactics ; if, there- stand, obstruct the vision. Countless are
fore, an elevated position isan obstacle the casesinwhichwemight seek in
to the approach ofthoseonlower ground, vain onthe spot for those advantages
 B(
ern

CHAP . XVIII.] COMMAND OF GROUND . 65

of an elevated position which a map vantages become greater, because we

would lead us to expect ; and we might can now use the advantages of the more
often be led to think we had only in- elevated ground not only in the combi
volved ourselves in all kinds of disadvan- nation of our forces with each other for
tages, the very opposite of the advantages one particular combat, but also in the
we counted upon . But these limitations combination of several combats with one
and conditions do not abrogate or de- another. Thus it is with the defensive.
stroy the superiority which the more As regards the offensive, it enjoys to a
the better die elevated position confers, both on the certain extent the same advantages as
elevated paita defensiveaand offensive. We shall point the defensive from the more elevated
atage which stro out, in few words, how this is the ground ; for this reason that the stra
Tar. case with each . getic attack is not confined to one act
composed Out of the three strategic advantages like the tactical. The strategic advance
Ferlooking ,con of the more elevated ground, the greater is not the continuous movement of a
Ites sptyrings the tactical strength, the more difficult approach, piece of wheelwork ; it is made in single
Securi white and the better view , the first two are of marches with a longer or shorter interval
brow ofahii , such a nature that they belong really to between them , and at each halting point
below, and the
apprehensia thedefensive only;forit is onlyin holding the
firmly to a position that we can make
the defensive
assailant asis his
justadversary.
as much acting on
of those belor . use of them , whilst the other side (offen- Through the advantage of a better
Fon made is : sive) in moving cannot remove them and view of the surrounding country, an
an it ought to take them with him ; but the third ad- ' elevated position confers, in a certain
of the high vantage can be made use of by the offen- measure, on the offensive as well as the
See more that sive just as well as by the defensive. defensive, a power of action which we
odifioy thn at al From this it follows that the more must not omit to notice ; it is the facility
ress mode elevated ground is highly important to of operating with separate masses. For
uth warrants the defensive, and as it can only be eachportionof a force separately derives
* imagination maintained in a decisive way in moun the same advantages which the whole
new elements tainous countries, therefore it would derives from this more elevated position ;
ct produced seem to follow, as a consequence, that by this— a separate corps, let it be strong
the defensive has an important advan- or weak in numbers, is stronger than it
advantage of tage in mountain positions. How it is would otherwise be, and we can venture
t is not ab that, through other circumstances , this to take up a position with less danger
Four ofthe is not so inreality, we shall show in the than we could if it had not that particu
ition ; it is chapter on the defence of mountains. lar property of being on an elevation.
wishes to We must first of all make a distinc- The advantages which are to be derived
combatants tion if the question relates merely to from such separate bodies of troops is a
Jer, and it commanding ground at one single point, subject for possessi
anotheronplace.
rmy on th
e as, for example , a position for an army ; If the of more elevated
o fight in 1 insuch case the strategieadvantages groundiscombined with other geo
rather merge in the tactical one of a graphical advantages which are in our
riedberg.) battle fought under advantageous cir favour, if the enemy finds himself
8. or com cumstances ; but if now we imagine
zat limits. cramped in his movements from other
the erasller a considerable tract of country - sup . causes, as, for instance, by the proxi
pass of pose a whole province — as a regular mity of a large river, such disadvan
which we like the declivity at à general decisive,
slope, ed, SO that we can make
watersh
tages of and position
his he may prove quite
may feel that he can
utless are not too soon relieve himself from such
seek in several marches, and always hold the
upper ground, then the strategic ad- a position . No army can maintain it
vantages
VOL . II. R
66 ON WAR. [BOOK V.
self in the valley of a great river if taken for the thing itself, the instrument
it is not in possession of the heights for the hand. The occupation of such
on each side by which the valley is and such a position or space of ground,
formed . has been looked upon as an exercise of
The possession of elevated ground may power like a thrust or a cut, the ground
therefore become virtually command, and or position itself as a substantive quan
we can by no means deny that this idea tity ; whereas the one is like the lifting
represents a reality. But nevertheless of the arm , the other is nothing but the
the expressions “commanding ground ,” lifeless instrument, a mere property
" sheltering position ,” “ key of the coun- which can only realise itself upon an
try,” in so far as they are founded on object, a mere sign of plus or minus
the nature of heights and descents, are which wants the figures or quantities.
hollow shells without any sound kernel. This cut and thrust, this object, this
These imposing elements of theory have quantity, is a victorious battle ; it alone
been chiefly resorted to in order to give really counts ;with it only canwereckon;
a flavour to the seeming commonplace and we must always have it in view,
of military combinations; they have as well in giving a critical judgment
become the darling themes of learned in literature as in real action in the
soldiers, the magical wands of adepts field .
in strategy, and neither the emptiness Consequently, if nothing but the
of these fanciful conceits, nor the fre- number and value of victorious combats
quent contradictions which have been decides in war, it is plain that the com
given to them by the results of experience
parative value of the opposing armies
have sufficed to convince authors, andand ability of their respective leaders
those who read their books, that with again rank as the first points for con
such phraseology they are drawing sideration, and that the part which the
water in the leaky vessel of the Da- influence of ground plays can only be
naides. The conditions have been mis- one of an inferior grade.
 67

>

BOOK VI. -DEFENCE.

CHAPTER 1.

1
OFFENCE AND DEFENCE .

may be to our advantage to wait for the

1.- Conception of Defence. charge against our bayonets, or the attack
What is defence in conception ? The on our position or our theatre of war.
warding off a blow. What is then its But as we must return the enemy's blows
characteristic sign ? The state of ex- if we are really to carry on war on our
pectancy (or of waiting for this blow). side, therefore this offensive act in defen
This is the sign by which we always sive war takes place more or less under
recognise an act as of a defensive cha- the general title defensive — thatis to say,
racter, and by this sign alone canthe the offensive of which we make use falls
defensive be distinguished from the offen- under the conception of position or thea
sive in war . But inasmuch as an absolute tre of war . We can, therefore, in a de
defence completely contradicts the idea fensive campaign fight offensively, in a
of war, because there would then be war defensive battle we may use some divi
carried on by one side only, it follows that sions for offensive purposes, and lastly,
the defence in war can only be relative while remainingin position awaiting the
and theabove distinguishing signsmust enemy's onslaught, we still make use of
therefore only be applied to theessential the offensive bysending at the same time
idea or general conception: it does not balls into the enemy's ranks. The defen
apply to all theseparate acts which com- sive form in war is therefore no mere
pose thewar. A partial combat is defen- shield but a shield formed of blows de
sive if we receive the onset,the charge livered with skill.
of the enemy ; a battle is so if we receive 2.- Advantages of the Defensive.
the attack, that is, wait for the appear
ance of the enemy before our position What is the object of defence ? To
of our fire ; a campaign preserve. Topreserveiseasier than to
is defensiverange
andwithin if wewaitfor theentryof acquire; fromwhich follows at once that
the enemy into our theatre of war. In the means on both sides being supposed
all these cases thesignof
and wardingoffbelongs waiting for Offensive.
equal, the defensiveis easier thanthe
to thegeneral But in what consists the
conception, without any contradiction greaterfacility of preserving or keeping
arising with theconception ofwar, for it possession?Înthis,thatall timewhich
68 ON AR. [BOOK VI.
is not turned to any account falls into in itself stronger than the offensive. This is
the scale in favour of the defence. He the result we have been desirous of ar
reaps where he has not sowed. Every inriving at; for although it lies completely
the nature of the thing, and has been
suspension of offensive action , either from
erroneous views, from fear or from indo- confirmed by experience a thousand
lence, is in favour of the side acting de- times, still it is completely contrary to
prevalent
fensively. This advantage savedthe may
State of Prussia from ruin more than
opinion — a proof how ideas
be confused by superficial writers.
once in the Seven Years' War. It If the defensive is the stronger form
is one which derives itself from the of conducting war, but has a negative
conception and object of the defensive , object, it follows of itself that we must
lies in the natureofall defence,and in onlymake use of it so long as our weak
ordinary life, particularly in legal busi- ness compels us to do so, and that we
ness which bears so much resemblance must give up that form as soon as we
to war, it is expressed by the Latin pro- feel strong enough to aim at the positive
verb, Beati sunt possidentes. Another ad- object. Now as thestateof our circum .
vantage arising from the nature of war stances is usually improved in the event of
and belonging to it exclusively , is the our gaininga victory through the assist
aid afforded by locality or ground ; this ance of the defensive,it is therefore, also,
is one of which the defensive form has a the natural course in war to begin with
preferential use. the defensive, and to end with the offen
Having established these general ideas sive. It is therefore just as much in con
we now turn more directly to the sub- tradiction with the conception of war to
ject. suppose the defensive the ultimate object
In tactics every combat, great or small, of the war as it was a contradiction to
is defensive if we leave the initiative to understand passivity to belong to all the
theenem y, and waitfor his appearance parts of thedefensive, as well as tothe
in our front. From that moment forward defensive as a whole. In other words :
we can make use of all offensive means a war in which victories are merely used
without losing the said two advantages to ward off blows, and where there isno
of the defence, namely, that of waiting attempt to return the blow , would be just
for, and that of ground . In strategy , at as absurd as a battle in which the most
, the canıpaign represents the battle, absolute defence (passivity) should every.
first
and the theatre of war the position ; but
afterwards the whole war takes the place where prevail in all measures.
Against the justice of this general
of the campaign, and the whole country view many examples might be quoted
that of the theatre of war, and in both in which the defensive continued defen
cases the defensive remains that which
it was in tactics.
sive to the last, and the assumption of
It has been already observed in a
the offensive was never contemplated ;
general way that the defensive is easier but such an objection could only be urged
if we lost sight of the fact that here the
thantheoffensive; but as the defensivo questionisonlyabout generalideas (ab
has a negative object, that of preserving,
and the offensive a positive object that stract ideas), and that examples in oppo
sition to the general conception we are
ofconquering, and the latter increases discussing areall of themtobe looked
ourown means ofascarryingon war,but uponascases in which the time for the
the preserving does not,therefore
order to express ourselves distinctly , in
possibility of offensive reaction had not
we
must say, that the defensive form of war is yet arrived .
In the Seven Years' War, at least in the
 69
CHAP. I. ] OFFENCE AND DEFENCE .
last three years of it, Frederick the Great daries, we return again to the assertion
did not think of an offensive ; indeed we that the defensive is the stronger form of
believe further, that generally speaking, making
he only acted on the offensive at any
war.
Upon a closer examination , and com
time in this war as the best means of parison of the offensive and defensive,
defending himself ; his whole situation this will appear perfectly plain ; but for
compelled him to this course, and it is the present we shall confine ourselves to
natural that a general should aim more noticing the contradiction in which we
immediately at that which is most in ac- should be involved with ourselves, and
cordance with the situation in which he with the results of experience by main
is placed for the time being. Neverthe- taining the contrary to be the fact. If
less, we cannot look at this example of a the offensive form was the stronger there
defence upon a great scale without sup- would be no further occasion ever to use
posing that the idea of a possible coun- the defensive, as it has merely a negative
terstroke againstAustria lay at the bot. object, every one would be for attacking,
whole of it, and saying to
tom of thethe and the defensive would be an absurdity .
ourselves, moment for that coun- On the other hand , it is very natural that
terstroke had not arrived before the the higher object should be purchased
war came to a close . The conclusion of by greater sacrifices. Whoever feels
peace shows that this idea is not without himself strong enough to make use of
foundation even in this instance; for the weaker form has it in his power to
what could have actuated the Austrians aim at the greater object; whoever sets
to make peace except the thought that before himself the smaller object can
they were not ina conditionwith their only do so in order to have the benefit
own forces alone to make head against of the stronger form - If we look to ex
the talent of the king ; that to maintain perience, such a thing is unheard of as
an equilibrium their exertions must be any one carrying on a war upon two dif
greater than heretofore, and that the ferent theatres - offensively on one with
slightest relaxation of their
probablylead to fresh lossesefforts would the
of territory. weaker army, and defensively on the
other with his strongest force. But if
And, in fact, who can doubt that if Rus- the reverse of this has everywhere and
sia, Sweden , and the army of the German at all times taken place that shows plainly
Empire hadtheceased together against that generals, although their own incli
Frederick Greattohe
actwould have tried nation prompts them to the offensive,
to conquer the Austrians again in Bo- still holā the defensive to be the stronger
hemia and Moravia ? form . We have still in the next
Having thus defined the true meaning chapters to explain some preliminary
of the defensive, having defined its boun- points.
70 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
I

CHAPTER II .

THE RELATIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TO EACH OTHER

IN TACTICS .

FIRST of all we must inquire into the as cover, under which troops are concealed
circumstances which give the victory in a from view. Indeed we may say that
battle .
even from ground which is quite unim
Of superiority of numbers, and bravery ,
portant a person acquainted with the
discipline, or other qualities of an army, locality may derive assistance. The at
we say nothing here, because, as a rule, tack from several quarters includes in
they depend on things which lie out of itself all tactical turning movements
the province of the art of war in the sense great and small, and its effects are de
in which we are now considering it ; be- riv partly from double execution
sides which they exercise the same effect obtained inthis way from fire-arms, and
in the offensive as the defensive ; and, partly from the enemy's dread of his
moreover also, the superiority in numbers retreat being cut off.
in general cannot come under consideration Now how do the offensive and defen
here, as the number of troops is likewise sive stand respectively in relation to
a given quantity or condition, and does these things ?
not depend on the will or pleasure of the Havingin view the three principles of
general. Further, these things have no victory just described, the answer to this
particular connection with attack and de- question is, that only a small portion of
fence. But, irrespective of these things, the first and last of these principles is in
there are other three which
appear to us favour of the offensive , whilst the greater
of decisive importance, these are : sur part of them , and the whole of thesecond
prise, advantage of ground, and the attack principle, are at the command of the party
from several quarters. The surprise pro- acting defensively.
duces an effect by opposing to the enemy The offensive side can only have the
a great many more troops than he ex- advantage of one complete surprise of
pected at some particular point. The the whole mass with the whole, whilst
superiority in numbers in this case is the defensive is in a condition to surprise
very different
numbers to a general superiority of incessantly , throughout the wholecourse
; it is the most powerful agent
in the art of war. — The way in which of the combat, by the force and form
the advantage of ground contributes to which hegives to his partial attacks.
The offensive has greater facilities
thevictory is intelligibleenough ofitself, thanthe defensive for surrounding and
andwehaveonlyone observation to make cuttingoffthewhole,asthe latteris ina
which is, that we do not confine our re
marks to obstacles which obstruct the manner in a fixed position while the
advance of an enemy, such as scarped former is in a state of movement having
grounds, high hills, marshy streams, reference to that position. But the supe
rior advantage
hedges, inclosures, etc. ; we also allude ment, for offensive
which the an enveloping move
possesses , as
to the advantage which ground affords
now stated, is again limited to a move
 S OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE .
[BOOK 2 CHAP. I. RELATION 71

ment against the whole mass ; for during a piece of work on an embroidery frame,
the course of the combat, and with sepa- from being broken through at any point.
rate divisions of the force, it is easier for The ground occupied possessed a direct
the defensive than for the offensive to value at every point, and therefore a
make attacks from several quarters, be- direct defence was required everywhere.
cause, as we have already said, the former Under such circumstances, the idea of
is in a better situation to surprise by the making amovement or attempting a sur
force and form of his attacks. prise during the battle could not be en
That the defensive in an especial man : tertained ; it was the exact reverse of
ner enjoys the assistance which ground what constitutes a good defence, and of
Oneill affords is plain in itself; as to what con- that which the defence has actually be
cerns the advantage which the defensive come in modern warfare .
e unit has in surprising by the force and form In reality, contempt for the defensive
of his attacks, that results from the offen- has always been theresult of some par
The te sive being obliged to approach by roads ticular method ofdefencehavingbecome
); and this
udes i and paths where he may be easily ob- worn out ( outlived its period
renent served, whilst the defensive conceals his was just the case with the method we
are de position, and, until almost the decisive have now mentioned, for in times ante
ecution moment, remaiņsinvisible to his opponent. cedent to the period we refer to, that very
an -Since the true method of defence has method was superior to the offensive.
of his been adopted, reconnaissances have gone If we go through the progressive de
quiteoutof fashion, that is to say, they velopment ofthe modern artof war, we
defan have become find that at the commencement — that
impossible . Certainly recon . is
lan to naissances are still made at times, but the Thirty Years' War and the war of the
they seldom bring homemuch with them . Spanish Succession — the deployment and
des of Immense as is the advantage of being drawing up of the army array,was
one of the great leadinginpoint s con
able to examine well a position , and be nected with the battle. It was the most
ion of
is in a battlperfe
come ctlyas
e, plain acqua inted he(the
it isthat defene-
with it befor importantpartofthe plan of the battle.
sive, as a rule, a great
eive) who lies in wait near such a chosen This gave the defen
wand position can much more easily effect a advantage, as he was already drawn up
parti sary , is and deployed . As soon as the troops
surpri
this se than
very his adver
hour the old notion stillex-
yetnot to acquired greater capability of maneuvr
ploded that a battle which is accepted is ing, this advantage ceased, and the
e of halflost. Thiscomes from the old kind offens
superiorit y passed over to the side ofthe
ive for a time. Then the defensive
of defensive practised twentyearsag
y o, sought shelter behind rivers or deep
and partly also inthe Seven Years'War,
Whenthe onlyassistanceexpected from valleys, or on high land. The defensive
the ground was that it should be difficult thus recovered the advantage, and con
of approach in front (by steep mountain tinued to maintain it until the offensive
ties
slope s, etc., etc.), when the littledepth acquireds such increased mobility and ex
ind of the positions andthediffi cultyof pertnes in man @ uvring thathehim
d
moving the flanks produce such weak- self could venture into broken ground
ness that the armies dodged one another and attack in separate columns, and
ing from one hill toanother,whichincreased thereforebecameableto turn his adver
sary. This led to a gradual increase in
founevil.
the If some
d on whic thesupport
restof
h tokind wings , were
then the length of positions , in consequence
of which, no doubt , it occurred to the
depednded ng the army
eenenti
95
all tcho
stre alongonbetwprev these poin ts, like offensive to concentrate at a few points ,
72 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
and break through the enemy's thin line. But that kind of passive defence of the
The offensive thus , for a third time, ground isusuallyno longer the principal
gained the ascendancy, and the defence affair : that is what we have to do with
was again obliged to alter its system . here .
This it has done in recent wars by keep- If the offensive should discover some
ing its forces concentrated in large new and powerful element which it can
masses, the greater part not deployed, bring to its assistance—an eventnotvery
and, where possible, concealed, thus probable, seeing the point of simplicity
merely taking up a position in readiness and natural order to which all is now
to act according to the measures of the brought — then the defence must again
enemy as soon as they are sufficiently alter its method. But the defensive is
revealed .
always certain of the assistance of ground ,
This does not preclude a partially which insures to it in general its natural
passive defence of the ground , its ad- superiority,as the special propertiesof
vantage is too great for it not to be country and ground exercise a greater
used a hundred times in a campaign. influence thanever on actual warfare.

CHAPTER III,

THE RELATIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE TO EACH OTHER

IN STRATEGY .

Let us ask again, first of all, what are

the circumstances which insure a suc its success. — Those things which chiefly
cessful result in strategy ? lead to this success, or at least facilitate
In strategy there is no victory, as we actiony the
it,consequentl
efficient leading principles
in strategy, of
are as fol
have beforesaid. On the one hand, the low :
strategic success is the successful pre- 1. The advantage of ground.
paration of the tactical victory ; the
greater this strategic success , the more form 2. The
of ansurprise , let it be
actual attack byeither in the
surprise or
probablebecomes the victorystr
inthe thetaiunexpected
by cer display of large forces
battle . the oth han
On er ategic
d, at pointsn .
success lies in the making use of the vio- 3. The attack from several quarters
tory gained. The more events the ( all three, as in tactics).
strategic combinations can in the sequel
include in the consequences of a battle 4. The assistance of the theatre of war
gained, the more strategy can lay hands by fortresses, and everything belonging
to them.
on amongst the wreck of all that has
been shaken to the foundation by the 5. The support of the people.
battle , the more it sweeps up in great 6. The
forces utilisation of great moral
.
masses what of necessity has been
gained with great labour by many single Now, what are the relations of offen
hands in the battle , the grander will be sive and defensive with respect to these
things ?
 CHAP. III.] RELATIONS OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE . 73

The party on the defensive has the unavoidable on account of subsistence,

advantage of ground; the offensive side then plainly the defensive has the ad
that of the attack by surprise in strategy, vantage on his side of being able to fall
as in tactics. But respecting the surprise, in force upon a fraction of the enemy.
we must observe that it is infinitely more Attacks in flank and rear, which in
1
efficacious and important in strategy than strategy mean on the sides and reverse of
in tactics. In the latter, a surprise sel- the theatre of war, are of a verydifferent
dom rises to the level of a great victory, nature to attacks so called in tactics.
while in strategy it often finishes the war 1st. There is no bringing the enemy
at one stroke. But at the same time we under two fires, because we cannot fire
from one end of a theatre of war to the
must observe that the advantageous use
of this means supposes some great and other .
uncommon , as well as decisive error com- 2nd. The apprehension of losing the
mitted by the adversary, therefore it line of retreat is very much less, for the
does not alter the balance much in favour spaces in strategy are so great that they
of the offensive . cannot be barred as in tactics.
The surprise of the enemy, by placing 3rd . In strategy, on account of the
superi or forces
has again a great ion atcertainpoints,
in positresemblance to the
extent of space embraced, the efficacy of
interior, that is of shorter lines, is much
analogous case in tactics. Were the de- greater, and this forms a great safe
fensive compelled to distribute his forces guard against attacks from several di.
upon several points of approach to his rections.
theatre of war, then the offensive would 4th. A new principle makes its appear
y theadv ge ofhis ance inthe sensibility, which is felt as to
have
to fallplainl
upon one pointanta
with all being able
weigh t. lines of communication , that is in the
But here also, the new art of acting on effect which is produced by merely inter
the defensive by a different mode of pro rupting them .
ceeding has imperceptibly brought about Now it confessedly lies in the nature of
new principles. If the defensive side things, that on account of the greater
spaces in strategy, the enveloping attack ,
does not
makin g use of hend
appre thatended
an undef road,y , will
the enem by or the attack from several sides, as a rule
throw himself upon some important isonlypossible forthesidewhich hasthe
magazine or depôt,or on someunpre- initiative,that is the offensive ,andthat
tion
pared fortifica , or on the capital the defensis,ve isnotin a econdition, as hen,
is in tactic in the cours of the actio
itself, - and if he is not reduced to the
alternative of opposing the enemy on the to turn the tables on the enemy by sur
road he has chosen, or of having his re rounding him , because he has it not in
treat cut off, then there are no peremp his power either to draw up his forces
tory grounds for dividing his forces ; for withthe necessary depth relatively, or to
if the offensive chooses a different road conceal them sufficiently : but then, of
from that on which the defensive is to be what use is the facility of enveloping to
found , then some days later the latter the offensive, if its advantages are not
can marchagainst his opponentwith his forthcoming ? We could nottherefore
whole force upon the road he haschosen ; bringforward the enveloping attack in
besides, he may atthe sametime,in strategy as a principle of victory in gene
most cases, rest satisfied that the offensive ral, ifits influence on the lines of commu
ion
nicat ion
did not come into considerat .
will do him the honour to seek him out. But this factor is seldom great at the first
-If
with the forcesive
bịs offens oblig
is ed
divid ed toh isoften
,whic advance moment,when attack and defence first
774 ON WAR. ( BOOK VI.
meet, and while they are still opposed to men passed the Niemen , 120,000 fought
each other in their original position ; it at Borodino, and much fewer arrived at
only becomes great as a campaign ad- Moscow .
vances , when the offensive in the enemy's We may say that the effect itself of this
country is by degrees brought into the stupendous attempt wassodisastrous that
condition of defensive ; then the lines of even if the Russians had not assumed
communication of this new party acting any offensive at all, they would still
on the defensive, become weak, and the have been secure from any fresh attempt
party originally on the defensive, in as- at invasion for a considerable time. It
suming the offensive canderive advantage is true that with the exception of Swe
from this weakness. But who does not den there is no country in Europe which
see that this casual superiority of the is situated like Russia, but the efficient
attack isnot to be carried tothecredit principle is alwaysthe same, the only
of the offensive ingeneral , for it is in distinction being in the greater or less
reality created out of the superior rela- degree of its strength.
tions of the defensive. If we add to thefourth and fifth prin
The fourth principle, the Assistance ciples, the consideration that these forces
of the Theatre of War, is naturally an of the defensive belong to the original
advantage on the side of the defensive. defensive, that is the defensive carried on
If the attacking army opens the cam in our own soil, and that they are much
paign it breaks away from its own weaker if
, defence takes place in an
the
theatre, and is thus weakened ,thatis,it enemy'scountry and ismixed upwith
leaves fortresses
and depôts
of all kinds
an offensive undertaking, then from that
behind it. The greater the sphere of there
operationswhich must betraversed the sive much thedisadvantage
is anew offen.
for therespect
same as above,
, , in
more it will be weakened (by marches and to the third principle ; for the offensiveis
garrisons); the army on thedefensive con- just as little composed entirely of active
tinues to keep up its connection with elements, as the defensiveofmere warding
everything , that is, it enjoys
fortresses
the support off blows; indeed every attackwhichdoes
weakened
of its , is not in any
way , and is near to its sources of supply. not
end lead directly
in the to peace must inevitably
defensive.
The support of the population as a fifth Now, if all defensive elements which
principle is not realised in every defence, are attackis are
in the that
broughtbyintoitsusenature,
for a defensive campaign may be carried weakened by
oninthe enemy's country, but still this belonging to the attack, then thismust
principle is only derived from the idea of
the defensive, and applies to it in the also be ofconsidered
vantage as a. general disad
the offensive
majority of cases. Besides by this is This is far from being an idle piece of
meant chiefly, although not exclusively , logical refinement, on the contrary, we
the effect of calling out the last Reserves,
and even of a national armament, the should rathersay that in it lies thechief
result of which is that all friction disadvantage of theoffensive in general,
is diminished , and that all resources and therefore from the very commence
are sooner forthcoming and flow in more ment of, as well as throughout every
abundantly . combination for a strategicattack, most
The campaign of 1812 , gives as it were particular attention ought to be directed
in a magnifying glass a very clear illus to this point, that is to the defensive,
tration of theeffectofthemeans speci- whichplainlymay
whenfollow shall see
, as wetothe
wecome bookmore
on
fied under principles 3 and 4. 500,000 plans of campaigns,
 ATTACK AND DEFENCE . 75
(NIEC CHAP. IV .]
1,000 formed The great moral forces which at times We think we have now sufficiently
r arrived at saturate the element of war, as it were established our proposition, that the
with a leaven of their own, which there- defensive is a stronger form of war than the
fore the commander certain cases can offensive ; but there still remains to be
istrins the use to assist the other means at his com- mentioned one small factor hitherto un
SANITA mand, are to be supposed just as well on noticed. It is the high spirit, the
which
rould the side of the defensive as of the offen- feeling of superiority in an army
sive ; at least those which are more springs from a consciousness of belonging
especially in favour of the attack, such to the attacking party. The thing is in
n ofSre as confusion and disorder in the enemy's itself a fact, but thefeeling soon merges
Ope The ranks — do not generally appear until after into the more general and more powerful
the decisive stroke is given, and conse- one which is imparted by victory or
the car quently seldom contribute beforehand to defeat, by the talent or incapacity of the
er orless produce that result. general.

ifth pris
OTETEN
wida
In med CHAPTER IV .

up with
om that
CONVERGENCE OF ATTACK AND DIVERGENCE OF DEFENCE.
le offer
respect
nsite is These two conceptions, these forms in the the assailant is imagined to be in move
active use of offensive and defensive, appear so ment, and in movement expressly directed
varding
frequently in theory and reality , that the against that standing adversary. It fol
chdată imagination is involuntarily disposed to lows from this, necessarily, that turning
look upon them as intrinsic forms, neces- and enveloping is at the option of the
Fitably
sary
ever, tois attack andthe
not really defence,
case, aswhich, how assailant
the smallest
only , that is to say, as long
as his movement and the immobility
reflection will show . We take the earliest of the defensive continue . This free
opportunity of examining them , that we dom of choice of the mode of attack,
may obtain once for all clear ideas respect- whether it shall be convergent or not,
disado ing them, and that, in proceeding with according as it shall appear advantageous
our consideration of the relationsof at- or otherwise, ought to be reckoned as an
te doen tack and defence, we may be able to set advantagetothe offensive in general.
these conceptions altogether,
aside andnot But this choice is free only in tactics; it
chist have our attention for everdistractedby is notalwaysallowed in strategy: In the
eral,
the appearance of advantage and the re- first, the points on which the wings rest
verse which they cast uponthings.Wetreat are hardly ever absolutely secure; but
them here as pure abstractions, extract they are very frequently so in strategy, as
TETT when the front to be defended stretches
MAS and conception
the reser ve ourof them
remar like
ks on partessence,
thean which in a straight line from one sea to another,
eitad
sire
it has in actual things fora future time. or from one neutral territory to another.
The defending party, both in tactics In such cases, the attack cannot be made
n00
101
andinstrategy,is supposed to bewaiting ina convergent form , andthelibertyof
in expectation, therefore standing,whilst choice is limited . It is limited in a still
76 ON WAR .

moreembarrassingmanner if the assailant plainly much more difficult, because great

is obliged to operate by converging lines. spaces are not easily blocked. The attack
Russia and France cannot attack Ger upon one and the same body from several
many in any other way than by converg- quarters is generally more effectualand de
ing lines; therefore they cannot attack cisive, the smaller this body is, the nearer
with their forces united. Now if we it approaches to the lowest limit — that of
assume as granted that the concentric a single combatant. An army can easily
form in the action of forces in the ma- give battle on several sides , a division
jority of cases is the weaker form, then
less easily, a battalion only when formed
the advantage which the assailant pos in mass, a single man not at all. Now
sesses in the greater freedom of choice strategy, in its province, deals with large
may probably be completely outweighed masses of men, extensive spaces, and con
by the disadvantage, in other cases , of siderable duration of time ; with tactics,
being compelled to make use of the it is the reverse . From this follows that
weaker form .
the attack from several sides in strategy
We proceed to examine more closely cannot have the same results as in tactics.
the action of these forms, both in tactics The effect of fire does not come within
and in strategy .
It has been considered one of the chief the scope of strategy ; but in its place
advantages of giving a concentric direc- there is something else. It is that totter
ing of the base which every army feels
tion to forces, that is, operating from the when there is a victorious enemy in its
circumference of a circle towards the rear, whether near or far off.
centre, that the further the forces ad- It is, therefore, certain that the con
vance, the nearer they approach to each centric action of forces has an advantage
other ; the fact is true, but the supposed in this way , that the action or effect
advantage is not ; for the tendency to against a is at the same time one against
union is going on equally on both sides ; b, without its force against a being dimin
consequently, the equilibriumisdispersion ished , andthat
notdis- likewise the action against b is
action against
turbed . It is the same in the a . The whole,
of force by eccentric movements. therefore, is not a + b, but something
But another and a real advantage is,
that forces operating on converging lines more ; and this advantage is produced
direct their action towards a common point, both in tactics
somewhat and strategy,
differently in each . although
those operating on diverging lines do not. Now what is there in the eccentric or
-Now what are the divergent action of forces to oppose to
in the two cases ? effectsoftheaction
Here we must sepa
rate tactics from strategy . this advantage? Plainly the advantage
We shall not push the analysis too far, of havingthe forces in greater proximity
and therefore confine ourselves to the to each other, and the moving on interior
following points asthe advantages of the lines.
action in tactics .
It is unnecessary
how thiscan become suchato multiplier
demonstrate
of
1. A cross fire, or, at least, an increased forces that the assailant cannot encounter
effect ofa fire
within , assoon
certain range .as allis
brought the advantage
he has it gives
a great his opponent
superiority unless
of force .
2. Attack ofone and the same point When
from several sides .
once
principle of thedefensive has adopted the
movement (movementwhich
3. The cutting off the retreat . certainly commences later than that of
The interception of a retreat may be the assailant, but still time enough to
also conceived strategically, but then it is break thechainsof paralysing inaction),
then this advantage of greater concentram
 ATTACK AND DEFENCE . 77
CHAP IV .]
tion and the interior lines tends much miles ; the first, that is, the small dis
more decisively, and in most cases more tances, concerns tactics, the greater ones
effectually, towards victory than the con- belong to strategy. But, although we
centric form of the attack. But victory certainly require more time, to reach an
must precede the realisation of this supe- object in strategy, than in tactics, and an
riority ; we must conquer before we can army is not so quickly defeated as a
think of cutting off an enemy's retreat, battalion , still, these periods of time in
In short, we see that there is here a strategy can only increase up to a cer
relation similar to that which exists be- tain point ; that is, they can only last
tween attack and defence generally ; the until a battle takes place, or, perhaps,
concentric form leads to brilliant results, over and above that, for the few days
the advantages of the eccentric are more during which a battle may be avoided
secure : the former is the weaker form without serious loss. Further, there is a
with the positive object; the latter, the much greater difference in the real start
stronger form with the negative object. in advance, which is gained in one case,
In this way these two forms seem to us as compared with the other. Owing to the
to be broughtnearly to an even balance. insignificance of the distances in tactics,
Now if we add to this that the defence, the movements of one army in a battle,
not being always absolute, is also not take place almost in sight of the other ;
always precluded from using its forces on the army, therefore, on the exterior line,
converging lines, we have no longer a will generally very soon be made aware
right to believe that this converging form of what his adversary is doing. From
$ is alone sufficient to ensure to the offen- the long distances, with which strategy
sive a superiority over the defensive uni- has to deal, it very seldom happens, that
versally , and thus we set ourselves free the movement of one army, is not con
from the influence which that opinion cealed from the other for at least a day,
usually exercises over the judgment, and there are numerous instances, in
whenever there is an opportunity. which especially if the movement is only
What has been said up to thepresent, partial,such asaconsiderable detachment,
relates to both tactics and strategy ; we that it remains secret for weeks.-It is
have still a most important point to asy to see, what a great advantage this
rd es egy
bring forwa , which appli to strat power of concealingmovements must be
only. The advantage of interior lines to that party, who through the nature of
increases with the distances to which his position has reason to desire it most.
these lines relate . In distances of a few We here close our considerations on
thousand yards, or a half mile, the time the convergent and divergent use of
forces, and the relation of those forms
which is gained, canno t course be as
much as in distances ofof sever al days' to attack and defence, proposing to re
march, or indeed , of twenty or thirty turn to the subject at another time.
78 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.

CHAPTER V.
1

CHARACTER OF STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE .

We have already explained what the geance — is the most brilliant point in the
defensive is generally, namely,nothing defensive; he who does not at once think
more than a stronger form of carrying on of it at the right moment, or rather he
war (page 69), by means of which we who does not from the first include this
endeavour to wrest a victory, in order, transition in his idea of the defensive
after having gained a superiority, to pass will never understand the superiorityof
over to the offensive, that is to the pos- the defensive
as a form ofwar; he will be
itive object of war. forever thinking only of the means which
Even if the intention of a waris only willbeconsumed bytheenemyand gained
the maintenance status
of the existing situatio n by ourselves through the offensive,which
of things, the quo, still a mere means however depend not on tying the
parrying of a blow is something quite knot, buton untyingit. Further, it isa
contradictory to the conception of the stupid confusion of ideas if, under the
term war, because the conduct of war is term offensive, we always understand
unquestionably no mere state of endu- sudden attack or surprise, and conse
rance , If the defender has obtained an quently under defensive imagine nothing
important advantage, then the defensive but embarrassment and confusion.
form has done its part, and under the It is true that a conqueror makes his
prote the ofblow
back ction
succewise
this, other ss he hemust give
expos es
determination to go to warsooner than
himself to certain destruction common the unconscious defender, and if he knows
;
how to keep his measures properlysecret,
sense points out that iron should be struck he may also perhaps takethe defender un
while it is hot, that we should use the awares ; but that is a thing quite foreign
advantage gained to guard against a to war itself, for it should not be so . War
second attack . How, when and where
this reaction shall commence issubject actually
sivethantakes place queror
for thecon more for the defen
, for invasion
certainly to a number of other conditions, only calls forthresistance , and it isnot
which we can only explain hereafter
. For until there is resistance that there is
the present we keepto this, that we must
always consider this transition to an
war . A conqueror is always a lover
offensive retu rn as a natural tendency of of himsel( fas)Buonapa
of peace ;hewoul rtedalways asserted
like toma ke
the defensive therefore as an essential
,
element of the same, and always con his entry into our state unopposed ;
clude that thereis something wrong in the in order to prevent this, we must choose
also make prepara
management of a war when a victory war, tions, and
thattherefore
is in otherwords, it isjust
gained through the defensive form is not
turned to good account in any manner, the weak, or that side which must defend
but allowed to wither away . itself, which shouldbe always armed in
A swift and vigorous assumption of order not to be taken by surprise; so it
the offensive the flashing sword of ven is willed by the art of war.
The appearance of oneside sooner than
 CHAP. VI. ] EXTENT OF THE MEANS OF DEFENCE . 79

the other in the theatre of war depends, If, therefore, we imagine to ourselves
besides, in most cases on things quite a defensive, such as it should be, we
different from a view to offensive or de- must suppose it with every possible pre
fensive. But although a view to one or paration of all means, with an army fit
other of these forms is not the cause, for, and inured to, war, with a general
it is often the result of this priority who does not wait for his adversary with
appearance. Whoever is first ready anxiety from an embarrassing feeling of
will on that account go to work offen- uncertainty, but from his own free choice,
sively, if the advantage of surprise is suf- with cool presence of mind, with for
ficiently great to makeit expedient ; tresses which do not dreada siege, and
na to and the party who is the last to be ready lastly, with a loyal people who fear the
can only then in some measure compen enemy as little as he fears them. With
sate for the disadvantage which threatens such attributes the defensive will act no
lude this
defensic him bythe advantages of the defensive. such contemptible part in opposition to
rioriyal At the same time, it must be looked the offensive, and the latter will not
temilli
upon in general as an advantage for the appear such an easy and certain form of
offensive, that he can make that good war, as it does in the gloomy imaginations
use of being the first in the field which of those who can only see in the offensive
d grained has been notice the third book ; only courage, strength of will, and energy ;
e, the
this general advantage is not an absolute in the defensive, helplessness and
Fing the necessity in every case .
s,itis a apathy.
der the
lerstand

nothing
kes the CHAPTER VI.
er than
Inors

Jerun EXTENT OF THE MEANS OF DEFENCE.

oreigt
We have shown in the second and third the columns of the different orders of
defen chapters of this book how the defence architecture in his edifice.
rasion has a natural advantage in the employ
is not 1. - Landwehr ( Militia ).
ment ofthose things,which ,-irrespective This force hasbeen used in modern times
ere i of the absolute strength and qualities of
lorear the combatant force, influence the tacti- to combatthe enemyon foreign soil; and it
serta strategic result,namely, is not to bedeniedthatits organisationin
mala the advantaasgetheof ground, sudden attack, many states,for instance inPrussia, is
calaswell
sal attack from several directions(con verg of such a kind, that it may almost be
horse ingform of attack ), the assistance ofthe regarded as part of the standing army,
pars theatre ofwar,suppor tofthepeople, therefore it does notbelongtothedo
just ely. At the same time,
and the utilising great moral forces. We fensive exclusivoverl
must not ook the fact, that the
afend think it useful now to cast again a glance we
very great use made of it in 1813-14
in over the extent of the means which are
sost 15 was the result of defensive war ; that
at command of the defensive in par it is organised in very few places to the
$
ticular, and which are to be regarded as
than
80 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
same degree as in Prussia, and that al- is made the object of a regular siege,
ways when its organisation falls below and holds out, is naturally of more con
thelevelofcomplete efficiency, it is better siderable weight in the scales of war,
suited for the defensive than for the than one which by the strength of its
offensive. But besides that, there always works merely forbids the idea of its
lies in the idea of a militia the notion capture, and therefore neither occupies
of a very extensive more or less voluntary nor consumes any of the enemy's forces.
co- operation of the whole mass of the
people in support of the war, with all 3. - The People.
their physical powers, as well as with
their feelings, and a ready sacrifice of all Although the influence of a single
they possess. The more its organisation inhabitant of the theatre of war on the
deviates from this, so much the more the course of the war in most cases is not
force thus created will become a stand- more perceptible than the co -operation of
ing army under another name, and the a drop of water in a whole river, still
more it will have the advantages of such even in cases where there is no such thing
a force; but it will also lose in proportion as a general rising of the people, the
the advantages whichbelong properly to total influence of the inhabitants of a coun
the militia , those of being a force, the try in war is anything but imperceptible.
limits of which are undefined , and cap Every thing goes on easier in our own
abletoofthe
ing beingeasily increased
feelings and by appeal.
patriotism country,
of the the provided
general is not
feelingit of the opposed by
population.
people . In these things lies the essence All contributions great and small, are
of a militia ; inits organisation , latitude only yieldedto the enemy under thecom
mustwhole
the be allowed
peoplefor
; ifthis
we co-operation of must
seek to obtain pulsionof direct forceby; the
be undertaken thattroops,
operation
and
something extraordinary from a militia , cost the employment of many men as
we are only following a shadow . well as great exertions. The defensive
But now the close relationship between receives all he wants, if not always
thisessence ofa militiasystem, and the voluntarily, as in cases of enthusiastic
concept ion of the defensive , is not to be devotion , still through the long-used
denied, neither can it be denied that such channels of submission to the state on
a militia will always belong more to the the part of the citizens, which has become
defensive form than to the offensive, and second nature, and which besides that, is
that it will manifest chiefly in the defen enforced by the terrors of the law with
sive, those effects through which it sur- which the army has nothing to do. But
passes the attack. the spontaneous co -operation ofthe people
2. - Fortresses . proceeding from true attachment is in
The assistance afforded by fortresses all cases most important, as it never fails
to the offensive does not extend beyond in renderedwithout
all those pointsany sacrifice
where . Weshall
service can be
whatisgiven bythose closeupon the only notice one point, whichis ofthe
frontiers, and iswhich
the assistance
only feeblein influence; highest importance in war, thatisintelli
the defensive can
portantnotinformation
derive from thisreaches further into gence, so much special,
throughgreat im
and ema
persons
the heart of the country , andthere- ployed, as that respectingtheinnumer
fore more of them can be brought into
use, and their utility itself ditfers in the able little matters in connection with
degree of its intensity . A fortress which which the daily service of an army is
carried on in uncertainty, and with regard
 CHAP. VI. ] EXTENT OF THE MEANS OF DEFENCE . 81

to which a good understanding with the serve the stability of the wbole than to
inhabitants gives the defensive a general produce changes, that is to say, this
tendency to stability exists in general.
advantage.
This we conceive to be the true notion
If we ascend from this quite general
and never failing beneficial influence, up
of a balance of power, and in this sense
pest
to special cases in which the populace it will always of itselfcome into existence,
begins to take part in the war, and then wherever there are extensive connections
further up to the highest degree, where between civilised states.
as inSpain, the war, as regards its leading How far this tendency of the general
events is chiefly a war carried on by the interests to the maintenance of the exist
people themselves, we may see that we ing state of things is efficient is another
have here virtually a new power rather question; at all events we can conceive
than a manifestation of increased co- some changes in the relations of single
operation on the part of the people, and states to each other, which promote
therefore that this efficiency of the whole, and others
which obstruct it. In the first case they
are efforts to perfect the political balance,
4. — The National Armament, and as these have the same tendency as
ile or general call to arms, may be considered the universal interests, they will also
as a particular means of defence. be supported by the majority of these
bi interests . But in the other case, they
are of an abnormal nature, undue activity
5. - Allies. on the part of some single states, real
Finally, we may further reckon allies as maladies ; still that these should make
the last support of the defensive . Natur- their appearance in a whole with so little
ally we do not meanordinary allies, cohesion as an assemblage of great and
which the assailant may likewise have ; little states is nottobewonderedat,for
we speak of those essentially interested we see the same in that marvellously
maintain
incountry. ing the integrity of the organis ed whole,the naturalworld .
If for instance we look at the If in answer we are reminded of in
composing stances in history where single states
various states
present time,we Europe
find (withou at theg have
t speakin effected important changes, solely
ofa systematically regulated balance of for their own benefit, withoutany effort
power and interests, as that does not on the part of the whole to prevent the
exist, and therefore is often with justice same, or cases where a single state has
been able to raise itself so much above
disputed,
great andstill, statesionably
smallunquest ) thats the
and interest of others as to become almost the arbiter of
nations are interwoven with each other the whole, -then our answer is that these
in a most diversified and changeable examplesby no means prove that a ten
manner , each of these points of inter- dency of theinterests of the whole in
section forms a bindingknot, forinit favour of stability does not exist,they only
thedirection of the one gives equilibrium show that itsaction was not powerful
enough at themoment.The efforttowards
tothe direction oftheother; by all these an object is a differentthing from the mo
knots therefor
compact connecte,ion of they awhole
evidentl more will
orless
be tion towards it. At the same time it is
formed, andthis general connection must anything but a nullity,of whichwe have
be partially overturned byeverychange the best exemplification in thedynamics
ofall
In this manner thewhole relations of the heavens.
states to each other serve rather to pre We say , the tendency of equilibrium
VOL . II.
82 ON WAR . BOOK FI.
is to the maintenance of the existing state, afforded by the whole has not in every
whereby we certainly assume that rest, instance proved strong enough to pre
that is equilibrium , existed in this state ; serve the independenceof each individual
for where that has been already dis- state, such exceptions are to be regarded
turbed, tension has already commenced, as irregularities in the life of the whole,
and there the equilibrium may certainly whichthem
also tend to a change. But if we look to have havenot destroyed that life, but
elves been mastered by it.
the nature of the thing, this change can It would be superfluous to go over the
only affect some few separate states, mass of events in which changes which
never the majority, and therefore it is would have disturbed the balance too
certain that the preservation of the latter much have been prevented or reversed
is supported and secured through the by the opposition more or less openly
collective interests of the whole - certain declared of other states. They will be
also that each single state which has not seen by the most cursory glance at
against it a tension of the whole will history . We only wish to say a few
have more interest in favour of its de- words about a case which is always on
fence than opposition to it. the lips of those who ridicule the idea of
Whoever laughs at these reflections as a political balance, and because it ap
utopian dreams, does soat the expense of
pears specially applicable here as a case
philosophical truth. Although we may in which an unoffending state, acting on
learn from it the relations which the es the defensive, succumbed without receiv
sential elements of things bear to each ing any foreign aid. We allude to
other, it would be rash to attempt to de- Poland . That a state of eight millions
duce laws from the same by whicheach ofinhabitants should disappear, should
individual case should be governed with- be divided amongst three others without
out regard to any accidental disturbing asword being drawn by any of the rest
influences. But when a person, in the of the European states , appears, at first
words of a great writer, “ never rises above sight, a fact which either proves con
anecdote,"builds allhistoryon it,begins clusively the general inefficiency of the
alwayswiththe most individual points, political balance, or at least shows that
with the climaxes of events , and only it is inefficient to a very great os
goes down just so deep as he finds a mo- tent in some instances. That a state of
tive for doing , and therefore never reaches such extent should disappear, a prey to
to the lowest foundationof thepredomi- others, and those already the most
his opinion will powerful( Russia and Austria),it appears
nant general relations, beyond will be
never have any value the one such a very extreme case that
case, and to him
provesto
,that whichphilosophy said, if anevent ofthis description could
applicable to cases in gene
be not rouse the collective interests of all
ral, will only appear a dream . free states, then the efficient action which
Without that general striving for rest
and the maintenance of the existing con thiscollective interest should display for
dition of things, a numberof civilised the benefit of individual states is ima
ginary. But we stillmaintain thata
states could not long livequietlysideby single case, however striking, does not
side ; they must necessarily become fused negative the general truth, and we
into one . Therefore, as Europe has ex
isted in its present state for more than a assert next that the downfall of Poland
thousand years, we can only regard the is also not so unaccountable as may at
fact as a result of that tendency of the first sight appear. Was Polandreally
collective interests ;and iftheprotection homoge neous membe
to be regarded r of thecstate,
as a European ommunitas ya
 (201 CHAP . VI.] EXTENT OF THE MEANS OF DEFENCE . 83

not in T of nations in Europe ? No ! It was a support, then certainly too much is

ugh to Tartar state, which instead of being asked.
chindividu located, like the Tartars of the Crimea , The partition of Poland had been
be regard on the Black Sea, on the confines of the talked of frequently for a hundred years,
hat life he territory inhabited by the European and for that timethe country had been
community, had its habitation in the not like a private house, but like a public
ed bris midst ofthatcommunity on the Vistula. road, on which foreign armies were con
go orer We neither desire by this to speak dis- stantly jostling one another. Was it the
respectfully of the Poles, nor to justify business of other states to put a stop to
balance 1
Or Teresa thelook of their country,
partition things but only this ; were they constantly to keep the
they really are. sword drawn to preserve the political in
to at as
For a hundred years this country had violability of the Polish frontier ? That
lep Filk ceased to play any independent part in would have been to demand a moral
glazo e European politics, and had been only an impossibility. Poland was at this time
apple of discord for the others. It was politically little better than an uninhabi
alwers de
the ideas impossible that for a continuance it could ted steppe ; and as it is impossible that
maintain itself amongst the others with defenceless steppes, lying in the midst
its state and constitution unaltered : an of other countries should be guarded
essential alteration in its Tartar nature for ever from invasion, therefore it was
acting a
would have been the work of not less impossible to preserve the integrity of
than half, perhaps a whole century , sup; this state, as itwas called . For all these
allnde posing the chief men of that nation had reasons there is as little to cause wonder
been in favour of it. But these men were in the noiseless downfall of Poland as
far too thorough Tartars to wishany such in the silent conquest of the Crimean
imika change. Their turbulent political con- Tartars ; the Turks had a greater in
the rest
dition, and their unbounded levity went terest in upholding the latter than any
, at ting European state had in preserving the
hand in hand, and sothey tumbled into
p of the
the abyss. Long before the partition of independence of Poland,but they saw
0978that
Poland the Russians had become quite thatit would be a vain effort to try to
wat er indepen there,
at homedent state, ies of an
ofits being
idea boundar
thewith its protect a defenceless steppe. -
We return to our subject, and think
own, had ceased, and nothing is more we have proved that the defensive in
PINTO certain than that Poland, if it had not general may count more on foreign aid
y
been partitioned , must have become a than the offensive; he may reckon the
Apra Russian province. If this had not been more certainly on it in proportion as his
80, and if Poland had been a state existence is of importance to others, that
I would capable of making a defence, the three is to say, the sounder and more vigorous
powers would not so readily have pro- hispolitical and military condition.
ceeded to its partition , and those powers Of course the subjects which have been
lasta most interested in maintaining its in here enumerated as means properly be
$ ims. tegrity, like France, SwedenandTurkey, longingto the defensive will not be at
that i would have been able to co -operate in a the command of each particular defen
very different manner towards its pre- sive. Sometimes one, sometimes another,
d servation . But if the maintenance of a may be wanting ; but they all belong to
Poland state is entirely dependent on external the idea of the defensive as a whole.

really

uning <
84 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.

CHAPTER VII .

MUTUAL ACTION AND REACTION OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE .

Weshall now consider attack and defence pendent of the reciprocal effectof attack
separately, as far as they can be sepa- and defence,and
rated from each other. We commence sive .
that it is in the defen
with the defensive for the following rea- If this is a logical consequence, the
sons :—It is certainly very natural and defensive must have motives of action,
even when as yet he knows nothing of
necessary to base the rulesfor the defence
upon those of the offensive, and vice versa ; the intentions of the offensive; and these
but one of the two must still have a third motives ofactionmustdetermine the
point of departure, if the whole chain of organisation of the means of fighting.
ideas isto have a beginning, that is, to Onthe other hand, as long as the offensive
be possible. The first question concerns knowsnothing of the plans of his adver
this point. sary, there are no motives of action for
If we reflect upon the commencement him , no grounds for the application of his
of war philosophically, the conception of military means. He can do nothing more
war properly does not originate with the s
than take these mean along with him,
offensive, asthatformhas forits absolute that is,takepossession by means ofhis
object , not so much fighting as the taking army. And thus it is also in point of
possession of something. The idea of war fact; for to carry about the apparatus of
arises first by the defensive, for that form war is not to use it ; and the offensive who
has the battle for its direct object, as takes such things with him, on the quite
warding off and fighting plainly are one general supposition that he may require
and the same. The warding off is directed to use them , and who, instead of taking
entirely against the attack ; therefore possession of a country by official func
supposes it, necessarily ; but the attack tionaries and proclamations, does so with
is not directed against the warding off ; an army, has not as yet committed, pro
it is directed upon something else — the perly speaking, any act of warfare; but
taking possession ; consequently does not the defensive who both collects his appa
presuppose the warding off. It lies , ratus of war, and disposes of it with a
therefore, in the nature of things, that view to fighting, is the first to exercise
the party who first brings the element of an act which really accords with the con
war into action, the party from whose ception of war .
point of view two opposite parties are
first conceived, also establishes the first The second question is now : what is
laws of war, and that party is the de theoretically the nature of the motives
We are not speaking of any which must arise in the mind of the de
fender. fensive first, before the attack itself is
individual case ; we are only dealing with
e
a general, an abstract case, which theory thought of ? Plainly the advanc made
s
imagine in order to determi ne the course with a view to taking possession, which
it is to take . wehave imagined extraneous tothe war,
By this we now know where to look but which is the foundation of the open
for this fixed point, outside and inde ing chapter. The defence is to oppose
this advance; therefore in idea wemust
 2[
016

CHAP . VIII.] METHODS OF RESISTANCE. 85

connect this advance with the land ( coun- which are produced are worth examina
try ) ; and thus arise the first most gene tion .
ral measures of the defensive . When This little analysis was necessary in
these are once established, then upon order to give more clearness and stability
them the application of the offensive is to what follows, such as it is ; it is not
founded, and from a consideration of the made for the field of battle, neither is it
2. means which the offensive then applies, for the generals of the future ; it is only
new principles again of defence are for the army of theorists, who have
7ofattack derived . Now here is the reciprocal made a great deal too light of the sub
the dela effect which theory can follow in its in. ject hitherto.
quiry, as long as it finds the fresh results
of arts
othing!
and then
mine the
fighting CHAPTER VIII.
offenste
isadre.
tion for
on of his
ng the METHODS OF RESISTANCE .
th him
The conception of the defence is warding only waits for attack on the country ; a
oint of off; in this wardingoff lies the stateof defence of atheatre of war an attack on
atus a expectance, and this state of expectance the theatre of war ; and the defence of
ise abie we have taken as the chief characteristic a position the attack of that position ,
a quite of the defence, and at the same time as Every positive, and consequently more or
less offensive, kind of action which the
equire its principal advantage.
taking But as the defensive in war cannot be defensive uses after the above period of
] fuzie a state of endurance, therefore this state waiting for, does not negative the idea
o mi of thecontinuance of the defensive ; for
d, p
of
absolute staten is
expectatio onlysubject
; the s ive,
a relat withnot an
which the state of expectation, which is the
thiswaiting for is connected are, as re chief sign of the same, and its chief ad
apa gards space, either the country, or the vantage, has been realised.
Tith theatre of war, or the position, and, as The conception of war, campaign, and
regards time, the war, the campaign, or battle, in relation to time, are coupled
the battle. That these subjects are no respectively with the ideas of country,
immutable units, but only the centres theatre of war, and position, and on that
hat is of certain limited regions, which run into account they have the same relations to
otte one another and are blended r
e do we know ; but in practical life togethe
we must, theThe
presentsubject.
defensive consists, therefore, of
It is often be contented only to group things two heterogeneous parts, the state ofex
made together, not rigidly to separate them ; pectancy and that of action. By having
hish and these conceptions have, in the real referred the first to a definite subject, and
world itself, sufficient distinctness to be therefore given it precedence of action,
made use of as centres round which we we have made it possible to connect the
pen two into one whole. But an act of the
may group other ideas.
A defence of the country, therefore, defensive, especially a considerable one,
86 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
such as a campaign or a whole war, does view led us before to the idea of the
not, as regards time, consist of two great defensive being nothing but the stronger
halves, the first the state of mere expecta- form of war, in order the more certainly to
tion, the second entirely of a state of conquer the enemy ; this idea we must
action ; it is a state of alternation be . adhere to throughout, partly because it
tween the two, in which the state of alone saves us in the end from absurdity,
expectation can be traced through the partly, because the more vividly it is
whole act of the defensive like a con . impressed on the mind, so much the
tinuous thread . greater is the energy it imparts to the
We give to this stateof expectation so whole act of the defensive.
much importance simply because it is If therefore we should make a dis
demanded by the nature of the thing . In tinction between the reaction, consti
preceding theories ofwar ithas certainly tuting the second element of the defen
never been brought forward as an inde- sive, and the other element which consists
pendent conception, but in reality it has in reality in the repulse only of the
served as a guide, although often
always ved enemy ;-if we should look at expulsion
unobser . ntal
It is such a fundame from the country, from the theatre of
part of the whole act of war, that the one war, in such a light as to see in it alone
without the other appears almost impos- the necessary thing by itself, the ultimate
sible ; and we shall therefore roften have objectbeyond the attainment of which
occasion to recur toit hereafte by calling our efforts should not be carried, and on
attention to its effects in thedynamic the otherhand, regard the possibility of
action of the powers called into play. a reaction carried still further, and pass
For the present we shall employ our . ing into the real strategic attack, as a sub
selves in explaining how the principle of jectforeign to andof no consequence to
the state of expectation runs through the the defence,—such a view would be in op
act of defence,andwhat are the succes- position to the nature of the ideaabove
sive stagesinthe defence itself which represented ,andtherefore we cannot
have their origin in this state.
In order to establish our ideas on
look upon this distinction as really
existing, and we must adhere to our
subjects of a more simple kind, we shall assertion, that the idea of revenge must
deferthe defence of acountry,a subject always beat the bottomof everyde
ofpolitical se, however
influenc verygreat
on whichesa exercise
ap owerfuly effect,until
s diversit damage;for
fensive mightotherwi
be occasio ned tomuch
the
we come to the Book on the Plan of War ;enemy , by a succesful issue of the first
andas on the other hand, thedefensive reaction ,therewouldalwaysbe a defi
on in a battle is matter ciencyin the necessary balance of thedy
act in a positior
of tactics, whichonlyforms a starting namic relations of the attack anddefence.
point for strategic action as a whole, we
We say, then , the defensi is ve the more
shall takethe defence
war
of a theatre,of powerf ul formofmakingwar, in order
as being the subject, in which to overcome the enemy more easily, and
we can best show the relations of the we leave to circumstances to determine
defensive .
whether which
We have said, that the state of expecta . against this thevictorydefence
over the
was object
com
tion and of action — which last is always a menced is sufficient or not.
counterstroke, therefore a reaction - are
both essential parts of the defensive ; for But as the defensive is inseparable
without the first,there would beno de- from that the idea
object,thofe defeatof
the state of expectation,
theenemy,only
fensive, without the second no war. This
exists conditionally, that is, only if the
 BTE
[OOT

METHODS OF RESISTANCE. 87
CHAP. VIII.]
dea of the offensive takes place ; and otherwise up, finding the position of the enemy
(that is, if the offensive stroke does not too strong
certainei follow ) of course the defensive is con- 4. By the army transferring its defence
tented with the maintenance of its pos to the heart of the country. The object of
because i sessions; this maintenance is therefore retreating into the interior is to cause a
absurdity its object in the state of expectation, that diminution in the enemy's strength, and
vidy is is, its immediate object; and it is only to wait until its effects are such that
much to as long as it contents itself with this his forward march is of itself discon
rts to the more modest end, that it preserves the tinued, or at least until the resistance
advantages of the stronger form of war. which we can offer him at the end of his
ke at If we suppose an army with its theatre career is such as he can no longer over
I, cult of war intended for defence, the defence come .
the delar may be made as follows : This case is exhibited in the simplest
ch tính 1. By attacking the enemy the mo- and plainest manner , when the defensive
ment he enters the theatre of war. can leave one or more of his fortresses
espokia (Mollwitz, Hohenfriedberg ). behind him, which the offensive is ob
heatre de 2. By taking up a position close on liged to besiege or blockade. It is clear
the frontier, and waiting till the enemy in itself, how much his forces must be
ultimate appears with the intention of attacking weakened in this way, and what a chance
ofthis it, in order then to attack him (Czaslau, there is of an opportunity for the defen
, andit Soor, Rosbach ). Plainly this second sive to attack at somepoint with superior
ibility: mode ofceproceed ing, partake s more of forces.
nd pretty enduran , we " wait for ” longer ; and But even when there are no fortresses,
a retreat into the interior of the country
although the time gained by it as com may procure by degrees for the defender
Uene
bele e gained in the first, may
pared with that
be very, littl , or none at all if the that necessary equilibrium or that su
s alum enemy'sattack actu ally takes place, still, periority which was wanting to him on
le
the batt h
whic first case was
in the tier for every forward movement
the fron ;
really certain , is in the second much less cer- in the strategic attack lessens its force,
tain, perhaps the enemy may notbe able partly absolutely, partly through the se
to make e up his mind to attack ; the paration of forces which becomes neces
F de advantag of the " waiting for,” is then sary, of which we shall say more under
the head of the 6 Attack ." We antici
at once greater.
3. Bythe army in such position not patethistruthhere as we consider itas
de fin g
only awaitin the decision of the enemy a fact sufficiently exemplified in all wars.
to fight a battle, that is his appearance Now in this fourth case the gain of
the dr > in front of the position , but alsowaiting timeis to belooked upon as the principal
efence ( in orderitzto keep point ofall. If
to be actually assaulted Bunzelw the assailant lays siege
to the same general, ). In to our fortresses, we have time till their
orda such case, wefighta regulardefensive probablefall,(which maybesome weeks
but if the
battle, which however, as wehave before or in some cases months);
rmine said, may include offensive movements weakening, that is the expenditure, of
objar with one or more parts of the army. the force of the attack is caused by the
Here also, as before, the gain of time advance, and the garrisoning or occupa
does not come into consideration, but tion of certain points, therefore merely
rable the determination of the enemy is put through the length of theassailants
atin
toa new proof; many a one has ad- march ,then the time gained in most
es er n
only vanced to the attack, and at the last cases becom great , and our actio is
fthe mome nt, or afterone attempt given it not somuchrestricted inpoint of time.
88 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
Besides the altered relations between that the most passive defence would
offensive and defensive in regard to therefore be the best. The action of
power which is brought about at the resistance is not weakened at each new
end of this march, we must bring into
account in favour of the defensive an stage, it is only delayed, postponed. But
the assertion that a stouter resistance
increased amount of the advantage of the can be offered in a strong judiciously
state of "
waiting
assailant by for.” Although
this advance the entrenched position, and also that when
may not in the enemy has exhausted his strength
reality be weakened to such a degree in fruitless efforts against such a posi
that he is unfit to attack our main tion a more effective counterstroke may
body where he halts, still he will pro- be levelled at him , is surely not unrea
bably want resolution to do so, for that sonable. Without the advantage of
is an act requiring moreresolutionin the position Daun would not have gained
position in which he is now placed, than the victory at Kollin , and as Frede
would have sufficed when operationshad rick the Great only brought off 18,000
not extended beyond the frontier : partly, men from , the field of battle, if Daun
because the powers are weakened , and had pursuedhimwith more energy the
no longer in fresh vigour,while the victory might have been one of the most
danger is increased ; partly, because with brilliant in military history.
an irresolute commander the possession We therefore maintain, that at each
of that portion of the country which has new stage of the defensive the prepon
been obtained isoftensufficient todo derance , or more correctly speaking, the
away with all idea of a battle,because counterpoise increases in favour of the
he either really believes or assumes as a
pretext, that it is no longer necessary. defensive, and consequently there is also
a gain in power for the counterstroke.
By the offensive thusdeclining to attack , Now are these advantages of the in
the defensive certainly does not acquire, creasin g force of the defensive to be had
as he would on the frontier, a sufficient for nothing ? By no means, for the
result of a negative kind, but still there sacrifice with which they are purchased
is a great gain of time.
It is plain that, in all the four methods increases
If we waitin the same proportion.
for the enemy within our
indicated, the defensive has the benefit of own theatre of war, however near the
the ground or country, and likewise that
he can by that means bring into co border of our territory the decision takes
place, still this theatre of war is entered
operationhisfortressesandthe
moreover
people; by the enemy,which mustentaila sacri
efficient principles
these in fice on our part; whereas, had we made
crease at each fresh stage of the de
fence , for they are a chief means of the attack
fallen , thisenemy.
on the disadvantage not have
would
If we do pro
bringing about the weakening of the ceed at once to meet the enemy and at
enemy's force in the fourth stage .
Now as the advantages of the “ state tack him , our loss will be the greater,
of expectation ” increase in the same and the extent of the country which the
enemy will overrunto
, asreach
well our
as the
direction , therefore itfollowsof itself which he requires time,
position
that these stages are to be regarded as a
continually increase . If we wish to
real intensifying of the defence , and that will
givebattleon the defensive , and we
this form ofwar always gains in strength
the more it differs from the offensive. therefore leave its determination and the
time
choice of he
We arenotafraidonthis account of any perhaps mayforremainfor some then
it to theenemy, time
one accusing us of holding the opinion
in occupation of the territory which he
 BET CHAP . VIII .
1.] METHODS OF RESISTANCE . 89

has taken, and the time which through Therefore in the first three stages of
e actiu de his deferred decision we are allowed to the defensive, that is, if it takes place on
each w gain will in that manner be paid for by the frontier, the non - decision is already a
ored. Be us. The sacrifices which must be made result in favour of the defensive.
become still more burdensome if a re- But it is not so with the fourth .
resister
judiwa treat into the heart of the country takes If the enemy lays siege to our for
that yla place. tresses we must relieve them in time ,
s strengti But all these sacrifices on the part of to do this we must therefore bring about
Eh a man the defensive, at most only occasion him the decision by positive action.
in general a loss of power which merely This is likewise the case if the enemy
troke
not and diminishes his military force indirectly, followsus into the interior of the country
lage de therefore, at a later period, and not without besieging any of our places.
e gained directly, and often so indirectly that its Certainly in this case we have moretime;
s Free effect is hardly felt at all. The de- we can wait until the enemy's weakness
fensive, therefore, strengthens himself is extreme, but still it is always an in
for the present moment at the ex- dispensable condition that we are at last
engs die pense of the future, that is to say, he to act. The enemy is now, perhaps, in
the ma borrows, as overy one must who is too possession of the whole territory which
poor for the circumstances hich he is was the object of his aggression, but it
at si placed. is only lent to him ; the tension continues,
Now , if we would examine the result and the decision is yet pending. As
prepon of these different forms of resistance , we long as the defensive is gaining strength
must look to the object of the
This is, to obtain possession ofaggression. and theaggressor
of the our thea- the postponementdaily becoming weaker,
of the decision is in
is aki
ੇa
tre ofwar,or, at least, of an important the interest of the former : but as soon
Toke part of it, for under the conception of as the culminating point of this progres
the it
beheard the whole, at least the greater part must sive advantage has arrived, as itatemust
stood, as the possession tof a do, were it only by the ultim in.
or the
chased
stripunder
be of territory a few miles in exten is, fluence of the general loss to which the
as a rule, of no real conse quence
in stra offensive has exposed himself, it is time
tegy. As long, therefore, as the aggres for the defender to proceed to action, and
0

ar the
sor is not inpossession of this,that is, bring on a solution, and the advantage
as long as from fear of our force he has of the " waiting for may be considered
tale
utend eithernot yet advanced to the attack of as completely exhausted .
the theatre of war, or has not sought to There can naturally be no point of
made
find us in our position, or has declined time fixed generally at which this hap
the combat weled determined by a multitude
offer, the objects of the pens, for it isces
hare defence is fulfil , and the effect of the of circumstan and relations; but it may
PN measures taken for the defensive have be observed that the winter is usually
adat therefore been successful. At the same a natural turning point. If we cannot
eata
h the time this result is only a negative one, prevent the enemy from wintering in the
time
which certainly cannot directlygive the territory which he has seized, then, asa
force for a real counterstroke. But it rule, it must be looked upon asgiven up;
may give it indirectly, that is to say, it is We have only, however, to call to mind
sh to on the way to do so ; for the timewhich TorresVedras,to see that this is no gene
792
Utbe elapses the aggression loses, and every ralWhat rule .
is now the solution generally ?
then
lossof time is a disadvantage, and must
weakesn in some way the party who We have always supposed it in our
inie suffer the loss. observations in the form of a battle ;
be
90 ON WAR . 1
[ BOOK VI.
but in reality, this is not necessary, for of the defensive has not co-operated ;
a number of combinations of battleswith but, for the practical view, it is impor
separate corps may be imagined, which tant to distinguish which of the two
may bring about a change of affairs, principles is the predominating one.
either because they have really ended In this sense we think we may say
with bloodshed , or because their pro- that there is a double solution in the
bable resultmakes theretreatofthe defensive , consequently a doublekind of
enemy necessary .
Upon the theatre of war itself there reaction,byaccording
ruined as the
the sword of aggressor
thedefensive, is
or by
can be no other solution ; that is a neces- his own efforts.
sary consequence of our view of war ; That the first kind of solution predo
for, in fact, even if an enemy's army, minates in the first three steps of the
merely from want of provisions , com
defence, the second in the fourth , is evi
mences his retreat, still it takes place dent initself ; and the latter will,in most
restraint in which our
from thestate of
sword holds him ; if our armywas not cases,
being only come to pass by the retreat
carrieddeep into the heart of the
the way
invision hewould soon beabletopro- country, and nothing butthe prospect of
his forces.
Therefore, even at the end of his that result
such can be considering
a retreat, a sufficient motive for
the great
aggressive course , when the enemy is sacrifices which it must cost.
suffering the heavy penalty of his attack ,
We are have,twotherefore,
whendetachments, hunger, andsickness there ascertainedofde
different principles that
have weakened and worn him out, it is fence ; there are cases in military history
always
still dread
the of our sword which where they each appear as separate and
causes him to turn about, and allow
distinctasitis possible
everything to go on again as usual. concept for practica
an elementary
But nevertheless, there is a great dif- When ion to appea
Frederick the rin
Great attacked llife.
the
ference between such a solution and one Austrians at Hohenfriedberg, just as
which takes place on the frontier .
In the latter case our arms only were they were descending from the Silesian
opposed to his to keep him in check , or mountains, their force could not have
carry destruction into
the end
his ranks; but at been
aggressive career the
weakened orf
by detachments in any sensible
atigue ; when,manner
on the
of the
enemy's forces, by their own exertions, other hand, Wellington, in his entrenched
are half destroyed, by which our arms camp atTorres Vedras, waited till hunger,
acquire a totally different value, and and the severity of the weather , had re
therefore, although they are the final mities Massena'scommenced
duced thatthey army to toretreatof
such extre
they are nottheonly meanswhich have themselves, the swordofthedefensive
produced thesolution .This destruction partyhad no sharein the weakening of
of the enemy's forces in the advance pre
pares the solution, and may do so to this the enemy's army. In other cases, in
extent, that the mere possibility of a which they are combined with each other
reaction on our part may cause the re in a variety of ways, still,one of them
treat, consequently a reversal of the distinctly predominates.This was the
situation of affairs . In this case, there . case in the year 1812. In that celebrated
fore, we can practically ascribe the solu campaign such a number of bloody en
tion to nothing else than the efforts made counters took place as might, under other
complete decision
circumstances, bythe
have sufficed for; nevern
sword
in the advance. Now ,inpoint of fact theless, thereis hardly anycampaign in a most
we shall find no case in which the sword
 CHAP. VII .] METHODS OF RESISTANCE. 91

M-opera which we can so plainly see how the ag- only to be regarded as a closer applica
gressor may be ruined by his own efforts. tion of it to locality and circumstances.
of the Ofthe 300,000 men composing the French That order of ideas has been deduced
zing de centre only about 90,000 reached Moscow ; from the conception of the defensive, and
not more than 13,000 were detached ; from its relation to the offensive ; we
ution in s consequently there had been a loss of have connected these simple ideas with
uble bili 197,000 men, and certainly not a third reality, and therefore shown the way by
AZ TEST of that loss can be put to account of which we may return again from the
fenere, car
battles . reality to those simple ideas, and obtain
All campaigns which are remarkable firm ground, and not be forced in reason
tion prü for temporising, as it is called, like those ing to take refuge on points of support
of the famous Fabius Cunctat , haveor which themsel ves air.
vanish in the
steps of3
irth, 2 been calculated chiefly on the destruction But resistance by the sword may wear
Fil,l in of the enemy by his own efforts. This such an altered appearance, assume such
the retre principle has been the leading one in a different character, through the multi
eart di many campaigns without that point being plicity ofways of combining battles, es
propere ti almost ever mention ed ; and it is only pecially in cases where these are not
motr hit when we disregard the specious reason- actually realised, but become effectual
the gas ing of historians, and look at things merelythrough their possibility, that we
clearly with our own eyes, that we might incline to the opinion that there
ained the are led to this real cause of many a must be some other efficient active prin
des det
solution . ciple still to be discovered ; between the
tory By this we believe we have unravelled sanguinary defeat in a simple battle,and
ayhis
arate is
sufficiently those ideas which lie at the
the effectsof strategic combinations which
enestay
root of the defensive, and that in the two
do not bring the thing nearly so far as
great kinds of defence we have shown actual combat, there seems such a differ
tical plainly and made intellig ible how the ence, that it is necessary to suppose some
ckedthe
just a principl e the waiting
the wholeofsystem for runsthroug
and connect
h fresh
s itself with force, something in thesame way as
astronomers have decided on the existence
Silexia
of here positive action in such a manner that, of other planets from the great space
sooner or later, action does take place between Mars and Jupiter.
If the assailant finds the defender in a
and that then the advantage of the
encha! attitude of waiting for appears to be strong position which he thinks he can
exhausted . not take, or behind a large river which
ungen he thinks he cannot cross, or even if he
tad We think, now, that in this way we
EDE have gone over and brought into view fearsthatby advancingfurther he will
eated 1 not be abletosubsist his army, inall
everything comprised in the province of these
the defensive. “At the sametime, there cases it is nothing but the sword of
easite are subjects of sufficient importance in the defensive which produces the effect ;
ing นี้
themselves toform separate chapters, for itis the fear of being conquered by
that is, points for consideration in them- this sword, either in a great battle or at
other
selves, and these we must also study ; some specially important points, which
s the forexample, the nature and influenceof compe lsthe aggressor tostop, only he will
ala fortified places, entrenched camps, de either not admit that at all, or does not
fenceof
against mountai andrivers,operations
the flank, Nowiteven
ns etc., etc. ' We shall admit in a ifstraightforwar d that, where
it is granted way.
ther
mas
treat of them in subsequent chapters, but there has been adecisionwithout blood
none of these things lieoutside of the shed, the combat merely offered, but not
1
preceding sequence of ideas; they are accepted, has been the ultimate cause of
7‫ܐ‬
92 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
the decision, it will still be thought that gic combination rests only upon the
in such cases the really effectual principle tactical results, andthat these are every
is the strategic combination of these com- where, in the bloody as well as in the
bats and not their tactical decision, and bloodless solution, the real fundamental
that this superiority of the strategic com- grounds of the ultimate decision. It is
bination could only have been thought of only if we have no reason to fear that
because there are other defensive means decision, whether on account of the cha
which may be considered besides an racter or the situation of the enemy, or on
actual appeal to the sword. We admit account of the moral and physical equa
this, and it brings us just to the point lity of the two armies, or on account ofour
we wished to arrive at, which is as own superiority — it is only then that we
follows : if the tactical result of a battle can expect something from strategic com
must be the foundation of all strategic binations in themselves without battles.
combinations, then it is always possible Now if a great many campaigns are to
and to be feared that the assailant may be found within the compass of military
lay holdof this principle, and above all history in which the assailant gives up
things direct hisefforts to be superior in the offensive without any blood being
the hour of decision, in order to Waffle the spilt in fight, in which, therefore, stra
strategic combination ; and that there. tegic combinations show themselves effec
fore this strategic combination can never tual to that degree, this may lead to the
be regarded as something all-sufficient in idea that these combinations have at
itself; that it only has a value when either least great inherent force in themselves,
on one ground or another we can look and might in general decide the affair
forward to the tactical solution without alone, where too great a preponderance
any misgivings. In order to make our . in the tactical results is not supposed on
selves intelligible in a few words, we the side of the aggressor. To this we
shall merely call to our readers' recol. answer that, if the question is about
lection how such a general asBuona. things which have their origin in the
parte marched withouthesitation through theatre ofwar, and consequently belong
thewhole web of hisopponents'strategic to thewar itself,this idea isalso equally
plans, to seek for the battle itself, be- false; and we add that the cause of the
cause he had no doubts as to its issue. failure of most attacks is to be found in
Where, therefore, strategy had not thehigher, the political relations of war.
directed its whole effort to ensure a pre The general relations out of which a
ponderance over him in this battle, where war springs, and which naturally con
stitute its foundation , determine also its
it engaged in finer (feebler) plans, there
it wasrentasunder like a cobweb. But character ;onthissubject we shall have
a general like Daun might be checked by
more to say hereafter, in treating of
such measures ; it would therefore be theplan of a war . Butthese generalre
folly to offer Buonaparte andhisarmy lations have converted most wars into
what the Prussian army
of the Seven
Years'War dared to offer Daun and his hostility -half
half-and things, itswaythrough
hastoforce into which real
contemporaries. Why ? Because Buona
such a conflict of interests, that it is
parte knew rightwellthatalldepended onlya veryweak elementat the last:
t
on the acticalissue
,andmade certainof This effect"mustnaturally showitself
gaining it ; whereas with Daun it was chiefly and with most force on the side
very different in both respects.
On this account we hold it therefore to of the offensive, the side ofpositive action.
be serviceable to show that every strate . One cannot therefore wonder if such
a short-winded, consumptive attack is
CHAP . VIII . METHODS OF RESISTANCE. 93
.. ]
brought to a standstill by the touch of now speak of a case where an aggressor
a finger. Against a weak resolution so does not proceed with his attack because
fettered by a thousand considerations, he can make no use of a victory, because
that it has hardly any existence, a mere at the end of his first bound he has not
show of resistance is often enough . enough impulsive force left to begin an
It is not the number of unassailable other. Such a case supposes an attack
positions directions, not the formid- which has been successful, a real con
able look of the dark mountain masses quest ; but we have here in view the
encamped round the theatre of war, or case where an assailant sticks fast half
the broad river which passes through it, way to his intended conquest.
not the ease with which certain combi- He is now waiting to take advantage of
nations of battles can effectually para favourable circumstances, of which favour
lyse the muscle which should strike the able circumstances there is in general no
blow against us - noneof thesethings prospect,forthe that
aggression now intended
there is no better
are the true causes of the numerous suc at once
shows

e, a from the
cesses which thedefensi
less fields ; the
ve
cause lies ingains
the weaknes presentt; from
on blood-s prospec it is, future than
the therefor further
of the will with which the assailant puts illusion. If now , as is commonly the
forward his hesitating feet . case, the undertaking is in connection
These counter acting influenc es may with other simultaneous operations, then
and ought to be taken into consideration, what they do not want to do themselves
but they should only be looked uponin
their true light, and
is transferred to other shoulders, and
their effects should their own inactivity is ascribed to want
not be ascribed to otherthings, namely surmoun
of support and proper co -operation . In
table obstacles are talked of, and
the things of which alone we are now
treating . We must not omit to point out motives in justification are discovered in
in an emphatic manner how easily military the most confused and subtil considera
bistory in thisrespect may become a per tions. Thus the forces of the assailant
petual liar and deceiver if criticism is not åre wasted away in inactivity , or rather in
careful abouttaking a correctpoint ofview . a partial activity, destitute of any utility.
Let us now consider, in what we may The defensive gains time, the greatest
call their ordinary form ,have
sive campaigns which the many offen- gain to him ; badendsweather
miscarried the aggression arrives, and
by the return of
without a bloody solution . the aggressor to winter quarters in his
The assailant advances into the own theatre of war.
enemy's country, drives back his op- A tissue of false representations thus
ponent a little way, but finds it too passes into historyin place of the simple
serious a matter to bring on a decisive real ground of absence of any result,
battle. Hethereforeremains standing namely fear of theenemy's sword . When
opposite to him ; acts as if he had made criticism takes up such a campaign, it
a conquest, and had nothing else to do wearies itself in the discussion ofa number
but it ; as if it wastheenemy's ofmotives and counter-motives,which
to protect
business toseekthebattle ,as if he give nosatisfactory result, becausethey all
offered it to him daily, etc., etc. These dwindle into vapour, and we have not des
are the representations with which the cended to the real foundation of the truth .
commander deludes his army,his govern The opposition through which the elemen
ment, the world, even himself. But the tary energy of war, and therefore of the
truth is, that he finds the enemy in a offensive in particular, becomes weakened ,
position too strong for him . We do not lies for the most part in the relations and
 94 ON WAR. 2
BOOK VI.

views of states, and these are always con- no more, that there might be no unnecés
cealed from the world , from the mass of sary waste of his force. But we must
the people belonging to the state, as well not overlook the circumstance that the
as from the army, and very often from room given for choice amongst these
the general-in - chief. No one will account different forms is generally very circum
for his faint-heartedness by the admis- scribed, because other circumstances
sion that he feared he could not attain which must be attended to necesarily
the desired object with the force at his urge a preference for one or other of
disposal, or that new enemies would be them . For a retreat into the interior of
roused, or that he did not wish to make the country a considerable superficial
his allies too powerful, etc. Such things space is required, or such a condition of
are hushed up ; but as occurrences have things as existed in Portugal ( 1810),
to be placed before the world in a pre- where one ally (England) gave support
sentable form , therefore the commander in rear, and another (Spain ) with its
is obliged, either on his own account or on wide territory, considerably diminished
that of his government to pass off a tissue theimpulsive force of the enemy. The
of fictitious motives . This ever - recur
ring deception in military dialectics has position orofmore
frontier the infortresses moremayon like
the interior the
ossified into systems in theory,which ,of wise decide for or against such a plan ;
course, are equally devoid of truth . but still more the nature of the country
Theory can never be deduced from the and ground, the character, habits, and
essenceof things except by following the feelings of the inhabitants . The choice
simple thread cause and effect
of , as we between an offensive or defensive battle
have tried to do.
If we look at military history with this may be decided by the plans of the
feeling of suspicion , then a great parade enemy, by the peculiar qualities of both
of mere words about offensive and de. armies and their generals ; lastly, the
possession
fensive collapses, and thesimple ideaof of defence, oforanthewantofthem
excellentpositionmay
or line
de
it, which we have given , comes forward termine for one or the other ; -in short,
of itself. We believe it therefore to be at the bare mention of these things, we
applicable to the whole domain of the can perceive that the choice of the form
defensive, and that we must adhere of defensive must in many cases be de
closely to it in order to obtain that clear termined more by them than by themere
view of the mass of events by which
alone we can form correct judgments. relative strength of the armies . As we
We have still to inquire into the ques .shall hereafter enter more into detail on
the more important subjects
tion of the employment ofthese different justbeentouched upon, the which have
influence
forms of defence .
As they are merely gradations of the which they must have upon the choice
same which must be purchased by a will then develop itself more distinctly,
in the
and in
highersacrifice, corresponding to the in- isedCampaigns.
of be
Planswill
Booktheonwhole
the end method
Wars and
creased intensity of the form , there would
seem to be sufficient in that view to in
dicate always to the general which he But thisinfluence will not, in general,
should choose , provided there are no
bedecisive unlessthe inequality in the
other circumstances which interfere. He strengthofthe opposing armiesis trifling;
would, in fact, choose that form which in the oppositecase( as inthe generality
appeared sufficient togivehis force the of cases),will
strength theberelation
decisiveof the numerical
. There isample
requisite degreeof defensive power and proof,in militaryhistory ,that it has
 CHAP . IX.] DEFENSIVE BATTLE. 95

Etbeno us done so heretofore, and that without the turn himself hither and thither as if he
But es chain of reasoning by which it has been had been pent up in a cage, instead of
ustanee thei brought out here ; therefore in a manner rushingforward recklessly upon someone
intuitively by mere tact of judgment, like of his adversaries ? And in October of the
amoogt á
Hly verset most things that happen in war. It was sameyear, whenthe disproportion reached
CITR ON the same general who at the head of the its climax, have we not seen him at
same army, and on the same theatre of Leipsic, seeking shelter in the angle
war, fought thebattle of Hohenfriedberg , formed by the Parth , the Elster, and
the interiri the camp of Pleiss, as it were
and at another time took upFrederick waiting for his enemy
Bunzelwitz . Therefore even the in the corner of a room , with his back
ble superior
a condizet Great, a general above all inclined to the against the wall ?
offensive as regards the battle, saw him- We cannot omit to observe, that from
tugal (1953 self compelledat last, by a great dispro- this chapter, more than from any other in
gare capaz our book, it is plainly shown that our ob
portion offorce, to resort to a real defensive
position ; and Buonaparte,who was once ject is not to lay down new principles and
nemp. 1 in the habit of falling on his enemy like methods of conducting war, but merely
a wild boar, have we not seen him, when to investigate what has long existed in
zlore
the proportion of force turned against its innermost relations, and to reduce it
or map
him , in August and September, 1813, to its simplest elements.
the court
habit, da
The chos
site laz
ns of the
s old CHAPTER IX .
astl,y the
ion artis
7maré ,
DEFENSIVE BATTLE .
inge,
the fico
bet We have said, in the preceding chapter, deviating always more from the principle
that the defender, in his defensive, would of a positive counterstroke, and passing
the met
makeuse of a battle,technicallyspeak- into that ofthe defence of a spot of ground.
ing, of a purely offensive character, if, We cannot here enter on the subject of
etail a at the moment the enemyinvades his how far this should be carried, andwhich
ch har theatre of war, he marches against him is the most advantageous proportion of
pleng8 and attacks him ; but that he might also the two elements of offensive and defen
wait for the appearance of the enemyin sive, as regards the winning a decisive
tinett his front, and then pass over to the victory. But we maintain that when such
ethe attack ; in which case also the battle a result is desired, the offensive part of
V and tactically would be again an offensive the battle should never be completely
battle, although ina modified form ; and omitted , and we are convinced that all
ers!
n the
lastly, that he might wait till the enemy the effects of a decisive victory may and
attacked his position, and then oppose must be produced by this offensive part,
Hipe ! him bothby holding aparticularspot, justaswellasinapurelytactical offen
ulit
ria and by offensive action with portionsof siveInbattle.
the same manner as the field of
mpki
his force. In all this we may imagine
has
several different gradations and shades, battle is only a pointin strategy, the
96 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
duration of a battle is only, strategically, gradually concentrated within narrower
an instant of time, and the end and re- limits. The defender therefore casts a
sult, not the course of a battle, constitutes contented look at the battle as it burns
a strategic quantity. in a moderate blaze before him ;-but
Now,if it is true that a complete victory he does not reckon that his resistance in
may result from the offensive elements front can last for ever ;—he does not think
which lie in every defensive battle, then his flanks impregnable ;—he does not ex
there would be no fundamentaldifference pectthat the whole course of the battle
between an offensive and a defensive battle, will be changed by the successful charge
as far as regards strategic combinations ; of a few battalions or squadrons. His
we areindeed convinced that this isso,but position is deep,for each part in the
the thing wears a different appearance. scale of gradation of the orderof battle,
In order to fix thesubject more distinctly from the division down to the battalion,
in the eye, to make our view clear and has its reserve for unforeseen events, and
thereby remove the appearance now re- for a renewal of the fight; and at the
ferred to, we shall sketch, hastily, the same time an important mass, one fifth
picture of a defensive battle, such as we to a quarter of the whole, is kept quite
imagine it.
The defensive waits the attack in a in as the
to berear out out
quite of the battle,
of fire, far back
andsoif possible
position ; for this he has selected proper so far as to be beyond the circuitous line
ground, and turned it to the best account, by which the enemy might attempt to
that is, he has made himself well ac- turn either flank . Withthis corps he
quainted with the locality, thrown up intends to cover his flanks from wider
strong entrenchments at some of the and greater turning movements, secure
most important points, opened and le- himself against unforeseen events, and
velled communications, constructed bat- in the latter stage of the battle, when
teries, fortified villages, and looked out the assailant's plan is fully developed,
places where he can draw up his masses
when the most of his troops have been
under cover, etc.,etc.,etc.Whilst the broughtinto action,he will throw this
forces on both sides are consuming each
mass on a part of the enemy's army, and
other at the differentpointswhere they open at that part of thefield a smaller
come into contact, the advantage of a offensive battle on his own part, using
front more or less strong, the approach
to which is made difficult by one or more all the elements of attack , such as
parallel trenches or other obstacles, or also charges, surprise, turning movements,
by the influence of some strong command and by meansof this pressure against
ingpoints, enables him withasmallpart the
onlycentre of gravity
restingona ofmake
point, the battle, now
the whole
force destroy great numbers
of his to of the recoil.
enemy at every stage of the defence up to This is the normal idea which we have
the heart of the position. The points of formed of a defensivebattle, based on
supportwhichhehas given his wings thetactics of the present day. In this
secure him from any sudden attack from
several hequarters battle
made bythetheassailant
general turning movement
in orderto assist
which has chosen for his ground
; the covered masses
makes the enemy cautious , indeed timid , his attack, and at the same time with a
and affords the defensivethe means of view
complete ,is replied
to make the results
to by of partialturn
a victory more
diminishing by partial and successful ingmovement on the
attacks the general backward movement partofthe defen:
which goes on as the combat becomes sive, that is,by the turning of that part
of the assailant's force used by him in
 CHAP. ix . ] DEFENSIVE BATTLE. 97

Ithin namin the attempt to turn. This partial move- apply much further . But what will take
refore fast! ment may be supposed suficient to de. place, on the other hand, if the defender is
stroy the effect of the enemy's attempt, victorious ? A division of the defeated
re him -: 1 but it cannot lead to a like general force. This may facilitate the retreat at
$ res 21 enveloping of the assailant's army; and the first moment, but next day a concen
doesnotis there will always be a distinction in the tration of all parts is the one thing most
edoesma features of a victory on this account, that needful. Now if the victory is a most
the side fighting an offensive battle decisive one, if the defender pursues with
essful de encircles the enemy's army, and acts to great energy, this concentration will often
adrons wards the centre of the same, while become impossible, and from this separa
part is the side fighting on the defensive acts tion of the beaten force the worst conse
der dhe more or less from the centre to the quences may follow, which may go on
he batteri circumference, in the direction of the step by step to a complete rout. If
7 FENE ER radii , Buonaparte had conquered at Leipsic,
and a b On the field of battle itself, and in the the allied army would have been com
first stages of the pursuit, the enveloping pletely cut in two, which would have
kept! form must always be considered the most considerably lowered their relative stra
80farhet effectual; we do not mean on account of tegic position. At Dresden, although
Hif peces itsform only to such
uitousles event of generally,we
its being carried outmean inthe Buonaparte
an gular certainly did not fight a re
defensive battle, the attack had the
attempt to extreme as to limit very much the enemy's geometrical form of which we have been
$ corps means of retreat during the battle. But speaking, that is, from the centre to the
it is just against this extreme point that circumference ; the embarrassment of the
the enemy's positive counter-effort is di- Allies in consequence of their separation,
ene a rected, and in many cases where this is well known, an embarrassment from
tl,e che effort is not sufficient to obtain a victory, which they were only relieved by the
eveloped it will at least suffice to protect him from victory on the Katzbach, the tidings of
bare beti such an extreme as we allude to. But which caused Buonaparte to return to
hmor this with the Guard.
arms, and namely, ofalways
wemust having thethat
admit retreat Dresden
linethisof danger, This battle on the Katzbach itself is
ed
seriously contract , is particul arly great a similar example. In it the defender,
rt, using in defensive battles, and if it cannot be at the last moment passes over to the
such a guarded against,the results in the battle offensive, and consequently operates on
itself, and in the first stage of the retreat diverging lines; the French corps were
regres are thereby very much enhanced in fa- thus wedged asunder, and several days
ttle or vour of the enemy . after, as the fruits of the victory, Puthod's
But as a rule this danger does not division fell into the hands of the Allies.
extend beyond the first stage of the re The conclusion we draw from this is,
reher treat, that is, until night - fall; on the that if the assailant, by the concentric
following day enveloping is at an end, form which is homogeneous to him , has
In this andboth
in
parties areagain on
this respect.
the means
an equality victor of giving expansionto his
y, on the otherhand the defender
Certainlythe defender may have lost also, bythe divergent form which is
his principalline of retreat, andtherefore homogeneous to the defence ,acquires a
a means of giving greater results to his
be placed in a disadvantageous strategic victory
situation for the future ; but in most cases than would be the case by a
deter
the turning movement itself willbe at an merely parallel position and perpendicu
atpart end,because it was only planned to suit lar attack, and we think that one means
the field of battle, andtherefore cannot is at least as good as the other.
VOL. II.
 1
98 OV VAR . [BOOK vi.
If in military history we rarely find has often been assumed to be the con.
such great victories resulting from the sequence of that part which every de
defensive battle as from the offensive, fender has to play: and thus in an
that proves nothing against our assertion absurd manner it has become a prevalent
that the one well suited produce
is as to view of the defensive that its battles
victory as the other ; the real cause is in should really be confined to warding off
the very different relations of the defender. the attacks of the enemy, and not direc
The army acting on the defensive is gene- ted to the destruction of the enemy. We
rally the weaker of the two, not only in hold this to be a prejudicial error, a re
the amount of his forces , but also in every gular substitution of the form for the
other respect ; he either is, or thinks he is, thing itself ; and we maintain unreser
not in a condition to follow up his victory vedly that in the form of war which we
with great results, and contents himself call defence, the victory may not only be
with merely fending off the danger and more probable , but may also attain the
saving the honour of his arms. That the same magnitude and efficacy as in the
defender by inferiority of force and other attack, and that this may be the case
circumstances may be tied down to that not only in the total result of all the com
degree we do not dispute, but there is bats which constitute a campaign, but also
no doubt that this, which is only the in any particular battle, if the necessary
consequence of a contingent necessity , degree of force and energy is not wanting.

CHAPTER X.

FORTRESSES .

FORMERLY, and up to the time of great and contributed essentially to the con
standing armies, fortresses, that is castles quest or occupation of the country, to the
and fortified towns , were only built for the successful or unsuccessful issue of the
defence and protection of the inhabitants. whole contest, and in this manner they
The baron , if he saw himself pressed on
all sides, took refuge in his castle to gain even became a means of making war
time and wait a more favourable moment ; more of a connected whole. Thus for
and towns sought by their walls to keep tresses acquired that strategic signifi
off the passing hurricane of war . This cance which for a time was regarded as
simplest and most natural object of for so important that it dictated the leading
tresses did not continue to be the only features oftheplans of campaigns,which
one ; the relation which such a place were more directed to the taking of one
acquired with regard to the whole coun or more fortresses than the destruction
try and to troops acting here and there of the enemy's army in the field . Men
in the country soon gave these fortified reverted to the cause of the importance
points a wider inportance, a signification of these places, that isto the connection
between a fortified point, and thecountry:
which made itselffeltbeyond theirwalls, andthe armies;andthen thought that
 mo CHAP. x. ] * FORTRESSES. 99

they could not be sufficiently particular Such has been the course of ideas, not
or toophilosophical in choosingthe points only in books but also in actual experi
hos to be fortified. In these abstract objects ence, at the same time, as usually hap
the original one was almost lost sight of, pens, it has been much more spun out in
and at length they came to the idea of books.
fortresses without either towns or in- Natural as was this tendency of things,
Ice habitants. still these ideas were carried out to an
On the other hand, the times are extreme, and mere crotchets and fancies
past in which the mere enclosure of a displaced the sound core of a natural and
place with walls , without any military urgent want. We shall look into these
preparations, could keep a place dry simple and important wants when we
during an inundation of war sweeping enumerate the objects and conditions of
over the whole country. Such a possi- fortresses all together ; we shall thereby
bility rested partly on the division of na- advance from the simple to the more com
tions formerly into small states, partly plicated, and in the succeeding chapter
on the periodical character of the incur- we shall see what is to be deduced
sious then in vogue, which had fixed therefrom as to the determination of the
and very limited duration , almost in position and number of fortresses.
accordance with the seasons, as either the The efficacy of a fortress is plainly
feudal forces hastened home, or the pay composed of two different elements, theit
for the condottieri used regularly to run passive and the active. By the first
short. Since large standing armies, with shelters the place, and all that it con
powerful trains of artillery mow down the tains ; by the other it possesses a certain
opposition of walls or ramparts as it influence over the adjacent country, even
were with a machine, neither town nor beyond the range of its guns .
This active element consists in the
other small corporation has any longer an
inclination to hazard all their meansonly attacks which the garrison may under
to be taken a few weeks or months later, take upon every enemy who approaches
and then to be treated so much the worse . within a certain distance. The larger
Still less can it be the interest of an the garrison , SO much the stronger
army to break itself up into garrisons for numerically will be the detachments that
a number of strong places, which may for may be employed on such expeditions ,
Giu' a time retard the progress of the enemy , and the stronger such detachments the
but must in the end submit . We must al- wider as a rule will be the range of their
ways keep enough forces,overandabove operations ; from which it follows that
those garrison, to make us sequal the the sphere of the active influence of a
enemyinin the openfield, we canto de-
?

unles great fortress is not only greåter in in

y but also more extensive than that
pend on the arrival of an ally, who will re tensit
of a small one. But the active element
lieve our strong place
free. Consequently thesnumber
and setofour army itself is again, to a certain extent, of two
fortress-
es bas necessarily much diminished, and kinds, consisting namely of enterprises
this has again led to the abandonment of of the garrison proper, and of enter
theidea ofdirectly protecting the popu- priseswhich other bodies of troops,great
lation and property in towns by fortifi- and small, not belonging to the garrison
cations, and promoted the other ideaof but in co-operation withnce,
it, may be able
sit
to carry out. For insta corps which
regarding the fortresses as an indirect pro independently would be tooweak to face
tection to the country , which they secure the enemy , may, through the shelter
hy their strategic importance as knots which , in case ofnecessity, the walls of a
which hold together the strategic web.
100 ON ’AR. [BOOK VI. 1

fortress afford them , be able to maintain state that a fortress may be intended to
themselves in the country, and to a cer- answer several of these purposes, perhaps
tain extent to command it. all of them , either at once, or at least at
The enterprises which the garrison of different stages of the war.
a fortress can venture to undertake are We say, therefore, that fortresses are
always somewhat restricted. Even in great and most important supports of the
the case of large places and strong gar- defensive.
risons, the bodies of troops which can 1. As secure depots of stores of all kinds.
be employed on such operations are The assailant during his aggression sub
mostly inconsiderable as compared with sists his army from day to day; the de
the forces in the field, and their average fensive usually must have made prepara
sphere of action seldom exceeds a couple tions long beforehand, he need not there
of days' marches. If the fortress is fore draw provisions exclusively from the
small, the detachments it can send out district he occupies, and which he no
are quite insignificant and the range of doubt desires to spare. Storehouses
ly
their activity will general be confine are therefore for him a great necessity.
d
to the nearest villages. But corps which The provisions of all kinds which the
do not belong to the garrison , and there aggressor possesses are in his rear as
fore are not under the necessity of re he advances, and are therefore ex
turning to the place, are thereby much empt from the dangers of the theatre
more at liberty in their movements, and of war, while those of the defensive are
by their means, if other circumstances are exposed to them . If these provisions of
favourable, the external zone of action of all kinds are not in fortified places, then a
a fortress may be immensely extended . most injurious effect on theoperations in
Therefore if we speak of the active in the field is the consequence, and the most
fluence of fortresses in general terms, we
extendednecessary
must always keep this feature ofthe become and compulsory
in ordertopositions often
cover depots
same principally in view . or sources of supply.
But even the smallest active element An army on the defensive without for
of the weakest garrison, is still essential tresses has a hundred vulnerable spots ;
for the different objects which fortresses it is a body without armour.
are destined to fulfil, for strictly speaking
even the most passive of all the func 2. As a protection to great andwealthy
tions of a fortress (defence against at towns. This purpose is closely allied to
tack) cannot be imagined exclusive the
of that active agency .
first, for
especially great and
commercial oneswealthy towns,
,are thenatur
At the same
time it is evident that amongst the ral
possession andofloss
storehouses affectsas the
an army; their
sucharmy
different purposeswhicha fortressmay directly. Besides this, it is also always
have to answer generally , or in this or
that moment, the passive element will be worth while topreservethis portion of
most required at one time , the active at the national wealth, partly on account
a fortress
rolewhichsimple
another. The perfectly is to of the, resources
rectly negotia
which they
partly because,in tions for
furnish di
fulfil may be and the
,
action ofthe placewill in such case be to peace, important place
anweightthrown
valuable intoisthe itself. a
in scale
complic This ed
ated,andthe action then becomes regard useinofmoderntimes
fortresses has been too little
more or less indirect. We shall examine , and yetitis
these subjectsseparately , commencing has a most powerful effect, andis the
with the first ; but at the outset we must
least liable to mistakes. If there was
 「頭 CHAP . x.] FORTRESSES . 101
be intelis a country in which not only all great and tions is usually some leagues, fortresses
[poses,perksta rich cities, but all populous places as well may be considered always as the best
or at lea
were fortified, and defended by the in- points d'appui for the flanks of a position.
habitants and the people belonging to À lake of several miles long is certainly
fortress an excellent support for the wing of an
the adjacent districts, then by that means
upports de the expedition of military operation would army, and yet a fortress of moderate size
be so much reduced, and the people at is better. The flank does not require to
ofelfin tacked would press with so great a part rest close upon it, as the assailant, for the
grewind of their whole weight in the scales, that sake of his retreat, would not throw him
das; the the talent as well as the force of will of the self between our flank and that obstacle.
lade prepare enemy's general would sink to nothing. 5. As a station (or stage ). If fortresses
ed notthe We just mention this ideal application are on the line of communication of the
rely frosti
of fortificationtoa countrytodojustice defensive, as is generally thecase, they
Storeberi
to what we have suppose
just d to be the serve as halting places for all that passes
proper use of fortresses , and that the up and down these lines. The chief danger
importance of the direct protection which to lines of communication is from irre
they afford may not be overlooked for a gular bands, whose action is always of
his reapi moment; but in any other respect this the nature of a shock . If a valuable
refone
the there
idea will not again interrupt our con convoy, on the approach of such a comet,
siderations, for amongst the whole number can reach a fortress by hastening the
fensire in of fortresses there must always be some march or quickly turning , it is saved,
prison de
which must be more strongly fortified and may wait there till the danger is
ices, theni thereal supports from
past.Furthe r, all troops marchintg o or
trating 1
than arserveas
active to
of theothers, my. the army, after halting here for a
dthe past The purposes specified under 1 and 2 a few days, are better able to hasten the
ions afin hardly call forth any other but the pas remainder of the march, and a halting
rer depuis sive action of fortresses. day is just the time of greatest danger.
3. As real barriers, they close the roads, In this way a fortress situated half way
thout fer and in most cases the rivers, on which on a line of communication of 30 miles
ole sport they are situated. shortens the line in a manner one half.
It is not as easy as is generally sup, 6. As places of refugefor weak or defeated
allied in
posed to find a practicable lateral road corps. Under the guns of a moderate
N
which passes round a fortress, for this sized fortress every corps is safe from
TOR turning must bemade, not only out of camp theenemy'sblows,evenifno entrenched
he nat
reach of the guns of this place, but also is specially prepared for them.
ich the by a detour greater or less, to avoid No doubt such a corps must give up its
sorties of the garrison. further retreat if it waits too long ; but
If thecountryisin the least degree this isnogreat sacrificein caseswherea
difficult, there are often delays connected
rtion of further retreat would only end in com
S
80 withthe slightest
which may cause deviation oftheroad plete destruction.
the loss of a whole In many cases a fortress can ensure a
ons hit day's march ,and, iftheroad is much few days halt without the retreatbeing
tsella y used, may become of great importance . altogether stopped . For the slightly
ale How they may have an influence on en- wounded and fugitives who precede a
olittle terprises beaten army, it is especially suited as a
by closing the navigation of a place
river is clear in itself. of refuge, where they can wait to
which 4. As tactical points d'appui. As the rejoi
s the diameter of the zone orcovered by the fire If nMagd
theirebur
corps.
g had lain on the direct
of even a very inferi classoffortifica- line of the Prussian retreat in 1806, and
 1

102 ON VAR. [BOOK VI.

if that line had not been already lost at tensive and decisive manner, and of all
Auerstadt, the army could easily have the objects that they can have, this may
halted for three or four days near that be regarded as the most important.
great fortress, and rallied and reorganised If this use of fortresses — far from 1
itself. But even as it was it served as a
being seen regularly repeating itself
rallying point for the remains of Hohen- seldom comparatively occurs in military
lohe's corps, which there first resumed history, the cause is to be found in the
the appearance of an army. character of most wars, this means being
It is only by actual experience in war to a certain extent far too decisive and
itself that the beneficial influence of
fortresses close at hand in disastrous too thoroughly effectual for them, the ex•
planation of which we leave till hereafter.
times can be rightly understood. They In this use of fortresses it is chiefly
contain powder and arms, forage and
bread, give covering to the sick, security their offensive power that is called for,
at least it isisthat by which their effec
to the sound, and recovery of sense to tual action chiefly produced. If a
the panic - stricken . They are like an fortress was no more to an aggressor
hostelry in the desert.
In the four last named purposes than a point which could not be occupied
is
evident that the active agency of for by him , it might be an obstacle to him,
tresses is called more into requisition . but not to such a degree as to compel
him to lay siege to it. But as he cannot
7. As a real shield aguinst the enemy's leave six , eight, or ten thousand men to
aggression . Fortresses which
the de- do as they likein his rear, he is obliged
fender leaves in his front break the
stream of the enemy's attack like blocks to invest the place with a sufficient force,
and if he desires that this investment
of ice. The enemy must at least invest should not continue to employ so large a
them , and requires for that, if the gar
risons are brave and enterprising , per detachment, he must convert the invest
haps double their strength. But, besides , ment
From into a siege,the
the moment andsiege
takecommences:
the place.
these garrisons may and do mostly con- it is then chiefly the passive efficacy of
sist in part of troops, who, although com- the fortress which comes into action .
petent to duty in a garrison , are not fit All the destinations of fortresses which
for the field - half trained militia , in
valids, convalescents, armed citizens, we have been hitherto considering are
landsturm , etc. The enemy, therefore, fulfilled in a simple and mainly in a direct
in such case is perhaps weakened four manner. On the other hand , in the next
times more than we are . two objects the method of action is more
This disproportionate weakening of complicated.
the enemy's power is the first and most ments .
8. As a protection to extended canton
impor tant but not the only advantage closes
which a besieged fortress affords by its
That a moderate
theapproach nmentfortress
to canto-sized s lying
resistance . From the moment that the behind it for a width of three or four
enemy crosses our line of fortresses, all milesis a simple result of its existence;
his movements become much more con þut how such a place comes to havethe
strained ;heis limited in his lines of honour
fifteen or
of twentymile
covering a line cantonments
s in oflength ,which
retreat, and must constantly attend to
we find frequently
the direct covering ofthe sieges which history spoken
as a fact that of in military
requires investi
he undertakes .
with the
therefore fortresses - operate
Here, defensive, act in a comost and refutation
gation it has really
as far assofaras
illusion ,
taken
it may be place,
mere
ex.
 103
CHAP . X. ] FORTRESSES.
four The following points offer themselves the case of a mere sudden attack on can
tonments , and therefore in the same pro
hare të
for
( 1.) That ation
consider :--
the place in itself blocks one portion the fortress will be less an ob
stacle to the attack of the cantonments .
imports:
Sarah aof the mainof roads,
breadth three and reallymiles
or four covers
of That is true enough ; also the cantonments
seating lying at a distance of six to eight miles
country. from the fortress cannot be directly pro
(2. ) That
exceptio nallyit strong regarded
may beadvance as an
d post, or tected by it ; but the object of such a sudden
found on
s meerhet attack does not consist alone in the attack
that itofaffords
tion a more
the count ry , complet
to whiche observa
may be of a few cantonments . Until we reach
I dire
the book on attack we cannot describe
them, te se ies ghinthe
addedtion
forma facilit
throu theordin of secret
way ary in circumstantially the real object of such a
relations
of civil life which exist between a great sudden attack and what may be expected
a calle town and the adjacent districts. It is from it ; but this much we may say at
h their present, that its principal results are
duel. Il
natural that
tenthou sand ininhaa bita
placents,ofone eight
six,shou or obtained, not by the actual attack on
ld be
some isolated quarters, but by the series
2 able to learn more of what is going on of combats which the aggressor forces
be arstid
ache me
in thee, neig
villag the quart ers ofd an
hbourhoo thanordin out-e on single corps not in proper order, and
a mer
in ary
more bent upon hurrying to certain
she reason
post.
( 3.) That smaller corps are appuyed points than upon fighting. But this
Ind mea on it,ity derive from it protection and attactio
ck and pursuit will always be in rea
n more or less towards
secur ad- dire
, and from time to time can the cent

cient fan
of the enemy's cantonments, and, there
vancge tow
brin ardsllig
in inte theenceene myin
, or, mayhebeat-
, itcase to fore, an important fortress lying before
salamat
this centre will certainly prove a very
tempts to turn agai nstress
the fort his, rear
to und er
; that great impediment to the eattack .
he intes
dertake something ct
If we refle on thes four points in
theplacNe theref e, stillughit may
quit itsoreplacaltho have ssthe, effic
a fortre cannoacyt
the whole of their effects , we see that an
MA
tiary i
ofan advanced corps (Fifth Book, eighth important fortress in a direct and in an
indirect way certainly gives some securi
se ty
Chapter). to a much greater extent of cantonments
blin(4.)g his
That s ,candefen
corpthe takeder,
up his tion atm
posiasse
after than we should think at first sight.
Ting we say, for all these
radimas a point directly behind this fortress , which “ Some
indi security
rect age ncies do not render the ad
the nert assail
coming
the expant
osecadnntootdanrea
gerch from thet for-
withou be vance of the enemy impossible ; they only
ܳ݁‫ ܝܶܐ ܕ‬R ,, make it more difficult , and a more serious
tress his trear.
No indoub every attack on a line of consideration ; consequently lessprobable
cantonments as such is to be taken in and less of a danger for the defensive.
the senseking
of rise, or rather , we are
only spea a surp
here of that kind of attack ; But that is also ldall that rsto
and all that shou be unde
required ,
was od
in this
now it is evident in itself that an attack case under the term covering . The real
iPad by surprise accomplishes its effect in a direct security must be attained by means
rethe of outposts and the arrangement of the
much shorter space of time than a regu cantonments themselves.
lar attagh
althou ck on
in athe latte erof cas
theatr ware,. The refore
a fort ress, There is, therefore , some truth in as
cribing to a great fortress the capability
which is to be passed by must necessarily of covering a wide extent of cantonments
lace be invested and kept in check , thise in lying in rear of it ; but it is also not to
2018 vestment will not be so indispensabl in
 1

104 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.

be denied that often in plans of real cam- tions can never be supplied in a regular
paigns, but still oftener in historical manner in a People's War ; on the other
works, we meet with vague and empty band, it is just in the very nature of such a
expressions, or illusory views in connec- war to do the best we can ; in that way a
tion with this subject. For if that thousand small sources furnishing means
covering is only realised by the co -opera- of resistance are opened which otherwise
tion of several circumstances, if it then might have remained unused ; and it is
also only produces a diminution of the easy to see that a strong commodious
danger, we can easily see that, in parti. fortress, as a great magazine of these
cularcases,through special circumstances, things, can well give to the whole defence
above all, through the boldness of the more force and intensity, more cohesion,
enemy, this whole covering may prove and greater results.
an illusion , and therefore in actual war we Besides, a fortress is a place ofrefuge
must not content ourselves with assuming for wounded, the seat of the civil func
hastily at once the efficacy of such and tionaries, the treasury , the point of as
such a fortress, but carefully examine and sembly for the greater enterprises, etc.,
study each single case on its own merits. etc .; lastly, a nucleus of resistance which
9. As covering a provincenot occupied. If during the siege places the enemy's force
during waraprovince is either notoccupied in a condition which facilitates and
at all , or only occupied by an insufficient favours the attacks of national levies
force, and likewise exposed more or less acting in conjunction,
to incursions from flying columns, then 11. For the defence of rivers and moun
a fortress, if not too unimportant in size, tains. Nowhere can a fortress answer
may be looked upon as a covering, or, so many purposes, undertake to play so
if we prefer, as a security for this pro many parts, as when it is situated on a
vince. As a security it may at all events great river. It secures the passage at
be regarded, for an enemy cannot become any time at that spot, and hinders that
master of the province until he has taken of the enemy for several miles each way,
it, and that gives us time to hasten to its it commands the use of the river for com
defence. But the actual covering can
certainly only be supposed very indirect , mercial purposes,
in its walls, receives
blocks all ships
bridges with
and roads,
or as not preperly belonging to it. That is, the and helps the indirect defence of the
fortress by its activeoppo sitioncan only river,that is, the defence by a position
in some measure check
the incursions of
hostile bands. If this opposition is on
by the enemy's side.
its influence It is ways,
in so many evident that,
limited to merely what the garrison can it very
effect , then the result must be little greatly
river, and may bethe
facilitates regarded an the
defenceasof es
indeed, for the garrisons of such places sential part of that defence.
are generally weak and usually consist Fortresses in mountains are important
of infantry only, and that not of the in a similar manner .
best quality . The idea gains a little They there form
more reality if small columns keep them the knots of whole systems of roads,
selves communication withthe place, which have
mination
makinginit their base and place of retreat at that commencement
theirspot and ter
;they thus command
in case of necessity . the whole country which is traversed by
roads,
thesetrue
10. As the focus of a general arming of the and theyofmay
buttresses regarded
thebewhole as
defen
the nation . Provisions , arms , and muni . sive system .
 ( IS CLAP, XI. ] FORTRESSES . 105

in a mai
on the eye
iredał CHAPTER XI .
2 thatmai
shing2: 3
h others
; additi FORTRESSES— ( CONTINUED ).
ombadio
e of the We have discussed the object of for- mentioned as the most essential, and are
ole deti tresses : now for their situation . At first of opinion that in many cases they alone
whesia the subject seems very complicated, when are sufficient, particularly in small states.
we think of the diversity of objects, each But, at the same time, other considera
of which may again be modified by the tions may be admitted, and may be im
civil for locality ; but such a view has verylittle perative in countries of a greater super
int of sa foundation if we keep to the essence of ficial extent, which either have a great
783, . the thing, and guard against unnecessary many important towns and roads, or, on
Ice Thai subtilties. the contrary, are almost without any,
"s.៥ It is evident that all these demands are which are either very rich, and, possess
at once satisfied, if, in those districts of ing already many fortresses, still want
country which are to be regarded as the new ones, or those which, on the other
theatre of war , all the largest and richest hand, are very poor, and under the neces
翻部 towns on the great high roads connecting sity of making a few answer, in short,
the two countries with each other are in cases where the number of fortresses
BISTE

pelerse fortified, more particularlythose adjacent does not correspondwiththe number of

led as to harbour s and bays of the sea, or important towns and roads which present
situated on large rivers and in mountains. themselves , being either considerably
suge greater or less.
Great towns and great roads always go
hand in hand , and both have also a We shall now cast a glance at the
derations
.
100 natural con nection with great rivers and nature of such other consi
the coasts of the sea, all these four The chief questions which remain re
nusta conditions, therefore, agree very well late1. to
rise toit no
givehand, The choice of the principal roads, if
in the two
of the
ositiu
congruit on theand
with eachy ; other, other is not countries are connected by more
i that the same with mountains, for large towns roads than we wish to fortify.
are seldom found there. If, therefore, 2. Whether the fortresses are to be
it rent
f the the position and direction of a mountain placed on the frontier only, or spread
chain makes it favourable to a defensive over the country . Or,
line, it is necessary tocloseitsroadsand 3. Whether they shall be distributed
passes by small forts, built for this uniformly , or in groups.
4. Circumstances relating to the geo
form
great and
cost, the only,
purpose at on
outlay least ofpossible
theworks fortifi- graphy of the country to which it is
0nda necessary to pay attention .
Iter cation being reserved for the important A number of other points with re
nard places of arms in the level country.
We have not yet noticed thefrontiers spect to thegeometrical form of the line
of the state, nor said anything of the of fortifications, such as whether they
geometrical form of the whole system of should be placed in a single line or in
fortresses, nor of the other geographical several lines, that is, whether they do
points in connection with their situation , more service when placed one beliind an
other, or side by side in line with each
because we regard the objects above
106 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
other ; whether they should be chequer- attack is situated , there the defensive
wise, or in a straight line; or whether arrangements should be made by prefer
they should take the form of a fortifica ence .
tion itself, with salients and re -entering Therefore, amongst a number of great
angles — all these we look upon as empty roads leading from the enemy's country
subtilties, that is, considerations so in- into ours, we should first of allfortify that
significant, that, compared with the really which leads most directly to the heart of
important points, they are not worth our dominions, or that which , traversing
notice ; and we only mention them here fertile provinces, or running parallel to
because they are not merely treated navigable rivers, facilitates the eneiny's
undertaking,
of in many books, but also a great deal The
more is made of this rubbish than it
and then we may rest secure.
assailant then encounters these
is worth . works, or should he resolve to pass
As regards the first question , in order them by, he will naturally offer a favour
to place it in a clearer light we shall able opportunity for operations against
merely instance the relation of the south his flank .
of Germany to France, that is, to the Vienna is the heart of South Germany,
upper Rhine. If, without reference to and plainly Munich or Augsburg, in
the number of separate statescomposing relation to Francealone (Switzerland
this district of country, we suppose it a and Italy being therefore supposed neu
whole which is to be fortified strategi- tral ) would be more efficient as a prin
cally,
numbermuch doubt will ariso, for a great cipal fortress than Nuremburg or Wurz
ofvery fineroads leadfromthe burg. But if, at thesame time, te look
Rhine into the interior Franconia
of , at the roads leading from Italy into Ger
Bavaria , and Austria . Certainly, towns many by Switzerland and the Tyrol, this
are not wanting which surpass others in will become still more evident, because,
size and importance, as Nuremburg, in relation to these, Munich and Augs.
Wurz burg, Ulm , Augsburg, and Munich '; burg will always be places of importance,
but if we are not disposed to fortily all, whereas Wurzburg and Nuremburg are
there is no alternative but to make a much the same, in this respect, as if they
selection . If, further, in accordance with did not exist .
our view, the fortification of the greatest We tuin now to the second question
and wealthiest ishenotldto be the principal Whether the fortresses should beplaced
thing, still it is to be denied that, on the frontier, or distributed over the
owing to the distance between Nurem country ? In the first place, we must
burg and Munich , the first has a very observe, that, as regards smallstates, this
different strategic signification from the question is superiluous, for what are
therefore it always remains
second ; and red called strategic frontiers coincide, in their
to be conside whether it would not be
case, nearly with the whole country. The
better, in place of Nuremburg, to fortify larger the state is supposed to be inthe
someother neighbourhood consideration of this question, theplainer
place in the place
of Munich even
, if the is one of appears the necessity for its being an
less importance in itself. swered.
As concerns the decision in such cases, The most natural answer is ,—that for
that is, answering the first question , we tresses belong to the frontiers, for they
must refer to what has been said in the
chapters on the general plan of defence, are to defend the state, and the state is
and on the choice of points of attack . defended as long as the frontiers are
Wherever the most natural point of defended. This, but
in the abstract argument may be valid
the following con
 FORTRESSES. 107
CHAP. x . ]
siderations will show that it is subject to of them . We think that this mistake has
ਸ਼ਾ very many modifications. been made in a remarkable degree in
Every defence which is calculated France.--A great doubt may with reason
chiefly on foreign assistance lays great arise if the border provinces of a country
value on gaining time ; it is not a contain no considerable towns, such towns
vigorous counterstroke, but a slow pro- lying further back towards the interior,
ceeding, in which the chief gain consists as is the case in South Germany in parti
more in delay than in any weakening of cular, where Swabia is almost destitute
the enemy which is effected. But now of great towns, whilst Bavaria contains
it lies in the nature of the thing that, a large number. We do not hold it to be
supposing all other circumstances alike, necessary to remove these doubts once for
fortresses which are spread over the all on general grounds , believing that in
whole country, and include between them such cases, in order to arrive at a solu
a very considerable area of territory, tion , reasons derived from the particular
will take longer to capture than those situation must come into consideration .
squeezed together in a close line on the Still we must call attention to the closing
frontier. Further, in all cases in which remarks in this chapter.
the object is to overcome the enemy Thethird question- Whetherfortresses
through the length of his communica- should be disposed in groups , or more
tions, and the difficulty of his existence equally distributed ?—will, if we reflect
therefore in countries which can chiefly upon it, seldom arise ; still we must not,
reckon on this kind of reaction, it would for that reason , set it down as a useless
be a complete contradiction to have the subtilty, because certainly a group of
le defensivepreparations of this kind only two, three, or four fortresses, which are
on the frontier . Lastly, let us also re- only a few days' march from a common
member that, if circumstances will in any centre, give that point and the army
way allow
l
of it, the fortification ding d there such strength, that, if other
of the placetions ed re
capita is a main point ; that accor to condi allow of it, in some measu
our principles the chief towns and places one would be very much tempted to form
to of commerce in the provinces demand it such a strategic bastion .
likewise; that rivers passing through the The last point concerns the other geo
country, mountains , and other irregular graphical properties of the points to be
features of ground, afford advantages for chosen . That fortresses on the sea, on
new lines of defence ; that many towns, streams and great rivers , and in moun
tains , are doubly effective, has been al
through their strong natural situation, ready stated to be one of the principal
ortificati
invitefories
access on ; such
of war, moreoasver, that
manuf certa
actor iesin considerations ; but there are a number
on
of arms, & c., are try better placed in the of other points in connecti with for
interior of the coun than on the fron- tresses to which regard must be paid .
tier, and their value well entitles them to If a fortress cannot lie on the river it
t
the protection of works of fortification ;
then we see that there is always more or
self, it is better not to place it near, but
at a distance of ten or twelve miles from
less occasion for the construction of for it ; otherwise , the river intersects , and
tresses in the interior of a country ; on lowers the value of the sphere of action
this account we are of opinion, that al- of the fortress in all those points above
ned
though states which possess a great num mentio . *
ber of fortresses are right in placing the * Philippsburg was the pattern of a badly-placed
greater number on the frontier, still it fortr ess ; it resembled a fool standing with his nose
woul d be a grea t mist ake if the inte rior
of the country was left entirely destitute close to a wall.
 108 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
This is not the same in mountains, be- ing in their nature, and directly con
cause there the movement of large or nected with the foundations of the state
small masses upon particular points is itself, not on transient views on war,
not restricted in the same degree as it is fashionable for a day ; not on imaginary
by a river. But fortresses on the enemy's strategic niceties, nor on requirements
side of a mountain are not well placed , completely singular in character — an error
because they are difficult to succour. If
which might be attended with irreparable
they are on our side, the difficulty of consequences if allowed to influence the
laying siege to them is very great, as the construction of fortresses intended to last
mountains cut across the enemy's line of five hundred, perhaps a thousand, years.
communication. We give Olmütz , 1758, Silberberg, in Silesia ,built by Frederick
as an example .
It is easily seen that impassable forests the Great on one of the ridges of the
Sudetics, has, from the complete altera
and marshes have a similar effect to that
of rivers. tion in circumstances which has since
The question has been often raised as taken place, lost almost entirely its im
to whether towns situated in a very diffi portance and object, whilst Breslau, if it
cult country are well or ill suited for for- had
and continued strong
been madetoa be place of
so, would arms,
have al
tresses. As they can be fortified and de- ways maintained its value against the
fended at a small expense , or be made
much stronger, often impregnable, at an French, as well as against the Russians,
Poles, and Austrians .
equal expenditure, and the services of a Our reader will not overlook the fact
fortress are always more passive than that these considerations are not raised
active, it does not seem necessary to attach
much importance to the objection that on the with
itself supposed
a setcase
of of
newa state providing;
fortifications
they can easily be blockaded .
If we now, in conclusion, cast a retro- they
object,would be useless if such was their
as such a case seldom, if ever,
spective glance a count
fortification forover oursimp
ry , we le
system oft happens; butthey may all ariseat the
may asser
designing of each single fortification. 1
that it rests on comprehensive data, last

CHAPTER XII .

DEFENSIVE POSITION.
EVERY position in which we accept battle,
at the same time making use of the ground Now we may also apply the term
as a means of protection , is a defensive marching
position and it makes no difference in
to encounter
to every position theenemy
in which would
an armywhilst 1
,
this respect whether we act inore pas certainly accept battle if the latter sought
sively or more offensively in the action . for it. In point of fact, most battles
This follows from the general view of take place in this way, and in all the
the defensive which we have given . middle ages no otherwas ever thought of.
That is,however,not the kind of position
 DEFENSIVE POSITION . 109
at
CHAP. XI .]
of which we are now speaking ; by far the rear, or by acting against its lines of
directly a greater number of positions are of this retreat and communication .
as of thesta kind, and the conception of a position The first of these, that is, an attack
ciers 1 on flank or rear is tactical in its nature.
in contradistinction to a camp taken up
on Imagten on the march would suffice for that. A In our days in which the mobility of
requireasa position which is specially called a defen- troops is so great, andall plans of battles
ter - ile sive position must therefore have some have more or less in view the turning or
h imepun other distinguishing characteristics. enveloping the enemy, every position
infrenta In the decisions which take place in must accordingly be adapted to meet
ended tobe an ordinary position, the idea of time evi- such measures, and one to deserve the
Isand, TELS dently predominates ; the armies march name of strong must, with a strong front,
of Fredens against each other in order to come to allow at least of good combinations for
an engagement: the place is a subordi- battle on the sides and rear as well, in
iete alus nate point, all that is required from it is case of their being menaced. In this
that it should not be unsuitable. But in way a position will not become untenable
ely itis a real defensive position the idea of place by the enemy turning it with a view to
Teslam, is predominates ; the decision is to be real- an attack on the flank or rear, as the
- have a ised on thisspot, or rather,chieflythrough battle which then takes place was pro
this spot. That is the only kind of po vided for in the choice of the position,
ainst the sition we have here in view. the defender all the
and should ensure
RIANTER Now the connection of place is a advantages which he could expect from
this position generally.
double one ; that is , in the first instance,
inasmuc h as a force posted at this point If the position is turned by the enemy
ot mine exercises a certain influence upon the with a view to acting against the lines of
ronting war in general ; and next, inasmuch as retreat and communication, this is a stra
ications the local features of the ground contri- tegic relation,and the question is how
Tas their bute to the strength of the army and long the position can be maintained, and
afford protection : in a word, a strategic by
whether we cannot outbid theenemy
a scheme like his own, both these
and a tactical connection .
ation. Strictly speaking, the term defensive questions depend on the situation of the
position has its origin only onin connection point (strategically ), that is, chiefly onthe
with tactics, for its connecti with stra- relations of the lines of communication
namely, that an army posted at
tegy,point of both combatants. A good position
this by its presence serves to defend should secure to the army on the defen
the country, will also suit the case of sive the advantage in this point. In any
an army acting offensively. case the position will not be rendered of
The strategic effect to be derived from no effect in this way, as the enemy is neu
a position cannot be shown completely tralised by the position when he is oc
until cehereafter, when
re
we discuss the cupied by it in the manner supposed.
defen of a theat of war ; we shall But if the assailant, without troubling
therefore only consider it here as far as himself about the existence of the army
can be done at present, and forthat end awaiting his attack in a defensive posi
we must examine more closely the nature tion, advances with his main body by
whik of two ideas which have a similarity and another line in pursuit of his object, then
would he passes by the position ; and if he can do
ught are often mistaken for oneanother, that is,
g a positi this with impunity, and really does it,
ttles turnin
theThe turni ng a onpositi
, andonthepas sing
relate by its
s to it. he will immediately enforce the aban
I the front, and is done either by an attack donment of the position, consequently
htot.
ation
upon the side of theposition or on its put an end to its usefulness.
110 ON VAR . | BOOK VI.
There is hardly any position in the ant is then in such a position that he
world which, in the simple sense of the can turn our line without deviating from
words, cannot be passed by , for cases his ownperpendicular disposition.
such as the isthmus of Perekop are so Further, the aggressor has much
rare that they are hardly worth attentijn. greater freedom for tactical movement
The impossibility of passing by must if he commands several roads for his re
therefore be understood as merely ap- treat whilst we are limited to one. In
plying to the disadvantages in which such cases the tactical skill of the defen
the assailant would become involved if sive will be exerted in vain to overcome
he set about such an operation . We the disadvantageous influence resulting
shall have a more fitting opportunity from the strategic relations.
to state these disadvantages in the Lastly as regards the fourth point, such
twenty- seventh chapter ; whether small a disadvantageous general influence niay
or great, in
equivalent of everycasethey
the tactical effectarewhich
the predominate
of in the
ground, that the other characteristics
most careful choice,
the position is capable of producing but and the best use of tactical means, can
which has not been realised, and in com do nothing to combat them . Under such
mon with it constitute the object of the circumstances the chief points are as
position. follows :
From the preceding observations, there- 1. The defensive must particularly seek
fore, two strategic properties of the de- for the advantage of being able to over
fensive position have resulted : look swiftly
his adversary,
1. That it cannot be passed round . able to throwsohimself
that he mayhim
upon be
2. That in the struggle for the lines inside the limits of his position. It is
of communication it gives the defender only when the local difficulties of ap
advantages . proach combine with these two conditions
Here we have to add two other stra
tegic properties, namely that the ground is really favourable to
the defensive .
3. That the relation of the lines of
communication may also have a favour On the other hand, those points which
ableinfluence on theformofcombat ;and are under the influence ofus commanding
disadvantageo
groundare to him ;also
4. That the general influence of the most positions in mountains (of which we
country is advantageous. shall speak more particularly in the chap
For the relation of the lines of commu
nication has an influence not only upon ters on mountain warfare). Further, posi
tions which rest one flank on mountains,
the possibility or impossibilityofpassing for such a positioncertainly makes the
bya position or of cutting off theenemy's passing by more difficult,but facilitates &
supplies , but also on the whole course turning movement. Of the same kind are
of the battle . An oblique line of retreat
all positions which have a mountain im
facilitatesa tactical turning movement mediately in their front, and generally
on the part of the assailant, and paralyses all those which bear relation tothe des
our own tactical movements during the cription of ground above specified.
battle . But an oblique position in rela
cation
tion to the lines of communi is often As an example of the opposite of these
not the fault of tactics but a consequence disadvantageousproperties,we shall only
of a defective strategic point ; it is, for instance the caseofapositionwhich has
example, not to be avoided whenthe advantagesresult
road changes direction in the vicinity of
a mountain in rear
that; from this so many
it maybeassumed
the position ( Borodino , 1812) ; the assail in general to be one of the most favour
able of all positions for the defensive.
 DEFENSIVE POSITION , 111
2017 CHAP . XII. ]
2. A country may correspond more or in proportion as our enemy is more de
less to the character and composition of termined on the attack, and that depends
an army. A very numerous cavalry is a on the nature of the individual case. Op
proper reason for seeking an open coun- posed to a Buonaparte, we may and
try. Want of this arm , perhaps also of should withdraw behind stronger ram
artillery, while we have at command a parts than before a Daun or a Schwartzen
courageous infantry inured to war, and burg.
eko acquainted with the country, make it ad- If certain portions of a position are
visable to take advantage of a difficult, unattackable, say the front, then that
close country. is to be taken as a separate factor of
We do not here enter into particulars its whole strength, for the forces not
at ntthat point are available
respecting the tactical relation which the required oyme
for empl here
elsew must
; but we
local features of a defensive position bear not omit to observe that whilst the
to the force which is to occupy it. We enemy is kept completely off such im
only speak of the total result, as that pregnable points, the form of his at
only is abtedl
Undou y ca quan
strategi posittity
ion . in which an tack assumes quite a different character,
army is to await the full force of the and we must ascertain , in the first in
hostile attack , should give the troops stance , how this alteration will suit our
such an important advantage of ground as situation .
r may be considered a multiplier of its For instance , to take up a position , as
force. Where nature does much, but has often been done, so close behind a
not to the full as much want,
as we the great river that it is to be looked upon
‫ܕܪ ܨ‬ as covering the front, is nothing else but
Ii‫ܐ‬ art of entrenchment comes to our help.
ly
In this way it happens not unfrequent to make the river a point of support for
ito
that some parts become unassailable, the right or left flank; for the enemy is
and not unusually the whole is made so : naturally obliged to cross further to the
Je right or left, and cannot attack without
of the ymeas
plainl in this
ure last case,gedthe
is chan . whole naturnoe changing his front : the chief question,
It is then
fore, is what advantages or disad
longer a battle under advantageous con there ages does that bring to us ?
ditions which we seek, and in this battle vant According to our opinion , a defensive
the issue of the campaign , but an issue
without a battle . Whilst we occupy with position will come positi
of such a
the nearer to the true
on the more its
our force an unassailable position, we ideal strength is hid from observation , and the
‫ܪ‬ direct ly
enemy to refus e battle, and oblig e our
seekthefor a solution in some more it is favourable to our surprising
other way . the enemy by our combinations in the
We mus t, therefore , completely sepa battle . Just as we advisably endeavour
rate these two cases, and shall speak of to conceal from the enemy the whole
山
the latter in thefollowing chapter,under tenti gth of our forces and ourreal in
strenons , so in the same way we should
theBut
titlethe
of adefen positonion
sivepositi
strong . with which seek to conceal from the enemy the ad
we haveofnow nothi ng more than vantages which we expect to derive from
a field to with
battle do is the addition of ad- the form of the ground . This of course
vantages in our favour ; and that it can only be done to a certain degree , and
requires, perhaps, a peculiar mode of
should
vant in me
agesbeco fieldurofmus
oura favo t lenot
batt be ad
, the too proceeding , hitherto but little attempt
great. But now what degree of strength ed .
1 The vicinity of a considerable fortress,
may such a position have ? Plainly more
112 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
in whatever direction it may be, confers better than he does his, and that we
on every position a great advantage over have a general superiority over him in 1
the enemy in the movement and use of unexpected movements in the course of
the forces belonging to it. By suitable the battle, then from these advantages
field -works, the want of natural strength united, there may result in our favour an 1
at particular points may be remedied, overpowering and decisive influence in
and in that manner the great features of connection with the ground, under the
the battle may be settled beforehand at power of which the enemy will succumb,
will ; these are themeans of strengthen- without knowing the real cause of his
ing by art ; if with these we combine a defeat. This is what we understand un
good selection of those natural obstacles der defensive position, and we consider it
of ground which impede the effective ac . one of the greatest advantages of defen
tion of the enemy's forces without making sive war.
action absolutely impossible, if we turn Leaving out of consideration particular
to the best account the advantage we circumstances, we may assumethat an
have over the enemy in knowing the undulating, not too well, but still not too
ground , which he does not, so that we little, cultivated country affords the most
succeed in concealing our movements positions of this kind.

CHAPTER XIII.

STRONG POSITIONS AND ENTRENCHED CAMPS .

We have said in the preceding chapter At the same time, that term may
that aposition so strongthrough nature, really be applied to any positionstrength:
assisted by art, that it isunassailable
, ened more or less byfield
does not come under the meaning of an need have nothing works,with
in common which
the
advantageous field ofbattle, but belongs nature of the position we are now con
to a peculiar class of things. We shall sidering :
in this chapter take a review of what The object of a strong position is to
constitutesthenature of this peculiarity , make the force there stationed in point
and on account of the analogy between offact unattackable, and by that means,
such positions and fortresses, call them
either really to cover a certain space
strong positions.
Merely by entrenchments alone they directly,
can hardly be formed , except as en
that spaceorinorderthen
only the troops which occupy
, through them ,
trenched camps resting on fortresses i in another way to effect the covering of
of thelines The
country indirectly. first was the
butstillless are theyto be found ready the
formed entirely by natural obstacles . Art
signification of former times,
for instance, those on the French fron
usually lends a hand to assist nature , tier ; the latter, isthat of entrenched camps
and therefore they are frequently desig- laid out near fortresses, and showing a
nated as entrenched camps or positions front every direction
. in .
 CHAP. XIII.] STRONG POSITIONS AND ENTRENCHED CAMPS. 113

If, for instance, the front of a position is equally strong everywhere. But such
is so strong by works and hindrances to a camp can be passed by, and that much
NI approach that an attack is impossible, easier than a fortifiedline, because its
then the enemy is compelled to turn it, to extent amounts to nothing.
make his attack on a side of it or in rear. Entrenched camps connected with for
Now to prevent this being easily done, tresses are in reality of this second kind ,
points d'appui were sought for these lines, for the object of them is to protect the
which should give them a certain degree of troops assembled in them ; but their fur
support on the side, such as the Rhine and ther strategic meaning, that is, the appli.
the Vosges give the lines in Alsace. The cation of this protected force, is some
longer the front of such a line the more wbat different from that of other fortified
easily it can be protected from being camps.
turned, because every movement to turn Having given this explanation of the
it is attended with danger to the side origin of these three different defensive
attempting the movement, the danger means, we shall now proceed to consider
increasing in proportion as the required the value of each of them separately,
movement causes a greater deviation from under the heads of strong lines, strong posi
the normal direction of the attacking tresses.
tions, and entrenched camps resting on for
force.Therefore, considerable length
a of
front, which canbe made unassailable, and 1. Lines. — They are the worst kind of
good flank -supports, ensure thepossibi- cordon war: the obstacle which they pre
lityof protecting alarge space ofterritory sentto the aggressorisof no valueatall
directly from hostile invasion : at least, unless they are defended by a powerful
that was the view in which works of this fire;in themselves they are simply worth
class originated ; thatwas the objectof less. But now theextent to which an
the lines in Alsace, with their right flank army can furnish an effective fire is gene.
on the Rhine and the left on the Vosges ; rally very small in proportion to the ex
and the lines in Flanders, fifteen miles tent of country to be defended ; the lines
long, resting their right on the Scheldt can, therefore, only be short, and conse
and the fortress of Tournay, their left on quently cover only a small extent of
the sea. country, or the armywill notbe able really
1 But when we havenot the advantages of to defend the lines at all points. In con
well.defended front,and good
such a longorts sequence of this, the idea was started of
flank -supp , if the country is to beheld not occupying all points in the line, but
generally by a force wellentrenched, then onlywatching them , and defending them
that force (and its position ) mustbepro- by meansof strong reserves, inthe same
tected against being turned by such an way as a small river may be defended ;
arrangement that it can show a front in but this procedure is in opposition to the
every direction . But then the idea of a nature of the means. If the natural
thoroughly covered tract of country vanishes, obstacles of the ground are sogreat that
for such a position is only strategically, a such a method of defence could be applied,
pointwhich covers the force occupying it, then the entrenchments were needless,
and thus secures to that force the power and entail danger, for that method of
ofkeeping the field, that is to say, main- defence is not local, and entrenchments
taining itself in the country. Such a camp are only suited to a strictly local defence;
cannot be turned, that is, cannot be but if the entrenchments themselves are
attacked in flank' or rear by reason of to be considered the chief impediments
those parts being weaker than its front, to approach, then we may easily conceive
for it can show front in all directions, and that an undefended line will not have
VOL . II . I
 0
114 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.

much to say as an obstacle to approach, rections ; and in conformity with the

What is a twelve or fifteen feet ditch, usual extent of tactical positions, if the
and a rampartten or twelve feet high, force is notverylarge( and a large force
against the united efforts of many thou- would be contrary to the nature of the
sands, if these efforts are not hindered by small
supposed case) it would take up avery
space, which , in the course of the
the fire of an enemy ? The consequence,
therefore, is, that if such lines are short combat, would be exposed to so many
andtoler ably well defended by troops, disadvantages that,even if strengthened
they can be turned ; but if they are exten- in every possible way by entrenchments,
sive , and not sufficiently occupied , they we could hardly expect to make a suc
can be attacked in front, and taken with- cessful defence. Such a camp, showing
out much difficulty . front in every direction, must therefore
Now as lines of this description tie the necessarily have an extent of sides pro
troops down to a local defence, and take portionably great; but these sides must
away from them all mobility, they are a likewise be as good as unassailable ; to
bad and senseless means to useagainst give thisrequisite strength, notwith:
an enterprising enemy. If we find them standing the required extension, is not
long retained in modern warsinspiteof withinthecompassof theart of field
ons
these objecti , thecauseliesentirely in fortification ; itis e
the low degree of energy impressed on mental condition thattherefor a funda
such a camp must
the conduct of war, oneconsequence of derive part of itsstrength from natural
which was,thatseeming difficulties often
effected
impediments of ssab
many places impa groundwhich render
le and others diffi
quite as much as real ones. Be
sides, in most campaigns these lines were cult to pass. In order, therefore, to be
used merely for a secondary defence able to apply this defensive means, it
against irregular incursions ; if they is necessary wanti
have been found not wholly inefficacious when to find
ng such aspot,and
, the object cannot
that is
for that purpose, we mustonly keep in be attai ned merelybyfield works. These
view, at the same time , how much moreconsiderations relate more immediately
usefully the troops required for their de- to tactical results in order that we may
fence might have been employed at other first establish the existence of this stra
points . In thelatest wars such
lineshave tegicmeans; we mention as examples
been out of the question, neither do we for illustration , Pirna, Bunzelwitz,
find any traceof them ;andit isdoubtful Now,
if they will ever re -appear.
Colberg, Torres Vedras, and Drissa.
as respects the strategic properties
2. Positions. - he defence of a tract and effects. The first condition is natu•
of country continues (aswe shall show rallythatthe force whichoccupies this
moreplainly in the 27th chapter)aslong camp shall have its subsistence secured
as the force designated for it maintains for some time, that is, for as long as we
itself there , and only ceases if that force think the camp will be required,and
removes and abandons it. this is onlypossible when the position
If a force is to maintain itself in any
districtof country which is attacked by has behind
Torres it a ofport,like
Vedras, Colbergand
stands inc onnection
very superior forces, the means of pro with a fortress like Bunzelwitz and
tectingthisforce against the powerof Pirna,“orhaslargedepôts withinito
the sword by a position which is una:
sailable is a first consideration . self or in the immediate vicinity, like
Drissa.
Now such a position, as before said ,
must be able to show a front in all di- visiItonin
is only in the first case that the pro
g can be ensured forany time we
 CHAP. XIII.] STRONG POSITIONS AND ENTRENCHED CAJIPS. 115

please; in the second and third cases, it can then such position should not be taken
mity rib: only be so for a more or less limited time, up, or if it is it should only be as a feint
sitios so that in this point there is always dan- to see whether the assailant can be im
a large lir ger. From this appears how the difficulty posed upon respecting itsvalue; this is
nature
of subsistence debars the use of many always attended with the danger, in case
ke up 17 strong points which otherwise would be of failure, of being too late to reach the
ciun suitable for entrenched positions, and pointwhich is threatened.
therefore, makes those that are eligible If the strong position is only held by
strengele scarce . an inferior force, then the aggressor can
ntrenches In order to ascertain the eligibility of never be at a loss for a further object of
malo os a position ofthis description , its advan- attack, because he has it in the main
tages and defects, we must ask ourselves body itself of the enemy's army; in
us their what the aggressor can do against it. this case , therefore, the value of the
of sidesF a. The assailant can pass by this strong position is entirely limited to the means
+ siden position, pursue his enterprise, andwatch which it affords of operating against the
waikhe : 4 the position with a greater or less enemy's strategic n Aank, and depends
ch, tim force . n upo that conditio .
sion, isr We must here make a distinction be- b. If the assailant does not venture to
art ofby tween the cases of a position which is pass by a position , he can invest it and
8 occupied by the main body, and one only reduce it by famine. But this supposes
CRUDEN occupied by an inferior force . two conditions beforehand : first, that the
In the first case the passing by the position is not open in rear, and secondly,
ich rad that the assailant is sufficiently strong to
thers
position can only benefit the assailant, be able to make such an investment. If
fore, the
if, besides
defendan the principal
t, there forceother
is also some of the
at- these two conditions are united then the
MAIN tainable and decisive object of attack, as, assailant's army certainly would be neu
Spon, forinstance, the capture of a fortress or tralised for a time by this strong position,
ert AB a capital city, etc. But even if there but at the same time, the defensive pays
is such an object, he can only fol- the price of this advantage by a loss of
mediat low it if the strength of his base and his defensive force.
the direction of his lines of communica- From this, therefore, we deduce that
tion are such that he has no cause to the occupation of such a strong position
A
PORDIT fear operations against his strategic withthemain body is ameasure only
nzelsis flanks. to be taken ,
7 Drive The conclusions to be drawn from this aa. When the rear is perfectly safe
withrespect
gibility tothe admissibility
of a strong andmain
position for the eli- (Torres Vedras).
bb. When we foresee that the enemy's
body of the defender's army are, that it force is not strong enough formally to
is only an advisableposition when either invest us in our camp. Shouldthe enemy
thepossibilityofoperating againstthe attempt the investment with insufficient
red, and strategic flank of the aggressor is so deci- means, then we should be able to sally
sive that we may be sure beforehand of out of the camp and beat him in
being where
able inhisthat waycan
to keep detail
TAR point army effect him
nothiatng,a cc. When we can count upon relief
izin or in a case where there is no object at- like the Saxons at Pirna, 1756, and as
Th e tainable by the aggressor for which the took place in the main at Prague, because
Prague could only be regar
defence need be uneasy . If there is such tren ded as an en
ched camp in which Prince Charles
an object, and the strategic flank of the would not have allowed himself to be
chepost
cine TI
assailant cannot beseriously menaced ,
 116 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
shut up if he had not known that the and only differ in reality from the other 1
Moravian army could liberate him. in this, that with the fortress they make
One of these three conditions is there .
up an inseparable whole, by which
fore absolutely necessary to justify the they naturally acquire much greater
choice of a strong position for the main strength .
body of an army ; at the same time we But there follows further from the
must add that the two last are bor- above the undermentioned special points.
dering on a great danger for the defen- a. That they may also have the particu
sive.
ofthefor
But if it is a question of exposing lar
tress either impossibletheor siege
object of rendering extremely diffi
an inferior corps totherisk of being cult. This object may be worth agreat
sacrificedforthe benefitofthe whole, sacrificeof troopsiftheplace is aport
then these conditions disappear, and which cannot be blockaded, but in any
the only point to decide is whether by other case we have to take care lest the
such asacrifice a greater evil may be place is onewhich may bereduced by
avoided. This will seldom happen ; atthe hunger so soon that the sacrifice of any
. considerable number of troops is
inconceivable
same time it is certainly not not
The entrenched camp at Pirna prevented justifiable.
Frederick the Great from attacking Bo b. Entrenched camps can be formed
hemia, as he would have done , in the
near fortresses for smaller bodies of
year1756. TheAustrians were atthat troops than those in the open field.
timeso littleprepared atthe
,th lossof Fourorfive thousand men maybe invin
that kingdom appears beyond doubt ; and cible under the walls of a fortress, when,
perhaps, a greater loss of men would on the contrary, in the strongestcamp in
have been connected with than
it the the world , formed in theopen field, they
17,000 allied troops who capitulated in would be lost.
the Pirna camp .
They may be used for the assembly
fied under a and b are in favour of the
and6. organisation
c. If none of those possibilities speci- still of forces
too little solidity to bewhich havein
trusted
aggressor ; if, therefore, the conditions
which we have there laid down for the de contact with the enemy, withoutthe sup
fensive are fulfilled , then there remains port afforded by the works of the place,
certainly nothing to be done by the as for example, recruits, militia , national
assailant but to fix himself before the levies, etc.
position , like a setter before a covey of They might, therefore, be recommended
birds, to spread himself, perhaps, as as a very useful measure, in many ways,
much as possible by detachments over ifthey had not the immensedisadvantage
the country,and contenting himself with whenthey
of injuring cannot be occupied
the fortress, more ;orandlessto,
thesesmall and indecisiveadvantages provide the fortress always with a garri
to leave the real decision as to the
possession of territory to the future . son, in some measure sufficient to occupy
In this case the position has fulfilled the camp also,would be much too onerous
its object . a condition .
3. Entrenched camps near fortresses. Weare, therefore, very much inclined
They belong ,as already said , to the class to consider themonly advisable for places
of entrenched positions generally, in so on a sea coast, and as more injurious
far, as they have for their object to than useful in all other cases.
cover not a tract of territory, but an If, in conclusion, weshould summarise
armed force against a hostile attack , our opinion in a general view, then strong
and entrenched positions are
CHAP. XIV .] FLANK POSITIONS. 117

1. The more requisite the smaller the them by other forces, or by the inclem
country, the less the space afforded for a ency of season, or by a rising of the
retreat. nation, or by want, &c.
2. The less dangerous the more surely 3. The more efficacious, the weaker the
we can reckon on succouring or relieving elementary force of the enemy's attack

CHAPTER XIV.

FLANK POSITIONS.

We have only allotted to this prominent strategic flank of the advancing enemy,
conception, in the world of ordinary mili- but also that the enemy alarmed for his
tarytheory, a special chapter in dictionary own retreat is unable to seizeoursentirely ;
fashion, thatit may the more easilybe for ifthat last is not thecase, then be
found ; for we do not believe that any cause our position is not a strong, that is
thing independent in itself is denoted by not an unassailable one, we should run the
the term. risk of being obliged to fight without
Every position which is to be held, having the commandof any retreat.
even if the enemy passes by it, is a flank The year 1806 affords an example
position ; for from the moment that he which throws a light on this. The dis
does so it can have no other efficacy but position ofthe Prussian army, on the
k of the Saal, might in respect
that which it exercises on the enemy's rightbanparte 's ce
y, to Buona advan by Hof, have
strate
all gic Alank.
strong positionsThere
are flank positsaril
fore, neces ions as become in every sense a flank position, if
well; for as they cannot be attacked , the the army had been drawn up with its front
enemyaccordingly is driven topassthem parallel to the Saal, and there, in that
by, therefore they canonly havea value positi on, waited theprogress of events.
If there had not been here such a dis
nce
by their influe on his strate flank .gic
The direction of the proper front of a proportion of moraland physical powers,
strong position is quiteimmaterial, whe- if there had only been a Daun at the
ther itruns parallel withtheenemy's headoftheFrencharmy,then the Prus
strate gic flank, asColberg, or atright sian position might haveshown its efficacy
angles as Bunzelwitz andDrissa, for a by amost brilliant result. To pass it by
was quite impossible ; that was acknow
strong position
But it may also front irab
mustbedes leway
every still; to ledged byBuonaparte,by his resolution
maintain a position which is not unassail- to attack it ; in severing from it the
able, even if the enemy passes by it, line of retreat even Buonaparte him
self did not completely succeed, and
such ad prepo
shoul its situat
nderaionting
, foradvan nce, give
instatage us
in the if the disproportion in physical and
comparative relations of the lines of re- moral relations had not been quite so
great, that would have been just aslittle
treat and communication , that we can not
ous practicable as the passing it by, for the
only make an efficaci attack on the
118 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.

Prussian army was in much less danger mainly produced by its properties, as is
from its left wing being overpowered the case in the action against a stra
than the French army would have been tegic flank .
by the defeat of their left wing. Even It appears from this that there is
with the disproportion of physical and nothing new to establish with regard to
moral power as it existed , a resolute and the properties of a flank position. A few
sagacious exercise of the command would words only on the character of the mea
still have given great hopes of a victory. sure may properly be introduced here;
There was nothing to prevent the Duke we set aside, however, completely strong
of Brunswick from making arrangements positions inthe true sense, as we have
on the 13th, so that on the mornting of said enough about them already.
the 14th , at day - break, he migh have A flankposition which is not assailable
opposed 80,000 men to the 60,000 with is an extremely efficacious instrument,
which Buonaparte passed the Saal, near but certainly just on that accounta dan
Jena and Dornburg. Had even this supe gerous one . If the assailant is checked
riorit y in numbers, and the steep valley by it , then we have obtained a great
of the Saal behind the French not been effect hy a small expenditure of force; it
suffi cient to procure a decisivevictory, is the pressure of the finger on thelong
still it was a fortunate concurrence of cir lever of a sharp bit. But if the effect
cumstances, and if withsuchadvantages is too insignificant,ifthe assailant is not
no successful decision could be gained, stopped, then the defensive has more of
no decisionwasto beexpected in thatdis- lessimperilledhis retreat, and mustseek
trict of country; and weshould,therefore, toescape either in hasteand by adetour
have retreated further,inorder to gain -consequentl
reinforcements and weaken the enemy . y underveryunfavourable
circumstances ,or he is in danger ofbeing
The PrussianpositionontheSaal, compelled tofight withoutanyline of
therefore, although assailable, might retreat being open tohim. Against a
have beenregarded as a flank position bold adversary, having the moral supo
in respect
but like every great road
totheposition which canHof;
through
be at riority,and seeking a decisivesolution,
this means is therefore extremely hazard
tacked , that property is not to be attri ous and entirely out of place, as shown
buted to it absolutely,because it would by theexample of 1806 above quoted,
only have become so if the enemy had On the other hand, when used against
not attempted to attack it. a cautious opponent in a war of mere
Still less would it bespeak a clear idea Observation, it may be reckoned one of
if those positions which cannot be main the best means which the defensive can
tainedaftertheenem y has passed
them ,andfrom which, in consequ by
ence of adopt. TheDukeFerdinand's defence of
theWeser by his position ontheleft
that, thede fensiveseeks toattackthe bank , and the well-known positions of
assailant's flank, werecalled flankposi- Schmotseifen andLandshutareexamples
tions merely because his attack is di.
ofthis ; only the latter, it is true, by the
rected against aflank;forthis flank catastrophe which befell Fouque's courbo
attackposition
hashardly anythi ng to dowith applicat
in1760,also
ion
shows thedangerof a false
the itself, or, at least, is not .
 DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 119
CIIAP xv.]

CHAPTER XV .

DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS .

every one then thinks to himself, Now

The influence of mountains on the con
duct of war is very great;tthe subject, if the enemy should appear with only
therefore, is very importan for theory. t
a few hundred men, he migh dis
As this influence introduces into action perse the whole . From this has origi
å retarding principle, it belongs chiefly nated the expression used by historical
to the defensive. We shall therefore writers, when they describe a narrow
discuss it here in a wider sense than that
pass as a place where “ a handful of men
conv eyed by the simple conception, de- mig ht keep an army in check.” At the
fence of mountains. * As we have dis- same time, every one who has had any
covered in our consideration of the sub- experience in war knows , or ought to
ject results which run counter to general know , that such a march through moun
opinion in many points , we shall there- tains has little or nothing in common
fore be obliged to enter into rather an with the attack of these same mountains,
and that therefore to infer from the
elab e analfirst
Weoratshall ysis of it. ne
exami the tactical difficulty of marching through mountains
nature of the subject, in order to gain that the difficulty of attacking them must
the point where it connects itself with be much greater is a false conclusion .
It is natural enough that an inexpe
Thegyendle
strate . ssdifficulty attending the rienced person should thus argue, and it
march of large columns on mountain is almost as natural that the art of war
roads, the extraordinary strength which itself for a certain time should have been
asmall post obtains by a steep scarp entangled in the same error, for the fact
covering its front, and by ravines right which itrelated to was almost as new
at that time to those accustomed to war
quest
and left ly the
ionabsuppo itsipal
rtingprinc flankcause s why
s, are un as to the uninitiated . Before the Thirty
such efficacy and strength are universally Years' War, owing to the deep order of
attributed to the defence of mountains, battle, the numerous cavalry , the rude
so that nothing but the peculiarities in fire-arms, and other peculiarities, it was
mentnted formiadable
tacticsat certain periods quiteunusual to make use of and for
arma
has preve andlarge masses of combatants obstacles of ground in war,
s t
mal defence of mountain , at leas by
from
Whe n aging
enga coluinmnit., winding like a ser- regular troops, was almost impossible.
pent, toils its way through narrow ravines It was not until a more extended order
of battle was introduced, and that in
itat
up to the top l's
a snai ofampace ain , lery
ount,artil and and over-
passestrain fantry and their arms became the chief
part of an army, that the use which might
theirers,ove
driv with vens and
oath
r -dri ts,oug
cattleshouthr h ging
be made of hills and valleys occurred to
flog the
men's minds . But it was not until a
gonrow
nar hasrug be got
to ged out
roads ofh the
, eac way wa
broken g hundred years afterwards, or about the
with
indescribable trouble , whilst all behind middle of the eighteenth century, that
the idea became fully developed .
are detained , cursing and blaspheming,
120
ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
The second circumstance, namely, the defiance to that odious turning movement.
great defensive capability which might Now as the connection between these posts
be given to a small post planted on a was considered sufficiently secure bythe
point difficult of access, was still more intervening spaces , being ground of an
suited to lead toanexaggeratedideaof impassable nature(columns at thattime
the strength of mountain defences . The notbeing ableto quitthe regular roads),
opinion arose that it was only necessary to it was thought a wall of brass was thus
multiply such a post by a certain number presented to the enemy. As an extra
to make an army out of a battalion , a precaution, a few battalions, some horse
chain of mountains out of a mountain .
and a dozen squadrons of
It is undeniable that a small post artillery,
cavalry,' formed a reserveto provide
acquires an extraordinary strength by against theevent of the line being unex
selecting a good position in a moun- pectedly burst through at any point,
tainous country. A small detatchment,
thisone
which would be driven off in the level of No deny that
ideawillis shown the prevalence
by history, and it
country by a couple of squadrons, and is not certain that at this day we are com
think itself lucky to saveitself from rout pletely emancipated from these errors:
or capture by a hasty retreat, can in the
mountains stand
up before a whole army ,
Thecourse of improvement in tactics
sincethe Middle
and,as onemight say, with a kind of creasing strengthAges,
of with thelikewise
armies, ever in
tactical effrontery exact thehaving
honour of regular attack
military contributed to bring mountainous districts
a , of its
flank turned, etc., etc. How it obtains in this sense
military actionmore
. within the scope of
this defensive power , by obstacles to The chief characteristic of mountain
approach, pointsd'appui for its flanks, defence is its completepassivity ; in this
and new positions which it finds onits lightmounta the tendency towardsthedefence
retreat,is a subjectestablis ics to explain ; of
fortacthed ins was very natural before
we acceptit as an fact. armies attained to their present capa
It was very natural to believe that a bility of movement. But armies were
numb erofsuchposts placed in aline constantly becoming greater,andon
would give a very strong , almost unas
sailable front, and all that remained to account of the effect of fire -arms began
bedonewas to preventthe position from to extend
lines connected and a
more with more
greatdeal of thin
into long art,
extending
being turned by itright and left
untileither flank-supports were metwith and
almost that account
onimpossible , to move , often,
very difficult
. To dispose
commensurate with the importance of the
whole, or until the extent of the position in order of battle, such an artistic machine,
itself gave security against turning move was often halfa day's work, and half
ments. A mountainous countryspecially the
attended
battle ;tointhe preliminary
and almost all which plan of
is now
a succession of defensive
pos anotons
one apparently better thaniti that position or drawing up. After thiswake
her,, each
one does not know where to stop ; and was done it was therefore difficult to make
therefore it ended in all and every ap any modifications to suit new circum
proach to the mountains within a certain stances which might spring up ;from
this itfollowed that the assailant, being
defence, andtenorfifteensingle posts , rally adapted
form histothe order ofhatte
by theitenemy
the lastto line of battle, natu
thusspread overa space of about ten adopted , withoutthe latter
miles or more , weresupposed to bid being able in turn to modifyhis in accola
 DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 121
CHAP . XV . ]
dance. The attack thus acquired a experienced, if we mayuse the expression,
general superiority, and the defensive a defeat like that which the armies en
had no other means of reinstating the gaged in it in the Revolutionary war so
balance than that of seeking protection often suffered .
from the impediments of ground, and But that we may not reject the good
for this nothing was so favourable in with the bad, and allow ourselves to be
general as mountainous ground . Thus carried along by the stream of common .
it became an objectto couple, as it were, place to assertions which, in actual
the army with a formidable obstacleof experience, would berefuted a thousand
ground, and the two united then made times by the force of circumstances, we
common cause. The battalion defended must distinguish the effects of moun
the mountain , and the mountain the bat- tain defence according to the nature of
talion of the
the aid; so passive
mountai nousdefence
ground through
became theThe
cases.
principal question to be decided
highly efficacious, and there was no here, and that which throws the greatest
other evilin the thing itself except that light over the whole subject is, whether
it entailed a greater loss of freedom of the resistance which is intended by
movement , but of that quality they did the defence of mountains is to be
not understand the particular use at that relative or absolute — whether it is only
time. intended to last for a time, or is meant
end in a decisive victory. For a re
When
upon eachtwo
other,antagoni stic system
theexposed, that is, act to
s the sistance of the first kind mountainous
weak point on the one side always draws ground is in a high degree suitable, and
upon itself the blows from the other side. introduces into it a very powerful element
If the defensive becomes fixed , and as it of strength ; for one of the latter kind ,
were, spell-bound in posts, which are in on the contrary, it is in general not at all
themselves strong, and can not be taken , suitable, or only so in some special cases.
the aggressorthen becomes bold in turning In mountains every movement is slower
movements, because hehas no apprehen- and more difficult, costsalso more time,
sion about his own flanks. This is what and more men as well, if within the
took place — The turning, as it was called, sphere of danger. But the loss of the
soon became the order of the day : tó assailant in time and men is thestandard
counteract this, positions were extended by which the defensive resistance is mea
more and more ; they were thus weak- sured. As long as the movement is all on
ened in front, and the offensive suddenly the side of the offensive so long the de
turned upon that part: instead of trying fensive has a marked advantage ; but as
to outflank by extending, the assailant soon as the defensive resorts to this prin
now concentrated his masses for attack at ciple of movement also, that advantage
ceases .
Now from the nature of the
some one point, and the line was broken. ds,
This is nearly what took place in regard thing, thatis to say, on tactical groun
a relative resistance allows of much
to mountain defences according to the greater degree of passivity than one
latest modern history . which is intended to lead to a decisive
Thendera
prepo ive throu
offensnce had thusagain gaine
gh the great d a result, and it allows this passivity to
er mo-
bility of troops; and it was onlythrough becarriedto anextreme, that is, to
the same means that the defence could the end of the combat, which in the
seek for help. But mountainous ground othercasecannever happen. The im
by its nature isopposed to mobility , and peding element of mountain ground,
thus the whole theory of mountain defence which as a medium of greater density
122 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
weakens all positive activity, is, there- In the first place, a country without roads
fore, completely suited to the passive is often confounded with one which is
defence. quite impassable. Where a column, or
We have already said that a small where artillery and cavalry cannot march,
post acquires an extraordinary strength infantry may still, in general, be able
by the nature of the ground ; but although may often be
to pass, and even artillery
this tactical result in general requires no brought there as well, for the movements
further proof, we must add to what we made in a battle by excessive efforts of
have said some explanation . We must short duration are not to be judged of
be careful here to draw a distinction be- by the same scale as marches. The
tween what is relatively and what is secure connection of the single posts with
absolutely small. If a body of troops, one another rests therefore on an illusion ,
let its size be what it may, isolates a por- and the flanks are in reality in danger.
tion of itself in a position,thisportion may Or next it is supposed, a lineof small
possibly be exposed to the attack of the posts,which are very strong in front,are
whole body ofthe enemy's troops, there also equallystrong on theirflanks,because
fore of a superior force, in opposition to
a ravine, a precipice, etc., etc., form excel
which it is itself small. There, as a lent supports for a small post. But why
rule, no absolute but only a relative de are they so ? —not because they make it
fence can be the object. The smaller impossible to turn the post, but because
the post in relation to the whole body theycause the enemyan expenditure of
from which it is detached and in relation time and offorce,which gives scope for
to the whole body of the enemy , the more the effectual action of the post. The ene
this applies. my who, in spite of the difficulty of the
But a post also which is small in an ground, wishes, and in fact is obliged, to
absolute sense, that is, one which is not turn such a post, because the frontis un
opposed an enemy, superio
by therefore
and which,
r to itself
may aspire to an, assailable requires,perhaps, half-a-day
absolute defence, a real victory, will be to execute his purpose, and cannot after
all accomplish" it without some loss of
infinitely better off in mountains than men . Now if such a post can be suc
a large army, and can derive more ad coured, or if it is only designed to resist
vantage from the ground as we shall show for acertain space of time,or lastly, if it
further on .
is ableto copes have
Our conclusion , therefore, is, that a flank with the enemy,then the
done their part, and
small post in mountains possesses great support
we may say the position had not onlya
flanks aswell,
strength. How this may be ofdecisive strong front, but strong itis
utility in all cases which depend entirely But it is notthesameifquestion a
on a relative defence is plain of itself;
butwillitbe of the same decisive utility tendedmou posts, forming. part
of a line ofntainposition of an ex
Noneofthese
absolute defence bya whole army ?
for the
This is the question which we now pro three conditions are realised in that case.
pose to examine. The enemy attacks one point with an
First of all we ask whether a front overwhelming force, the support in rear
line composed of several posts has, as isperhaps slight, and yet it is a question
has hitherto been assumed , the same of absolute resistance . Under such cir
strength proportionally as each post cumstances flank :supports of such
the nothing
posts are worth
singly. This is certainly not the case,
and to suppose so would involve one of Upon a weak pointlike thisthe attack
usually directs its blows. The assault
two errors .
with concentrated, and therefore very
 E OF MOUNTAINS.
(PINO DEFENC 123
CHAP . xv .]
Duntryritkatrs superior forces, upon a point in front, retreat, made under a pressure exerted
with one di may certainly be met by a resistance, which along the whole front, and great as may
ere a coleta is very violent as regards that point, but be the loss of time to an enemy who
alrycannotbra which is unimportant as regards the whole. makes a turning movement in such a
general, beable After it is overcome, the line is pierced, country, still theseagain are only advan
erg mas ajal and the object of the attack attained . tages in the case of a relative defence, ad
of the DoTedzi From this it follows that the relative vantages which have no connection with
Icessite fine di resistance in mountain warfare is, in the decisive battle, the resistance to the
to be juded
general, greater than in a level country, last extremity . The resistance will last
marches. 1 that it is comparatively greatest in small certainly somewhat longer, that is until
single petti posts, and does not increase in the same the enemy has reached a point with his
flank - columns which menaces or com
Te onanillat measure
Let usasnow
theturn to the
masses real object
increase. of pletely bars our retreat. Once he has
lity in danga
a line of great battles generally — to the positive gained sucha point then relief is a thing
ong in front o victory which may alsobe the object in hardly possible. No act of the offensive
ns
the defence of mountai . If the whole which we can make from the rear can
rflanks, haare
etc, form eine mass, or the principal part of the force, drive him out again from the points
. But e is employed for that purpose, then the which threaten us ; no desperate assault
postey keth defence ofmountains changes itself eo ipso with our whole mass can clear the pas
se th ma s into a defensive battle in the mountains . A sage which he blocks. Whoever thinks he
, but became
st nditure
expe et battle, that is the application of all our discovers in this a contradiction, and
gisrets scope kr powers to the destruction of the enemy believes that the advantages which the
po . The entire is now the form , a victory the object of assailant has in mountain warfare, must
the combat. The defence of mountains also accrue to the defensive in an attempt
fficulty ofthe to cut his way through, forgets the dif
tis obliged I which takes place in this combat, appears ference of circumstances. The corps
Chefrontison no a subo
nowlonge r the ate tcons
rdinobjec , it ider
is only n , for
atiothe is which opposes the passage is not en.
it s.
mean
ps, half-a-dip
1 cannot site Nowin this view, how does the ground gaged inan absolute defence, afew hours?
sone In
in mountains answer to the object ? resistance will probably be sufficient ; it
The character of a defensive battle is is, therefore, in the situation of a small
can be
gued toresist a passive reaction in front, and an in- post. Besides this, its opponent is no
vlastir,ift creased active reaction in rear ; but longer in full possession of all his fight
Or
amp, then the
for this the ground in mountains is a ing powers ; he is thrown into disorder,
paralysingprinciple. There are two rea- wants ammunition , etc. Therefore, in
zeir part,and sons for this : first, want of roads af- any view , the chance of cutting through
ed not only i fording means of rapidly moving in all is small, and this is the danger that the
anks as wel directions, from the rear towards the defensive fears above all ; this fear is at
is aquest
is front, and even the sudden tactical at- work even during the battle, and ener
art of an er
tack is hampered by the unevenness of vates every fibre of the struggling ath
Tone ofthe ground ; secondly, å free view over the lete. A nervous sensibility springs up
in that can country, and the enemy's movements is on the flanks, and every small detach
int with us not to behad. The ground in mountains, ment which the aggressor makes a dis
ort in na therefore, ensures in this case to the play of on any woodedeminence in our
s aquestiu enemy the same advantages which it rear, is for him a new lever, helping on
er such a
Its ofcat gave to us in the front, and deadens all the the victor
The y . advantages will,
se dis for the most
the attack
tobe ed of
half
betteradd the
a thi objecttance.
rd resis Toely
ion, nam theis
this par t, disappear, leaeving all the in
tages, if thedef encof a mou nta
advan
dis
the ascult danger of being cut off. Much as a trict consists in the concentrated dis .
efore Feri mountainous country is favourable to a
124 ON WAR . 1
[ BOOK VI.
position of the army on an extensive in a geological, than in a geometrical
mountain plateau . There we may ima sense. 1

gine a very strong front; flanks very For smaller bodies of troops, the dis 1
difficult of approach , and yet the most advantages of a defensive position in
perfect freedom of movement, both mountains diminish as we have already
within and in rear of the position. remarked . The cause of this is, that
Such a position would be one of the such bodies take up less space, and re
strongest that there can be, but it is quire fewer roads for retreat, etc., etc.
little more than an illusion , for although A single hill is not a mountain system ,
most mountains are more easily tra- and has not the same disadvantages.
versed along their crests than on their The smaller the force, the more easily
declivities, yet most plateaux of moun . it can establish itself on a single ridge
tains are either too small for such a pur
or hill, and the less will be thenecessity
for it to get entangledinthe
pose ,orthey have no proper right to be of intricacies
called plateaux, and are so termed more countless steep mountain gorges.

CHAPTER XVI.

DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS ( CONTINUED).

We now proceed to the strategic use of
the tactical results developed in the pre assailant. This runs exactly counter to
ceding chapter. the generally received opinion; butthen
We make a distinction between the how many other things there are which
following points : general opinion confuses; how little does
1. A mountainous district as a battle it draw distinctions between things which
field . are of the most oppositecenature! From
l resistanoffer
2.The influencewhich the possession of the powerfu
bodies oftroopsmay in amsmall
which oun
it exercises on other parts of the country .
3. Its effect as a strategic barrier. tainous country, common opinion be
4. The attention which it demands in comes impressed with an idea that all
respect to the supply of the troops. mountain defence is extremely strong,
The first and most important of these and is astonished when any one denies
heads, we must again subdivide as that this great strength is communicated
follows :
to the greatest act of all defence, the
a. A general action . defensive battle. On the other hand, it
b. Inferior combats. is instantly ready, whenever a battle is
lost by the defensive in mountain war
1. A mountain system as a battle - field . fare, to point out the inconceivable error
Wehaveshowninthepreceding chapter regard to theoffactthat
of a system
how unfavourable mountain ground is to natureanyof
in thewithout
cordon war,
the defensive in a decisive battle , and , on
the other hand, how much it favours the
things such a system is unavoidable in
mountain warfare. We do not hesitate
to put ourselves in direct opposition to
CHAP . XVI DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 125
1..]
such an opinion, and at the same time predominating character must be a con
centrated order of battle in the moun
we mustion,mention , that to our
we have found great
our views tains, in which everything unites into one
satisfact
supported in the works of an author battle, and passes as much as possible
under the eye of one comman
whose opinion oughtto have great weight which der, and in
there are sufficient reserves to
in this matter ; we allude to the history make the decision something more than
of the campaigns of 1796 and 1797, by
the Archduke Charles, himself a good a mere warding off, a mere holding up of
the shield. This condition is indispens
historical writer, a good critic, and above able, but difficult to realise ; and the
all,Wecan general.
a goodonly characterise it as a lament. drifting into the pure defence of moun
able position when the weaker defender, tains comes so naturally , that we cannot
who has laboriously, by the greatest be surprised at its often happening ; the
effort, assembled all his forces, in order danger in this is so great that theory
to make the assailan t feel the effect of cannot too urgently raise a warning voice.
his love of Fatherland, asm
of his enthusi Thus muchas to a decisive battle with
ability,
andonhiswhom in a eye
decisive battle — when the main body of the army.-
he every is fixed in anxious For combats of minor significance and
expectation, having betaken himself to importance, a mountainous country : on
the obscurity of thickly veiled moun- the other hand, may be very favourable,
tains, and hampered in every movement because the main point in them is not
by the obstinate ground ,standsexposed absolute defence, and because no decisive
to the thousand possible forms of attack results are coupled with them. We may
make this plainer by enumerating the
which his .powerful
againsthim adversary can use
Only towards one single objects oflythisreaction.
a . Mere to gain time. This motive
side isligen
intel there
ce, still
and left
thatan isopen fieldfor
in mak ing his
all occurs a hundred times : always in the case
possible use of every obstacle ofground; of a defensive line formed with theview
s
but this leads close to the border of of observat ion ; besides that, in all cases
in which a reinforcement is expected.
allstro
the disa
under us mstan
circu is toons
of , cord
war ces whicedh ,.
be, avoid 6. The repulseof a mere demonstration
or minor enterprise of the enemy. If a
Very far therefore from aseein g atain
moun ouse province is guarded by mountains which
refug
for the
coun try , whe n sive
defen , in
a deci sive battle is sought, are defended by troops, then this defence,
however weak , will always suffice to pre
we should rather advise a general in such vent partisan attacks and expeditions
a case to avoid such a field by every pos intended to plunder the country . With
It ismean
sible s. however , that this is some- out the mountains , such
true, a weak chain of
impilyosshave
timesssar but thebattlet willacte
then ess. ns
posts would ebe uselnstr
nece iblea; very differen char r c. To mak demo atio on our own
fromone in a level country : the disposi- part. It will be some time yet beforen
general opinion with respect to mou
tend mostpscase
in troo
of -the
tion ed will
s twic e or h
be muc mor
thre e exs
e time tains will be brought to the right point ;
until then an enemy may at any time be
the ther; the
count
the leng blow stance less
resimuch passive,
moreeffect ive. met with who is afraid of them ,and shrinks
These are influences ofmountain ground back fromthem inefor hise, under takings,
In such a case, ther the principal
which are inevitable ; still, in such a body may also be used for the defence
battle the defensive is not to be converted of a mountain system . In wars carried
into a mere defence of mountains ; the
126 ON VAR . [BOOK VI.
on with little energy or movement, this we want to occupy. But it is not so in
state of things will often happen ; but it mountains; there a very stout resistance
must always be a condition then that we is possible by much inferior forces, and
neither design to accept a general action for that reason, if we require a portion of
in this mountain position, nor can be country which includes mountains, enter
compelled to do so. prises of a special nature, formed for the
d. In general, a mountainous country purpose, and often necessitating a con
is suited for all positions in which we do siderable expenditure of time as well as
not intend to accept any great battle, for of men , are always required in order to
each of the separate parts of the army is obtain possession. If, therefore, the
stronger there, and it is only the whole mountains of a country are not the theatre
that is weaker; besides, in such a posi- of the principal operations of a war, we
tion, it is not so easy to be suddenly at cannot , as we should were it the case of
tacked and forced into a decisive battle. upon the
a district of level country, look
e. Lastly,a mountainous country isthe possessionof themountains as dependent
true region for the efforts of people in of our
a on and a necessary consequence
arms. But while national risings should success at other parts.
always be supported by small bodies of A mountainous district has therefore
regular troops, on the other hand, the much more independence,
proximity of a great army seems to have and the pos
session of it is much former and less liable
an unfavourable effect upon movements to change. If we add to this that a
of this kind ; this motive, therefore, as ridge of mountains from its crests
a rule, will never give occasion for trans affords a good view over the adjacent
ferring the whole army to the mountains. open country , whilst it remains itself
Thus much for mountains in connection
with the positions which may be taken veiled in obscurity, we may therefore
conceive that when we are close to moun
up there for battle. tains, without being in actual possession
2. The influence of mountains on other of them , they are to be regarded as a
parts of the country. constant source of disadvantage - a sort
of laboratory of hostile forces ; and this
Because, as we have seen , it is so easy will be the case in astill greater degree
in mountainous ground to secure a con if the mountains are not only occupied
siderable tract of territory by small posts, by the enemy, butalsoform part of his
80 weak in numbers that in a district territory. The smallest bodies of adven .
easily traversed they could not maintain
themselves, and would be continually turous partisans always find shelter there
exposed to danger ; because every step ifpursued, and can then sally forth again
forward in mountains which have been with impunity at other points; the
occupied by the enemy must be made largest bodies, under their cover, can
much more slowly than in a level country, approach unperceived, and our forces
and therefore cannot be made at the must, therefore, always keep at a suffi
same rate with him — therefore the ques cientdistance ifthey would avoid getting
tion, Who is in possession ? -is also much within reach of their dominating infu
more important in reference to mountains ence — if they would not be exposed to
than to any other tract of country of disadvantageous combats and sudden
equal extent. In an open country, the attacks which they cannot return.
possession may change from day to day. In this manner every mountain sys
The mere advance of strong detachments tem, as far as a certain distance, exer
compels the enemy to give up the country cises a very great influence overthe lower
and more level country adjacent to it.
CHAP , XVI DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 127
1..]
Whether this influence shall take effect which may afford us an opportunity of
momentarily, for instance in a battle (as gaining avictory, because the enemy will
at Maltsch on the Rhine, 1796) or only be compelled by it to divide his forces in
after some time upon the lines of com- advancing, and is tied down to certain
munication, depends on the local rela- roads, which will enable us with our
tions ;—whether or not it shall be over : forces concentrated behind the moun
come through some decisive event hap- tains to fall upon fractions of his force.
As the assailant on his march through
pening
dependsinonthethevalley or level
relations of thecountry,
armed the mountains, irrespective of all other
forces to each other respectively. considerations, cannot march in a single
Buonaparte, in 1805 and 1809, advanced column because he would thus expose
upon Vienna without troubling himself himself to the danger of getting engaged
much about the Tyrol; but Moreau had to in a decisive battle with only one line of
leave Swabia in 1796, chiefly because he retreat, therefore , the defensive method
was not master of the more elevated parts recommends itself certainly on substan
of the country, and too many troops were tial grounds. But as the conception of
mountains and their outlets is very un
ns,d defined , the question of adopting this
required
in watchisthem.
whichtothere In campaig
an evenly balance
series of alternate successes on each side, plan depends entirely on the nature of
we shall not expose ourselves to the the country itself, and it can only be
constant disadvantage of the mountains pointed out as possible whilst it must
also be considered as attended with two
remaini
we ng therefor
need, in possessi on ofendeavo
e, only ur to: disadvantages, the first is, that if the
the enemy
enemy receives a severe blow, he soon
seize
ofthem which isrequiredn ofonthat
andretainpossessio portion
accou ntof finds shelterin the mountains ; the second
is, that he is in possession of the higher
the direction of the principal lines of our ground, which, although not decisive,
tains this generall
attack ;being the arena y leads to the moun
of thesepar ate must still always be regarded as a disad
minor comba ts which take
forces on each side . But we must place between
be
vanta ge for thepursuer .
We know of no battle given under
careful of overrating the importance of such circumstances unless the battle with
Alvinzi in 1796 can be so classed . But
this circu
sider mstan
a mount ce ,-chain
ain and being led totocon
as thekey the that the case may occur is plain from
Buonaparte's passage of the Alps in the
wholemain
the cases, When
in allpoint. ssion
possery
and itsa victo as year 1800, when Melas might and should
is the
object sought ;then it istheprincipal, have fallen onhim with his whole force
object; and if the victory is gained, befor e hehad united his columns.
The second influence which mountains
other
to thething
paras can regulated
mounbet requi remenaccor ding may have asa barrier isthatwhich
t ofthe
they have upon the lines of communica
situation . tion if they cross those lines. Without
3. Mountains considered in their aspect of taking into account what may bedone
a strategic barrier . by erecting forts at the points of passage
andbyarmi
We must divide this subject under mountai ng the people,thebadroads in
ns atcertain seasons of the year
twoTheheads.
first is again that of a decisive may of themselves alone prove at once
battle. We can,for instance , consider destruct ive to an army; they have fre
quently compelled a retreat after having
the mountain chain as a river, that is, as first sucked all the marrow and blood
a barrier with certain points of passage ,
128 ON WAR . [BOOK VI,
out of the army.
If, in addition, troops thereby, that kind of defensive which is
of active partisans hover round, or there decisive, on the result of which the ques
is a national rising to add to the diffi- tion of the possession or loss of the
culties, then the enemy'sarmy is obliged country depends. They limit theview
to make large detachments , and at last and prevent movements in every direc
driven to form strong posts in the moun tion ; they force a state of passivity, and
tains and thus gets engaged in one of make it necessary to stop every avenue
the most disadvantageous situations that or passage, which always leads more or
can be in an offensive war. less to a war of cordons. We should
4. Mountains in their relation to the pro therefore, if possible, avoid mountains
visioning an army . with the principal mass of our force, and
This is a very simple subject, easy to leave
before
them on one side, or keep them
behind us.
or
understand. The opportunity to make At the same time, we think that, for
the best use of them in this respect is
minor operations and objects, there
when the assailant is either obliged to element of increased strength toisbe
an
remain in the mountains , or at least to found in mountain ground ; and after
leave them close in his rear .
what has been said , we shall not be
These considerations on the defence of accused
that sucha inconsistency
of country in maintaining
is thereal place of
mountains, which, in the main , embrace for those
all mountain warfare, and, by their re refuge for the weak, that is,
flection , throw also the necessary light who dare not any longer seek an absolute
on offensive war, must not be deemed decision. On the other hand again, the
incorrect or impracticable because advantages derived from a mountainous
we can
neither make plains out of mountains, nor countryby troops acting an inferior rôle
hills out of plains, and the choice of a cannot be participated inby large masses
theatre of war is determined by so many of troops.
other things that it appears as if there was Still all these considerations will hardly
counteract the impressions made on the
little margin left for considerations of this
kind In affairs of magnitude it will be senses. The imagination not only of the
found that this margin is not so small. inexperienced but also of all those accus
If it is a question of the disposition and tomed to bad methods of war will still
effective employment of the principal feel in the concrete case such an over
force , and that, even in the moment of a powering dread of the difficulties which
decisive battle
, by a few marches more
to the inflexible and retarding
nature of
the frontor rear an army can be brought mounta inousof groundoppose
movements s totheywill
anassailant,that all the
out of mountain ground into the level
country , then a resolute concentration of hardly be able to look upon our opinion
the chief masses in the plain will neu as anything buta most singular paradox ,
tralise the adjoining mountains. Then again ,withthose who takea general
We shall now once more collect the view , the historyofthe last century (with
light which has been thrown on the sub its peculiar form of war) will take the
ject, and bring it to a focus in one distinct place of the impressions ofthesenses, and
picture. therefore there will be but few who will
We maintain and believe we have not still adhere to the belief that Austria,
shown, that mountains, both tactically for example, should bebetter able to
and strategically, are in general un defend her states on the Italian side than
favourable to the defensive , meaning on
handthe, side
the of the Rhine.
French who carried
On theonother
war
 DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 129
CHAP. XVI. ]
fensive til for twenty years under a leader both and to leave them behind. Besides, a
which the energetic and indifferent to minor con- determination to accept a great battle in
Or les do siderations, and have constantly before the plains, by no means excludes a pre
limit the their eyes the successful results thus ob. liminary defence of the mountains by
Dements tained, will, for some time to come, dis subordinate forces, an arrangement very
' pacient tinguish themselves in this as well as in advisable in respect to such masses as
DETETTEL other cases by the tact of a practised the Alps and enees. Lastly, it is
Lead Di judgment . far from our intention to argue that the
Does it follow from this that a state conquest of a mountainous country is
one , unless
better
would bethan
country d by an open easier than that of a level *
protectens
olur tanga by mountai , that Spain a single victory sufficed to prostrate the
y completely . After this victory
- kep de would be stronger without the
Lombardy more difficult of acces Pyrenee
s with-s ; enem
ensues a state of defence for the con
queror, during which the mountainous
outNort
as thehAlps,
German level
andy amor e diffi cultryto such
count con- ground must be as disadvantageous
quer than a mountainous country ? To to the assailant as it was to the defen
ngth 13
d
: an st these false deductions we shall devote sive, and even more so. If the war con
tinues, if foreign assistance arrives, if
concluding
ourWe remarks.
do notasser t that Spain would be the people take up arms, this reaction
Daint
stronger without the Pyrenees than with will gain strength from a mountainous
them , but we say that a Spanish army, country .
feelin g itself g enoudoghbetter
stronwould to engag e in It is here as in dioptrics , the image
a decisive battle, by con- represented becomes more luminous when
வீரம், 4 centrating itself in a position behind the moved in a certain direction , not, how
ounts
Demir ni Ebro, than by fractioning itself amongst ever, as far as one pleases, but onlyuntil
the fifteen passes of the Pyrenees. But the focus is reached, beyond that the
is reversed .
the influence of the Pyrenees on war is effect
If the defensive is weaker in the
very far
le og account. from being set aside on that
We say the same respecting mountains, that would seem to be a rea
an Italian army. If it divided itself in son for the assailant to prefer a line of
ards High Alps itwould bevanquished by operations in the mountains . But this
the resolute commander it encountered ,
each will seldom occur, because the difficulties
of supporting an army, and those arising
without ive of victory or
t in alternat
even the
defeat; whils the plain s ofTurin it from theroads, the uncertainty as to
would have the same chance as every whether the enemy will accept battle in
atur other army. But still no one can on that the mountains, and even whether he will
account suppose that it is desirable for take up a position there with his prin
Les ra? an aggressor to have to march over cipal force, tend to neutralise that pos
orizia
1 masses of mountains such as the Alps, sible advantage .
d « gebirgigen ” in this passage in the original
haveAsbyitsome
is conceived thate the
meansbecom words
transp “ ebenen an
osed,theirequiva lents -leveland mountainous — are hereplacedin
: a: the order inwhichit is presumed the authorintendedthewords to stand. Tr.
10 m2

ble
than
Other
K
130 ON VAR . [ BOOK VI. 2

CHAPTER XVII . 1

DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS (CONTINUED).

In the fifteenth chapter we spoke of the both the general height and the general
nature of combats in mountains, andin profileof themountain,while the valleys
the sixteenth of the use to be made of formed by the streams present also the
them by strategy, and in so doing we best means of access to the heights,
often came upon the idea of mountain because so much of the effect of the
defence, without stopping to consider the erosive and alluvial action of the water
form and details of such a measure . We is permanent, that theain
inequalities ofhed
the
shall now examine it more closely. slopes of the mount are smoot
As mountain systems frequently extend downby it to one regular slope. Hence,
like streaks or belts over the surfaceof therefore,the idea of mountain defence
the earth , and form the division between would assume that, when a mountain ran
streams flowing in different directions , about parallel with the front to be de
consequ ently the separationbetween fended , itwas to be regarded as a great
whole water systems nd as this gene
,a obstacle to approach, as a kind of ram
ral form repeats itself in the parts com part, the gates of which were formed by
posing that whole, inasmuch as these the valleys. The real defence was then
parts diverge from the main chain in to be made on the crest of this rampart,
branches or ridges, and then form the (that is, on the edge of the plateau which
separation between lesser water systems; crowned the mountain ) and cut the val
hence the idea of a system of mountain leystransversely. If the line of the prin
defence has naturally founded itself in cipal mountain -chain formed somewhat
the first instance , and afterwards deve of a right angle with the front of defence,
loped itself, upon the conception of the then one of the principal branches would
general form of mountains, that of an be selected to be used instead; thus the
obstacle ,like a great barrier, having linechosen wouldbeparallel to one of
geologi stsare not yetagreed astothe principal ridge,which might be regarded
origin of mountains and the laws of their
formation , still in every case the course as theextremity.
of the waters indicates in the shortest We have noticed this scheme for moun
and system
surestmannerthe
whether
general formof tain defence
structure founded ,onbecause
of theearth thegeological
it really
the , the action of the
water has contributed to give that general presented itself in theory for some time,
form ( according to the aqueous theory ), and in the so-called “ theory of ground "
or that the course of the water is a conse the laws of theprocess of aqueousaction
quence of the form of the system itself. have
war .
been mixed upwith the conduct of
It was, therefore, very natural again, in is so full of false hypo
But all
devising a system of mountain defence, theses andthisincorrect substitutions ,that
series of
sesform a natural
thosecourwhich
guido,aslevels, from obtain
we can
reality
when remains
these
kind
any
are tos erveasthebasis
abstracted
system.
of a
,nothing in
of
 131
CHAP. XVII. ] DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS .

The principal ridges of real mountains principal ridge, for the occupation of the
are far too impracticable and inhospitable valleyitself is often required and that at
to place largemasses of troops upon them ; its outer extremity nearest to the open
it is often the same with the adjacent country , not at its commencement, be
ridges, they are often too short and irre- cause there its sides are steeper. Besides,
gular. Plateaux do not exist on all this defence of valleys offers a means of
mountain ridges, and where they are to defending mountainous districts, even
be found they are mostly narrow, and when the ridge itself affords no position
therefore unfit to accommodate many which can be occupied ; the rôle which it
troops; indeed, there are few mountains performs is, therefore, generally greater
which, closely examined , will be found in proportion as the masses of the moun
surmounted by an uninterrupted ridge, tains are higher and more inaccessible.
or which have their sides at such an The result of all these considerations
angle that they form in some measure is, that we must entirely give up the idea
of a defensible line more or less regular,
practicable slopes, or, at least, a succes
sion of terraces . The principal ridge and coincident with one of the geological
winds, bends, and splits itself ; immense lines, and must look upon a mountain
range as merely a surface intersected and
branches launch into the adjacent country
in curved lines, and lift themselves often broken with inequalities and obstacles
just at their termination to a greater strewed over it in the most diversified
manner , the features of which we must
heightries e
monto mainon,ridg
thejoin
thanthen formf ; deep
and itsel pro
try to make the best use of which cir
valleys which do not correspond withthe cumstances permit ; that therefore, al
general system . Thus it is that, when though a knowledge of the geological
several lines of mountains cross each other, features of the ground is indispensable
or at those points from which they branch to a clear conception of the form of
out, the conception of a small band or mountain masses, it is of little value in
placeistocompl
belt etely at an
mountain and end,lines
water andradiat
gives- theorgan isation of defensive measures .
Neither in the war of the Austrian
ing from a centre in the form of a star. Succession , nor in the Seven Years' War,
From this it follows, and it will strike nor in those of the French Revolution,
those who have examined mountain- do we find military dispositions which
masses in this manner the more forcibly, comprehended a whole mountain system ,
thattheidea of asystematicdisposition and inwhich the defence was systema
is out of the question, and that to adhere tised in accordance with the leading fea
tosuch an idea as a fundamental prin- tures of that system . Nowhere do we
çiple for ourmeasureswould bewholly findarmieson the principalridges always
impracticable. There is still one im- in position on the slopes. Sometimes at
portant point to notice belonging to the a greater, sometimes at a lower eleva
tion ; sometimes in one direction , some
provinceofpractical application.
If we look closely atmoun tain warfare times in another; parallel, at right angles,
in its tactical aspects, it is evident that and obliquely ; with and against the
in lofty mountains, such
these are of two principal kinds, the first watercourse ;
as the Alps, frequently extended along
of which is the defence of steep slopes, the valleys; amongst mountains of a
Now this dlast,
the secon is that ofteow
whichof isnarr indeys
n, valle ed. inferior class, like the Sudetics (and this
is the strangest anomaly ), at the middle of
almost gene rally, highly favourable to the declivity, as it sloped towards the de
comp atibon wit
the actile nce, is not very
h thedefedisp
of the
osition onthe fender, therefore withthe principal ridge
132 ON WAR . [DOOK I. E

in front, like the position in which
Frederick the Great, in 1762 , covered
the siege of Schwednitz , with the “ hohe
‫לל‬
down large masses gradually, then spread
out, and burst through the thin andfrom
that moment weak line, which, perhaps, 1

Eule " before the front of his camp . has nothing more for its protection than
The celebrated positions , Schmotseifen the rocky bed of a shallow mountain
and Landshut, in the Seven Years ' War, stream . But now retreat, which must
are forys the most part in the bottoms of always be madet piecemeal in a valley,
the mountains is
valle . It is the same with the posi- until the outle from
irch , in the Vorarlsberg. reached ,is impossible for many parts of
Feldkigns
tion ofcampa
In the of 1799 and 1800 , the the line of troops ; and that was the
chief posts, both of the French and Aus- reason that the Austrians in Switzerland
almosttroop
trians, were always quite in the valleys, their alway s lost
s take a third,
n priso
or a half of
ners.
not merely across them so as to close
them, but also parallel with them, whilst Now a few words on the usual way of
the ridges were eithe rnot occupied atall, dividing troopsin such a method of
or merely few single posts.
by a defence.
The crests of the higher Alps in par Each ofwith
the apositiontaken
subordinate positions is in
ticular are so difficult of access , and relation up bythe
afford solittlespace for the accommoda- principalbody of troops,more or less in
tion of troops, that it would beimpos- thecentre ofthewholeline, on the prin
sible to place any considerable bodies of cipal road of approach. From thiscen;
men there. Now if wemustpositively tral position, other corps aredetached
have armies in mountains to keep pos- right and leftto occupy themost impora
session of them , there is nothing to be tant points of approach , and thus the
done but to place them in the valleys. wholeis disposed in a line, as itwere,of
At firstsight this appears erroneous,be- three, four, five,six posts,& c. Howfar
cause,inaccorda ncewiththeprevalent thisfractioningand extension ofthe line
theoretical ideas, it will be said, the shall be carried, must depend on the re
heights command the valleys. Butthat quirementsofeachindividualcase
is really not the case. Mountain ridges
: An
are only accessible by a few paths and extent of acouple of marches,
e
thatis,six
and
to eight miles is of moderat length,
rude tracks, with a few exceptions only we have seen it carried as far as twenty
passable for infantry, whilst the carriage
roads are in the valleys. The enemy can orBetween
thirty miles.
each of these separate posts,
only appear there at certain pointswith which are one or two leagues from each
infantry ; but in these mountain masses
the distances are too great for any effec other, there will probably be some ap.
tive fire of small arms, and therefore a proachesof inferior importance, to which
afterwards attention must be directed.
position in the valleys is less dangerous
than it appears. At the same time, the Some very goodpostsfor acoupleof
valley defence is exposed to another great battalionseach are selected, which form
danger, that of being cut off. The enemy a good connection between the chief
can, it is true, only descend into the val posts, and they are occupied. It is easy
to see that the distribution of the force
ley with
and infantry
with certain; points
great,atexertion ,slowly,
he cannot may be carried still further,andgo down
therefore, take us by surprise ; but none to posts occupied only by single com
panies and
ed squadrons; and this has often
of position
the the
defend s weha
outlets of such paths into the happen . Thereare, therefore, in this
veinthevalley
general limits to the extent of frac
valley. The enemy can,therefore,bring no
tioning. On the other hand,the strength
T CHAP . XVIII.] DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS. 133

of each post must depend on the strength 3. A strategic reserve, to reinforce any
of the whole ; and therefore we can say point attacked , has very seldom been
nothing as to the possible or natural kept in rear, because tảe extension of
degree which should be observed with front made the line feel too weak already
regard to the strength of the principal in all parts. On this account the support
posts. We shall only append, asa guide, which a post attacked has received, has
some maxims which are drawn from ex- generally been furnished from other posts
perience and the nature of the case. in the line not themselves attacked .
1. The more lofty and inaccessible the 4. Even when the division of the forces
mountains are, so much the further this has been relatively moderate, and the
separation of divisions of the force not strength of each single post considerable,
only may be, but also must be, carried ; the principal resistance has been always
for the less any portion of a country can confined to a local defence ; and if once
be kept secureby combinationsdependent theenemy succeeded in wresting a post,
on the movement of troops, so much the it has been impossible to recover it by
more must the security be obtained by any supports afterwards arriving.
direct covering. The defence of the How much, according to this, may be
Alps requires a muchgreater division of expectedfrom mountain defence,in what
force, and therefore approaches nearer to cases this means may be used , how far
the cordon system, than the defence of the we can and may go in the extension and
fractioning of the forces — these are all
Vosges or the Giant mountai
wherev er ns .
defence of questions which theory must leave to the
rto
2. Hithe ,
mountains has taken place, such a divi- tact of the general. It is enough if it
force employe d has been made tells him what these means really are,
that ofthe
sion the chief posts have generally and what rôle they can perform in the
consisted of only one line of infantry, and active operations of the army.
A general who allows himself to be
in alry;
second line, tssome squadronsf of
cava at alleven , only the chie post beaten in an extended mountain position
established in the centre has perhaps had deserves to be brought before a court
some battalions in a second line. martial.

CHAPTER XVIII .

DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS .

liarities is, that they are like implements

STREAMSofand
speak largedefen
their rivers, so farg , aslike
ce, inbelon we of hard and brittle metal, they either
mount ains,to they
barriers . But thecateg ory ofmount
differ from
egic defen
stratains standceevery blow without bending,ortheir
breaks and then ends altogether.
If the river is very large, and the other
in two
relat , the ts
iverespec othe theione
. rThe luterns
conce
r abso defetheir
nce . conditions are favourable, then the pas
sage may be absolutely impossible. But
Like mountains, they strengthen the if the defence of any river is forced at one
relative defence ; but one of their pecu
134 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
point, then there cannot be, as in moun- 1. A direct defence by opposing the
tain warfare, a persistent defence after passage .
wards ; the affair is finished with that 2. Ă rather indirect one, by which the
one act, unless that the river itself runs river and its valley are only used as a
between mountains . means towards a better combination for
The other peculiarity of rivers in re- the battle .
lation to war is, that in many cases they 3. A completely direct one, by holding
admit of very good, and in general of an unassailable position on the enemy's
better combinations than mountains for side of the river.
a decisive battle. We shall subdivide our observations, in
Both again have this property in com conformity with these three degrees, and
mon, that they aredangerous and seduc- after we have made ourselves acquainted
tive objects which have often led to false with each of them in its relation to the first,
measures, and placed generals in awk- which is the most important of the forms,
ward situations . We shall notice these we shall then proceed to do the same in
results in examining more closely the respect to their relations to the other two.
defence of rivers . Therefore, first, the direct defence, that
Although history is rather bare in ex is, such a defence as is to prevent the
amples of rivers defended with success , passage of the enemy's armyitself.
and therefore the opinion is justified that This can only come into the question
rivers and streams are no such formida
ble barriers as was once supposed , when
in relation to large rivers, that is, great
bodies of water.
an absolute defensive system seized all The combinations of space, time, and
meansofstr engthening itself which the force, which require to be looked intoe
country offered, still the influence which nts
as eleme y of defenc
of this theor ,
they exerciseto the advantage of the make the subject somewhat compli
battle, as well as of the defence of a cated, so that it is not easy to gain a sure
country, cannot be denied. The
In order to look over the subject in a point from which to commence.
following is the result at which every one
connected form , we shall specify the dif will arrive on full consideration.
ferent points of view from which we The time required to build a bridge
propose to examine it. determines the distance from each otherat
which the corps charged with thedefence
which streams and rivers produce through oftheriver should beposted. Ifwedivide
theirdefence, must be distinguished from
the influence whichrythey
defence of a count have on the by this distance,wegetthenumber:of
, even when not corps required for the defence ; if with
themselves specially defended . number we divide the mass of troops
Further, the defence itself may take that
three different forms :
disposab le,weshall get the strength ice
1. An absolute defence with the main each corps. If wenow compare the
body . strength of each single corps with the
mere demonst ration resistance numberof troops
using all the which
means in theenemy, by
hispower ,this
2.3. AA relative resistance byofsubordinate.
bodies of troops , such as outposts , cover pass over during the construction of his
ing lines , flanking corps , etc. bridge, we shall be able to judge how
Lastly , we must distinguish three farwe can expect a successful resistance.
different degrees or kinds of defence , in For wecanonly assumethe forcing of
each of its forms, namely the passage to beimpossible whenthe
defender is able to attack the troops
 DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS. 135
CHAP. XVIII.]
passed over with a considerable numerical use. We shall now bring into consider
superiority, say the double, before the ation particulars in detail, and measures
bridge is completed. An illustration will requisite for such a defence.
make this plain. Setting aside, in the first place, geo
If the enemy requires twenty-four graphical peculiarities, we have only
hours for the construction of a bridge, to say that the corps as proposed by
and if he can by other means only pass the present theory, must be posted close
over 20,000 men in those twenty - four to the river, and each corps in itself
hours, whilst the defender within twelve concentrated . It must be close to the
hourscan appear at any point whatever river, because every position further back
with 20,000 men , in such case thepassage lengthens unnecessarily and uselessly
cannot be forced ; for the defender will thedistance to be gone over to any point
arrive when the enemyengaged in crossing menaced ; for as the waters of the river
has only passed over the half of 20,000. give security against any important
Now as in twelve hours, the time for movement on the part of the enemy, a
conveying intelligence included, we can reserve in rear is not required, as it is
march four miles, therefore every eight for an ordinary line of defence, where
miles 20,000 men would be required, there is no river in frunt. Besides, the
which would make 60,000 for the defence roads running parallel to and near a
of a length of twenty - four miles of river. river up and down, are generally better
than transverse roads from the interior
These would be sufficient for the appear
ance of 20,000 men at any point, even if leading to any particular points on the
the enemy attempted the passage at river . Lastly, the river is unquestion
two points at the same time ; if at only ably better watched by corps thus placed
one pointe twice 20,000 coulde be brought than cular of posts
by aly mere chain ande , more
rs are all
to oppos him at that singl point . parti as the comm
Here, then, there are three circum- close at hand . — Each of these corps must
stances exercising a decisive influence : be concentrated in itself, because other
wise all the calculation as to time would
( 1 ) the
mean passage, offorthe
s of breadth two ;deter
the river the require alteration . He who knows the
(2 ) mine
both the ne requi red to const ruct the loss of time in effecting a concentration ,
bridge , and the number of troops that will easily comprehend that just in this
can cross during the time the bridge is concentrated position lies the great effi
cacy of the defence . No doubt, at
being builtarmy.
defender's ; ( 3) The strength of the
the strength the first sight, it is very tempting to make
enemy's force itself does not as yet the crossing, even in boats, impossible
for the enemy by a line of posts ;
cometheor
this intoy consideration.
we may say that According
there is toa but with a few exceptions of points,
point at which the possibility of crossical ing ing, such
specially favourable for crossmely
completely stops, and that no numer a measure would be extre prej u
dicial . To say nothing of the objection
superiority on the part of the enemy that the enemy can generally drive off
would
Thisenable him to
is the simpl force ya of
e theor passage ..
thedirect such a post by bringing a superior force
defence of a river, that is, of a defence to bear on it from the opposite side,
enemy from it is, as a rule, a waste of strength, that
inten
fini dedg to
shin preve
his bri nt and
dge the from making is to say, the most that can be obtained
the passage itself; in this there is as by any such post, is to compel the enemy
yet no notice taken of the effect of to choose another point of passage . If,
e
therefor , we are not so strong that we
demonstrations which the enemy may
136 ON WAR . [BOOK VI,
can treat and defend the river like a river between its extreme points, of course
ditch of a fortress, a case for which no we may suppose that all points within
new precept is required , such a method that portion are not equally well suited
of directly defending the bank of a river for crossing. This subject admits of
leads necessarily away from the proposed being somewhat more precisely deter
object. Besides these general principles mined in the abstract, but not positively
for positions , we have to consider - first, fixed, for the very smallest local pecu
the examination of the special peculiar- liarity often decides more than all which
ities of the river; second,theremoval looks great andimportant in books.
of all means of passage ; third , the Besides, it is wholly unnecessary to lay
influence of any fortresses situated on
down any rules on this subject, for the
the river . appearance of the river, and the infor
A river, considered as a line of defence , mation to be obtained from those resid
must have at the extremities of the line, ing near it, will always amply suffice,
right and left, points d'appui, such as, for without referring backto books.
instance , the sea, or a neutral territory ; As matters of detail, we may observe
or there must be other causes which make that roads leading down upon ariver, its
it impracticable for the enemy to turn the affluents, the great towns through which
line of defence by crossing beyond its it passes , and lastly above all, itsislands ,
extremities . Now, as neither such flank generally favour a passage the most ;
supports nor such impediments are to be that on the other hand, the elevation of
found, unless at considerable distances, one bank over another, and the bend in
we see at once that the defence of a river the course of the river at the point of
must embrace a considerable portion of passage, which usually act such apro
re
its length, and that, therefo ,the possi- minent rôle in books, are seldom of any
bility of a defence by placing a large body consequence . The reason of this is, that
of troops behind a relatively shortlength the presumed influence e
of the river vanishes from the class of pos rests on the limited ofthes twothings
idea of an absolute
sible facts (to which we must always con defence of the river bank — a case which
fineours elves) We say a relatively short seldom or never happens in connection
length of the river, by which we mean a with great rivers.
length which does not very much exceed Now, whatever may be the nature of
that which the same number of troops the circumstances which makeiteasier
wouldusua lly occupy ordinary to crosshavean atpartiecular
position in linewithoutona an
river.Such must a river influenc points,they
on the position
cases, we say, do not occur, and every troops, and modify the general
the ical
direct defenceof ys becomes ofgeometr
a riveralwaleast
cordon system
law ; but it isnotadvisable
a kind of , at as far to deviate too far from that law, relying
as regards the extension of the troops ,
on the difficulties
and therefore isnotatall adapted toop- points. of the passage atexactly
The enemywouldchoose many
pose a turningmovement onthepartof thosespots which aretheleastfavour
natural to an army in a concentrated that theseare the points where there is
position. Where, therefore,such turning the least likelihood of meetingus.
movement is possible, the direct defence
oftheriver, however promising its In any case the strongest possible
inothe rrespects ,isa measureresults
highest degree dangerous.
occupatended
inthe recomm ion ofislands e asmeasure
, becausisa tobe
eriousattack
indicates
islandd point in the surest way
theanintende
Now , as regards the portion of the on of passage .
 CHAP. XVIII.] DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS. 137

As the corps stationed close to a river of the river itself, then the difficulty of
must be able to move either up or down passing and the strength of the defence
along its banks according as circum- are certainly increased ; but the volume
stances require, therefore if there is of water is not made up for by such
no road parallel to the river, one of the obstacles, for they constitute no absolute
most essential preparatory measures for severance of the country, which is an
the defence of the river is to put the indispensable condition of direct defence.
nearest small roads running in a parallel If we are asked what rôle such a direct
direction into suitable order, and to con river defence can play in the strategic
struct such short roads of connection as plan of the campaign, we must admit
that it can never lead to a decisive vic
may be necessary .
The second point on which we have tory , partly because the object is not to
to speak, is theremoval of the means of let the enemy pass over to our side at
crossing. On the river itself the thing all, or to crush the first mass of any size
is no easy matter, at least requires con- which passes ; partly because the river
siderable time; but on the affluents which prevents our being able to convert the
fall into the river, particularly those on advantages gained into a decisive victory
the enemy's side, the difficulties are al- by sallying forth in force.
most insurmountable, as these branch On the other hand, the defence of a
rivers are generally already in the hands river in this way may produce a great
นี้ of the enemy. For thatreason it is im- gain of time, which is generally all im
J
portant to close the mouths of such portant for the defensive. The collecting
rivers by fortifications the means of crossing, takes up often
1
nt .
As the equipme for crossing rivers much time; if several attempts faiſa good
which an enemybrings with him , that dealmore timeis gained. If the enemy,
11
is his pontoons, are rarely sufficient for on account of the river, gives his forces
the passage of great rivers, much depends an entirely different direction, then still
on the means to be found on the river further advantages may be gained by
itself, its affluents, and in the great that means. Lastly, whenever the enemy
1
towns adjacent, andlastly, on the timber is not in downright earnest about advan
for building boats and 'raftsin forests cing, a river will
s
stoppaged in
occasion aby
near the river . There are
cases in his movement and there affor a
which all these circumstances are SO durable protection to the country.
A direct defence of a river, therefore ,
river israble,
unfavou thatmeans
by that almost anofim-a when the masses of troops engaged are
the crossing
considerable , the river large, and other
Lastly,ty the fortresses, which lie on circumstances favourable , may be re
possibili
both sides, or on theenemy'sside of the garded as a very good defensive means,
river, serve both to prevent any crossing and may yield results to which com
at any points near them, up or down the manders in modern times ( influenced
river, and as a means of closing the only by thethought of unfortunate at
mouths ofaffluents, as well as toreceive temptsto defend rivers, which failed from
immediately all craft or boats which may insufficient means), have paid too little
be seized . attention . For if, in accordance with
So much as to the direct defence of a the supposition just made (which may
river, on the supposition that it is one easily be realised in connection with
containing a great volume of water. If suchrivers as the Rhine or the Danube),
a deep valley with precipitous sides or an efficient defence of 24 miles of river
marshy banks, are added to the barrier is possible by 60,000 men in face of a
138 ON VAR . (BOOK VI.
very considerably superior force, we may the influence of some vague fceling, and
well say that such a result deserves con-without any fixed idea, expect everything
sideration . from attack and movement, and think
We say, in opposition to a considerably they see the most true picture of war in
superior force, and must again recur to a hussar at full gallop brandishing his
that point. According to the theory we sword over his head.
have propounded, all depends on the Such ideas and feelings are not always
means of crossing, and nothing on the all that is required ( we shall only instance
numerical strength of the force seeking to here the once famous dictator Wedel , at
cross, always supposing it is not less than Zullichau, in 1759 ) ; but the worst of all
the force which defends the river. This is that they are seldom durable, and they
appears very extraordinary, and yet it is forsake the general at the last moment
true . But we must take care not to for. if great complex cases branching out
get that most defences of rivers, or, more into a thousand relations bear heavily
properly speaking, the whole, have no upon him .
absolute points d'appui, therefore, may We therefore believe that a direct
be turned , and this turning movement defence of a river with large bodies of
will be very much easier if the enemy ops, under favourable conditions, can
has very superior numbers . lead to successful results if we content
If now we reflect that such a direct ourselves with a moderate negative :
defence of a river, even if overcome by but this does not hold good in the case
the enemy, is by no means to be com- of smaller masses. Although 60,000
pared to a lost battle, and can still less men on a certain length of river could
lead to a complete defeat, since only a prevent an army of 100,000 or more from
part of our force has been engaged, and passing, a corps of 10,000 on the same
the enemy , detained by the tedious cros length would not be able to oppose the
sing overof histroops on asingle bridge, passage of acorps of 10,000men,indeed,
cannot immediately follow uphis victory, probably, not ofchose
posed
one half that strength
to run the risk of
we shall be the lessdis
this means of defence .
to despise if such a body
placing itself on the same side of the
In all the practical affairs of human river with an enemy so much superior in
lifeit
and soisalso,
importa nt defence
in thetohit the ofright point
a river
s
, it; number . The case is clear, as the means
makes a great difference whether we of passing do not alter.
We have as yet said little about feints
rightly appreciate our situation in all its or demonstrations ofcrossing, as theydo
relations ; an apparently insignificant innottheessent
circumstance may essentially alter the
ially comeinto consideration
direct defence of a river, for partly
case, and make a measure which is wise
and effective in one instance , a disastrous such defence is not a question of concen ?
tration of the army at one point, but
mistake in another. Thisdifficulty of eachcorps has the defence of a portion
formin g a right
the notion thatjudgmen
t and river
“ a river isoafavoiding of theriverdistinctlyallotted to it;
partly such simulated intentions of cross
is
perhapsgreaterherethan anywhere else, ingare also very difficultunder the cira
againstfalse applications and interpreta- cumstances we have
instance, themea ns ofsupposed. , for
crossingin Ifthema
tions ; but having done so, we have
also no hesitation in plainly declaring selves
that we do not think it worth while
are alreadylimited
such abundance as the ,assailant
that is, not in
must
desire to ensurethe success of his under
to listen to the cry of thosewho, under taking, he will then hardly be able or
 DEFENCE OF STREAMS AVD RIVERS. 139
CHAP . XVIII.]
willing to apply a large share to a mere to be able to attack him before he has
demonstration : at all events the mass of gained so much ground that he has the
troops to be passed over at the true point command of several passages. In the
of crossing must be so much the less, and present case the river or its valley must
the defender gains again in time what be watched and partially defended by a
through uncertainty he may have lost. chain of outposts whilst the army is dis
This direct defence, as a rule, seems posed in several corps at suitable points
only suitable to large rivers, and on the and at a certain distance ( usually a few
last half of their course . leagues) from the river.
The second form of defence is suitable The most difficult point lies here in
for smaller rivers with deep valleys, often the passage through the narrow way
It con
formed by the river and its valley. It is
also for very unim port ant ones.
sists in a position taken up further back not now only the volume of water in the
from the river at such a distance that river with which we are concerned , but
the enemy's army may either be caught the whole of the defile, and, as a rule,
in detail after the passage (if it passes a deep rocky valley is a greater impedi
at several points atthe same time) or if ment to pass thana river ofconsiderable
the passageis made by the whole at one breadth. The difficulty of the march of
point, then near the river, hemmed in a large body of troops through a long
upon one bridge and road. An army defile is in reality much greater than
ation
appears at first consider . The time
with or
river deeppressed
thearear valley, and against
close conf a
ined to required is very
considerable ; and the
one line of retreat, is in a most disadvan. danger that the enemy during the march
tageous position for battle ; in the making may make himself master of the sur
proper useof this circumstance, consists rounding heights must cause disquietude.
precisely the most efficacious defence of If the troops in front advance too far,
rivers of moderate size, and running in they encounter the enemy too soon , and
deep valleys.sition
are in danger of being overpowered ; if
The dispo of an army in large they remain near the point of passage
corps close to a river which we consider then they fight in the worst situation .
passage across such an obstacle of
the best in ad irect
ot defen ce, supposes that- The nd
the enemy cann pass the river unex grou with a view to measure strength
pectedly and in great force, because with the enemy on the opposite side is,
otherwise, bymaking such adisposition, therefore, a bold undertaking, or it im
there would be great danger of being plie s very superior numbers and great
confidence in the commander ,
beat
cumstenances
in deta il. If,
which ther
favou r the e, thece are
efordefen cir Such a defensive line cannot certainly
the be extended to such a length as in the
has iently
not suffic
enemy alreadyadvan
in hand us, ifmeans
tageoample direct defence of a great river, for it is
of crossing, if the river has manyislands intended to fight with the whole force
or fords, if it is not broad enough , if we united, and thepassages , however difficult,
are too weak, etc., etc. , then the idea of cannot be compared in that respect with
that method may be dismissed : the those over a large river ; it is, therefore,
troops for the more secure connection much easier for the enemy to make a
with each othermustbe drawn back sam
turning movement movement
e time, such a against
us. carr
Butiesathim
the
a little
rem ainsfrom
to dotheis to
river,
ensure all that
andthemos then
t rap id outof his natural direction ( for we sup
concentration possible upon that point pose, asses is plain in itsenlf, that the val.
ctio t
ley cros that dire at abou right
where the enemy attempts to cross , so as
140 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.

angles), and the disadvantageous effect evening of the day on which the enemy
of a confined line of retreatonly disap- passes, enoughis said, and it may stand
pears gradually, not at once, so that the in place of all combinations of time,
defender will still always have some ad power, and space, things which, in this
vantage over the advancing foe,although case,
the latter is not caught exactly at the
must dependonmany local points.
The battle to which these circumstances
crisis of the passage,but by the detour lead musthave aspecial character - that
he makes is enabled to get a little more
room to move .
of the greatest impetuosity on the side of
the defender. The feigned passages by
As we are not speaking of rivers in which the enemy will keep him for some
connection only with the mass of their time in uncertainty — will, in general pre
waters, but have rather more in view vent his discovering the real point of
the deep cleft or channel formed by their crossing a moment too soon. The pecu .
valleys , we must explain that under the liar advantages of the situation of the
term we do not mean any regular moun- defender consist in the disadvantageous
tain gorge, because then ail that has situation of the enemy's corps just imme
been said about mountains would be diately in his front; if other corps, hay
applicable. But, as every one knows, ing passed at other points, menacehis
s st streams
channels of even the smalle
flank, he can
there are many level district wherethe cou not, as in a defensive battle,
nteract such movements by vigorous
have deep and precipitous sides ; and, blows from his rear , for that would be to
besides these, such as have marshy sacrifice the above-mentioned advantage
banks, or whose banks are otherwise of his situation ; he must, therefore, de
difficult of approach, belong to the same cide the affair in his front before such
class . other corps can arrive and become dan
Under these conditions , therefore, an gerous, that is, he must attack what he
army on the defensive, posted behind a has before him as swiftly and vigorously
large river or deep valley with steep as possible , and decide all by its defeat.
sides , is in a very excellent position , and But the object of this form of river
this sort of river defence is a strategic defence can never be the repulse of a
measure of the best kind. very greatlysuperior force, as is conceiv
Its defect ( the point on which the able in the direct defence of a large river;
defender is very apt to err) is the over for as a rule we have really to deal with
extension of the defending force. It is the bulk of the enemy's force, and al
80 natural in such a case to be drawn on
though we doso under favourable circum
from one pointof passage to another, stances, still itiseasy toseethe relation
and to miss the right point where we between the forces must soon be felt.
ought to stop ; but then, if we do not This is the nature of the defence of
succeed in fightingwiththe whole army riversofa moderate size and deep,val
united , we miss the intended effect ; a
defeat in battle, the necessity of retreat , leys when theprincipal masses of the
confusion in many ways and losses re armies are concerned, for in respect to
duce the army nearly to ruin , even al them the considerable resistance which
can be
thoughtheresistancehasnot been pushed the offered
valley on thecomparison
standsno ridges or scarps of
with the
to an extremity.
In saying that the defensive under the
, disadvantages of a scattered position, and
to them .a But
aboveconditions, should not extend his necessity decisive victoryisa
if nothing more matter
is wantedof
forces widely , that he should be in any
case able to assemble all his forces on the butthereinforcement of a secondary line
of defence which is intended to hold out
CHAP. XVIII.] DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS. 141

for a short time, and which can calculate that every deviation by him from the
on support, then certainly a direct defence direct road is fraught with consequences
of the scarps of the valley, or even of the altogether too serious to be risked .
river bank, may be made ; and although In this second form of defence, feigned
the same advantages are not to be ex- passages are much more dangerous, for
pected here as in mountain positions, still the assailant can make them more easily,
the resistance will always last longer while, on the other hand, the proposition
than in an ordinary country. Only one for the defender is, to assemble his whole
circumstance makes this measure very army at the right point. But the de
dangerous, if not impossible: it is when fender is certainly not quite so much
the river has many windings and sharp limited for time here, because the advan
turnings, which is just what is often the tage of his situation lasts until the assail
case when a river runs in a deep valley, ant has massed his whole force, and made
Only look at the course of the Mosel. In himself master of several crossings; more
a case of its defence, the corps in advance over, also, the simulated attack has not
on the salients of the bends would almost the same degree of effect here as in the
inevitably be lost in the event of a re- defence of a cordon, where all must be
treat. held, and where, therefore, in the appli
That a great river allows the same cation of the reserve, it is not merely a
defensive means, the same form of de- question, as in our proposition, where
fence, which we have pointed out as best the enemy has hisprincipal force , but
suited for rivers of a moderate size, in the much more difficult one, Which is
connection with the mass of an army, and the point he will first seek to force ?
also under much more favourable circum- With respect to both forms of defence
stances, is plain of itself. It will come of large and small rivers, we must ob
into use more especially when the point serve generally, that if they are under
with the defender is to gain a decisive taken in the haste and confusion of a
victory (Aspern ). retreat , without preparation, without the
armyordrawn with its removal of all means of passage, and
Theclose
front on aanriver,
caseof streamup, or deep without an exact knowledge of the
valley, in order by that means to com- country, they cannot certainly fulfil what
mand a tactical obstacle to the approach has been here supposed ; in most such
to its position, or to strengthen its front, cases, nothing of the kind is to be calcu
is quite a different one , the detailed lated upon ; and therefore it will be
examination of which belongs to tactics. always a great error for an army to
Of the effect of this we shall only say this divide itself over extended positions.
much, that it is founded on a delusion.- As everything usually miscarries in
If the cleft in the ground is very consider- war, if it is not done uponclearconvictions
able, the front of the position becomes and with the whole will and energy, so a
absolutely unassailable. Now , as there is river defence will generally end badly when
no more difficulty in passing round such it is only resorted to because we have not
a position
same as if theany
than other, it
defender had just the the heart to meet the enemy in the open
is himself
field , and hope that the broad river or the
gone out of the way of the assailant, deep valley will stop him. When that is
yet that could hardly be the object of the case, there is so little confidence in the
the position. A position of this kind can, actual situation that both the general and
therefore, only be advisable when, as a his army are usually filled with anxious
consequence of its position, it threatens forebodings, which are almost sure to be
the communications of the assailant, 80 realised quick enough. A battle in the
142 ON WAR. [BOOK 11.
me
open field does not suppose a perfectly can assu that, accor
ding to the usual
equal state of circumstances beforehand, course of things, the passage of the
like a duel; and the defender who does defender, as well as of his depôts of all
not know how to gain for himself any kinds, are better secured by fortresses
advantages, either through the special than those of the offensive, in so far is
nature of the defence, through rapid such a defence conceivable , and one
marches , or byknowledge of the country which might be substituted for the direct
and freedom of movement, is one whom defence when circumstances are not
nothing can save, and least of all will a favourable to that form . Certainly then
river or its valley be able to help him . the river is not defended by the army,
The third form of defence - by a strong nor the army by the river, but by the
position taken up on the enemy's side of connection between the two the country
the river — founds its efficacy on the is defended, which is the main point.
danger in which it places the enemy of Atthe same time it must be grantedthat
having his communications cut by the this mode of defence, without a decisive
river, and being thus limited to some blow, and resembling the state of tension
bridges . It follows, as a matter of course, of two electric currents, of which the
that we are only speaking of great rivers atmospheres only are as yet in contact,
with a great volume of water, as these cannot stop any very powerful impulsive
alone can lead to such results, whilst a force. It might be applicable against even
river which is merely in a deep ravine a great superiority of force on the side of
usually affords such a number of pas the enemy, if their army is commanded
sages that all danger of the above dis- by a cautious general, wanting in de
appears. cision, and never disposed to push for
But the position of the defensive must ward with energy ; it might also answer
be very strong, almost unassailable ; when a kind of oscillation towards equality
otherwise he would just meet the enemy between the contending forces has pre
half way ,
and give up his advantages. viously arisen, and nothing but small
But if it is of such strength that the advantages are looked for on either side.
enemy resolves not to attack it, he Bu if we have to deal with superior
will, under certain circumstances, with by a bold egeneral, we are upon
be forces, ledrous
confined thereby same bank
to the a dange cours , very close to an
the defender. If the assailant crosses , abyss.
he exposes his communications ; but This form of defence looks so bold, and
certainly, at the same time, he threatens at the same time so scientific, that it
ours. Here, as in all cases in which one might be called the elegant ; but as
armypassesby another, the great point elegance easily merges into folly,and
is, whose communications, by their num as it is not so easily excused in war as
ber, situation , and other circumstances , in society, therefore we have had as yet
arethe bestsecured, and whichhasalso,e few instances of this elegant art. From
in other respects most
, therefor
to lose, this third mode a specialmeans of assist
can be outbid by his opponent; lastly , ance for the firsttwo formsis developed,
which possesses still in his army the most that is, bythe permanent occupation of
power of victory upon which he can a bridge and a tête du pont to keep up a
depend in an extreme case . The influence constant threat of crossing.
of the river merely amounts to this, that
it augments the danger of such a move
Besides the object of an absolute de
fence modesof
ment for both parties, as both aredepen three with the main body, each ofhave
defencemayalso the
dent on bridges . Now, in so far as we that of a feigned defence.
 CHAP. XVIII DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS. 143
11.. ]
This show of a resistance, which it is an impossibility . The only idea which
not intended really to offer, is an act · Buonaparte could therefore entertain was
offer his first real resistance some
which is combined with many other to where on the French Meuse,
measures, and fundamentally with every could make his appearance withwhere he
his army
position which is anything more than a
camp of route ; but the feigned defence in some measure reinforced . Had he at
of agreat river becomes a complete stra- once withdrawn his forces to that point,
the Allies would have followed close at
in this way
tagem actually
adopt , that
more it is anecessary
or less number ofto his heels
; had he placed his army in
measures of detail, and that its action is cantonments for rest behind the Rhine,
usually on a greater scale and of longer the same thing must have taken place
duration than that of any other ; for the almost as soon , for at the least show of
act of passing a great river in sight of an desponding caution on his part, the
army is always an important step for the Allies would have sent over swarms of
assailant, one over which he often pon Cossacks and other light troops in pur
ders long, or which he postpones to a suit , and, if that measure produced good
more favourable moment. results, other corps would have followed.
For such a feigned defence it is there- The French corps had therefore nothing
fore requisite that the main army should for it but to take steps to defend the
Rhine in earnest . As Buonaparte could
divide and post itself along the river, foresee that this defence must end in no
(much in the same manner as for a real
defence ); but as the intention of a mere thing whenever , the Allies seriously un
demonstration shows that circumstances dertook to cross the river, it may there
fore be regarded in the light of a mere
are not favourable enough for a real de demonstration, in which the French corps
e measure as it
alwaystherefor
fence, occasions, from that
a more or less extended incurred hardly any danger, as their
and scattered disposition, the danger point of concentration lay on the Upper
of serious loss may very easily arise if Moselle. Only Macdonald, who, as is
the corps should get engagedin a real known, was at Nimeguen with twenty
resistance, even if not carried to an ex- thousand men, committed a mistake in
tremity ; it would then be in the true deferring his retreat till fairly compelled
重 sense a half measure . In a demonstra- to retire, for this delay prevented his
tion of defence, therefore, arrangement joining Buonaparte before the battle of
must be made for a sure concentration of Brienne, as the retreat was not forced
on him until after the arrival of Winzur
the army
haps at a point considerably
severaldays'march ) inrear, and(per
the gerode's corps in January. This defen
defence should not be carried beyond what sive demonstration on the Rhine, there
consiste
is In nt with this arrangement. fore, produced the result of checking the
order to make our views plainer, Allies in their advance, and induced them
to postpone the crossing of the river
and to show the importance of such a until their reinforcements arrived, which
defen siveof demon
the end stration
the campai us refer
gn ,oflet1813. to did not take place for six weeks. These
Buona-
parte repassed tho Rhine with forty or six weeks were of infinite value to Buona
fifty thousand men .
To attempt to de- parte. Without this defensive demon
fend this river with such a force at all stration on the Rhine, Paris would have
points where the Allies, according to the become the next immediate object after
direct ion of their forces, might easily the victory of Leipsic , and it would have
pass, that is, between Manheim and been impossible for the French to have
Nimeguen, would have been to attempt given battle on that side oftheir capital.
144 ON WAR. [ BOOK VI.
In a river defence of the second class, or to a corps of observation, much greater
therefore, in that of rivers of a smaller and morereliable strength than itwould
size, such demonstrations may also be have without the river. In all these
used, but they will generally be less cases the question is limited to a relative
effectual, because mere attempts to cross resistance , and that must naturally be
are in such a case easier, and therefore considerably strengthened by such a great
the spell is sooner broken . natural obstacle. At the same time, we
Inthe third kind of river defence, a must not think only of the relative quan
demonstration would in all probability tity oftimegained by the resistance in
be still less effectual, and produce no fight in a case of this sort, but also of
more result than that of the occupation the many anxieties which such under
ofany other temporary position . takings usually excite in the mind of the
Lastly, the two first form s of defence enemy , and which in ninety -nine cases
are very well suited to give a chain of out of a hundred lead to his giving up
outposts, or any otherdefensive line (cor- his plans ifnot urged or pressed by
don) established for a secondary object, necessity .

CHAPTER XIX .

DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS ( CONTINUED .)

We have still to add something respect An army on the defensive, having be.
ing the influence of streams and rivers hind it a large river within easy reach
on the defence of a country, even when (but not less than a day's march),and on
they are not themselves defended . that river an adequate number of secure
Every important river, with its main crossings, is unquestionably in a much
valley and its adjacent valleys, forms a stronger situation than it would be with
very considerable obstacle in a country , out the river; for if it loses a little in
and in that way it is, therefore, advanta freedom of movement by the requisite
geous to defence in general; but its pecu care for the security of the crossings, still
liar influence admits of being more par it gains much more by the security of its
ticularly specified in its principal effects. strategic rear, that means chiefly of its
First we mustdistinguish whether lines of communication .Inallthis we
it flows parallel to the frontier, that
allude to a defence in ourowncountry; for
is, the general strategic front, or at an
in the enemy's country, although his
oblique or a right angle to it. In the y arm might be before us, we should still
case of the parallel direction we must have always moreor less to apprehend
obse ce ween having hisappearance behindus on theother
rve the differenbet
our own army or that of the enemy be
hindit, and casesagai
andeninit both
tance betwe ng w s
the army . nthe dis- volvi asitdoes narro dofile ins roads,
would be more disadvantageou than
 CHIAP. XIX . ] DEFENCE OF STREAMS AND RIVERS, 145

otherwise in its effect on our situation. quest of these provinces by the Austrians
The further the river isbehind the army, and Russians, although there was no
the less useful it will be, and at certain real defence of those rivers in the whole
distances its influence disappears alto- Seven Years' War, and their course is
gether . mostly, as connected with the enemy, at
If an advancing army has to leave a an oblique or a right angle rather than
river in its rear , the river cannot be parallel with the front.
otherwise than prejudicial to its move- It is only the convenience of a river as
ments, for it restricts the communications a means of transport, when its course is
of the army to a few single passages. more or less in a perpendicular direction,
When Prince Henry marched against which can, in general, be advantageous
the Russians on the right bank of the to the assailant; in that respect it may
Oder near Breslau, he had plainly apoint be so for this reason, that as hehas the
d'appui in the Oder flowing behind him longer line of communication, and, there
at a day's march ; on the other hand, fore, the greater difficulty in the transport
when the Russians under Cznernitschef of all he requires, water carriage may
passed the Oder subsequently, they were relieve him of a great deal of trouble and
in a very embarrassing situation, just prove veryuseful. The defender,on his
through the risk of losing their lineof re- side, certainly has it in his power to close
treat , which was limited to one bridge . the navigation within his own frontier by
If a river crosses the theatre of war fortresses; still even by that means the
more or less at a right angle with the advantages which the river affords the
strategic front, then theadvantage is assailant will not be lost so far as regards
again on the side of the defensive ; for, in its course up to that frontier. But if we
the first place, there are generally a reflect upon the fact that many rivers are
number of good positions leaning on the often not navigable, even where they are of
river, and covered in front by the trans- no unimportant breadth as respects other
verse valleysconnected with the principal military relations, that others are not
valley (like the Elbe for the Prussians in navigable at all seasons, that the ascent
the Seven Years' War); secondly, the against the stream is tedious, that the
assailant must leave one side of theriver winding of a river often doubles its
or the other unoccupied , or he must
divide his forces ; and such division can-
length , that the chief communications be
tween countries now are high roads, and
not fail to be in favour again of the that now more than ever the wants of an
defensive, because he will be in posses army are supplied from the country ad
sion of morewell secured passages than jacent to the scene of its operations, and
over the wholeWe
theassailant. Seven only cast
needYears' War, to be not
a glance by carriagefrom distant parts,-we
can well see that the use of a river does
convinced that the Oder and Elbe were not generally play such a prominent part
very useful to Frederick the Great in the in the subsistence of troops as is usually
defence of his theatre of war (namely fluence
Silesia, Saxony and the Mark ), and con
represented in books,and that its in
on the march of events is there .
sequently a great impediment to the con- fore very remote and uncertain .

VOL. II. L
146 ON WAR , [ BOOK v1.
CH !

AT
CHAPTER XX .
1.51

A. -DEFENCE OF SWAMPS.

Very large wide swamps, such as the on many occasions may be insurmount
Bourtang Moor in North Germany, are able .
so uncommon that it is not worth while A second peculiarity of a swamp is,
to lose time over them ; but we must not that the means used to cross cannot be
forge t thatcertainlowlands and marshy completely removed likethose usedfor
banks of small rivers are more common , passing a river ; bridges may be broken,
0

and form very considerable obstacles of or so completely destroyed that they

ground which may be, and often have can never be used again ; the most that
been , used for defensive purposes. can be done with dykes is to cut them ,
Measures for their defence are certainly which isnot doing much . If there isa
very like those forthere
thedefen ce of rivers , river in the middle,the bridge can of
at the same time are some peculiar course be taken away, but the whole
ties to be specially noticed . The first passage will not by that means be de
and principal one is,thatamarshwhich stroyed inthesame degree as thatofa
except on thecauseway is impracticable The largenatu
riveral thedestruction
r by conse ofa bridge.
quence is that dykes
for infantry is much more difficult to
cross than any river ; for, in the first which exist must always be occupied in
place, a causeway is not so soon built as force and strenuously defended if we
a bridge ; secondly , there are no means at desire to derive any general advantage
hand by which the troops to cover the from the morass .
construction of the dyke or causeway can On the one hand, therefore, we are
be sent across . No one would begin to compelled to adopt a local defence, and
build a bridge without using some of the on the other , such a defence is favoured
boats tosend overanadvanced guard in by the difficulty of passingat
the first instance ; but in the case of a From these two peculiaritiesother parts
morass no similar assistance can be em
the result:
is, that the defence of a swamp must be
ployed ; the easiest way to make a cross more local and passive than that of a
ing for infantry over a morass is by river.
means of planks, but when the morass It follows from this that we must be
is of some width , this is a much more stronger in a relative degree than in the
tedious process than the crossing of the direct defence ofa river, consequently
first boats on a river. If now, besides , that the line of defence must not be
there is in the middle of the morass a of great length, especially in cultivated
river which cannot be passed without a countries, where the number of passages,
bridge, the crossing of the first detach even under the most favourable circum.
ment of troops becomes a still more diffi
cult affair, for although single passengers stances for defence, is still very great.
In this respect, therefore, swamps are
may get across on boards, theheavyg inferiortogreatrivers,andthisisapoint
material requiredfor greatimportance, for salllocaldefence
ted bridge buildiny of
cannotbe so transpor . This difficult ngerou
is illusoryandda extreme.
to an
 CHAP . XX ] INUNDATIONS. 147

But if we reflect that such swamps and made ourselves acquainted with in the
low grounds generally have a breadth case of streams and rivers, in which
with which that of the largest rivers in obstacles of ground are made use of to
Europe bears no comparison , and that bring on a great battle under advanta
consequently a post stationed for the geous circumstances, is generally quite as
defence of a passage is never in danger applicable to morasses.
of being overpowered by the fire from The third method of a river -defence
the other side, that the effects of its own by means of a position on the enemy's
fire over a long narrow dyke is greatly side would be too hazardous on account
increased , and that the time required to the toilsome
of nature of the crossing.
pass such a defile, perhaps a quarter or It is extremely dangerous to venture
half a mile long, is much longer than on the defence of such morasses , soft
would suffice to pass an ordinary bridge : meadows, bogs, etc. , as are not quite im
if we consider all this, we must admit passable beyond the dykes. One single
that such low lands and morasses, if Iine of crossing discovered by the enemy
means of crossing are not too numerous, is sufficient to pierce the whole line of
belong to the strongest lines of defencé defence which, in case of a serious resist
which can be formed . ance, is always attended with great loss
An indirect defence, such as we to the defender.

B.-INUNDATIONS.

Now we have still to consider inun- sect the country in such a way that they
dations. As defensive means and also may be seen running in lines in parallel
as phenomena in the natural world they directions.
have unquestionably the nearest resem-
blance to morasses .
3. Larger canals, inclosed by dykes
and intended for irrigation, drainage, and
They are not common certainly ; per- transit of vessels, run through the coun
haps Holland is the only country in try in all possible directions and are of
Europe where they constitute a pheno. such a size that they can only be passed
menon which makes them worth notice on bridges .
in connection with our object ; but just 4. The level of the ground throughout
that country, on account of the remark- the whole district subject to inundation,
able campaigns of 1672 and 1787, as lies perceptibly under the level of the
well as on account of its important rela- sea, therefore, of course, under that of
tion in itself to both France and Germany, the canals.
obliges us to devote some consideration 5. The consequence of this is, that by
to this matter . means of cutting the dams, closing and
The character of these Dutch inunda- opening the sluices, the whole country
tions differs from ordinary swampy and can be laid under water, so that there
impassable wet low lands in the following are no dry roads except on the tops of the
respects : dykes, all others being either entirely
1. The soil itself is dry and consists under water or, at least, so soaked that
either of dry meadowsor ofcultivated they become no longer fit for use. Now,
fields. if even the inundation is only three or
2. For purposes of irrigation or of four feet deep, so that, perhaps, for short
drainage, a number of small ditches of distances it might bé waded through,
greater or less depth and breadth inter- still even that is made impossible on
148 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
account of the smaller ditches mentioned very great in comparison to other strat
under No. 2, which are not visible. It egetic dispositions ; from which again we
is only where these ditches have a cor- have , as a consequence , that such a
responding direction , so that we can move defensive line must not be long.
between two of them with out crossing The principal line of defence in Hol.
on
either, that the inundati does not con- land is from Naarden on the Zuyder
stitute in effect an absolute bar to all Zee (the greater part of the way behind
communication. It is easy to conceive the Vecht), to Gorcum on the Waal, that is
that this exception to the general ob. properly to the Biesbosch ,its extent being
struction can only be for short distances, about eight miles . For the defence of
and, therefore, can only be used for tac- this line a force of 25,000 to 30,000 was
tical purposes of an entirely special cha- employed in 1672, and again in 1787.
racter . If we could reckon with certainty upon an
From all this we deduce invincible resistance, the results would cer
1. That the assailant's means of mov tainly be very great, at least for the pro
ing are limited to a more or less small vinces of Holland lying behind that line.
number of practicable lines, which run In 1672 the line actually withstood
along very narrow dykes, and usually very superior forces led by great gene
have a wet ditch on the right and left, rals, first Condé, and afterwards
Luxem,
and
consequently form very long defiles. bourg , who had under their comm
2. That every defensive preparation 40,000 to 50,000 men , and yetwould not
upon such adam maybeeasily strength- assault,preferring towait forthewinter,
ened to such a degree as to become which did not prove severe enough. On
impregnable. the other hand, the resistance which was
3. But that, because the defensive is made on this first line in 1787 amounted
so hemmed in, he must confine himself to nothing, and even that which was
to the most passive resistance as respntly
ects made by a second linemuch shorter,
each isolated point, and conseque between the Zuyder Zee and the lake
must look for his safety entirely from of Haarlem , although somewhat more
passive resistance . effective, was overcome by the Duke of
4. That in such a country it is not a Brunswick in one day, through a very
syst emofa sing le defe nsiv e line, clos ing skilful tacticaldisposition well adapted
the country like a simple barrier, but to the locality , and this although the
that as in every direction the same Prussian force actually engaged inthe
obstacle to movement exists, and the attack was little , if at all, superior in
same security for flanks may be found, numbers to the troops guarding the
new posts may incessantly be formed, and lines .
in this manner any portion of the first The different result in the two cases
defensive line, if fost, may be replaced is to beattributed to the difference in
by new piece. We may say that the
a eme
the supr and
comm . In the year 1672
number of combinations here, like those theDutc h were surprised by Louis XIV.,
on a chessboard , are infinite . while everything was on a peace estab
5. But whilethisgeneralcondition of ;
a country is only conceivable along with therebreathed very little military spirit
the supposition of a high degree of as far as concerned land forces. For
cultivation and a dense population , it that reason the greater number of the
follows of itself that the number of fortresses were deficient in all articles of
passages , and therefore the number ofmaterial and equipment,garrisoned only
postsrequired ortheir defence,must be byweak bodies of hired troops, and
CHAP . xx. ] INUNDATIONS. 149

defended by governors who were either 1787 ought to have ensured at least as
native-born incapables, or treacherous great results as that of 1672. But there
foreigners. Thus all the Brandenburg was one important difference, which is,
fortresses on the Rhine, garrisoned by that in the year 1787 unity of command
Dutch, as well as all their own places sit- was entirely wanting. What in 1672
uated to the east of the line of defence had been left to the wise, skilful, and
above described, except Groningen,very energetic guidance of the Prince of
soon fell into the hands of the French, so called
Orange, was entrusted to a
and for the most part without any real Defence Commission in 1787 , which
defence. And in the conquest of this although it included in its number men
great number of places consisted the of energy, was not in a position to infuse
chief exertions of the French army , into its work the requisite unity of
150,000 strong, at that time. measures, and to inspireothers with that
But when , after the murder of the confidence which was wanted to prevent
brothers De Witt, in August 1672, the the whole instrument from proving im
Prince of Orange came to the head of perfect and inefficient in use. on this
affairs, bringing unity to the measuresWe have dwelt for a moment
for national defence, there was still time example, in order togive more distinct
to close the defensive line above -men- ness to the conception of this defensive
tioned, and all the measures then adopted measure, and at the same time to show
harmonised so well with each other that the difference in the effects produced,
neither Condé nor Luxembourg, who according asmore or less unity and
commanded the French armies left in sequence prevail in the direction of the
Holland after the departure of the two whole.
armies under Turenne and Louis in per Although the organisation and method
son ,would venture to attempt anything of defence of such a defensive line are
against the separate posts. tactical subjects, still, in connection with
In the year 1787 all was different. It the latter, which is the nearest allied to
was not the Republic of seven united strategy, we cannot omit to make an
provinces , but only the province of Hol observation to which the campaign of
land which had to resist the invasion. 1787 gives occasion .
The conquest of all thefortresses, which Wethink,namely, that however pas
had been the principal object in 1672, sive the defence must naturally be at
was therefore not the question ; the each point in a line of this kind, still
defence was confined at once to the line an offensive action from some one point
we have described . But the assailant of the line is not impossible, and may not
this time, instead of 150,000 men, had be unproductive of good results if the
enemy , as was the case in 1787, is not
only 25,000, and was no mighty sove
reign of a great country adjoining Hol- decidedly very superior. For although
land, but the subordinate general of a such an attack must be executed by
distant prince, himself by no means in means of dykes, and on that account can
dependent in many respects. The people not certainly have theadvantage of much
in Holland, like those everywhere else freedom of movement or of any great im
were divided into two par- pulsiveforce, nevertheless, it isimpossible
ties buttime,
at ,that the republican spirit in Holland forthe offensive side to occupyall the
wasdecidedly predominant, and had at dykesandroads which he does not re
thesame time attained even to a kind fore quireforhisown purposes, and thero
the defensive with his better know
of enthusiastic excitement. Under these
circumstances the resistance in the year ledge of the country , and being in posses
150 ON WAR . [ BOOK II.
1
sion of the strong points, should be able case, we may well imagine that every
by some of the unoccupied dykes to effect sally on the part of the defensiveside
a real flank attack against the columns which has the remotest possibility ofn
assailant,
of thesourc or toycutthem off from success must at once as a demonstratio
es of suppl
their . If now, on the be most effective. We doubt very much
other hand, we reflect for a moment on prudent and cautious duke of
the constrained position in which the Brunswick would have ventured to ap
ass ailant
ispla ced , how much more de- proach Amsterdam ifthe Dutch had only
pendent he is on his communications made such a demonstration ,from Utrecht
than in almost any other conceivable for instance .

CHAPTER XXI.

DEFENCE OF FORESTS.

ABOVEtangled
all thingsimpassable
we must distinguish time
placetobehind that army, and at thesame
be available as an assistance to
thick and forests from
extensive woods under a certain degree cover and facilitate the retreat.
of culture, which are partly quite clear, At present we only speak of forests in
partly intersected by numerous roads . level country , for where the decided
Whenever the object is to form a de mountain character enters into combina
fensive line, the lattershouldbeleft in tion ,itsinfluence becomespredominant
rear or avoided as much as possible. over tactical and strategic measures, and
The defensi ve s
require more than the we have already treated of those subjects
assailant to see clearly round him, partly elsewhere.
because, as a rule, he is the weaker, But impassable forests, that is, such
partly because the natural advantages of as can only be traversed on certain roads,
his position cause him to develop his afford advantages in an indirect defence
plans later than the assailant . If he similar to those which the defence derives
should place a woody district before him from mountains for bringing on a battle
he would be fighting like a blindman under favourable circumstances; the army
against one with his eyesight. If he can await the enemy behind the wood in a
should place himself in the middle of the more or less,concentrated position with a
wood then both would be blind, but that view to falling on him the moment he
equality of condition is just what would debouches from the roaddefiles. Such
not answer the natural requirements of a forest resembles a mountain in its effects
the defender .
more than a river : for it affords, it is true,
Such awooded country can therefore only one very long and difficult defile,
not be brought into any favourable con
nection with the defensi ve except it is but in respect otherwi
itisgeous
advanta se. eat rather
than to theretr
der's
kept in rear of the defen army, so as But å direct defence of forests, let
to conceal from the enemy all that takes
them be ever so im practicable,is a very
 TIE CORDON . 151
CIIAP XXII.]
hazardous piece of work for even the Much more important is the influence
thinnest chain of outposts ; for abattis of great forests of every kind in connec
are only imaginary barriers, and no wood tion with the arming of a nation ; they
is so completely impassable that it cannot are undoubtedly the true element for
be penetrated in ahundred places by small such levies ; if, therefore, the strategic
detachments, and these, in their relation plan of defence can be so arranged that
to a chain of defensive posts, may be the enemy's communications pass through
likened to the first drops of water which great forests, then, by that means, another
ooze through a roof and are soon followed mighty lever is brought into use in sup
by a general rush of water. port of the work of defence.

CHAPTER XXII .

THE CORDON ,

The term cordon is used to denote every lines and frontier defences of the Euro
defensive planwhich is intended directly pean States bordering on Asia and Tur
to cover a whole district of country by a key. Applied in this way the cordon
line of posts in connection with each system is neither absurd nor does it
appear unsuitable to its purpose . Cer
other.
of a greaWe sayy directly,
t arm posted inforline
several
with corps
each tainly it is not sufficient to stop all in
other might protect a large district of roads, but it will make them more difficult
country from invasion without forming and therefore of less frequent occurrence,
a cordon ; but then this protection would and this is a point of considerable impor
not be direct, but through the effect of tance where relations subsist with people
like those of Asia, whose passions and
combinationsntand mov ements .
e that such a habits have a perpetual tende ncy to war.
It is evide at a glanc
long defen sive line as that must be, Next to this class of cordons come the
which is to cover an extensive district of lines, which, in the wars of modern
country directly, can only have a very times have been formed between Euro
small degree of defensive stamina. Even pean States, such as the French lines on
the Rhine and in the Netherlands. These
when
the large
verythis
lines bodiebes of
would cases if
thetroop theyy
occup were originally formed only with a view to
protect a country against inroads made for
wereobje
The ct ked
attac of abycord
corre
on can thering
spond eformasse s . the purpose of levying contributions or
e only
be to resist a weak blow, whether that living at the expense of the enemy .
the weakness proceeds from a feeble They are, therefore, only intended to
will or the smallness of the force em- check minor operations , and consequently
it is also meant that they should be de
ploye
Withd. this view the wall of China was fended by small bodies of troops . But,
built : a protection against the inroads of course, in the event of the enemy's
of Tartars. This is the intention of all principal force taking its direction against
152 ON VAR [BOOK VI.
these lines, the defender must also use circumstances and motives which lead to
his principal force in their defence, an and accompany such a proceeding.
event by no means conducive to the best Every position in a mountainous coun
defensive arrangements. On accountof try, even if taken up with the view of a
this disadvantage and because the pro- battle with the whole force united, is and
tection against incursionsintemporary must necessarilybe more extended than
war is quite a minor object, by which position in a level country. It may be
through the very existence of these lines because the aid of the ground augments
an excessive expenditure of troops may very much the force of the resistance ;
easily be caused, their formation is it must be because a wider basis of re
looked upon in our day asapernicious treat is required ,as we have shown in
measure . The more power and energy the chapter on mountain defences. But
thrown into the prosecution of the war if there is no near prospect of a battle,
the more useless and dangerous this if it is probable that the enemy will
means becomes. remain in his position opposite to us for
Lastly, all very extended lines of out- some time without undertaking anything
posts covering the quarters of an army unless tempted by some very favourable
and intended to offer a certain amount opportunity which may presentitself (the
of resistance come under the head of
cordons .
usual state of things in most wars for
merly ), then it is also natural not to limit
This defensi ve measur e is chiefly de ourselves merely to the occupation of so
signed as an impediment to raids , and country as is absolutely necessary,
other such minor expeditions directed muchbut to hold as much right or left as is
against single cantonments, and for this consistent with the security of the army,
purpose it may be quite sufficient iffa- bywhich we obtain many advantages,
voured by the country. Against an ad as we shall presently show . In open
vance of the main body of the enemy the countries with plenty of communications,
opposit ion offered can be only relative, this object may be effected to agreater
that is, intended to gain time : but as this extent than in mountains, through the
gain of time will be but inconsiderable in principleofmovement, and forthat reasons
most cases,this object may be regarded the extension and dispersion of thetroops
as a very minor consideration in the es
tablishment of these lines. The assem is less necessary in an open country ; it
bling and advance of the enemy's army
would also be much more dangerous
there on account of the inferior capa
never take place so unobservedly
itselfcan defender bility of resistance of each part.
that the getshis first informa
tion of it through his outposts ; when But in mountains where all occupation
on local
such is the case he is much to be pitied. of ground is more dependent
Consequently, in this case also, the defence, where relief cannot so soon be
cordon is only intended toresist the afforded to a point
whenoncethe menaced,
enemy and where,
has gotpossess ion
attack of aweakforce,and theobject, of apoint, itis moredifficult todislodge
therefore, in this and in the other two
cases is not at variance with the means . him by a force slightly superior
But that an army formed for the de mountains, under these circumstances,
fence of a country should spread itself tionshall
we which , if come
always to a form
not strictly of posi
speaking
site tointhea enemy,thatitshould disperse cordon,
being astill
lineapproachesvery near toom
of defensive posts.Fr it,
itself cordon form , seems to be so
absurd that we must seek to discover the such a disposition,consisting of several
detached posts, to the cordon system ,
 CATE OHAP. XXI .] THE CORDON . 153

tire while there is still certainly a considerable although these campaigns exhibit the
a procedit step, but it is one which generals, never- most decided and most incomprehensible
mountaina theless, often take without being aware examples of chains of posts so extended
with the matt of it, being drawn on from one step to that they may just with as much propriety
orce unital in another. First, the covering and the be called cordons as any that ever were.
die ertendal possession of the country is the object of We may completely justify these posi
untry. It was the dispersion ; afterwards it is the secu- tions by saying, the prince knew his
ground rity of the army itself. Every commander opponent ; he knew that he had no enter
of the rest of a post calculates the advantage which prises of a decisive character to appre
Tider basiese may be derived from this or that point hend from that quarter, and as the object
e hare short connected with the approachto his posi- of his position besides was to occupy
in defence tion on the right or the left, and thus always as much territory as possible, he
pect ofales the whole progresses insensibly from therefore carried out that object as far
the enemy one degree of subdivision to another. as circumstances in any way permitted.
posite tone A cordon war, therefore, carried on by If the prince had once been unfortunate
taking amali the principal force of an army, is not to with one of these cobwebs, and had met
"Fery famount be considered a form of war designedly with a severe loss, we should not say
Tesent ite ! chosen with a view to stopping every that he had pursued a faulty system of
most tast blow which the enemy's forces might warfare, but that he had been mistaken
ural not to attempt, but a situation which the army about a measure and had applied it to a
upation at's is drawn into in the pursuit of a very case to which it was not suited.
itely netesne. different object, namely, the holding While we thus seek to explain how
ght or left si and covering the country against an the cordon system, as it is called, may
tyoftheapp enemy who has no decisive undertaking be resorted to by the principal force in a
yg adrantes in view . Such a situation must always theatre in war, and how it may even be
206. In een be looked upon as a mistake; and the a judicious and useful measure, and,
mmunicatio motives through which generals have therefore, far from being an absurdity,
Ito a gmail? been lured bydegrees into allowing one we must, at the same time, acknowledge
through the small postafteranother,are contemptible that there appear to have been instances
in connection with the object of a large where generals or their staff have over
or that looked the real meaning or object of a
of the trails army ; this point of view shows, at all
1 counts; I
events, the possibility of such a mistake. cordon system, and assumed its relative
e dangunit That it is reallyan error, namely,a mis- value to be a general one; conceiving it
nferior takenthatappreciation of our own position, to be really suited to afford protection
and of the enemy is sometimes not against every kind of attack, instances,
vart.
lloevrupati observed, and it is spoken of as an erro therefore, where there was no mistakene
eat on la neous system . But this same system , application of themeasure but a complet
t so son la when it is pursued with advantage, or, misunderstanding of itsnature ; we shall
and there at all events, without causing damage, further allow that this very absurdity
isquietly approved . Every one praises amongstothersseems to havetaken
thethe
faultless ofPrince Henry placeinthe defence of the Vosges by the
to dislom in Sevencampaigns
Years War, because they Austrian and Prussian armies in 1793
apuermsiotarn-1as have been pronounced so by the king, and 1794 .
c
an of pensi
peaking a
near to

of Serena
On systee !
151 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.

CHAPTER XXIII.

KEY OF THE COUNTRY .

THERE is no theoretical idea in the art Lascy

but to turned it twice
be able (1737
to establ ishand 1738)
themse lves—
ofwar which has played such a part in
criticism as that we are now entering with tolerable security in the Crimea.
upon. It is the “ great war steed ” in That is very simple, but we gain very
all accounts ofbattles and campaigns; little in this throughthe conceptionofa
the most frequent point of viewin alí key-point.But ssion
if itmightbe said, Who
arguments, and one of those fragments ever has posse of the district of
of scientific form withwhichcriticsmake LangrescommandsallFranceasfaras
a show of learning. And yet the concep Paris — that is to say, it only rests with
tion embodied in it has never yet been himself to take possession — that is
established, nor has iteverbeen clearly of
explained.
plainly
mucha very differen
highe r import thing,something
tance. Accord
We shall try to ascertain its real mean ing to the first kind of conception the
ing, and then see how far it can be made possession of the country cannot be
available for practical use. thought of without the possession of the
Wetreat ofitherebec ause the defence ispointwhic
of mountains , river defences, as well as
h we have
a thing which is intell
d key;
calleigible to that
the
the conceptions of strong andentrenched most ordinary capacity : but according to
camps with which it closely connects the second kind of conception , the posses,
itself, required to have precedence . sion of the point which we have called
The indefinite confused conception key, cannot be imagined without theposa
which is concealed behind this ancient session of the country following, as a
mili tary metaphor hassometimes signi necessary consequence; thatis plainly;
fied the most exposed part of a country ng
somethi ous
marvell , common sense is
at other times the strongest. no longer sufficient to grasp this, the
If thereis any spotwithout the posses- magicof the occultsciencesmustbe
sion of which no one dare venture to penetrate called into requisition . This cabala
into an enemy's country that may, with came into existence in works published
propriety, be called the key of that coun fifty years ago, and reached its zenith
try . But this simple, though certainly at the end of the last century ; and not
at the same time also, barren notion withstanding the irresistible force,cena
has notsatisfied theorists,r the they tainty
and term distinctness
have amplified it,andunde parte'sand
method with which Buona
conducting
of war carried
key of a country imagined points which conviction generally, this cabala has,
decide upon the possession ofthe whole nevertheless, still managed , wesay,to
country. spin out the thread of its tenacious exis.
When the Russians wanted to advance
into the Crimean peninsula , they were tence through the medium of books.
(Setting aside for a moment our con
obliged tomakethemselvesmasters ofthe ception of thekey -pointitisself-evident
)
muchto gain an entrance generally - for commanding importance , where several
 KEY OF TIE COUNTRY. 155
CHAP . XXIII.]
roads meet, where our means of subsist- more restricted sense. This idea has
ence may be conveniently collected, which been the starting point of a false theory
have the advantage of being centrally sit- (of which, perhaps, Lloyd may be re
uated with reference to other important garded as the founder); and on this
points, the possession of which in short account, elevated points from which seve
meets many requirements and affordsmany ral roads descend into the adjacent
advantages. Now, if generals wishing to country , came to be regarded as the key
express the importance of such a point points of the country - as pointsnat
which
ural
by one word have called it the key of the command the country. It was
land , it would be pedantic affectation that this view should amalgamate itself
to take offence at their using that term ; with one very nearly connected with it,
on the contrary we should rather say that of a systematic defence of mountains,
the term is very expressive and pleasing. and that the matter should thus be driven
But if we try to convert this mere flower still further into the regions of the
of speech into the germ of a system illusory ; addedted to which many tactical
branching out like a tree into many elements connec e
with the defenc of
sens e rises in mount ains came into play, and thus the
opposfica
rami tion
ition s, co
,and mmon
dema nds that the expres- idea of the highest point in the road was
sion should be restricted to its true soon abandoned, and the highest point
value. generally of the whole mountain system ,
In order to develop a system out of the that is the point of the watershed , was
expression , it was necessary to resort to substituted for it as the key of the
somethi ng l distinct and
the practicamore absolute than country.
, but certainly very indefini te
, Now just at that time, that is the
meaning attaching to the term in the latter half of the preceding century,
ns g
narratio of generals when speakin of more definite ideas on the forms given to
the surface of the earth through aqueous
their military
amongst all its various ses . And
enterprirelation from
s, that of action became current ; thus natural
science lent a hand to the theory of war
high ground
Where was chosen
a road . s a mountain
traverse by this geological system, and then every
ridge, we thank heaven when we get to barrier of practical truth was broken
the top and have only to descend. This through, and reasoning floated in the
feeling so natural to a singletravelleris illusory system of a geological analogy.
In consequence of this, about the end of
still culti
diffi morees soseem
in the
to case of ancome
be over army.
, andAll
so the eighteenth century we heard, or
they are indeed in most instances ; we rather weread, of nothing but the sources
of the Rhine and Danube. It is true
find that
consc ious the
of adesc ent of
kind is easy,
feelinand
g ofwe are that this nuisance prevailed mostly in
supe-
riority over anyone who would stop us ; we books, for only a small portion of book
wisdom ever reaches the real world ,
have
and comm and sive
an exten viewa look
it with over the count
befor ry,.
ehand and the more foolish a theory the less
Thus the highest point on a road over a it will attain to practice ; but this of
mountain is always considered to possess a which we are now speaking has not been
decisive importance, and it does in fact in unproductive of injury to Germany by
the majority of cases, but by no means in its practical effects, therefore we are not
. Such points are very often described fighting with a windmill, in proof of
allthe despatches of generals by the name which we shall quote two examples;
in
of key -points; but certainly again in a first, the important but very scientific
campaigns of the Prussian army, 1793
somewhat different and generally in a
 1

156 ON WAR . 0
[ BOOK VI.
and 1794 in the Vosges, the theoretical regular influence on the use of the
country for the purposes of war, and
key to which will be found in the works
of Gravert and Massenbach ; secondly, that little is so over- balanced by other
the campaign of 1814, when, on the local circumstances, and other require
principle of the same theory, an army ments, thata line of positions may often
of 200,000 men was led by the nose run quite close to one of the points we
through Switzerland on to the plateau are discussing without having been in
of Langres as it is called. any way attracted there by that point.
But a high point in a country from We have only dwelt so long upon this
which all its waters flow, is generally false idea because a whole and very pre
nothing more than a high point; and tentious - system has built itself upon it.
all that in exaggeration and false ap- We now leave it, and turn back to our
plication of ideas, true in themselves, own views.
was written at the end of the eighteenth We say, then, that if the expression,
and commencement of the nineteenth key-position, isto represent ani ndepen
centuries,aboutitsinfluence onmilitary dentconception instrategy, it must only
events, is completely imaginary. If the be that of a locality the possession of
Rhine and Danube and all the six rivers
of Germany had their common source
which is indispensable before daring
on the top of one mountain , that moun to enter the enemy's country. But if we
choose to designate
tain would not on that account have convenient by thattoterm
point of entrance every
a country,
any claim to any greater military value or every advantageous central point in
than being suited for the position of a the country, then the term loses its real
trigonometrical point.
tower For, astillless
it would beless useful signal meaning
something(that
whichis,may
its value),
be foundandanywher
denotese
so for a vidette , and for a whole army more or less. It then becomes a mere
worth just nothing at all.
To seek for a key -position therefore in the pleasing figure such
But positions of speech.
as the term conveys
so called key country, that is where the dif to our. mind are very rarely indeed to be
ferent branches of the mountains diverge found
general, the best key to the
from a common point, and at the highest country In
liesinthe enemy's army; and
source of its waters, is merely an idea in when the idea of country predominates
books, which is overthrown by nature
itself,becausenature does notmakethe over that advantageou
specially of the armed force, some very
s circumstances
opinionprevail
assumed by the hithertoso calledtheory must ,maybe . These, according
recognised to our
by theirtendo
of ground,butdistributes peaks and ing to two principalresults: first,that
gorges , in the most irregular manner, and
not unfrequently the lowest water level the force occupying the position, through
is surrounded by the loftiest masses of the help capability
ordinary of the ground, obtains
of tactical extra;
resistance
mountain. If any one questions military second , that theenemy's lines of com ,
history on the subject, he will soon con- munication
can be sooner effectively
vince himself that the leading geological threatened from this position than he can
points of a country exercise very little threaten ours.
CIIAP . XXIVv.. ] OPERATING AGAINST A FLANK . 157

CHAPTER XXIV .

OPERATING AGAINST A FLANK.

Weneed hardlyobserve that we speak strategy, it isa completely false kind of

of the strategic flank , that is, a side of notionto consider that coming on the rear
the theatre of war, and that the attack of the enemy is at once an advantage in
from one side in battle, or the tactical itself. In itself, it is as yet nothing ;
movement against a fank , must not be but it will becomesomething in connec
confounded with it ; and even in cases in tion with other things, and something
which the strategic operation against a either advantageous or the reverse, ac
flank, in its last stage, ends in the tacti- cording to the nature of these things, the
cal operation, they can quite easilybe examination of which now claims our
kept separate, because the one never fol- attention .
lows necessarily other.and the gicFirst, in the action against the strate
These flankingoutmoveme
of the nts, flank , we must make a distinction
flanking positions connected with them, between two objects of that measure
belong also to the mere useless pageantry between the action merely against the
of theory, which is seldom met with in communications, and that against the line
actual war. Not that the means itself is of retreat, with which, at the same time,
either ineffectual or illusory, but because an effect upon the communications may
both sides generally seek to guard them- also be combined.
selves against its effects ; and cases in When Daun, in 1758, sent a detach
ble are
is impossicases ment to seize the convoys on their way
. Now
in thesethis
which uncommon thisrare
means to the siege of Olmütz, he had plainly no
has
often also proved highly efficacious, and intention of impeding the king's retreat
for this reason, as well as on account of into Silesia ; he rather wished to bring
about that retreat, and would willingly
the constant
required watching
in war, it is against
importaitntwhich
that is
it have opened the line to him .
should be clearly explained in theory. In the campaign of 1812, the object of
h c on
Althoug the strategi operati against all the expeditionary corps that were de
tached from the Russian army the
a flank
only canpart
on the of they defensive,
naturall be imagine d, also
but not months of September and October, was
on that of the offensive, still it has much only to intercept the communications,
more affinity with the first, and therefore not to stop the retreat ; but the latter
finds its place under the head of defensive was quite plainlythe design of the Mol
means . davian army which, underTschitschagof,
Before we enter into the subject, we marched against the Beresina, as well as
must establis
which must h the
never sight principl
simple
be lost of after-e, of the attack which GeneralWittgenstein
was commissioned to make on the French
wards in the consideration of the sub- corps stationed on the Dwina.
ject, that troops which are to act against These examples are merely to make the
the rear or flank oftheenemy cannotbe exposit ion clearer.
employed against his front, and that, The action against the lines of com
therefore, whether it be in tactics or munication is directed against the enemy's
158 ON WAR . [BOOK VI
convoys, against small detachments fol the second point is, that the situation of
lowing in rear of the army, against the line is such as exposes it to our ac
couriers and travellers small depôts, etc.; tion .
,
in fact, against all the means which the This weakness of the line may arise in
enemy requires to keep his army in a two ways — either by its direction, if it is
vigorous and healthy condition ; its object not perpendicular to the strategicfront
of the enemy's army, or because his lines
re
is, therefo , to weaken the condition of
the enemy in this respect, and by this of communication pass through our ter
means to cause him to retreat. ritory ; if both these circumstances exist,
The action against the enemy's line of the line is so much the more exposed.
retreat is to cut his army off from that These two relations require a closer exa
line . It cannot effect this object unless n
minatio .
the enemy really determines to retreat ; One would think that when it is a
but it may certainly cause him to do so question of covering a line of communi
by threate ning his lineof retreat,and, cation fortyor fifty miles long,itisof
therefore, it may have the same effect as quence
little conse er wheth on
the positi
the action against theline of communica- . occupied by an army standing at one cafe
tion, by working as a demonstration . tremity of this line forms an oblique angle
But as already said, none of these effects or a right angle in reference to it, as
are to be expected from themereturning the breadth of theposition is little more
which has been effected , from the mere than a mere point in comparison to the
geometrical form given to the disposition line; and yet it is not so unimportant as
of the troops, they only result from the it may seem. When an army is posted at a
conditions suitable to the same . rightangle with its communications, it is
Inorder to learnmore distinctly these difficult ,evenwith a considerable supe
conditions, we shall separate completely
riority, to interru pt thecommunications
the two actions againstthe flank ,and by any detachments orpartisans sent out
first consider that which isdirected for the purpose .If wethink only of the
against the communications . difficulty of covering absolutely a certain
Here we must first establish two prin- space, we should not believe this,but
tions,one orot
cipal condiys her ofwhich
coming
rather suppose,onthe contrary,that it
must alwa be forth . must be very difficult for an army to
Thefirstis, that the forcesused for protect its rear (that is,the count ry ben
this action against the flank of the enemy s
hind it) against all expedition which an
must be so insignificant in numbers that enemy superior in numbers may under.
their absence is not observed in front, Certainly, if we could look at
Thesecond,thattheenemy
runitscare er,and therefore 'sarmyhas everyth
can neither pape r ! ing in war as itiscover
Thentheparty sheet of
on inga the
make use of a fresh victory over our army , y
taint as to the point where line
nor can he pursue us if we evade a com in his uncer
bat by moving out of the way. light troops or partisans may appear,
This last case, which is by no means would be in a certainmeasure blind,and
so uncommon as might be supposed, we only the partisans would see. But if we
shall lay aside for the moment , and think of the uncertainty and insufficiency
occupy ourselves with the accessory con of intelligence gained in war,and know
ditions of the first areincessantly groping
that both parties
The first of these is, that the commu in the dark, then we easily perceive that
nications have a certain length , and can a detached corps sent round theenemy's
not be protected by a few good posts ; flank to gain his rear is in the posi
tion of a man engaged in a fray with
 OPERATING AGAINST A FLANK. .159
CHAP. XXIV. ]
numbers in a dark room . In the end he with each other, it is evident that if the
must fall ; and so must it also be with defensive wishes to take up a position at
bands who get roundan army occupying e, where the two lines intersect, the as
a perpendicular position, and who there- sailant from b, by the mere geometrical
fore place themselves near to the enemy, relation, could compel him to form front
but widely separated from their own peo- oppositeto him , and thus to lay bare his
ple. Not only is there danger of losing communications. The case would be re
numbers in this way ; there is also a versed if the defensive took up his posi
risk ofthe whole instrument itself being tion on this side of the point of junction,
blunted immediately ; for the very first about d ; then the assailant must make
front towards him , if so be that his line
misfortune which happens to one such
party will make all the others timid, and of operations, which closely depends on
instead of bold attacks and insolent geographical conditions, cannot be arbi
dodging, the only play will be constant trarily changed, and moved, for instance,
n
to the directio a d. From this it would
running away.
Through this difficulty , therefore, an seem to follow that the defender has an
armyoccupying a perpendicular position advantage in this system of reciprocal
covers the nearest points on its line of action, because he only requires to take
communications fora distance of two or a position on this side of the intersection
three marches, according to the strength of the two lines . But very far from
of the army ; but those nearest points are attaching any importance to this geo
metrical element, we only brought it into
just those which are most in danger, as consideration to make ourselves the better
they are the nearest to the enemy.
On the other hand, in the case of a understood ; and we are rather of opinion
decidedly oblique position, no such part that local and generally individual rela
tions have much more to do with deter
the smallest pressure ,cation
of the line of communi is covered ;
the mostinsigni- mining the position of the defender ;
that, therefore, it is quite impossible to
ficant attempt
leads at once toona the partble
vulnera of the enemy,
point. lay down in general which of two belli
But now, what is it which determines gerents will be obliged soonest to expose
unications .
the front of a position , if it not just the hisIfcomm
the lines of communication of both
communi
perpendicular to the line of
directioncation sides lie in one and the same direction ,
? The front of the enemy ;
but as then whichever of the two parties takes
wellthen , again,
suppose d as this mayntbeonequally
depende our front. up an oblique position will certainly
Here there is a reciprocal effect, forthe compel his adversary to do the same.
origin of which we must search. But then there is nothing gained geo
metrically by this, and both parties
attain the same advantages and disad
b vantages.
In the continuation of our considera
tions we shall, therefore, confine our
selves to the case of the line of commu
nication of one side only being exposed.
Now as regards the second disadvan
If we suppose the lines of communica- tageous relation of a line of communica
tion of the assailant, a b, so situated with tion, that is to say, when it runs through
respect to those of the enemy , c d , that an enemy's country, it is clear in itself
the two lines form a considerable angle how much the line is compromised by
160 ON WAR , [BOOK VI.
that circumstance, if the inhabitants of We have, therefore, now ascertained
the country have taken up arms ; and that
consequently the case must be looked at 1. A considerable length,
as if a body of the enemy was posted all 2. An oblique direction ,
along the line ; this body, it is true, is 3. An enemy's province,
in itself weak without solidity or inten- are the principal circumstances under
sive force ; but we must also take into which the lines of communication of an
consideration what the close contact and army may be interrupted by a relatively
influence of such a hostile force may small proportion of armed forces on the
nevertheless effect through the number side of the enemy ; in order to make this
of points which offer themselves one after interruption effectual, a fourth condition is
cation
another on long lines of communi . still requisite , which is a certain duration
That requires no further explanation . of time. Respecting this point, we beg
But even if the enemy's subjects have not attention to what has been said in the
taken up arms, and even if there is no fifteenth chapter of the fifth book .
militia in the country, or other military But these four conditions are only the
organisation, indeed if the people are even chief points which relate to the subject ;
very unwarlike in spirit, still the mere a number of local and special circum
relation of the people as subjects to a stances attach themselves to these, and
hostile governm ent is a disadvantage for often attain to an influence more decisive
the lines of communication of the other and important than that of the principal
side which is always felt. The'assistance onės themselves. Selecting onlythe most
which expeditionary forces and partisans essential, we mention the state of the
derive merely through a better under- roads, the nature of the country through
standing with the people, through a which they pass, the means of cover
knowledge of the country and its inhabit- which are afforded by rivers, mountains,
ants, through good information, through and morasses, the seasons and weather,
the support of official functionaries, is, the importance of particular convoys,
for them , of decided value ; and this sup such assiege trains, the number of light
port every such body will enjoy with- troops, etc. , etc.
out any special effort on its own part. On all these circumstances, therefore,
Added to this, within a certain distance
will depend the effect with which a
there will not be wanting fortresses , general can act on his opponent's com
rivers, mountains, or other placesof munications ; and by comparing the re
refuge, which of ordinary right belong sult of the whole of thesecircumstances
to the enemy , if they have not been on the one side with the result of the
formally taken possession of and occupied whole on the other,we obtain a just esti
by our troops.
Now in such a case as is here supposed , mate of the relativeadvantages of both
systems of communication, on which will
especially if attended with other favour depend which of the two generals can
able circumstances , it is possible to act
against the communications of an army , play the highest game.
although their direction is perpendicular What here seems so prolix in the ex
to the position of that army ; for the de planation is often decided in the concrete
tachments employed for the purpose do case at first sight ; but still, the tact of a
not then require to fall back always on practised
and a
judgment is required for that,
their own army, because being in their one aofperson must have thoughtover every
the cases now developed in order
own country they are safe enough if they
only make their escape . to seeinitstruelighttheabsurdity of
those critical writerswho think they have
 CHAP . xxiv . ] OPERATING AGAINST A FLANK . 161

settled something by the mere words

66
anxiety about exposing our own line of
turning " and acting on a flank,” communications , by taking up a position
without giving their reasons . on one or other flank , and as the enemy
We now come to the second chief con- by that means may always be com
dition, under which the strategic action pelled to form front obliquely to his
against the enemy's flank may take place. line of communications, therefore this
If the enemy is hindered from ad- one of the conditions above named will
vancing any other cause but the seldom fail to occur. The more the rest
resistancebywhicń our army opposes , let of the conditions, as well as other circum
that cause be what it may, then our stances, co- operate, so much the more
army has no reason to be apprehensive certain are we of success from the means
about weakening itself by sending out now in question ; but the fewer favour
be
detachments to harass the enemy; for if able circumstances exist, the more will
the enemy should attempt to chastise us all depend on superior skill in combina
by an attack, we have only to yield some tion, and promptitude and precision in
ground and decline the combat. This is the execution .
.
what was done by the chief Russian Here is the proper field for strategic
army at Moscow in 1812. But it is not at manoeuvres, such as are to be found so
all necessary that everything should be frequently in the Seven Years' War, in
again on the same great scale as inthat Silesia and Saxony, and in the man
cam
campaign
agai
for such a casewar,
In the firs Sile
to happen
Fre
paigns of 1760 and 1762. If, inamo y
war in whi onl a mod
n. t sian de- s ch y erate unt
rick the Great was each time in this of elementary force is displayed, such
situation, on the frontiers of Bohemia strategic manoeuvring very often ap
and Moravia, and in the complex affairs pears, this is not because the commander
relating to generals and their armies, on each occasion found himself at the
many causesof different kinds, particu- end of his career, but because want of
larly political ones, maybe imagined, resolution and courage, and ofan enter
whichmake
sibility . further advance animpos- have
prisingoften
spirit,supplied
anddreadtheof place
responsibility,
of real
As in the case now supposed more impediments; for a case in point, we
forces may be spared to act against the have only to call to mind Field Marshal
enemy's flank, the other conditions need Daun.
not be quite so favourable : even the As a summary of the results of our
nature of our communications in relation considerations, we may say, that the
to those of the enemy need not give us action against a flank is most effectual
be the advantage in that respect, as an enemy 1. In the defensive ;
who is not in a condition to make any 2. Towards the end of a campaign ;
particular use of our further retreat is 3. Above all, in a retreat into the
not likely to use his right to retaliate, heart of the country i and
but will rather be anxious about the di 4. In connection with a general arm
rectcovering of his own line ofretreat. ingofthe people.
Such a situation is therefore very well On the mode of executing this action
suited to obtain for us, by means less against the communications , we have
brilliant and complete but less dangerous only a few words to say,
than a victory, those result which s it The enterprises must be conducted
would betoo grea
obtain by a battle .
ta risk to seek to the
byskil ful detachme leade , who, at
head of small ntbodies,rs by bold
As in such a case we feel little marches and attacks , fall upon the
VOL. II . M
162 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
enemy's weak garrisons, convoys, and taken up on the Aank for that purpose,
small detachments on the march here or by a formal turning movement ; the
and there, encourage the national levies second is, if he divides his forces, and,
(landsturm ), and sometimes join with by an enveloping position with onepart,
them in particular undertakings. These threatens the enemy's rear, with the
parties must be more numerous than other part his front.
strong individually, and so organised The result is intensified in both cases
that it may be possible to unite several alike, that is either there is a real inter
of them for any greater undertaking ception of the retreat, and consequently
without obstacle
any from the vanity or the enemy's army taken prisoners, or the
caprice of any of the single leaders. greater part scattered , or there may be
We have now to speak of the action a long and hasty retreat of the enemy's
against the enemy's line of retreat. force to escape the danger.
Here we must keep in view , above all But the intensified risk is different in
things , the principle with which we com- the two cases.
menced , that forces destined to operate If we turn the enemy with our whole
in rearcannot be used in front;that, force, thedanger lies in the laying open
therefore, the action against the rear or
flanks is not an increase of force in
our own rear ; and hence the question
itself ; it is only to be regarded as a
again depends on the relation of the
more powerful application (or employ
mutual lines of retreat, just as in the
action against the lines of communica
ment) ofthe
ss same;inect
creas ing thedegre
asinge tion,it depended ontherelation of those
of succe in prosp , but also incre lines.
the degre e of risk . Now certainly the defender, if he is in
Every opposition offered with the his own country, is less restricted than
sword which isnotof adirect andsimple the assailant, both as tohis linesof
nature, has a tendency to raise the result retreat and communication, and in so far
at the cost of its certainty . An operation
against the enemy's flank , whether with is therefore in a better position to turn
adversary strategically ; but this
one compactforce, or 'withseparate his
general relation isnot of asufficiently
bodies converging from several quarters , decisive character to be used as the
belongs to this category . there
foundation of abut
But isnownot, toif be
retreat cutting the enemy's,
offdemonstration
a mere fore ,nothing practical methodthe
the whole of ; rela
but is seriously intended , the real solu tions in each individual case can decide.
tion is a decisive battle , or , at least , the Only so much we may add , that favour
conjunction of all the conditions for the able conditions are naturally more com
same ; and just in this solution we find mon in wide spheres of action than in
again the two elements above - mentioned small ; more common, also, on the side
-the greater result and the greater dan of independent states than on that of
ger. Therefore, if a general is to stand weak ones,dependent on foreign aid,
justified inadopting methodof and whose armies attention
must, therefore, con
action, his reasons mustthis
be favourable stantly have
pointofju nctiontheir
withthe
bent onarmor
auxiliary
the
conditions.
In this method of resistance we must lastly, they become most favorable for
distinguish the two forms already men the defender towards the close of the
campaign, when the impulsive force of
hiswholeforce intends to attack the much ,again, inis the
the assailant same manneras
somewhat in
spent ; very
enemy in rear, eitherfrom a position the caseof the lines of communication.
CHAP. XXIV .] OPERATING AGAINST A FLANK . 163

Such a flank position as the Russians their main force, and of thus shifting
took up with such advantage on the road the theatre of war from the Oder to the
from Moscow to Kaluga, when Buona. Elbe. Their ill -success at Dresden is to
parte's aggressive force was spent, would be ascribed not to this general plan but
have brought them into a scrape at the to their faulty dispositions both strategic
commencement of the campaign at the and tactical . They could have concen
camp of Drissa, if they had not been trated 220,000 men at Dresden against
wise enough to change their plan in Buonaparte's 130,000, a proportion of
good time. numbers eminentlyfavourable at Leipsic,
The other method of turning the enemy, at least, the proportion was as 285 : 157).
and cutting off his retreat by dividing our It is true that Buonaparte had distri
force, entails the risk attending a division buted his forces too evenly for the par
of ourown force,whilstthe enemy, having ticular system of a defence upon one
the advantage of interior lines, retains his line ( in Silesia 70,000 against 90,000, in
forces united, and therefore has the power tbe Mark - Brandenburg — 70,000 against
of acting with superior numbers against 110,000 ), but at all events it would have
one of our divisions. This is a disadvan- been difficult for him, without completely
tage which nothing can remove, and in abandoning Silesia, to assemble on the
exposing ourselves to it, we can only be Elbe a force which could have contended
justified by one of three principal rea- with the principal army of the allies
sons : in a decisive battle. The allies could
1. The original division of the force also have easily called up the army of
which makes such a method of action Wrede to the Maine, and employed it to
necessary, unless we incur a great loss try to cut Buonaparte off from the road
of time. to Mayence.
2. A great moral and physical supe- Lastly, in 1812, the Russians might
riority, which justifies the adoption of a have directed their army of Moldavia
decisive method . upon Volhynia and Lithuania in order to
3. The want of impulsive force in the move it forward afterwards against the
enemy as soon as he has arrived at the rear of the principal French army, be
culminating point of his career. cause it was quite certain that Moscow
When Frederick the Great invaded must be the extreme point of the French
Bohemia, 1757, on converging lines, he line of operations. For any part of
had not in view to combine an attack in Russia beyond Moscow there was nothing
front with one on the strategic rear , at to fear in that campaign, therefore the
all events, this was by no means 'his Russian main army had no cause to con
principalobject, as we shall more fully sider itself too weak.
explain elsewhere , but in any case it is This same scheme formed part of the
evident that there never coulă have been disposition of the forces laid down in the
any question of a concentration of forces first defensive plan proposed by General
in Silesia or Saxony before the invasion , Phul, according to which the army of
the camp at
was tothatoccupy
Barclay whilst
as hewould thereby have sacrificed alí Drissa,
the advantagesof asurprise, under Bragathion
When the allies formed their plan for was to press forward against the rear of
the second part of the campaign of 1813, the main French army. But what a dif
looking to their great superiority in ference of circumstances in the two cases !
In the first of them the French were
numbers, they might very well at that
time entertaintheidea ofattacking threetimesasstrong as the Russians ;
Buonaparte's right onthe Elbewith in the second, the Russians were deci.
 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
164
dedly superior . In the first, Buona- with having given the conditions under
parte's great army had in it an impulsive which this kind of reaction may take
force
beyondwhich carried
Drissa it to second
: in the Moscow , it80is miles
unfit place.
Very commonly the design of causing
to make a day's march beyond Moscow ; the enemy to retreat by menacing his
in the first, the line of retreat on the line of retreat, is understood to imply
Niemen did not exceed 30 miles : in the rather a mere demonstration than the
second it was 112. The same action actual execution of the threat. If it
against the enemy's retreat therefore, was necessary that every efficacious
which was so successful in the second demonstration should be founded on the
case , would, in the first; have been the actual practicability of real action, which
seems a matter of course at first sight,
Asest
wild thefolly.
action against the enemy's line then it would accord with the same in
of retreat, if it is more than a demonstra- all respects . But this is not the case :
tion, becomes a formal attack from the on the contrary , in the chapter on demon
rear , there remains thereforet still a good strations weh shalldit
nected wit
seeiontha t y at con
s theewhare
som dif
deal to be said on the subjec , but it will con
come in more appropriately in the book ferent, at all events in some respects,
upon the attack ; we shall therefore we therefore refer our readers to that
break off here and content ourselves chapter .

CHAPTER XXV.

RETREAT INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY.

We have considered the voluntary re tary history in every campaign in which

treat into the heart of the country as a there has been a considerable advance.
This loss in the advance is increased
icular indirect form ofdefence through
partch if the enemy has not been beaten , but
whi itd is expe cted my
the ene will be
destroye , not so much by the sword as withdraws of his own accord with his
by exhaustion from his own efforts . In forces intact , and offering a steady con
, tinuous resistance, sells every step of
eithernot supposed, or it is assumed to ground ata bloodyprice, so that the
take place when the enemy's forces are advance is a continuous combat for
considerably reduced. ground and not a mere pursuit.
Every assailant in advancing dimin On the other hand, the losses which
ishes his military strength by the advance ; a party on the defensive suffers on a
we shall consider this more in detail in retreat, are much greater if his retreat
the seventh book ; here we mnst assume has been precededby a defeat in battle
that result which we may the more than if his retreat is voluntary. Forif
readily do as it is clearly shown by mili he isable tooffer thepursuer the daily
 CHAP. xxv.] RETREAT INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. 165

resistance which we expect on a volun- in many cases impossible ; and the pur
tary retreat, his losses would be at least suer who, in the former case, advances
the same in that way, over and above extremely cautiously, even hesitatingly,
which those sustained in the battle have like a blind man, always groping about,
still to be added. But how contrary to presses forward in the latter case with
the nature of the thing such a suppo the firm tread of the conqueror, with the
sition as this would be ! The best army overweening spirit which good fortune
in the world if obliged to retire far into imparts, with the confidence of a demi
thecountry after the loss of a battle, will god, and the more daringly he urges the
suffer losses on the retreat, beyond mea- pursuit so much the more he hastens on
sure out of proportion ; and if the enemy things in the direction which they have
is considerably superior, as we suppose already taken, because here is the true
him , in the case of which we are now field for the moral forces which intensify
speaking, if he pursues with great and multiply themselves without being
energy as has almost always been done restricted to the rigid numbers and mea
in modern wars, then there is the highest sures of the physical world.
probability that a regular flight takes It is therefore very plain how different
place by which the army is usually com. will be the relations of two armies ac
pletely ruined. cording as it is by the first or the second
A regularly measured daily resistance, of the above ways, that they arrive at that
that is ,one which each time only lasts point which may be regarded as the end
as long as the balance of success in the of the assailant's course.
combat can be kept wavering, and in This is merely the result of the mu
which we secure ourselves from defeat tual destruction ; to this must now be
by giving up the ground which has been added the reductionswhich the advancing
contested at the right moment, will cost party suffers otherwise in addition, and
the assailant at least as many men as respecting which, as already said, we
the defender in these combats, for the refer to the seventh book ; further, on the
loss which the latter by retiring now other hand , we have to take into account
and again must unavoidably suffer in reinforcements which the retreating party
prisoners, will be balanced by the losses receives in the great majority of cases,
of the other under fire, as the assailant by forces subsequently joining him either
must always fight against the advan- in the form of help from abroad or
tages of the ground. t is true that the through persistent efforts at home.
retreating side loses entirely all those Lastly , there is, in the means of sub
men who are badly wounded, but the sistence, such a disproportion between
assailant likewise loses all his in the the retreating side and the advancing,
same case for the present, as they usually that the first not uncommonly lives in
remain several months in the hospitals . superfluity when the other is reduced to
The result will be that the two armies want .
will wear each other away in nearly The army in retreat has the means
equal proportions in these perpetual of collecting provisions everywhere, and
collisions
. he marches towards them, whilst the
quite different in the pursuit of a pursuer must have everything brought
It is a
beat en rmy. Here the troops lost in after him, which, as long as he is in
battle, the generaldisorganisation,the motion,even with theshortest lines of
broken courage, theanxiety about the communication, is difficult, and on that
retreat, make such a resistance on the account begets scarcity from the very
part of the retreating army very difficult, first.
166 ON WAR . (BOOK V1.

All that the country yields will be in his advance, the other is the moral
taken for the benefit of the retreating impression.
army first, and will be mostly consumed . To protect the country from loss can
Nothing remains but wasted villages and certainly never be looked upon as the
towns, fields from which the crops have object of the whole defence. That object
ain
been gathered , or which are trampled is an advantageous peace. To obt
y
down, empt wells, and mudd y brook s . that as surely as possi ble is the endea
The pursuing army, therefore, from vour, and for it no momentary sacrifice
the very first day, has frequently to con- must he considered too great. At the
tend with the most pressing wants. On same time, the above loss, although it
taking the enemy's supplies he cannot may not be decisive , must still be laid in
reckon ; it is only through accident , or thebalance, for it always affects our in
some unpardonable blunder on the part terests.
of the enemy, that here and there some This loss does not affect our army
little falls into his hands. directly ; it only acts upon it in a more
Thus there can be no doubt that in or less roundabout way, whilst the retreat
countries of vast dimensions , and when itself directly reinforces our army. It is,
between no
thereis the bellige
dinarydisproporti
extraorrent on therefore, ditficult todraw a comparison
powers, a relation between the advantage and disadvantage
may be produced in this way between the in this case ; they arethings of a dif
military forces, which holds out to the ferent kind , the action of which is
defensive an immeasurably greater chance not directed towards any common point.
of a final result in his favour than he We must, therefore, content ourselves
would have had if there had been a with saying that the loss is greater when
great battle on the frontier . Not only we have to sacrifice fruitful provinces well
does theprobability ofgaininga victory populated, andat alarge
become greater through this alteration but it arrives maxicommercial
mum when toat the
the
in the proportions of the contending same time we lose war -means either ready
armies, but the prospects of great results for use or in course of preparation.
from the victory are increased aswell, The second counterpoise is the moral
through the change of position. What impression .Thereare cases in which the
a difference between a battle lost close tocommander must be above regarding such
the frontier of our country and one in the in which he must quietly follow
middle of the enemy's country Indeed a thing,
! , out his plans, and run the risk ofthe ob
thesit uation ofthe assailant isoften jectionswhich short-sighted despondency
such at the end of his first start, that may offer ; but nevertheless, this im
even a battle gained mayforce him to pression is no phantom which shouldbo
retre at, because
impulsive powerhe
hasneither enough despised. It is not likeaforce which
left to complete and
make use of a victory , nor is he in a
acts upon one point : but like a force
condition to replace the forces he has which,with the speed of lightning, pene
trates every fibre, and paralyses aſl the
lost.
There is, therefore , an immense differ powers which should be in full activity,
ence between a decisive blow at the comboth in a nation and in itsarmy. There
mencement and at the end of the attack.are indeed cases in which the cause
of the retreat into the interior of the
To the great advantage of this mode ly stood by both
of defence are opposed two drawbacks . country is quick under
The first
suffers is the loss which thecountry nation
hope,areandeleva
through the presence of the enemy
army, and trust,
ted bythe step b;asutsuch
well as
cases are rare. More usually, the people
 RETREAT INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. 167
CHAP . xxv.]
and the army cannot distinguish whether such as that of the French in 1812, easily
it is a voluntary movement or a precipi- appear under different circumstances,
tate retreat, and still less whether the still less such a superiority in numbers as
plan is one wisely adopted, with a view existed at the commencement of the cam
to ensure ulterior advantages, or the paign, when the French army had more
result of fear of the enemy's
sword. The than double the numbers of its adver
people have a mingled feeling of sym- sary, besides its undoubted moral supe
pathy and dissatisfaction at seeing the riority. Therefore, what was here only
fate of the provinces sacrificed ; the army effected at the end of 100 miles, may
easily loses confidence in its leaders, or perhaps, in other cases, be attained at
even in itself, and the constant combats the end of 50 or 30 miles.
of the rear-guard during the retreat, tend The circumstances which favour this
always to give new strength to its fears. mode of defence are
These are consequences of the retreat about 1. A country only little cultivated.
which we must never deceive ourselves. 2. A loyal and warlike people.
3. An inclement season.
more certainly
And itnatural, simpler, nobler, in
is — considered itself
and more All these things increase the difficulty
in accordancewith themoral existence of of maintaining an army, render great
a nation, to enter the lists at once, that convoys necessary, many detachments,
the enemy may uot cross the frontiers of harassing duties, cause the spread of
its people without being opposed by its sickness, and make operations against
genius, and being called to a bloody the flanks easier for the defender.
account. Lastly, we have yet to speak of the
These are the advantages and disad- absolute mass alone of the armed force,
vantages of this kind of defence ; now as influencing the result.
a few words on its conditions and the It lies in the nature of the thing itself
circumstances which are in its favour. that, irrespective of the mutual relation
A country of great exten t, or at all of the forces opposed to each other, a
t
events, a long line of retrea , is the first r
small force is soone sted
exhau than a
and fundamental condition ; for an ad. larger, and, therefore, that its career
vance of a few marches will naturally cannot be so long, nor its theatre of war
not weaken the enemy seriously . Buona- so wide. There is, therefore, to a certain
parte's centre, in the year 1812, at extent, a constant relation between the
Witepsk, was 250,000 strong, at Smo- absolute size of an army and the space
lensk , 182,000, at Borodino it had only which that army can occupy. It is out of
tion
diminished to 130,000 , that is to say, the question to try to express thisrela
had t anequaislity
to abouBorodino
fallencentre. the by anyfigures, andbesides,itwill always
withmiles
Russian ninety be modified by other circumstances ; it is
from the frontier; but it was not until sufficient for our purpose to say that these
they came near Moscow that the Russians things necessarily have this relation from
reached that decided superiority
d in numn their very nature. We may be able to
bers, which of itself reverse the situatio march upon Moscow with 500,000 but not
with 50,000, even if the relation of the
Frenc victory nts
of thehcombata atMaloJarosl y , that
so assuredlewetz the invader's army to that of thedefender
could
not essentially alter it again . in point of numbers were much more
Noother European statehas the di- favou Now rable in assu
if we me thatcase.
the latter there is this re
mensions of Russia, and in very few can
a line of retreat 100 miles long be difflatieren t caseolut
on ofabs e
s, thenpow
er to space in two
it is certain that the
imagined But neither will a power
168
ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
effect of our retreat intothe interior in required strategically and tactically. A
weakening the enemy will increase with hundred thousandmen who have to march
the masses .
to and from the point of assembly every
1. Subsistence and lodging of the day, halted at one time, and then set in
troops become more difficult - for, sup movement again , now called to arms,
posing the space which an army covers then cooking or receiving their rations
to increase in proportion to the size of a hundred thousand who must not go
the army, still the subsistence for the into their bivouac until the necessary
army will never be obtainable from this reportsare delivered in from all quarters
space alone, and everything which has these men, as a rule, require for all
to bebrought after an armyissubject
to greater loss also ; the
connected with theactual
these exertions
whole space march, twice as much time as 50,000
occupied is never used for covering for would require, but there are only twenty
the troops, only a small part of is re four hours in the day for both. How
quired, and this does not increase in themuch the time and fatigue of the march
same proportion as the masses. according to the size of the
2. The advance is in the same manner body differs
itself
of troops to be moved, has been
more tedious in proportion as the masses shown in
increase, consequently, the time the ninth chapter of the pre
before the career of aggressionislonger
is run
ceding book. Now, the retreating army,
out, and the sum total of the daily losses it is true, partakes of these fatigues as
is greater . well as the advancing, but they are
much greater for the latter :
Three thousand men driving two thou 1 , because the mass of his troops is
sand before them in an ordinary country, greater on account of the superiority
will not allow them to march at the rate
of 1, 2, or at most 3 miles a day, and which we supposed,
2 , because the defender, by being
from time totime to make a few days always the party to yield ground, pite
them, and force themto make a further initiative, and,therefore , theright al.
retreat is the work of a few hours ; but ways to give the law to the other. He
ifcaseweismultipl y these masses by 100, the forms his plan beforehand, which, in
altered . Operations for which a
few hours sufficed in the first case , re most cases , he can carry out unaltered,
quire now a whole day, perhaps two. but the aggressor , on the other hand,
The contending forces cannot remain to can only make his plans conformably to
gether near one point ; thereby , therefore, those
in the of
firsthisinstance
adversary, which he must
find out,
the diversity of movements and combina
tions increases , and, consequently, also We must, however , remind our readers
the time required . But this places the that we are speaking ofthe pursuit of
assailant ata disadvantage, because his an enemy who has not suffered a defeat,
difficulty with subsistence being greater, who has not even lost a battle. It is
he is obliged to extend his force more necessary to mention this, in order that
than the pursued , and, therefore, is we may not be supposed to contradict
always in danger of being overpowered what was said inthe twelfth chapter of
by the latterat some particular point, our fourth book.
as the Russians tried to do at Witepsk . But this privilege of giving the law
3. The greater the masses are, the to the enemymakesa differencein saving
more severe are the exertions demanded ofrespect
time,ofo
expenditure of dvantages
thermiuora force,as well asin;
which
from each individual for the daily duties
in the long run, becomes very important.
 169
CHAP. xxv .] RETREAT INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY.
3, because the retreating force on the therefore, made it completely in con
one hand does all he can to make his formity with a regular plan, they might
own retreat easy , repairs roads, and easily, from Smolensk, have taken the
bridges, chooses the most convenient road to Kaluga, which they only took
places for encampment, etc., and, on the on leaving Moscow ; it is very possible
other hand again , does all he can to that under these circumstances Moscow
throw impediments in the way of the would have been entirely saved.
pursuer, as he destroys bridges, by the That is to say , the French were about
mere act of marching makes bad roads 130,000 strong at Borodino, and there
worse, deprives the enemy of good places is no ground for assuming that they
for encampment by occupying them would have been any stronger if this
himself, etc. battle had been fought by the Russians
Lastly, we must add still,as a specially half way to Kaluga instead ; now , how
favourable circumstance, the war made many of these men could they have
by the people. This does not require spared to detach to Moscow ? Plainly,
further examination here, as we shall very few ; but it is not with a few troops
allot a chapter to the subject itself. that an expedition can be sent a distance
Hitherto, we have been engaged upon of fifty miles (the distance from Smo
the advantages which such à retreat lensk to Moscow) against such a place
ensures, the sacrifices which it requires, as Moscow.
and the conditions which must exist ; Supposing Buonaparte when at Smo
we shall now say something of the lensk , where he was 160,000 strong ,
mode of executing it. had thought he could venture to detach
The first question which we have to against Moscow before engaging in a
propose to ourselves is with reference to great battle, and had used 40,000 men for
the direction of the retreat . that purpose, leaving 120,000 opposite
It should be made into the interior of the principal Russian army, in that case,
the country, therefore, if possible, towards these 120,000 men would not have been
a point where the enemy will be sur- more than 90,000 in the battle, that is
rounded on all sides by our provinces; 40,000 less than the number which fought
there he will be exposed to their influence, at Borodino ; the Russians, therefore,
and we shall not be in danger of being would have had a superiority in numbers
separated from the principal mass of our of 30,000 men . Taking the course of
territory, which might happen if we the battle ofBorodino asa standard, we
chose a line too near the frontier, as may very well assume that with such a
would have happened to the Russians in superiority they would have been vic
1812 if they had retreated to the south torious. At all events, the relative situ
instead of the east . ation of the parties would have been
This is the condition which lies in the more favourable for the Russians than
object of the measureitself. Whichfarpoint it was at Borodino. But the retreat of
in the country is the best, how the the Russians was not the result of a
choice of thatpoint will accord with the well -matured plan ; they retreated as
design of covering the capital or any far as they did because each time that
other important point directly, or draw- they were on the point of giving battle
ing the enemy away from the direction ves strong
they did not consider themsel
ofsuch important places depends on cir- enough action ; all their
yetfora greatents
cumstances . iessupplreinforcem
and were on the
If the Russians had well considered road from Moscow to Smolensk, and it
their retreat in 1812 beforehand , and, could not enter the head of anyone at
 170
ON WAR , (BOOK VI.
Smolensk to leave that road. But, be so in this new direction which would have
sides, a victory between Smolensk and led them to Kiew, therefore much nearer
Kaluga would never have excused, in the again to the enemy's frontier. That the
eyes of the Russians , the offenceofhaving French ,even ifthey had still preserved a
left Moscow uncovered, and exposed it large numerical superiority overthe Rus
to the possibility d
of being capture . sians, could not have maintained their
Buonaparte , in 1813, would have line of communication by Moscow under
secured Paris with more certainty from such circumstances is clear in itself; they
an attack if he had taken up a position at have given up not only Moscow but,
some distance in a lateral direction , some must
in all probability, Smolensk also, there
where behind the canal ofBurgundy,leav- fore have again abandoned the conquests
ing only with the large force of National obtained with so much toil, and con
Guard in Paris a few thousand regular tentedthemselves with a theatre of war
troops. The allies would never have had on this side the Beresina.
the courage to march a corps of 50,000 or Now , certainly, the Russian army
60,000 against Paris whilst Buonaparte would thus have got into the same diffi
was in the field atAuxerrewith100,000 culty to whichitwould have exposed
men .
Ifthe case is supposedreversed, itself by taking the direction of Kiew at
andthealliesin Buonaparte's place, then first, namely,that of being separated
no one, indeed, would have advised them
to leave the road open to their own from the mass of its own territory ;
capital with Buonaparte for their oppo this disadvantage would now have be
nent. With such a preponderance he come almost insignificant, for how dif
would not have hesitated a moment ferent would have been the condition of
about marching on the capital. So dif the French army if it had marched
ferent is the effect under the same cir straight upon Kiew without making the
cumstances but under different moral detour by Moscow.
relations. It is evident that such a sudden change
As we shall have hereafter to return of direction of a line of retreat, which is
to this subject when treating of the plan very practicable in a spacious country,
of a war, we shall only at present add ensures remarkable advantages.
1. It makes it impossible for the
that, when such a lateral position is taken ,
the capital or place which it is the object enemy (the advancing force) to maintain
to protect , must , in every case , be capa his old line of communication : but the
ble of making some resistance that it organisation of a new one is always a
may not be occupied and laid under difficult matter, in addition to which the
contribution by every flying column or change is made gradually , therefore,
irregular band probably, he has to try more than one
But we have still to consider another new line.
peculiarity in the direction of such a line 2. If both parties in this manner
of retreat, that is, a sudden change of direc approach the frontier again ; the position
tion . After the Russians had kept the of the aggressorno longer covers his
same direction as far as Moscow they left conquests,and
give them up: he must in allprobability
that direction which would have taken
to Wladimir country
is Russia enormousarmies
whichtwo
withinits dimensions,
themroad
the to Riazan ,and
for som edistancetaking
afterfirst ,then in athis manner regularly pla at pri
y mig ht
then transferred their army tothe Kaluga soners ' base ( Zeck jagen):
road . If they had been obliged to continue
But such à change smallercountries
their retreat they couldeasilyhavedone treatisalsopossiblein of the line of re,
CHAP. xxv.] RETREAT INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. 171

when other circumstances are favourable, The weakest features in a long advance
which can only be judged of in each on the part of the aggressor are for
individual case, accordingto its different instance ;—the length of the lines of
relations. communication, and the exposure of the
When the direction in which the enemy strategic flanks. By the divergent form
is to be drawn into the country is once of retreat, the aggressor is compelled
fixed upon, then it follows of itself that to cause a portion of his force to show
our principal army should take that a front to the flank, and this portion
direction, for otherwise the enemy would properly destined only to neutralise our
not advance in that direction, and if he force immediately in his front, now
even did we should not then be able to im- effects to a certain extent something else
pose upon him all the conditions above in addition, by covering a portion of the
supposed . The question then only re- lines of communication .
mains whetherwe shall take this direction For the mere strategic effect of the
with our forces undivided, or whether retreat, the divergent form is therefore
considerable portions should spread out not favourable ; but if it is to prepare an
laterally and therefore give the retreat a action hereafter against the enemy's line
divergent ( eccentric) form . of retreat, then we must refer to what
this we answer that this latter form has been said about that in the last
in itself is to be rejected. chapter.
1. Because it divides our forces, There is only one object which can
whilst their concentration on one point give occasion to a divergent retreat,
is just one of the chief difficulties for that is when we can by that means pro
the enemy. tect provinces which otherwise the enemy
2. Because the enemy gets the ad wouWhat
vantage of operating on interior lines,
ld occupy :
sections of territory the advan
can remain more concentrated than we cing foe will occupy right and left of his
are, consequently can appear in so much course, can with tolerable accuracy be
thegreater force at any onepoint. Now discerned by the point of assembly of,
certainly this superiority is less to be and directions given to, his forces, by the
dreaded when we are following a system situation of his own provinces, fortresses,
of constantly giving way ; but the very etc. , in respect to our own. To place troops
condition of this constantly yielding, is in those districts of territory which he
always to continue formidable to the will in all probability leave unoccupied,
enemy and not to allow him to beat us would be dangerous waste of our forces.
, which might easily happen. A
in detail object of such a retreat, is to But now whether by any disposition of
further our forces we shall be able to hinder him
bring our principal force by degrees to a from occupying those districts which in
superiority of numbers, and with this all probabilityhe will desire to occupy,
superiority to give a decisive blow, but is more difficult to decide, and it is there
that by a partition of forces would become fore a point, the solution of which
an uncertainty . depends much on tact of judgment.
When the Russians retreated in 1812,
3. Because
centric (convergent) general
as a action rule the
against con
the ene- they left 30,000 men under Tormassow
my is not adapted to the weaker forces . in Volhynia , to oppose the Austrian force
4. Because many disadvantages of which was expected to invade that
the weak points of the aggression dis- province. The size of the province, the
appear when the defender's army is numerous obstacles of ground which the
divided into separate parts. country presents, the near proportion
 0
172 ON WAR. [BOOK VI.
1
between the forces likely to come into country should therefore as a rule be
conflict justified the Russians in their made directly before the enemy, and as
expectations , that
they would be able, orto
keep the upper hand in that quarter slowly as possible, with an army which
has not suffered defeat and is undivided ;
at least to maintain themselves near to and by its incessant resistance it should
their frontier. By this, very important force theene my to a constant state of
advantages might have resulted
in the ss
readine for battle, and to a ruinous
sequel, which we shall not stop here to expenditure of forces in tactical and
discuss ; besides this, it was almost im- strategical measures of precaution.
possible for these
troops to have joined When both sides have in this manner
the main army in time if they had reached the end of the aggressor's first
wished. For these reasons, the determi- start, the defendershouldthen dispose
nation to leave these troops in Volhynia hisarmy in a position, if such canbe
to carry on there a distinct war of found , forming an oblique angle with
their own, was right. Now on the the route of his opponent
other hand ,if according to theproposed against the enemy's rear,with
and operate
all the
plan of campaign submitted by General means at his command .
Phul , only the army of Barclay ( 80,000 The campaign of 1812 in Russia shows
men), was to retire to Drissa , and Braga- all these measures on a greatscale,and
thion's army ( 40,000 men) was to remain their effects, as it were, in a magnifying
on the right flank of the French, with a glass. Although it was not a voluntary
view to subsequently falling on their rear, retreat , we may easily consider it from
it is evident at once that this corps could that point of view . If the Russians with
not possibly maintain itself in South the experience they now have of the
Lithuania so near to the rear of the main
body of the French army , and would soon results to bethusproduced, had to under
take the defence of their country over
havebeen destroyed by their overwhelm- again,exactlyunder the same circum ,
ing masses . stances, they would do voluntarily and
That the defender's interest in itself systematically what in great part was
es
is to give upas few provinc ible
as possible done without a definite plan in 1812 ;
to the assailant is intellig enough,
but it would be a great mistake to
but this is always secondary consider
a suppose that there neither is nor can be
ation ; that the attack is also made more any instance elsewhere of the same mode
difficult the smaller or rather narrower the of action where the dimensions of the
theatre of war is to which we can confine
the enemy , is likewise clear in itself ; but Russian empire are wanting.
Whenever a strategic attack, without
all this is subordinate to the condition coming to the issue of a battle, is wrecked
that in so doing we have the probability merely on the difficulties encountered, and
of a result in our favour, and that the
main body of the force on ned the defensive the aggressor is compelled to makeamore
will not be too much weake ; for upon or less disastrous retreat, there the chief
that force we must chiefly depend for conditions and principal effects of this
the final solution , because the difficulties mode of defence willbe found to have
and distress suffered by the main body taken place, whatever may be the modi
of the enemy, first call forth his determi fying circumstances otherwise with which
nation to retreat, and increase in the it is accompanied . Frederick theGreat's
greatest degree the loss of physical and campaign of 1742 in Moravia ,of 1744 in
moral power therewith connected. Bohemia, the French campaign of 1743
The retreat into the interior of the in Austria and Bohemia , the Duke of
Brunswick's campaign of 1792 in France,
CHAP. XXVI.] ARMING THE NATION .
Massena's winter campaign of 1810–11
in Portugal, are all cases in which this is
exemplified, although in smaller propor-
tions and relations; there are besides
innumerable fragmentary operations of
this kind, the results of which , although
notwholly, are still partly to be ascribed
to the principle which we here uphold ;
these we do not bring forward, because through that victory, as through a first
it would necessitate a development of blow,to cause a movement which usually
circumstances which would lead us into
too wide a field .
In Russia, and in the other cases cited ,
CHAPTER XXVI.
ARMING THE NATION.
A PEOPLE's war in civilised Europe is a
phenomenon of the nineteenth century.
It has its advocates and its opponents :
the latter either considering it in a poli-
tical sense as a revolutionary means, a
state of anarchy declared lawful, which
is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to
social order at home ; or on military
grounds, conceiving that the result is not
commensurate with theexpenditure of the
nation's strength. The first point does not
concern us here, for we look upon a peo
ple's war merely as a means of fighting,
therefore, in its connection with the
enemy; but with regard to the latter point,
we must observe that a people's war
in general is to be regarded as a conse-
quence of the outburst which the military
element in our day has made through its
old formal limits" an expansi
; aswhole on and
strengthening of the fermentation-
process which we call war. The requi.
sition system , the immense increase in
the size of armies by means of that
173
the crisis or turn of affairs took place
without any successful battle, having
given the decision at the culminating
point ; but even when such an effect is
not to be expected, it is always a matter
of immense importance in this mode of
defence to bring about such a relation of
forces as makes victory possible, and
goes on increasing in its disastrous effects
according to the laws applicable to falling
bodies.
system, and the general liability to mili
tary service, the utilizing militia , are
all things which lie in the same direc
tion, ifwe make the limited military
system of former days our starting point ;
and the levée en masse, or arming of the
people, now lies also in the same direction .
If the first named of these new aids to
war are the natural and necessary conse
quences of barriers thrown down ; and if
they have so enormously increased the
power of those who first used them, that
the enemy has been carried along in the
current, and obliged to adopt them like
wise, this will be the case also with
people -wars. In the generality of cases ,
the people who make judicious use of
this means, will gain a proportionate
superiority over those who despise its
use . If this be so, then the only ques
tion is whether this modern intensifica
tion of the military element is, upon the
whole, salutary for the interests of hu.
manity or otherwise,-a question which it
174 ON WAR . (BOOK VI.
would be about as easy to answer as the except Russia, or suppose a disproportion
question of war itself — we leave both between the strength of the invading
to philosophers. But the opinion may army and the extent of the country, such
be advanced ,that the resources swallowed as never occurs in reality. Therefore, to
up in people's wars might be more profit- avoid following a phantom , we must
ablyemployed ,ifusedin providingother imaginea people-waralways
militarymeans ; no very deep investiga- nation, with awar carried
in combi
on by aregular
tion , however, is necessary to be con ed
army, and both carri ding
on accor to a
vinced that these resou rces are for tthe plan embracing the operations of the
sable
most part not dispo canno be whole .
, and
utilized inan arbitrary manner at pleasure. The conditions under which alone the
e's war can become effective are the
One essentialpart that is themoral ele- peoplowin
ment, is not called into existence until g
foll
this kind of employment for it arises. 1. That the war is carried on in the
We therefore do not ask again : how heart of the country.
much does the resistance which the whole 2. That it cannot be decided by a
nation in arms is capable of making single catastrophe.
cost that nation ? but we ask : what is the 3. That the theatre of war embraces
effect which such a resistance can pro- a considerable extent of country.
duce ? What are its conditions, and how 4. That the national character is
is it to be used ? favourable to the measure.
It follows from the very nature of the 5. That the country is of a broken and
thing that defensive means thus widely difficult nature,either from being, moun,
dispersed, are not suited to great blows tainous , or by reason of woods and
requiring concentrated action in time marshes, or from the peculiar mode of
and space. Its operation , like the pro- cultivation in use.
cess of evaporation in physical nature , Whether the population is dense or
is according to the surface . The greater otherwise, is of little consequence, as
that surface and the greater the contact there is less likelihood of a want of men
with the enemy's army, consequently the than of anything else. Whether the
more that army spreads itself out, so inhabitants are rich or poor is also a
much the greater willbe theeffects of pointbyno means decisive, at leastit
armingthe nation. Like a slowgradual that
heat, it destroys the foundations of the
shoulda not be ; but it must be admitted
poor population accustomed to
enemy's army. As it requires time to pro hard work and privations usually shows
duce its effects, therefore whilst the hostile itself more vigorous and better suited for
elements are working on each other, there war.
is a state of tension which either gradually One peculiarity of country which
wears out if the people's war is extin greatly favours the action of war carried
guished at somepoints, and burns slowly on bythe people, is the scattered sites of
away at others, or leads to a crisis, if the
flames of this general conflagration the dwellings of the country people,
envelop the enemy's army, and compel such as yis. toThe
German befound inmany
countryis parts of
thus moreinter
an dcovered ; the roads are worse ,
fromutter destruction . In orderthatthis sected
result should be produced by a national
although more numerous; thelodgement
ss
of troops is attended with endle diffi
war alone, we must suppose either a
surfa culties,
ce-extentofthedominions invaded, repea ts but
itselfespecially
ona smal that peculiarity
l scale,wh ich
exceeding that any country Europe
of in , a people-war possesseson a great scale,
 ARMING THE NATION . 175
21 CHAP . XXVI.]

se a disposit namely that the principle of resistance a mountainous, thickly wooded, or even
of the int exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangi- broken country, becomes a service of a
the county, ble . If the inhabitants are collected in very dangerous character, for at any mo
villages, the most troublesome have troops ment a combat may arise on the march ;
antom, TEIS quartered on them, or they are plundered if in point of fact no armed bodies
ulways in the
as a punishment, and their houses burnt, have even been seen for some time,
don byemai etc. , a system which could not be very yet the same peasants already driven
in actunity easily carried out with a peasant com- off by the head of a column, may at
perations d's munity of Westphalia. any hour make their appearance in its
National levies and armed peasantry rear. If it is an object to destroy roads
which also cannot and should not be employed or to block up a defile ; the means
effective as
against the main body of the enemy's which outposts or detachments from an
army, or even against any considerable army can apply to that purpose, bear
urried and corps of the same, they must not attempt about the same relation to those fur
to crack the nut, they must only gnaw nished by a body of insurgent peasants,
on the surface and the borders. They as the action of an automaton does to
decided
should rise in the provinces situated at that of a human being. The enemy las
one of the sides of the theatre of war, and no other means to oppose to the action
in which the assailant does not appear of national levies except that of detaching
puntry r in force, in order to withdraw these numerous parties to furnish escorts for
characta
provinces entirely from his influence. convoys to occupy military stations ,
f'a brokas defilesfirst
Where no enemy is to be found , there is the dges, etc.
, briefforts In proportion as
of the national levies
being Do
no want of courage to oppose him, and
Trands of
at the example thus given, the massof are small, so the detachments sent out
uliar mer the neighbouring populationgradually will be weak in numbers, from the repug
takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it nance to a great dispersion of forces ; it is
is deve
does in heather, and reaching at last on these weak bodies that the fire of the
that part of the surface of the soil on national war usually first properly kindles
sequency Which the aggressoricatio
is based , it seizes itself, they are overpowered by num
Trant of n
his lines of commun and preys bers at some points, courage rises, the
lhether
or is about upon the vital thread by which his exist- love of fighting gains strength, and the
ence is supported . For although we enter- intensity of this struggle increases until
be admital tain no exaggerated ideas of the omni- the crisis approaches which is to decide
customa
lt potence ofa people’s war, such as that it is the issue .
sualftahleti
an inexhaustible, unconquerable element, According to our idea of a people's war,
er sui over which the mere force of anarmy has it should, like a kind of nebulous vapoury
as little control as the human will has over essence, never condense into a solid body ;
DITT TA the wind or the rain; in short,although otherwise the enemy sends an adequate
war cami our opinion is not founded on flowery force against this core, crushes it, and
sredst
er ephemeral literature, still wemustadmit makes a great many prisoners; their
before us inpeasant
thatarmed s are not to be driven
the sameway
couragesinks; every onethinksthe main
\" pairtnsit soldiers who keeptogether as a body of
like aherd question is decided, any further effort
useless,and the arms fallfromthe hands
mor of cattle, and usually follow their of the people. Still, however , on the
t noses. Armed peasants, on the con- other hand, it is necessary that this mist
lodgeng trary, when broken, disperse in all di- should collect at some points into denser
dessdit rections, for which no formal plan is masses, and form threatening clouds
it
meculiar required ; through this circumstance, the from which now and again a formidable
ule, this march of every small body of troops in flash of lightning may burst forth .
reatsel
176 ON WAR. [ BOOK VI.

These points are chiefly on the flanks of and efficacy ; the causes of this are in
the enemy's theatre
observed. There theofarmament
war, as already
of the the first troopsare
enemy's place, thatthustoodrawn
manyinto
of the
the
people should be organised into greater district, and, in the second place, that
and more systematic bodies, supported the inhabitants then rely on their own
by a small force of regular troops, so as regular troops, and, thirdly, because the
to give it the appearance of a regular force presence of such large bodies of troops
and fit it to venture upon enterprises on makes too great demands on the powers
a larger scale. From these points, the of the people in other ways, that is,in
irreg ular character in theorganisation providing quarters,transport, contribu
of these bodies should diminish in pro- tions, etc. , etc.
portion as they are to be employed Another means of preventing any
more in the direction of the rear of the serious reaction on the part of the enemy
enemy, where he is exposed to their against this popular movement consti
hardest blows. These betterorganised tutes,at the sametime,a leadingprinciple
masses, are for the purpose of falling in the method of using such levies ; this
upon the larger garrisons which the is, that as a rule, with this great stra
enemyleavesbehind him. Besides, they tegicmeansof defence,atactical defence
feeliaseng ofuneas
serve to create aincre the
iness
chara
moral im-
shouldseldom or ever take place. The
cter of a combat with national levies
and dread, and
pression of the whole, without them the is the same as that of all combats of
total action would be wanting in force, masses of troops of an inferior quality,
and the situation of the enemy upon the great impetuosity and fiery ardour at the
whole would not be made sufficiently un commencement, but little coolness or
comfortable . tenacity if the combat is prolonged.
The easiest way for a general to pro- Further, the defeat and dispersion of a
duce this more effective form of a national body ofnatie onal levies is of no material
armament, is to support the movement consequenc , as they lay their account
by small detachments sent from the army . with that, but a body of this description
Without the support of a few regular must not be broken up by losses in killed,
troops as an encouragement, the inhabi wounded,and prisoners ; a defeat of that
tants generally want an impulse, and the kind would soon cool their ardour. But
confidence to take up arms. The stronger both these peculiarities are entirely op
thesedet achments are,the greaterwill posed to thenatureofatactical defensive.
be their power of attraction, the greater In the defensivecombat a persistent slow
willbe the avalanchewhichis tofall systematicaction is required, and great
down . But thishasitslimits; partly, risksmust be run ; a mere attempt,from
first, because it would be detrimental to which we can desist as soon as we please,
the army to cut it up into detachments, can never lead to results in the defensive.
for this secondary object, to dissolve it, If, therefore, the national levies are en.
as it were, into a body ofirregulars, and trusted withthe defenceof any particular
form with
fensive
directio
it inbyallwhich
line,
ns a weakde-
we may be sure
portion erritor
oft y e mustbe
,car taken
both the regular army and national that the measure does not lead to a regu
levies alike would becomecompletely lar great defensive ever60
circumstanceswere for if the
combat ; favourable
ruined ; partly, secondly , because expe
to tellus thatwhen there tothem,
rience'seems
are too many regular troops in dis
theyand
They may, would besure
should, to be defeated
therefore,defend.
a
trict, the people -war loses in vigour the approaches to mountains, dykes,
over marshes, river-passages, as long as
CHAP. XXVI .] ARMING THE NATION . 177

possible ; but when once they are broken, man catches at a straw , so in the natural
they should rather disperse,and continue course of the moral world a people should
their defence by sudden attacks, than con- try the last means of deliverance when it
centrate and allow themselves to be shut sees itself hurried along to the brink of
up in some narrow last refuge in a regu- an abyss.
lar defensive position. However brave However small and weak a State may
a nation may be, however warlike its be in comparison to its enemy, if it fore
habits, however intense its hatred of the goes a last supreme effort, we must say
enemy, however favourable the nature of there is no longer any soul left in it.
the country, it is an undeniable fact that This does not exclude the possibility of
a people's war cannot be kept up in an saving itself from complete destruction
atmosphere too full of danger. If, there- by the purchase of peace at a sacrifice;
fore, its combustible material is to be but neither does such an aim on its part
fanned by any means into a considerable do away with the utility of fresh measures
flame it must be at remote points where for defence ; they will neither make
there is more air, and where it cannot be peace more difficult nor more onerous,
extinguished by one great blow. but easier and better. They are still
After these reflections, which are more more necessary if there is an expectation
of the nature of subjective impressions of assistance from those who are inte
than an objective analysis, because the rested in maintaining our political exist
subject is one as yet of rare occurrence ence. Any government, therefore, which ,
generally, and has been but imperfectly after the loss of a great battle, only
treated of by those who have had actual thinks how it may speedily place the
experience for any length of time, we nation in the lap of peace, and unmanned
have only to add that the strategicplan by the feeling of greathopes disappointed,
of defence can include in itself the co- no longer feels in itself the courage or
operation of a general arming of the the desire to stimulate to the utmost
people in two different ways, that is, every element of force, completely stulti
either as a last resource after a lost fies itself in such case through weakness ,
battle, or as a natural assistance before and shows itself unworthy of victory,
a decisive battle has been fought. The and, perhaps, just on that account, was
latter case supposes
try
a retreatinto the incapable ofgainingone.
interior of thecoun , and that indirect However decisive, therefore, the over
kind of reaction of which wehave treated throw may be which is experienced by a
inof the eighth and twenty-fourth chapters State, stił by a retreat of the army into
this book .We have, therefore, here the interior, theefficacy ofits fortresses and
only to say a few words on the mission an arming of the people may bebrought
of the national levies after a battle has into use. In connection with this it is
been lost . advantageous if the flank of the principal
No State should believe its fate, that theatre of war is fenced in by mountains,
is, its entire existence , to be dependent or otherwise very difficult tracts of
upon one battle, let it be even the most country , which stand forth as bastions,
decisive If it is beaten, the calling the strategic enfilade of which is to
forth fresh power, and the natural weak- check the enemy's progress.
ening which every offensive undergoes If the victorious enemy is engaged in
with time,may bringabout a turn of for- siege works,ifhe has left strong gar
tune, orassistance may come from abroad. risons behind him everywhere to secure
No such urgent haste to die is needed his communications, or detached corps
yet ; and as by instinct the drowning to make himself elbow -room , and to keep
VOL. II. N
178 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
the adjacent provinces in subjection, if the defensive army should again enter
he is already weakened by his various the lists, and by a well-directed blow
losses in active meansand materialof make the assailant staggor in his disad
war, then the moment is arrived when vantageous position.

CHAPTER XXVII .

DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR.

Having treated of the most importantde- already treated of connect themselves

fensive means, we might perhaps be con- with it.
tented to leave the manner in which The defensive, according to our con
these means attach themselves tothe ception, is nothing but the stronger form of
plan of defence as a whole to be dis- combat. The preservation of our own
cussed in the last Book , which will be forces and the destruction of those of the
devoted to the
this every
Plan of a War ; forfrom enemy — in aword, thevictory
secondary scheme, either of of this contest, butat the same—istheaim
attack or defence, emanates and is deter- its ultimate object.
time not
mined in its leading features ; and more That object is the preservation of our
over in many cases the plan of the war own political state and the subjugation
itself is nothing more than the plan of the of that of the enemy ; or again, in one
attack or defence of the principal theatre word, the desired peace, because it is only
of war . But we have not been able to byitthat this conflict adjusts itself, and
commence with war as a whole, although ends in a common result .
in war more than in any other phase of But what is the enemy's state in con
human activity,the parts areshapedby nection with war? Aboant ve all things its
the wholo,imbued withand essentially militaryforceisimport , then its terrin
altered
we bybeen
have obliged to make ourselves, many
itscharacter;insteadofthat tory ; other
butcertainlythere arealso still
things which , through par.
thoroughly acquainted , in the first in ticular circumstances, may obtain a pre
stance , with each single subject as a dominant importance ;to these belong;
separate part. Without this progress before all, foreign and domestic political
from the simple to the complex , a num relations, which sometimes decide more
ber of undefined ideas would have over But although the
than all the rest.
powered us,action
reciprocal and themanifold phases military force andthe
in particular wouldof enemy alone are territory itself,
stillnotthe state ofthe
have constantly confused our conceptions. nor are they the only connections which
We shall therefore still continue to ad the state may have with the war, still
vance towards the whole by one step at these two things are always prepondera
a time ; that is, we shall consider the ting , mostly immeasurably surpassing all
defence of a theatre in itself, and look other connections in importance. Mili.
forthe thread by whichthe subjects of
 CHAP . XXVII.] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 179

ould sgua the state, or to conquer that of an the defensive to deviate from this sim
ell-directed By
ger in base enemy; the territory on the other hand, plest form of the act of warfare, and dis
constantly nourishes and renovates the tribute his power in space ? The answer
military force. The two, therefore, de- is, the insufficiency of the victory which
pend on each other, mutually support he might gain with all his forces united.
each other, are equal in importance one Every victory has its sphere of influence.
to the other. But still there is a differ- If this extends over the whole of the
ence in their mutual relations. If the enemy's state, consequently over the
military force is destroyed, that is com- whole of his military force and his terri
pletely defeated, rendered incapable of tory, that is, if all the parts are carried
further resistance, then the loss of the along in the same movement, which
territory follows of itself ; but on the we have impressed upon the core of
other hand, the destruction of the mili- his power, then sucha victory is all
tary force by no means follows from the that we require, and a division of our
conquest of the country, because that forces would not be justified by sufficient
force may of its own accord evacuate the grounds. But if there are portions of
nact that territory, in order afterwards to recon- the enemy's military force, and of coun
quer it the more easily. Indeed, not only try belonging to either party, over which
Ig to r / does the complete destruction of its army our victory would have no effect, then
atnaga fent decide the fate of a country, but even we must give particular attention to
I for every considerable weakening of its military those parts ; and as we cannot unite ter
of these force leads regularly toa lossofterritory;
ontheother hand, conside
every
ritory like a military force in one point,
rable loss therefore we must divide our forces for
came te
ofterritorony does not cause a proport the the purpose of attacking or defending
diminuti of militar y power ; inionate those portions.
rvationdc long run it will do so, but not always It is only in small, compactly shaped
esubjgen. within the space of time in which a war states that it is possible to have such a
is brought to a close. unity of military force, and that proba
use iteets From this it follows that the preser bly all depends upon a victory over that
stsit
vation of our own military power, and force. Such a unity is practically impos
the diminution or destruction of that of sible when larger tracts of country,
State i the enemy,take precedence in importance having for agreat extent boundaries
all thingsto con

then its ter

over the occupation of territory , and, conterminious with our own, are
therefore, is thefirst objectwhich a general cerned ,orin the case of an alliance of
in alus should strive for. The possession of ter several surrounding states against us.
hrongh Hot ritory only, presses for consideration as an In such cases, divisions of force must
btain afirst object if that means (diminution or de- necessarily take place, giving occasion
ese bile struction of the enemy's military force) to different theatres of war.
stie pulito has not effected it. The effect of a victory will naturally
ecideh
thoug the
If the whole of the enemy's military depend on its greatness, and that onthe
power was united in one army, and if the mass of the conquered troops. Therefore
oft whole war consisted of one battle, then the the blow which, if successful, will produce
tory
possession of the country would depend the greatest effect, must be made against
Tops TL on the issue of that battle ; destruction that part of the country where the great
r of the enemy's military forces, conquest est number of the enemy's forces are
reporte of his country and security of our own, mass
collected together ; and the greater the
ια κάρ 2 would follow from that result, and, in a of our own forces whichwe use for
ce. tori
certain measure, be identical with it. this blow, so much the surer shall we be
eri Now the question is, what can induce of this success. This natural sequence of
180 ON WAR. [ BOOK VI.
ideas leads us to an illustration by which of force, so in like manner, on theother
we shall see this truth more clearly; it is hand, we have to fear every undue excess
as a real evil, because it entails a waste
the nature and effect of the centre of
of power, and that in turn a deficiency of
gravity in mechanics.
As the centre of gravity is always situ power at othe r points.
er
To distinguish these “ centra gravitatis”
collectere
atedwhe
is andgrea
d , the as a shoc k sagai
test mas mattthe
ofnst in the enemy's military power , to dis
cern their spheres of action is, therefore,
centre of gravity of a body always pro a supreme act of strategic judgment.
s the
ducemos
the t effe test
effec
greactive blo t
w is, str her,
furt
anduck as
with the We must constantly ask ourselves, what
centre of gravity of the power used, so it effect the advance or retreat of part of
is also in war . The armed forces of every the forces on either side will produce on
belligerent, whether of a single state or the rest.
of an alliance of states, have a certain We do not by this lay claim in any
way to the discovery of a new method,
unity, and in that way , connection ; but
where connection is there come in ana we have only sought to explain the
logies of the centre of gravity. There foundation of the method of all generals,
are, therefore, in these armed forces cer
in every age, in a manner which may
tain centres ofgravity, the movement place its connection withthe nature of
ngs ina
and direction of which decide upon other thiHow arerepti
thiscleconc ligonht. of the centre of
points, and these centres of gravity are
sit uat ed re
whe th egreat est bod ies of gra vit y of the ene my's force affectsthe
troops are assembled. But just as, in whole plan ofthe war,weshall consider
the world of inert matter, the action in the last book, for that is the proper
against thelimi
cent re gravityecti place for the subject, and we have only
sure and ts inofthe conn has on
itsof
mea
the borrowed it from there to avoid leaving
parts, so it is in war, and here as well anybre ak in the sequence of ideas. By
ted may easily bethe introduction of this view we have seen
as there the force exer
greater than the resistance requires, and the motives which occasion a partition
then there is a blow in the air, a waste offorces in general. These consist funda
of force . mentally of two interests which are in
What a difference there is between opposition to each other;
thesolid ity ofanarmyunderone standard , possession of territorystrives tothedivionede the
led into battle under the personal com forces; the other, the effort of force against
the
mand of one general, and that of an the centre ofgravity ofthe enemy's military
alli y ended over 50 or100miles, power,combines them again up to a cera
ed armext
or it may be even based upon quite dif tain point
Thus it. is that theatres of war or par
ferent sides (of the theatre of war ).
ns
There wesee coherence inthe strongest ticular army regiooriginate. These
are
degree, unity most complete ;hereunity those boundariesofthe area of the comma.
in a very remote degree often only exist try and of the forces thereon distributed,
ing in the political view held in common ,
and in that also in a miserable and in
within which every decision given by
the principal force of such a region ex;
sufficient degree , the cohesion of parts tendss itself directly over the whole, and
mostly very weak, often quite an illu carrie on the whole with it in its own
sion . direction . We say directly , because a
Therefore, if on the one hand, the vio decision on one theatre of war must
lence with which we wish to strike the naturally have also an influence more or
blow prescribes the greatest concentration less over those adjoining it.
CHAP. XXVIII.] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 181

Although it lies quite in the nature of We think, therefore, a theatre of war,

the thing, we must again remind our
readers expressly that here as well as
everywhere else our definitions are only
directed at the centres of certain specu-
lative regions, the limits of which we
neither desire to, nor can we, define by
sharp lines.
whether large or small, with its military
force, whatever may be the size of that,
represents a unity which may be reduced
to one centre of gravity. At this centre
of gravity the decision must take place,
and to be conqueror here means to defend
the theatre ofwar in the widest sense.

CHAPTER XXVIII .

DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR— (CONTINUED ).

DEFENCE, however, consists of two dif- state of expectation to the whole is only
ferent elements, these are the decision correct when a decision is really to take
and the state of expectation. The com . place, and is regarded by both parties as
bination of these two elements forms the inevitable. For it is only by that decision
subject of this chapter. that the centres of gravity of the respec
First we must observe that the state tive forces, and the theatre of war deter
of expectation is not, in point of fact, the mined through them are effectually hit.
complete defence; it isonly that province Whenever the idea of a decisive solution
of the same in which it proceeds to its disappears, then the centres of gravity
aim. As long as a military force has are neutralised, indeed, in a certain
not abandoned the portion of territory sense, the whole of the armed forces become
placed under its guardianship , thetension so also, and now the possession of terri
of forces on both sides created by the tory, which forms the second principal
attack continues, and this lasts until branch of the whole theatre of war, comes
there is a decision. The decision itself forward as the direct object. In other
can only be regarded as having actually words, the less a decisive blow is sought
taken place when either the assailant or for by both sides in a war, and the more
defender has left the theatre of war. it is merely a mutual observation of one
As long as an armed force maintains another, so much the more important be
itself within its theatre, the defence of comes the possession of territory, so
the same continues, and in this sense the much the more the defensive seeks to
defence of the theatre of war is identical cover all directly, and the assailant
with the defence in the same. Whether seeks to extend his forces in his
the enemy in the meantime has obtained advance.
possession of much or little of that section Now we cannot conceal from ourselves
of country is notessential, foritis only the fact that the majorityofwars and
lent to him until the decision . campaigns approach much more to a
But this kind of idea by which we state of observation than to a struggle
wish to settle the proper relation of the for life or death, that is, a contest in
182 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.

which one at least of the combatants object (which either cannot itself be at
uses every effort to bring about a com- tained by the successful issue of a battle,
plete decision. This last character is or which itself is necessary to the suc
only to be found in the wars of the nine- cessful issue of the battle) is blameable.
teenth century to such a degree that a But the greatest concentration of forces
theory founded on this point of view can is not the only fundamental condition ; it
be made use of in relation to them. But is also requisite that they should have
as all future wars will hardly have this such a position and place that the battle
character, and it is rather to be expected may be fought under favourable circum
that they will again show a tendency to stances .
the observation character, therefore any The different steps in the defence
theory to be practically useful must pay which we have become acquainted with
attention to that. Hence we shall com in the chapter on the methods of defence,
mence with the case in which the desire are completely homogeneous with these
of a decision permeates and guides the fundamental conditions; there will there
whole, therefore with real, or if we may fore be no difficulty in connecting them
use the expression , absolute war ; then in with the same, according to the special
another chapterwe shall examine those requirements of each case, But there is
modifications which arise through the one point which seems at first sight to
approach, in a greater or less degree, to involve a contradiction in itself, and
the state of a war of observation . which, as one of the most important in
Inthe first case (whetherthe decision thedefence,requiresexplanation somuch
is sought by the aggressor or the de- , the more. Itis the hitting upon the
fender) the defence of the theatre of war exact centre of gravity of the enemy's
must consist in the defender establishing force.
himself there in such a manner, that If the defender ascertains in time the
in a decision he will have an advan roads by which the enemy will advance,
tage on his side at any moment . This and uponwhich in particular the great
decision may be either a battle, or a mass of his force will be found for a cer
series of great combats, but it mayalso tainty, he may march against him on
consist in the resultant situatiorelation
which arise from the ofmere n of the
s, thatroad . This will bethe most usual
ugh
case, for altho ce
the defen precedes
opposing forces, that is, possible combats. the attack in measures of a general
If the battle were not also the most nature, in the establishment
of strong
powerful, the mostusual and most ef- places, greatarsenals, and depôts,
fectual means of a decision in war , as we andin
lishment
the peace estab of his army, and
think we have already shown on several thus givesa line of direction to the assail.
occasions,still themere fact ofitsbeing antinhispreparations,still,when the
general wayone
in a ing ion
of campaign
of the meansient ion
really opens,'the
ssor
defender,in
reach this solut , would be suffic
to enjoin the greatest concentration of our
relat to the aggre ,has the pecha
forces which circumstances will in any liar advantage in general of playing the
last hand.
way permit. A great battle upon the To attack very
theatre of war istheblow of thecentre large
of force against the centre of force ; the
army, a foreign country
consider with a
able prepara
more forces can be collected in the one tions are required. Provisions, stores,
or the other, the surer and greater will and articles of equipment of all kinds
be the effect. Therefore every separation must
forces which
time. be collected,
While which tions
those prepara is a work of
are going
of is not called for by an
on, the defender has time to prepare ac
 DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 183
CHAP. XXVIII.. ]

cordingly, in regard to which we must tions of his adversary. If the assailant

not forget that the defensive requires less does not take this direction which is
time, generally speaking, because in every favourable to him, he foregoespart of his
state things are prepared rather for the natural advantages. It is evident that,
defensive than the offensive. if the defender has taken up a position
But although this may hold good in in that direction,the evadinghis position,
the majority of cases, there is always a or passing round, is not to be done for
possibility that, in particular cases, the nothing ; it costs a sacrifice. From this
it follows that there is not on the side of
defensive may remain in uncertainty as
the principal line; by enemy
the is the defender such a risk of missing the
to
intends to advance andwhich
this case more direction of his enemy ; neither on the other
likely to occur when the defence is de- hand, is it so easy for the assailant to pass
pendent on measures which of themselves round his adversary as appears at first
take a good deal of time, as for example, sight ,because there exists beforehand a
the preparation of a strong position. very distinct, and in most cases prepon
Further, supposing the defender places derating, motive in favour of one or the
himself on the line by which the aggressor other direction, and that consequently the
is advancing, then, unless the defender defender, although his preparations are
is prepared to take the initiative by at . fixed to one spot, will not fail in most
tacking the aggressor, the latter may cases to come in contact with the mass of
avoid the position which the defenderhas the enemy's forces. In other words, if
taken up, byonly altering a little his line the defender has put himself in the right
of advance,for in the cultivated parts of position, hemay be almost sure that the
Europe we can never be so situated that assailant will come to meet him.
there are not roads to the right or left But by this we shall not and cannot
by which any position may be avoided . denythepossibilityof thedefender some
Plainly, in such a case the defender could times notmeeting with the assailant after
not wait for his enemy in a position, or all these arrangements, and therefore the
at least could not wait there in the ex- question arises, what he should then do,
pectation of giving battle. and how much of the real advantages of
But before entering on the means his position still remain available to him.
available to the defensive in this case, we If we ask ourselves what means still
must inquire more particularly into the remain generally to the defender when
nature of such a case, and the probability the assailant passes by his position, they
of itsoccurrence . are the following .

Naturally there are in every State, and 1. To divide his forces instantly, so as
also in every theatre of war (of which to be certain to find the assailant with
alone we are at present speaking), ob- one portion, and then to support that
jects and points upon which an attack is portion with the other. ion
likely to be more efficacious than any 2. To take up a posit with his force
Where else. Uponthis we think itwill united, and in case the assailant passes
be better to speakwhen we come to the by him ,to push on rapidly in front of
attack. Here we shall confineourselves him by a lateral movement. In most
to observing that, if the most advan- cases there will not be time to make such
tageous object and point of attack is the a movement directly to a flank , it will
motive forthe assailant in the direction therefore be necessary to take up the
new position somewhat further back .
of his
defe e, and this
nsivblow, be hise guid
mustmotiv reactes inoncase
thes 3. With his whole force to attack the

g enemy in flank .
in which he knows nothin of the inten
184 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
4. To operate against his communica- and without quite rejecting the latter,
tions. we hold the former to be in the majority
5. By a counter attack on his theatre of cases the true means of defence.
of war, to do exactly what the enemy has In a position where our forces are
done in passing by us. divided, there is always a danger of
We introduce this last measure, be- getting involved in a war of posts, from
cause it is possibleto imagine a case in which, if our adversary isresolute, can
which it may be efficacious ; but as it is follow, under the best of circumstances,
in contradiction to the object of the de- only a relative defence on a large scale,never
fence, that is, the grounds on which that a decision such as we desire; and even
form has been chosen , therefore it can if by superior tact we should be able to
mistake, still, by the prelimi
only be regarded as an abnormity, which avoid thisstan
can only take place because the enemy nary resi
ce being with divided forces,
has made somegreat mistake , or because the first shock is sensibly weakened, and
we can never be sure that the advanced
there are other special features in a par
ticular case. corps first engaged will not suffer dispro
Operating against the enemy's com portionate losses. To this is to be added
munications implies that our own are that the resistance of this corps which
superior, whichis alsoone of thefunda- main
usuallyendsinitsrs falling back on the
body, appea to the troops
mental requisites of a good defensive in the
position . Butalthough on thatground light of a lost combat,ormiscarriageof
this action may promise the defender a plans , and the moral force suffers ac
certain amount of advantage, still, in the cordingly.
defence of a theatre of war, it is seldom The second means, that of placing our
an operation suited to lead to a decision , whole forcein front of the enemy, in
which whicheve
wehave supposed to be theobject march r direction he may bendhis
ofthe campaign . , involves a risk of our arriving
The dimensions of a single theatre of too late, and thusbetween two measures,
war are seldom so large that the line of falling'short of both . Besides this,a
communications is exposed to much dan- defensive battle requires coolness and
consideration, aeknowledge, indee
ger bytheir rlength, and evenwhicifhthey mate d inti
were in dange , still the time the knowledg of the country, which
assailant requires for the execution of cannot be expected in a hasty oblique
ly
his blow is usual too short for his pro movement to a flank . Lastly, positions
gress to be arrested by the slow effects suitable for a good defensive battle-field
of the action against his communica are too rarely to be met with to reckon
ad .
tions .
upon them at every point ofevery ro
Therefore this means (that is the action On the other hand , the third means,
against thec ommunic
icacious ations)will prove namelytoattackthe enemy inflank:
quiteineff inmostcasesagainst therefore to givebattle with a changeof
an enemy determined uponadecis
and also in case the defende
ion, front,isattended withgreat advantages.
r seeks such
a solution .
Firstly, there is always in this case, as
we know, an exposure of the lines of
The object of the three other means communication, here the lines of retreat,
which remain for the defender, is a direct and in this respect the defender has one
decision-- a meeting of centre offorce advantage in his general relations as
with centre of force ; they correspond defender , andnext and chiefly , the
bette
But wer, there foreat,witonce
shall h thesaything we red
thatrequi de. the
tage whic
advanstrategi h we have claimed for
cidedly prefer the third to the other two,
c properties of his position
at present.
CHAP. XXVIII.] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 185

Secondly,—and this is the principal decision by resorting to a flank at

thing, -overy assailant who attempts to tack.
pass by his opponent is placed between If cases of this kind are hardly to be
two opposite tendencies. His first desire found in military history , the reason is,
is to advance to attain the object of his partly , that the defender has seldom
attack ; but the possibility of being at- had the courage to remain firm in
tacked in flank at any moment, creates a such a position, but has either divided
necessity for being prepared, at any mo- his forces, or rashly thrown himself in
ment, to deliver a blow in that direction , front of his enemy by a cross or diagonal
and thattoo a blow with the mass of his march, or that no assailant dares to ven
forces. These two tendencies are con- ture past the defender under such circum
tradictory, and beget such a complication stances, and in that way his movement
in the internal relations (of his army), usually comes to a stand still.
such a difficulty in the choice of mea The defender is in this case compelled
sures, if they are to suit every event, to resort to an offensive battle : the fur
that there can hardly be a more dis- ther advantages of the state of expectation
agreeable position strategically. If the of a strong position , of good entrenchments,
assailant knew with certainty the moment etc., etc., he must give up; in most cases
when he would be attacked, he might the situation in which he finds the ad
prepare to receive the enemy with skill vancing enemy will not quite make up
and ability ; but in his uncertainty on for these advantages, for it is just to evade
this point, and pressed by the necessity their influence that the assailant has
of advancing, it is almost certain that placed himself in his present situation ;
when the moment for battle arrives, it still it always offers him acertain com
findshim in the midst of hurried and pensation, and theory is therefore not just
half-finishedpreparations, and therefore obliged to see a quantity disappearat
byno means in an advantageous relation once from the calculation , to see the pro
to hisen emy and contra mutually cancel each other, as
If then there are favourable moments so often happens when critical writers of
for the defender to deliver an offensive history introduce a little bit of theory,
battle, it is surely at such a moment as It must not, in fact, be supposed that
this, above all others, that we may look we are now dealing with logical sub
for success. If we consider, further, that tilties ; the subject is rather one which
the knowledge of the country and choice the more it is practically considered, the
of ground are on the side of the defender, more it appears as an idea embracing the
that he can prepare his movements, and whole essence of defensive war, every
can time them , no one can doubt that where dominating and regulating it.
he possesses in such a situation a decided It is only by the determination on the
superiority, strategically , over his ad. part of the defender to assail his oppo
versary nent with all his force, the moment he
Wethink, therefore, that a defender passes by him , that he avoids two pitfalls,
occupying a well chosen position, with close to which he is led by the defensive
his forces united, may quietly waitfor form ; that is a division of hisforce, and
the enemy passing by his army; should a hasty flank march to intercept the
the enemy not attackhim in his position, assailant in front. In both he accepts
and thatan operation against the enemy's the law of the assailant; in both he
communications does not suit the circum- seeks to aid himself through measures
stances, there still remains for him an of a very critical nature , andwith a inost
dangerous degree of haste ; and wher
excellent means of bringing about a
186 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.

over a resolute adversary, thirsting for into effect, but it was always contem
victory and a decision, has encountered plated by Prince Hohenlohe, that is, by
such a system of defence, he has knocked Colonel Massenbach, who exerted all his
it on the head. But when the defender influence to draw the Duke into this
has assembled his forces at the right plan. Still less could the idea be enter,
point to fight a general action, if he is tained of leaving the position which had
determined with this force, come what been taken on the left bank of the Saale
will, to attack his enemy in flank , he has to try an offensive battle against Buona
done right, and is in the right course, parte on his advance, that is, to such an
and he is supported by all the advan- attack in flank as we have been consider
tages which the defence can give in his ing ; for if theSaale was an obstacle to
intercepti
situation; his actions willthenbear the ment ng theenemy in the last mo
(à fortiori) it would be a still
stamp of good preparation , coolness , security ,
unity and simplicity. greater obstacle to assuming the offensive
We cannot here avoid mentioning a at a moment when the enemy would be
remarkable event in history, which has a in possession of the opposite side of the
close analogy with the ideas now deve river, at least partially. The Duke,
loped ; we do so to anticipate its being therefore, determined towait behind the
usedin a wrong application. Saale to see what would happen, that is
When the Prussian army was, in Octo to say, if we can call anything a determi
ber, 1806 , waiting in Thuringia for the nation which emanated from this many
French under Buonaparte , the former time
headed Headquarters' Staff, and in this
was posted between the two great roads of confusion and utter indecision.
on which the latter might be expected to Whatever may have been the true con
advance, that is, the road to Berlin by dition of affairs during this state of
Erfurth , and that by Hof and Leipsic. expectation , the consequent situation of
The first intention of breaking into Fran the army was this :
conia straight through the Thuringian 1. That the enemy might be attacked
Forest, and afterwards, when that plan if he crossed the Saale to attack the
was abandoned, the uncertainty as to Prussian army.
which of the roads the French would 2. That if he did not march against
choose for their advance, caused this that army, operations might be com
intermediate position. As such, it must menced against his communications.
therefore have led to the adoption of the 3. If it should be found practicable
measure
we have been discussing , a and advisable, he might be intercepted
hasty interception of the enemy in front near Leipsic by a rapid flank march.
by a lateral movement . In the first case, the Prussian army
This was in fact the idea in case the
enemy marched by Erfurth, for the roads
possessed a great strategic and tactical
in that direction were good ; on the other advantage in the deep valleyof the Saale.
hand, the idea of a movement of this In the second, the strategic advantagº
description ontheroadby Hof couldnot was just as narrow
only avery great, forthe enemy had
base between our
be entertained,partly because thearmy positionand the neutral territory of Bo:
was two or threemarchesaway from that hemia,whilstours was extremelybroad;
the'Saale interposed ; neither did this by the Saale ,was still by no meansin
plan ever enter into the views of the
Duke of Brunswick , so that there was no a disadvantageous situation . All these
kind of preparation made for carrying it three measur
andwant es,in
of any clearperce at headn
the confusio
spite ofption
 CHAP. XXVIII.] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR. 187

quarters, were really discussed ; but cer- selves. To go through the different ar.
tainly we cannot wonder that, although a rangements more in detail does not come
right idea may have been entertained, it within our views, for that would lead us
should have entirely failed in the execution into a boundless field of particular cases.
by the complete want of resolution and When a general has laid down for his
the confusion generally prevailing, direction a distinct point, he will see how
In the two first cases, the position on far it agrees with geographical, statistical,
the left bank of the Saale is to be re- and political circumstances, the material
garded as a real flank position , and it and personal relations of his own army
had undoubtedly as such very great and that of the enemy, and how the one
qualities ; but in truth, against a very or the other may require that his plans
‫ܐ‬HN 1 superior enemy, against a Buonaparte, a should be modified in carrying them into
flank position with an army that is not effect.
very sure about what it is doing, is a But in order more distinctly to connect
very bold measure. and look closer at the gradations in the
After long hesitation , the Duke on the defence specified in the chapter on the
Det 13th adopted the last of the plans pro- different kinds of defence, we shall here
posed, but it was too late, Buonaparte lay before our readers what seems to us
had already commenced to pass the Saale, most important, in relation to the same
and the battles of Jena and Auerstadt generally.
were inevitable. The Duke, through his 1. Reasons for marching against the
indecision, had set himself between two enemy with a view to an offensive battle,
firste position too late may be as follows :
push; he
tostools army inhisbefor
hisquitted the enemy, and (a) If we know that the enemy is ad
too soon for a battle suited to the object. vancing with his forces very much divi
Nevertheless, the natural strength of this ded, and therefore we have reason to
position proved itself so far that the Duke expect a victory , although we are, upon
was able to destroy the right wing of the the whole, much weaker.
enemy's army at Auerstadt, whilst Prince But such an advance on the part of the
Hohenlohe, by a bloody retreat, was still assailant is in itself very improbable, and
able to back out of the scrape ; but at consequently, unless we know of it upon
Auerstadt they did not venture to realise certain information , the plan is not good ;
the victory, which was quite certain ; for to reckon upon it, and rest all our
gh a mere supposition ,
and at Jena they thought they might hopes on it throuient
reckon upon one which was quite im- and without suffic motiv , leads gene
e
possible. rally to a very dangerous situation . We
In any case, Buonaparte felt the stra- do not, then, find things as we expected ;
tegic importance of the position on the we are obliged to give up the offensive
Saale so much, that he did not venture battle, we are not prepared to fight on
to pass itby, but determined on a pas the defensive, we are obliged to com
sage of the Saale in sight of the enemy. mence with a retreat against our will,
By what we have now said we think and leave almost everything to chance.
we have sufficiently specified the relations This is very much what occurred in
between the defence and the attack when the defence, conducted by the army under
a decisive course of action is intended, Dohna against the Russians, in the cam
and we believewe have shown also the paign of 1759, and which ,under General
threads to which, according to their situa- Wedel, ended in the unfortunate battle
tion and
jects of theconnection, the different them-
plan of defenceattach sub- of Züllichau .
This measure shortens matters so much
 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
188
that plan -makers are only too ready to too much weight to any such saying ; in
propose it, without taking much trouble most cases in war we feel more exhila
to inquire how far the hypothesis on rated , more courageous when acting
which it rests is well founded.
offensively than defensively : but this is
(6) If we are generally in sufficient a feeling which all troops have in com
battle, mon, and there is hardly an army re
(6)ngth
stre If for
a blund and, irresolute adver-
ering specting which its generals and leaders
ally invites an attack . ise have not made the same assertion (as
sary speci
In this case the effect of surpr may Frederick ). We must, therefore, not too
be worth more than any assistance fur- readily rely on an appearance of supe,
nished by the ground through agood riority, and through that neglect real
posit is thetoreal
ion. Itthus essence
bring of good
into play the advantages.
A very natural and weighty reason
generalship
power of the moral forces ;—but theory for resorting to an offensive battle may
can never say loud enough nor often be the composition of the army as re
enough there must be an objective founda- gards the three arms, for instance, &
numerous cavalry and little artillery.
tion dati
foun to suppositions
these
for on be always talk ing of such
; without sur- We continue the enumeration of rea
ity
prises and the superior of novel or sons .
(e. ) When we can nowhere find a good
unusual modes of attack , and thereon to
found plans, considerations, criticisms, is posi( ftion . n we must hasten with the
.) Whe
acting without any egrounds, and is alto
gether objectionabl . decision.
(9. ) Lastly, the combined influence of
es When the nature of our army
mak(d) it specially suited for the offensive. several or all of these reasons .
It was certainly not a visionary or false 2. The waiting for the enemy in a
idea when Frederick the Great conceived locality where it isintendedy to attack
that in his mobile, courageous army, full him (Minden, 1759) naturall proceeds
of confidence in him, obedient by habit, a, mthere being no such disproportion
fro
trained to precision , animated and ele of force to our disadvantage asto makeit
vated by pride, and with its perfection in
necessary to seek a strong position and
the oblique attack, he possessed an in
strument which , in his firm and daring strengthenlityit by entrenchments .
hand, was much more suited to attack b, a loca having been found ſparti
ly ed
than defence ; all these qualities were cular adapt to the purpose . The
wanting in his opponents, andin this toproperties which determine this belong
tactics ; we shall only observe that
respect, therefore, he had the most de
cided superiority ; to make use of this thes e properties chiefly consist in an easy
wasworth more to him, in most cases , approach for the defender from his side,
than to take to his assistance entrench and in all kinds of obstacles on the side
ments and obstacles of ground . - But next to the enemy
on . l
such a superiority will always be rare ; 3. A positi wil be taken with the
a well -trained army, thoroughly prac express intention of there waiting the
tised in great movements, has only part attack of the enemy.-- .
of the above advantages. If Frederick a. If the disproportion of forces com
the Great maintained that the Prussian pels us toseek cover from natural ob
stacles or behind field -works.
armydwas particularly adap ted
ssantlyfor atta
ck
ated b . When the country affordsan excel
-an this has been ince repe
since his time still we should not attach
lent position for our purpose.
 DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 189
CHAP . XXVIII.]
The two modes of defence, 2 and 3 , But as the cases a and b very rarely
will come more into consideration accord- occur, therefore, the entrenched camp is
ing as we do not seek the decision itself, a measure which requires to be well
but content ourselves with a negative considered, and which is very seldom
result, and have reason to think that our suitable in practice. The hope of in
opponent is wavering and irresolute , and spiring the enemy with respect by such
that he will in the end fail to carry out a camp, and thus reducing him to a
his plans. state of complete inactivity , is attended
4. An entrenched unassailable camp with too much danger, namely, with the
only fulfils the object danger of being obliged to fight without
a. If it is situated at an extremely im- the possibility of retreat. If Frederick
portant strategic point. the Great gained his object in this way
The character of such a position con- at Bunzelwitz, we must admire the cor
sists in this, that we cannot be driven rect judgment he formed of his adver
out of it ; the enemy is therefore obliged sary, but we must certainly also lay
to try some other means, that is, to pur more stress than usual on the resources
sue his object without touching this which he would have found at the last
camp, or to blockade it and reduce it by moment to clear a road for the remnants
starvation ; if it is impossible for him to of his army, and also on the irresponsibility
do this, then the strategic qualities of the of 5.a king:
If there is oneor if there are seve
position must be very great.
b. If we have reason to expect aid ral fortresses near the frontier, then the
from abroad . great question arises, whether the de
Such was the case with the Saxon fender should seek an action before or
army in its position at Pirna. Notwith- behind them. The latter recommends
standing all that has been said against itself
the measure on account of the ill- success a, by the superiority of the enemy in
which attended it in this instance, it is numbers, which forces us to break his
perfectly certain that 17,000 Saxons power before coming to a final struggle.
could never have been able to neutralise b, by these fortresses being near, so
40,000 Prussians in any other way. If that the sacrifice of territory is not
the Austrians were unable to make better greater than we are compelled to make.
use of the superiority obtained at Lowo- C, by the fitness of the fortresses for de
sitz, that only shows the badness of their fence.
whole method of war, as well as of their One principal use of fortresses is un
whole military organisation ; and there questionably, or should be, to break
cannot be a doubt that if the Saxons in. the enemy's force in his advance and to
stead of taking postin the camp at Pirna weaken considerably that portion which
had retired into Bohemia, Frederick the we intend to bring to an engagement.
Great would have driven both Austrians If we so seldom see this use made of
and Saxons beyond Prague, and taken fortresses, that proceeds from the cases
that place in the same campaign . Who- in which a decisive battle is sought for
ever does not admit the value of this by one of the opposing parties being
very rare . But that is the only kind of
advantage , and limits his consideration case which we treat of here . We there.
to the capture
shows the wholeofSaxon
himselfofincapable army,a fore look upon it as a principle equally
making
calculation of all the circumstances in a simple and important in all cases in
case of this kind, and without calculation which the defender has one or more for
no certain deduction can be obtained. tresses near him , that he should keep
190 ON WAR. [BOOK VI.
them before him, and give the decisive was situated far back ; for then it would
battle behind them. We admit that a be necessary to abandon a considerable
battle lost within the line of our for- part of our theatre of war, a sacrifice
tresses will compel us to retreat further which, as we know , should not be made
into the interiorof the country than one unless in a case of great urgency. In
lost on the other side, tactical results in such a case the measure would bear
both cases being the same , although the more resemblance to a retreat into the
causes of the difference have their origin interior of the country.
rather in the imagination than in real Another condition is, the fitness of the
things; neither do we forget that a battle place for defence. It is well known that
may be given beyond the fortresses in a There are fortified places, especially large
well chosen position , whilst inside them ones, which are not fit to be brought
the battle inmost cases must be an offen . into contact with an enemy's army, bo
sive one, particularly if the enemy is cause they could not resist the sudden
laying siege to a fortress which is in assault of a powerful force. In this
danger of being lost; but what signify case, our position must at all events be
these nice shades of distinction, as com so close behind that we could support
pared to the advantage that, in the deci- the garrison .
sive battle, we meet the enemy weakened Lastly , the retreat into the interior of
by a fourth or a third of his force, per the country is only a natural resource
haps one half if there are many for- under the following circumstances :
tresses ? a, when owing to the physical and
We think, therefore, that in all cases moral relation in which we stand as
of an inevitable decision, whether sought respects the enemy, the idea of asuccesso
for by the offensive or the defensive, and ful resistance on the frontier or near it
that the latteris not tolerably sure of a cannot be entertained .
victory, or if the nature of the country b, when it is a principal object to gain
does not offer some most decisive reason time.
to give battle in a position further for- c, when there arepeculiarities in the
ward - in all these cases we say when a country which are favourable to the
fortress is situated near at hand and measure , a subject on which we have al
ready treated inthetwenty-fifth chap
capable of defence ,thedefender should ter.
by all means withdraw at once behind
it, and let the decision take place on this We thus close the chapter on the de
side, consequently withits co-operation. fence ofa theatre ofwar if a decisivo
If he takes up his position so close to solution is sought for by one or other
the fortress thatthe assailant can neither party,and istherefore inevitable. But
e
form thesiege ofnor blockadtheplace itmustbe particularly borne in mind, that
without first driving himoff,heplace
the assailant under the necessity of ats
events in war do not exhibit themselves
in such a pure abstract form , and that
tackinghim ,thedefender, in his position
To us, therefore, of all defensi ve mea. therefore, if our maximsand argumen ts
on actual
sures in a critical situation , none appears should be used in reasoning
and efficacious asthe choice of war,
kept our thirtieth chapter should also be
60simple
a good position near to and behind a
in view ,andwemustsupposethe
general, in themajority ofcases, as placed
strong fortress. more to
between two tendencer urged ng to cir
At the sametime, the question would wardsoneor
wear differen t aspect if the fortress
theoth ies,,accordi
a cumstances.
CHAP. XXIX .] SUCCESSIVE RESISTANCE. 191

CHAPTER XXIX .

DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR— (CONTINUED ).

SUCCESSIVE RESISTANCE .

We have proved, in the twelfth and thir- gains. In treating of the attack, we shall
teenth chapters, that in strategy a suc- examine more closely the extent of the
cessive resistance is inconsistent with the influence of a victory; here we shall only
nature of the thing, and that all forces observe that it reaches to the exhaustion
available should beused simultaneously. of the superiority, that is, the resultant of
As regards forces which are moveable, the physical and moral relations. Now
this requires no further demonstration; this superiority exhausts itself in the first
but when we look at the seat of warit- place by theduties required from the
self, withits fortresses, the natural divi- forces on the theatre of war,and secondly
sions of the ground, and even the extent by losses in combats ; the diminution of
of its surface as being also elements of forcebearising from these two causes can
war, then, these being immovable, we can not essentially altered, whether the
only either bring them gradually into use, combats take place at the commencement
or we must at once place ourselves so far or at the end, near the frontier, or fur
back, that all agencies of this kind which ther towards the interior of the country
are to be brought into activity are in our (vom oder hinten ). We think, for example,
front. Then everything which can con- that a victory gained by Buonaparte
tribute to weakenthe enemy in the ter- over the Russians at Wilna, 1812, would
ritory which he has occupied, comes at have carried him just as far as that of
once into activity, for the assailant must Borodino — assuming that it was equally
atleast blockade the defender's fortresses, great — and that a victory at Moscow
he must keep thecountryin subjection would not have carried him any further;
by garrisons and other posts, hehas long Moscow was,in either case, thelimit of
marches to make, and everything he this sphere of victory. Indeed , it cannot
requires must be brought fromadistance, bedoubted for a moment that a decisive
etc. All these agencies commence to battle on the frontier ( for other reasons)
work, whether the assailant makes his would have produced much greater re
advance before or after a decision, but in sults through victory , and then, perhaps,
the former case their influence is some- the sphere of its influence would have
what greater. From this, therefore, it been wider. Therefore, in this view , also,
follows, that if the defender chooses to the transfer of the decision to a point
transfer his decision to a point further further back is not necessary for the de
back, he has thus the means of bringing fence.
at once into play all these immovable In the chapter on the various means
elements of military force. of resistance, that method of delaying
On the other hand, it is clear that this the decision, which may be regarded as
transfer of the solution (on the pårt of the an extreme form , was brought before
defender) does not alter the extent of the us under the name of retreat into the
influence of a victorywhich the assailant interior, and as a particular method
192 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
of defence, in which the object is haps, some considerable obstacle of
rather that the assailant should wear ground will be quite sufficient as a
himself out, than that he should be de- means of stopping the enemy.
stroyed by the sword on the field of There is, therefore, in strategy, in the
battle . But it is only when such an in- use of the theatre of war as well as in
tention predominates that the delaying everything else,an economy of force; the
of the decisive battle can be regarded less one can makesuffice the better : but
as a peculiar method of resistance ; for other- there nt
must be sufficie , and here, as well
wise it is evident that an infinite number as in commerce ,there is something to be
of gradations may be conceived in this thought of besides mere niggardliness.
method , and that these may be combined But in order to prevent a great mis
with all other means of defence. We conception, we must draw attention
therefore look upon the greater or less to this, that the subject of our present
co-operation of the theatre of war, not as consideration is not how much resistance
a special form of defence, but as nothing an army can offer, or the enterprises
more than a discretionary introdu
le
ction which it can undertake after a lost battle,
into the defence of the immovab means
but only the result which we can promise
of resistance , just according as circum ourselves beforehand from this second act
stances and the nature of the situation in our defence; consequently, how high
may appear to require. we can estimate it in our plan. Here
Butnow, if the defender does not think there is only one point almost which the
he requires anyassistance from these im- defender hasto look to, which isthe
movable forces his purposed decision
for , character and the situation of his oppo
or if the further sacrifice connected with nent. An adversary weak in character,
the use of them is too great,then they with little self-confidence,withoutnoble
are kept in reserve for the future, and ambition, placed under greatrestrictions,
will content himself, in case he is such
form a sort of succession of reinforce-
ments, which perhapsensure the possi- cessful,with a moderate advantage,and
bility of keepingthemoveable forces in timidlyhold backat every fresh offer of
such a condition that they will be able to a decision which the defender ventures
follow up the first favourable decision to make. In this case the defender may
with a second , or perhaps in the same count upon the beneficial use of all the
manner even with a third, that is to say, means of resistance of his theatre of war
inthis manner
his forces a successiv
becomes possiblee .application of insuccession,in constantly fresh,al
If the defender loses a battle on the though in themselves small, combats, in
frontier, which does not amount to a com which the prospect always brightens of
an ultimate decision in his favour.
plete defeat, we may very well imagine
that, by placing himself behind the But who does not feel that we are now
nearest fortress, he will then be in a on the road to campaigns devoidofde
cision, which are much more the field of
condition to accept battle again ; indeed ,
if he is only dealing with an opponent a successive application offorce. Of
who has not much resolution , then, per- these . shall speak in the following
chapterwe
CIIAP. XXX. ] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 193

CHAPTER XXX.

DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR (CONTINUED ).

WHEN NO DECISION IS SOUGHT FOR .

WHETHER and how far a war is possible Here we shall confine ourselves to the
in which neither party acts on the offen- conclusion that in such a campaign the
sive, therefore in which neither combat- settlement of the whole question is not
ant has a positive aim , we shall consider looked for by either assailant or defender
in the last book; here it is not necessary through a decisive battle, that,therefore,
for us to occupy ourselves with the con- the great battle is no longer the key -stone
tradiction which this presents, because of the arch, towards which all the lines
on a single theatre of war we can easily of the strategic superstructure are di
suppose reasons for such a defensive on rected. Campaigns of this kind (as the
both sides, consequent on the relations history of all times and all countries
of each of these parts to a whole. shows us) are not only numerous, but form
But in addition to the examples which such an overwhelming majority, that the
history furnishes of particular campaigns remainder only appear as exceptions.
that have taken place without the focus Even if this proportion should alter in the
of a necessary solution, history alsotells future, still it iscertainthat there will
us of many others in which there was always be many such campaigns ; and,
no want of an assailant, consequently no therefore, in studying the theory of the
want of a positive will on one side, but defence of a theatre of war, they must be
in which that will was so weak that brought into consideration. We shall
instead of striving to attain the object endeavour to describe the peculiarities by
at any price, and forcing the necessary which they are characterised. Real war
decision, it contented itself with such will generally be in a medium between
advantages as arose in a manner spon the two different tendencies, sometimes
taneously out of circumstances . Or the approaching nearer to one, sometimes to
assailant pursued no self-selected end at the other, and we can , therefore, only see
all, but made his object depend on cir- the practical effect of these peculiarities
cumstances, in the meanwhile gathering in the modification which is produced,
such fruits as presented themselves from in the absolute form of war by their
time to time. counteraction . We have already said
Although such an offensive which in the third chapter of this book , that
deviates sity
very much fromt the strictlogi - the state of expectatim is one of the
cal neces of a direc march towards greatest advantages which the defensive
the object, and which, almost like a loun- has over the offensive ; as a general
ger sauntering through the campaign, rule, it seldom happens in life, and least
looking out rightand left for the cheap of allin war, that all that circumstances
fruits of opportunity, differs very little would lead us to expect does actually
from the defensive itself, which allows the take place. The imperfection of human
general to pick up what he can in this insight, the fearof evil results, acci
way, still we shall give the closer philo- dents which derange the development
sophical consideration of this kind of of designs in their execution, are causes
warfare a place in the book on the attack through which many of the transactions
VOL. II. 0
191 ON JAR . [ BOOK VI.

enjoined by circumstances are never re- at when the decision (by battle) is not
alised in the execution. In war where sought. They are as follows:
insufficiency of knowledge, the danger of 1. The seizure of a considerable strip
a catastrophe, the number of accidents of territory, as far as that can be done
are incomparably greater than in any without a decisive engagement.
other branch of human activity, the num- 2. The capture of an important maga
ber of shortcomings, if we may so call zine under uresame condition.
them , must necessarily also be much 3. The capt ess
ofa fortr not covered.
greater. This is then the rich field No doubt a siege is more or less agreat
whe re the defensive gathers fruits which operation, often iring great labour;
grow for it spontaneously. If we add to but it is an underequ
rtaking which does not
this result of experience the substantial contain the elements of a catastrophe.
importance of the possession of the sur- If it comes to the worst , the siege can be
face of the ground in war, then that raised without thereby suffering a great
maxim which has become a proverb , positive loss.
beati sunt possidentes, holds good here as 4. Last , a successful combat of some
ly
well as in peace. It is this maxim which importance, but inwhi ch there isnot
here takes the place of the decision , much risked,and consequently not much
that focus of all action in every war to be gained ; a combat which takes
ful ctedto
direbey mutualuredestr
ond meas n
uctio . Itisfrui
, not in acti
t- stra
ons which e c bonthe
placteginotas inal
card knot of awhol
d , but on its ownaccount
e
it calls forth, but in motives for not for the sakeoftrophies or honour of the
acting, and for all that actionwhichis troops. Forsuchan at anyofprice
done in the interest of inaction. When combat is not foughtobject, course,
; veas
nodecision isto be soughtfor or expected, eitherwaitfor thechance ofa favourable
reason only
for thatnocould
thereis for giving upanyth
be done
ing, opportunity, orseektobringone about
to gain by skill.
thereby some advantage in the decision . These four objects of attack give rise
The consequenceisthat the defender to the following efforts on thepart of the
keeps all, or at least as much as he can defence :
(that is as much as he can cover), and 1. To cover the fortresses by keeping
the assailant takes possession of so much them behind us .
as he can without involving himself in 2. To cover the country by extending
a decision , (that is, he will extend him- the troops over it.
self laterally as much as possible ). We 3. Where the extension is not sufficient,
have only to deal with the first in this to throw the army rapidly in front of the
place. enemy by a flank march .
Wherever the defender is not present 4. To guard against disadvantageous
with his military forces, the assailant can combats.
take possession , and then the advantage It is clear that the object of the first
of the state of expectation is on his side ; three measures is to force on the enemy
hence the endeavour to cover the country the initiative, and to derive the utmost
everywhere directassaly,ilan
chance of the and takethe
to ckin
t atta g the and tageobje
advanthis fromct thest ate ofexpectaticing
is so deeply rooted in
Beforewe go further intothe special treatafully to ydespiseitprimafacieethe
properties of the defence, we must ex
tract from the book on the attack those must necessaril occupy a higher placethe
objectswhichtheassailant usuallyaims ruling principle inall such campaigns,
 CHAP. xxx . ] DEFENCE OF A TIEATRE OF JAR. 195

even although, apparently, a considerable the probability of maintaining the status

degree of activity may be manifested in quo without any sacrifice, is not even
slightest risk.
small actions of an indecisive character . attended with the
Hannibal as well as Fabius, and both If the defender places himself behind
Frederick the Great and Daun, have done the fortress, he offers the assailant an
homage to this principle wheneve object which is exactly suited to the cir
r they cumstan
did not either. seek for orexpect a de- latter placed.
ces in which the is
cision. The fourth effort serves as a If the fortress is not of great strength,
corrective to the three others, it is their and he is not quite unprepared, he will
conditio sine quâ non.
commence the siege : in order that this
We shall now proceed to examine may not end in the fall of the place, the
these subjects a little more closely. defender must march to its relief. The
At firstsight it appears somewhat pro. positive action, the initiative, is now laid
posterous to protect a fortress from the on him, and the adversary who by his
enemy's attack by placing an army in siege is to be regarded as advancing
front of it ; such a measure looks like a towards his object, is in the situation of
kind of pleonasm , as fortifications are occupier.
built to resist a hostile attack of them- Experience teaches that the matter
selves . Yet it is a measure which we always takes this turn , and it does so
see resorted to thousands and thousands naturally. A catastrophe, as we have
of times. But thus it is in the conduct before said, is not necessarily bound up
of war ; the most common things often with a siege. Even a general, devoid of
seem
would
the most incomprehensible. Who either thespirit of enterprise or energy,
presume to pronounce these thou- who would never make up his mind to a
sands of instances to be so many blunders battle, will proceed to undertake a siege
on the ground of this seeming inconsis- with perhaps nothing but field artillery,
tency ? The constant repetition of the when he can approach a fortress without
measure shows that it must proceed from risk . At the worst he can abandon his
some deep - seated motive. This reason undertaking without any positive loss.
is, however, no other than that pointed There always remains to be considered
outabove, emanating from moralslug- thedangerto which most fortresses are
gishness and inactivity. more or less exposed, that of being taken
If the defender places himself in front by assault, or in some other irregular
of his fortress, the enemy cannot attack manner, and this circumstance should
itunless he first beats the army in front certainly not be overloo ked by the de
of it ; but a battle is adecision ion
; if that fender in his calculat of probabil . ities
is not the enemy's object then there will In weighing and consideringthe differ
be no battle, and the defender will remain ent chances, it seems natural that the
in possession of his fortress without defender should look upon the proba
striking a blow ; consequently, whenever bility of not having to fight at all as more
we do not believe the enemy intends to for his advantage than the probability of
should venture on the fighting even under favourable circum
fight a battle, wemaking
chance of his not up his mind to stances . And thus it appears to us that
do so, especially as in most cases we still the practice of placing an army in the
retain the power of withdrawing behind field before its fortress, is both natural
the fortress in a moment , if, contrary to and fully explained . Frederick the
our expectation, the enemy should march Great, for instance, at Glogau, against
to attack us ; the position before the for the Russians, at Schwednitz, Neiss, and
tress is in this way freefromdanger, and Dresden, against the Austrians,almost
 196 ON VAR . [ BOOK VI.
always adopted it. This measure, how- then the position before it is frequently
ever, brought misfortune on the Duke of
a matter of absolute necessity, and in
Bevern at Breslau ; behind Breslau he most cases is very natural. But it is
could not have been attacked ; the supe easy to see that this obvious motive,
riority of the Austrians in the king's which is easily over-valued by those who
absence would soon cease, as he was are not in the habit of looking far before
explas in all
approaching ;andtherefore, bya posi- thems ,is neither sufficientumstto ance
tion behind Breslau , a battle might have case , nor are the circ con
been avoided until Frederick's arrival. nected with it of sufficient importance to
No doubt the Duke would have preferred entitle
that course if it had not been that it it toure
The capt giveofa one
finalordecision.
more fortresses
woualdbom
have t e out
exposed that importan plac with ris kin g le,
abatt is such a very
bardment, at which the king, natural object of all attacks which do not
to
who was anything but tolerant on such aim at a decision on the field of battle,
occasions, would have been highly dis that the defender makes it his principal
pleased . The attempt made by the Duke to business to thwart this design . Thus it
ct Breslupau forbyanentr
protetaken
tion the purpo se, dcanno
enche is thatonthea
posi-t
numb tres sses
er of fortre of ,war, find ning
we contai thesese
afterall be disapproved , for it was very places made the pivots of almost all the
possible that Prince Charles of Lorraine , movements ; we find the assailant seek
contented withed the capture of Schwednitz, ing to approach one of them unexpectedly,
and threaten by the march of the king , and employing various feints to aid his
would, by that position , have been pre purpose , and the defender immediately
vented from advancing farther. The seeking to stop him by well-prepared
best thing he could have done would have movements. Such is the general cha
been to refuse the battle at the last by racter ofalmostall the campaignsof
withdrawing through Breslau at the mo Louis XIV. in the Netherlands upto the
ment that the Austrians advanced to the time of Marshal Saxe.
attack ; in this way he would have got So much for the covering of fortresses .
all the advantages of the state of expec . The covering of a country by an
tation without paying for them by a exten ded disposition of forces, isonly
great danger. conceivable in combination with very con.
able obstacles of ground. Thegreat
before afortressto reasons ofa superior sider
andsmall postswhich mustbeformedfor
adoption on those grounds,wehave still bilityon ;ofres
to observe that there is a motive of a
istance through strength of poem
siti and as natural obstaclesare seldom
more found sufficient, therefore field fica
obvieous one,isngnot sufithough
cient of intern et tiom is madeuse ofas an assistanforti
ce.Bu t
alon , not bei abso lute
; we refe tor now it is to be observed that, the power
the use which is made by armies of the resistance which is thus obtained at any
nearest fortress as a depôt of provisions one point, is always only relative (see the
and munitions of war . This is so co
venient, and presents so many advan chapteron thesignificationas
n at
absolute. It),
ofthecomb
tages, that a general will not easily and neverinly to be regarded
make up his mind to draw his supplies of may certa happen that one such post
all kinds from more distant places, or to may remain proof against allattacks made
lodge them in open towns. But if a upon it, and that therefore in a single
fortress is the great magazine of an army, instance there may be an absolute result;
but from the great number of posts, any
V
OTAP . XXX.] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR. 197

single one, in comparison to the whole, though he can undoubtedly make himself
appears weak, and exposed to the possible master of it, still the question arises as
attack of an overwhelming force, and to the price it will cost, and whether that
consequently it would be unreasonable price is not too high for any use that
to place one's dependence for safety on he can make of thevictory.
theresistance of any one single post. In In this way we may see how the
such an extended position, we can there- powerful
fore only count on a resistance of relative
relative resistance which the
defender can obtain from an extended
length, and not upon a victory, properly disposition, consisting of a number of
speaking. This value of single posts, at posts in juxtaposition with each other,
the same time, is also sufficient for the may constitute a satisfactory result in the
object, and for a general calculation. In calculation of his whole campaign. In
campaigns in which no great decision , no order to direct at once to the right point
irresistible march, towards the complete the glance which the reader, with his
subjugation of the whole force is to be mind's eye, will here cast upon military
feared, there is little risk in a combat history, we must observe that these
of posts, even if it ends in the loss of a extended positions appear most fre .
post. There is seldom any further re- quently in the latter half of a campaign,
sult in connection with it than the loss of because by that time the defender has
the post and a few trophies ; the influence become thoroughly acquainted with his
of victory penetrates no further into the adversary, with his projects, and his si
situationof affairs, it does not tear down tuation ; and the little quantity of the
any part of the foundation to be followed spirit of enterprise with which the assail
by amassof building in ruin . In the worst ant started, isusually exhausted .
case, if, for instance, the whole defensive In this defensive, in an extended posi
system is disorganised by the loss of a tion by which the country, the supplies,
single post, the defender has always time the fortresses are to be covered, all great
to concentrate his corps, and with his natural obstacles, such as streams, rivers,
whole force to offer battle, which the mountains, woods, morasses, must natu
assailant, according to our supposition, rally play a great part, and acquire a
does not desire. Therefore also itusually predominant importance. Upon their
happens that with this concentration use we refer to what has been already
of force the act closes, and the further said on these subjects.
advance of the assailant is stopped. A It is through this predominant import
strip of land, a few men and guns, are the ance of the topographical element that the
losses of the defender,and with these knowledge andactivity which are looked
results the assailant is satisfied . upon as the speciality of the general
To such a risk we say the defender staff of an army are more particularly
may very well expose himself, if he has, called into requisition. Now , as the staff
on the other hand, the possibility, or of the army is usually that branch which
rather the probability, in his favour, that writes and publishes most, it follows that
the assailant from excessive caution will these parts of campaigns are recorded
halt before his posts without attacking more fully in history ; and then again
them . Only in regard to this we must from that there follows a not unnatural
not lose sight of the fact, that we are tendency to systematise them , and to
now supposing an assailant who will not frame out of the historical solution of one
venture upon any great stroke, a mod- case a general solution for all succeed
erate sized, but strong post will very well ing cases. But this endeavour is futile,
and therefore erroneous. Besides , in
serve to stop such an adversary, for al.
198 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.
this more passive kind of war, in this same time as the assailant, by his own dis
form of it which is tied to localities, each positions and other circumstances, is con
case is different to another, and mustbe fined to certain principal directions and
differently treated . The ablest memoirs great roads, and any great deviations
of a critical character respecting these from these directions, even if he is only
subjects are therefore only suitedto make opposed to a veryinactive defender, would
one acquainted with facts, but never to be attended with great embarrassment
serve as dictates. and disadvantage , therefore generally
Natural, and at the same time merito- all that the defender has to do is to cover
the country for a certain number of miles
rious,ingas is this indus try
cord to the general view,which , ac
we have or marches right and left of these prin
attributed to the staff in particular, still cipal lines ofdirection of his adversary.
we mustonsraise a warning voice against But again tod effect this covering , wemay
usurpati which often spring from be contente with defensive posts on the
it to the prejudice ofthe whole. The principal roadsand means of approach,
and merely watch the country between
authority acquired by those who are at
the head of,and best acquainted with, by small posts of observation . The con
this branch of military service, gives sequence ofthisis certainly that the
them often a sort of general dominion assailant may then pass a column be
inning tween two of these posts, and thus make
over ralle's
peop
the gene elf,ds,and
himsmin begfrom this with
then the attack, which he has in view, upon
springs a routine of ideas which causes one post from several quarters at once.
an undue bias of the mind. At last Now, these posts are in some measure
the general sees nothingbut mountains arrangedto meet this, partly by their
and passes, and that which should be a having supports for their flanks, partly
measure offreechoice guided bycircum- bytheformation of flank defences (called
stan ces becomes mannerism ,becomes recei
crochets tly by
, partance
ve )assis from beinveg able
theia rreser postedto
second nature .
Thus in theyear 1793 and 1794, in rear, or by troops detached fromad
Colonel Grawert ofthe Prussian army, joini ng posts. In this manner the numi
who was the animating spirit of the staff ber of posts is reduced still more,
n
at that time, and well know as a regu. the result is thatanarmy engaged in a
lar man for mountains and passes , per defence of this kind , usuallydivides itself
Buaded twogenerals of the most opposite intofour or five principal posts.
personal characteristics, the Duke of For important points of approach,
beyoendmeasa ure
Brunswick andGeneral Mollendorf,into som
exactly the same method of carrying on
certathre distaednce,
in aten , speci yet alin
andal centr
war . points are established which, in a certain
That a defensive line parallel to the measure , form small theatres of war
course of a formidable natural obstacle within the principal one. In this manner
maylea d to acordonwar is quitplain
e theAustrians,duringthe Sevenbodyof
It must, in most cases, necessarily lead to War, generally placed the main Years'
that if really the whole extent of the their army, in four or five posts in the
theatre of war could be directly covered mountains of Lower Silesia ; whilst a
in that manner .
But most theatres of small almost independent corps Om
war havesuch an extent,that the normal ganised for itself a similar system of
tactical disposition of the troops destined defence
for its defence would be by no means Now, in
theUpper
furtherSilesia.
such a defensive sys
commensurate with that object ; at the tem diverges from direct covering, the
 DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 199
CHAP. xxx.]
more it must call to its assistance — mo . which are menaced ; next, in many cases,
bility ( active defence ), and even offensive he must be ready to repair with the bulk
means . Certain corps are considered of his forces to any posts uponwhich the
reserves; besides which, one post hastens bulk of the enemy's force is about to be
to send to the help of another all the thrown, as otherwise those posts would
troops it can spare. This assistance may be too easily overpowered ; lastly, a
be rendered either by hastening up di- general who has an aversion to confining
rectly from the rear to reinforce and his army to a passive resistance in an
re -establish the passive defence, or by extended position, must seek to attain
attacking the enemy in flank, or even by his object, theprotection of the country,
menacing his line of retreat. If the by rapid, well-planned , and well- con
assailant threatens the flank of a post ducted movements, The greater the
not with direct attack, but only by a spaces which he leaves exposed, the
position through which he can act upon greater the talent required in planning
the communications of this post, then the movements, in order to arrive any
either the corps which has been advanced where at the right moment of time.
for this purpose must be attacked in The natural consequence of striving to
earnest, or the way of reprisal must be do this is, that in such a case, positions
resorted to by acting in turn on the which afford sufficient advantages to make
enemy's communications. an enemy give up all idea of an attack as
We see, therefore, that however pas- soon as our army, or only a portion of it,
sive this defence is in the leading ideas reaches them , are sought for and pre
on which it is based, still it must com- pared in all directions . As these posi
prise many active means , and in its tions are again and again occupied , and
organisation may be forearmed in many all depends on reaching the same in right
Ways against complicated events . Usually time, they are in a certain measure the
those defences pass for the best which vowels of all this method of carrying on
make the most use of active or even war, which on that account has been
offensive means ; but this depends in termed a war of posts.
great part on the nature of the coun- Just as an extended position, and the
try ,the characteristics of the troops, and relative resistance in a war without great
even on the talent of the general ; partly decisions, do not present the dangers
we are also very pronein general to which are inherent in its original nature,
expect too much from movement, and so in the same manner the intercepting
y s
other auxiliar measure of an active the enemy in front by a march to a flank
nature, and toplace too little reliance on is not so hazardous as it would be in the
the local defence of a formidable natural immediate expectation of a great deci
obstacle. We think we have thus suffi- sion. To attempt at the last moment in
ciently explained what we understand by greatest haste (by a lateral movement )
to thrust in an armyin front of an adver
an extended line of defence , and we now sary of determined character , who is both
iary means, they
turn ng
placi oursethird
to the lves inauxil
front of theenem able andwilling to deal heavy blows, and
has no scruples about an expenditure of
s h to asaril
by a rapid marc
This mean is neces flanky.
one of those forces, would be halfway to amost deci
provided for that defence of a country sive disaster ; for against an unhesitating
which we are now considering . In the blow delivered with the enemy's whole
first place the
ded
defender , even with thet strength , such
ion,
running andstumbling
most exten posit often canno into a position would not do. But against
an opponent who, instead of taking up
guard all the appro aches to his country
200 ON WAR . [BOOK VI.

his
the work
tips ofwith his whole
his fingers, whohand,
does uses only of
not know the enemy's army, provided the rest of
the force of which it is a member is
how to make use of a great result, or sufficiently near to carry it on
h
and finish
ed
rather of the opening for one, who only it,- now such a flank marc is attend
seeks a trifling advantage but at smallwith less difficulty even under the eye of
expense, against such an opponent this the enemy. What formerly could only
kind of resistance certainly may be ap- beeffected through theactual mechanism
plied with effect. of the order of march, can now be done
A natural consequence is, that this by starting single divisions at an earlier
meansalsoin general occurs oftener in hour, byhastening themarchofothers,
the last half of a campaign than at its and by the greater freedom in the em
commencement . ployment of the whole.
Here, also, the general staff has an By themeansof defence just considered,
y of displaying itstopographi- the assailant can beprevented from taking
opportunitledg
cal know e in frami ng ss from occupying any im.
a system of any fortre ,
combined measures , connected withthe portant exten t of country, or capturing
choice and prepa ration ofthe positions in
maga s
zine ;andhewillbe
every direc
preve
tion combats are
nted, if
offered to
and the roadsleading to them.
When the whole object of one party is him in which he can see little probability
to gain in the end a certain point, and of success , or too great danger of a re
the whole object of his adversary , on the action in case of failure, or in general,an
other hand, is to prevent his doing so, expenditure of force too great for his ob
then both parti es are often oblig ed
make their movements under the eyes of
to ject
Ifand
nowexist
the defen derions
ing relat . eds in this
succe
each other ; for this reason , these move triumph of his art and skill, and the
mentsonmust be made with a degree ofpre- assailant, wherever he turns hiseyes,
cauti and precision not otherwise re sees prudent preparations through which
quired. Formerly, before the mass of an he is cut off from any prospect of attain
and even onmedof
armywasfor indephenden
the marc t
divissions,
was alway re princ iplemode
ing his st s:
seeks to thentheoffen
often wishe escape from the sive
garded asan indivisiblewhole, thisprecau- diffic ulty inthe satisfaction ofthe mere
honour of its arms. The gain of some
tion and precision was attended with much
more formality, and with the copious use combat of respectable importanceance
, gives
of tactical skill. On these occasions, cer the arms of the victor a sembl of
leavesingle
tainly,
to
brigadeswere often obliged superiority , appeasesthevanityof the
the general line of battle to se general, of the court, of the army, and
cure particular points , and act an inde the people, and thus satisfies, to a cer
pendent part until the army arrived : but tainextent, the expectations whichare
thesewere, andthecontinu
proceedings ; and
ed ,anomalous naturally always raised when the offen
aim in the order of sive is assumed .
An advantageous t
comba of some im
onepoint toanother as awhole, portanc
from rving mere
e lyfor the,bsake
prese norma
avoiding suchitsexcep
l forma
tiona tion
l proce ,ans asd fory and some trophies
eding ecomeofs,th
thevic
ere
the above as far as possible. Now that fore,
the last hope of the assailant. No
the parts of the main body of an army
one must suppose that we here involve
ourselves in a contradiction, for we con
aresubdivided again into independent tendthatwe still continue me
bodies , and those bodies can venture to
withi n our
asures of
enter into an engagement with the mass own supposition,
the defender have the goodthe assailant
thatdeprived
 &. ]
CHAP. XXX . DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR . 201

of all expectation of attaining any one of the situation of all his corps and posts.
those other objects by means of asuccessful No doubt here all greatly depends on the
combat ! To warrant that expectation, two leaders of those corps making suitable
conditions are required, that is, a favour- dispositions ; but any one of them may
termination
able the
that the combat, and next, be led into an unavoidable catastrophe by
result shallto lead really to the attain. injudicious orders imposed on him by the
ment of one of those objects. general-in - chief. Who is not reminded
The first may very well take place here of Fouque's corps at Landshut, and
without the second, and therefore the of Fink's at Maxen ?
In both cases Frederick the Great
defender
much s' corps
more frequent and posts
ly in singly are reckoned too much on customary ideas.
danger of get-
ting involved in disadvantageous combats It was impossible that he could suppose
if the assailant merely aims at the honour 10,000 men capable of successfully resist
of the battle field , than if he connects with ing 30,000 in the position of Landshut ,
that a view to further advantages as well . or that Fink could resist a superior force
If we place ourselves in Daun's situa- pouring inand overwhelming him on all
tion, andwith his way of thinking, then sides ; but he thought the strength of the
his venturing on the surprise of Hoch- positionof Landshut would be accepted,
kirch does not appear inconsistent with like a bill of exchange, as heretofore, and
tra
his characte r, as long as we suppose him that Daun would see in the demons
aimingat nothing more than the trophies tion against his flanksufficient reason to
of the day. But a victory rich inresults, exchange his uncomfortable position in
which would have compelled the king to Saxonyfor the more comfortable one in
abandon Dresden and Neisse, appears an Bohemia . He misjudged Laudon in one
entirely different problem, one with which case and Daun in the other, and therein
he would not have been inclined to med- lies the error in these measures .
dle . But irrespective of such errors, into
Let it not be imagined that these are which even generals may fall who are
trifling or idle distinctions ; we have, on not so proud, daring, and obstinate as
the contrary, now before us one of the Frederick the Great in some of his pro
deepest-rooted, leading principles of war. ceedings may certainly be termed, there
The signification of a combat is its very is always, in respect to the subject we are
soul in strategy, and we cannot too often now considering, a great difficulty in this
repeat, that in strategy the leading events way, that the general- in- chief cannot
always proceed from theultimate viewsof always expect all he desires from the
ity sagac , good -will, courage and firmness
the two
clusio n ofparties, as ittrain
the whole were,
of from
ideas. a This
con of character of his corps-commanders.
is why there may be such a difference He cannot , therefore, leave everything to
strategically between one battle and their good judgment ; he must prescribe
another , that they can hardly be looked rules on many points by which their
upon as althoug
the same s. course of action, being restricted, may
Now, h mean
the fruitless victory of easily become inconsistent with the cir.
the assailant can hardly be considered cumstances of the moment. This is,
any serious injury to the defence, still as however, an unavoidable inconvenience .
the defender will not willingly concede Without an imperious commanding will,
the influence of which penetrates through
even this
never knowadvanta ge, particul
what acciden t mayarlyalso
as we
be the whole army, war cannot be well con
connected with it, therefore the defender ducted ; and whoever would follow the
requires to keep an incessant watch upon practice of always expecting the best
202 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
from his subordinates, would from that specially important to the defender, for
very beanquite
reason of
Commander army.
unfit for a good although it is true that its interruption
Therefore the situation of every corps cannot be an object of the hostile opera
tions which takeplace, yet it might com
and post must be for ever kept clearly in pel him to retreat,and thus to leave other
view , to prevent any of them being un objects open to attack .
expectedly drawn into a catastrophe. All the measures having for their ob
The aim ofall these effortsis to pre- ject theprotection of the areaof the
serve the status quo. The more fortunate
and successfultheseefforts are,the longer theatre
have theeffectof must naturally also
of war itself,covering
thelinesof
will the war lastat the same point ; but communication ; their security is there
the longer war continues atonepoint, fore in partprovidedfor in thatway,and
the greater become the cares for subsist- we have only to observe that it is a prin
ence .
cipal condition in fixing upon a posi.
In place of collections and contribu- tion .
tions from the country, a system of sub A special means of security consists in
sistence from magazines commences at
once, or in a very short time ; in place the bodies convoys
escorting of troops, both small and large,
. First, the most ex
of country waggons being collected upon tended positions are not sufficient to
each occasion,the formation, more or less,
secure the lines of communication, and
of a regular transport takes place, comnext, such an escort is particularly neces
posed either of carriages of the country ,
or of those belonging to the army ; in sary when the general wishes to avoid a
short, there arisesan approach to that very
find, extended
in Tempelhposition.
of's HistoryTherefore, we
ofthe Seven
regular system of feeding troops from Years' War, instances without end in
magazines, of whichwehavealready which Frederick theGreatcaused his
treated in the
Subsistence )
fourteenth chapter (On bread and flourwaggonsto be escorted
Atthesame
exercises time, it is not this which by
a great influence on this mode
single regiments
valry, of wholebri
sometimes alsoby infantry or ca
gades
,
of conducting war, foras this mode, by On the Austrian side we nowhere find
mention ofthesame thing, whichcera
its object
tied downand character, isspace
to a limited in factalready
, therefore
tainlymay bepartly accounted for in
the question of subsistence may very well this way, that they had no such circum
have a partindetermining its action partstantial
it ishistorian
alsoto beonascribed
their side, but in
justtothis
and so in mostcases
will dogeneral - without that they alwaystook up much more,
altering the character the war.
of
On the other hand , the action of the belli extended positions.
gerents mutually against the lines of com Having now touched upon the four
munications gains a much greater import- efforts which
defensive that form the aiin
does not foundation of a
at a decisi on,
ance for two reasons . Firstly, because in
such campaigns , there being no measures and which are at the same time, alto
of a great and comprehensive kind , gether
Offensivefree upon ,the
elements wewhole fromsayo
must now all
generals must apply their energies to something of the offensivemeans witha
because herethereis timeenough to wait mixed up,in a certainmeasure flavoured.
for the effect of this means . The security These offensive means are chiefly ;
of his line of communications is therefore
1. Operating against the enemy's com
CHAP. XXX. ] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR. 203

munications, under which we likewise But as the above means may be used
include enterprises against his places of just as well by the assailant, and in itself
supply. is a real attack , we therefore think more
2. Diversions and incursions within suitable to leave its further examination
the enemy's territory . for the next book. Accordingly we shall
3. Attacks on the enemy's corps and only count it in here, in order to render
posts, and even upon his main body, a full account of the arsenal of small
under favourable circumstances, or the offensive arms belonging to the de
threat only of such intention. fender of a theatre of war, and for the
The first ofthese means is incessantly present merely add that in extent and
in action in all campaigns of this kind, importance it inay attain to such a point,
but in a certain measure quite quietly as to give the whole war the appearance,
actuallyposition
withoutsuitable
Every making for appeara
itsthe ncer. and
defende
along with that the honour, of the
offensive . Of this nature are Frederick
derives a great part of its efficacy from the Great's enterprises in Poland, Bo
the disquietude which it causes the as- hemia and Franconia, before the cam
sailant in connection with his communi- paign of 1759. His campaign itself is
cations; and as the question of sub- plainly a pure defence; these incursions
sistence in such warfare becomes, as we into the enemy's territory, however, gave
have already observed , one of vital im- it the appearance of an aggression,
portance, affecting the assailant equally, which perhaps had a specialvalue on
therefore, through this apprehension of account of the moral effect.
e action An attack on one of the enemy's corps
offensiv
the enemy's position, great ng
, possiblya resulti partfromof or on his main body must always be kept
the strategic web is determined, as in view as a necessary complement of the
we shall again find in treating of the whole defence whenever the aggressor
attack . takes the matter too easily, and on that
Not only this general influence, pro- account shows himself very defenceless
ceeding from the choice of positions, at particular points. Under this silent
which, like pressure in mechanics, pro condition the whole action takes place.
duces an effect invisibly, but also an But here also the defender, in the same
actual offensive movement with part of way as in operating against the commu
the army againstthe enemy's lines of nications of the enemy, may go a step
communication , comes within the compass further in the province of the offensive,
of such a defensive. But that it may be and just as well as his adversary may
done with effect, the situation of the lines of make it his business to lie in wait for a
communication, the nature of the country, favourable stroke. In order to ensure a
and the peculiar qualitiesof the troopsmust resultin this field, he must either be very
be specially propitious to the under- decidedly superiorh
in force to his oppo
inly sistent
nent — whic certa is incon
taking
Incursions into the enemy's country with the defensive in general, but still
may happen — or he must have a method
whichinghave
contribu theirs , objec
as tion cannott repri sals be
properly or and thetalent of keeping his forces more
levy
regarded as defensive means, they are concentrated, and make up by activity
rather true offensive means ; but they are and mobility for the danger which he
usually combined with the object of a real incurs in other respects.
The first was Daun's case in the Seven
diversionnsiv
realdefe , whic h sur
e mea maye, be
as itreg inteed
is ard a Years ' War ; the latter, the case of Fred
ndedas to
erick the Great. Still we hardly ever see
weaken the enemy's force opposed to us.
204 ON WAR . [BOOK 11.
Daun's offensive make its appearance and defence must always tend more to
except when Frederick the Great invited disappear. At the opening of acam
itbyexcessive boldnessanda displayof paign, certainly one party will enterthe
contempt for him (Hochkirch, Maxen , other's theatre of war, and in that man.
Landshut). On the other hand, we see ner, to a certain extent, such party puts
Frede rick the Great almostconst antly on the form of offensive. But it may
on the move in order to beat one or other very well take place, and happens fre
of Daun's corps with his main body. quently that he must soon enough apply
He certainly seldom succeeded , at least, all his powers to defend his own country
the results were never great, because on the enemy's territory. Then both
Daun, inaddition to his greatsuperior ity stand, in reality, opposite one anotherin
innumbers , had also a raredegreeof pru a state of mutual observation. Both
dence and caution ; but we must not sup- intent on losing nothing, perhaps both
pose that, therefore, the king'sattempts alike intent also on obtaining a positive
werealtogether fruitless. theseattempts advantage . Indeed
lay rather a very effectualIn resistance ; for with Frederick it may happen, as
the Great, that the real
thecare and fatigue, which his adversary defenderaims higher in that way than
had to undergo in order to avoid fighting his adversary.
ata disadvantage, neutrali sed those forces Now the more the assailant gives up
which would otherwi se have aided in
advancing the offensive action. Let us the position of an enemy making pro
gress, the less the defender is menaced
onlycall to mindthe campaign of 1760, byhim ,and confined to a strictly defen
in Silesia , where Daun and the Russians, sive attitude by the pressing claims ofa
outofsheerapprehensionof beingat regardformeresafety
tacked and beaten by the king , first here , so much the
ons
more a similarity in the relati of the
andthen there, never could succeedin parties is produced in which thenthe
making one step in advance . activity of both will be directed towards
We believewe havenow gonethrough gaining an advantage over hisopponent,
all the subjects whichform thepredomi- and protectinghimself againstanydis
nant ideas, the principalaims,andthere-
fore the main stay, of the whole action
advantage, therefore to å truestrategic
in the defence of a theatre of war when
manæuvring ; and indeed this is the cha
no idea of decision is entertained . Our racter into which all campaigns resolve
themselves more or less, when the situa
chief,and, indeed, sole objectinbringing tion of the combatants or political views
them all close together, was to let the do not allow of any great decision.
organism of the whole strategic action
be seen in one view ; the particular mea In the following bookwe have allotted
sures by means of which those subjects tegic uvres y to the subject
manqspeciall
a chapter equipofoised
; butasthis stra
comotolife,march es,positions, etc.,etc., playof forceshas frequentlybeen invested
we have already considered in detail.
By now casting a glance once more at in theory with animportance to which it
is not entitled, wefind ourselves under
the whole of our subject, the idea must
strike us forcibly, that with such a the necessity of examining the subject
treating of
weak offensive principle, with so little more closely while weinarethat
desire for a decision on either side , with the defence, as it is form of
so little positive motive with so many Warfare moreis particularly
importance ascribed to that this man
strategic false
counteracting influences , of a subjective
Quvres.
nature , which stop us and hold us back ,
the essential difference between attack We call it an equipoised play of forces,
for when there is nomovement of the
 CHAP. Xxx .] DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR. 205

whole body there isa state of equilibrium ; great decision ; they will,therefore, have
where no great object impels, there is no somewhat less weight when there is an
movement of the whole; therefore, in equipoised play of forces, and the pre
such a case, the two parties , however dominating ascendancy of sagacious cal
unequal they may be, are still to be re- culation increases not only at the expense
12
garded as in a state of equilibrium . of chance, but also at the expense of these
From this state of equilibrium of the qualities. On the other hand, these bril
whole now come forth the particular liant qualities, at the moment of a great
motives to actions of a minor class and decision, may rob chance of a great part
secondary objects. They can here de- of its power, and therefore, to a certain
velop themselves, because they are no extent, secure that which calculating in
longer kept down by the pressure of a telligence in such cases would be obliged
great decision and great danger. There- to leave to chance. We see by this that
fore, what can be lost or won upon the here a conflict takes place between several
whole is changed into small counters, forces, and that we cannot positively
$ and the action of the war, as a whole, is assert that there is a greater field left
broken up into smaller transactions. open to chance in the case of a great
With these smaller operations for smaller decision, than in the total result when
C gains, a contest of skill now takes place that equipoised play of forces takes place.
between the two generals ; but as it is Ifwe, therefore, see more particularly in
impossible in war to shut out chance, this play of forces a contest of mutual
and consequently good luck, therefore skill, that must only be taken to refer to
this contest will never be otherwise than skill in sagacious calculation, and not to
a game. In the meantime, here arise the sum total of military genius.
two other questions, that is, whether in Now it is just from this aspect of stra
this manoeuvring, chance will not have tegic manoeuvring that the whole has
a smaller, and superior intelligence a obtained that false importance of which
greater, share in the decision, than where we have spoken above. In the first place,
all concentrates itself into one single in this skilfulness the whole genius of a
great act. The last of these questions general has been supposed to consist ;
we must answer in the affirmative. The but this is a great mistake, for it is, as
more complete the organisation of the already said , not to be denied that in
whole, the oftener time and space come moments of great decisions other moral
into consideration—the former by single qualities of a general may havepower to
moments, the latter at particular points control the force of events. If this power
so much the greater, plainly, will be the proceeds more from the impulse of noble
field for calculation, therefore the greater
feelings and those sparks of genius which
the sway exercised by superior intelli- start up almost unconsciously, and there
gence. What the superior understanding fore does not proceed from long chains of
gains is abstracted in part from chance, thought, still it is not the less a free
but not necessarily altogether, and citizen of the art of war, for that art is
therefore we are not obliged to answer neither a mere act of the understanding,
the first question affirmatively. More- nor are the activities of the intellectual
over, we must not forget that a superior faculties its principal ones. Further,it has
understanding is not the only mental been supposed that every active campaign
quality of a general ; courage, energy, without results must be owing to that sort
resolution, presence of mind, etc. , are of skill on the part of one, or even of both
qualities which rise again to a higher generals, while in reality it has always
value when all depends on one single had its general and principal foundation
 206 ON WAR . [ BOOK VI.
just in the general relations which have tory, fruitless war game, the perfection
turned war into such a game . of the art is realised. There lies at the
As most wars between civilised states bottom of this last view such a want of
havehad for their object ratherthe obser- logicand philosophy, that it canonlybe
vation of the enemy than his destruction, termed a hopeless,distressing confusionof
therefore it was only natural that the ideas. Butat the same time the opposite
greater number of the campaigns should opinion,that nothing like the past will
bear the character of strategic manœuv ever reappear, is very irrational. Of
ring. Those amongst them which did not the novelappearances manifested in the
bring into notice any renowned generals , domain of the art of war, very few indeed
attracted no attention ; but where there are to be ascribed to new discoveries,
was a great commander on whom all eyes or to a change in the direction of ideas;
were fixed , or two opposed to eachother, theyarechiefly attributable to the altera
like Turenne and Montecuculi, there the tions in the social state and its relations.
seal of perfection has been stamped upon But as these took place just at the crisis
this whole art of manœuvring through of a state of fermentation, they must not
the names of these generals. A further be taken as a norm ; and we cannot,
consequence hasthen been thatthis game therefore, doubt that a great part of the
has been looked upon as the summit of formermanifestations of war,will again
theart, as themanifestationof its highest make their appearance. This is not the
perfecti on, and consequently also as the place to enter further into these matters ;
source at which the art of war must
it is enough for us that by directing at
chiefly be studied . tention to the relation which this even
This view prevailed almost universally balancedplay of forces occupies in the
in the theoretical world before the wars
of the French Revolution . But when conduct
whole and
cation connection to itsobjects,
andother
of a war,with signifi
these wars at one stroke opened to view we have shown that it is always pro
a quite different world of phenomena in duced by constraint laid on bothparties
war, at firstsomewhat roughandwild, engaged inthecontest,and by amilitary
but which afterwards, under Buonaparte element greatly attenuated .
In this
systematisedinto a method on a grand gameonegeneralmayshowhimself
scale , produced results which created
astonishment amongst old and young , more skilful than his opponent; andis
then people set themselves free from the therefore, if the strength of his army
old models, and believed that all the equal, he may also gain many advan
changes they saw resulted from modern tages over him ; or if his force is inferior,
discoveries , magnificent ideas, etc.; but hemay, by his superior talent, keep the
also at the same time, certainly from the contest ovenly balanced ; but it is com
changes in the state of society. It was pletely contradictory to the nature of the
now thought that what was old would thingto look here for the highest honour
never more be required, and would never and glory of a general ; such a cam
even reappear . But as in such revolu paign is always rather à certain sign
tions in opinions two parties are always that neither of the generals has any
formed , so it was also in this instance , great military talent, or that he who has
and the old views found their champions, talent is prevented by the force of cir
who looked upon the new phenomena as cumstances fromventuring on a great
rude blows of brute force , as a general decision ; but when this is the case,
decadence of the art ; and held the opi. there is no scope afforded for the display
nion that, in the evenly-balanced, nuga of the highest military genius .
We have hitherto been engaged with
CHAP . xxx.] DEFENCE OF A TIEATRE OF ITAR . 207

the general character of strategic manou- retical rule, except one founded on ex
vring ; we must now proceed to a special perience. A war directed to great de
influence which it has on the conduct of cisions is not only much simpler, but also
war, namely this, that it frequently leads much more in accordance with nature ; is
the combatants away from the principal more free from inconsistencies, more
roads and places into unfrequented , or objective, more restricted by a law of
at least unimportant localities. When inherent necessity ; hence the mind can
trifling interests, which exist for a mo- prescribe forms and laws for it ; but for a
ment and then disappear, are paramount, war without a decision for its object, this
the great features of a country have less appears to us to be much more difficult.
influence on the conduct of the war . We Even the two fundamental principles of
therefore often find that bodies of troops the earliest theories of strategy published
move to points where we should never in our times, the Breadth of the Base, in
look for them, judging only by the great Bulow, and the Position on Interior Lines,
and simple requirements of the war ; and in Jomini, if applied to the defence of
that consequently, also, the changeful- a theatre of war, have in no instance
ness and diversity in the details of the shown themselves absolute and effective.
contest as it progresses, are much greater But being mere forms, this is just where
here than in wars directed to a great they should show themselves most effica
decision. Let us only look how in the cious, because forms are always more
last five campaigns of the Seven Years' efficacious, always acquire a preponde
War, in spite of the relations in general rance over other factors of the product,
remaining unchanged in themselves, each the more the action extends over time
of these campaigns took a different form , and space. Notwithstanding this, we
and , closely examined , no single measure find that they are nothing more than
ever appears twice ; and yet in these particular parts of the subject, and cer
campaigns the offensive principle mani- tainly anything but decisive advantages.
fests itself on the side of the allied army It is very clear that the peculiar nature
much more decidedly than in most other of the means and the relations must
earlier wars . always from the first have a great influ
In this chapter on the defence of a ence adverse to all generalprinciples.
theatre of war, if no great decision is What Daun did by the extent and pro
proposed, we have only shown the ten. vident choice of positions, the king did
dencies of the action, together with its by keeping his army always concentrated ,
combination, and the relations and cha- always hugging the enemy close, and by
racter of the same ; the particular mea- being always ready to act extemporally
sures of which it is composed have been with his whole army. The method of
described in detail in a former part of each general proceeded not only from the
our work . Now the question arises nature of the army he commanded, but
whether for these different tendencies of also from the circumstances in which he
action no thoroughly general comprehen- was placed. To extemporise movements
sive principles, rules, or methods can be is always much easier for a king than
given . To this we reply that, as far as for any commander who acts under res
history is concerned , we have decidedly ponsibility. We shall here once more
not been led to any deductions of that point out particularly that the critic has
kind through constantly recurring forms; no right to look upon the different man.
and at the same time, for a subject so ners and methods which may make their
diversified and changeful in itsanygeneral appearance as different degrees on the
nature, we could hardly admit theo. road to perfection, the one inferior to the
208 ON WAR . [BOOK VI
other ; they are entitled to be treated as From the point of view at which we
on an equality, and it must rest with have here placed ourselves , suchan error
the judgment to estimate their relative may appear to be almost impossible; but
fitness for use in each particular case. it is not impossible in the real world,
To enumerate these different manners because there things do not appear in
which may spring from the particular such sharp contrast .
nature of an army, of a country, or of Wemust just again remind our readers
circumstances , is not our object here; that, for the sake of giving clearness,
the influence of these things generally distinctness, and force to our ideas, we
we have already noticed. have always taken as the subject of our
We acknowledge, therefore, that in consideration only the complete anti
this chapter we are unable to give any thesis, that is the two extremes of the
maxims, rules, or methods, because his question, but that the concrete case in
tory does not furnish the means ; and on war generally lies between these two
the contrary, at almost every moment , we extremes , and is only influenced by either
there meet with peculiarities such as are of these extremes according to the de
often quite inexplicable, and often also gree in which it approaches nearer to
surprise usby their singularity. But it is wards it.
not on that account unprofitable to study Therefore, quite commonly, everything
history in connection with this subject depends on the general making up his
also . Where neither system nor any dog own mind before all things as towhether
matic apparatus can be found, there may his adversary has the inclination and the
still be truth , and this truth will then , in means of outbidding him by the use of
most cases, only be discovered by a prac greater and more decisive measures. As
tised judgment and the tactof longexperi soon as he has reason to apprehend this,
he must give up small measures intended
ence . Therefore, even if history does not
here furnish any formula , we may be cer to ward off small disadvantages ; and the
tain that here as wellas everywhere else, it course which remains for him then is to
will give us exercise for thejudgment. put himself in a better situation, by a
We shall only set up one comprehen. voluntary sacrifice, in order to make him .
sive general principle, or rather we shall self equal to a greatersolution. In other
reproduce, and present to view more words, the firstrequisite is that the gene
vividly , in the form of a separate prin ral should take the right scale in laying
ciple, the natural presupposition of all out his work .
that has now been said.
All the means which have been here
In order to give these ideas still more
set forth have only a relative value ; they
distinctness through the help of real ex
perience, we shall briefly notice a string
are all placed under the legal ban of a of cases in which, according to our
certain disability on both sides ; above opinion , a false criterion was made usa
this region a higher law prevails , and of, that is, in which one of the generals
there is a totally different world of phe
nomena . The general must never forget in the calculation of his operations very
much underestimated the decisive action
this ; he must never move in imaginary
security within the narrower sphere, as intended by hisngadversary . campa
We begin
ign of
if he were in an absolute medium ; never with the openi ofthe
1757 , in which the Austrians showed by
look upon the means which he employs the disposition of their forces that they
here as the necessary or as the only means ,
and still adhere to them , even when he himself had
offensive ed adopted
as that upon
not count ugh an
thoroFreder
so by ick
already trembles at their insufficiency . the Great ; even the delay of Piccolo
CTIAP . XXX. ] A DEFENCE OF A THEATRE OF WAR. 209

mini's corps on the Silesian frontier offered at Montenotte, Lodi, etc., etc.,
while Duke Charles of Lorraine was in show sufficiently how little the Austrians
danger of having to surrender with his understood the main point when con
whole army, is a similar case of complete fronted by a Buonaparte.
misconception of the situation. In the year 1800 it was not by the
In 1758, the French were in the first direct effect of the surprise, but by the
place completely taken in as to the effects false view which Melas took of the pos
of the convention of Kloster Seeven (a sible consequences of this surprise, that
fact, certainly, with whichwehave nothing his catastrophe was brought about.
to do here), and two months afterwards Ulm, in the year 1805, was the last
they were completely mistaken in their knot of a loose network of scientific but
judgment of what their opponent might extremely feeble strategic combinations,
undertake, which, very shortly after, cost good enough to stop a Daun or a Lascy
them the country between the Weser but not a Buonaparte, the Revolution's
and the Rhine. That Frederick the Emperor.
Great, in 1759, at Maxen , and in 1760, The indecision and embarrassment of
at Landshut, completely misjudged his the Prussians in 1806, proceeded from
enemies in not supposing them capable and
of such decisive measures has been al-
antiquated, pitiful, impracticable views
measures being mixed up with some
ready mentioned. lucid ideas and a true feeling of the
But in all history we can hardly find immense importance of the moment.
a greater error in the criterion than that If there had been a distinct conscious
in 1792. It was then imagined possible ness and a complete appreciation of the
to turn the tide in a national war by a position of the country, how could they
moderate sized auxiliary army, which have left 30,000 men in Prussia, and
brought down on those who attempted it then entertained the idea of forming a
the enormous weight of the whole French special theatre of war in Westphalia,
people,at that time completely unhinged and of gaining any results from a trivial
by political fanaticism . We only call offensive such as that for which Rüchel's
this error a great one because it has and the Weimar corps were intended ? and
proved so since, and not because it would how could they have talked of danger to
have been easy to avoid it. As far as magazines and loss of this or that strip
regards the conduct of the war itself, it of territory in the last moments left for
cannot be denied that the foundation of deliberation ?
all the disastrous years which followed Even in 1812, in that grandest of all
was laid in the campaign of 1794. On campaigns, there was no want at first of
the side of the allies in that campaign , unsound purposes proceeding from the
even the powerful nature of the enemy's use of an erroneous standard Scale. In
system of attack was quite misunder- the head quarters at Wilna there was a
stood, by opposing to it a pitiful system party of men of high mark who insisted
of extended positions and strategic man on a battle on the frontier, in order that
cuv res ; and further in the want of una- no hostile foot should tread on Russian
nimity between Prussia and Austria poli- ground with impunity. Thatthis battle
tically, and the foolish abandonment of on the frontier might be lost, nay, that
Belgiumand theNetherlands, wemay also it would be lost,these mencertainly ad
see how little presentiment the cabinets mitted ; for although they did not know
of that day had oftheforce of the torrent that there would be 300,000 French to
which had just broken loose. In the meet 80,000 Russians, still they knew
year 1796, the partial acts of resistance that the enemy was considerably superior
VOL . II. P
 210 ON WAR [BOOK VI.
in numbers. The chief error was in the subordinate . armies of the allies under
value which they ascribed to this battle ; Bificher and the Crown Prince of Sweden
they thought it would be a lost battle, by corps which were certainly not able
like many other lost battles, whereas it to offer any effectual resistance, but
may with certainty be asserted that this which might impose sufficiently on the
great battle on the frontier would have cautious to preventtheirrisking anything,
produced a succession of events completely as had so often been done inpreceding
different to those which actually took wars . He did not reflectsufficientlyon the
place. Even the camp at Drissa was a reaction proceeding from the deep -rooted
measure at the root of which there lay a resentment with which both Blücher and
completely erroneous standard with re- Bulow were animated, and from the im
gard to the enemy . If the Russian army minent danger in which they were
had been obliged to remain there they placed .
would have been completely isolated and In general , he under -estimated the
enterpri
cut off from every quarter,andthen the Leips sing er t of_old Blüc
ic Blüchspiri
her. At
French army would not have been at a alonewrested fromhim
loss for means to compel the Russians to the victory ; at Laon Blücher mighthave
lay down their arms . The designer of entirely rủined him , and if he did not do
that camp never thought of power and so the cause lay in circumstances com
will on such a scale as that . pletely outof the calculation of Buona
arte sometimes used parte; lastly, at Belle-Alliance, the
But even BuonapAfter
a false standard . the armistice of penalty of this mistake reached him like
1813 he thought to hold in check the a thunderbolt.
l
0 N W A Ꭱ.

VOL. III.
一
 CONTENTS.- VOL. III.

SKETCHES FOR BOOK VII.

THE ATTACK..
CHAP . PAGE
1
I. The Attack in Relation to the Defence
2
II. Nature of the Strategical Attack 4
III. Of the Objects of Strategical Attack 4
IV. Decreasing Force of the Attack 5
V. Culminating Point of the Attack 6
VI. Destruction of the Enemy's Armies. 7
VII . The Offensive Battle
8
VIII. Passage of Rivers
IX. Attack of Defensive Positions 10
11
X. Attack of an Entrenched Camp
XI . Attack of a Mountain 12
XII . Attack of Cordon Lines 14
XIII . Mancuvring 15
17
XIV. Attack of Morasses, Inundations, Woods
XV. Attack of a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision . 18
20
XVI. Attack of a Theatre of War without the View to a great Decision 23
XVII. Attack of Fortresses
XVIII. Attack of Convoys 26
28
XIX. Attack of the Enemy's Army in its Cantonments
XX. Diversion 32
XXI, Invasion 34

SKETCHES FOR BOOK VIII.

PLAN OF WAR .
42
I. Introduction
43
II. Absolute and Real War 46
III. 4.- Interdependence of the Parts in War 48
B .--Of the Magnitude of the Object ofthe War, and the Efforts to be Made 56
IV. Ends in War More Precisely Defined . - Overthrow of the Enemy 62
V. Ends in War More Precisely Defined (continued .) - Limited Object 63
VI. 4. - Influence of the PoliticalObject on the Military Object 65
B.—War is an Instrument of Policy 70
VII. Limited Object. - Offensive War 72
VIII. Limited Object - Defence 75
IX . Plan of War when the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object
iv CONTENTS.VOL . III.

APPEND I X.
SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE AUTHOR TO HIS ROYAL
HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE , IN THE YEARS 1810, 1811 , and 1812. PAGE
95
Scheme which was laid before General Von Gandy
Themost Important Principles of the Art of War to Complete my Course of Instruction 97
of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince 97
I. General Principles to be Observed in War 98
II. Tactics or the Theory of Combat 98
1. General Principles 98
A. For the Defence 101
B. For the Attack 103
II. Principles for the Use of Troops 106
ul . Principles for the Use of Ground 110
III. Strategy 110
1.General Principles 114
II. Defensive 116
III. Attack 116
IV . On the Practice in War of the Principles now laid down :
121
ON THE ORGANIC DIVISION OF ARMED FORCES
125
SKETCH OF A PLAN FOR TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT
127
GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT
 ON WAR .

BOOK VII. –THE ATTACK .

CHAPTER I.

THE ATTACK IN RELATION TO THE DEFENCE.

If two ideas form an exact logical anti- former standpoint. What is thus per
thesis, that is to say if the one is the com- ceived will, therefore, be the complement
plement of the other, then, in fact, each of our former train of thought ; and it will
one is implied in the other; and when the not unfrequently happen that what is said
limited power of our mind is insufficient on the attack will throw a new light on
the defence . In treating of the attack
to apprehend
mere antithesisboth at once,se and,
, to recogni by one
in the the we shall, of course, very frequently have
perfect conception the totality of the the same subjects before us with which
other also, still, at all events, the one our attention has been occupied in the
always throws on the other a strong, defence . But we have no intention, nor
in many parts a sufficient light. Thusand
we would it be consistent with the nature of
think the first chapter on the defence the thing, to adopt the usual plan of
throws a sufficientlight on all the points the on engineer
worksattack, ing ,and in treatingof
of the attack which it touches upon . But to circumvent or upset all
so through
is notthe
itpoint; outthought
in respect of every that we have found of positive value in
train of could no- the defence, by showing that against
where be carried to a finality; it is, there every means of defence , there is an in
fore,natural that where the opposition of falliblemethod of attack. Thedefence
ideas does not lie so immediately atthe has its strong points and weak ones ; if
root of the conception as in the first the first are even not unsurmountable,
chapters, all that can besaid about the still they can only be overcome at a dis
attack does not follow directly from what proportionate price, andr that must re
has been said on the defence. An alter- main true from whateve point of view
we look at it, or we get involved in a
ation of our point of view brings us contradiction . Further, it is not our in
neare r to the
us to obser ve,subje ct, and rit point
at thisclose of al
is natur for tention thoroughly to review the recip
view,
rocal action of the means ; each means of
thatVOL.which
III ,
escaped observation at our B
 ON VAR .
[BOOK VII.
2

defence suggests a means of attack ; but subject, to set forth the peculiar rela
this is often so evident, that there is no tions of the attack, so far as they do
occasion to transfer oneself from our not directly come out of the defence,
standpoint in treating of the defence and this mode of treatment must neces
to a fresh one for the attack, in order sarily lead us to many chapters to
to perceive it; the one issues from the which there are no corresponding ones
other of itself. Our object is, in each in the defence .

CHAPTER II .

NATURE OF THE STRATEGICAL ATTACK.

We have seen that the defensive in war strategy, is therefore a perpetual alter
generally — therefore, also, thestrategic fenc
nating binering of attack andrded
andthecomlatt
e ; but
de
defensive - is no absolute state of expec is not to be rega
tancy and warding off, therefore no com as an effectual preparation for attack, as
pletely passive state, but that it is a rela a means by which its force is heightened,
tive state, and consequently impregnas ted that is to say, not as anactiv e principle,
more or less with offensive principle . In but pnrely as a necessary evil; as the
the same waythe offensive is no homo- retarding weightarising from the specific
geneous whole, butincessantly mixed upgravity ofthe mass ; it is itsoriginal
with the defensive . But there is this sin, its seed of mortality. We say: a re
difference between the two, that adefen- does g weight,bec
tardinnot ause if thedefence
sive, without an offensive return blow,
contribute to strengthen the
attack , it must tend to diminish its effect
cannot be conceived ; that this return
blow is a necessary constituent part of sen
by tsthe. ver y loss of time which itrepre
But now , may not this defensive
the defensive, whilst in the attack , the element, which is contained in every
blow or act is in itself one complete idea.
The defence in itself is not necessarily a attack, have over it a positively disadran
e
part of the attack ; but time and space, tageous influenc ? If we suppose the
to which it is inseparae bly bou nd ,impo rt attac k istheweak er, thedefence the stronger
into it the defensiv as à necessary form of war , it seems to follow that the
se
evil. For in the first place , the attack latter can not act in a positive sen pre
can not be continued uninterruptedly up judicialley on icie mere '; forforas
thentforforc the lon g er
to its conclusion, it must have stages of we hav suff weak
rest , and in these stages , when its action form , we should have more than enough
is neutralised , the state of defence steps for the stronger. In general — that is, as
in of itself ; in the second place, the space regards the chief part — this is true : in its
which a military force, in its advancc, deta il chapt
in the we shal lanalyse itmore precisely,
er on the culminating point of
leaves behind it, and which is essential ; but wemnst not forget that that

bytheattackitself,butmustbespecially founded in this,that the attack itself can

protected.
The actofattack in war, but particu- not take place without a mixture ofweak
larly in that branch which is called fence, and of a defensive of a very
CILAP. II. ] NATURE OF THE STRATEGICAL ATTACK . 3

kind ; what the assailant has to carry about active, and the defensive, which connects
with him of this kind are its worst ele- itself with it, is only a dead weight ;
ments ; with respect to these, that which there is, therefore, not the same kind of
holds good of the whole, in a general difference in it. No doubt, in the energy
sense, cannot be maintained; and there- employed in the attack, in the rapidity
be a
fore it is conceivable that the defensive and force of the blow, there may
may act upon the attack positively as a great difference , but only a difference in
weakening principle. It is just in these degree, not in form . — It is quite possible
moments of weak defensive in the attack, to conceive even that the assailant may
that the positive action of the offensive choose a defensive form, the better to at
principle in the defensive should be intro- tain his object ; for instance, that he may
duced. During the twelve hours rest choose a strong position, that he may be
which usually succeeds a day's work , attacked there ; but such instances are so
what a difference there is between the rare that we do not think it necessary to
situation of the defender in his chosen, dwell upon them in our grouping of ideas
well-known, and prepared position, and and facts, which are always founded on
that of the assailant occupying a bivouac, the practical. We may, therefore, say
into which - like a blind man - he has that there are no such gradations in the
longer period attack as those which present themselves
groped his way,or during aprovisions
of rest, required to obtain and in the defence .
to await reinforcements, etc., when the Lastly, as a rule , the extent of the
defender is close to his fortresses and sup means of attack consists of the armed
plies, whilst the situation of the assailant, force only ; of course, we must add to
on the other hand, is like that of a bird these the fortresses, for if in the vicinity
on a tree. Every attack must lead to of the theatre of war, they have a decided
a defence ; what is to be the result of that influence on the attack. But this influ
defence, depends on circumstances ; these ence gradually diminishes as the attack
circumstances may be very favourable if advances ; and it is conceivable that, in
the enemy's forces are destroyed ; but the attack, its own fortresses never can
they may be very unfavourable if such play such an important part as in the
is not the case. Although this defensive defence, in which they often become ob
does not belong to theattack itself, its
nature and effects must
jects of primary importance. The assist
re-act on the ance of the people may be supposed in
attack,and
its value. must take part in determining co-operation withthetheinhabita
cases in which attack,ntsin those
of the
The deduction from this view is, that country are better disposed towards the
in every attack the defensive , which is ne- invader of the country than they are to
cessarily an inherent feature in the same , their own army ; finally, the assailant
must come into consideration , in order to may also have allies, bnt then they are
see clearly the disadvantages to which it only the result of special or accidental
is subject, and to be prepared for them . relations, not an assistance proceeding
On the other hand, in another respect, from the nature of the aggressive. Al
the attack is always in itself one and the though, therefore, in speaking of the
same. But the defensive has its gra- defence we have reckoned fortresses, pop
dations according as the principle of ular insurrections, and allies as available
expectancy approaches to an end. This means of resistance ; we cannot do the
begets forms which differ essentially from same in the attack ; there they belong
each other, as has been developed in the to the nature of the thing ; here they only
chapter on theforms of defence. appear rarely, and for themost part acci
As the principle of the attack is strictly dentally.
 ON JAR .
[ BOOK VII
4

CHAPTER III.

OF THE OBJECTS OF STRATEGICAL ATTACK.

phenomena . Practically the moments of

THEwaroverthrow
in ofonthe
; destructi the hosistilthe
of enemy aim
e mil i- the attack , that is, its views and measures,
tary forces, the means both in attack
often glide just as imperceptibly into the
defence as the plans of the defence into
and defence . By the destruction of the the offensive . It is seldom , or at all
enemy's military force,the defensiveis led events not always , that a general lays
con nsivste,ofterr
to the offeque
itontothe the offe ry. e Ter
itonsiv is led by
ritory dow n positively for himself what he will
conquer ,he leaves that dependent on the
is, therefore, the object of the attack ; but His attack often leads
course of events .
be confind ednot be a who
that nee
to a par le cou
t, apro vin cey,, ait strip
ntr
himfurther than he had intended ;after
ntry,a subst . All these s
ss l value from their rest
thing moreorless,heoftengets renewed
ofcou a fortre
antia utsourbein
gth, of thi d tot
g differen
may have make outwitho
stren two quiteoblige
politi cal
r impor tance , in treat ing for peace, r
whethe they are retained or exchanged acts ; atllanothe time he is brough to a t
The object of the strategic attack is,
soorner than he expected , witsh
standsti ve
out, howe , giving up his intention ,
therefore, conceivable in an infinite num and changing to a real defensive. We see,
ber of gradations , from the conquest of therefore , that if the successful defence
the whole country down to that of some may change imperceptibly into the offen
insignificant place . As soon as this ob sive; so on theother hand an attack may, in
ject is attained , and the attack ceases , the like manner,change into a defence. These
defe ns iv e comm en ce s . We may, there gradations must be kept in view ,in order
fore, represent to ourselves the strategic to avoid making a wrong application of
attack as a distinctly limited unit . But what we have to say of the attack in
it is not so if we consider the matter prac
tically, that is in accordance with actual general.

CHAPTER IV .

DECREASING FORCE OF THE ATTACK.

This is one of the principal points in ease

The decrug lute r es
h of abso ct powe arisack
strategy : on its right valuation in the 1. Thro the obje of the att ,
conc rete,depends our being able to judge theoccupation of the
comm enei
ence s fir ter ry
ny'sst afcount the
correctly what we are able to do . this generally
 5
CHAP. IV .] DECREASING FORCE OF TIE ATTACK .

first decision, but the attack does not
cease upon the first decision .
2. Through the necessity imposed on
the attacking army to guard the country
in its rear, in order to preserve its line
of communication and means of sub .
sistence .
3. Through losses in action and through
sickness.
4. Distance of the various depôts of into the comparison any more forces than
supplies and reinforcements.
5. Sieges and blockades of fortresses .
6. Relaxation of efforts .
7. Secession of allies .
But frequently, in opposition to these
weakening causes, there may be many
others which contribute to strengthen the
attack. It is clear, at all events, that a net
result can only be obtained by comparing
these different quantities ; thus, for ex
ample, the weakening of the attack may
be partly or completely compensated, or
even surpassed by the weakening of the
defensive. This last is a case which
rarely happens ; we cannot always bring
those in the immediate front or at deci
sive points, not the whole of the forces
in the field . — Different examples : The
French in Austria and Prussia , in
Russia ; the allies in France, the French
in Spain .

CHAPTER V.

CULMINATING POINT OF THE ATTACK.

The success of the attack is the result of point at which the forces remaining
are
a present superiority of force, it being just sufficient to maintain a defensive,
understood that the moral as well as and to wait for peace . - Beyond that
physical forces are included. In the pre- point the scale turns, there is a reaction ;
ceding chapter we have shown that the the violence of such a reaction is com
power of the attack gradually exhausts monly much greater than the force of
itself; possibly at the same time the supe the blow . This we call the culminating
rioritymay increase, but in most cases it point of the attack .— As the object of
diminishes. The assailant buys up pro- the attack is the possession of the enemy's
spective advantages which are to be territory, it follows that the advance must
turned to account hereafter in negotia- continuetill the superiority is exhausted;
tions for peace ; but, in the meantime, he this cause; therefore, impels us towards
has to pay down on the spot for thema the ultimate object, and may easily lead
certain amount of his military force. If us beyond it. If we reflect upon the
a preponderance on the side of the attack, number of the elements of which an equa
although thus daily diminishing, is still tion of the forces in action is composed,
maintained until peace is concluded, the we may conceive how difficult it is in
object is attained. There are strategic many cases to determine which of two
attacks which have led to an immediate opponents has the superiority on his side.
peace — but such instances are rare ; the Often all hangs on the silken thread of
majority, on the contrary , lead only to a imagination .
6 ON WAR . [BOOK VII.
Everything then depends on discover- should think that the latter can never
ing the culminating point by the fine lead us too far, for as long as the weaker
tact of judgment. Here we come upon form remains strong enough for what is
a seeming contradiction . The defence is required,the stronger form ought to be
stronger than the attack ; therefore we still more so .

CHAPTER VI.

DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S ARMIES .

The destruction of the enemy's armed of territory, is in itself really a destruc

forces is the means to the end . — What
is meant by this — The price it costs
tion of the enemy's force, and it may
also lead to a still greater destruction,
Different pointsofview which arepossible and therefore, also, be an indirect
in respect to the subject. means .
1 , only to destroy as many as the ob The occupation of an undefended strip
ject of the attack requires. of territory , therefore, in addition to the
2, or as many on the whole as is pos value which it has as a direct fulfilment
sible. of the end , may also reckon as a destruc
3, the sparing of our own forces as the tion of the enemy's force as well. The
principal point of view . ring, so as to draw an enemy
4, this may again be carried so far, manouv
out ofa district of country whichhe has
occupied,issomewhatsimilar, and muste
of the enemy'stowards
that the assailant does nothing
thedestruction force therefor
except when a favourable opportunity offers, e,only be looked atfromthe
which same point of view, and not as a
may rly estima ng: se
tothe objecint theof theattac
mentioned
thesessmean
k,asalready succe
third chapter.
of arms, propeally
s are gener speakited -

The only means of destroying the

more than they are worth — they have
seldom the value of a battle ; besides
this maybe done in twoways disadvaitntageou
rectly, which
: 91,dition spositiontowhichthey
is always to be feared that the
, indirect
2combats h
ly , throug a combina of lead, will be overloo ked ; they arethey
. — If, therefore, the battle is the
chief means , still it is not the only means. ductive through the low pricewhich they
cost.
The capture of a fortress or of a portion
We must always consider means of
•Herefollowsin the MS. this note :-“ Development of this subject after Book 3, in the essay on the
Culminating Point of Victory ."
Under this title , in an envelope endorsed “ Various dissertations asmaterials , " an essay has been found

seventh book .-- EDITRESS' Note .

the
CHAP. VII. ] DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S ARMIES. 7

this description as small investments, Then they are certainly better than bat
from which only small profits are to be tles without a purpose - than victories,
expected ; as means suited only to very the results of which cannot be realised
limited State relations and weak motives. to the full.

CHAPTER VII.

THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE .

What we have said about the defensive dependent upon other things connected
battle throws a strong light upon the with the defence. To be able in turn
offensive also . to operate with success against the
We there had in view that class of flanks of an enemy, whose aim is to
battle in which the defensive appears turn our line, it is necessary to have
most decidedly pronounced , in order that a well chosen and well prepared posi
we mightconvey a more vivid impression tion. But what is much more impor
of its nature ;—but only the fewer number tant is, that all the advantages which
are of that kind ; most battles are demi- the defensive possesses, cannot be made
rencontres in which the defensive character use of ; most defences are poor make
disappears to a great extent. It is shifts ; the greater number of defenders
otherwise with the offensive battle : find themselves in a very harassing and
it preserves its character under all critical position, in which, expecting the
circumstances, and can keep up that worst, they meet the attack half way.
character the more boldly, the
as
The consequence of this is, that battles
defender is out of his proper esse . For formed with enveloping lines, or even
this reason, in the battle which is not with an oblique front, which should pro
purely defensive and in the real rencontres, perly result from an advantageous rela
therealways remains also somethingof tionof the lines of communication, are
the difference of the character of the mmonly the result of a moral and phy
como
battle on the one side and on the other. sical preponderance (Marengo, Auster
The chief distinctive characteristic of the litz , Jena ). Besides, in thefirst battle
offensive battle is the manœuvre to turn fought, the base of the assailant,if not
or surround, therefore, the initiative as superior to that of the defender, is still
well . mostly very wide in extent, on account of
A combat in lines, formed to envelope, the proximity of the frontier ; he can,
has evidently in itselfgreat advantages; therefore,affordto venture a little. The
itis, however, a subject oftactics. The flank-attack, that is,the battlewith ob
attack must not give up these advantages lique front, is moreover generally more
because the defence has a means of coun- efficacious than the enveloping form . It
teracting them ; for the attack itself is an erroneous idea that an enveloping
cannot make use of that means, inas- strategic advance from the very com
much as it is one that is too closely mencement must be connected with it, as
.8 ON WAR . [BOOK VII.

at Prague. (That strategic measure has most cases, as to the position of the
seldom anythings in common with it, and enemy ; it is a complete groping about
is very hazardou ; of which we shall speak amongst things that are unknown (Aus
further in the attack of a theatre of war.) terlitz , Wagram , Hohenlinden , Jena,
As it is an object with the commander Katzbach). " The more this is the case,
so much the more concentration of forces
in the defensive battle to delay the
amodunt,and turning
decision as long as possible ,and gain becomes parerre ing a flank
time, because a defensive battle unde to be pref ound
to surr . That
cided atsunset is commonly one gained : the principal fruits of victory are first
therefore the commander, in theoffensive gathered in the pursuit ,wehave already
battle , requires to hasten the decision ; learnt in the twelfth chapter of the 4th
but, on the other hand,there is a great Book. According to the nature ofthe
risk intoomuch haste , because it leads thing, thepursuit is more an integral
ity in part of the whole action in the offensive
to a waste ofe forces. One peculiarnty
the offensiv battle is the uncertai e
, in than in the defensiv battle.

CHAPTER VIII .

PASSAGE OF RIVERS.

1. A LARGE river which crosses the even if it fails, still a stand can be
direction of the attack is always very in made near the river, then the assailant
convenient for the assailant : for when in his calculations must add to the re
he has crossed it he is generally limited sistance which hemayexperience in the
to one point of passage, and, therefore, defence of the river, all the advantages
unless he remains close to the river he mentioned in No. 1, as being onthe side
becomes very much hampered in his of the defender of a river, and the effect
movements . Whether he meditatesof the two together is, that we usually
bringing on a decisive battle after cros see generals show great respect to a
sing, or may expect the enemy to attack river before they attack it if it is de
him, he exposes himself to great danger ; fended .
therefore , without a decided superiority, 3. But in the preceding book we have
both in moral and physical force, a seen, that under certain conditions, the
general will not place himself in such a real defence of ariver promises right
position .
2.From this mere disadvantage of frience,we must allow that such results
muchoftenercapableof defence than it than theory promises, because inthe
would otherwise be. If we suppose that we only calculate with real circumstances
this defence is not considered the only as wefind them take place,while inthe
means ofsafety,butissoplanned that execution, thingscommouly appear to
CHAP . VIII.
.] PASSAGE OF RITERS.

the assailant much more difficult than in numbers and bent upon serious blows,
they really are , and they become there. has the means of making a demonstra
fore a greater clog on his action . tion at one point and passing at another,
Suppose, for instance, an attack which and then by superior numbers, and ad
is not intended to end in a great solution , vancing , regardless of all opposition , he
and which is not conducted with thorough can repair any disadvantageous relations
energy, we may be sure that in carrying in which he may have been placed by
it out a number of little obstacles and the issue of the first encounters : for his
accidents, which no theory could calculate general superiority will enable him to
upon, will start up to the disadvantage do so. It very rarely happens that the
of the assailant, because he is the acting passage of a river is actually tactically
party, and must, therefore, come first forced by overpowering the enemy's
into collision with such impediments. principal post by the effect of superior
Let us just think for a moment how often fire and greater valour on the part of
some of the insignificant rivers of Lom- the troops, and the expression, forcing a
bardy have been successfully defended !- passage is only to be taken in a strategic
If, on the other hand, cases may also be sense , in so far that the assailant by
found in military history, in which the his passage at an undefended or only
defence of rivers has failed to realise slightly defended point within the line
what was expected of them , that lies in of defence, braves all the dangers which ,
the extravagant results sometimes looked in the defender's view, should result to
for from this means ; results not founded
him through the crossing.–But the worst
in any kind of way on its tactical nature,
which an assailant can do, is to attempt
but merely on its well-known efficacy , to
a real passage at several points, unless
which people have thought there were no they lie close to each other and admit of
bounds. all the troops joining in the combat ; for
4. It is only when the defender com- as the defender must necessarily have
mits the mistake of placing his entire his forces separated, therefore, if the as
nce on sailant fractions his in like manner, he
depende
that in case it the
is forced a river, so
defenceheofbecomes in- throws away his natural advantage. In
volved in great difficulty, in a kind of that way Bellegarde lost the battle on
catastrophe, it is only then that the de- the Mincio, 1814, where by chance both
fence of a river can be looked upon as a armies passed at different points at the
form of defence favourable to the attack , same time, and the Austrians were more
divided than the French.
for itofis acertainl
sage y easier
river than to force
to gain the pasy
an ordinar 7. If the defender remains on this side
battle . of the river, it necessarily follows that
5. It follows of itself from what has there are two ways to gain a strategic
just been said that the defence of a river advantage over him : either to pass at
may become of great value if no great some point, regardless ofhis position, and
solution is desired, but where that is to be so to outbid him in the same means , or
to give battle. In the first case, the rela
expected, either from the superior num tions of the base and lines of communi
bers or energy of used
means, if wrongly the ,enemy, thento this
may turn the cations should chiefly decide, but it often
positive advantage of the assailant. happens that special circumstances exer
6. There are very few river-lines of cise more influence than general rela
defence which cannot be turned either tions ; he who can choose the best posi
on the whole length or at some particular tions, who knows best how to make his
point. Therefore the assailant,superior dispositions, who is better obeyed, whose
10 ON VAR. [ BOOK VII.
army marches fastest, etc., may contend two armies remain any length of time
with advantage
stances. As regards second circum-
againstthegeneral confronting
means , of a river.
one anotheron different sides
it presupposes on the part of the assail But also in cases of a great solution,
ant the means, suitable relations, and the a river is an important object; it always
determination to fight ; but when these weakens and deranges the offensive; and
conditions may be presupposed, the de- the most fortunate thing, in this case is,
fender will not readily venture upon this if the defender is induced through that
mode of defending a river. to look upon the river as a tactical barrier,
8. As a final result, we must therefore and to make the particular defence of
give as our opinion that, although the that barrier the principal act of his re.
passage of a river in itself rarely presents sistance,so that the assailant at once ob
great difficulties, yet in all cases not im- tains ge
the advanta of being able to
inediately connected with a great deci. strike a decisive blow in a very easy
sion, so many apprehensions of the con- manner. — Certainly, in the first instance,
this blow will never amount to a com
bound up with it,that atallevents the pletedefeatofthe enemy,butitwill
progress of the assailant may easily be consist of several advantageous combats,
so far arrested that he either leaves the
and these bring about a state of general
defender on this side the river, or relations very adverse to the enemy, as
he passes,
to the river. and
For itthen remains
rarely happens close happened
that Rhine to the Austrians on the Lower
, 1796.

CHAPTER IX .

ATTACK OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

In thebook onthe defence, it has been position, it would be an error to makin

sufficiently explained how far defensive
positions can compel the assailanteither object, then it is a question whetherhe
Onlythosewhichcaneffectthisaresub: position by threatening histank,
servient to our object, and suited to wear only if such means are ineffe thatis&
ctual, that
out or neutralise the forces of the commander determines on the attack of
aggres
sor, either wholly or in part, andin so a good position , and then an attack di
far the attack can do nothing against
such positions , that is to say , there are rected against oneside,always in general
presents theless difficulty ; but thechoice
no means at its disposal by which to of the side must depend onthe position
counter - balance this advantage. But de n
and directio of the mutual lines of re
fensive positions are not all really of this treat, consequently, on the threatening
kind . If the assailant sees he can pur
sue his object without attacking such a the enemy's retreat, and covering our
own . Between these two objects a com
CHAP. IX.] ATTACK OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. 11

petition may arise, in which case the aguerried ) ; but upon the whole, the dan
first is entitled to the preference, as it is ger is small, and it vanishes altogether,
of an offensive nature ; therefore homo- opposed to the infinite number of cases
geneous with the attack, whilst the other in which we have seen the most resolute
is of a defensive character. But it is commanders make their bow before such
certain, and may be regarded as a truth positions. ( Torres Vedras.)
of the first importance, that to attack an We must not, however, confuse the sub
enemy thoroughly inured to war, in a good ject now before us with ordinary battles.
position, is a critical thing. No doubt Most battles are real wrencontres," in
instances are not wanting of such battles, which one party certainly occupies a
and of successful ones too,as Torgau, position, but one which has not been
Wagram (we do not say Dresden, because prepared.
we cannot call the enemy there quite

CHAPTER X.

ATTACK OF AN ENTRENCHED CAMP .

It was for a time the fashion to speak of entrenchments generally, if not to

with contempt of entrenchments and strengthen the defence ? No, not only
their utility. The cordon lines of the reason but experience, in hundreds and
French frontier, which had been often thousands of instances, show that a well
burst through ; the entrenched camp at traced, sufficiently manned, and well de
Breslau in which the Duke of Bevern fended entrenchment is, as a rule, to be
was defeated , the battle of Torgau, and looked upon as an impregnable point, and
several other cases, led to this opinion of is also so regarded by the attack. Start
their value ; and the victories of Freder- ing from this point of the efficiency of a
ick the Great, gained by the principle of single entrenchment, we argue that there
movement and the use of the offensive, can be no doubt as to the attack of an
threw a fresh light on all kind of defen- entrenched camp being a most difficult
sive action, allfighting in a fixed posi- undertaking, andone in which generally
tion , particularly in intrenchments, and it will be impossible for the assailant to
brought them still more into contempt. succeed .
It is consistent with the nature of an
Certainly,
to when amiles
defend several few thousand men and
of country, are entrenched camp that it should be weakly
when entrenchments are nothing more garrisoned ; but with good, natural ob
than ditches reversed, they are worth stacles of ground and strong field works,
nothing, and they constitute a dangerous it is possible to bid defiance to superior
snare through the confidence which is numbers. Frederick the Great considered
placed in them. But is it not inconsis- the attack of the camp of Pirna as im
tent, or rather nonsensical,to extend this practicable, although he had at his com
view even to the idea of field fortification, mand double the force of the garrison ;
ina mere swaggering spirit (as Temple- andalthough it hasbeen since asserted,
hof does) ? What would be the object here and there, that it was quite possible
12 ON WAR. [BOOK VII,

to have taken it ; the only proof in favour category of quite exceptional means on
of this assertion is founded on the bad the part of the offensive. It is only if
condition of the Caxon troops ; an argu. the entrenchments have been thrown up
ment which does not at all detract in any in haste are not completed, still less
But itfrom
way the value of. entrenchments. strengthed by obstaclesto prevent their
is a question, whether those who being approached, or when, as is often
have since contended not only for the the case taken altogether, the whole
camp is only an outline of what it was
feasibility
attack , woubut
ld also
have for
madthe
e upfacility
their of
minthe
ds intended to be, a half - finished ruin, that
to execute it fore
at the time . then an attack on it may be advisable,
We, there , think that the attack and at the same time become the road
of an entrenched camp belongs to the to gain an easy conquest over the enemy.

CHAPTER XI .

ATTACK OF A MOUNTAIN .

From the fifth and following chapters of mountains, and certainly find his account
the sixth
ciently the book, mayrelations
strategic be deduced suffi.
of a moun- so doing
in But we must here once more repeat
tain generally, both as regards the de-that it will be difficult to obtain respect
fence and the attack . for this conclusion, because it runs coun.
We have also
es
there endeavoured to explain the part ter to appearanc , and is also, at first
which a mountain plays as a lineof sight , contrary to the experience cases
It has been observed , in mostofwar.
defence, properly so called , and from
that naturally follows how'it is to be hit herto, that an army pressing forward
looked upon in this signification from to k er ng
the attac (wheth seeki a great
the sideofthe assailant .Thereremains, general action or not), has consideredtheit
therefore, little for us to say here on this an unusual piece of good fortune if ing
important subject. Our chief result was enemy has not occupied the interven
there that the defence must choose as his mountains , and has itself then hastened
point of view a secondary combat, or the to be beforehand in the occupation of
entirely different one of agreat general them. No one willfindthisforestalling
action ; that in the first case the attack of the enemy in any way inconsistent
of a mountain can only be regarded as a with the interests of the assailant; in our
necessary evil, because all the circum view this is also quite admissible, only
stances are unfavourable to it ; but in we must point out clearly a fine distinc
the second case the advantages are on tion herebetween circumstances.
the side of the attack . An army advancing against the enemy,
An attack , therefore, armed with the with the design of bringing him to a
means and the resolution for a battle , general action ,if ithasto pass over fun
will give the enemyameeting in the unoccupied range of mountain, has natu
 ATTACK OF A MOUNTAIN . 13
CHAP. XI.]
rally to apprehend that the enemy may, quite unassailable from the mountainous
at the last moment , block up those very character of the ground : there are such
passes which it proposes to use on positions which are not, onthat account,
its march : in such a case, the assailant in the mountains ( Pirna, Schmotseifen ,
will by no means have the same advan- Meissen, Feldkirch ), and it is just be
tages as if the enemy occupied merely an cause they are not in the mountains , that
ordinary mountain position. The latter they are so well suited for defence. Иө
is, for instance, not then in a position may also very well conceive that positions
extended beyond measure, nor is he in may be found in mountains themselves
uncertainty as to the road which the where the defender might avoid the ordi
assailant will take ; the assailant has not nary disadvantages ofmountain-positions,
been able to choose his road with refer . as, for instance, on lofty plateaux ; but
ence to the enemy's position , and there- they are not common , and we can only
fore this battle in the mountains is not take into our view the generality of
cases .
then unite d with all those advantages on
his side of which we have spoken in the It is just in military history that we
sixth book r; under such circumstan ces see how little mountain -positions are
the defende might be found in an im-, suited to decisive defensive battles, for
pregnable position . — According to this, great generals have always preferred a
the defender might even have means at position in the plains, when it was their
his command of making advantageous object to fight a battle of the first order ;
use of the mountains for a great battle.- aud throughout the whole range of mili
This is, at any rate, possible ; but if we tary history , there are no examples of
reflect on
fender would difficult
thehave ies whichinthe
to encounter de decisive battles in the mountains, except
estab . in the Revolutionary Wars, and even
lishing himself in a strong position in there it was plainly a false application
the mountains just at the last moment, and analogy which led to the use of
particularly if he has left it entirely un- mountain -positions, where of necessity a
occupied before, we may put down this decisive battle had to be fought ( 1793 and
meansof defence as one upon which no 1794 in the Vosges, and 1795, 1796, and
dependence can be placed, and therefore 1797 in Italy ) . Melas has been gene
as one , the probability of which the assail- rally blamed for not having occupied the
ant has little reason to dread. But even Alpine passes in 1800 ; but such criticisms
if it is a very improbable case, yet still it are nothing more than " early notions
is natural to fear it ; for in war, many a -we might say - childlike judgments
thing is very natural, and yet in a certain founded on appearances. Buonaparte,
measure superfluous. in Mela's place, would just as little have
But another measure which the as- thought of occupying the passes.
The dispositions for the attack ofmoun
sailant
liminaryhasdefence of thendmountai
to apprehe here is,
ns abypre
an tain -positions are mostly of a tactical
advanced guard or chain of outposts. nature ; but we think it necessary to in
Thismeans, also, will seldom accord with sert here the following remarks as to the
the interests of the defender ; but the general outline, consequently as to those
assailant has not the means ofdiscerning parts which come into immediate contact
how far it may be beneficial to the de- with, and are coincident with, strategy.
fender or otherwise, and therefore he has 1. As we cannot move wide of the roads
only to provide against the worst. in mountains as we can in other districts,
and form two or three columns out of one,
Further, our view
clude s the possibility ofbya no means
positi ex when the exigency of themoment re
on being
14 ON WAR . [BOOK VII.
quires that the mass of the troops should of the scheme of attack, as the front
be divided ; but, on the contrary, we attacks fall upon the mass of the de
are generally confined to long defiles ; fender's forces; but the turning move.
the advance in mountains mustgenerally ments again must be made more witha
be made on several roads, or rather upon view to cutting off the enemy's retreat,
a somewhat broader front. than as a tactical rolling up of theflank or
2. Against a mountain line of defence attack on the rear ; for mountain positions
of wide extent, the attack must naturally are capable of a prolonged resistance
be made with concentrated forces ; to even in rear if forc are not
es wanting,
and the quic kest resu lt is inva riab ly to
surreound
ther , andthe whol
if an
e rtanot
impocann t resu lt isght
be thou of be expected only from the enemy's appre
to be
gained from victory, it must be obtained hension of losing his line of retreat ;
rather by bursting through the enemy's thissort eof unearful siness arises sooner, and
acts mor powe ly in mountains, be
line, and separating the wings , than by cause , when it comes to the worst, is
surrounding the force, and so cutting it not so easy to make room sword in hand.
off. A rapid, continuous advance upon A mere demonstration is no sufficient
the enemy's principal line of retreat is means here ; it might certainly man
there the natural endeavour of the as .
sailant .
ouvre the enemy out of his position , but
3 But if the enemy to be attacked oc. woul d not ensure any special result ; the
aim must therefore be to cut him off, in
cupies a position somewhat concentrated ,
turning movements are an essential part reality, from his line of retreat.

CHAPTER XII .

ATTACK OF CORDON LINES.

IF a supreme decision should lie in respect, that is, ifthey are occupied by the
their defence and their attack , they place main body of an army ; for instance ,those
the assailant in an advantageous situa of Stollhofen, held by Louis of Baden
tion, for their wide extent is still more in in the year 1703, were respected even
opp osition to all the requirements of a by Villars. But if they are only held by
decisive battle than the direct defence of a a secondary force, then it is merely a
river or a mountain range . Eugene's lines question of the strength of the corps
of Denain , 1712, are an illustration to
which we canspare for their attack . The
resistan
the point here,fortheir losswasquite but ce insam
at the such cases the
e time resulom
is seld grenthete
t of
equal to a complete defeat, but Viſlars
a victory
d hardly have gained suchated
woulnst tory circ
vicThe issel dom wor
umvallat ionthlines
muchof. a besieger
agai Eugene in a concentr po
sition , If the offensive side does not have a peculiar character, of which we
possess the means required for a decisive shall speak inthe chapter on the attack
battle, then even lines are treated with of a theatre of war .
CHAP . XIII . ] MANEUVRING . 15

All positions of the cordon kind, as,
for instance, entrenched lines of outposts,
etc., etc. , have always this property, that
they can be easily broken through ; but
when they are not forced with a view of
going further and bringing on a decision,
there is so little to be gained in general
by the attack , that it hardly repays the
trouble expended.

CHAPTER XIII .

MANEUVRING.

1. We have already touched upon this (a .) The subsistence from which it is

subject in the thirtieth chapterof the sixth our object to cut off the enemy, or to
book. It is one which concerns the de- impede hisobtaining.
fence and the attack in common ; never : ( 6.) The junction with other corps.
theless it has always in it something (c ) The threatening other communi
more of the nature of the offensive than cations with the interior of the country,
the defensive. We shall therefore now or with other armies or corps.
examine it more thoroughly . (d. ) Threatening the retreat.
2. Mancuvring is not only the opposite (e. ) Attack of isolated points with su
of execu ting the offensive by force, by perior forces .
means of great battles ; it stands also These five interests may establish
opposed to every such execution of the themselves in the smallest features of
offensive as proceeds directly from offen- detail belonging to any particular situa
sive means, let it be either an beration tion ; and any such object then becomes,
against the enemy's communications , or on that account, a point round which
line of retreat , a diversion , etc. , etc. everything for a time revolves . A bridge ,
3. If we adhere to the ordinary use of a road , or an entrenchment, often thus
the word, there is in the conception of plays the principal part. It is easy to
manæuvring an effect which is first pro- show in each case that it is only the rela
duced, to a certain extent, from nothing, tion which any such object has to one of
that is, from a state of rest or equilibrium the above interests which gives it impor
through the mistakes into which the tance .
enemy is enticed . It is like the first ( f.) The result of a successful man
moves in a game of chess. It is, there- cuvre, then, is for the offensive, or
fore, a game of evenlybalanced powers, rather for the active party (which may
to obtain results from favourable oppor- certainly be just as well the defensive ),
tunity, and then to use these as an ad- a piece of land , a magazine, etc.
vantage enemy. ( 9. ) In a strategic maneuvre two con
4. Butover theinterest
those s which, partly as verse propositions appear, which look
the final object, partly asthe
supports ( pivot) of action, principal like different for the res
must be con- times served manœuv , and have some
derivation of false
maxims and rules, and have four
sidered in this matter, are chiefly :
16 ON VAR . [BOOK VII.

branches, which are, however, in reality, and Montecuculis against Turenne in

all necessary constituents of the same 1673 , 1675 , have always been reckoned
thing, and are to be regarded as such . the most scientific combinations of this
The first antithesis is the surrounding kind, and fromthem we have chiefly de
the enemy, and the operating on interior rived our view.
lines ; the second is the concentration of (k. ) Just as the four partsofthetwo anti
forces, and their extension over several thesesabove supposed must not be abused
posts. by being made the foundation of false
(h .) As regards the first antithesis ,we maxims and rules , so we must also give
certainly cannot say that one of its mem àgener caution against attaching to other
bers deserves a general preference over etc. , an al relations , such as base, ground,
the other ; for partly it is natural that importance and a decisive influ
action of one kind calls forth the other ence which they do not in reality possess.
as its natural counterpoise, its true The smaller the interests at stake, so
remedy ; partly the enveloping form is much the more important the details of
homogeneous to the attack , but the use time and place become, so much the more
of interior lines to the defence ; and that which is general and great falls into
therefore, in most cases, the first is more the background, having , in a certain
suitable to the offensive side, the latter measure no place in small calculations.
to the defensive. That form will gain e
there to
aIs mor rd foun
absube
d
situatio
ed
n thangener
, view ally
that of;
the upper hand which is used with the
greatest skill . Turenne in 1675, when he stood with his
( i.) The branches of the other antithe- back close to the Rhine , his armyalong
sis can just as little be classed the one a line of three miles in extent , and with
above the other . The stronger force has his bridge of retreat at the extremity of
the choice of extending itself over several his right wing ? But his measures ans
posts ; by that means he will obtain for wered their object, and it is not without
himself a convenient strategic situation , reason that they are acknowledged to
and liberty of action in many respects , show a high degree of skill and intelli
and spare the physical powers of his gence . We can only understand this
result and this skill when we look more
troops. The weaker, on the other hand,
must keep himself moreconcentrated,and closely into details, andjudge of them
seek byrapidity of movement to counteract according to the valuewhichthey must
the disadvantage of his inferior numbers. have had in this particular case.
This greater mobility supposes greater We are convinced that there are no
readiness in marching. Theweaker must rules of any kind for strategic manoon :
physihcalweandmust
whic moralnatur
forces,—afinalresult
ally come upon ciplecandetermine the ymode
but that superior energ of ion
, precis action;
, or
everywhere if we would always be con der, obedience, intrepidity in the most
siste nt,and which, as theforelogi
to a certain extent, there cal testrd
, werega of, find
al and
specimean obtaingn for
s totrifli circuthems ces sig.
mstanelves may
the reasoning. The campaigns of Frede nal advantages, and that, therefore,
rick theGreat against Daun,intheyears chiefy on those qualities will depend the
1759 and 1760, and against Laudon , 1761 , victory in this sort of contest .
 CHAP . XIV.] ATTACK OF NORASSES, INUNDATIONS, IVOODS. 17

CHAPTER XIV.

ATTACK OF MORASSES, INUNDATIONS, WOODS,

MORASSES, that is, impassable swamps, yet nothing is more certain than that the
which are only traversed by a few success of the campaign, that is, the
embankments, present peculiar difficul- advance through the last line of in
ties to the tactical attack , as we have undation up to the walls of Amsterdam
stated in treating of the defence . Their depended on a point of such extreme
breadth hardly ever admits of the nicety that it is impossible to draw any
enemy being driven from the opposite general deduction from this case. The
bank byartillery, and of the construction point alluded to was the leaving un
of a roadway across. The strategic con- guarded the Sea of Haarlem . By means
sequence is that endeavours are made to of this, the Duke turned the inundation
avoid attacking them by passing round line, and got in rear of the post of
them . Where the state of culture, as in Amselvoen . If the Dutch had had a
many low countries, is so great that the couple of armed vessels on this lake
means of passing are innumerable, the the duke would never have got to
resistance of the defender is still strong Amsterdam, for he was “ au bout de son
enough relatively, but it is proportion- latin .” What influence that might have
ably weakened for an absolute deci- had on the conclusion of peace does not
sion, and, therefore, wholly unsuitable concern us here, but it is certain that
for it. On the other hand, if the low any further question of carrying the
land (as in Holland) is aided by in- last line of inundation would have been
undations, the resistance may become put an end to completely.
absolute, and defy every attack. This The winter is, no doubt, the natural
was shown in Holland in the year 1672, enemy of this means of defence, as the
when, after the conquest and occupation French have shown in 1794 and 1795,
of all the fortressesoutside themargin but itmust be a severe winter.
of the inundation, 50,000 French troops Woods, which are scarcely passable,
became available, who, -first under we have also included amongst the
Condé and then under Luxemburg , — means which afford the defence power
were unable to force the line of inunda- ful assistance. If they are of no great
tion, although it was only defended by depth then the assailant may force his
about 20,000 men. The campaign of the way through by several roads running
Prussians, in 1787, under the Duke of near one another, and thus reach better
Brunswick, against the Dutch, ended, it ground, for no one point canhave any
is true, in a quite contrary way, as these great tactical strength, as we can never
lines were then carried by a force very suppose a wood as absolutely impass
little superior to the defenders, and with able as a river or a morass. But when ,
trifling loss; but the reason of that is to as in Russia and Poland , a very large
be found in the dissensions amongst the tract of country is nearly everywhere
defenders from political animosities, and covered with wood, and the assailant
a want of unity in the command, and has not the power of getting beyond
VOL . III, C
 ON WAR.
[ BOOK VII.
18
it, then , certainly, his situation becomes forest to make his ubiquitous adver
sary feel his superiority in numbers.
very embarrassing. We have only to Certainly this is one of the worst
think
tend witofh the
to sub sistulties
diffic he y must
his arm con situations in which the offensive can be
, and how
little he can do in the depths of the placed .

CHAPTER XV .

ATTACK OF A THEATRE OF WAR WITH THE VIEW TO A DECISION .

Most of the subjects have been already sudden attack and surprise, which, inthe
touched upon in the sixth book, andby attack, are generally assumed to be fer
their mere reflection ,throwsufficient tilelitsources
y of victory,and which yet,in
er occur except under special
rea , nev
light on the attack . en- . circumstances. The nature of the real
of an
cloMoreover, ofwaconception
sed theatrethe r,has a nea strate
rer rela : of giesurprisew, e the
elsewhere . If,
have already spoken
n , the attack is
e
tion to the defenc than to the attack .
attany
Ma ck , of
the the points the oryobjectof
g on of, vict
leaofdinacti inferior in physical power, it musthave
, etc. , theascendancy in moral power r
advantage, sinordech
sphere
to ma ke up for the dis whi
have been already treated of in that book , are inherent in the offensive form ; if the
and that which is most decisive and superiority in that way is also wanting,
essential on the nature of the attack , can then there are no good grounds for the
not be made to appear until we get to attack , and it will not succeed .
the plan of war : still there remains a 2. As prudence is the real genius of
good deal to say here , and we shall the defender, so boldness and self -confi
again commence with the campaign , in dence must animate the assailant. We
which a great decision is positively intended . do not mean that the opposite qualities
e first aim of the attack is a vic
tor1.y . ThTo all the advantages which the in each case niay be altogether wanting,
tion ,the assailant can only oppose supe greatest affinitothe
ty attack and defenfin
qualitiesareonlyin
riornumbers;and, perhaps, in addition, respectively.These because actionin waris
theslight advantagewhich thefeeling of realitytnecessary
being
gives anthearmy.
offensive
Theandimportanceof side
advancing this
activitywhichiscarried on if not in the
feeling,however, is generally overrated; dark,atallevents in a feeble
which we must trust twilight
ourselve in
s to ,the
for it does not last long, and will not
Of leader who isbestsuited to carry out the
hold out against real difficulties. aim we have in view . The weaker the
course, we assume that the defender is as defender shows himself morally, the
faultless and judicious in all he does as bolder the assailant should become.
the aggressor. Our object in this obser 3. For victory, it is necessary that
vation is to set aside those vague ideas of
 CHAP. xv. ] ATTACK OF A THEATRE OF WAR, ETC. 19

there should be a battle between the the assailant, the latter would be wrong
enemy's principal force and our own. in marching direct upon the capital, he
This is less doubtful as regards the at- would do much better by taking his di
tack than in regard to the defence, for rection upon the line connecting the
the assailant goes in search of the de- defender's army with the capital, and
fender in his position . But we have seeking there the victory which shall
maintained (in treating of the defensive) place the capital in his hands.
that the offensive should not seek the If there is no great object within the
defender out if he has placed himself in assailant's sphere of victory, then the
a false position , because he may be sure enemy's line of communication with the
that the defender will seek him out, and nearest great object to him is the point
then he will have the advantage of fight- of paramount importance. The question,
ing where the defender has not pre- then, for every assailant to ask himself is,
pared the ground. Here all depends If I am successful in the battle, what is
on the road and direction which have the the first use I shall make of the victory ?
greatest importance ; this is a point The object to be gained, as indicated
which was not examined in the defence, by the answer to this question , shows the
being reserved for the present chapter. natural direction for his blow . If the
We shall, therefore, say what is necessary defender has placed himself in that di
about it here .
rection , he has done right, and there is
4. We have already pointed out those nothing to do but to go and look for him
objects to which the attack should be there. If his position is too strong, then
more immediately directed, and which , the assailant must seek to turn it, that is,
necessity. But if the
therefore, are the ends to be obtained by make a virtue of placed
victory ; now, if these are within the defender has not himself on this
theatre of war which is attacked, and right spot, then the assailant chooses
within the probable sphere of victory, that direction, and as soon as he comes
then the road to them is the natural di- in line with the defender, if the latter
rection of the blow to be struck. But has not in the mean time made a lateral
we must not forget that the object of the movement, and placed himself across his
attack doesuntil
nification notvictory
generallyobtain its sig- path, he should turn himself in the direc
has been gained, tion of the defender's line of communica
and therefore the mind must always em tion in order to seek an action there ;
brace the idea of victory with it; the if the defender remains quite station
principal consideration for the assailant ary, then the assailant must wheel round
is, therefore, not so much merely to reach towards him and attack him in rear.
the object as to reach it a conqueror ; Of all the roads amongst which the
therefore the direction of his blow should assailant has a choice, the great roads
be not so much on the object itself as on which serve the commerce of the country
the way which the enemy's army must are always the best and the most natural
take toreach it. This way is the imme to choose. To avoid any very great
diate object of the attack. To fall in bends, more direct roads, even if smaller,
with the enemy before he has reached must be chosen , fora line of retreat
this object, to cuthim off from it,and which deviatesmuch from a directline is
in that position to beat him — to do always perilous.
this is to gain an intensified victory. 5. The assailant, when he sets out with
- If,for example, the enemy's capital is a view to a great decision, has seldom any
the object of the attack, and the defender reason for dividing his forces, and if, not
has not placed himselfbetweenitand withstanding this, he does so, it generally
20 ON AR .
[ BOOK VII.

proceeds from a want of clear views. for this duty, and therefore a partition of
He should therefore only advance with rall forces is required, this cannot but natu
y weaken the force of the blow itself.
his columns on such a width of front as
will admit of their all coming into action -Asa - large army is always in the habit
together. If the enemy himself has of advancing with a front of aday's
divided his forces, so much the better march at least in breadth, therefore
, if
ation
the lines of retreat and communic
for the assailant, andto preserve this do not deviate much from the perpen
further advantage small demonstrations
s covering
dicular,casethe
should bemadeagainst the enemy'scorps most ofthose lines is in
attained by the front of the
which have separated from the main
body ; these are the strategic fausses army. gers of this description, to which
attaques ; a detachment of forces for this theDanassailant is exposed ,must be mea.
purpose would then be justifiable. sur ed chiefly by the situation and cha
on
Such separati into several columns as
is indispens abl y necessary must be made ract er of the adversary. When every
use of for the disposition of the tactical thi ng
inent undt erdeci
liesgrea thesionpres sure ofin
attack in the enveloping form , for that imm , there is little
m for the defender to engage in
form is natural to the attack , and must roo
not be disregarded without good reason . undertakings of this description; the
But it must be only of a tactical nature, t has, therefore , in ordinary cir
assailannce
cumsta s not much to fear. But if the
for a strategic envelopment when a
great blow takes place ,isa complete isadvgra eisllyovepasr ,ifthe
ancdua t ensiveelf
o theilandefhims
sing intassa
waste of power . It can only be ex ,
cused when the assailant is so strong that then the covering of the rear becomes
there can be no doubt at all about the every moment more necessary, becomes
result . more
a thing of the first importance.
6. But the attack requires also pru Forallthe rear of the assailant being na
y weaker than that of the defender,
dence , for the assailant has also a rear, tur
and has communications which must be therefore the latter, long before he passes
protected. This service of protection over to the real ' offensive, and even
must be performed as far as possible at und the same time that he is yielding
by the manner in which the army ad gro , may have commenced to ope
vances , that is, eo ipso by the army itself. rate against the communica
tions of the
ce
If a for mus be t spec iall y det ail ed ant
assail .

CHAPTER XVI.

ATTACK OF A THEATRE OF WAR WITHOUT THE VIEW TO A GREAT

DECISION .
1. ALTHOUGH there is neither the will nor strategic attack, but it is directed againstk
the power sufficient for a great decision, some secondary object. If the attac
there may still exist a decided view in a succeeds, then , with the attainment of
CHAP . XVI.] ATTACK OF A THEATRE OF WAR, ETC. 21

this object the whole falls again into a made the siege of fortresses the subject
state of rest and equilibrium . If difficul- of a separate chapter, to which we refer
ties to a certain extent present themselves, our readers. Forthe reasons there ex
the general progress of the attack comes plained, it is easy to conceive how it is
to a standstiĩl before the object is gained. that fortresses always constitute the best
Then in its place commences a mere and most desirable objects in those offen
occasional offensive or strategic ma- sive wars and campaigns in which views
nouvring . This is the character of cannot be directed to the complete over
most campaigns. throw of the enemyor the conquest of an
2. The objects which may be the aim important part of his territory. We may
of an offensive of this description are : also easily understand how it is that in
( a .) A strip of territory ; gain in means the wars in the Low Countries, where for
of subsistence, perhaps contributions, tresses are so abundant, everything has
sparing our own territory, equivalents in always turned on the possession of one
negotiations for peace - such are the ad- or other of these fortresses, so much so,
vantages to be derived from this procedure. that the successive conquests of whole
Sometimes an idea of the credit of the provinces never once appear as leading
army is attached to it, as was perpetually features ; while, on the other hand, each
the case in the wars of the French Mar- of these strongplaces used to be regarded
shals in the time of Louis XIV. It as separate thing, which had an intrin
makes a very important difference whe- sic value in itself, and more attention
ther a portion of territory can be kept or was paid to the convenience and facility
not. In general, thefirstis the caseonly with which it could be attacked than to
when the territory is on the edge of our the value of the place itself.
own theatre of war, and forms a natural At the same time, the attack of a place
complement of it. Only such portions of some importance is always a great
comeinto consideration as an equivalent undertaking, because itin causes a very
negotiating
in and, wars in which
a peace, others areusually large expenditure;
only taken possession of for the duration the whole is not staked at once on the
of a campaign, and to be evacuated when game, this is a matter which ought to
winter begins. be very much considered . Therefore ,
(6. ) One of the enemy's principal magasuch a siege takes its place here as one
zines. If it is not one of considerable of the most important objects of a
importance, it can hardly be looked upon strategic attack . The more unimportant
as the object of an offensive determining a place is, or the less earnestness there
a whole campaign. It certainly in itself is about the siege, the smaller the
is a loss to the defender, and a gain to preparations for it, the more it is done
the assailant; the great advantage, how- as a thing en passant, so much the
ever, from it for the latter, is that the smaller also will be the strategic object,
loss may compel the defender to retire a and the more it will be a service fit for
little and giveupa strip of territory small forces and limited views;and the
which he would otherwise have kept. wholething then often sinks into a kind
The capture of a magazine is therefore of ham fight, in order to close the
in reality more a means, and is only campaign with honour, because as assail
spoken of here as an object, because, ant it is incumbent to do something.
until captured , it becomes, for the time
(d. ) A successful combat, encounter, or
being, the immediate definite aim of even battle, for the sake of trophies, or
action . merely for the honour of the arms, some
(c.) The capture of a fortress. We have times even for themere ambition of the
 [ BOOK 17.
ON WAR .
22
commanders. That this does happen no the threatening of weak allies, etc., etc.
one can doubt, unless he knows nothing Should the attack effectually interrupt
at all of military history. In the cam- the communications , and in such a
manner that the defender cannot re
paigns
Lou of Vthe
is XI . , French
the mosduring the off
t of the reign of
ensive establish them but at a great sacrifice, it
battles were of this kind . But what is compels thedefender to take up another
e
of more importanc for us is to observe position more to the rear or to a flank to
that these things are not without object- cover the objects, at the same time giving
up objects of secondary importance.
ive ofuevan, ity
timeval the;y the
arey hav
notethe mer
a ver y edistpas
inct Thu s å stri
a magazi
p ofa for
ne or ritssoryuncisoveleft
tertre redope n
: the;
inf it nce
as lue wereon dir
peaectce,toand
thethe
objref
ectore Thed
. lea one exposed to be overrun, the other to
military fame, the moral superiority of be invested . Outof this, combats greater
or less may arise , but in such case they
the army and of the general, are things, are not sought for and treated as an
gh
the ernce
nevlue
seen ,inf of towhi
ceases bea uponhou
chr, alt
the whoun
obj ect of the war but as a necessary
le
evil, and can never exceed a certain
action in war . degree of greatnessn and importance.
The aim of such a combat of course 4. The operatio of the defensive on
adesup
pre te espro; spe(act) ofthavic
quapos they,re (B)is
t tor an
that the communications of the offensive, is
a kind of reaction which in wars waged
ke depen
therte onis theiss
den .— heavh ya bat
not a ueverySuc statle
fought placethe
for great solution, can only take
when the lines of operation are
in straitened relations , and with a limited very long ; on the other hand , this kind
object, must naturally not be confounded of reaction lies more in accordance with
pro h abl
witfit
accyounwhi
e tor
a vic t ch
mereislynotfrom nedratol
turmo thenaturede ofthings inwa
not aim at the gre solu . The at
rs which are
tion
weaknessh.
3. Wit sthe exception of the last of enemy's lines of communication are
these object (d) they may all be attained seldom very long in such a case ; but
without a combat of importance ,and then,neither is it here so much a quesa
generally they are so obtained by the tion of inflicting great losses of this
offensive. Now ,themeans which the description ontħe enemy, amere,imo
assailant has at command without re
sor battle, are derived subsistence often produces an effect, and
ting to a decisive
fromtheinterests whichthedefensive whatthe lines wantin length is made
up for me ree in so length of
deg by the
has to protect in his theatre of war ; be expended in this
his lines of communications,ateithet kinreasdonof contes
, the covetwiring
th the
his en emyegic
strat flankss
: forthi
through objects connected with subsist
ence, as magazines,fertile provinces, the
water communications, etc., orimportant assailan.t If, therefore,a contestace
or also bridges,defiles,and
points( such inlike,
by placing other corps the rivalry)of this description
between theassailant takesplace
and defender,then
the assailant must seek to compensate
occupation of strong positions situated
inconveniently near to him and from by numbers his
If heforret ainsnaturaldisadvan:
sufficient power
which he cannot again drive us out ; tag andesresolution
. still to venture a decisive
the seizure of important towns , fertile stroke against one of the enemy's corps,
districts, distur bed parts of the coun or against the enemy'smain body itself,
try , which may be excited to rebellion,
 23
CHAP. XVII.] ATTACK OF FORTRESSES.
the danger which he thus holds over the of consequence in his mind . Practi
head of his opponent is his best means of cally viewed, there usually lies already
covering himself. in the choice of the defensive form of
5. In conclusion , we must notice war, a sort of guarantee that nothing
another great advantage which the as- positive is intended ; besides this, the
sailant certainly has over the defender preparations for a great reaction differ
in wars of this kind, which is that of be much more from the ordinary prepara
ing better able to judge of the intentions tions for defence than the preparations
and force of his adversary than the latter for a great attack differ from those di
can in turn of his. It is much more rected against minor objects. Finally, the
difficult to discover in what degree defender is obliged to take his measures
an assailant is enterprising and bold soonest of the two, which gives the assail
than when the defender has something ant the advantage of playing the last hand.

CHAPTER XVII.

ATTACK OF FORTRESSES .

The attack of fortresses cannot of sufficiently evident by what has been

course come before us here in its aspect said about fortresses in the book on
as a branch of the science of fortification
the Defence, the reflection from which
or military works ; we have only to con- throws all the light required on these
siderstrategic
the subject, first, in its relation to relations with the attack .
the object with which it is con- In relation to the taking of strong
nected ; secondly, as regards the choice places, there is also a great difference
among several fortresses; and thirdly, between campaigns which tend to a
asregards the manner in which a siege great decision and others. In the first,
should be covered . a conquest of this description is always
That the loss of a fortress weakens to be regarded as an evil which is un
the defence, especially in case it forms avoidable . As long as there is yet a
an essential part of that defence ; that decision to be made, we undertake no
many conveniences accrue to the assail. sieges but such as are positively unavoid
ant by gaining possession of one, inas- able . When the decision has been al
much as he can use it for magazines ready given — the crisis, the utmosttension
and depôts, and by means of it can of forces, some time passed -- and when,
cover districts of country cantonments, therefore, a state of rest has commenced ,
etc. ; that if his offensive at last should then the capture of strong places serves
as a consolidation of the conquests made,
ve, and
have
it forms thechanged
to be very bestinto the defensi
support for that then they can generally be carried
defensive - all these relations which out, if not without effort and expenditure
fortresses bear to theatres of war, in of force, at least without danger. In the
the course of a war ,make themselves crisis itself thesiege of a fortress heightens
24 ON WAR . [ BOOK VII.
the intensity of the crisis to the prejudice to take small places; but it is better to
of the offensive; it is evident that nothing take a small one than to fail before a
so much weakens the force of the offensive, large one.
and therefore there is nothing so certain (c) Its strength in engineering respects,
to rob it of its preponderance for a season. which obviously is not always in propor
But there are cases in which the capture tion to its importance in other respects.
Nothing is more absurd than to waste
nsive ssis istobe unav
quitecont oid
of
able, offefortre
thisif orthethat inue d , forces before a verystrong place of little
and in such case a siege is to be con importan , eif a placct
ce e of less strength
sidered as an intensified progress of the may be mad the obje of attack.
attack ; the crisis will be so much greater (d) The strength of the armament and
the less there has been decided pre of the garrison as well. If a fortress is
viously . All that remains now for con- weakly armed and insufficiently garri
sideration on this subject belongs to the sone d , its capture must naturally be
easier ; but here we must observe that
book on the plan of the war.
In campaigns with a limited object, a the strength of the garrison and arma
fortress is generally not the means but ment , are to be reckoned amongst those
the end itself ; it is regarded as a small ngs which make the total import
independent conquest , and as such has ance of the place , because garrison and
the following advantages over every armamesnts are directly parts of the
other : enemy' military strength, which cannot 1

1.That a fortressis a small, distinctly- be said in nthe samemeasure of works of

defined conquest,which does not require fortificatio st
. Theconque of a fortress
a further expenditure of force, and there- with strong garrison can, therefore,
fore gives no cause to fear a reaction . much more readily repay the sacrifice it
2. That in negotiating for peace, its costs than one with very stro ng works.
value as an equivalent may beturned to (e) The facility of moving the siege
account . train.
st
Mo sie ges fai l for want of
3.That a siege is a real progress of means, and the means are generally
theattack,oratleast seems so,without wan ting from t. Eug
their transpor the ene y att
diffic'sultsieg ing
e ofendLan
constantly diminishing the force like dreci, 1712, and Frederick the Great's
every other advance of the offensive .
remark
4. Tha t the siege is an enterprise siege of Olmütz, 1758, are very
without a catastrophe . able
The result of these things is that the ( 1)instances in re
Lastly, the point.
remains the facility
captureofone ormoreofthe enemy's
strong places, is very frequently the ob
ofcoveringthe siege as a point now to
be considered.
ject of those strategic attacks which can There are two essentially different
ways by which a siege may be covered :
not aim at any higher object.
The grounds whichdecide the choice
of the fortresswhichshould beattacked, is by aleline of circumvallation, andthe
are
incasethat maybe doubtful, generally first
whatis called linesofs has
of thesemethod observation.
gonequiteThe
out e im
(a) That it ise one whichcan be easily offashion,although evidently on
kept, therefor stands high in value as ant tport poin speaks in its favour,namely,
an equivalent in case of negotiations for that by this method the force of the
peace . assailant does not suffer by division ex
(6) That the means of taking it are at actly that weakening which isso gener
hand. Small means areonlysufficient rally founda great disadvantage at
CHAP. XVII. ] ATTACK OF FORTRESSES. 25

sieges. But we grant there is still a special detachments are not made use of
weakening in another way, to a very to cover it, in which way the very parti
considerable degree, because tion of force which it was intended to
1. The position round the fortress, as obviate takes place. Thus the besieging
a rule, is of too great extent for the army will be always in anxiety and em
strength of the army. barrassment on account of the convoys
2. The garrison , the strength of which, which it requires, and the covering the
added to that of the relieving army, same hy lines of circumvallation , is not to
would only make up the force originally be thought of if the army and the siegą
opposed to us, under these circumstances supplies required are considerable, and
is to be looked upon as an enemy's corps the enemy is in the field in strong force,
in the middle of our camp, which, pro unless under such conditions as are found
tected by its walls, is invulnerable, or at in the Netherlands, where there is a
least notto be overpowered, by which its whole system of fortresses lying close to
power is immensely increased. each other, and intermediate lines con
3. The defence of a line of circumval- necting them, which cover the rest of the
lation admits of nothing but the most theatre of war, and considerably shorten
absolute defensive, because the circular the lines by which transport can be
order, facing outwards, is the weakest and affected . In the time of Louis the Four
most disadvantageous of all possible teenth the conception of a theatre of war
orders of battle, and is particularly un- had not yet bound itself up with the posi
favourable to any advantageous counter- tion of an army. In the Thirty Years'
attacks. There is no alternative, in fact, War particularly, the armies moved here
but to defend ourselves to the last extre- and there sporadically before this or that
mity within the entrenchments . That fortress, in the neighbourhood of which
these circumstances may cause a greater there was no enemy's corps at all, and
diminution of the army than one -third besieged it as long asthe siege equipment
which, perhaps, would be occasioned by they had brought with them lasted, and
forming an army of observation, is easy until an enemy's army approached to
to conceive. If, added to that, we now relieve the place. Then lines of circum
vallation had their foundation in the
think of the general preference which
ck
has nature of circumstances.
existed since the time of Frederi the
Great for the offensive , as it is called , In future it is not likely they will be
(but which, in reality, is not always so) often used again, unless where the enemy
for movements and maneuvres, and the in the field is very weak, or the concep
aversion to entrenchments , we shall not tion of the theatre of war vanishes before
wonder at lines of circumvallation having that of the siege. Then it will be natural
gone quite out of fashion . But this to keep all the forces united in the siege,
weakening of the tactical resistance is by as a siege by that means unquestionably
no means its only disadvantage ; and we gains in energy in a high degree.
have only reckoned up the prejudices The lines of circumvallation in the
which forced themselves into the judg- reign of Louis XIV ., at Cambray and
ment on the lines of circumvallation next Valenciennes, were of little use, as the
in order after that disadvantage, because former were stormed by Turenne, op
they are nearly akin to each other. A posed to Condé, the latter by Condé op
line of circumvallation only in reality posedto Turenne; but we must not over
covers that portion of the theatre of war look the endless number of other cases in
which it actually encloses ; all the rest is which they were respected, even when
more or less given up to the enemy if there existed in the place the most urgent
26 ON TVAR , [ DOOK VII.
need for relief ; and when the commander it is more difficult to save the siege train,
on the defensive side was a man of great If a defeat is sustained at a distance of
enterprise, as in 1708, when Villars did one or more days' march from the place
not venture to attack the allies in their besieged , the siege may be raised before
lines at Lille. Frederick the Great at the enemy can arrive, and the heavy
Olmütz , 1758 , and at Dresden , 1760 , trains may, in the mean time, gain also
although he had no regular lines of cir a day's march.
cumvallation , had a system which in all In taking up a position for an army
essentials was identical ; he used the of observation, an important question to
same army to carry on the siege, and also be considered is the distance at which it
as a covering army . The distance of the should be placed from the besieged place.
Austrian armyinduced him to adopt this This question will, in most cases, be de
plan at Olmütz, but the loss of his con cided by the nature of the country, or by
voy atDomstädtelmadehimrepent it; at the position ofotherarmies or corps with
Dresden in 1760 the motives which led gers
which the besie n
have to remai in
him to this mode of proceeding, were his communication . In other respects, it is
contempt for the German States' imperial easy to see that, with a greater distance,
army, and his desire to take Dresden as the siege is better covered, but that by a
soon as possible . smaller distance, not exceeding a few
Lastly,
circumva itis adisadva
llation ntage in lines of miles, the two armies are better able to
, that in case of a reverse afford each other mutual support.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ATTACK OF CONVOYS.

THE attack and defence of a convoy form yoy is several miles in length . Now,
a subject of tactics : we should, therefore, how is it possible to expect that the few
have nothing tosay upon the subject troops usually allotted to a convoy it !
here if it was not necessary , first, to de suffice for its defence ? If to this diffi
monst rate generally,to a certain 'extent, cultyweadd theunwieldy nature of this
the possibility of the thing, which can
only be done from strategic motives and
mass, which can only advance at the
slowest pace, and which, besides , is al
relat ions. We should havehad to speak waysliable tobe thrown into disorder,
of it in this respect before when treating
of the defence , had it not been that the
and lastly, that every part of a convoy
little which can be said about it can easily must be equally protected , because the
be framed to suit for both attack and de
moment that one part is attacked by the
enemy, the whole is brought to a stop,
fence,while at the same timethe firstplays andthrown into a stateofconfusion,we
the higher part in connection with it. may well ask ,-how can the covering
A moder ate convoy of three or four and defence of such a train be possible
hundr ed
wagons , let the load be what it at all ? Or, in other words, why are
may, takes up half a mile, a large con not all convoys taken when they are
CHAP . XVIII . ] ATTACK OF CONVOYS. 27

attacked, and why are not all attacked sailants of its convoy, and punishing it
which require an escort, or, which is the ultimately for the undertaking by de
same thing, all that come within reach feating it. The apprehension of this,
of the enemy ? It is plain that all tactical puts a stop to many undertakings, with
expedients, such as Templehof's most im- out the real cause ever appearing ; so
practicable schere of constantly halting that the safety of the convoy is attri
and assembling the convoy at short dis- buted to the escort, and people won
tances, and then moving off afresh ; and der how a miserable arrangement, such
the much better plan of Scharnhorst, of as an escort, should meet with such
breaking up the convoy into several respect. In order to feel the truth of
columns, are only slight correctives of a this observation, we have only to think
radical evil . of the famous retreat which Frederick
The explanation consists in this, that the Great made through Bohemia after
by far the greater number of convoys the siege of Olmitz, 1758, when the half
derive more security from the strategic of his army was broken into a column of
situation in general, than any other parts carriages.
exposed to the attacks of the enemy,
companies toWhat a convoy
coverprevented of 4,000
Daun from
which bestows on their limited means of falling on this monstrosity ? The fear
defence a very much increased efficacy. that Frederick would throw himself upon
Convoys generally move more or less in him with the other half of his army, and
rear of their own army, or, at least, at a entangle him in a battle which Daundid
great distance from that of the enemy. not desire ; what prevented Laudon,
The consequence is, that only weak de- who was constantly at the side of that
tachments can be sent to attack them, convoy, from falling upon it at Zisch
and these are obliged to cover themselves bowitz sooner and more boldly than he
by strong reserves. Added to this the did ? The fear that he would get a rap
unwieldiness itself of the carriages used , over the knuckles. Ten miles from his
makes it very difficult to carry them off ; main army, and completely separated
the assailant must therefore, in general, from it by the Prussian army, he thought
content himself with cutting the traces, himself in danger of a serious defeat if
taking away the horses, and blowing up the king, who had no reason at that time
powder-wagons, by which the whole is to be concerned about Daun , should fall
certainly detained and thrown into dis- upon him with the bulk of his forces.
order, but not completely lost ; by all this It is only if the strategic situation of
we may perceive, that the security of such an army involves it in the unnatural
trains lies more in these general relations necessity of connecting itself with its
than in the defensive power of its escort. convoys by the flank or by its front that
If now to all this we add the defence of then these convoys are really in great
the escort, which, although it cannot by danger, and become an advantageous
marching resolutely against the enemy object of attack for the enemy, if his
directly cover the convoy , is still able to position allows him to detachtroops for
derange of the enemy's attackin-; that purpose. The same campaign of
then, the plan attack
at last,the of a convoy, 1758 affords an instance of the most
stead of appearing easy and sure of suc- complete success of an undertaking of
cess, will appear rather difficult, and very this description, in the capture of the
uncertain in its result . convoy at Domstädtel. The road to
But there remains still a chief point , Neiss lay on the left flank of the Prus
which is the danger of the enemy's army, sian position, and the king's forces were so
or one of its corps, retaliating on the as- neutralised by the siege and by the corps
28 ON WAR . [ BOOK VII.
watching Daun, that the partizans had occasion, and in what embarrassments
no reason to be uneasy about themselves , he involved himself, ending in a complete
and were able to make their attack com- change of circumstances .
pletely nat their ease.
The conclusion we draw, therefore, is
Whe Eugene besieged Landrecy in that however easy an attack on a convoy
1712, he drew his supplies for the siege may appear in its tactical aspect, still it
from Bouchain by Denain ; therefore, in has not much in its favour on strategic
reality, from the front of the strategic grounds, and only promises important
position. It is well known what means results in the exceptional instances of
he was obliged to use to overcome the lines of communication very much
difficulty of protecting his convoys on that exposed.

CHAPTER XIX.

ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S ARMY IN ITS CANTONMENTS.

The attack on an enemy's army in

We have not treated of this subject in cantonments is therefore the surprise
the defence, because a line of cantonments of an army not assembled . If this
is not to be regarded as a defensive surprise succeeds fully, then the enemy's
means , but as a mere existence of the army is prevented from reaching its
army in a state which implies little appointed place of assembly,and, there
readiness for battle . In respect to this fore , compelled to choose another more
readiness for battle , we therefore did not as this change of the
to the rearemb
go beyond what we required to say poi
in connection with this condition of an
nt of ass ; ly to the rear in a state
army in the 13th chapter of the 5th book .
of such emergency can seldom be effected
But here, in considering the attack, inless than a day's march, but generally
l require several days, the loss of
we have to think of an enemy's army wilground which this occasions is by no
in cantonments ects
in all resp as a
means an insignificant loss;and this isthe
special object ; for, in the first place ,
such an attack isof a very peculiar firsBut antage
t advnow, assailant:
nedpribyse thewhi
thisgaisur ch is in
kind in itself ; and, in the next place, it on
may be considered as a strategic means connecti nlywith the general relations,
y certai at the same time , in its
of particular efficacy. Here we have be. ma men cement, be an onslaught on some
fore us, therefore, not the question of an com
onslau ght on a sin gle can ton men t or a of the ene my's single cantonments, not
sma ll corps dispersed
lages , as
amongst a few vil- because
arrangements
certainlythat
uponwould
all, orupon
supposoa great many
a scattering
the for that are of the attacking armyto an extent which
entirely of a tactical nature, but of the
attack of a largearmy,distributedin the most advanced quarters, only those
cantonments more or less extensive ; an
h
attack in which the object is not the mere ction
whic lie in thedire of theattack
surprise of asingle cantonment, butto ing columns,can besurprised,andeven.
prevent the assembly of the army . this will seldom happen to many of them ,
CHAP. xix.] ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S ARMY, ETC. 29

as large forces cannot easily approach Such are the proper results of a success
unobserved. However, this element of ful surprise of the enemy in cantonments,
the attack is by no means to be dis- that is, of one in which the enemy is
regarded ; and we reckon the advantages prevented from assembling his army
which may be thus obtained , as the without loss at the point fixed in his
second advantage of the surprise. plan. But by the nature of the case,
A third advantage consists in the success has many degrees ; and, therefore,
minor combats forced upon the enemy the results may be very great in one case,
in which his losses will be considerable. and hardly worth mentioning in another.
A great body of troops does not assemble But even when, through the complete
itself at once by single battalions at the success of the enterprise, these results
spot appointed for the general concen- are considerable, they will seldom bear
tration of the army, but usually forms comparison with the gain of a great
itself by brigades, divisions, or corps, battle, partly because, in the first place,
in the first place, and these masses can- the trophies are seldom as great, and
not then hasten at full speed to the in the next, the moral impression never
rendezvous ; in case of meeting with an strikes so deep:
enemy's column in their course, they are This general result must always be
obliged to engage in a combat; now, kept in view, that we may not promise
they may certainly come off victorious in ourselves more from an enterprise of this
the same, particularly if the enemy's kind than it can give. Many hold it to
attacking column is not of sufficient be the non plus ultra of offensive activity ;
strength , but in conquering, they lose but it is not so by any means, as we may
time, and, in most cases, as may be see from this analysis, as well as from
easily conceived , a corps, under such military history.
circumstances, and in the general ten One of the most brilliant surprises in
dency
re
to gain a point which lies to the history, is that made by the Duke of
ar , will not make any beneficial use of Lorraine in 1643, on the cantonments of
its victory. On the other hand, they may the French, under General Ranzan, at
be beaten, and that is the most probable Duttlingen . The corps was 16,000 men,
issue in itself, because they have not time and they lost the neral commanding,
to organise a good resistance. We may, and 7,000 men ; it was a complete defeat.
therefore, very well suppose that in an The want of outposts was the cause of
attack well planned and executed, the the disaster.
assailant through these partial combats The surprise of Turenne at Mergen
will gather up a considerable number of theim (Mariendal, as the French call it, )
trophies, which become a principal point as
in the general result.
1644, tois ain defeat
in equal likemanner to be regarded
in its effects, for he
Lastly, the fourth advantage, and the lost 3,000 men out of 8,000, which was
keystone of the whole,is a certain
momentary disorganisation and
principally owing to his having been led
dis- into making an untimely stand after he
couragement on the side of the enemy, got his men assembled. Such results we
which, when the force is at last assem- cannot, therefore, often reckon upon ; it
bled , seldom allows of its being imme- was rather the result of an ill-judged
diately brought into action, and generally action than of the surprise, properly
obliges the party attackedto abandon speaking, for Turenne might easilyhave
still more ground to his assailant, and to avoided the action, and have rallied his
make a change generally in his plan of troops upon those inmore distant quarters.
operations. A third noted surprise is that which
30 ON JVAR , [ BOOK VIL
Turenne made on the Allies under the If from these different examples we
great Elector, the Imperial General seek for a conclusion as to the efficacy of
Bournonville and the Duke of Lorraine, this kind of attack, then only the two
in Alsace, in the year 1674. The tro- first can be put in comparison with a
phies were very small, the loss of the battle gained. But the corps were only
Allies did not exceed 2,000 or 3,000 men , small, and the want of outposts in the
which could not decide the fate of a force system of war in those days was a cir.
of 50,000 ; but the Allies considered that cumstance greatly in favour of these en
they could not venture to make any terprises. Although the four other cases
must be reckoned completely successful
further resistance in Alsace , and retired
across the Rhine again. This strategic enterprises, it is plain that not one of
result was all that Turenne wanted , but them is to be compared with a battle
we must not look for the causes of it en gained as respects its result. The general
tirely in the surprise . Turenne sur result could not have taken place in any
prised the plans of his opponents more of them except with an adversary weak
than the troops themselves ; the want in will and character, and therefore it did
of unanimity amongst the allied generals not take place at all in the case of 1741 .
and the proximity of the Rhine did the In 1806 the Prussian army contem
rest. This event altogether deserves a plated surprising the French in this
closer examination , as it is generally manner in Franconia. The case promised
viewed in a wrong light . well for a satisfactory result. Buonaparte
In 1741,Neipperg surprised Frederick was not present, the French corps were
theGreatin his quarters ;thewhole of in widelyextended cantonments ; under
the result was that the king was obliged these circumstances, the Prussian army,
to fight the battle of Mollwitz before he acting with great resolution and activity,
had collected all his forces, and with a might very well reckon on driving the
change of front. French back across the Rhine, withmore
In 1745 , Frederick the Great sur or less loss. But this was also all; if
prised the Duke of Lorraine in his can they reckoned upon more, for instance,
tonments in Lusatia ; the chief success on following up their advantages beyond
was through the real surprise of one of the Rhine, or on gaining such a moral
the most
Henne , by tant
rsdorfimpor which tersAustr
quarthe ,thatiansof ascendancy
again ventu, re to appear onh would
thattheFrenc not
the right
suffered a loss of 2,000 men ; the general bank of the river in the same campaign,
result was that the Duke of Lorraine re- such an expectation had no sufficient
treated to Bohemia by Upper Lusatia , grounds whatever.
but that did not at all prevent his re In the beginning of August , 1812, the
turning into Saxony by theleft bankof Russians
the Elbe , so that without the battle of n
from Smolensk
onments
meditated falling
ch
upo the cant of the Fren
Kesselsdorf, there would have been no
important result .
when Napoleon halted his army in the
neighbourhood of Witepsk. But they
1758. TheDuke Ferdinand surprised wanted courageto carry out themembers
the French quarters ; the immediate re
sult was thatthe French
lostsotomethou-
sands of men , and wereobliged take up did ; foras the French commander with
a position behind the Aller . The moral
his centre was notonly more than twice
h
effectmay havebeenofmore
and may have
importance the strengt of their centre, but also in
himselfthe mostreso lute commander
had some influence on the, that ever lived, as further, the loss of a
subsequent evacuation Westphalia
of . few miles of ground would have decided
 31
CHIAP. XIX. ] ATTACK ON THE EVENY'S ARMY, ETC.
nothing, and there was no natural ob- concentration of his force, and therefore
stacle in any feature of the country near we must do the same. This point of
enough up to which they might pursue concentration should , if possible , be the
their success, and by that means, in some enemy's point of assembly, or lie on his
measure make it certain , and lastly, as the line of retreat, it will naturally be best
war of the year 1812 was not in any way where that line crosses an important ob
a campaign of that kind, which draws stacle in the country.
itself in a languid way to a conclusion, ( 3.) The separate columns when they
but the serious plan of an assailant who come in contact with the enemy's forces
had made up his mind to conquer his must attack them with great determina
opponent completely , —therefore the tri- tion , with dash and boldness, as they
fling results to be expected from a sur- have general relations in their favour,
prise of the enemy in his quarters, appear and daring is always there in its right
nothing else than utterly disproportionate place. From this it follows that the
to the solution of the problem , they could commanders of the separate columns
not justify a hope of making good by must be allowed freedom of action and
their means the great inequality of forces full power in this respect.
and other relations . But this scheme (4.) The tactical plan of attack against
serves to show how a confused idea of the those of the enemy's corps that are the
effect of this means may lead to an en- first to place themselves in position, must
tirely false application of the same. always be directed to turn a flank , for the
What has been hitherto said, places greatest result is always to be expected by
the subject in the light of a strategic separating the corps, and cutting them off.
means. But it lies in its nature that its ( 5. ) Each of the columns must be
execution also is not purely tactical, but composed of portions of the three arms,
in partbelongs again to strategy so far, and must not be stinted in cavalry, it
particularly that such an attack is gene- may even sometimes be well to divide
rally made on a front of considerable amongst them the whole of the reserve
width; and the army which carries it out cavalry; for it would be a great mistake
can, and generally will, come to blows be to suppose that this body of cavalry could
fore it is concentrated , so that the whole play any great part in a mas in an en
is an agglomeration of partial combats. terprise ofthis sort. The first village,
We must now add a few words on the the smallest bridge, the most insignifi.
most natural organisation of such an at- cant thicket would bring it to a halt.
tack . ( 6. ) Although it lies in the nature of
The first condition is : a surprise that the assailant should not
( 1.) To attack the front of the enemy's send his advanced guard very far in
quarters in a certain width of front, for front, that principle only applies to the
that is the only means by which we can first approach to the enemy's quarters.
really surprise several cantonments, cut When the fight has commenced in the
off others, and create generally that dis- enemy's quarters, and therefore all that
organisation in the enemy's army which was to be expected from actual surprise
is intended.—The number of, and the in- has been gained, then the columns of
tervals between, the columns must de- the advanced guard of all arms should
pend on circumstances. push on as faras possible, for they may
( 2.) The direction of the different greatly increase the confusion on the
columns must converge upon a point side of the enemy by more rapid move
where it is intended they should unite; ment. It is only by this means that it
for the enemy ends more or less with a becomes possible to carry off here and
32 ON WAR . [BOOK VII.

there the mass of baggage, artillery, non
effectives, and camp -followers, which
have to be dragged after a cantonment
suddenly broken up, and these advanced
guards must also be the chief instru
ments in turning and cutting off the
enemy .
( 7.) Finally, the retreat in case of
ill -success must be thought of, and a
rallying point be fixed upon beforehand.

CHAPTER XX.

DIVERSION.

ACCORDING to the ordinary use of lan drawing off just the same number, then
guage, under the term diversion is under their efficacyas diversions,prop
ing
erly called,
stood such an incursion into the enemy's ceases, and the undertak becomes a
country as draws off a portion of his force mere subordinate attack . Even where , on
from the principal point. It is only account of circumstances, we have in
when this is the chief end in view , and view to attain a very great end witha
not the gain of the object which is selected very small force, as, for instance, to make
as the point of attack, that it is an enter an easy capture of an important fortress,
prise of a special character, otherwise it and another attack is made adjoining to
is only an ordinary attack. the principal attack, to assist the latter,
Naturally the diversion must at the that is no longer a diversion.d When two
same time always have an objectofattack, states are at war, and a thir falls upon
for it is only the value of this object that m,
one of the an event is very com
such
will induce the enemy to send troops for monly called a diversion — but such an
its protection ; besides, in case the un attack differs in nothing from an ordi
dertaking does not succeed as a diver nary atta ck except in its direction ; there
sion , this object is a compensation for the is, ther efor e, no occasion to give it a par
forces expended in the attempt. ticular name, for in theory it should be a
These objects of attack may be for rule only to denote by particular names
tresses, or important magazines, or rich such things as are in their nature distinct.
and large towns, especially capital cities, But if small forces are to attract largo
contributions of all kinds; lastly, assist ones, there must obviously be some special
ance may be afforded in this way to dis cause, and, therefore, for the object of a
contented subjects of the enemy : diversion it is not sufficient merely to
It is easy to conceive that diversions detach some troops to a pointnot hither
may be useful, but they certainly are not occupied . lant
to If
so always ; on the contrary, they are just the assai with a small corps of
as often injurious. The chief condition 1000 men overruns one of his enemy's
is that they should withdraw from the provinces, not belonging to the theatre
principal theatre of the war more of the of war, and levies contributid on, etc., it
enemy's troops than we employ on the is to
see beforehan that the
diversion ; for if they only succeed in enemeasy
y cannot put a stop to this by de
 CHAP. xx . ] DIVERSION . 38

taching 1000 men, but that if he means reason it will always be the means, more
to protect the province from invaders, ho or less, of calling forth military forces
must at all events send a considerably which would otherwise have continued
larger force. But it may be asked cannot in abeyance, this will be done in a way
a defender, instead of protecting his own which will be very sensibly felt if the
province, restorethe balance by sending enemy has any organised militia, and
a similar detachment to plunder a pro- means of arming the nation at large.
vince in our country ? Therefore, if It is quite in the natural order of things,
an advantage is to be obtained by an and amply shown by experience, that if
aggressor in this way, it must first be a district is suddenly threatened by an
ascertained that there is more to be got enemy's force, and nothing has been pro
or to bethreatened in the defender's
vinces than in his own . pro-
If this is the
pared beforehand forits defence, all the
most efficient official functionaries imme.
case, then no doubt a weak diversion will diately lay hold of and set in motion
occupy a force on the enemy's side greater every extraordinary means that can be
than that composing the enterprise. On imagined , in order to ward off the im
the other hand, this advantage naturally
pending danger. Thus, new powers of
diminishes as the masses increase, for resistance spring up, such as are next to
50,000 men can defend a province of a people's war, and may easily excite one.
moderate extent not only against equal This is a point which should be kept
but even against somewhat superior vell in viewin every diversion, in order
numbers advantage
. The of large diver- that we may not dig our own graves .
sions is, therefore, verydoubtful, and the The expeditions to North Holland in
greater they become the more decisive 1799 , and to Walcheren in 1909,regarded
must be the other circumstances which as diversions, are only to be justified in
favour a diversion if any good is to come so far that there was no other way of
out of such an enterprise upon the employing the English troops ; but there
whole . is no doubt that the sum total of the
Now these favourable circumstances means of resistance of the French was
may be : thereby increased , and every landing in
a. Forces which the assailant holds France, would have just the same effect.
available for a diversion without weak- To threaten the French coast certainly
eningthe great mass of his force. offers great advantages, because by that
b . Points belonging to the defender means an important body of troops be
which are of vital importance to him comes neutralised in watching the const,
and can be threatened by a diversion . but a landing with a large force can never
c. Discontented subjects of the same. be justifiable unless we can count on the
d . A rich province which can supply a assistance of a province in opposition to
considerable quantity of munitions of the Government .
war .
The less a great decision is looked for .
If only these diversions are undertaken , ward to in war the more will diversions
which, when tested by these different con- be allowable, but so much the smaller
siderations, promise results, it will be will also certainly be the gain to be de
found that an opportunity of making a rived from them . They are only a means
diversion does not offer frequently. of bringing the stagnant masses into
But now comes another important motion .
point. Every diversion brings war into Execution .
a district into which the war would not
otherwise have penetrated : for that 1. A diversion may include in itself
VOL. III. D
34 ON TAR . [ BOOK VII.
a real attack, then the execution has no state of circumstances . It follows from
special character in itself except boldness the nature of the thing that there must
and expedition . be a great fractioning of forces on such
2. It may also have as an object to occasions .
appear more than it really is, being , in 3. If the forces employed are notquite
fact, a demonstration as well. The special inconsiderable, and the retreat is re
ns
mea to be empl oyed stricted to certain points , then a reserve
in such a case can
on which the whole may rally is an es
only suggest themselves to a subtil mind
well versed in men and in the existing sential condition .

CHAPTER XXI .

INVASION.

ALMOST all that we have to say on this or to be carried into the heart of the
subject consists in an explanation nof the country, whether it shall make the
term . We find the expressio very seizure of theenemy's strong places the
frequently used by modern authors and chief object, or seek out the core of
also that they pretend to denote by it the enemy's power, and pursue it un
som ething particular.- Guerre d'invasion remittingly , is the result of circum
occurs perpetually in French authors. stances, and not dependent on a sys;
They use it as a term for every attack tem. In some cases, to push forward
which enters deep into the enemy's coun may be more methodical, and at the
try, and perhaps sometimes mean to apply same time more prudent than to tarry
it as the antithesis to methodical attack , on the frontier , but in mostcases it is
that is, one which onlynibbles atthe nothing elsethan just thefortunate
frontier. But this is a very unphiloso- result of a vigorous attack, and conser
an
al
phicattaconf usion lang
ck is to beofconf uage
ined to .Whe ther resp tly. does not differ from it in any
quenect
the frontier

ON THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY. *

The conqueror in a war is not always its surface some apparent contradictions
glitter, as in ever-changing colours.com
completely. to subduehisadversary
in a conditionOften, in fact, almost uni therefore wish toexamine it more closely,
versally, there is a culminating point of andlook forits essential causes .
ciently; but as the subject is one espo- ponderance ofthe sum of all the physica!
and the pivot of almost all plans com wou notcrea
ealylditin
campaigns, while , at the same time, on ses thishtprep
be soug for onde
rance,orcid
and purchase

* See Chapters IV. and V.

 CHAP. XXI. ] ON THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY. 35

at a great sacrifice. Victory itself does 7. Lastly, the discouragement of the

this unquestionably ; also its conse enemy who lets the arms, in some mea
quences have the same effect, but not to sure, drop out of his hands.
the utmost point - generally only up to a The causes of decrease of strength in an
certain point. This point may be very near army advancing, are :
at hand, and is sometimes so near that the 1. That it is compelled to lay siege to
whole of the results of a victorious battle the enemy's fortresses, to blockade them
are confined to an increase of the moral or observe them ; or that the enemy, who
superiority. How this comes about we did the same before the victory, in his
have now to examine.
retreat draws in these corps on his main
In the progress of action in war, the body.
combatant force is incessantly meeting 2. That from the moment the assailant
with eleinents which strengthen it, and enters the enemy's territory, the nature
others which weaken it. Hence it is a of the theatre of war is changed ; it
question of superiority on one side or the becomes hostile ; we must occupy it,
other. As every diminution of power on for we cannot call any portion our own
one side is to be regarded as an increase beyond what is in actual occupation, and
on the opposite, it follows, of course, that yet it everywhere presents difficulties to
this double current, this ebb and flow , the whole machine, which must neces
takes place whether troopsare advancing sarily tend toweaken its effects.
or retiring . 3. That we are removing further away
It is therefore necessary to find out the from our resources, whilst the enemy is
principal cause of this alteration in the drawing nearer to his ; this causes a
one case
with it. to determine the other along delay in the replacement of expended
power.
In advancing, the most important 4. That the danger which threatens
causes of the increase of strength which the the state, rouses other powers to its pro
assailant gains, are : tection .
1. The loss which the enemy's army 5. Lastly, the greater efforts of the
suffers, because it is usually greater than
that of the assailant
adversary, in consequence of the increased
. danger, on the other hand, a relaxation
2. The loss which the enemy suffers of effort on the side of the victorious
in inert military means , such as maga state.
zines, depôts, bridges, etc. , and which All these advantages and disadvan
the assailant does not share with him. tages can exist together, meet each
3. That from the moment the assailant other in a certain measure, and pur
enters the enemy's territory, there is a loss sue their way in opposite directious,
of provinces to the defence, consequently except that the last meet as real oppo
of thesources of new military forces. sites, cannot pass, therefore mutually
4. That the advancing army gains a exclude each other. This alone show's
portion of those resources, in other words, how infinitely different may be the effect
gains the advantage of living at the ex- of a victory according as it stuns the
pense of the enemy. vanquished or stimulates him to greater
5. The loss of internal organisation exertions .
and of the regular action of everything We shall now try to characterise, in a
on the side of the enemy. few words, each of these points singly,
6. That the allies of the enemy secede 1. The loss of the enemy when de
from him, and others join the con- feated, may be at the greatest in the first
queror. moment of defeat, and then daily di
 OV VAR. [BOOK VII,
36

minish in amount until it arrives at a can be detached from the principal mass,
point where the balance is restored as as these, like limbs compressed by liga
regards our force ; but it may go on in-
creasing every day in an ascending ratio. tures, usually soon die off.
As to six and seven, it is at least pro
The difference of situation and relations bable that they increase with the ad
vance ; furthermore, we shall return to
determines this. aWe
in general , with canarm
good only
y say
the that,
first them hereafter . Let us now pass on to
will be the case, with an indifferent army the causes of weakness .
1. The besieging, blockade, and in
the spirind
the seco t of; next to the
the Gov menttofis the
ernspiri y,
armthe
here vestment of fortresses, generally increase
most important thing. It is ofgreat conse- as the army advances . This weaken
quence in war to distinguish between the ing influence alone acts so powerfully
two cases in practice , in order not to stop on the condition of the combatant force,that
just at the point where we ought to be- it may soon outweigh all the advantages
gin in good earnest, and vice versa .
gained. No doubt, in modern times, a
2. The loss which the enemy sustains
system has been introduced of blockading
places with a small number of troops, or
s
in that part of the apparatu of war of watching them with a still smaller
h ise iner
whicsam
the mantner , andebb
, may thisand
will depjust
flow in number ; and also the enemy must keep
end on
the accidental position and nature of the garris ons in them . Nevertheless,theyme
n t ent
depôts from which supplies are drawn . mai a grea elem of secu . The
rity
This subject ,however,inthe present peop
garris ons sist ver
le, whoconhave y often in half of
taken no part in the
day, cannot be compared with the others Before those places
in point of importance. war
whichpreviou slyated
are situ . near the line of com
3. The third advantage must neces
munitocatileaonve,ita isfornece
sarily increase as the army advances ; ant yfor
ssarleas
ce at thebleassaithel
t dou
indeed , it may be said that it does not strength of the garrison ; and if it is desi
come into consideration until an army
rable to lay formal siege to, or to starve
has penetrated far into the enemy's coun out, one single considerable place , a small
try ; that is to say, until a third or a
army is required for the purpose.
fourth In
rear.
of the ion,try
additcoun thehasintrin
beensic left in
value 2. The second cause, the taking up a
which a province has in connection with theatre of war in the enemy's country,
the war comes also into consideration . increases necessarily with the advance ,
Inuldthesam e way the fourth advantage and ifit doesnotfurther weaken the
condition of the combatant force at the
sho increase with the advance .
But with respect to these two last, it moment, it does so at all events in the
is also to be observed that their influence long run.
on the combatant powers actually en We can onlyregard as our theatre of
gaged in the struggle, is seldom felt so war, so much of the enem
we actually possess ; tha t y's country
is to say, as
where
immediately ; they only work slowly and
by a circuitous course ; therefore we we either have small corps in the field,
should not bend the bow too much on or where we have left here and thero
thei r account, that is tosay, notplace stro
tionsnggarris onsroad
along the in larg e townow
s , etc.; ns,ortv
, how
ourselves in any dangerous position . ever small the garrisons may be which
The fifth advantage, again , only comes
into consideration if we have made a are detached, still they weaken
batant force considerably. Butthethis
comis
considerable advance, and if by the form
of the enemy's country some provinces the smallest evil.
 CHAP. xxi.] ON THE CULIINATING POINT OF VICTORY. 37

Every army has strategic flanks, that to the army from its own country ,-men
is, the country which borders both sides in particular; because the subsidies fur
of its lines of communications ; the nished by the enemy's country are, in
weakness of these parts is not sensibly most cases, neither so promptly nor so
felt as long as the enemy is similarly surely forthcoming as in our own coun
situated with respect to his. But that try ; because the means of meeting any
can only be the case as long as we are in unexpected requirement cannot be so
our own country ; as soon as we get into quickly procured ; becausemisunderstand
the enemy's country, the weakness of ings andmistakes of all kinds cannot so
these parts is felt very much, because the soon be discovered and remedied.
smallest enterprise promises some result If a prince does not lead his army in
when directed against a long line only person, as became the custom in the last
feebly, or not all, covered , and these wars, if he is not anywhere near it, then
attacks may be made from any quarter another and very great inconvenience
in an enemy's country. arises in the loss of time occasioned by
The further we advance, the longer communications backwards and for
these flanks become, and the danger wards ; for the fullest powers conferred
arising from them is enhanced in an on a commander of an army, are never
increased ratio, for not only are they sufficient to meet every case in the wide
difficult to cover, but the spirit of enter- expanse of his activity .
prise is also first roused in the enemy, 4. The change in political alliances.
chiefly by long insecure lines of com- If these changes, produced by a victory,
munication, and the consequences which should be such as are disadvantageous to
their loss may entail in case of a retreat the conqueror, they will probably be so
are matter of grave consideration. in a direct relation to his progress, just
All this contributes to place a fresh as is the case if they are of an advan
load on an advancing armyat every step tageous nature. Thisall depends on the
of its progress ; so that if it has not com- existing political alliances, interests,
menced with a more than ordinary supe. customs, andtendencies, on princes, min.
riority, it will feel itself always more and isters, etc. In general, we can only say
more cramped in its plans, gradually that when a great state which has smaller
weakened in its impulsive force, and at allies is conquered, these usually secede
last in a state of uncertainty and anxiety very soon from their alliance, so that the
as to its situation. victor, in this respect, with every blow
3. The third cause, the distance from becomes stronger ; but if the conquered
the source from which the incessantly state is small, protectors much sooner
diminishing combatant force is to be just present themselves when his very exist
as incessantly filled up, increases with ence is threatened, and others, who have
the advance . A conquering army is like helped to place him in his present em
the light of a lamp in this respect ;the barrassment, will turn round to prevent
more the oil which feeds it sinks in the his complete downfall.
reservoir and recedes from the focus of 5. The increased resistance on the
light, the smallerthe light becomes,until part of the enemy which is called forth .
at length it is quite extinguished. Sometimes the enemy drops his weapon
The richness of the conquered pro out of his hands from terror and stupe
vinces may certainly diminish this evil faction ; sometimes an enthusiastic pa
very much, but can never entirely re- roxysm seizes him, every one runs to
move it, because there are always a num- arms, and the resistance is much strong
ber of things which can onlybe supplied erafterthe firstdefeat than itwas
38 ON VAR . [BOOK VII.
before. The character of the people and but it does not necessarily follow from
of the Government, the nature of the this that it will be nil before the fall of
country and its political alliances, are the enemy : the fall of the enemy may
here the datafrom which the probable takeinedplacebybeforethat, and if it is to be
the last minimum of pre
obta
effect must be conjectured.
What countless differences these two ponderance, it would be an error not to
last points alone make in the plans end pre
expThe it for
ponthat purp
deranc osech
e whi : we have or
which may and should be made in war acquire in war is, therefore, the means ,
in one case and another ? Whilst one, not the end, and it must be staked to
through an excess lof caution , gs
and what
is called methodica proceedin , fritters
away his good fortune, another, from a
gain the latter. But it is necessary to
know how far it will reach , in order not
to go beyond that point , and instead of
want of rational reflection , tumbles into
destruction . fresh advantages , to reap disaster .
In addition , we must here call to mind
It is not necessary to introduce special
s
the supinenes , which not unfrequently examplthesatfro erienc
m is the e
this exp ch rthe
way inin whiorde to
comes over the victorious side, when dan
ge r isreinoved ; whilst,on the contrary, in
renewed efforts are then required in
the ic
strateg strprepond erance
ategic att it is ratsher
ack ; exhaust
tances which has forced
itself
the
titude mul of ins
order to follow up the success. If we cast us to investigate the causes of it. It is
a general glance over these different and
nistic princi
agoess s n only since the appeearancne ofBuaign
e deabldue ctuseioof,
ple thfit onass
antbtl
dou is, thatthe ,pro betweetha
par t welizehav
te n civi ionow
d natkn s, in camp
which the
the onward march in a war of aggres
sion, in the generality ofcases, diminishes preponderance has led,without inter
thepreponderance with which theassail ruption,tothe fall ofthe my re
gn ene ; befo
ant setout, or which has been gained by histime,every campai ended withfine
victory .
Here the question must naturally awher e it could simplymaintain itselfin
state of equilibrium . At this point,
strike us ; if this be so , what is it which
the movement of victory stopped , eveyn
impels the conqueror to follow up the if a retreat did not become necessar .
career of victory to continue the offen
sive ? And can this really be called wil
Nowl als
, this culearmininatitheng poi
o app nt,inofvict
future orys
all war
making further use of the victory ? in which the overthrow of the enemy
is
Would it not be better to stop where and
as yet there is hardly any diminution of th
ita
e gen millit
not theera y ryofwa
object of the war ;
rs will still be of this
the preponderance gained ? Th e na tu ral aim of all single
To this we must naturally answer : the
preponderance of combatant for
Thces
only the means , not the end . e endis pl icsh of
whan mpens
the caoff ives is
aign gees poi
chanth intont the
the
or object is to subdue the enemy , or at But now , to overstep
defensive. this point, is
least to take from him part of his terri re n ply an usefuless expreenditu, reit
tory, in order thus to put ourselves in a of powtha, yisim
mo
er el dingo rt her su lt
condition to realize the value of the is a destructive step which causes re
advantages we have gained when we and this re -action is, according
conclude a peace . Even if our aim is action
to all ; general experience, productive of
to conquer thte enemy comple telryy , wep most disproportionate effects. This last
must be con ten that, perhaps , eve ste
we advance , reduces our preponderance, fact is 60 common , and appears 80
CHAP. XXI.] ON TITE CULJINATING POINT OF VICTORY. 39

natural and easy to understand that we the case in a defensive, which commences
need not enter circumstantially into the after the exhaustion of an offensive, and
causes .Want of organization in the has its theatre of war usually situated at
conquered land, and the very opposite the apex of an offensive triangle thrust
effect which a serious loss instead of the far forward into the country. Of the
looked -for fresh victory makes on the four principles above named, this defen
feelings, are the chief causes in every sive only enjoys the first - the use of the
case.
The moral forces, courage on the ground — undiminished, the second gene
one side rising often to auducity, and rally vanishes altogether, the third be.
extreme depression on the other, now comes negative, and the fourth is very
begin generally their active play. The much reduced . A few more words,
losses on the retreat are increased there- only by way of explanation, respecting
by, and the hitherto successful party now the last.
generally thanks providence if he can If the imagined equilibrium , under the
escape with only the surrender of all his influence of which whole campaigns have
gains, without losing some of his own often passed without any results, because
territory. the side which should assume the initiative
We must now clear up an apparent is wanting in the necessary resolution,
contradiction . —and just therein lies, as we conceive,
It may be generally supposed that as the advantage of the state of expectancy
long as progress in the attack continues, if this equilibrium is disturbed by an
there must still be a preponderance ; and, offensive act, the enemy's interests
thatas the defensive, which will commence damaged, and his will stirred up to
at the end of the victorious career , is a action , then the probability of his re
stronger form of war than the offensive, maining in a state of indolent irresolution
therefore, thereis so much the less danger is much diminished. A defence, which
of becoming unexpectedly the weaker is organised on conquered territory, has
party. But yet there is, and keeping a much more irritating character than
history in view, we must admit that the one upon our own soil ; the offensive
greatest danger of a reverse is often just principle is engrafted on it in a certain
at the moment when the offensive ceases measure, and its nature is thereby weak .
and passes into the defensive. We shall ened. The quiet which Daun allowed
try to find the cause of this. Frederick II. in Silesia and Saxony,
The superiority which we have attri- he would never have granted him in
buted to the defensive form of war Bohemia.
consists : Thus it is clear that the defensive,
1. In the use of ground. which is interwoven or mixed up with
2. In the possession of a prepared an offensive undertaking, is weakened
theatre of war . in all its chief principles ; and, there
3. In the support of the people. fore, will no longer have the pre
4. In the advantage of the state of ponderance which belongs to it origin
expectancy. ally.
It must be evident that these principles Äs no defensive campaign is composed
cannot always be forthcoming and active of purely defensive elements, so likewise
in a like degree ; that, consequently, one no offensive campaign is made up entirely
defence is not always like another ; and of offensive elements; because, besides
therefore, also, that the defence will not the short intervals in every campaign, in
always have this same superiority over which both armies are on the defensive,
the offensive. This must be particularly every attack which does not lead to a
40 ON WAR . [ BOOK VII.
peace, must necessarily end in a de- which specially lie in the offensive, like
fensive. a horse drawing a load uphill, finds
In this manner it is the defensive itself it less difficult to advance than to stop.
which contributes to the weakening of By this,we believe,we have now shown,
the offensive. This is so far from being assa outt contradiction in itself, how the
withilan may pass that point, where, if
an idle subtlety, that on the contrary, we had stopped at the right moment,
consider it a chief disadvantage of the he
he might still, through the defensive,
attack that we are afterwards reduced
through it to a very disadvantageous have had a result, that is equilibrium.
defensive. Rightly to determine this point is,
And this explains how the difference ther efore impgn
ortant in fram ing a plan
of a cam,pai , as well for the offen
whi ch inally
orig ts
exis een
betw the sive, that he may not undertake what is
strength of the offensive and defensive
forms in war is gradually reduced . We cont
beyond ers certain
debts ), as( tofora the
racthispow extent
defensive,
shall now show how it may completely
disappear, and the advantage for a short that he may perceive and profit by
ge rse this erro r if committed by the assail
time may chan into the reve .
If we may be allowed to make use of ant.
an idea from nature, we shall be able
If now we look back at all the points
which the commander should bear in
sooner to explain ourselves. It is the mind in making his determination, and
h every force in the material
worldwhic
time requires to show its effect. A remember that he can only estimate the
tendency and value of the most import
power, which if applied slowly by de ant of them through the consideration
grees , would be sufficient to check a body of many other near anddistant relations,
in motion , will be overcome by it if time
fails .This law of the material world is that he must to a certain extent guess at
a striking illustration of many of the them - guess whether the enemy's army,
phenomena in our inner life. If we are after the first blow, will show a stronger
once roused to a certain train of thought , core and increasing solidity, or like a
it is notevery motive sufficient initself Bologna phial,will turn into dustas
which can change or stop that current of soon as the surface is injured; guess
thought. Time, tranquillity and durable the extent of weakness and prostration
impressions on our senses are required. which the drying up of certain sources,
So it is also in war . When once the the interruption of certain communica
mind has taken a decided direction to tions will produce on the military state
wards an object, or turned back towards of the enemy ; guess whether the enemy,
from the burning pain of the blow which
a harbour of refuge, it may easily hap
has been dealt him, will collapse power
case naturally servetorestrain,and those legs, borewhether,like a woundedbum,be
which in the other as naturally excite to will rise to a state of fury ; lastly, guess
enterprise , are not felt at once in their full whether other powers will be dismayed
force; and as the progress of action in the or roused, what political alliances are
mean time continues ,one iscarried along likely to bedissolved,and what rint
by the stream of movementbeyond the like
line of equilibrium , beyond the cul
hemly t hit allrmed
ustobefo this,.andWhe n we
much saythat
more , with
minating point , without being aware the tact of khis judgme nt, astherifleman
of it. Indeed, it may even happen that, hits a mar , itmust beadmitted that
in spite of the exhaustion of force , the such an act of the human mind is no
assailant, supported by the moral forces trifle. A thousand wrong roads running
 ON THE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY. 41
CHAP . XXII.]
here and there, present themselves to rather than to approach too close ; and
the judgment; and whatever the number, thus it happens that a fine courage and
the confusion and complexity of objects great spirit of enterprise often gobeyond
leaves undone, is completed by the sense the point, and therefore also fail to hit
of danger and responsibility . the mark . Only he that does great
Thus it happens that the majority of things with small means has made a suc.
generals prefer to fall short of the mark cessful hit.
 42

BOOK VIII.-PLAN OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION .

In the chapter on the essenceand object act

promi nently forward the realobject ofthe
of war, the destruction of the enemy's
of war,
its concephed,
wel sketc
genera a certa
tionin, and d outre,
poiinntemeasu its combatant force as the primary object
universally belonging to it; wenow re
rel
in ord onstotocom
atier sur
men ngh cir
roucendiwit a cum nd nce
sousta
s,
fun- turn to War as a whole , as we propose
to speak of the Plan of War, and of cam.
ental ifo a . We
ideld a glanced
tiesrewhicascht themin
dam
at theman difficulthe
encounters in the consideration of this
paigns ; and that obliges us to revert to
the ideas in our first book .
In these chapters, which are to deal
subject, whilst we postponed the closer with the whole question , is contained
exa atinon of them , and stopped at the
minsio
conclu , that the overthrow of the str ategy, pro
comprehen e ly
sivper aking, in its
andspeimportant mosest.
featur
enemy , consequently the destruction of We enterthis innermost parts of its do
his combatant force, is the chief object of main , where all other thread meet, not
the whole of the action of war This
put us in a position to show in the fol- without a degree of diffidence, which , in
lowing chapter, that the means which the d , on
deeIf, thely
is amp nd,d . we see how ex
onejusthaifie
erloys is the combat alone .
act of war emp
Inthis mann , we think, we have ob- tremely simple the operations of war
tained at the outset a correct point of appear'; if we hear and read how the
view .
plainest
Having now gone through singly all go and briefest manner, how this
vernment and management of this
the principal relations and forms which ponderous machine, with its hundred
appear in military action, but are extra thousand limbs, ismade no more of in
neous to, or outside of, the combat , iny
ord er that wemight fix more distinctl theirlips than if they were only speako
their value,"partly through the nature of ing"oftheir owns act
whole tremendou onswar
persofduel,so isthat vi.
inditiho
the thing, partly from the lessons of ex dualised into a kind of ; if we find
perience which military history affords, the motives also oftheir action brought
purify them from , and root out, those into connection sometimes with a few
vague ambiguous ideas which are gene
rally mixed up with them ,and also to put simple ideas,sometimes with some os.
 --
CHAP. II. ] ABSOLUTE AND REAL VAR . 43

citement of feeling ; if we see the easy, With some fear we proceed again ; we
sure, we might almost say light manner, can only do so by pursuing the way
in which they treat the subject- and now which we have prescribed for ourselves
see, on the other hand , the immense from the first. Theory ought to throw a
number of circumstances which present clear light on the mass of objects, that
themselves for the consideration of the the mind may the easier find its bearings;
mind ; the long, often indefinite,distances theory ought to pull up the weeds which
to which the threads of the subject run error has sown broadcast ; it should show
out, and the number of combinations the relations of things to each other,
which lie before us ; if we reflect that it separate the important from the trifling.
is the duty of theory to embrace all this Where ideas resolve themselves spon
systematically, that is with clearness and taneously into such a core of Truth as is
fullness, and always to refer the action to called Principle , when they of themselves
the necessity of a sufficient cause, then keep such a line as forms a rule, Theory
comes upon us an overpowering dread should indicate the same.
of being dragged down to a pedantic Whatever the mind seizes, the rays of
dogmatism, to crawl about in the lower light which are awakened in it by this
regions of heavy abstruse conceptions, exploration amongst the fundamental
where we shall never meet any great notions of things, that is the assistance
captain, with his natural coup d'œil. If which Theory affords the mind . Theory
the result of an attempt at theory is to can give no formulas with which to solve
be of this kind, it would have been as problems; it cannot confine the mind's
well , or rather, it would have been bet- course to the narrow line of necessity by
ter, not to have made the attempt ; it Principles set up on both sides. It lets
could only bring down on theory the con the mind take a look at the mass of
tempt of"genius, and the attempt itself objects and their relations, and then
would soon be forgotten. And on the allows it to go free to the higher regions
other hand, this facile coup d'oeil of the of action, there to act according to the
general, this simple art of forming no- measure of its natural forces, with the
tions, this personification of the whole energy of the whole of those forces com
action of war, is so entirely and com- bined , and to grasp the True and the
pletely the soul of the right method of Right, as one single clear idea, which
conducting war, that in no other but this shooting forth from under the united
broad way is it possible to conceive that pressure of all these forces, would seem
freedom of the mind which is indispens- to be rather a product of feeling than of
able if it is to dominate events, not to be reflection.
overpowered by them.

CHAPTER II.

ABSOLUTE AND REAL WAR .

The Plan of the War comprehends the one final determinate object, in which all
whole Military Act; through it that particular objects must become absorbed .
Act becomes a whole, which must have No war is commenced, or, at least, no war
44 ON WAR. [BOOK VIII.

should be commenced,
ly , with out saying ifto the
people acted
mselve ception not satisfied ? That medium
s, cons
wise ists in the number of interests, forces,
What is to be attained by and in
the same; the first is the final object ;
and circumstances of various kinds,inthe
existence of the State, which are affected
the other istheintermediate aim. By
this chief consideration the whole course
by the war, and through the infinite
ramifications of which the logical conse
of the war is prescribed , theextentof
the means and the measure of energy
quence cannot be carried outas itwould
on the simple threads of a few conclu
are determined ; its influence manifests sions ; in this labyrinth it sticks fast,
itself down to the smallest organ of and man, who in great things as well as
action. in small, usually acts moreon the im
We said,
overthr in the enemyisthe
ow ofthe first chapter, that thel pulse
natura ing toof'ideas and feelings,
strictlylogica than ons
l conclusi accord
,is
end of the act of War ; and that if we hardly conscious of his confusion , un
would keep within the strictlyphiloso- steadiness ofpurpose, and inconsistency.
phical limits of the idea, there can be no But if theintelligence by which the
other in reality . war is decreed, could even go over all
As this idea must apply to both the these things relating to the war, without
belligerent parties, it must follow , that for a moment losing sight of its aim,
there canbe no suspension in the Military still all the otherint elligences intheState
Act, and peace cannot take place until ed
which are concern may not be able to do
one or other of the parties concerned is the same ; thus an opposition arises, and
overthrown . with that comes the necessity for a force
In the chapter on the suspension of capable of overcoming the inertia ofthe
the Belligerent Act, we have shown whole mass - a force which is seldoni
how the simple principle
nt
of hostility ap- forthcoming to the full.
plied to its embodime , man, and all This inconsistency takes place on
circumstances out of which it makes a
one or other of the two sides, or it may
war, is subject to checks and modifica be on both sides, and becomes the cause
tions from causes which are inherent of the war being something quite dif
the ferent to whatit should be, according to
But this modification is not nearly the conception of it a half and half
sufficie nt tocarry us from theorigina production,a thing without a perfect
conception of War to the concrete form inner cohesion.
in which it almost everywhere appears
. This is how we find it almost every
Most wars appear only as an angry where, and we might doubt whether our
feeling on both sides, under the influ notion of its absolute character or nature
ence of which , each side takes up arms
to protect himself, and to put his ad was founded in reality, if we had not
seen realwarfare makeits appearencein
versary in fear, and — when opportunity this absolutecompleteness justintion
offers, to strike a blow . They are, there
own times.
ments like mutuallydestructiveele-
fore, notbrought collision performed by theFrenchRevolution,the
into liko impetuous
, butwhich
tensions of two elements still apart
Buonaparte
it to thi poin . Un
quickly brought
s t der him it was carried
discharge themselves in small partial on without slackening for a moment until
shocks.
But what is now the non - conducting the enemy wasprostd rated ,andthe coun
medium which hinders the complete dis ter stroke followe almost with as little
remission . Is it not natural and neces
charge ? Why is the philosophical con
sary that this phenomenon should lead us
CHAP. II. ] ABSOLUTE AND REAL WAR . 45

back to the original conception of war not from a final adjustment of the innu
with all its rigorous deductions ? merable relations with which it is con
Shall we now rest satisfied with this nected, but from some amongst them
idea, and judge of all wars according to it, which happen to predominate; then it
however much they may differ from it, - follows, as a matter of course, that it
deduce from it all the requirements of rests upon a play of possibilities, pro
theory ? babilities, good fortune and bad, in
We must decide upon this point, for which rigorous logical deduction often
we can say nothing trustworthy on the gets lost, and in which it is in general a
P’lan of War until we have made up our useless, inconvenient instrument for the
minds whether war should only be of head ; then it also follows that war may
this kind , or whether it may be of be a thing which is sometimes war in a
another kind, greater, sometimes in a lesser degree.
If we give an affirmative to the first, All this, theory must admit, but it is its
then our Theory will be, in all respects, duty to give the foremost place tothe abso
nearer to the necessary, it will be a lute form of war, and to use that form as a
clearer and more settled thing . But general point of direction, that whoever
what should we say then of all wars wishes to learn something from theory,
since those of Alexander up to the time of may accustom himself never to lose sight
Buonaparte, if we except some cam- of it, to regard it as the natural measure
paigns of the Romans ? We should have of all his hopes and fears, in order to
to reject them in a lump, and yet we approach it where he can, or where he must.
cannot, perhaps, do so without being That a leading idea, which lies at the
ashamed of our presumption . But an root of our thoughts and actions, gives
additional evil is, that we must say to them a certain tone and character, even
ourselves, that in the next ten years when the immediately determining
there
may perhaps be a war of that same grounds come from totally different re
kind again, in spite of our Theory; and gions, is just as certain as that the
that
is stillthisquite
Theory, with arigorous
powerless against thelogic, painter can
force picture give colours
by the thisor that
with tone to his
which he
of circumstances . We must, therefore, lays on his ground .
decide to construe war as it is to be, Theory isindebted to the last wars for
and not from pure conception, but by being able to do this effectually now.
allowing room for everything of a foreign Without these warning examples of the
nature which mixes up with it and destructive force of the element set free,
fastens itself upon it - all the natural she might have talked herself hoarse to
inertia and friction of its parts, the whole no purpose ; no one would have believed
of the inconsistency, the vagueness and possible what all have now lived to see
hesitation (or timidity) of the human realised.
mind : we shall have to grasp the idea Would Prussia have ventured to pene
that war, and the form which we give trate into France in the year 1798 with
it, proceeds from ideas, feelings, and 70,000 men , if she had foreseen that the
circumstances, which dominate for the reaction in case of failure would be so
moment ; indeed, if we would be per- strong as to overthrow the old balance of
fectly candid we must admit that this power in Europe ?
has even been the case where it has Would Prussia, in 1806, have made
taken its absolute character, that is, war with 100,000 against France, if she
under Buonaparte . had supposed that the first pistol shot
If we must do so, if we must grant would be a spark in the heart of the
that war originatesand takes its form mine,which would blow it into the air ?
 ON VAR.
[BOOK VIII.
46

CHAPTER III .

A -INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTS IN WAR.

ACCORDING as we have in view the abso . was as certain as it is possible for things
lute form of war, or one of the real forms of this kind to be . This second part
deviating more or less from it, so like- Buonaparte missed at the right time, and
wise different notions of its result will he could never afterwards attain it, and
so the whole of the first part was not
In . the absolute
arise form , where everything onlTo
y use
thiles s , but
s vie w offat
theal rel
to ati
him.
ve connection
is
cauthe onectthi
se , effe ofngitsfol lowura
nat l ot
s an and r inra
henec aryð
esspi of results in war ,whichmay be regarded
as extreme , stands opposed another ex
succession ; there is, if we may use the treme, according to which war is com
accres
exp t ofn ,theman
ounsio tralldspa
no neuifo reacecti; the
onareryis—on
which war contains in itself, * on account
effects pos ed' of single independent results, in
which , as in any number of games
played, the preceding has no influence
of connec
ing,thethe le n ser
whotio which
in ies comict
of, str batly ssp
,t ea k
fol- on the next following ; everything here,
account of of efore ,ult
therthe depends only on the sum total
low one after another, on res s, and we can lay up each
the
has,culm ondingwhpoin
beyinat lossesh ever
icht whic andy vict orys
defeat glet one
sinJus like firs
as the a cou ntedr of
t kin at pla y
view. derives
commence I - on account of all these its truth from the nature of things, so
natural relations of war there is, I say, we find that of the second in history.
onlyil one resuesltpla
it tak , tocewit, theg fina
nothin isdec ideltd,.
l resu
There are cases without number inwhich
Unt
nothing won , nothing lost. Here we may a small moderate advantage might have
say indeed : the end crowns the work . been gained without any very onerous
condition being attached to it. The more
orets, war is an indi
visi this who
In ble vielé therefpar
w , , the of which ( the the
comm onmen
ele t cases isbecmod
theseofwar omeifi; edbuttheas mor
littlee
subordinate results ) have no value except as the first of the views now imagined
in their relation to this whole . The was ever completely realised in any war,
conquest of Moscow , and of half Russia
e
in1812, was of no value to Buonapart the justlasast sui
litttsle inis all repec
theres anywar ch
ts, and inthewhifirst
unless it obtained for him the peace which
he desired . But it was only a part of his canIfbe
wedisp p tod with
keeense the .first of these sup
gn ; to com te thatucti n,
onenpart
Pla waspaistill
of cam wanted ple
,thedestr Plaon
posed views, wemust perceive the necesa
of the Russian army ; if wesuppose this, who
sityle
ofev ery war being looked upon as a
from the very commencement,and
added other success then the peace
to the , that at the very first step forwards, the
commander should have in his eye the
* Book I., Chapter I. object to which every line must con
+ Book I. , Chapter I.
Book VII.,Chapters IV. and V. (Culminating verIfge.we admit the second view , then
Point of Victory ).
CHAP. III . ] INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTS IN WAR . 47

subordinate advantages may be pursued scanned in their minds the whole series
on their own account, and the rest left of events which either, in the case of
to subsequent events . success, or of the reverse, would probably
As neither of these forms of conception
follow the first step, and lead up to
peace. This was quite indispensable, as
is entirely without result, therefore theory
cannot dispense with either. But it well to enable them to determine with
makes this difference in the use of them , themselves how far victory might be
that it requires the first to be laid as followed up without danger, and how
a fundamental idea at the root of every- and where they would be in a condition
thing, and that the latter shall only to arrest the course of victory on the
be used as a modification which is justi enemy's side.
tied by circumstances . An attentive consideration of history
If Frederick the Great in the years shows wherein the difference of the
1742, 1744, 1757 , and 1758 , thrust out two cases consists. At the time of the
from Silesiaand Saxony afresh offensive Silesian War in the eighteenth century,
point into the Austrian Empire, which war was still a mere Cabinet affair, in
he knew very well could not lead to a which the people only took part as a
new and durable conquest like that of blind instrument; at the beginning of
Silesia and Saxony, it was done not the nineteenth century the people on each
with a view to the overthrow of the side weighed in the scale . The com
Austrian Empire, but from a lesser mo- manders opposed to Frederick the Great
tive, namely , to gain time and strength ; were men who acted on commission, and
and it was optional with him to pursue just on that account men in whom caution
that subordinate object without being was a predominant characteristic ; the
afraid that he should thereby risk his opponent of the Austrians and Prussians
whole existence.* But if Prussia in 1806 , may be described in a few words as the
and Austria in 1805, 1809, proposed to very god of war himself.
themselves a still more moderate object, Must not these different circumstances
that of driving the French over the give rise to quite different considerations ?
Rhine, they would not have acted in a Should they not in the year 1805, 1806,
reasonable manner if they had not first and 1809 have pointed to the extremity
of disaster as a very close possibility,
* Had Frederick the Great gained the Battle of nay, even a very great probability , and
Kollen, and taken prisoners the chief Austrian should they not at the same time have
army with their two field marshals in Prague, it led to widely different plans and measures
would have been such a tremendous blow that he
might then have entertained the idea of marching to from any merely aimed at the conquest
Vienna to make the Austrian Court tremble, and of a couple of fortresses or a paltry pro
gain a peace directly. This, in these times, un- vince ?
paralleled result, which would have been quite liko They did not do so in a degree com
what we have seen in our day, only still more
wonderful and brilliant from the contest being be mensurate with theirimportance,although
tween a little David and a great Goliath, night both Austria and Prussia, judging by
very probably have taken place after the gain of their armaments, felt that storms were
this one battle ; but that does not contradict the brewing in the political atmosphere.
assertion above maintained , for it only refers to They could not do so because those re
what the king originally looked forward to from
his offensive. The surrounding and taking prisoners lations at that time were not yet so
the enemy's armywas an event which was beyond plainly developed as they have been since
all calculation, andwhichthe king never thought from history. It is just those very cam
of,at least not until the Austrians laidthemseives paigns of 1805,1806, 1809, and following
open to it by the unskilful position in which they
placed themselves at Prague. ones, which have made it easier for us to

i
48 ON WAR . (BOOK VIN.
form a conception of modern absolute the form of absolute war, the more its
outline embraces the mass of the belli
war in its destroying energy . gerent states and draws them into the
Theory demands , therefore, that at
the commencement of every war its cha vortex, so much the more complete will
be the relation of events to one another
racter and main outline shall be defined
according to what the political conditions and the whole , but so much the more
essary it will also be not to take the
and relations lead us to anticipaingte as nec
probable. The more, that accord to first step without thinking what may be
This probability its character approaches the last.
B.—OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OBJECT OF THE WAR, AND THE EFFORTS
TO BE MADE .
in which he acts to a certain extent
The compulsion which we must use course ,
n ciple of only applying, so
towards our enemy will be regulated by upo the prin
the prop orti ons ofourownand his poli- muc h forceare
and aiming at suchanobject
nt for the at
tical demands. In so far as these are in war as just sufficie
mutually known they will give the mea. tainment its pol itical object. To make
sure of the mutual efforts ; but they are this principle practicable he must re
not always quite so evident, and this may nounce every absolute necessity of a
be a first ground of adifference inthe result , andthrow outof thecalculation
means adopted by each. remote
Here,contingencies.
therefore, the action of the mind
The situation and relations of the
states are not like each other ; this may strictly
leaves the province of science, cs
become a second cause . speaking, of logic and mathemati , and
becomes, in the widest sense of the term,
Thestrength of will , the character and an art, that is, skill in discriminating , by
capabilities of the governments are as
little like ; this is a third cause . the tact of judgment among an intinite
These three elements cause an uncer multitude of objects and relations , that
tainty in the calculation of the amount of which is the most importantand decisive.
resistance to be expected, consequently tio
Thisnably ofe judg
tactmor ment
or les cons
s in somists
e intu esae
unquitiv
an uncertainty as to the amount ofmeans
lieandtheobjectto
be inappwar
to As be chosen.
dthe want of sufficient comparisonof thingsandrelations by
exer which the remote and unimportant are
tion may result not only in failure but in more quickly set aside , and the more im
positive harm , therefore, the two sides mediate and important are sooner dis
respectively seek to outstrip each other, covered than they could be by strictly
which produces a reciprocal action .
This might lead to the utmost extre Inalord
logic er totion
deduc asc.ertain the real scale of
mity of exertion , if it was possible to the means which wemust put forth for
define such a point. war, we must think over the political
politicaldl demand
the amount heofthe ns s Objmyb
ect bot hdeon our own side andon
for ld
wou
rela be
tion lost,t mea wou los e ali cho osi ;we must consider teiltthee
to the end , and in most cases power and position of the enemy's stato
this aim at an extreme effort would be as well as of our own, the character of
wrecked by the opposing weight of forces his government and of hispeople, and
within itself. the capacities of both, and all thatcoagai
nnec
n
In this manner , he who undertakes on our own side, and the political
war is brought back again into a middle tionsof other states, and the effectwhich
 CHAP. III.] OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OBJECT, ETC. 49

the war willproduce on those States. That at different times. We must allow our
the determination of these diverse cir- selves here a passing glance at history.
cumstances and their diverse connections Half-civilised Tartars, the Republics
with each other is an immense problem , of ancient times, the feudal lords and
that it is the true flash of genius which commercial cities of the Middle Ages,
discovers here in a moment what is right, kings of the eighteenth century , and,
and that it would be quite out of the lastly, princes and people of the nine
question to become master of the teenth century, all carry on war in their
complexity merely by a methodical own way, carry it on differently, with
study, this it is easy to conceive. different means, and for a different
In this sense Buonaparte was quite object.
right when he said that it would be a The Tartars seek new abodes. They
problem in algebra before which a New- march out as a nation with their wives
ton might stand aghast. and children, they are, therefore, greater
If the diversity and magnitude of the than any other army in point of numbers,
circumstances and the uncertainty as to and their object is to make the enemy
the right measure 'augment in a high submit or expel him altogether. By
degree the difficulty of obtaining a right these means they would soon overthrow
result, we zaust not overlook the fact that everything before them if a high degree
although the incomparable importance of of civilisation could be made compatible
the matter does not increase the com- with such a condition .
plexity and difficulty of the problem , still The old Republics with the exception
it very much increases the merit of its of Romewere of small extent ; still smaller
solution . In men of an ordinary stamp their armies, for they excluded the great
freedom and activity ofmind are depressed mass of the populace : they were too nu
not increased by the sense of danger and merous and lay too close together not to
responsibility : but where these things find an obstacle to great enterprises in
give wings to strengthen the judgment, the natural equilibrium in which small
there undoubtedly must be unusual great- separate parts always place themselves
ness of soul.
according to the general law of nature :
First of all, therefore, we must admit therefore their wars were confined to
thatthe judgment on an approaching war, devastating the open country and taking
on the end to which it should be directed , some towns in order to ensure to them
and on the means which are required, selves in these a certain degree of influ
can only be formed after a full considera- ence for the future.
tion of the whole of the circumstances in Rome alone forms an exception , but
connection with it : with which therefore not until the later period of its history.
must also be combined the most indi- For a long time, by means of small bands,
vidual traits of che moment ; next, that it carried on the usual warfare with its
this decision, likeall in military life, neighbours for bootyandalliances . It
cannot be purely objective but must be became great more through the alliances
determined by the mental and moral which it formed, and through which
qualities of princes, statesmen, and gene- neighbouring peoples by degrees became
rals, whether they are united in the amalgamated with it into onewhole,than
person of one man or not. through actual conquests. It was only
The subject becomes general and more after having spread itself in this manner
fit to be treated of in the abstract if we all over Southern Italy, that it began to
look at the general relations in which advance as a really conquering power.
States have been placed by circumstances Carthage fell, Spain and Gaul were con
VOL, III . E
 ON WAR.
[BOOK VIII.
50

quered, Greece subdued ,and its dominion respect ; so far from their showing any.
extended to Egypt and Asia . Atthis thing likeextreme energy or impetuosity
period its military power was immense , in the field , their combats were generally
without its efforts being in the samepro- onlysham fights. In a word, hatredand
portion. These forces were kept up by enmity no longer roused a state to per
its riches ; it no longer resembled the sonal activity , but had become articles
its
ancient republics, nor itself as it had of trade ; war lost great part
been ; it stands alone.
danger, altered completely its nature,
andnothing we can say of the character
Just as peculiar in their way are the it then assumed, would be applicable to
wars of Alexander . With a small army ,
but distinguished for its intrinsic perfec- it in real
Theitsfeu itysys
dal . tem condensed itself by
tion, he overthrew the decayed fabric of degrees into adecided territorial supre
the Asiatic States ; without rest , and re macy ; the ties binding the State together
gardless of risks , be traverses the breadth ame closer; obligations which con
of Asia, and penetrates into India . No bec cer ned the person were made subject of
republics could do this. Only a king, in
a certain measure his own condottiere , comp osit ion ;by
the substitute in deg
most s golds, and
reecase me
becathe
could get through so much so quickly . feudal armies were turned into mer
The great and small monarchies of the The condottieri formed the
middle ages carried on their wars with conneces
cenari tin. glink in the change , and were
feudal armies . Everything was then re
stricted to a short period of time; what therefore, fora time , the instrument of
ever could not be done in that time was
the more powerful States ; but this had
dier ed
not lasted long, when the sol , hir
held to be impracticable. The feudal for a limited term , was turned into a
force itself was raised through an organ
isation of vassaldom ; the bond which standing mercenary,and themilitary force
held it together was partly legal obliga. of States now became an army,having its
tion, partly a voluntary contract; the basIt
e in
is the licura
onlypubnat thary
l asu
tre t .the slow ad
whole formed a real confederation . The vance to this stage caused a diversified
armament and tactics were based on the
right of might,onsingle combat , and int
taryerw eaving
force ofallr thr
. Unde HenreeykinIVds. we
ofmilfind;i
therefore little suited to large bodies. In the feudal contingents ,condottieri,and
fact, at no period has the union of States
been so weak, and the individual citizen stand ingdotarm
The con tieriy car
allrieemplo yedir togeth
d on the er
existence
so independent . All this influenced the up to the period of the Thirty Years'
character of the wars at that period in
the most distinct manner . They were
War, indeed there are slight traces of
comparatively rapidly carried out, there the m even in the eighteenth century.
ntlly
idlyonl ps, ing The other relations oftheStates of
the littect
was obj wase gen
le tim speera iny cam
punish but, Eur ope at these different periods were

offhiscat
retur
Thened
tle;commercial
home
great
burnt
histowns,
again and then Upon
had splthePothole,
. towns and small partly up into ainthis
itrepublics part
of
maass of therestres
pet ty States,,
state of internal
dissension , partly small monarchies in
republics brought forward the condottieri. which the power of the government was
That was an expensive, and therefore, as very limited and insecure. A State in
far as visible strength , a very limited either of these cases could not be con
military force ; as for its intensive
strength , it was of still less value in that sidered as a real unity ; it was rather an
 CHAP. III.] OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OBJECT, ETC. 51
agglomerationof loosely connected forces. denly arose the great Spanish monarchy,
Neither, therefore, could such a State be composed of Spain, Burgundy, Germany,
considered an intelligent being, acting and Italy united. What this colossus
in accordance with simple logical rules. wanted in unity and internal political
It is from this point of view we must cohesion , it made up for by gold, and its
lookat the foreign politics and wars of standing army came for the first time
the Middle Ages. Let us only think of into collision with the standing armyof
the continual expeditions of the Emperors France. After Charles's abdication ,the
of Germany into Italy for five centuries, great Spanish colossus split into two
without any substantial conquest of that parts, Spain and Austria. The latter,
country resulting from them , or even strengthened by the acquisition of Bo
having been so much as in view. It is hemia and Hungary, now appears on the
easy to look upon this as a fault repeated scene as a great power, towing the Ger
over and over again - as a false view man Confederation like a small vessel
which had its root in the nature of the behind her.
times, but it is more in accordance with The end of the seventeenth century,
reason to regard it as the consequence of the time of Louis XIV ., is to be regarded
a hundred important causes which we can as the point in history at which the
partially realise in idea, but the vital standing military power,such as it existed
energy of which it is impossible for us to in the eighteenth century, reached its
understand so vividly as those who were zenith. That military force was based
brought into actual conflict with them. on enlistment and money . States had
As long as the great States which have organised themselves into complete uni
risen out of this chaos required time to ties; and the governments, by commuting
consolidate and organise themselves, their the personal obligations oftheir subjects
whole power and energy is chiefly di- into a money payment, had concentrated
rected to that point ; their foreign Wars their whole power in their treasuries.
are few, and those that took place bear Through the rapid strides in social im
the stamp of a State-unity not yet well provements, and more enlightened
a
cemente d. system of government, this power had
The wars between France and England become very great in comparison to what
are the first that appear, and yet at that it had been. France appeared in the
time France is not to be considered as field with a standing army of a couple of
really a monarchy, but as an agglomera- hundred thousand men, and the other
tion of dukedoms and countships ; Eng- powers in proportion .
land, although bearing more the sem The other relations of States had like
blance of a unity, still fought with the wise altered. Europe was divided into
feudal organisation , and was hampered by a dozen kingdoms and two republics ; it
serious domestic troubles. was now conceivable that two of these
Under Louis XI., France made its powers might fight with each other with
greatest step towards internal unity ; out ten times as many others being
under Charles VIII. it appears in Italy mixed up in the quarrel, as would cer
as a power bent on conquest; and under tainly have been the case formerly.
Louis XIV . it had brought its political The possible combinations in political
state and its standing army to the highest relations were still manifold, but they
perfection . could be discerned and determined from
Spainattains to unity under Ferdinand time to time according to probability.
the Catholic ; through accidental mar Internal relations had almost every
riage connections, under Charles V., sud- where settled down into a pure monarchical
 (BOOK VIII.
ON WAR.
52
form ; the rights and influence of privi- indirect influence on the war through
y, es
d bodi tes net
estacabi hadhadgrad ually thisues
theiInr virt ints.proportion as the
ner,faul
and
lege
died awa andorthe become man
go ve rn me nt se pa ra ted itself from the
a complete unity , acting for the State people, and regarded itself as the state,
in all its external relations. The time war became more exclusively a business
had therefore come that a suitable in . of the government, which it carried on
strument and a despotic will could give by means of the money in its coffers and
war
a form in accordance with the the idle vagabonds it ng could pick up in its
theoretical conception . own and neighbouri countries. The
And at this epoch appeared three new consequence of this was, that the means
Alexanders — Gustavus Adolphus, Charles which the government could command
XI s dbyFrsmedalerl icbuk tth
aimI .,waan hieghGr
had tol osed
-dist,cipwhlin
lyea e
well define limits, which erably d
could be mutually estimated, both as to
armies, to raise little States to the rank
their extent and duration ; this robbed
of great monarchies, and to throw down war of its most dangerous feature: namely
everything that opposed them . If they the effort towards the extreme, and the
ha deal with
thedyhawodulondlyhatovemore Asiyati
closel c Sta
res led, hidden series of possibilities connected
embtes
Alexander in the parts they acted In theTh eith
rew fin.ancial means, the contents of
an y cas e , sor
we s ma y loo k up e
on th em
theprecur of Buonap as respec the tre ry , the state of creditof the
art ts
as asu enemy, were approximately known as
that which may be risked in war . well as the size of his army. Any large
atdwa
in Bufortcewhan r sis
con edcyonwath
gainten selosonteagasidine increase ofthese atthe outbreak ofa
war was impossible. Inasmuch asthe
on the other side .
ereign ed li mits of the enemy's power could thus
treAr miryes
asu , wh iche th
wer supe por
sovted gardthe
outreof be judged of, a State felt tolerably secure
from complete subjugation, and asthe
par tly t his private purse , or at least as Sta te was conscious at thesame time of
and noas to the people. Relations with the limits of its own means, it saw itself
a resource belonging to the government ,
restricted to a moderate aim . Protected
other states , except with respect to a few from an extreme, there was no necessity
commercial subjects, mostly concerned to venture on an extreme. Necessity no
restts th
only the inte,no of eathsue rypeoporof
the tr
of os the Tonger giving an impulse in thatdirection,
le ;at
go ve rn me nt that impulse could only nowBbe given
ut these
least ideas tended everyw he re in that way .
nismeytihocaunldrearlapetionpesrf. ulEvcoenuntekirpngoisseinincothemmanpandic
thtrematorseslvofes aslargthee esowtaneterss, anwhdicadh mith
were obliged to use the instrume of war nt
were continually seeking to increases with caution. If the armywas dispersed,
t s
withou nt
the tena e te on thes esta no new one could begot, andexcept the
being particularly interested in this im thingprudenc
ere wasy nogreat
armya thnecessit . This eiminposealld
pr ovement. The peop le, therefore
blics, wh
o akings. It was onlywhen a decided
in waer, wh theonsold re
o in asi as dert
d
in th Tartar, inv
in the Middle Ages werepueveryt, hi
un
anng
, ( if we restrict the advantage seemed to present itself that
idea to those possessing the rights of they made use of the costly instrument;
bring abou
toa general's t such an opportunity was
art ; but until it wasbrought
citizens ,) were of great consequence , were
in the eighteenth century , absolutely aboutthey floated to a certain degree in an
nothing directly, having only still an
 CHAP . II .) OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OBJECT, ETC. 53

absolute vacuum , there was no ground of Europe, and at the end of the seventeenth
action, and all forces, that is all designs, century had already got to such a point
seemed to rest. The original motive of as to trouble himself little about the
the aggressor faded away in prudence general feeling of animosity, he carried
and circumspection . on war just as it had heretofore been
Thus war , in reality, became regular
a conducted ; for while his army was cer
game, in which Tine and Chance tainly that of the greatest and richest
shuffled the cards ; but in its significa- monarch in Europe, in its nature it was
tionit was only diplomacy somewhat in- justlike others.
tensified, a more vigorousway of negoti- Plundering and devastating the
ating, in which battles and sieges were enemy's country, which play such an im
substituted for diplomatic notes. To portant part with Tartars, with ancient
obtain some moderate advantage in order nations, and even in the Middle Ages,
to make use of it in negotiations for were no longer in accordance with the
peace, was the aim even ofthe most am. spirit of the age. They were justly looked
bitious.
upon as unnecessary barbarity, which
This restricted, shrivelled - up form of might easily be retaliated, and which
war proceeded, as we have said, from the did more injury to the enemy's subjects
narrow basis on which it was supported. than the enemy's government, therefore,
But that excellent generals andkings, produced no effect beyond throwing the
like Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII., nation back many stages in all that relates
and Frederick the Great, at the head of to peaceful arts and civilisation . War,
armies just as excellent, could not gain therefore, confined itself more and more
more prominence in the general mass of both as regards means and end, to the
phenomena that even these
— men were army itself. The army with its fortresses,
obliged to be contented to remain at the and some prepared positions, constituted
ordinary level of moderate results, is to a State in a State, within which the ele .
be attributed to the balance of power in ment of war slowly consumed itself. All
Europe. Now that States had become Europe rejoiced at its taking this direc
greater, and their centres further apart tion, and held it to be the necessary
from each other, what had formerly been consequence of the spirit of progress.
done through direct perfectly natural in. Although there lay in this an error, inas
terests, proximity , contact, family con- much as the progress of the human mind
nections , personal friendship,to prevent can never lead to what is absurd, can
any one single State among the number never make five out of twice two, as we
from becoming suddenly great was ef- have already said, and must again re
fected by a higher cultivation of the art peat, still upon the whole this change
of diplomacy. Political interests , attrac- ħad a beneficial effect for the people ;
tions and repulsions developed into a only it is not to be denied that it had a
very refined system , so that a cannon shot tendency to make war still more an affair
could not be fired in Europe without all of the State, and to separate it still more
the
occ
cabinets having some interest in the from the interests of the people. The plan
urrence.
of a war on the part of thestate assuming
A new Alexander must therefore try the offensive in those times consisted
the use of a good pen as well as his good generally in the conquest of one or other
with ; and
swordhis conquestsnever went very far
yet ho. of the enemy's provinces ; the plan of
the defender was to prevent this ; tho
But although Louis XIV. had in view
to overthrow the balance of power in
particular plan of campaign was to take
one or other of the enemy's fortresses,
54 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.
or to prevent one of our own from being attained or war is badly conducted, what
taken ; it was only when a battle became be displayed.
ever art may ers
Thus matt stood when the French
unavoidable
sought for andfor thishtpurpose
foug . Whoevethat it was
r foug ht Revolution broke out ; Austria and
a battle without this unavoidable neces- Prussia tried their diplomatic art of
war ; this very
sity, from mere innate desire of gaining Whilst, accordinsoon proved insufficient.
g to the usual way of
a victory, was reckoned a general with ng gs, s ed
too much daring. Generally the campaign seei thin all hope were plac on
a very limited military force in 1793,
e ,ges,and
veryed
pass actiover with
ve one, witone sieg
h two sie was
or if it win tera such a force as no one had any concep ;
quarters, which were regarded as a neces- tion of, made its appearance. War had
suddenly become again an affair of the
sity, and during which ,the faulty arrange
ments ofthe one could never be taken people, and that of a people numbering
advantage of bythe other,and in which thirty millions,every one of whom re
the mutual relations of the twoparties Wit ed thims
gardhou elf aciti
enteringasher
zen the
e into oftheState,
details of
almost entirely ceased , formed a distinct
circumstances with which this great phe
limit to the activity which was considered nomenon was attended , we shall confine
to belong to one campaidgn.
If the forces oppose were too much ourselves to theresults which inte
n rest us
at present. By this participatio of the
on an equality , or if the aggressor was peo ple in the war instead of a cabinet
decidedly the weaker of the two, then and an army, a whole nation with its natu
neither battle nor siege took place , and ral weight came into the scale. Hence
the whole of the operations of the cam
paign pivoted onthemaintenance of forch ward, themeansavailable — the efforts
certain positions and magazines, and the whi might becalled forth —had nolonger
regular exhaustion of particular districts any definite limits ;the energy with which
of country the war itself might be conducted had no
As long as war was universally con lon ger any counterpoise, and consequently
ducted in this manner , and the natural the danger for the adversary had risen to
limits of its force were so close and obvi . theIfextreme.
the whole war of the revolution
ous, so far from anything absurd being
perceived in it,allwas considered to be passed over without allthis
makingitself
becomingquite
in the most regular order;andcriticism, felt in itsfullforce and
itsthe
to turnin
which eighteenthcenturybegan
attention to the field of art in
evident; ifthe generals of the revolution
war, addresseditself todetailswithout extreme,anddid not overthrow the
troublingitself much aboutthebegint monarchies in Europe, if the German.
nence and perfectionofeverykind, and tunity of" resisting with success,cand
even FieldMarshalDaun,towhomit checking for atimethetorrentofvictory
Greatcompletelyattainedhisobject, and incompleteness withwhichtheFrench
hers,notwithstandingthatOnly
for a great General. couldnow
stillpass
and
amongstthecommon soldiers,thenthing
againamorepenetrating
its judgmentmade
appearance, that is, sound common Directory,intheGovernmentitself,
After all this wasperfected by the
senseacknowledged thatwith
numbers something posi superior
tive shou ld be handof
based onBuonaparte,this
the strength of themilitary power,n ,
whole natio

..
CHAP . III. ] OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OBJECT, ETC.
marched over Europe, smashing every
thing in pieces so surely and certainly,
that where it only encountered the old
fashioned armies the result was not doubt
ful for a moment. A re-action, however,
awoke in due time. In Spain, the war
became of itself an affair of the people.
In Austria, in the year 1809, the Govern .
ment commenced extraordinary efforts,
by means of Reserves and Landwehr,
which were nearer to the true object,
and far surpassed in degree what this
State had hitherto conceived possible,
In Russia, in 1812, the example of Spain
and Austria was taken as a pattern, the
enormous dimensions of that empire on
the one hand allowed the preparations,
although too long deferred, still to pro
duce effect ; and, on the other hand,
intensified the effect produced. The re
sult was brilliant. In Germany, Prussia
rose up the first, made the war a national
cause, and without either money or credit,
and with a population reduced one half,
took the field with an army twice as
strong as that of 1806. The rest of
Germany followed the example of Prus
sia sooner or later, and Austria, although
less energetic than in 1809, still also
came forward with more than its usual
strength . Thus it was that Germany and
Russia in the years 1813 and 1814, in
cluding all who took an active part in,
or were absorbed in these two campaigns,
appea against France with about a
milliored
n of men .
Under these circumstances, the energy
thrown into the conduct of the war was
quite different; and, although not quite
on a level with that of the French, al
thoughat some points timidity was still
to be observed, the course of the cam
paigns, upon the whole, may be said to
have been in the new , not in the old, us, that bounds, which to a certain extent
style. In eight months the theatre of existed only in an unconsciousness of
war was removed from the Oder to the
Seine . Proud Paris had to bow its head
for the first time ; and the redoubtable at least, whenever great interests are in
Buonaparte lay fettered on the ground. dispute, mutual hostility will discharge
55
Therefore, since the time of Buona
parte, war, through being first on one
side, then again on the other, an affair
of the whole nation, has assumed quite a
now nature, or rather it has approached
much nearer to its real nature, to its
absolute perfection . The means then
called forth had no visible limit, the limit
losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm
of the Government and its subjects. By
the extent of the means, and the wide
field of possible results, as well as by the
powerful excitement of feeling which
prevailed, energy in the conduct of war
was immensely increased ; the object of
its action was the downfall of the foe ;
and not until the enemy lay powerless on
the ground was it supposed to be pos
sible to stop or to come to any under
standing with respect to the mutual
objects of the contest.
Thus, therefore, the element of war,
freed from all conventional restrictions,
broke loose, with all its natural force.
The cause was the participation of the
people in this great affair of State, and
this participation arose partly from the
effects of the French Revolution on the
internal affairs of countries, partly from
the threatening attitude of the French
towards all nations.
Now, whether this will be the case
always in future, whether all wars here
after in Europe will be carried on with
the whole power of the States, and, con
sequently, will only take place on account
of great interests closely affecting the
people, or whether a separation of the
interests of the Government from those
of the people will gradually again arise,
would be a difficult point to settle ; and,
least of all, shall we take upon us to
settle it. But every one will agree with
what is possible, when once thrown down,
are not easily built up again ; and that,
56 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.

itself in the same manner as it has done tion and necessary . But it is just as
in our times. improbable that wars henceforth will all
We here bring our historical survey have this grand character as that the
to a close, for it was not our design to wide barriers which have been opened to
give ata gallop, some of the principles them will ever becomplyetely closedagain.
on which war has been carried on in Therefore, by a theor which only dwells
upon this absolute war, all cases in which
each age, but only to show how each external influences alter the nature of
period has had its own peculiar forms
of war ,its own restrictive conditions, war would be excluded or condemned
as false. This cannot be the object of
and its own prejudices. Each period
would, therefore, also keep its own theory, which ought to be the science
of war, not under ideal but under real
theory of war, even if every where , in
early times , as well as in later, the task circumstances. Theory, therefore, whilst
had been undertaken of working out a casting a searching, discriminating and
theory on philosophical principles. The way
classi fying glance atobjects,should al
s have in view the manifold diversity
events in each age must , therefore , be
judged of in connection with the pecu of causes from which war may proceed ,
ies
liarit of the time, and only he who, and should , therefore, so trace out its
less through an anxious study of minute great features as to leave room for what
deta ils thanthrough an accurate glance is required bythe exigencies of time and
at the whole sfer
, can tran elf
hims into ent
the mom .
ar age, is fit to understand
each particulte Accordingly, we must add that the
and apprecia its generals. object which every one who undertakes
But this conduct of war, conditioned war proposes to himself, and the means
by the peculiar relations of States , and which he calls forth , are determined
of the military force employed , must still entirely according to the particular
always contain in itself something more detailsofhis position; and on that very
account they will also bear in them
general, or rather something quite gene selves the character of the time and
ral, with which , above everything,
theory is concerned . of the general relations ; lastly , that
The latest period of past time, in which they are always subject to the general con
war reached its absolute strength , con clusions to be deduced from the nature of
tains most of what is of general applica war .

CHAPTER IV.

ENDS IN WAR MORE PRECISELY DEFINED .

OVERTHROW OF THE ENEMY .

THE aim of war in conception must al Now, what is this overthrow ? It does
ways be the overthr ow of the enemy ;
ental not always imply as necessary the com
this is the fundam idea from which plete conquest of the enemy's country .
we set out. İf the Gormans had reached Paris, in
CHAP. IV .] ENDS IN WAR MORE PRECISELY DEFINED . 57

1792, there — in all human probability— levelled against the Russian auxiliary
the war wtth the Revolutionary party army, in the doubtful battle of Eylau,
would have been brought to an end at once was not decisive enough, and the un
for a season ; it was not at all necessary doubted victory of Friedland was required
at that time to beat their armies before- as a finishing blow , like the victory of
hand, for those armies were not yet Austerlitz inthe preceding year.
to be looked upon as potent powers We see that here, also, the result can
in themselves singly . On the other not be determined from general grounds;
hand, in 1814, the allies would not the individual causes, which no one
have gained everything by taking Paris knows who is not on the spot, and many
if Buonaparte had still remained at the of a moral nature which are never heard
head of a considerable army ; but as of, even the smallest traits and accidents,
his army had nearly melted away, there- which only appear in history as anec
fore, also in the year 1814 and 1815 the dotes, are often decisive. All that theory
taking of Paris decided all. If Buona- can here say is as follows : -- That the
parte in the year 1812 , either before or great pointis to keep the overruling rela.
after taking Moscow, had been able to tions of both partiesin view . Out of them
give the Russian army of 120,000 on the a certain centre of gravity, a centre of
Kaluga road, a complete defeat, such as power and movement, will form itself, on
he gave the Austrians in 1805 , and the which everything depends ; and against
Prussian arm
y, 1806, then the possession this centre of gravity of the enemy, the
of that capital would most probably have concentrated blow of all the forces must
brought about a peace, although an be directed .
enormous tract of country still remained The little always depends on the great,
to be conquered. In the year 1805 it the unimportant on the important, and
was the battle of Austerlitz that was the accidental on the essential . This
decisive ; and, therefore, the previous must guide our view.
possession of Vienna and two -thirds of Alexander had his centre of gravity in
the Austrian States, was not of sufficient his army, so had Gustavus Adolphus,
weight to gain for Buonaparte a peace ; Charles XII. , and Frederick the Great,
but, on theother hand also, after that bat- and the career of any one of them would
tle ofAusterlitz, theintegrityof Hungary, soon have been brought to a close by the
still intact, was not of sufficient weight destruction of his army : in States torn
to prevent the conclusion of peace. In by internal dissensions, this centre gepe
the Russian campaign , the complete dependent
rally lies inonthegreater
defeat of the Russian army was the last
capital;ones,
in itsmall states
lies gene
blow required : the Emperor Alexander rally in the army ofthese allies ; in a con
had no otherarmy at hand, and,there- federacy,itliesin the unity of interests ;
fore, peace was the certain consequence in a national insurrection, in the person of
of victory. If the Russian army had the chief leader, and in public opinion ;
heen on the Danube along with the against these points the blow must be
Austrian, and had shared in its defeat, directed. If the enemy by this loses his
then probably the conquest of Vienna balance, no time must be allowed for him
would not have been necessary, and to recover it ; the blow must be persist
peace would have been concluded in ently repeated in the same direction , or,
Linz . in other words, the conqueror must al
In other cases, the complete conquest ways direct his blows upon the mass, but
of a country has not been sufficient, as in not against a fraction of the enemy. It
the year 1807, in Prussia, when the blow is not by conquering one of the enemy's
58 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII

provinces, with little trouble and superior the last is the case, the easier it is tolook
numbers, and preferring the more secure upon the different enemies as one alone,
possession of this unimportant conquest and the more readily we can simplify our
to great results, but by seeking out con- principal enterprise to one great blow ;
stantly the heart of the hostile power, and and as long as this is in any way possible,
staking everything in order to gain all, it is the most thorough and complete
that we can effectually strike the enemy means of success.
to the ground . We may, therefore, establish it as a
But whatever may be the central point principle, that if we can conquer all our
of the enemy's power against which we enemies by conquering one of them, the
are to direct our operations , still the con- defeat of that one must be the aim of the
quest and destruction of his army is the war, because in that one we hit the com
surest commencement , and in all cases, mon centre of gravity of the whole war.
the most essential. There are very few cases in which this
Henc e we asce
think that, accor ding kind ofconception is not admissible , and
majo rity of rtai ned fact s, the to
follthe
ow- where this reduction of several centres of
gravity to one cannot be made . But if
ing circumstances chiefly bring about the this cannot be done, then indeed there is
overthrow of the enemy .
1. Dispersion of his army if it forms, no alternative but to look npon the war
in some degree , a potential force. as two or more separate wars, each of
which has its own aim . As this case
2. Capture of the enemy's capital city,
if it is both the centre of the power of the supposes the substantive independence of
State and the seat of political assemblies several enemies, consequently a great
and actions, superiority of the whole,therefore in this
3. An cffectual blow against the prin case the overthrow of the enemy cannot,
cipal ally, if he is more powerful than in general, come into question .
the enemy himself. We now turn more particularly to the
We have always hitherto supposed the question , When is suchan object possible
enemy in war as a unity, which is allow- and advisable ?
able for considerations of a very general In the first place, our forces must be
nature. But having said that the subju sufficient, - a decisive victory over those
gation of the enemy lies in the overcoming 1. To gain
his resistance, concentrated in the centre of the enemy
of gravity , we must lay aside this sup . 2. To make the expenditure of force
position and introduce the case, in which which may be necessary to follow up the
wehav
ponent .
victory
e to dealwithmorethan one op- longeto apointatwhichitwill
r be possi ble for the enemy to no
re
If two or more States combine against gain his balance.
a third, that combination constitutes, in t t
Nex , we mus feel sure that in our
apolitical aspect, only onewar ,atthe political situation, such a result willnot
same time this political union has also its excite against us new enemies , who may
degrees. compel us on the spot to set free our first
The question is whether each State in enemy
the coalition possesses an independent France, in the year 1806, was able
interest in, and an independentforce complet
with which to prosecute , the war ; or so toit bro
in doingely conquer
ught Prussia,althoug
down upon itselhf
whether there is one amongst them on the whole military power of Russia , be
whose interests and forces those of the cause it was ina condition to cope with
others lean for support . The more that the Russians in Prussia .
CHAP . Iv. ] ENDS IN WAR MORE PRECISELY DEFINED . 59

France might have done thesame in is more likely to happen for the con
Spain in 1808 as far as regards England, quered than for the conqueror. Further,
but not as regards Austria. It was com- we must recollect that to make right use of
pelled to weaken itself materially in a first victory, as we have already shown,
Spain in 1809, and must have quite a great expenditure of force is necessary ;
given up the contest in that country if this is not a mere outlay once for all, but
it had not had otherwise great superi- has to be kept up like housekeeping,
ority both physically and morally, over a great scale ; the forces which have 1
Austria . been sufficient to give us possession of a
These three cases should therefore be province, are not always sufficient to
carefully studied, that we may not lose meet this additional outlay ; by degrees
in the last the cause which we have the strain upon oạr resources becomes
gained in the former ones, and be con- greater, until at last it becomes insup
demned in costs.
portable ; time, therefore, of itself may
In estimating the strength of forces, bring about a change.
and that which may be effected by them, Could the contributions which Buona
the idea very often suggests itself to look parte levied from the Russians and Poles,
upon time by a dynamic analogy as a in money and in other ways, in 1812 ,
factor of forces, and to assume accord- have procured the hundreds of thousands
ingly that half efforts, or half the num- of men that he must have sent to Moscow
ber of forces would accomplish in two in order to retain his position there ?
years what could only be effected in one But if the conquered provinces are
year by the whole force united. This sufficiently important, if there are in them
view which lies at the bottom of military points which are essential to the well
schemes, sometimes clearly, sometimes being of those parts which are not con
less plainly , is completely wrong. quered, so that the evil, like a cancer, is
An operation in war, like everything perpetually of itself gnawing further
else upon earth, requires its time ; as a into the system , then it is possible that
matter of course we cannot walk from the conqueror, although nothing further
Wilna to Moscow in eight days ; but is done, may gain more than he loses.
there is no trace to be found in war of Now in thisstate of circumstances, if no
any reciprocal action between time and help comes from without, then time may
force, such as takes place in dynamics. complete the work thus commenced;
Time is necessary to both belligerents, what still remains unconquered will,
and the onlyquestion is: which
ofthetwo, perhaps, fall of itself. Therefore, thus
judging by his position, has most reason time may also become a factor of his
to expect special advantages from time? forces, but this can only take place if a
Now ( exclusive of peculiarities in the return blow from the conquered is no
situation on one side or the other) the longer possible, a change of fortune in
vanquished has plainly the most reason, his favour no longer conceivable, when
at the same timecertainly not by dynamic, therefore this factor of his forces is no
but by psychological laws. Envy, jea- longer of any value tothe conqueror ; for
lousy,anxiety for self, as well as nowand he has accomplished the chief object, the
again magnanimity, are the natural in- danger of the culminating point is past,
tercessors for the unfortunate ; they raise in short, the enemy is already subdued.
up for him on the one hand friends, and Our object in the above reasoning has
on the other hand weaken and dissolve been to show clearly that no conquest
the coalitionamongst his enemies. There- can be finished too soon, that spreading
fore, by delay somethingadvantageous itover a greater space of timethan is abso
60 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII.
lutely necessary for its completion, in- 3. Fortifying important points, as,
stead of facilitating it, makes it more magazines, bridges, positions, etc.
difficult. If this assertion is true, it is 4. Resting the troops in quarters
further true also that if we are strong during winter, or when they require to be
enough to effect a certain conquest, we recruited in health and refreshed.
must also be strong enough to do it in 5. Waiting for the reinforcements of
one march without intermediate stations. the ensuing year.
Of course we do not mean by this with- If for the attainment of all these ob
out short halts, in order to concentrate jects we make a formal division in the
the forces, and make other indispensable course of the offensive action, a resting
arrangements . point in the movement, it is supposed
By this view, which makes the cha that we gain a new base and renewed
racter of a speedy and persistent effort force, as if our own State was following
towards a decision essential to offensive up in the rear of the army, and that the
war, we think we have completely set latter laid in renewed vigour for every
aside all grounds for that theory which fresh campaign.
in place of the irresistible continued All these praiseworthy motives may
following up of victory, would substitute make the offensive war more convenient,
a slow methodical system as being more but they do not make its results surer,
sure and prudent . But even for those and are generally only make-believes to
who have readily followed us so far, our cover certain counteracting forces, such
assertion has, perhaps after all, so much as the feelings of the commander or ir
the appearance of a paradox , is at first resolution in the cabinet. We shall try
sight so much opposed and offensive to to roll them up from the left flank.
an opinion which , like an old prejudice, 1. The waiting for reinforcements suits
has taken deep root, and has been re the enemy just as well, and is, we may
peated a thousand times in books, that say, more to his advantage. Besides, it
we considered it advisable to examine lies in the nature of the thing that a
more closely the foundation of those State can place in line nearly as many
plausible arguments which may be combatant forces in one year as in twot;
advanced . for all the actual increase of combatan
It is certainly easier to reach an object force in the second year isbut trifling in
near us than one at a distance , but when relation to the whole.
the nearest one does not suit our purpose 2. The enemy rests himself at the
it does not follow that dividing the work , same time that we do .
that a resting point, will enable us to 3. The fortification of towns and posi
get over the second half of the road tions is not thework of the army, and
easier. A small jump is easier than a therefore no ground for any delay,
large one, but no one on that account, 4. According to the present system of
wishing to cross a wide ditch, would jump subsisting armies, magazines are more
half of it first. y
necessar when the army is in canton
If we look closely into the foundation ment s , than when it is advancing . As
of the conception of the so -called me long as we advance with success, we
thodical offensive war, we shall find continually fall into possession of some
it generally consists of the following of the enemy's provision depots ,which
things : assist us when the country itself is poor.
1. Conquest of those fortresses belong 5. The taking of the enemy's fortresses
ing to the enemy which we meet with . cannot be regarded as asuspension of
2. Laying in the necessary supplies. the attack : it is an intensified progress,
CHAP . Iv .] ENDS IN WAR MORE PRECISELY DEFINED. 61

and therefore the seeming suspension the idea that time of itself can do some
which is caused thereby is not properly thing for the advantage of the assailant.
a case such as we allude to, it is neither But as the political relations may change
a suspension nor a modifying of the use from year to year, therefore, on that
of force. But whether a regular siege, account alone, many cases may happen
a blockade, or a mere observation of one which are exceptions to this general
or other is most to the purpose, is a ques truth .
tion which can only be decided according It may appear perhaps as if we had
to particular circumstances. We can left our general point of view , and had
only say this in general, that in answer- nothing in our eye except offensive
ing this question another must be clearly war ; but it is not so by any means .
decided , which is, whether the risk will Certainly, he who can set before himself
not be too great if, while only blockading, the complete overthrow of the enemy as
we at the same time make a further ad- his object, will not easily be reduced to
vance . Where this is not the case, and take refuge in the defensive, the imme
when there is ample room to extend our diate object of which is only to keep pos
forces,it is better to postpone the formal session ; but as we stand by the declara
siege till the termination of the whole tion throughout, that a defensive without
offensive movement. We must therefore any positive principle is a contradiction
take care not to be led into the error of in strategy as well as in tactics, and
neglecting the essential, through the therefore always come back to the fact
idea of immediately making secure that that every defensive, according to its
which is conquered. strength, will seek to change to the attack
No doubt it seems as if, by thus ad- as soon as it has exhausted the advan
vancing, we at once hazard the loss of tages of the defensivo, sotherefore, how
what has been already gained . Our ever great or small the defence may be,
opinion, however, is that no division of we still also include in it contingently the
action, no resting point, no intermediate overthrow of the enemy as an object
stations are in accordance with the nature which this attack may have, and which is
of offensive war, and that when the same to be considered as the proper object of
are unavoidable, they are to be regarded the defensive, and we saythat there may
as an evil which makes the result not be cases in which the assailant, notwith
more certain , but, on the contrary, more standing he has in view such a great
uncertain ; and further, that, strictly object, may still prefer at first to make
speaking, if from weakness or any cause use of the defensive form . That this
we havebeen obliged to stop, a second idea is founded in reality is easily shown
spring at the object we have in view is, by the campaign of 1812. The Emperor
as a rule, impossible ; but if such a Alexander in engaging in the war did
second spring is possible, then the stop- not perhaps think of ruining his enemy
page at the intermediate station was completely, as was done in the sequel ;
unnecessary, and that when an object at but is there anything which makes such
the very commencement is beyond our an idea impossible ? And yet, if so, would
strength, it will always rema so . it not still remain very natural that the
We say, this appears to be the general Russians began the war on the de
truth, bywhich we only wish to setaside fensive ?
62 ON WAR . [BOOK yin.

CHAPTER V.

ENDS IN WAR MORE PRECISELY DEFINED— ( CONTINUED ).

LIMITED OBJEOT .

has taken up arms with that object, and

In the preceding chapter we have said every moment of time which is lost with
that, under the expression " over throw of d son h
the enemy," we understan the real out any goo rea , is so muc lost time
d
absolute aim of the “ act of war ;" now him .have here decided for offensive or
forWe
we shall see what remains to be done
when the conditions under which this defensive war on grounds which have
object might be attained do not exist. nothing to do with the relative forces of
These cond ons presuppose a great the combatants respectively, and yet it
y appear that it would be nearer right
physical or moral superiority, or a great mato make the choice of the offensive or
spirit of enterprise , an innate propensity
to extreme hazards. Now where all this defensive chiefly dependent onthe mutual
tions of combatants in point of mili
is not forthcoming, the aim in the act of rela
war can only be of two kinds ; either the tary strength ; our opinion is, that in
conquest ofsomesmallormoderate por road. doing soThewe logi justectnleavesse theof right
shoucalld corr our
tion of the enemy's country , or the de
simpllenow
fence ofour own until better times ; this shal argume nt no her
see whet one willdisp uterete
in the conc ; 18
last is the usual case in defensive war.
Whether the one or the other of these case it leads to the contrary.
aims is of the right kind, can always be Let us suppose a small Štate which is
settled by calling to mind the expression involved in a contestwith a very superior
usedinreference to the last. Thewaiting its posriti
powe ,and eesome
foresbec
on will thatwith
worse :eachyear
should it
till more favourable times implies that we
not, if war is inev itab
have reason to expect such times here time when its situation ismak le, e use of the
furthest from
after, and this waiting for, that is, de Then it must attack , not
fensive war, is always based on this the worst ?
ensures any
prospect ; on the other hand , offensive because the attack in itself
war,that is, the taking advantage of the advantages — it will rather increase the
presentmoment, is always commanded disparity offorces — butbecausethisState
pect,not
sary . toourselves, but to our adver- ing the matter completely to an isine
Thethirdcase, which isprobably the van
ing,at
most common, is when neither party has tagesleast,in
which the meanhertime,someado
it may eafter turn to
anything definite to look for from the account. This theory cannot appear
future, when therefore it furnishes no absurd . But ifthethissmallState isquite
motive for decision . certain that enemy will advance
In this case , the
offensive war is plainly imperative upon against it, then, certainly,it can and
him who is politically the aggressor, that may make use of thedefensive against
is, who has the positive motive ; for he its enemy toprocurea first advantage;
 CHAP . VI.] INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL OBJECT, ETC. 63

there is then at any rate no danger of offensive war and defensive war ; we
losing time. shall consider both in separate chapters.
If, again, we suppose a small State But we shall first turn our attention
engaged in war with a greater, and that to another phase.
the future has no influence on their de- Hitherto we have deduced the modifi
cisions, still, if the small State is politi- cations in the object of war solely from
cally the assailant, we demand of it intrinsic reasons . The nature of the
also that it should go forward to its political view (or design), we have only
object. taken into consideration in so far as it
If it has had the audacity to propose is or is not directed at something posi
to itself a positive end in the face of tive. Everything else in the political
superior numbers, then it must also act, · design is in reality something extraneous
that is, attack the foe, if the latter to war ; but in the second chapter of
does not save it the trouble. Waiting the first book (End and Means in War)
would be an absurdity ; unless at the we have already admitted that the nature
moment of execution it has altered its of the political object, the extent of our
political resolution , a case which very own or the enemy's demand, and our
frequently occurs, and contributes in no wholepolitical relation practically have a
small degree to give wars an indefinite most decisive influence on the conduct of
character.
the war, and we shall therefore devote
These considerations on the limited the following chapter to that subject
object apply to its connection both with specially.

CHAPTER VI.

A.- INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICAL OBJECT ON THE MILITARY OBJECT.

We never find that a State joining in the
cause of another State, takes it up with
the same earnestness as its own. An
auxiliary army of moderate strength is
sent; if it is not successful, then the ally
looks upon the affair as in a manner
ended , and tries to get out of it on the
cheapest terms possible.
In European politics it has been usual necessarily begin with a declaration of
for States to pledge themselves tomutual
assistance by an alliance offensive and
defensive, not so far that the one takes
part in the interests and quarrels of the
other, but only so far as to promise one
another beforehand the assistance of a
fixed, generally very moderate , contin
gent of troops, without regard to the
object of the war, or the scale on which
it is about to be carried on by the
principals. In a treaty of alliance of
This kind, the ally does not look upon
himself as engaged with the enemy in a
war properly speaking, which should
war, and end with a treaty of peace.
Still, this idea also is nowhere fixed with
any distinctness, and usage varies one
way and another.
The thing would have a kind of con
sistency, and it would be less embarrass
64 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII.
ing to the theory of war if this promised their foundation can have no gradations;
contingent of ten, twenty , or thirty nevertheless it was no mere diplomatic
thousand men was handed over entirely offspring which thereason couldlook
to the state engaged in war, so that it down upon ,but deeply rooted in the
could be used as required; it might natural limitedness and weakness of
then be regarded as a subsidised force. human nature.
* Lastly, even in wars carried on with
But the usual practice is widely different.
Genera the auxili force has its own a greallies,
lly ary out the political cause of a war has
at influence on the method in which
commander, who depends only on his
own government , and to whom theys it is conducted .
prescribe an object such as best suit Ifwe only require from the enemy a
the shilly -shally measures they have in small sacrifice, then we content ourselves
view. with aiming at a small equivalent by the
But even if two States go to war with war, and we expect to attain that by
athird , they do not always both look in moderate efforts. The enemy reasons in
like measure upon this common enemy very much the same way. Now, if one
as one that they must destroy or be or the other finds that he has erred in his
dest royed by themselves, thebusiness is rockoning — thatin place of being slightly
often settled like a commercial trans superior to the enemy, as he supposed,
action ; each, according to the amount he is, if anything, rather weaker, still,
of the risk he incurs orthe advantage to at that moment, moneynt and all othe r
be expected , takes shares in the concern al lse
means , as well as sufficie mor impu
to the extent of 30,000 or 40,000 men, for greater exertions are very often de
and acts as if he could not lose more than ficient : in such a case he just does what
the amount of his investment. is called “ the best he can ;" hopes better
Not onlyisthis the pointof view taken things inthefuture, although hehas not
whenaState comesintotheassis
another in a cause tancein ofa and
which it has the test
the sligh war,found ation
in the for time
mean hopes
such drags
manner, little concern , but even when itself feebly along, like abody worn out
both allies have a common and very with sickness.
considerable interest at stake, nothing Thus it comes to pass that the recipro
can bedoneexcept underdiplomatic cal action, the rivalry,the violenceand
reservation , and the contracting parties impetuosity ofwarlose themselves in the
stipulatedcontingent, in order toemploy secu
the rest of the forces according to the bothritypartiniesmvery
ovewith
circumscaribe
certain
d kindof
spheres.
special ends to which policy may happen If this influence of the political object
to lead them . is once permitted, as it then must be,
there is no longer any limit, and we must
into ralbyre
gene
aso n of alli
, and was only
ance
obli
s was
ged quit e bepleased to come down to suchwarfare
to give as consists in a merethreatening of the
place to the natural way in quite modern
times, when the extremity of danger drove enemy and in negotiating.
That thetheoryofwar, if it is to be
and to continue a philosophical study,
(asin the warsagainst Budnapartes,and finds itself here ntia
ina difficulty is clene
All that is esse lly inherent in the
pelle d themtoit (asunder Buonaparte):
It was an abnormal thing , an anomaly, and it is in danger of being left with
.
for war and peace are ideas which in But the
out any point of support.
 CHAP . VI. ] WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. 65
natural outlet soon shows itself. Accord- guiding principles. All military art then
ing as a modifying principle gains in- changes itself into mere prudence, the
fluence over the act of war, or rather, principal object of which will be to pre
the weaker the motives to action become, vent the trembling balance from suddenly
the more the action will glide into a turning to our disadvantage, and the
passive resistance, the less eventful it half war from changing into a completo
will become, and the less it will require one .

B. - WAR IS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY.

HAVING made the requisite examination lines on which the events of the war pro
on both sides of that state of antagonism gress, and to which they are attached, are
in which the nature of war stands with only the general features of policy which
relation to other interests of men indi. run all through the war until peace takes
vidually and of the bond of society, place. And how can we conceive it to be
in order not to neglect any of the oppos otherwise ? Does the cessation of diplo
ing elements,—an antagonism which is matic notes stop the political relations
founded in our own nature, and which, between different nations and Govern
therefore, no philosophy can unravel,– ments ? Is not war merely another kind
we shall now look for that unity into of writing and language for political
which , in practical life, these antago- thoughts ? It has certainly a grammar
nistic elements combine themselves by of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to
partly neutralising each other. We itself.
should have brought forward this unity Accordingly,warcan never be separated
at the very commencement, if it had not from political intercourse, and if, in the
been necessary to bring out this contra- consideration of the matter, this is done
dictionvery plainly, and also to look at in any way, all the threads of the differ
the different elements separately. Now, ent relations are, to a certain extent,
this unity is the conception that war is only broken, and we have before us a sense
a part ofpolitical intercourse, therefore by no less thing without an object.
means an independent thing in itself. This kind of idea would be indis
We know ,certainly, that war is only pensable even if war was perfect war,
called forth through the political inter- the perfectly unbridled element of hos
course of Governments and nations ; but tility, for all the circumstances on which
in general it is supposed that such inter- it rests, and which determine its leading
course is broken off by war, and that a features, viz ., our own power, the enemy's
totally different state of things ensues, power, allies on both sides, the character
subject to no laws but its own. istics of the people and their Govern
We maintain, on the contrary : that ments respectively, etc., as enumerated
war is nothing but a continuation of in the first chapter of the first book,—a
political intercourse, with a mixture of they not of a political nature, andare they
other means. We say, mixed with other not so intimately connected with the whole
means, in order thereby to maintain at political intercourse that it is impossible
the same time that this political inter- to separate them ?-Butthis view isdoubly
course doesnot cease by the waritself, is indispensable if we reflect that real war
not changed into something quite differ- is no such consistent effort tending to
ent, but that, in its essence, it continues an extreme, as it should be according to
to exist, whatever may be the form of the the abstract idea, but a half and half
means which it uses, and that the chief thing, a contradiction in itself ; that, as
VOL . III, F
 BOOK VIII.
66 ON WAR ,

such, it cannot follow its own laws, but siderations, ect,

but small as tisinitstheinfluence
must be looked upon as a part of another in this resp it is grea forma.
whole , —and this whole is policy. tion of a plan for a whole war, or å
Policy in making use of war avoids all campaign, and often even for a battle.
those rigorous conclusions which proceed For this reason we were in no hurry
from its nature ; it troubles itself little to establish this view at the commence
le
about final possibilities, confining its ment. Whi enga
ged with particulars,
s
attention to immediate probabilitie . If itwou ld have given us little help; and,
on the other hand, would have distracted
much uncertainty in the whole action our attention to a certain extent ; in
ensues therefrom , if it thereby becomes
asort of gamet, he policy of eachcabinet the plan of a war or campaign it is
places its confidence in the belief that in indispensable.
There n
is, upo the who , noth le ing
this game it will surpass its neighbour in more import ant in life than to find out
skilland sharpsightedness . ht point of view from which things
Thus policy makes out of the all the rig
overpowering element of war a mere
should be looked at and judged of, and
t
then to keep to that poin ; for we can only
battle-sword,whichshould be lifted with apprehend themass ofevents in their
body tostrike once forall, into alight the keeping to one point of view that
guards us from inconsistency .
handy weapon , which is even sometimes If, therefore, in drawing up a plan of
nothing more than a rapier to exchange a war it is not allowable to have a two
thrusts and feints and parr ies.
ns
Thus the contradictio in which man , fold or three-fold point of view, from
naturally timid , becomes involved by war , which things may ber looked at,now with
the eye ofa soldie ,then with that of
may be solved , if we choose to accept this an administrator, and then again with
as a solution .
it that of a politician, etc., thenthe next
rally ramounis,whether
take itscharacterfromthenco.TTi question t, and everyt hingisnecessarily
policy else subor
policy is grand and powerful, so will pa
also be the war, and this may be carried dinate to it.
to the point at which war attains to its That policy unites in itself, and recon
absolute form . ciles all the interests of internal admin
In this way of viewingthe subject, istrations,even those of humanity,and
therefore, weneed not shut dut of sight ishatever else are rational subjects
keep itcontinually in view ' in theback nothingin
ground.
itself,"
sentative and exceptamere
exponen t of all represe
these
interests towards other States . That
, war
recoversunity ;only by it can we see all policymaytakea false direction,and many
wars as things of one kind ; and it is promoteu“nfairlytheambitiousrendre
obtainthetrue and perfectbasisand rulers,"does not concern ushere; fort
point of view from which great plans under nocircumstances can theforte
may be traced out and determined upon. of war be regarded as its preceptor,
It is true the political element does and we can only look at policy here as
the representative of the interests
not sink deep into the details of war ,
Vedettes are not planted, patrols do not generally of the whole community.
make their rounds from political con The only question, therefore, is,
 CHAP . VI.] WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY.
67

whether in framing plans for a war the At all events, from this point of view ,
political point of view should give way there is no longer in the nature of things
to the purely military (if such a point is a necessary conflict between the political
conceivable ), that is to say, should dis- and military interests, and where it
appear altogether, or subordinate itself to appears it is therefore to be regarded
it, or whether the political is to remain as imperfect knowledge only. That
the ruling point of view , and the mili- policy makes demands on the war which
tary to be considered subordinate to it. it cannot respond to, would be con
That the political point of view should trary to the supposition that it knows
end completely when war begins, is only the instrument which it is going to use,
conceivable in contests which are wars therefore, contrary to a natural and in
of life and death , from pure hatred : as dispensable supposition. But if it
wars are in reality, they are as we before judges correctly of themarch of military
said, only the expressions or manifesta- events, it is entirely its affair, and can
tions of policy itself. The subordination be its only to determine what are the
of the political point of view to the events and what the direction of events
military would be contrary to common most favourable to the ultimate and
sense,for policy has declared the war ; great end of the war.
it is the intelligent faculty, war only In one word, the art of war in its
the instrument, and not the reverse. The highest point of view is policy, but, no
subordination of the military point of doubt, a policy which fights battles,
view to the political is, therefore, the instead of writing notes.
only thing which is possible . According
If we reflect on the nature of real war, great militarytoenterprise,
this view, orto the
leave
plana
and call to mind what has been said for one, to a purely military judgment and
in the third chapter of this book, that decision, is a distinction which cannot be
every war should be viewed above all things allowed, and is even prejudicial; in
according to the probability of its character deed, it is an irrational proceeding to
and its leading features as they are to be consult professional soldiers on the plan
deduced from the political forces and propor of a war, that they may give a purely 1

tions, and that often - indeed we may military opinion upon what the cabinet
safely affirm ,in our days, almost always should do; but still more absurd is the
-war is to be regarded as an organic demand of Theorists that a statement of
whole, from which the single branches the available means of war should be
are not to be separated, in which there- laid before the general, that he may
fore every individual activity flows into draw out a purely military plan for the
the whole, and also has its origin in the war or for a campaign, in accordance
idea of this whole , then it becomes certain with those means. Experience in general
and palpable to us that the superior also teaches us that notwithstanding
stand -point for the conduct of the war, the multifarious branches and scientific
from which its leading lines must pro character of military art in the pre
ceed , can be no other than that of policy. sent day, still the leading outlines of
From this point of view the plans a war are always determined by the
come, as it were, out of a cast; the cabinet , that is, if we would use tech
apprehension of them and the judgment nical language, by a political not a mili
upon them become easier and more natu- tary functionary .
ral, our convictions respecting them gain This is perfectly natural. None of
in force, motives are more satisfying, the principal plans which are required
and history more intelligible. for a war can be made without an insight
68 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII.

into the political relations; and, in reality, by the two Brothers Belleisle and the
when people speak, as they often do, of Duke of Choiseul, although all three
the prejudicial influence of policy on the were good soldiers.
conduct of a war, they say in reality some If war is to harmonise entirely with
thing very different to what they intend . the political views and policy, to accom
It is not this influ ence but thepolicy war,
modate itself to the means available for
there is only one alternative to be
itself h
whic d
shoul be found fault with .
If policy is right , that is, if it succeeds recommended when the statesman and
in hitting the object, then it can only act soldier are not combined in one person,
on the war in its sense , withe advantage whi chis, to make the chiefcommander
also ; and if this influenc of policy a member of the cabinet, that he may
causes a divergence from the object, the take part in its councils and decisions
cause is only to be looked for in a mis on important occasions . But then again,
taken policy . this is only possible when the cabinet,that
when policy promises itself is the government itself, is near thethea,
wrongonlyeffect from certain military tre of war,so that things can be settled
a Itis
means and measures, an effect opposed without a seriouswaste of time.
to their nature, that it can exercise a This is what the Emperor of Austria
prejudicial effect on war by the course did in 1809, and the allied sovereigns in
it prescribes . Just as a person in a lan 1813 , 1814, 1815 , and the arrangement
guage with which he is not conversant proved completely satisfactory: ry
sometimes says what he does not intend , The influence of any milita man
so policy,when intending right,mayoften cabin
order things which do not tally with itsexcepett , the raldange
Genemely
is extre rous in
-in Chief the
; it very
own views . seldom leads to able vigorous action.
This has happened times without end, The example of France in 1793, 1794,
and it showsthata certainknowledge
of the nature of war is essential to the 1795,s, man
Pari d thet,cond
whenageCarno whileresi dingin
uct of the war,
management of political commerce . is to beavoided, as a system of terror is
But before going further , we must not at the command of any but a revo
guard ourselves against a false inter- lutionary government.
pretation of which this is very suscep We shall now conclude with some
tible . We are far from holding the reflections derived from history .
opinion that a war minister , smothered In thelast decennary of thepastcentury,
in official papers, a scientific engineer , whenthat remarkable changeinthe artof
or even a soldier who has been well
tried in the field , would , any of them ,
warin Europe took place by which thebest
armies found that a partof their method

State where the sovereign does not act and events were brought about of a mag
,
for himself ; or in other words, we do not
nitude far beyond what any one had any
mean to saythat this acquaintancewith previous conception of, it certainlyeip:
thena tureforofwa
fication a war minister ; ipalquali-
ristheprinc elevation , thin d that a false calculation rge
peareg was of everye
to be laid to thecha of the
superiority ofmind , strength of charac art of war. It was plain that while
ter, these are the principal qualifications confined by habit within a narrow circle
which he must possess ; a knowledge of of conceptions, she had been surprised
war may be supplied in one way or the by the force of a new state of relations,
other , France was never worse advised
lying, no doubt , outside thatcircle, but
in its military and political affairs than still not outsidethenature of things.
 CHAP . VI.] WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. 69

Those observers who took the most If policy had risen to a just appro
comprehensive view, ascribed the cir- ciation of the forces which had sprung
cumstance to the general influence which up in France, and of the new relations
policy had exercised for centuries on the in the political state of Europe, it
art of war, and undoubtedly to its very might have foreseen the consequences,
great disadvantage, and by which it had which must follow in respect to the great
sunk into ahalf -measure, often into mere features of war, and it was only in this
sham fighting. They were right as to way that it could arrive at a correct view
fact, but they were wrong in attributing of the extent of the means required as
it to something accidental, or which well as of the best use to make of those
might have been avoided . means .
Others thought that everything was We may therefore say, that the twenty
to be explained by the momentary influ- years' victories of the revolution are
ence of the particular policy of Austria, chiefly to be ascribed to the erroneous
Prussia, England, etc., with regard to policy of the governments by which it
their own interests respectively.
But is it true that the real surprise by wasIt opposed.
is true these errors first displayed
which men's minds were seized ,was con themselves in the war, and the events
fined to the conduct of war, and did not of the war completely disappointed the
rather relate to policy itself ? That is, as expectations which policy entertained .
we should say: did the ill success proceed But this did not take place because
from the influence of policy on the war, policy neglected to consult its military
or from a wrong policy itself ? advisers . That art of war in which the
The prodigious effects of the French politician oftheday could believe,namely,
revolution abroad were evidently brought that derived from the reality of war at
about much less through new methods that time, that which belonged to the
and views introduced by the French in policy of the day, that familiar instru .
the conduct of war than through the ment which policy had hitherto used
changes which it wrought in state-craft that art of war, I say, was naturally
and civil administration , in the character involved in the error ofpolicy, and there
of governments, in the condition of the fore could not teach it anything better.
people , etc. That other governments It is true that war itself underwent im
took amistaken view of all these things; portant alterations both in its nature and
that they endeavoured, with their ordi- forms, which brought it nearer to its
nary means, to hold their own against absolute form ; but these changes were
forces of a novel kind, and overwhelming not brought about because the French
in strength ; all that was a blunder in Government had, to a certain extent,
policy . delivered itself from the leading -strings
Would it have been possible to per of policy ; they arose from an altered
ceive and mend this error by a scheme policy, produced by the French Revolu
for the war from a purely military point tion, not only in France, but over the
of view ? Impossible. For ifthere had rest of Europe as well. This policy had
been, even in reality, a philosophical called forthother means and otherpowers,
strategist, who merely from the nature of by which it becamepossible to conduct
the hostile elements, had foreseen all the warwith a degree of energy which could
consequences, and prophesied remote not have been thought of otherwise.
possibilities, still it would have been Therefore, the actual changes in the
purely impossible to have turned such
wisdom to account
art of war are a consequence of altera
.
tions in policy ; and, so far from being
70 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII.
an argument for the possible separation its character, it must measure with its
of the two, they are, on the contrary , scale : the conduct of war, in its great
very strong evidence of the intimacyof features,is therefore policy itself, which
their connexion. takes up the sword in place of the pen,
Therefore, once more : war is an instru- but does not on that account cease to
ment of policy; it must necessarily bear think according to its own laws.

CHAPTER VII.

LIMITED OBJECT-OFFENSIVE WAR.

Even if the complete overthrow of the territory has its degrees,and thesedepend
enemycannotbethe object,theremay chiefly on the geographicalpositionof
still beone whichis directly positive, thisportionof territory. Themore it is
and this positive object can be nothing an annex of our own country, being con.
else than the conquest of a part of the tiguous to or embraced by it,the more it
enemy's country . is in the direction of our principal force,
The use of such a conquest is this, by much
combsoatan t forc less will
thee. In the it weake
Seve
n our
n Year s'
that we weaken the enemy's resources
generally,therefor e,ofcourse, hismili- of ony theat
Prussianwas
the Sax
War, re ofral
anatu complement
war, and Fred
e
tary power, whil we incr ease our own ;
that we therefore carry on the war, to a erick the Great'sarmy, instead of being
certain extent , at his expense ; further in weakened, was strengthened by the pos
this way, that in negotiations for peace , session of that province,because itlies
the possession of the enemy's provinces nearer to Silesia than to the Mark, and
may be regarded as net gain, because at the same time covers the latter.
we can either keep them or exchange Even in 1740 and 1741, afterFrederick
them for other advantages. the Great had once conquered Silesia,it
This view of a conquest of the enemy's did not weakenhis army in the field,
provi nces al
is very natur , and would be bec aus e, owing to its form and situation
open to no objection if it were not that as well as thecontour of its frontier line,
the defensive attitude, which must suc it only presented a narrow point to the
ceed the offensive, may often cause un Austrians, as long as they were not mas.
easiness . ters of Saxony, and besides that, this
poin t of echapte
Inth r havethesuffi
victory we on culm
cient ly ing
inat smallpointofcontact also lay in the
ex direction of the chiefoperations
plained the manner in which such an of the
offensive weakens the combatant force, contending forces.
If, on the other hand, the conquered
and that it may be succeeded by a situa - territory is a strip running upbetween
tion causing anxiety as to the future. hostile provinces , has an eccentric posi
This weakening of our combatant force tion and unfavourable configuration of
by the conquest of part of theenemy's ground, then theweakening increases so
 CHAP . VII . ] LIMITED OBJECT- OFFENSIVE WAR . 71

visibly that a victorious battle becomes which the enemy takes from us than
not only much easier for the enemy , but we can gain by the one we take, be
it may even become unnecessary as well. cause a number of our forces become to a
The Austrians have always been certain extent like faux frais, non - effective.
obliged to evacuate Provence without a But as the same takes place on the
battle when they have made attempts on enemy's side also, one would suppose that
it from Italy. In the year 1744 the in reality there is no ground to attach
French were very well pleased even to more importance to the maintenance of
get out of Bohemia without having lost what is our own than to the conquest.
a battle . In 1758 Frederick the Great But yet there is . The maintenance of
could not hold his position in Bohemia our own territory is always a matter
and Moravia with the same force with which more deeply concerns us, and the
which he had obtained such brilliant suffering inflicted on our own state can
not be outweighed, nor, to a certain ex
successes in Silesia and Saxony in 1757.
Examples of armies not being able to tent, neutralised by what we gain in
keep possession of conquered territory return, unless the latter promises a high
solely because their combatant force was percentage, that is, is much greater.
so much weakened thereby, are so com- The consequence of all this is that a
mon that it does not appear necessary to strategic attack directed against only
quote any more of them . a moderate object involves a greater
Therefore, the question whether we necessity for steps to defend other
should aim at such an object depends on points which it does not directly cover
whether we can expect to hold possession than one which is directed against the
of the conquest or whether a temporary centre of the enemy's force ; conse
occupation (invasion,diversion) would re- quently, in such an attack the concentra
pay the expenditure of force required : tion of forces in time and space cannot
especially, whether we have not to ap- be carried out to the same extent. In
prehend such a vigorous counterstroke as order that it may take place, at least
will completely destroy the balance of as regards time, it becomes necessary
forces. In the chapter on the culmination for the advance to be made offensively
point we have treated of the consideration from every point possible, and at the
due to this question in each particular case. same moment exactly : and therefore
There isjust one point which we have this attack loses the other advantage of
still to add .
being able to make shift with a much
An offensive of this kind will not smaller force by acting on the defensive
always compensate us for what we lose at particular points. In this way the
upon other points. Whilst we are en- effect of aiming at a minor object is to
gaged in making a partial conquest, the bring all things more to a level : the
enemy may be doing the same at other whole act of the war cannot now be con
points, and if our enterprise does not centrated into one principal affair which
greatly preponderate in importance then can be governed according to leading
it will not compel the enemy to give points of view ; itis more dispersed;the
therefore, question for friction becomes greater everywhere, and
up his. It is, a
serious consideration whether we may there is everywhere more room for chance.
not lose more than we gain in a case of This is the natural tendency of the
this description. thing. The commanderis weighed down
Even if we suppose two provinces by it,finds himselfmore and more neu
(one on each side) to be of equal value, more he is conscious of
tralised. The
we shall always 'lose more by the one his own powers, the greater his resources
72 ON WAR . [BOOK -VIII.

subjectively, and his power objectively, give to some one point a preponderating
so much the morehe willseekto liberate importance ,even ifthat should only be
himself from thistendencyinorderto possible by running greater risks.

CHAPTER VIII.

LIMITED OBJECT_DEFENCE.
The ultimate aim of defensive war can other ; in the next place, he is deprived
never be an absolute negation, as we generally of a portion of territory
ore
and of
have before observed . Even for the his resources . We have , theref , here
weakest there must be some point in no ground on which to build the expec.
which the enemy may be made to feel, tation gthat thesoffensive will cease, and
and which may be threatened . nothin remain butthe idea that if the
y
ainl tiomay
the exhauswe
is Cert adversaryobje
the thatthis
n of say ct assailant repeats his blowwhile
s, the dead
, for fensive does nothing but wait to ward
as he has a positive object , every one of them off, then the defender has no coun
his blows which fails, ifithasnoother
result than the loss of the terponeoise
force applied , of of as
thesae set cks succeeding soonegr
attaofftotheriskherun
still may be considered a retrograde step or later.
in reality, whilst the loss which the de Although in reality the exhaustion, or
fensive suffers is not in vain , because his rather the weakening of the stronger,
object waskeeping possession , and that he has broug ht about a peace in many
has effected . This would be tantamou nt ances
inst that is to be attributed to the
to saying thatthedefensive has his posi indecision which is so general inwar,but
Suchrea
was soning
certain that mig begoodafter
thehtassailant sive ral
ifita gene warandultim ate, obje
whatever therect
ofanydeferer
is, therefore,,
certain number of fruitless attempts must no alternative but that the defence should
be worn out, and desist from further find its object in the idea of the 'waiting
efforts. But just this necessary conse for ,' which is besides its real character.
quence is wanting. If we look at the This idea in itself includes that of
exhaustion of forces, the defender is under an alteration of circumstances, of an
a disadvan tage. The assa ilant
bec omes improvement of the situation , which ,
weaker, but only in the sense that itmay therefore , when it cannot be brought
reach a turning point; if we set aside by internal means, that is, by
that supposition, the weakening goes on about
defensivo purein , 'can only be
itself
certain lymorerapidlyonthedefensi
side than on that of the assailant : for ve
in expected thpough
w assistan
s ce eme
rov coming fromm
nt fro
er
the first place, he is the weak , and, without. No , thi imp
without can proceed from nothing else
therefore , if the losses on both sides are than a change in political relations ;
equal, he loses mo re ly
actual than the either now alliances spring up in favour
CHAP. VIII. ] LIMITED OBJECT - DEFENCE . 73

of the defender, or old ones directed stroke that is warranted by circumstances

against him fall to pieces. the more the defensive imports into itself
Here, then, is the object for the de- ofa positive character. In other words, the
fender, in case his weakness does not more the defence has been adopted volun
permit him to think of any important tarily, in order to make the first blow
counterstroke. But this is not the nature surer, the bolder may be the snares
of every defensive war, according to the which the defender lays for his opponent.
conception which we have given of its The boldest, and if it succeeds, the most
form . According to that conception it is effectual, is the retreat into the interior
the stronger form of war, and on account of the country ; and this means is then
of that strength it can also be applied at the same time that which differs most
when a counterstroke more or less im- widely from the other system .
portant is designed . Let us only think of the difference
These two cases must be kept distinct between the position in which Frederick
from the very first, as they have an in- the Great was placed in the Seven Years'
fluence on the defence . War, and that ofRussia in 1812 .
In the first case, the defender's object When the war began, Frederick,
is to keep possession of his own country through his advanced state of prepara
intact as long as possible, because in that tion for war, had a kind of superiority,
way hegains most time; and gaining time this gave him the advantage of being
is the only way to attain his object. The able to make himself master of Saxony,
positive object which he can in most cases which was besides such a natural com
attain, and which will give himan oppor- plement of his theatre of war, that the
tunity, of carrying out hehiscannot
negotiations for peace, objectyet
in the possession of it did not diminish, but
in- increased, his combatant force.
clude in his plan for the war . In this Attheopening of the campaign of 1757,
state of strategic passiveness, the advan- the King endeavoured to proceed with his
tages which the defender can gain at strategic attack, which seemed not im
certain points consist in merely repelling possible as long as the Russians and
partial attacks; thepreponderancegained French had notyet reached the theatre
at those points he triesto make of service of war in Silesia, the Mark and Saxony.
to him at others, for he is generally hard But the attack miscarried, and Frederick
pressed at all points. If he has not the was thrown back on the defensive for
opportunity of doing this, then there often the rest of the campaign, was obliged to
only accrues to him the small advantage evacuate Bohemia and to rescue his own
that the enemy will leave him at rest for theatre from the enemy, in which he only
a time . succeeded by turning himself with one
If the defender is not altogether too and the same army, first upon the
weak, small offensive operations directed French, and then upon the Austrians.
less towards permanent possession than This advantage he owed entirely to the
a temporary advantage to cover losses, defensive.
which may be sustained afterwards, In the year 1758 when his enemies had
invasions , diversions, or enterprisos drawn round him in a closer circle, and his
against a single fortress, may have a forces were dwindling down to a very
place in this defensive system without disproportionate relation, hedetermined
alteringitsobject
or essence. on an offensive on a small scale in
But in the second case, in which a Moravia : his plan was to take Olmütz
positive object is already grafted upon before his enemies were prepared ; not
the defensive, the greater the counter- in the expectation of keeping posses
74 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII.
sion of, or of making it a base for further soon have thrust his sword through such
advance, but to use it as a sort of ad- tactical cobwebs, we must not forget
vanced work , a counter -approach against that times have changed, that war has
the Austrians , who would be obliged to become a totally different thing, is quick
devote the rest of the present campaign , ened with new energies , and that there.
and perhaps even a second , to recover fore positions might have been excellent
possession of it . This attack also mis at that time, although they are not so
carried. Frederick then gave up all idea now, and that in addition to all, the
of a real offensive, as he saw that it only character of the enemy deserves atten
increased the disproportion of his army. tion. Against the army of the German
A compact position in the heart of his States, against Daun and Butturlin, it
own country in Saxony and Silesia, the might have been the height ofwisdo m
use of short lines, that he might be able to employ means which Frederick would
rapidly to increase his forces at any have despised if used against himself.
point which might be menaced , a battle The result justified this view : in the
when unavoidable,small incursions when state of patient expectation, Frederick
opportunity offered, and along with this attained his object, and got rounddiffi
a patientstate of waiting-for( expecta- cultiesin a collisionwith which his forces
tion ), a saving of his means for better would have been dashed to pieces.
times became now his general plan. The relation in point of numbers be
By degrees the execution of it became tween the Russian and French armies
more and more passive . As he saw that opposed to each other at the opening of
even a victory cost him too much, there the campaign in 1812 was still more un
fore he tried to manage at still less favourable to the former than that be
expense ; everything depended on gain tween Frederick and his enemies in the
ing time, and on keeping what he had Seven Years' War. But the Russians
got ; he therefore became more tena looked forward to being joined by large
cious of yielding any ground, and did reinforcements in the course of the cam
not hesitate toadopt a perfectcordon paign. All Europewas in secrethostility
powe r
inSaxony,as wellasthoseof theKing screweduptothehighestpoint,adea
in the Silesian mountains , may be so
termed. In his letters to the Marquis the vast extent of Russia allowed. point
d'Argens, ho manifests theimpatience pushing theexhaustionoftheenemy's
with which looksforward to winter
quarters, andhethe satisfaction he military meansto the utmost extremity
felt at by a retreat over a hundred miles of
being able to take them up again with country. Under circumstances on this
out having suffered any serious loss. grand scale, a tremendous counterstroke
cted ifthe French
sefailtoedbe(anexped how
not only
and looks upon it as sign thathis was
spirit had sunk, would, a we think , pass
enterpri could it shot
judgment without much reflection . ceed if the Russian Emperor would not
nched camp at Bunzelwitz, mak e peace, or his subj ects did not rise
If the entre
s n
in insurrec
tion ?) but this counterstroke
the position take up by Prince Henry mightalso end in the complete destruction
in Saxony, and by the King in the the enemy. The most profound saga
Silesian mountains, do not appear to us of
city could , therefore, not have devised a
now as meas ures
on which a General better plan of campaign than that which
should place his dependence in a last of the
extremity because a Buonaparte would the Russians followed on the spur
moment .
CHAP . IX .] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 75

That this was not the opinion at the
time, and that such a view would then
have been looked upon as preposterous,
is no reason for our now denying it to
be the right one. If we are to learn from
history, we must look upon things which
have actually happened as also possible grėater, and in most would have been
in the future, and that the series of great
events which succeeded the march upon
Moscow is not a succession of mere acci-
dents every one will grant who can claim
to give an opinion on such subjects. If
it had been possible for the Russians,
with great efforts, to defend their frontier,
it is certainly probable that in such
case also the French power would have
sunk, and that they would have at last
suffered a reverse of fortune; but the
reaction then would certainly not have
been so violent and decisive. By suffer
ings and sacrifices ( which certainly in
any other country would have been
impossible) Russia purchased this enor.
mous success.
Thus a great positive success can never
be obtained except through positive
measures, planned not with a view to a
mere state of “ waiting- for," but with a
view to a decision, in short, even on the
defensive, there is no great gain to be
won except by a great stake.

CHAPTER IX .

PLAN OF WAR WHEN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY IS THE OBJECT.

HAVING characterised in detail the differ- as swiftly as possible ; therefore, to allow

ent aims to which war may be directed, of no delay or detour without sufficient
we shall go through the organisation of reason ,
war as a whole for each of the three sepa- The reducing the enemy's power to
rate gradations corresponding to these one central point depends
aims.
1. On the nature of its political con.
In conformity with all that has been nection . If it consists of armies of one
saidon the subject up to the present , two Power, there is generally no difficulty ;
fundamental principles reign throughout if of allied armies, ofwhich one is acting
the whole plan of the war, and serve as a simply as an ally without any interest of
guide for everything else. its own, then the difficulty is not much
The first is : to reduce the weight of the greater ; if of a coalition for a common
enemy's power into as few centres of object, then it depends on the cordiality
gravity as possible, into one if it can be of the alliance ; we have already treated
done ; again , to confine the attack against of this subject .
these centres of force to as few principal 2. On the situation of the theatre of
undertakings as possible, to one if pos- war upon which the different hostile
sible ; lastly, to keep all secondary un. armies make their appearance.
dertakings as subordinate as possible. If the enemy's forces are collected in
In a word, the first principle is, to act one army upon one theatre of war, they
concentrated as much as possible. constitute in reality a unity, and we need
The second principlē runs thus —— to act not inquire further ; if they are upon
 76 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.
one theatre of war, but in separate Saxony, because he would have been
armies, which belong to different Powers, called upon to co -operate in Bohemia,
there is no longer absolute unity ; there and the Crown Prince of Sweden as well
, however,a sufficient interdependance would
is
of parts for a decisive blow upon one the havebeenunwillingto remain in
Mark.
part to throw down the other in the con- On the other hand, Austria, if carry
cussion. If the armies arepostedin ing on war against the French onthe
theatres of war adjoining each other, and Rhine and Italy at the same time, will
notseparat ed by any great natural ob-
stacles, then there is in such case also a always find it difficulttogive a decision
upon one of those theatres by means
decided influence of the one upon the of a successful stroke on the other.
other ; but if the theatres of war are Partly because Switzerland, with its
wide apart, if there is neutral territory, mountains, forms too strong a barrier
great mountains, etc., intervening between between the two theatres, and partly
them, then the influence is very doubtful because the direction of the roads on each
and improbable as well ; if they are on side is divergent. France, again, can
quiteopposite sides of the State against muchsooner decide inthe one by asuca
which the war is made, so that operations cessful result in the other, because the
directed against them must diverge on direction of its forces in both converges
eccentric lines, then almost every trace upon Vienna, the centre of the power of
of connection is at an end.
the whole Austrian empire ; we may
If Prussia was attacked by France and add further, that adecisive blow in Italy
Russia at the same time , it would be as will have more effect on the Rhine
respects the conduct of the war much the theatre than a success on the Rhine
same as if there were two separate wars ;
at the same time the unity would appear would have in Italy, because the blow
from Italy strikes nearer to the centre,
in the negotiations. and thatfrom the Rhine more upon the
Saxony and Austria, on the contrary, flank, ofthe Austrian dominions.
as military powers in the Seven Years' It proceeds fromwhatwe have said
War, were to be regarded as one ; what
the theered
one suff
because ofrwar
theothe
theatres feltalso,pa rtly that
nectedthehost
conception of separated
ile powerextends throorughcon,all
lay in the degrees of relationship, and thattherefore,
same direction for Frederick the Great ,
each case, the first thing is to discover
partly because Saxonyhadnopolitical in
independence. theinfluenc e which events inonetheatre
Numerous as were the enemies of may have upon the other, according to
Buonaparte in Germany in 1813 , still which we may then afterwards settle
they all stood very much in one direction how far the different forces of the enemy
may be reduced into one centre of force.
in respect to him, and the theatres of
war for their armies were in close con There isonlyoneexception to the
nection , and reciprocally influenced each principle of directing all our strength
other very powerfully. If by a concen . against the centre of gravityof the
tration of all his forces he had been able enemy 'snspower,
peditio thatextraord
promise inarylary
is, ifancil ex
advan
would have had a decisive effect on all
the parts. If he had beaten the Bohe
achetnaa
dition assumed , that wehave such
main grand army , and marched upon decisive kesuperiority
underta as sesenables
such enterpri us to
without in
Vienna by Prague , Blücher, however curring too great risk at the point which
willing, could not have remained in
forms our great object.
 CHAP. IX.] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 77

When General Bulow marched into against the heart of France is from the
Holland in 1814, it was to be foreseen Lower Rhine, and that of the Austrians
1 that the thirty thousand men composing is from the Upper Rhine. Concentration,
his corps would not only neutralise the therefore, in this case, could only be
same number of Frenchmen, but would, effected by a sacrifice ; consequently in
besides, give the English and the Dutch any particular instance, the question to
an opportunity of entering the field with be decided would be, Is the necessity for
forces which otherwise would never have concentration so great that this sacrifice
been brought into activity . must be made ?
Thus, therefore, the first consideration 2. The attack by separate lines may
in the combination of a plan for a war, is offer greater results.
to determine the centresof gravity of the As we are now speaking of advancing
enemy's power, and, if possible, to re- by separate lines against one centre of
duce them to one. The second is to unite force, we are, therefore, supposing an
the forces which are to be employed advance by converging lines. A separate
against the centre of force into one great advance on parallel or eccentric lines be
action .
longs to the rubric of accessory undertak
Here now the following grounds for ings, of which we have already spoken .
dividing our forces may present them. Now, every convergent attackin stra
selves :
tegy, as well as in tactics, holds out the
1. The original position of the military prospect of great results ; for if it suc
forces, therefore also the situation of ceeds, the consequence is not simply a
the States engaged in the offensive. defeat, but more or less the cutting off
If the concentration of the forces would of the enemy. The concentric attack is,
occasion detours and loss of time, and therefore, always that which may lead
the danger of advancing by separate to the greatest results ; but on account of
lines is not too great, then the same may the separation of the parts of the force,
be justifiable on those grounds; for to and the enlargement of the theatre of
effect an unnecessary concentration of war, it involves also the most risk ; it
forces, with great loss of time, by which is the same here as with attack and de
the freshness and rapidity of the first fence, the weaker form holds out the
blow is diminished, would be contrary to greater results in prospect.
the second leading principle we have The question, therefore, is, whether the
laid down. In all cases in which there assailant feels strong enough to try for
is a hope of surprising the enemy in this great result.
some measure, this deserves particular When Frederick the Great advanced
attention .
upon Bohemia, in the year 1757 , he set
But the case becomes still more im- out from Saxony and Silesia with his
portant if the attack is undertaken by forces divided. The two principal rea
allied States which are not situated on a sons for his doing so were, first,that his
line directed towards the State attacked forces were so cantoned in the winter
—not one behind the other but situated that a concentration of them at one point
side by side. If Prussia and Austria would have divested the attack of all the
undertook a war against France, it would advantages of a surprise; and next, that
be a very erroneousmeasure,a squan. by this concentric advance, each ofthe
dering of time and force if the armies of two Austrian theatres of war was
the two powers were obliged to set out threatened in the flanks and the
from the same point, as the natural line rear. The danger to which Frederick
for an army operating from Prussia the Great exposed himself on that
 ON WAR .
[BOOK VIII.
78

occasion was that one of his two

lines may afford the enemy the means of
armies might have been completely de. counteracting the inequality of numer
h
ical
feated by superior forces ; should the lines, suc a form
forces by using interiorble
Austrians not see this, then they would of attack is not advisa ; and if on ac
have to give battle with their centre only, count of the situation of the belligerents,
or run the risk of being thrown off their it must be resorted to, it can only be re.
lineof communication ,either on oneside garIf,dedfro necesspoiaryntevil.
asma this of view, we cast
or the other , and meeting with a cata our eyes on the plan which was adopted
str kineg; thi
theoph hopsedwas thiat
by gre
forthe resu
s adv lt ewhi
anc ch
. The for the invasion of France in 1814,
it is impossible to give it approval.
Austrians preferred the battle in the The Russian , Austrian , and Prussian
the trepos
cenir , but
itionPra gue
, wa s in, whe reuat
a sit iony too
the k ch
toomu up armies were concentrated at a point near
under the influence ofthe convergent Frankfort on the Maine, on the most
uralfor
attack, which , as they remained perfectly ofnatthe andcemos t theectFrelin
of dir nche tomon
thecen tre.
archy
passive in their position , had time to de These armies were then separated, that
velop its efficacy to the utmost . The one might penetrate into France from
consequence of this was that when they Mayence , the other from Switzerland.
lost the battle, it was a complete cata As the enemy's force was so reduced that
strophe ; as is manifest from the fact a defence of the frontier was out of the
commander -in-chief were obliged toshut que ecton
expsti froe
ed, th thiols econ
m wh adcenvatri e toancbee,
ntcagadv
mseslveslli
theThi Pracesgue
bri upantinsuc .
satthe opening of and
if it suc ceeded ,was that while Lorraine
Alsace were conquered by one
the campaign was attained by the bold army, Franche -Comte would be taken by
stroke with a concentric attack . If Fre the other. Was this trifling advantage
derick considered the precision of his worth the trouble of marching into
own movements , the energy of his Switzerland ?_We know very well that
gen ops,lson, the
troera moral
the one ority ggi
side,supanderitheslu of his
sh- re e er icient
the wer oth (butjustasinsuff
grounds which caused this march ;
ness of the Austrians on the other , as we confine ourselves here to the point
sufficient to ensure the success of his plan ,
who can blame him ? But as we cannot considering.
which we are er
leave these moral advantages out of con
On the oth side, Buonaparte wasa
sideration , neither can we ascribe the suc
man who thoroughly understood the de
fensive to oppose to aconcentric attack,
cess solely antto the mer egn
geo metrical for m'sof as he had already shown in his masterly
lli. Lecatmp
briack
leses att
th usaionlyofthBu k of
inon thte
apar e not, campaign of 1796 ; and although the
Allies were very considerably superior in
in the year 1796 , when the Austrians numbers , yet the preponderance due to
were ly ed r
so severe punish for thei con his superiority as ageneral was on all
tric rch
cen ma ly
into Ita . The means occasions acknowledged . He joined his
which the French general had at com army too late near Chalons, and looked
mand on that occasion , the Austrian down rather too much , generally, on
general had also at his disposal in 1757 s oppothe nts
ne two, armies was verlyy; nea
still he separate r
he th
(wi therather
had ion offor
exceptmore, thehe al ),not,
morwas like, hi
indeed hitting and
ar te er than his adve rs ar y. wh at was the state he found them in
Buonap , weak

Therefore , when it is to be apprehended at

of Bri
enne ? me
his 65,000
r hhad only 27,000
Blünchewit him , and the
that the advance on separate converging
CHAP. IX.] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 79

great army, out of 200,000, had only ponding extension on our part. We
100,000 present. It was impossible to speak here of one theatre of war, or of
make a better game for the adversary. several, if they are quite close to each
And from the moment that active work other. Obviously this is, therefore, the
began , no greater want was felt than case when, according to our view, the
that of re -union .
chief operation is, at the same time, to
After all these reflections, we think be decisive on subordinate points .
that although the concentric attack is in But now can we always run the chance
itself a means of obtaining greater re- of this ? And may we expose ourselves to
sults, still it should generally only pro- the danger which must arise if the in
ceed from a previous separation of the fluence of the chief operation is not suffi
parts composing the whole force, and cient to decide at the minor points ?
that there are few cases in which we the want of a certain breadth
Does not
should do right in giving up the shortest for a theatre of war deserve special con
and most direct line of operation for the sideration ?
sake of adopting that form . Here as well as everywhere else it
3. The breadth of a theatre of war can is impossible to exhaust the number of
be a motivefor attacking on separate lines. combinations which may take place ; but
If an army on the offensive in its ad- we maintain that, with few exceptions,
vance from any point, penetrates with the decision on the capital point will
success to some distance into the interior carry with it the decision on all minor
of the enemy's country, then, certainly, points. Therefore, theaction shouldbe
the space which it commands is not re- regulated in conformity with this prin
stricted exactly to the line of road by ciple, in all cases in which the contrary is
which it marches, it will command a not evident.
margin on each side ; still that will de- When Buonaparte invaded Russia, he
pend verymuch, if wemay use thefigure, had good reasonto believe that by con
on thesolidity and cohesion of the oppo- quering the main body of the Russian
sing State. If the State only hangs army he would compel their forces on the
loosely together, if its people are an Upper Dwina to succumb. He left at
effeminate race unaccustomed to war, first only the corps of Oudinot to oppose
then , without our taking much trouble, a them, but Wittgenstein assumed the of
considerable extent of country will open fensive, and Buonaparte was then obliged
behind our victorious army ; but if we to send also the sixth corps to that quarter.
have to deal with a brave and loyal On the other hand, at the beginning
population, the space behind our army
will form a triangle , more or less acute. of the campaign , he directed a part of
his forces against Bagration ; but that
In order to obviate this evil, the at- general was carried along by the influence
tacking force requires to regulate its of the backward movement in the centre,
advance on a certain width of front. If and Buonapartewas enabled then to re
the enemy's force is concentrated at a call that part of his forces. If Wittgen
particular point, this breadth of front stein had not had to cover the second
can only be preserved so long as we are capital, he would also have followed the
not in contact with the enemy, and must retreat of the great army under Barclay.
be contracted as we approach his position : In the years 1805 and 1809, Buona
that is easy to understand . parte's victories at Ulm and Ratisbon
But if the enemy himself has taken up decided matters in Italy and also in the
a position with a certain extent of front, Tyrol, although the first was rather a
then there is nothing absurd in a corres distant theatre, and an independent one
80 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.
in itself. In the year 1806 , his victories a principle there would be such a mea
at Jena and Auerstadt were decisive in sured pace in the movements, such a
respect to everything that might have paralysation of the impulsive force, such
been attempted against him in West- room for the freak of chance, and such
phalia and Hesse , or on the Frankfort a loss of time, as would be practically
road .
perfectly inconsistent with an offensive
Amongst the number of circumstances directed to the complete overthrow of
which may have an influence on the the enemy
diffi culty mes
beco still grea if ter
resistance at secondary points, there are theThe
forces stationed at these minor points
two which are the most prominent. re rgent lines.- What
The first is : that in acountry of vast can reti on dive
extent, and also relatively of great would then become of the unity of our
power, like Russia , we can put off the atta
Weck ? st,
mu therefore, declare ourselves
decisive blow at the chiefd point for some tely opposed in principle tothe
time , and are not oblige to do all in a comple
endence ef ack minor
dep of the chi att on
hurry . attacks, and we maintain that an attack
The second is : when a minor point directed to the destruction of the enemy
( like Silesia in the year 1806 ), through a which has not the boldness to shoot, like
great number of fortresses, possesses an thepoint of an arrow , direct at theheart
extraordinary degree of independent
strength . And yet Buonaparte treated of the enem
y's power, can never hit the
that point with great contempt, inas mark .
4. Lastly, there is still a fourth ground
much as, when he had to leave such a
point completely in his rear on the for a separate advance in the facility
which it may afford for subsistence.
march to Warsaw , he only detached It is certainly much pleasanter to
20,000 men under his brother Jerome to
that quarter. march with a small army through an
ent try, than with a large army
If it happens that the blow at the opulough coun a poor one; but by suitable
capital point, in all probability, will thr measures, and with an army accustomed
not shake such a secondary point , or has to
not done so, and if the enemy has still and, privations, thelatter isnot impossible,
forces at that point , then to these ,-as a therefore,thefirst should never have
necessary evil, -an adequate force must such aninfluence on our plans as to lead
be opposed , because no one can abso us into a great danger.
We have now done justice to the
lutely lay open his line of communica grounds for a separation of forces which
tion from the very commencement.
But prudence may go a step further ; divides the chief operation into several,
it may require that the advance upon and if the separation takes place on any
the chief point shall keep pace with of these grounds, with a distinct concep
that on the secondary points, and con tion of the object, and after due con.
sequently the principal undertaking sidetagration of theadvantages and disad
must be delayed whenever the secondary van es, we shall not venture to find
points will not succumb . fault.
This principle does not directly con But if, as usually happens, a plan is
tradict ours as to uniting all action as drawn outby a learned general staff,
far as possible in one great undertaking, merely according to routine ;if different
but the spirit fromwhich it springs is dia
chessres
theat of, must
board war, each
like have
the squar es onfirstå
its piece
metrically opposed to the spirit in which
ours is conce ived . By follo wing such placed on it before themovesbegin, if
CHAP. IX .] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 81

these moves approach the aim in com- In this view , it is advisable only to pro
plicated lines and relations by dint of an ceed offensively against that one principal
imaginary profundity in the art of com- point, and to preserve the defensive upon
bination, if the armies are to separate all the others. The attack there being
to -day in order to apply all their skill only justifiable when invited by very
in reuniting at the greatest risk in four- exceptional circumstances.
teen days — then we have a perfect horror Further we are to carry on this defe
of this abandonment of the direct simple sive, which takes place at minor points,
common-sense road to rush intentionally with as few troops as possible, and to
into absolute confusion. This folly hap- seek to avail ourselves of every advan
pens more easily the less the general- tage which the defensive form can give.
in -chief directs the war, and conducts it This view applies with still more force
in the sense which we have pointed out to all theatres of war on which armies
in the first chapter as an act of his indi- come forward belonging to different
viduality invested with extraordinary powers really, but still such as will be
powers ; the more, therefore, the whole struck when the general centre of force
plan is manufactured by an inexpe- is struck .
rienced staff, and from the ideas of a But against the enemy at whom the
dozen smatterers .
great blow is aimed, there must be,
We have still now to consider the according to this, no defensive on minor
third part of our first principle ; that is, theatres of war. The chief attack itself,
to keep the subordinate parts as much as and the secondary attacks, which for
possible in subordination . other reasons are combined with it, make
Whilst we endeavour to refer the up this blow, and make every defensive,
whole of the operations of a war to one on points not directly covered by it,
single aim , and try to attain this as far superfluous. All depends on this prin
by one great
as possiblepoints effort, we deprive cipal attack ; by it every loss will be
the other of contact of the States compensated. If the forces are suffi
at war with each other of a part of their cient to make it reasonable to seek for
independence ; they become subordinate that great decision, then the possibility
actions. If we could concentrate every- of failure can be no ground for guard.
thingabsolutelyintooneaction,thenthose ing oneself against injury at otherpoints
points of contact would be completely in any event; for just by such a course
neutralised ; but this is seldom possible, this failure will become more probable,
and, therefore, what we have to do is to and it therefore constitutes here a con
keep them so far within bounds, that tradiction in our action ,
they shall not cause the abstraction of This same predominance of the prin
too many forces from the main action. cipal action over the minor, must be
Next, we maintain that the plan of the principle observed in each of the
the war itself should have this tendency, separate branches of the attack. But
even if it is not possible to reduce the as there are generally ulterior motives
whole of the enemy's resistance to one which determine what forces shall ad
point; consequently, in case we are vance from one theatre of war, and what
placed in the position already mentioned , from another against the common centre
of carrying on two almost quite separate of the enemy's power, we only mean
wars at the same time, the one must here that there must be an effort to make
always be looked upon 'as the principal the chief action over-ruling, foreverything
affair to which our forces and activity will become simpler and less subject to
are to be chiefly devoted. the influence of Chance events the nearer
VOL. III. 6
 1

82 ON WAR. [BOOK VIII.

sooner , which means the nearer our own
this state of preponderance can be at frontiers, this victory is sought for, the
tained .
Thesecond principle concerns the rapid ther ; the later,
easierin ittheis heart that is, the fur
use of the forces. of the enemy's country
Every unnecessary expenditure of time, it is gained , the mor e decisive it is. Here,
every unnecessary detour, is a waste of as well as everywhere , the facility of
power, and therefore contrary to the succ
ess and its magnitude balance each
principles of strategy . other.
It is most important to bear always in If we are not so superior to the enemy
mind thatalmost the only advantage we
thatthe
should,victor
y possible,ndseek
when isbeyo doubt,then
him out,
which the offensive possesses
, is the effect
of surprise at the opening of the scene . that is his principal force. We say when
Suddenness and irresistible impetuosity him ble,toforgreaifthisend
possiled eavour to find
t detours , false directions,
thenges
are ctits isstro
obje t pini
comp leteons; and
over w ofn the
throwhe the and a loss of time, it might very likely
enemy, it can rarely dispense with them . turn out a mistake . If the enemy's
By this,therefore, theory demands principal forceisnot on our road,and
the shortest way to the object, and com our interests otherwise prevent our going
pletely excludes from consideration end. in quest of him , we may be sure we shall
less discussions about right and left here meet with him hereafter, for he willnot
and there . fail.lto place himself in our way. We
If we call to mind what was said shal then, as we have just said, fight
in the chapter on the subject of the under less advantageous circumstances
an evil to which we must submit. How
strategic attack respecting the pit of the
stomach in a state, and further , what ever, if we gain the battle, it will be
appears in the fourth chapter of this so Fromuch the more decisive .
book , on the influence of time, we believe m this it follows that, in the case
now assumed , it would be an error to
tha tthe influence which weclaim for sig
that principle really belongs to it.
passnedbyly, the
if itenem ces itselfinal foree
play'sprincip rde,
ourway,
Buonaparte never acted otherwise . at least if we expect thereby to facilitate
The shortest high road from army to a On
victory.
army, from onecapital to another, was the other hand , it follows from
always the way he loved best. what precedes , that if we have a de
And in what will now consist the cided superiority over the enemy's
principal action to which we have re principal force, we may designedly pass
ferred everything , and for which we it by in order at a future time to deliver
have demanded a swift and straight a more decisive battle.
forward ion
execut ? We have been speaking of a complete
In the fourth chapter we have ex. victory, therefore of a thorough defeat of
ral waywhatthetotaloverth
geneene mymeans,anditisunnecesrowsartof Butsuch 'svictory
tlerequ iresan anoblienvel oping
the attack, braabat
to repeat it. Whatever that mayare fora these two form witsh alwa ys quegivethee
frente
pend on at last in particular cases still result a decisive character. It is there
,
the first step is always the same in all fore an essential part of a plan of a war
ructision to make arrangements for this move
cases ,comb
my's
ely t: force
namatan The ,dest
that the ene
, a ofgreat vice ment, both as regards the mass of forces
 CHAP . IX.] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 83

them, of which more will be said in the not this difficulty, will not this intrinsic
chapter on the plan of campaign. counterpoise come to a point which im
It is certainly not impossible, that even pedes further advance ? Certainly that
Battles fought with parallel fronts may may occur ; but just as we have already
lead to complete defeats, and cases in insisted that it would be a mistake to try
point are not wanting in military history; to avoid this contracted theatre of war at
but such an event is uncommon ,and will the commencement, and for the sake of
be still more so the more armies become that object to rob the advance of its
on a par as regards discipline and handi- elasticity, so we also now maintain, that
ness in the field . We no longer take as long as the commander has not yet
twenty - one battalions in a village, as overthrown his opponent, as long as he
they did at Blenheim.
considers himself strong enough to effect
Once the great victory is gained , the that object, so long must he also pursue
next question is not about rest, not about it. He does so perhaps at an increased
taking breath, not about considering, not risk, but also with the prospect of a
about reorganising, etc., etc. , but only greater success. If he reaches a point
of pursuit of fresh blows wherever neces- which he cannot venture to go beyond,
sary, of the capture of the enemy's capi- where, in order to protect his rear, he
tal, of the attack of the armies of his must extend himselfright and left - well,
allies, or of whatever else appears to be then, this is most probablyhis culminat
à rallying point for the enemy. ing point. The powernot
If the tide of victory carries us near and if the enemy is of flight is ,spent,
subdued most
the enemy's fortresses, the laying siege probably he will not be now.
to them or not will depend on ourmeans. All that the assailant now does to in.
If we have a great superiority of force, tensify his attack by conquest of for
it would be a loss of time not to take tresses, defiles, provinces, is no doubt
them as soon as possible ; but if we are still a slow advance, but it is only of a
not certain of the further events before relative kind, it is no longer absolute.
us, we must keep the fortresses in check The enemy is no longer in flight, he is
with as few troops as possible, which perhaps preparing a renewed resistance,
precludesany regular formal sieges. The and it is therefore already possible that,
moment that the siege of a fortress com- although the assailant still advances in
pels usto suspend ourstrategicadvance, tensively, the position of the defence is
that advance , as rule, has reached
a its every day improving. In short, we come
culminating point. We demand , there- back to this, that, as a rule, there is no
fore, that the main body should press second spring after a halt has once been
forward rapidly in pursuit without any necessary
rest; we have already condemned the Theory, therefore, only requires that,
idea of allowing the advance towardsthe as long as there is an intention of des
principal point being made dependent on troying the enemy, there must be no ces
success at secondary points ; the con sation in the advance of the attack ; if
sequence of this is, that in all ordinary the commander gives up this object be
cases, our chief army only keeps behind cause it is attended with too great a risk ,
it a narrow strip of territory which it can he does right to stop and extend his force.
call
tutesitsown,
and which therefore consti- Theory onlyobjects to this when he does
its theatre of war. How this it with a view to more readily defeating
weakens the momentum at the head, and the enemy.
the dangers for the offensive arising We are not so foolish as to maintain
therefrom , we have shown already. Will that no instance can be found of States
 84 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.
having been gradually reduced to the ut- and that the former must, to a certainex.
the tent, be a counterpoise to thelatter ; but
extremity
mostcipl
prin e we now In the
. main is noplace,
tainfirst absolute we look upon anyevil which springs out
of the forward hmovement,as
truth, to which an exception is impossi- able an unavoid
evil whic only deserves attention
ble, but ded only on the ordi
one foun
nary and probable result ; next, we must when here is no longer hope for us
make a distinction between cases in a-head by the forward movement.
which the downfall of a State has been Buonaparte's case in 1812, very far
effected by a slow gradual process , and from shaking our opinion, has rather
those in which the event was the result confirmed us in it.
gn We are here only His campaign did not miscarry because
of
treaating thepai
firstofcam latter. case, for it is only in he advanced too swiftly, or toofar, as is
such that there is that tension of forces common
ly believed , but because the only
which either overcomes the centre of means of success failed . The Russian
gravity of the weight, or is in danger of Empire is nocountry which can beregur
being overcome by it. If inthe first larly conquered , thaion
t is to say,which can
year we gain a moderate advantage, to be held inpossess , at least notby
the forces of the present States of Europe,
which in the following we add another, nor by the 500,000 men with which
and thus gradually advance towards our
object, there is nowhereveryimminent aBuon couapar
teinvad
ntry can ed subdued byry.Such
only bethecount its own
danger , but it is distributed over many wea ss
kne , and by the effects of internal
points . Each pause between one re r In orde to strike these
sult and another gives the enemy fresh dissension .
chances : the effects of the first results vulnerable points in its political existence,
have very little influence on those which the country must be agitated to its very
follow , often none, often a negative only, cen tre. It was only by reaching Moscow
because the enemy recovers himself, or is with the force of his blow that Buona .
perhaps excited to increased resistance , or parte could hope to shake thecourage of
the Government, theloyalty and stead.
.
done in onemarch ,thesuccess ofyesterday fastness of the people. InMoscow the
brand lightsitself fromanother.11/there befo
are cases in which States have been over
omfyrationalobjectwhichhecouldbe
re himself in undertaking such a
come by successive blows — in which , war .
consequently , Time, generally the patron He therefore led his main body against
that ofthe Russians,which fell back before
how infinitelyamorenumerous and thein- and did not stop until it reached Smo
failed . Let us only think of the result his movement, beat the principal Russian
of the Seven Years' War, in which the army, and took Moscow . He acted on
this occasion as he had always done : it
Austrians sought to attain their object so
was only in thatway that he made him
comfortably, cautiously, and prudently, self the arbiter of Europe, and only in
that they completely missed it.
In this view , therefore, we cannot at t way was it possible forhim todo so.
thaHe, therefore, who admires Buona
all join in the opinion that the care which as the
bel ongs to the preparation ofatheatre of parte in all hisearli, oug
war, and the impulse which urges us
er cam
htpai gns
not to censure
onwards, are on a level in importance,
gre atest of generals
him in this instance.
 CHAP . IX 85
x.. ] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY.
It is quite allowable to judge an event some evil spirit laid at his heels !—This
according to the result, as that is the best is the way in which he would have been
criticism upon it ( see fifth chapter, judged of after the result, for this is the
2nd book), but this judgment derived fashion of critics' judgments in general.
merely from the result, must not then be In opposition to this, we say, the cam
passed off as evidence of superior under- paign of 1812 did not succeed because
standing. To seek out the causes of the the government remained firm , the people
failure of a campaign, is not going the loyal and steadfast, because it therefore
length of making a criticism upon it ; it could not succeed . Buonaparte may
is only if we show that these causes have made a mistake in undertaking
should neither have been overlooked nor such an expedition ; at all events, the
disregarded that we make a criticism result has shown that he deceived him
and place ourselves above the General. self in his calculations, but we maintain
Now we maintain that any one who that, supposing it necessary to seek the
pronounces the campaign of 1812 an ab- attainment of this object, it could not
surdity merely on account of the tremen- have been done in any other way upon
dous reaction in it, and who, if it had been the whole .
successful, would look upon it as a most Instead of burthening himself with an
splendid combination, shows an utter in- interminable costly defensive war in the
capacity of judgment. east, such as he had on his hands in the
If Buonaparte had remained in Lithu- west, Buonaparte attempted the only
ania, as mostof his critics think he should, means to gain his object: by one bold
in order first to get possession of the for- stroke to extort a peace from his aston
tresses, of which, moreover, except Riga, ished adversary. The destruction of his
situated quite at one side, there is hardly army was the danger to which he exposed
one, because Bobruisk is a small insig- himself in the venture; it was the stake
nificant place of arms, he would have in the game, the price of great expecta
involved himself for the winter in a tions. If this destruction of his army
miserable defensive system : then the was more complete than it need have
same people would have been the first to been through his own fault, this fault
exclaim , This is not the old Buonaparte ! was not in his having penetrated too far
Howis it, he has not got even as far into the heart ofthe country, for that
as a first great battle ? he who used to put was his object, and unavoidable ; but in
the final seal to his conquests on the last the late period at which the campaign
ramparts of the enemy's states, by vic- opened, the sacrifice of life occasioned by
tories such as Austerlitz and Friedland . his tactics, the want of due care for
Has his heart failed him that he has not the supply of his army, and for his line
taken the enemy's capital, the defenceless of retreat, and lastly , in his having too
Moscow, ready to open its gates, and long delayed his march from Moscow .
thus left a nucleus round which new ele- That the Russians were able to reach
ments of resistance may gather them the Beresina before him, intending regu
selves ? He had the singular luck to larly to cut off his retreat, is no strong
take this far -off and enormous colossus argument against us. For in the first
by surprise, as easily as one would sur- place, the failure of that attempt just
prise a neighbouring town, or as Fred- shows how difficult it is really to cut off
erick the Great entered the little state of an army, as the army which was inter
Silesia, lying at hisdoor ,and hemakes cepted in this case under the most unfa
no use of his good fortune, halts in the vourable circumstances that can be con
middle of his victorious career, as if ceived, still managed at last to cut its
 86
ON WAR. [BOOK VIII.
way through ; and although this act the Niemen in 1812, Buonaparte had
upon the whole contributed certainly to
increase its catastrophe , still it was not brought back 250,000 instead of the
50,000 who repassed it under Schwart
essenti ally the cause of it. Secondly,it zenberg,Regmer,and Macdonald,which
was only the very peculiar nature of the
country which afforded the means to was possible, by avoiding the mistakes
with which he has been reproached, the
carry things as far
for if it had not
as for
been
Russiansdid;
thethe marshes of campaignwouldstill have been an unfor;
tunate one, but theory would have had
the Beresina,
borders lyingwithits
wooded impassable
across the great road, the
nothingtoobject to it,for the lossofhalf
an army in such a case is not at all
cutting off wouldhavebeen stilllesspos- unusual, andonlyappearssotousin
sible. Thirdly , there is generally no this instance on account of the enormous
means of guarding against such an even- scale of the whole enterprize.
tuality except by making the forward So much forthe principal operation,its
movement with the front of the army of necessary tendency, and the unavoidable
such a width as we have already dis risks. As regards the subordinate ope
approved ; for ifwe proceed on the plan rations,theremustbe, above all things,
of pushing on in advance with the centre a common aim for all ; but this aim must
so situated as not to paralyse the
tache d right and left thenwith
these detached armies,meets if eithe r be
a checkof,
action ofanyof the individual parts.If
we invade France from the upper
we must fall back with the centre , and then middle Rhine and Holland, with the
very little can be gained by the attack. intention ofuniting at Paris, neither of
Moreover, it cannot be said that Buona d torisk anything on
parte
force remained fronting Wittgenstein,
advanceemploye
the armies
neglected hiswings. A superior the , buttokee p itselfintarit
until the concentration is effected, that is
a proportionate siege- corps stood before what we call a ruinous plan. There
Riga which at the same time was not
needed there, and in the south Schwar must be necessarilyaconstant compari
son of the state of this threefold move
.
zenberg had 50,000 men with which he ment causi ng delay, indecision, and
wassu perior Tormasoffandalmost timidity in theforwardmovement of
equal to Tschitotschagow : in addition , each of the armies. It is better to assign
there were 30,000 men under Victor , its mission, and only to
to each part
coverin g therea
in the mont rofmber
h of Nove the centre Even
, there.fore , at place the pointof unionwhereverthese
the decisive moment when the s
several activitie become unity of them
Russian
armies had been reinforced, and the selves .
French were very much reduced , the Therefore, when a military force ad
superiority of the Russians in rear of vance s to the attack on separate theatres
the Moscow army was not so very extra of war, to each army should be assigned
ordinary. Wittgenstein, Tschitschagow, an object against which the force of its
andSacken,madeup
Shoc kis to be directed. beHere the pointil
togethertaforce to te thattriestoshockeyshould
100,000. Schwartzenberg Regmer Victor
, , , givenfrom all
Oudinot, and St. Cyr, had still 80,000 sides simulta
portional neously,
advan butdnotresult
tages shoul that pro
from
effectives. The most cautious general in
advancing would hardly devote a greater all of them .
proportion of his force to the protection If thetoo task
found assigne
difficult d to one
because the army is
enemy
of his flanks.
If out of the 600,000 men who crossed hasmade a dispositionof
ferent to that his force ifdifit:
which was expected,
-

CHAP. IX .] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF TIIE ENEMY. 87

1 sustains a defeat, this neither should , nor · emptorily to follow out his object. If
must have, any influence on the action of any serious incongruity really arises from
the others, or we should turn the pro- this, a remedy can always be applied in
bability of the general success against time by the supreme authority . Thus,
ourselves at the very outset. It is then , may be obviated the chief evil of
only the unsuccessful issue of the majority this separate mode of action, which is,
of enterprises or of the principal one, that in the place of realities, a cloud of
which can and must have an influence apprehensions and suppositions mix
upon the others : for then it comes under themselves up in the progress of an
the head of a plan which has mis- operation, that every accident affects not
carried.
only the part it comes immediately in
This same rule applies to those armies contact with, but also the whole, by the
and portions of them which have origin- communication of impressions , and that
ally acted on the defensive, and, owing a wide field of action is opened for the
to the successes gained, have assumed personal failings and personal animosi
the offensive, unless we prefer to attach ties of subordinate commanders.
such spare forces to the principal offen- We think that these views will only
sive, a point which will chiefly depend appear paradoxical to those who have
on the geographical situation of the
theatre of war .
not studied military history long enough
or with sufficient attention, who do not
But under these circumstances , what distinguish the important from the unim
becomes of the geometrical form and portant, nor make proper allowance for
unity of the whole attack, what of the the influence of human weaknesses in
flanks and rear of corps when those general.
corps next to them are beaten . If even in tactics there is a difficulty,
That is precisely what we wish chiefly which all experienced soldiers admit
to combat. This glueing down of a great there is, in succeeding in an attack in
offensive plan of attack on a geometrical separate columns where it depends on
square, is losing one's way in the regions the perfect connection of the several
of fallacy . columns, how much more difficult, or
In the fifteenth chapter of the Third rather how impossible, must this be in
Book we have shown that the geometri- strategy, where the separation is so
cal element has less influence in strategy much wider. Therefore, if a constant
than in tactics ; and we shall only here connection of all parts was a necessary
repeat the deduction there obtained, that condition of success, a strategic plan of
in the attack especially, the actual results attack of that nature must be at once
at the various points throughout deserve given up. But on the one hand , it is not
more attention than the geometrical left to our option to discard it completely,
figure, which may gradually be formed because circumstances, which we cannot
through the diversity of results. control, may determine in favour of it ;
But in any case, it is quite certain, that on the other hand, even in tactics, this
looking to the vast spaces with which constant close conjunction of all parts at
strategy has to deal, the views and re. every moment of the execution, is not at
solutions which the geometrical situation all necessary, and it is still less so in
of the parts may create, should be left to strategy. Therefore in strategy we should
the general-in -chief; that, therefore , no pay the less attention to this point, and
subordinate general has a right to ask insist the more upon a distinct piece of
what his neighbour is doing or leaving work being assigned to each part.
undone, but each is to be directed per We have still to add one important
88 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.
observation: it relates to the proper conquered it in the year 1787 ; they would
allotment of parts. then have covered the Lower Rhine, and
In the year 1793 and 1794 the
palAustrian army was
princi- consequently that part of the Prussian
herlands
in theNet , monarchy which lay next to the theatre
that of the Prussians, onthe upper Rhine. of war . Prussia on account of subsidies
The Austrians marched from Vienna to would also have had a closer alliance
Condé and Valenciennes, crossing the with England, which, under these circum
line of march of the Prussians from Ber stances, would not so easily have dege
lin to Landau . The Austrians had cer nerated into the crooked policy of which
tainly to defend their Belgian provinces the Prussian cabinet was guilty at that
in that quarter , and any conquests made time.
in French Flanders would have been A much better result, therefore, might
acquisitions conveniently situated for have been expected if the Austrians had
them , but that interest was not strong appeared with their principal force on
enough. After the death of Prince the Upper Rhine , the Prussians with
Kaunitz , the Minister Thugut carried a their whole force in the Netherlands, and
measure for giving up the Netherlands the Austrians had left there only a corps
entirely, for the better concentration of of proportionate agth .
the Austrian forces . In fact, Austria is
If, instead of the enterprising Blücher,
about twice as far from Flanders as from General Barclay had been placed at the
Alsace ; and at a time when military re head of the Silesian army in 1814, and
sources were very limited, and every Blücher and Schwartzenberg had been
thing had to be paid for in ready money, kept withthe grandarmy, the campaign
that was no trifling consideration . Still, would perhaps have turned out a complete
the Minister Thugut had plainly some failure .
thing else in view ; his object was, through If the enterprising Laudon , instead
the urgency of the danger to compel of having his theatre of war at the
Holland , England, and Prussia , the strongest point ofthe Prussian domin
powers interested in the defence of the ions, namely, in Silesia,had been in the
Netherlands and Lower Rhine , to make position of the German States' army,
greater efforts. He certainly deceived perhaps the whole Seven Years' War
himself in his calculations, because would have had quite a different turn.
nothing could be done with the Prussian In order to examine this subject more
cabinet at that time, but this occurrence narrowly, we must look at the cases ac
always shows influence
the political
of cording to their chief distinctions.
interests on the course of a war .
Prussia had neither anything to con The firstis, if wecarryon war in
conjunction with other powers, who not
quer nor to defend in Alsace . In the r lies t o
year 1792 it had undertaken the march only take part as ou al , bu als
through Lorraine into Champagne in a have an independent interest as well.
sort of chivalrous spirit. But as that Thesecondis, if thearmy of the ally
enterprise ended in nothing, through the has come to our assistance.
unfavourable course of circumstances, it The third is, when it is only a
continued the war with a feeling of very question with regard tothe personal
little interest . characteristics of the General.
Inthe twofirst cases,thepoint maybe
had been inthe Netherlands,they trould raised, whetheritisbetter tomixwels,
have been in direct communication withtroops of the differentpowers completely,
Holland, which they might look upon
almost as their own country , having so that each
of corps separate
of different army, asis was
powers sed
compodone
i CHAP. IX .] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 89

in the wars 1813 and 1814, or to keep activity by the force of circumstances ;
them separate as much as possible, so but if they find themselves in close con
that the army of each power may con- nection, or quite on the same theatre of
tinue distinct and act independently. war, this is not the case, and besides that
Plainly, the first is the most salutary the ill will of one paralyses also the
plan; but it supposes a degree of friendly powers of the other as well.
feeling and comm
mmunity of interests which In the first of the three supposed cases,
is seldom found. When there is this there will be no difficulty in the complete
close good fellowship between the troops, separation, as the natural interest ofeach
it is much more difficult for the cabinets State generally indicates to it a separate
to separate their interests ; and as regards mode of employing its force ; this may
the prejudicial influence of the egotistical not be so in the second case, and then ,
views of commanders, it can only show as a rule, there is nothing to be done
itself under these circumstances amongst but to place oneself completely under the
the subordinate Generals, therefore, only auxiliary army, if its strength is in any
in the province of tactics, and even there way proportionate to that measure, as
not so freely or with such impunity as the Austrians did in the latter part of
when there is a complete separation . In the campaign of 1815 , and the Prussians
the latter case, it affects the strategy, in the campaign of 1807.
and therefore , makes decided marks. With regard to the personal qualifica
But, as already observed, for the first tions of the General, everything in this
case there must be a rare spirit of con- passes into what is particular and indi
ciliation on the part of the Governments. vidual ; but we must not omit to make
In the year 1813, the exigencies of the one general remark , which is, that we
time impelled all Governments in that should not, as is generally done, place at
direction; and yet we cannot sufficiently the head of subordinatearmies the most
praise this in the Emperor of Russia, that prudent and cautious Commanders, but
although he entered the field with the the most enterprising ; for we repeat that
strongest army, and the change of for- in strategic operations conducted sepa
tune was chiefly brought about by him , rately, there is nothing more important
yet he set aside all pride about appear-
than that every part should develop its
ing at the head of a separate and an in.
powers to the full, in that way faults
dependent Russian army, and placed his committed at one part may be compen
troops under the Prussian and Austrian sated for by successes at others. This
Commanders. complete activity at all points, however,
If such a fusion of armies cannot be is only to be expected when the Com
effected, a complete separation of them is manders are spirited , enterprising men,
certainly better than a half-and-half state who are urged forwards by natural im
of things; the worst of all is when two pulsivenessby their own hearts, because
independent Commanders of armies of a mere objective, coolly reasoned out, con
different powers find themselves on the viction of the necessity of action seldom
same theatre of war, as frequently hap- suffices.
pened in the Seven Years' War with the Lastly, we have to remark that, if cir
armies of Russia, Austria, and the Ger- cumstances in other respects permit, the
man States. When there is a complete troops and their commanders, as regards
separation of forces, the burdens which their destination, should be employed
must be borne are also better divided, in accordance with their qualities and
and each suffers only from what is his the nature of the country — that is re
own, consequently is more impelled to gular armies ; good troops; numerous
90 ON WAR . [BOOK VIII.

cavalry ; old, prudent, intelligent gene- federation, the Netherlands and England,
rals in an open country ; - Militia ; determine on a war with France, but
national levies ;young enterprising Russia remains neutral — a case which has
commanders in wooded country, moun frequently happened during the last one
tains and defiles ; auxiliary armies in hundred and fifty years — they are able to
rich provinces where they can make them- carry on an offensive war, having for its
selves comfortable . object the overthrow of the enemy. For
What wehavenowsaidupon a plan of powerfuland great as France is, itisstill
a war in general, andin this chapterupon possible for ittosee morethan halfitster
those in particular which aredirectedto fitoryoverrun by theenemy,its capital
the destruction of the enemy, is intended occupied, and itself reducedin its means
to give special prominence to theobject to a state of complete inefficiency,without
of the same,and nexttoindicateprin. there being any power, except Russia,
ciples which may serve as guides in the which can give iteffectual support. Spain
preparation of ways and means. Our is too distant and too disadvantageously
desire has been in this way to give a clear situated; the Italian States are at pre
perception of what is to be, and should sent too brittle and powerless.
be, done in such a war. We have tried to The countries we have named have,
emphasise the necessary and general, and exclusive of their possessions out of
toleavea margin for the play of the Europe, above 75,000,000 inhabitants,
particular and accidental; but to exclude whilst France hasonly 30,000,000 ; and
all that isarbitrary, unfounded ,trifling, the army which
fantastical, or sophistical. If we have suc
they couldcallout for
a war against France really meant in
ceeded in this object, we look upon our earnest, would be as follows, without
problem as solved . exaggeration :
Now, if any one wonders at finding Austria ... 250,000
nothing here about turning rivers, about Prussia ...... 200,000
commanding mountainsfrom theirhighest The rest of Germany 150,000
points, about avoiding strong positions, Netherlands 75,000
and finding the keys of a country , he has England 50,000
not understood us, neither does he as yet
understand war in its general relations Total 725,000
according to our views .
Should this force be placed on a war
In precedin books have cha- footing it would ,in all probability,very
racterised theseg subjects we
in general,and much exceedthat which France could
we there arrived at theconclusion,they oppose;for under Buonapartethecountry
nature thanweshouldthinkfrom their Now, ifwe take into account thededzes
high repute. Therefore, so much the less tions required as garrisonsfor fortresses
can or ought they to play a great part,
that is, so far as to influence the whole and depôts, to watch the coasts, etc.;
there can be no doubt the allies would
plan ofawar,whenit is a war which have agreat superiority intheprincipal
has for its object the destruction of the
enemy . theatre of war,andupon that the object
At the end of the book we shall de- or plan
chiefl ed . owing the enemy is
of overthr
y found
vote a chapter specially to the considera
tion of the chief command ; the present
chapter we shall close with an example . This chapter was probably written in 1828,
If Austria , Prussia , the German Con since which timethe numerical relations have con
siderably changed . - A. D. H.
 CHAP. IX. ] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 91

The centre of gravity of the French plan,concentration of force. To think of con

power lies in itsmilitary force and in like
quering
Paris. To defeat the former in one or more
France
trying byathe Rhone,
musket would be
to lift by the point
battles, to take Paris and drive the wreck of its bayonet; but also asan auxiliary en
of the French across the Loire, must be terprise, an attack on the South of France
the object ofthe allies. The pit of the sto- is to be condemned, for it only raises
mach of the French monarchy is between new forces against us. Whenever an
Paris and Brussels, on that side the fron- attack ismade on distant provinces, inter
tier is only thirty miles from the capital. ests and activities are roused, which
Part of the allies ; the English , Nether- would otherwise have lain dormant. It
landers, Prussian, and North German would only be in case that the forces left
States have their natural point of assem- for the security of Italy were in excess of
bly in that direction, as these States lie the number required , and, therefore, to
partly inthe immediate vicinity, partly in avoid leaving them unemployed , that there
a direct line behind it. Austria and South would be any justification for an attack on
Germany can only carry on their war con- the South of France from that quarter.
veniently from the upper Rhine. Their We therefore repeat that the force left
natural direction is upon Troyes andParis, in Italy must be kept down as low as
or it maybe Orleans. Bothshocks, there- circumstances will permit; and it will
fore, that from the Netherlands and the be quite large enough if it will suffice to
other from the upper Rhine, are quite prevent the Austrians from losing the
direct and natural, short and powerful; whole country in one campaign. Let us
and both fall upon the centre of gravity suppose that number to be 50,000 men
of the enemy's power. Between these for the purpose of our illustration.
two points, therefore, the whole invading Another consideration deserving atten
army should be divided. tion, is the relation of France in respect
But there are two considerations which to its sea -coast. As England has the
interfere with the simplicity of this plan. upper hand at sea, it follows that France
The Austrians would not lay bare their must, on that account, be very suscepti
Italian dominions,they would wishtoretain ble with regard to the whole of her
themastery over events there, in any case , Atlantic coast ; and, consequently, must
and therefore would not incur the risk of protect it withgarrisons of greater or
making an attack on the heart of France, less strength. Now, however weak this
by which they would leave Italy only in- coast -defence may be, still the French
frontiers are tripled by it ; and large
directly covered. Looking to thepolitical drafts,
state the country, this collateral con
of is not to be treated with con on that account, cannot fail to be
sideration withdrawn from the French army on the
tempt ; but it would be a decided mistake theatre of war. Twenty or thirty thou
if the old and oft-tried plan of an attack sand troops disposable to effect a landing,
from Italy, directed against the South of with which the English threaten France,
France, was bound up with it, and if on would probably absorb twice or three
that account the force in Italy was in times the number of French troops; and,
creased to a size not required for mere further, we must think not only of troops,
security against contingencies in thefirst but also of money, artillery, etc., etc. ,
campaign . Only the number needed for reqạired for ships and coast batteries.
that security should remain in Italy,only Letus suppose that the English devote
that number should be withdrawn from 25,000 to this object.
the greatundertaking, if we would not be Our plan of war would then consist
unfaithful to that first maxim , Unity of simply in this :
 92 ON WAR . [ BOOK VIII.
1. That in the Netherlands : to Switzerland a predominant geographi
200,000 Prussians, cal influence upon events in war because
75,000 Netherlanders, it is the highest land in Europe. Such
25,000 English, an influence only exists under certain
50,000 North German Con very restricted conditions, which are not
federation , to be found here. When the French are
Total... 350,000 be assembled , attacked in the heart of their country
of whom about 50,000 should be set they can undertake nooffensive from
asideto garrisonfrontier fortresses, and Switzerland, either against Italy.com
the remaining 300,000 should advance Swabia , and, least of all,can the elevated
against Paris, and engage the French situation of the country come into con
Army in a decisive battle . sideration as a decisive circumstance.
2. That 200,000 Austrians and 100,000 The advantage of a country which isdomi
South German troops should assemble on nating in a strategic sense, is, in the first
the Upper Rhine to advance at the same place, chiefly important in the defensive,
time as the army of the Netherlands, and any importance which it has in the
their direction being towards the Upper offensive may manifest itself in a single
Seine, and from thence towards the Loire, encounter . Whoever does not know this
with a view , likewise , to a great battle. has not thought over the thing and ar
These two attacks would, perhaps, unite rived at a clear perception of it,and in
in one on the Loire . e councineldof poten
case that at any futurme
By this the chief point is determined . so lear icer
off of
tates and generals,
What we have to add is chiefly intended the general staff should be found, who,
to root out false conceptions , and is as withan anxious brow, displays such wis
follows : dom, we now declare it beforehand to be
1. To seek for the great battle, as pre mere folly, and wish that in the same
scribed , and deliver it with such a rela council some trueBlade,some child of
tion, in point of numerical strength and soundcommon-sensemaybepresent who
under such circumstances, as promise a will stop his mouth.
. decisivevictory, is the course for the chief 3. The space between two attacks we
commanders to follow ; to this object every think of very little consequence. When
thing must be sacrificed ; and as few men 600,000 assemble thirty or forty miles
as possible should be employed in sieges , from Paristo march againstthe heart of
blockades, garrisons, etc. If,like Schwart France , would anyonethink of covering
zenberg in 1814, as soon as they enter the middle Rhine as well as Berlin,
theene my's provincesthey spread out Dresden, Vienna, and Munich There
in eccentric rays all is lost. That this would be no sense in such a thin?g. Are
did not take place in 1814 the Allies we to cover the communications ? That
may thank the powerless state of France would not be unimportant; but thenwe
alone . The attack should be like a wedge might soon be led intogiving this cover
well driven home , not like a soap bubble, ing the importance of an attack, and
which distends itself till it bursts.
2. Switzerland must be left to its own then, instead of advancing on twolines,
as the situation of theStates positively
forces. If it remains neutral it forms a requires, we should be led to advance
good point d'appui on the Upper Rhine ; upon three, which is not required. These
if it is attacked by France , let her stand thre e would then, perhaps,become five,
up for herself, which in more than one or perhaps seven , and in thatway the old
respect she is very well able to do . rigmarole would oncemore become the
Nothing is more absurd than to attribute
order of the day.
 CHAP. IX .] PLAN OF WAR FOR DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY. 93

Our two attacks have each their ob- chief point, and on no account should
ject ; the forces employed on them are either of the two great attacks be made de
probably very superiorto the enemy in pendent in any way on these minor ones.
numbers. If each pursues his march We are quite convinced that in this
with vigour, they cannot fail to react way France may be overthrown and
advantageously upon each other. If one chastised whenever it thinks fit to put on
of the two attacks is unfortunate be- that insolent air with which it has op
cause the enemy has not divided his pressed Europe for a hundred and fifty
force equally , we may fairly expect that years. It is only on the other side of
the result of the other will of itself re- Paris, on the Loire, that those conditions
pair this disaster, and this is the true can be obtained from it which are neces
interdependence between the two. An sary for the peace of Europe. In this
interdependence extending to (so as to way alone the natural relation between
be affected by) the events of each day 30 millions of men and 75 millions will
is impossible on account of the distance ; quickly make itself known, but not if the
neither is it necessary , and therefore the country from Dunkirk to Genoa is to be
immediate, or, rather the direct connec- surrounded in the way it has been for
tion, is of no such great value. 150 years by a girdle of armies, whilst
Besides, the enemy attacked in the fifty different small objects are aimed at,
very centre of his dominions will have no not one of which is powerful enough to
forces worth speaking of to employ in overcome the inertia , friction, and ex
interrupting this connection ; all that is traneous influences which spring up and
to be apprehended is that this interrup- reproduce themselves everywhere, but
tion may be attempted by a co-operation more especially in allied armies.
of the inhabitants with the partisans, so How little the provisional organisation
that this object does not actually cost the of the German federal armies is adapted
enemy any troops. To prevent that, it to such a disposition, will strike the
is sufficient to send a corps of 10,000 reader . By thatorganisation thefedera
or 15,000 men , particularly strong in tive part of Germany forms the nucleus
cavalry, in the direction from Trèves to of the German power, and Prussia and
Rheims . It will be able to drive every Austria thus weakened , lose their na
partisan before it, and keep in line with tural influence. But a federative state
the grand army. This corps should is a very brittle nucleus in war — there is
neither invest nor watch fortresses, but in it nounity, no energy, no rational
march between them, depend on no fixed choice of a commander, no authority, no
basis, but give way beforesuperior forces responsibility,
in any direction , no great misfortune Austria and Prussia are the two natural
couldhappen to it, andif such did hap- centres of force of the German empire ;
pen, would again be no serious
it mis- they form the pivot (or fulcrum ), the
fortune for the whole . Under these forte of the sword ; they are monarchical
circumstances, such a corps might pro states, used to war ; they have well-de
bably serve as an intermediate link be- fined interests, independence of power ;
tween the two attacks. they are predominant over the others.
that is, thetwo
4. The Austrian army undertakings,
subordinate The organisation
in Italy, and natural should follow these
lineaments, and not a false
the English army for landing on the notion about unity, which is an impossi
coast, might follow their object as ap- bility in such a case ; and he who ne
peared best. If they donot remainidle, glects the possible in quest of the impos
their mission is fulfilled as regards the sible is a fool.
|
 95

SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUCTION

GIVEN BY THE AUTHOR

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE,

IN THE YEARS 1810, 1811 , AND 1812.

SCHEME WHICH WAS LAID BEFORE GENERAL VON GAUDY.

PRESUMING that it is only a preliminary will be, in the first place, to make myself
knowledge of the art of war which His always intelligible to the Prince, as other
Royal Highness the Crown Prince is to wise the most attentive pupil must soon
receive from me, with a view to His become wearied, confused and disgusted ;
Royal Highness being enabled to under- secondly, in every case to avoid giving
stand modern military history, it is of any erroneous ideas, through which his
the first importance that I should give further instruction or the progress of his
the Prince a clear idea of war , and that own studies might be impeded or inter
I should do so in such a manner as to fered with .
avoid diffuseness, or taxing the Prince's For the sake of the first of these ob.
faculties too much .
jects, I shall endeavour to keep the sub
In order to acquire a thorough know- ject always in correspondence with the
ledge of a science, it is necessary to apply natural understanding asmuch as pos
one's mind chiefly to the study of it for sible, and in this effortshall oftendeviate
some time, and it appears to be too soon from the scientific spirit and scholastic
for the Prince to do this . forms.
For these reasons I have adopted the I now submit to Your Excellency the
following course, which appears to me plan I have sketched hastily, and beg
most in accordance with the natural you will do me the favour to correct my
direction of the ideas of a young man .
view in any points in which it may not
In carrying it out my chief endeavour be in accordance with your own .

Next to a preparatory knowledge of theory of fighting, is in reality the prin

weapons and thedifferent kinds of troops, cipal thing , partly because battles are
some conception of applied or higher tac- decisive, partly because it comprises the
tics, as they are called, and strategy, is most of what can be taught. Strategy, or
principally necessary in order to compre- the theory of the combination of separate
hend military history. Tactics, or the battles towards the object of the cam
 96 ON WAR .
paign, is a subject more of natural and Arms.
matured power of judgment; still, we Powder, small arms, rifles, cannon, and
must at least point out clearly the sub- all appertaining thereto.
jects which are therein to be found, and Artillery.
show their mutual connection and rela.
tion to the whole . Theory of charges for horizontal and
Field fortification in such a synoptical vertServi firiofngcanno
icalce . n of all kinds.
course will be most suitably placed with
the theory of the defensive in tactics, Organisation of a battery.
permanent fortification in or after stra Expense of guns, and ammunition,etc.
tegy. Effect ofartillery - ranges - probability
Tactics itself comprises two different of hitting
classes of subjects. One class may be Other kinds of Troops.
understoodwithout having an acquaint Cavalry - light - heavy.
ance with the strategic relations of the y - do.
whole ; to this belong the formation for Infantr
Formation ;-destination ; -character.
tactical purposes, and the mode of fight
ing of all the smaller parts, from the Applied or Higher Tactics.
company or squadron, up to a brigade of A general conception of war- battles.
allarms, and in all kinds ofcountry. mod
Positi
Those of the other class are in intimate
on fightinglle. r divisions ,and their
e of ofsma
connection with strategic conceptions; to A company ofinfantry with or without
this class belong the usual action of whole artillery on all kinds ofground.
corps and armies in battle, outpost ser A squadron of cavalry the same.
vices, and the minor operations of war, The two together .
etc., etc. , because in such there are intro Ditto in different kinds of ground.
Order of battle for a corps of several
duced conceptions of position, battle,
march , etc., which cannot be under- brigades.
stood without previous conceptions of Ditto of an army of several corps.
. the combination of the whole cam The two last sections without relation
paign. to ground, because otherwise the idea of
shaofll,the
I ses subjec tsore
ref inara
, sep te concis
with athe twoe posi tion would be introd . uced
clas ; beg More detailed explanation of a cam
and ver y gen era l des cri pti on ofwar, pas s pai gn .
on to tactics, or the action of the smaller Organisation of army at the commence
divisions in battle, and then stop short
when I reach the position ( order of ment Whilofsta itcampaign.
marches ,and takes up posi
battle) of whole corps or armies , in tions, it requires measures of security ,
order to return to the general view outposts - patrols - reconnaissances - de
gn
of the campai , andon to explain more tachments — minor warfare.
in detail the connecti of things ; then When an army chooses a po
sition,
the remaining chapters on tactics will
follow .
such arryangements must be made that
end lf me
the arm candef itse in the sa
Lastly, I shall begin strategy again, tactical defensive - field fortification .
with the idea of the course of a campaign, Attack of the enemy in such positions
in order to consider the subject from this -conduct to be observed in the combat
new point of view.
From this now follows the arrangement es -
itself - battle retreat
ce
- pursuit.
s
March - defen of river - passage
as under .
of rivers — linesofposts — cantonments.
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION .
97

Strategy. Defensive war .

View of a campaign and of a whole
war in strategic respects.
What determines the result in war.
Plan of operations.
Plan of operations - arrangements for
subsistence.
Offensive war .
Positions — lines of posts — battles
marches - defence and passage of rivers.
Cantonments — winter quarters.
Mountain warfare.
System of war, etc. etc.
Permanent fortification and siege war
fare either precede strategy or form a
conclusion to the whole.

THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF WAR TO COMPLETE MY

COURSE OF INSTRUCTION OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE CROWN PRINCE .

ALTHOUGH these principles are the result
of much reflection and an assiduous study
of military history, they have only been
drawn up hastily on the present occasion,
and the form in which they appear will
not bear any stringent criticism . Be
sides, from the multiplicity of subjects,
only the most important have been se
lected, a certain conciseness being essen
tially necessary. These principles, there
fore, do not constitute a complete course
of instruction for your Royal Highness.
They are only intended as a founda
tion for reflection on your own part,
and to serve as a guide in these reflec
tions.

1.- GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN WAR .

1. The great object of the theory of a pedant, who can only do harm by the
war is to guide us to the way of obtain- views he advances. In the critical mo
ing a preponderance of physical force ments of life, in the tumult of battle, you
and advantages at the decisive points ; will one day feel clearly that no other
but if this is not possible, theory teaches view can give any help when help is
also how to speculate upon the moral most necessary, and when a dry pedantry
powers ; upon the probable errors of the of figures leaves us to our fate.
enemy, upon the impression made by a 2. Naturally in war we always seek to
bold spirit of enterprise, etc., etc. — even have the probability of success on our
upon our own desperation. All this
is by no means beyond the province
side, whether it be that we count upon a
physical or moral superiority. But this
of the art of war and its theory, for is not always possible ; we must often
that theory is nothing but rational re- undertake things when the probability
flection upon all situations in which we of our succeeding is against us, if, for in
can be placed in war. The most dan- stance, we can do nothing better. If, in such
gerous positions in which we can be a case, we despair, then our rational re
placed are just those which we should flection and judgment leave us just when
look upon as most likely to occur, and most wanted, when everything seems to
those about which we should most dis- conspire against us.
tinctly make up our minds. That leads Therefore, even when the probability
to heroic resolves founded on reason. of success is against us, we must not, on
Whoever represents the affair to your that account, consider our undertaking
Royal Highness in any other manner is as impossible or unreasonable ; reason
VOL. III. H
 98 ON WAR .

able it will always be if we can do no able 5th December , and not because he
thing better, and if we employ the few had made a calculation that with the
means we have to the best advantage. oblique order of battle he would in all
In order that in such cases we may probability beat
t the
Austrians .
never lose equanimity and firmness , two ations
3. Amongs all the oper left to
qualities which in war are always the your choicein any given case, amongst
first to be in peril, which , in such a situa all the measures which are open to adop
tion, are difficult to maintain ,but with- tion, there will alwaysbe a choicebe
out which, withthe mostbrilliant quali- tween thebold and the prudent. Some
ties of themind,wecan effectnothing, side
we must familarise ourselves with the people think that theory isalwayson the
of the prudent . That is false. If
idea of falling with honour ; cherish that theory could giveadvice in the matter, it
idea constantly and completely accustom would counsel the most decisive, conse
ourselves to it. Be convinced, most noble quently the boldest, as that is most con.
prince, that without this firm determina . sistent with the nature of war ; but it
tionnothing great to say
most fortunate war,can be effectedinthe leaves
nothing of an to the to the general chooseaccording
measure ofhisto own courage, of
unfortunate one . his spirit ofenterprise, and confidencein
We may be certain that this idea often himself. Choosethen according to the
occupied the mind of Frederick II. measure of these inner powers ; always
during
because his first Silesian campaign; and remembering thatwas
he was accustomed to it he made great general who therewantnever
ing inwas.
k hen r
bold
the attac at Leut on that memo ness .

II. - TACTICS OR THE THEORY OF COMBAT.

Warconsists of aNow
distinct battles. combination of many
, although this Therefore, warthing
portance in the of the highestartinnof
willalwaysbethe
combination may be either skilful or the conquering the enemy in battlesom
reverse , and the result in a great measure
.
this, yourRoyal Highness,cannot bestow
too much attention and thought. The
itself stands before it in point of aim following principles I holdtobe the most
portance , for nothing but a combination important:
of successful battles gives a good result .

I. - GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
A. -FOR THE DEFENCE .

1. To keep troops on the defensiv

under cover from fire as long as possible.e
action at once. If this fault is committed ,
all rational guidance of the combat is at
As we may be attacked, consequently an end ; it is only with disposable troops
may have to defend ourselves, at any that we can turn the course of a battle.
moment, except when we are ourselves 3. To trouble ourselves little about the
acting on the offensive, we must there width of our front, as it is a matter of
fore always take up a position as much e cons nce
eque (that f, andthedept
under cover as possible . littl
of the position in itsel
is the number of
h
2. Not to bring the whole force into troops placed one behind the other) is
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 99
diminished by an extension of the front . 7. This attack, belonging to the de
Troops which are in rear of the front fensive, may be made either at the
line are disposable ; they can either be moment the enemy opens his attack on
used to restore the combat at that point us, or whilst he is on themarch to do so.
or be brought forward at other adjacent It may also be arranged so that, when
points. This principle follows from the the enemy commences his attack, we draw
preceding. back and thus lure him on to ground of
4. As the enemy, whilst he attacks which he is ignorant, in order to fall
some part of the front, often seeks to upon him on all sides. For all disposi
outflank and envelop at the same time , tions of this kind, the deep formation of
therefore, the troops placed in rear are an army, that is an order in which only
available to repel such attempts, and two-thirds or the half, or even less, are
accordingly supply the want of local in front, and the rest posted directly
obstacles on which to rest the flanks. and obliquely in rear, under cover if
They are better placed for that purpose possible, is very well suited ; and, there
than if they stood in line and extended fore, this order of battle a point of
the width of the front, for in such case infinite importance .
they themselves would be easily turned 8. Therefore, if we have two divisions ,
by
establishes
This point also further
the enemy. second it is better to place one behind the other
the . than to place them in line : with three
5. If there are many troops to be divisions, one at least should be placed
posted in the rear, only a part should be in rear ; with four, probably two ; with
placed directly behind thefront, the rest five, at least two, in many cases, three,
are placed in an oblique direction in etc., etc.
echelon) to the rear, beyond either flank. 9. At the points where we remain
From this last position, the enemy's passive, we should make use of field
columns approaching to turn our flank, fortification, but only in separate en
can in turn be taken in flank . closed works of bold profile.
6. It is a first maxim never to remain 10. In forming a plan of battle, we
perfectly passive, but to fall upon the should have a great object in view , as, for
enemy in front and flank, even when he example, the attack of a strong column
is in the act of making an attack upon of the enemy, and a complete victory
us .
We adopt the defensive therefore over it. If we only choose a small ob
on a certain line only to compel the ject, whilst the enemy pursues a great
enemy to develop his forces for the one, we shall evidently be the losers.
attack of that line, and we then pass We play with thalers against pfennings.
over to the offensive with troops which 11. If our plan of defence is aimed at
have been kept in reserve. As Your some great object (the destruction of a
Royal Highness once justly remarked, column of an enemy, etc.), we must
The art of field fortification is not to serve follow it up with the utmost energy,
the defender like a wall behind which he expend uponit all our forces. In most
can stand in greater security, but to aid cases, the efforts of the assailant will
him in attacking the enemy with more be in some other direction ; whilst we
success , —the same applies to every pas- fall upon his right wing, he will be
sive defence : it is always only the means seeking to gain an advantage with
of attacking the enemy with advantage his left. If we slacken our efforts
on ground that we have looked out and sooner than the enemy, if we follow
prepared for ourselves, and where we up our object with less energy than
have drawn up our troops . he does, he will attain his object, he
100 ON WAR .

will gain his advantagecompletely,whilst fought in the spirit of these principles,

we shall only half reach ours. Thus the ples
for they are princi derived from the
enemy obtains the preponderance, thus study of history,
the victory becomes his, and we must At Minden, the Duke Perdinand sud
giveup even ourhalf advantage gained. denly appeared on a field of batle on
If Your Royal Highness readsattentively which theenemy did notexpect him,and
account of theBattles of Ratisbonne proceede d attack ; whilst atTann
the
and Wagram , you will see both the truth haus en hetothe
defended himself passively
and importance of this . behind entrenchments.
At Rossbach , Frederick II. threw
In both these battles the Emperor
Napoleon attacked with his right wing, himse lf on the enemy at a pointand
standing on the defensive with the left. at a time where his attack was not ex
The Archduke Charles did the same.
But the one did it with full resolution pected . gnitz, the Austrians found the
At Lei
and energy, the other was undecided, pos
and stopped always half way. The suc
King in frothem nightinquitea
ition different
that in which they had
cesses gained by that portion of the seen him the day before ; he fell upon a
column of the enemy with the whole
Archduke's army which was victorious,
wer ortant;tho
eunimpNapoleon
Emperor gained the fore the others could take part in thethem
seinwhithechsame
time at the opposite point, were de engagement. en
cisive, At Hohenlind , Moreau had five di
12. If I may be allowed to bring for visions in his front andfour behind him ,
ward once more the twolast principles, either directly or obliquely to the rethe
the combination of them yields a maxim
whic h , in themodernart ofwar,maybe right-flank column before it could carry
regarded as the first among all causes of out its intended attack.
victory, that is : to follow up a great and At Ratisbonne, Marshal Davoust de.
decisive object with energy and perseve fend ed himself wing,velyattacked
with the right passi ,while Napol eon
the fifth
rance .
13. Danger in case of failure is in . and sixth corps d'armée, andcompletely
creased thereby, it is true; but prudence defeated themam.
At Wagr the Austrians were, in
itis a false prudence which, as already reality , on the defensive,stillon these
said, is opposed tothe very nature of with
war ; for great ends we must venture ed thgreater
attyackthe ror onof their
eEmpepart the seco nd daywe
force,
much . a look
m on e
up tter
th la tingas ac on
, if we risk any
carefully
the means to our end , and to neglect attacked the Austrian left, turned and
ing through indolence or want of beat it, not troubling himselfmeanwhile
nothid
cons eration . Of this kind was the about his weak left wing ( consisting of a
dence of the Emperor Napoleon , who
pru single division ), resting on the Danube;
objects timidly and but by means (deep
withhalfmeasures
dence . Austrian right wing from having any
influence on the victory which he had
Among the few victorious defensive gained on the Russbach . With these re
battles that are noted in history, you will
find , noble sir, that the greatest were serves he retook Aderklaa. are not
All the foregoing principles
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION .
101

plainly exemplified in each of the battles ger build, as other armies are as capable
enumerated, but all are examples of an of moving as ours now . On the other
active defensive. hand, at that time the turning a flank
The mobility of the Prussian army was less generally in vogue, and, there
under Frederick II. was a means to vic- fore, the deep order of battle was less
tory for him , upon which we can no lon- imperative.
B. FOR THE ATTACK .

1. We try to fall upon a point in the from the field of battle, is the principal
enemy's position ; that is, a part of his point. Upon this, as an object or end,
army (a division, a corps ), with a great the plan of the battle must be formed,
preponderance of force, whilst we keep for a victory once gained, even if it is not
the other parts in uncertainty, that is to decisive, is easilymade so by energy in
say, occupy them . It is only in this way pursuit.
that when our forces are equal or infe- 5. We endeavour to make our attack
rior, we can fight with the superiority on concentrically on that wing of the enemy
our side, that is, with a probability of which is to receive the shock of our main
success.
If we are very weak, then we body, that is, in such a form that his
can only spare very few troops to occupy troops find themselves engaged on all
the enemy at other points, that we may sides at once. Allowing that theenemy
be as strong as possible at the decisive has troops enough to show a front in all
point. Unquestionably Frederick II . directions, still the troops, under such
only gained the battle of Leuthen be circumstances, become more easily dis
cause he had his small army on one spot couraged ; they suffer more, are sooner
and well-concentrated, as compared with thrown into disorder , etc .; in short, we
the enemy.
may expect to make them give way
2. The principal blow is directed sooner .
against a wing of the enemy's force by 6. This turning of the enemy compels
an attack in front and flank , or by com- the assailant to develop a greater force
pletely going round it and attacking it in in front than the defender.
rear .
It isonly if we push the enemy B
off his line of retreat by the victory that
we gain a great success.
3. Even when in strong force we often
choose only one point for the great shock,
and give the blow against that point the
greater strength ; for to surround an
army completely is seldom possible, or
supposes an immense preponderance both
physically and morally. But the enemy
may also be cut off from his line of re-
e F
If the corps a , b, c, are to fall con
treat by an attack directed against a centrically (or by converging lines) on
point in one of his flanks, and that is the part e of the enemy's army , they
generally sufficient to ensure great re- must naturally stand on lines contiguous
sults. to each other. But this development of
4. Generally the certainty ( high pro our force in front must never be carried so
bability) of the victory — that is, the cer- far that we do not retain strong reserves.
tainty of being able to drive the enemy That would be the greatest error possible,
 102 ON WAR .

and would lead to defeat, if the enemy points, we have no chance of the victory
is only in some measureprepared against except by surpassing him in energy and
being out- flanked . boldness . If he remains passive then, in
that case, we run no great danger.
g 9. Long, continuous lines of troops are
Z to be particularly avoided, they only lead
to parallel attacks which are now no
longer to the purpose.

f
Each division makes its own attack,
a
although in conformity with the plans of
higher authority, and consequently so
that they accord with each other. But
one division (8000 to 10,000 men) is never
now formed in one line, always in three
If a, b, c, are corps intended to attack or four ; from this it follows that no
e a part of the enemy's army, thenthe long continuous lines can be used any
corps f g must be kept in reserve . With more .
10. The attacks of divisions or Army
this deep formation we can incessantly
renew our attacksuponthesamepoint,and Corps in concert,must notbe combined
if ourtroops are repulsed at the opposite with the intention of their being under
extremity of the enemy's position , we are one guidance, so that although at a dis
not obliged to give up the day at this, be tance from each other, and perhaps even
cause we have a set-off to any success the separated by the enemy, they still remain
enemy may have gained . It was thus in communication , even aligning them
with the French at Wagram . The left selves on each other, &c. This is an
wing, which was opposed to the Austrian erroneous bad method of carrying out a
right resting on the Danube, was ex co -operat ion , which is liable toa thousand
tremel
Eve y wea
n the k and
ir cen wastAde
tre at llyaadefe
otarkl was not can
dents,bethroughwhichnothing
ated. acciever effected ,and by which great
one is
to almost certain to be well beaten if we
to theAustrianson thefirstday. But have todeal withanactive,vigorous
that did not signify, because the Em- enemy.
peror's right, with which he attacked the The true
division way is to the
Commander, each corps,
givegeneral of
control
Austrian left in front and flank, had such
a of his march, to give him the enemyis
of cavalry and horse artillery tohear the point on whichhismarchis tothe
he didtheAust
upon not beat s in , Aderk
rianthem laa,andif
was able, direct
at all as ed,and the victoryoverthe enemy
events , to stop their progress. the object of his march.
Each commander of a column has,
7. As in the defensive, so in the of therefore, the order to attack the enemy
fensive, that part of the enemy's army wherehe finds him ,andtodo so with
all
which , in its destruction , will yield de his strength . He must not be made an
cisive advantages , should be the object swerable for the result,forthat leadsto
of attack .
indecision ; he must be responsible for
8. As in the defensive, so here , we noth ing mor e than thatitshiscorps joins
must not relax our efforts till we have in the fight with all energies and
attained our object, or that our means are makes any sacrifice that may be necessary.
entirely exhausted. If the defender is 11. A well organised independent corps
also active, if he attacks us at other can resist the attacks of a vastly superior
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 103

force for a certain length of time (come wars being now prosecuted with more
hours) and is, therefore, not to be de- vigour, so that there are not now those
stroyed in a moment ; therefore, if it has long pauses in the operations which lulled
even been engaged too soon with the the one party to sleep, and gave the other
enemy and is beaten, still its action is not a favourable opportunity to make a sud
lost on the whole ; the enemy must have den attack .
deployed his forces, and expended a cer Under these circumstance, except by
tain portion of them on this corps, and a regular night-surprise (as at Hoch
thus given our other corps a favourable kirch ), which is always possible, the
opportunity for attack. only way now to surprise an enemy is to
Of the organisation of a corps for this make a march to the flank or the rear,
purpose, we shall speak hereafter. and then suddenly return upon him ; or
We ensure the harmonious action of if we are at a distance, then by forced
the whole in concert when each corps has marches, and by great efforts, to reach
in this manner a certain independence , the enemy's position sooner than he ex
and seeks out the enemy and attacks him pects.
at any cost. 13. The regular surprise (by night, as
12. One of the most important prin- at Hochkirch ), affords the best chance
ciples for offensive war is the surprise of of doing something, when our army is
the enemy. The more the attack par- small ; but it is attended with more
takes of the nature of a surprise , the risks for the assailant, if the defender
more successful we may expect to be. knows the country better than he does.
The surprise which the defender effects The less we know of the country and of
by the concealment of his dispositions, by the enemy's arrangements, the greater
the covered position in which he places these risks are ; therefore, such attacks,
his troops, the offensive can only effect in many instances, can only be regarded
the unexpected march to the attack.
byThis as desperate means.
is an occurrence which rarely 14. In such attacks, all the arrange
happens in modern warfare. This is ments must be more simple, and we
partly owing to better measures for the must keep still more concentrated than
security of an army ; partly owing to by day.

II .-PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF TROOPS.

1. If we cannot dispense with the use prevails in the enemy's ranks that we may
offire-arms (and if we could ,why should hope for success by his hasty retreat.
we carry them at all ?) we must open 2. The fire of artillery produces
the combat with them , and the cavalry greater effect than that of infantry. A
shouldnot be employed until the enemy battery of eight six pounders does not
hassuffered considerably by the action occupy a third part of the front of a
of low
fol infantry
s:
and artillery. From this battalion of infantry, is worked by an
eighth of the number of men com

(a ) That
behind the cavalry should be posted posing a battalion, and does
the infantry.
certainly
three times, as much exe
twice, if not
(6. ) That we must not be induced to cution with its fire . On the other
bring the cavalry into action too soon. hand, artillery has the disadvantage of
The cavalry should not be launched not being so easily moved as infantry.
boldly to the attack until such disorder This applies in general, even to the
104 ON WAR .
lightest description of horse artillery, for (d .) This is the chief purpose for which
it cannot be used like infantry upon any the infantry is destined : if weare drawn
ground. From the commencement, there up in such deep formation that we have
fore, the artillery must be kept united at still a line of infantry in column in re
the most important points, because it can serve, we are tolerably well master ofthe
not, like infantry, concentrate itself at combat at this point. This second line
s g
those point durin the progr ess of the of infantry should, if possible, be used
battle . A great battery of twenty or
only in columns, to decide the day.
thirty guns is in most cases decisive at (e.) The cavalry during this time keeps
the point where it is placed . in rear of the troops engaged in action,
3. From the particulars just specified as near as it can, without suffering much
and others which are evident, the follow- loss , that is beyond the reach of grape
ing rules present themselves for the use and musketry. It must, however, be at
of the different arms of the service re
hand, that we may be able to profit by
spectively . any success which takes place in the
(a. ) The battle is commenced by artil course of the combat.
lery . The greater proportion of that arm 4. In following these rules more orless
being brought into use from the very strictly, we mustkeep in view the follow
troops that bothywithlarg
first,itisonl e masses of ing principle ,
horse and foot artillery too stronglyonwhi
, viz., not ch Icannotinsise
to make a venture
are kept in reserve. Artillery is used in with all our forces at once, because we
largemasses broughttogether at single thus throw awayallmeansofdirecting
sary
them ; to weary our adver with asfew
the principa
r
l pointinone great
enemy
battery
's , troops as possible, and keep in handira
or batte the point in the line considerable mass for the last decisivo
which it is intended to attack .
moment . Once thislast reserve is staked,
( 6.)We nextuse lightinfantry — either it must beledwith theutmostboldness,
marksmen , riflemen , or fusiliers - prin 5. An order of battle, that is, a method
cipally in order not to bring too many of drawing up the troops before and
troops into action at once ; we try first to during the battle , must be established
feel what there is in our front ( for that for the whole campaign , or the whole
can seldom be properly examined ) we war .
This order of battle is to be ob
want to see which direction the fight is served in all cases when there is not time
likely to take . specialdispositions. It must,
If we can maintainan equal fight with totheremake
fore,me based chiefly with aviewing
andthat thereis no reason for hastening army
the affair , we should do wrong to hurry
teducefights
ene Form Or manner inwhich is
to a kind ofmethod, which is
forward other forces ; we should weary out
very necessary as wellas salutary, be
the enemy with this kind of fight as much cause a great number ofthe generals of
as possible. second order, and other officers at the
(c .) If the enemybrings so many troops head of smaller divisions, have little
of skirmishers, or if we cannot delay any .
longer, we bring forward a full line of tude at all for war.
By this, a certain methodicism is insti
infantry, which deploys itself at 100 or tuted which takes the place ofart, where
200 paces from the enemy, and either the latter is wanting . Mypersuasion is
opens fire or advances to the charge , that this exists to the greatest degree in
according to circumstances .
the French army.

Die
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION. 105

6. According to what has been said brigade would be something like the
respecting the use of the different arms following :
of the service, this order of battle for a
a ооо ооооооо ооооооо ооооооо b

cc ::: : : : : : : :
f

g h

Ic

1 m .

ITorse Horse
Artillery. :: :: Artillery.

a, b is a line of light infantry which opens the battle, and in a broken, uneven
country, serves in some measure as an advanced guard ; then comes the artillery,
c, d , intended to be placed in battery atadvantageous points. Until put in posi
tion, it remains behind the first line of infantry. e , f is the first line of infantry,
intended to deploy and open fire ; in this case it is formed of four battalions ; 9,
h, two regiments of cavalıy; i, k, the second line of infantry, which constitutes
the reserve intended to decide the result of the battle. l, m, its cavalry.

According to the same principles, a generals and staff. They are drawn up
similar disposition may be established in line, or one behind another, according
for a corps of larger proportions : at the as that may be prescribed by the general
same time it is not essential that the principles for the combat. One thing
order adopted should be precisely that we have still to add, which is, that if we
now laid down, it may differ in some are not too weak in cavalry, we should
respects, so that it is in conformity with form a special reserve of that arm , which
the foregoing principles. Thus, for in- naturally will be placed quite in rear,
stance, the usual position of the cavalry, and is for the followingpurposes :
gh, may be in the line lm, and then it is (a) To press upon the enemy, if he
only brought forward when it is found to retreats from the field, and to attack the
be too far in rear at I m . cavalry which he employs in covering his
7. The army consists of several such retreat . If the enemy's cavalry is beaten
independent corps, which have their at that moment, greatresults must follow ,
 106
ON WAR.

unless the enemy's infantry performs and rear-guard, and forms a column of
prodigies of valour. Small bodies of itself ; that does not, however, prevent
cavalry will not answer the purpose on several
such an occasion . such corps from marching on the
same road one after another, and thus, to
(b) To hasten the pursuit of the enemy a certain extent, forming as a whole one
if, without being beaten , he makes a great column.
retreat ; or if, after a lost battle, he con
(b) The corps march according to their
tinues to retire on the following day. position in the general order of battle;
Cavalry marches quicker than infantry, that is to say, according as their ap
and is more dreaded by troops that are
retreating. And next to beating the pointed
to be place in that order may happen
inline with , or in rear of, each
enemy, the pursuit is the most important other, so they march.
thing in war. (c) In the corps themselves the follow
(c) If our object is to make a great ing order is invariably observed; the
turning movement (to turn the enemy light infantry form the advanced and
strategically ), and on account of the
detour we must employ an arm which rear guards, accompanied by a propor
marches quicker, then we may take this tion of cavalry; then follows the infantry;
reserve cavalry for the purpose . then the artillery ; last of all, the rest of
the cavalry.
In order to make thiscorpsmore inde This order is kept, whether we move
pendent, horse artillery should be attached against the enemy - in which case it is
to it ; for there is greater strength in a
combination of several arms. the natural order — or parallel with the
enemy, in which case, properly, those
The orderof
8.relation
has to the battle it isthe
battle; for troops
their dis who in the order of battlearetostand
position for that end. behind one another, should march side
by side . If we have to form line of
The order of march is, in its essentials , battle, there can never be want of time
as follows :
to such a degree that we cannot with
(a) Each complete corps ( whether bri draw
gade or division ) has its own advance the cavalry and the second line by
.
one flank or the other.

III. - PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF GROUND.

1.The terrain (the ground or country ) level country , in most cases,still allores
gives two advantages in war.
The first is, that obstacles to approach of drawing up troopsmore or less under
cover .
are thus presented which either render it
impossible for an enemy to reach certain Formerly, the first of these advantages
points, or compel him to march slowly, to was almost the onlyone known, and
very little use was made of the second.
keep in column, etc.
Thee secon
enabl us to dis,that
obstaposit
conceal the of groun
clesion of ourd
Now the
that isofy lessof servic
mobilit
the first allarmiesis such,
e, and juston
troops. that account we must make use the more
Both advantages are very important, frequently of thesecond . The first of
but the second appears to these two advantages is only serviceable
me the
greatest : at all events it is certainly in
attack defensi
theand ve, . the second, in both
defence
the one which we can most frequently
make use of, because , even the most 2. The ground considered as an ob
stacle to approach , is of use chiefly in
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 107

the following points :-(a) as a support defend ourselves in themost unfavourable

for the flanks, (b) as a means of strength of all forms, with both flanks thrown
ening the front. back, a d , cb .
3. As a fit support for a flank , an 4. These considerations lead again to
obstacle should be quite impassable— the deep order of battle. The less we
such as a large river, a lake, an impass- are able to find secure support for the
able swamp. These are all impediments wings, the more corps we must ve in
which are rarely met with, and therefore rear , with which we may in turn
perfect supports for the flanks are seldom outflank any portion of the enemy's
to be found, and the want of them is felt army which shall seek to act against
now more frequently than formerly, be our flank .
cause armies move more, do not remain 5. All kinds of ground which cannot
so long in one position , consequently re- be passed by troops marching in line,
quire a greater number of positions in all villages, all enclosures of parcels of
the theatre of war.
ground by hedges and ditches, marshy
If the obstacle to approach is not an meadows, lastly — all hills which can
impassable barrier, then it is, properly only be mounted with some dificulty,
speaking , no point d'appui for a flank, come under the head of terrain -hin
it is only a point which strengthens the drances of this kind, that is, of obstacles
position. Troops must then be placed that cannot be passed except with dif.
behind it, and then again it becomes in ficulty, and slowly ; and which, there
relation to these an obstacle to approach. fore, add greatly, to the strength of the
It is certainly alwaysof advantage bat.
troopsWoods
to strengthen the flanks in this manner,
posted can
bēhind them inthe com
only be included in
as fewer troops are then required at this category when the underwood is
those points ; but we must take precau very thick and the ground marshy. A
tions against two things : the first is, common wood of high trees is as easy
placing too much reliance on such sup- to pass as a plain. There is one point,
however,
ports for the flank, and thus neglecting must in respect to a wood which
not be overlooked, that is, that it
to have strong reserves behind them ;
nay serve to conceal the enemy. If we
place ourselves inside it, then there is
the same disadvantage for both sides ;
but it is very dangerous, and at the
same time a great mistake to have
woods in front or on the flank . Such
a thing can never be allowable unless
there are very few roads by which they
can be traversed . Abattis intended to
6
bar the passages are so easily removed
the second is, covering both wings with that they are not of much use.
obstacles of this description, for as they 6. From all this it follows that we
do not completely secure either, they do should endeavour to make use of such
not prevent the possibility of a combat obstacles upon one flank, in order to offer
on both flanks ; this may easily become there a relatively strong resistance with
a most disadvantageous defensive, for the fewtroops, whilst we carry out our in
obstacles will not allow us easily to tended offensive on the other flank, With
sally forth with an active defence on one these obstacles, the use of entrenchments
wing, and thus we may be reduced to may be combined with great advantage,
108 OV WAR .

because then, if the enemy passes the plenty of artillery available; thefire of
obstacle, the fire from the entrenchments musketry ( 150 to 200 yards), if there is
may secure our weak force from being little artillery
8. Thr ough at
thishand.
it becomes a rule to
overwhelmed by superior numbers, and include within the zone of our most
thr7.own back too suddenly
When we
.
on the defensive,effective fire, every obstacle to approach
are
every obstacle covering our front is of with which we wish to strengthen our
great value.
front. But at the same time, it is im
portant to observe, that our whole defence
upAll
arehills
onlyon piedh on
whic
occu posit ions areunttaken
thisacco ; for should never depend entirely on our fire,
an elevated position has seldom any im- but a considerable portion of our troops
portant influence, often none at all, on (one-third to one-half) should always be
the effect of the arms in use. If we kept ready to attack with the bayonet.
stand above the enemyashe approaches, Therefore, ifwe are very weak, wemust
he must ascend with difficulty ,therefore merely place the line of fire (riflemen and
he advances only slowly ,his ranks get artillery) near enough tocovertheobo
into disorder , and he reaches us with his stacle with their fire,and place the rest of
physical powers exhausted , advantages the troops in columns
600 or 800 yards
for us which , with equal bravery and further back , and if possible under cover.
9. Another way of making use of
numbers on each side, ought to be deci
sive. The great effectmorally of a rapid the m beesa tolittl
obstacl e furthherin infront,isto
approac front of let
our
ge d
char at full spee is a poin which t
must not on any account be overlooked. line, rangethey
ctivsoe tha shalnonl -sho
t of can be twith inthe
( 1,000 to
The soldier ncing
who is adva mes effe
beco 2,000 yards), and if the enemy's columns
insensible even to danger , the one who
isstanding still loses his presence of pas s them then , to attack him fromall
sides. (At Minden, the Duke Ferdinand
mind . It is therefore always advan
tageous to place thefirst lines of infantry did someacle
an obst
g
thinlikethis.).Inthismanner
of ground is favourable to
and artillery on high ground.
If the slope of the hill is so steep, its the plan of actively defending ourselves;
declivity so broken and uneven , that we and this active defence, of which we have
cannot sweep it well with our fire,which already spoken elsewhere,then takes
is often the case, then, instead of placing plac
10.e on
Inour
the fron t. ing observations, ob
preced
our front line on the summit ridge, that
part shouldrs atmost only be occupied by stac les of grochiefly
considered undandcoun try havlines
as connected e beenin
she
skirmi uld
, and the full line sho be
so placed on the reverse slope , that at relation to extensive positions, but it is
themoment when the enemy reaches the necessary to say something about single
summit ridge and begins to rally his points.
ranks , he is exposed to the greatest fire. Isolated points in general can only be
Allother local features which m
for 06- defended her
eit by ent renchments
,orbi ha
staclesamsto appr oach,such as smallrivers, strongnaturalobst acle ofground.Ofthes
stre hol , low waysetc.,
, serve to make first sedonotspeakat present.Obstacles
breaks in the enemy's front. He must, of ground which, standing isolated, may
after passing them ,halttoreform ,and have tobe defended can only be
that delays him ; therefore he should ( a .)thi
In s case d, ent
Isolate steep
renHeights.
chments are indis
effectua l
fire.Themost effectual fire it pensabile, becausethe enemy can always
grape ( 100to 600 yards), if there is advance against thedefender with a front
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 109

more or less extended, and the defender
must then at last be taken in rear, be-
cause he will rarely be strong enough to
show a front on all sides.
(6.) Defiles.
Under this term , we include every
narrow way forming the only approach
by which the enemycan reach a particu-
lar point. Bridges, embankments, rocky
gulleys with precipitous sides, belong to
this class.
In respect to all these cases, it is to be
observed, that either it is impossible for
the assailant to turn the obstacle, as, for
instance, a bridge over a great river ; in
which case then the defender may boldly
use all his force in order to bring as
much fire as possible to bear on the point
of passage, or we not secure against
theobstacle being turned, as in the case
of bridges over small streams, and the
greater number of mountain defiles ; then
it is necessary to reserve a considerable
part of the force (one-third to one -half )
for an attack in close order.
(c) Buildings and Enclosures, Villages,
small Towns, etc.
If troops are brave and carry on a war
with enthusiasm , there is no place or con-
dition of things in which a few can so well
resist many as in the defence of houses.
But if we arenot quite certain of the men
individually, it is better only to occupy troops in columns that they may be the
the houses, gardens, etc. with riflemen, more easily concealed; we take advantage
and to plant cannon at the approaches, and of villages, plantations, all undulationsof
to draw up the greater part of the troops the ground,in order to conceal our troops
(one-third to one-half) in close column, in behind them ; in advancing we choose the
the place itself, or behind it under cover,
in order to rush upon the enemy with
this reserve, when he attempts to enter.
11. These isolated posts serve the
great operations partly as outposts, not
intended to offer an absolute defence, but
mostly only to detain the enemy, partly,
at points which are of importance in the
combinations planned for the whole army.
It is also often necessary to hold a distant
point, in order to gain time for the develop-
ment of active defensive meaures which
we have in view. If the point is remote,
it is naturally on that account isolated.
12. It is only now necessary to add two
remarks concerning isolated points, the
first is, that we must hold troops in readi
ness behind these points for the detach
ments to rally upon in case ofbeing driven
out ; the second is that whoever includes
such a defence in the series of his combina
tions, should never reckon too much upon
it, let the strength of the natural obstacles
of ground be ever so great; that on the
other hand, whoever is entrusted with
the defence, must determine to carry out
the object, let circumstances be ever so ad
verse to him. For this, a spirit of resolu
tion and self -devotion is required which
can only spring from a thirst for glory
and from enthusiasm : for this reason ,
people must be chosen for such duties
who are not deficient in these noble
qualities ofthe soul.
13. All that concerns the use of the
ground as a means for covering our
position and our march up to occupy it,
requires no elaborate exposition.
We do not now place ourselves on a
hill we wish to defend (as was often done
formerly ) but behind it: we do not place
ourselves before a wood , but in it, or behind
it ; the latter only when we can over
look the wood or thicket. We keep our
most broken intersected country, etc.
In cultivated countries there are hardly
any localities so much overlooked that
it is not possible by a skilful use of such
obstacles and features as the ground
presents, to keep a great partof thetroops
For
on the defensive from being seen .
the assailant, there is more difficulty in
keeping a march secret, because he must
follow the high road.
Of course, when the ground is made
use of for purposes of concealment of
110 ON WAR .

troops, this must be done with a due are principally embraced in two leading
regard to the end and the combinations points : not to choose an over difficult
which have been decided upon ; therefore, country for the point of attack ; and next,
in this we must take care above all things on all occasions to advance through the
that we do not pull to piecesthe order of country so that the enemy cansee as
battle, although some small deviations little as possible of our movements.
may be allowable. 17. I close these observations on the
14. If we sum up what has now use of ground, with a maxim of the
been said on ground, we deduce from it highest importance for the defence, and
as respects the defensive, that is the which is to be regarded as the key-stone
choice of positions, that the following of thewhole theory of defence, which
points are those of most importance : --- is :—Not to expect everything from the
(a) Support of one or both flanks. strength of the ground, consequently never to
( 6) Open view before front and flanks. be enticed into a passive defence by a strong
( c) Obstacles to the approach in front. country. For if the country is in reality
(d) Masked positions for troops. so strong that it is impossible for the
To this is to be added assailant to drive us out of our position,
(e) A broken country in rear, because he will turn it, which is always possible,
that makes pursuit difficult in caseof and then thestrongest countryis useless;
disaster ; but no defiles too near ( as at we are then compelled to fight under
Friedla nd ), for that causes delay and aquite
confusion .
different circumstances,inquite
different country ; and we might aswell
15. It would be pedantic to suppose that not have included the other locality in
all these advantages are to be obtained our combinations. But if the ground is
at every position which it is necessary to not of such strength , if it is possible to
take up in war . All positions are not attack it, stillthe advantages of such a
of equal importance; theirimportance position willneveroutweigh thedisadvan:
increases in proportion to theprobability tagesof a passive defence. Allobstacles
of our being attackedinthem . It is only of ground musttherefore only betaken
in the most important that we try to com advantage offor a partial defensive, in
bine, if possible, all these advantages ; in orderto offer a relatively great resistance
others we try to do so more or less. with few troops, and to gain time for the
16. The considerations which the as offensive, by which the real victory is to
sailant has to study in respect to ground , be gained at other points .
III . - STRATEGY.
This is the combination of the single depend, like thedirection of a battle, on
battles of a war, in order to attaid to the special knowledge.
object of the campaign,or war. All that is essential in the few princi.
how knower,how
Iftoweconqu theretofig
ht much
is not,if we know plesflywhich
more chie on thethere
consare,andwhichdepend
titution of States and
wanted ; to combine successful results is armies may, therefore, be brought with
easy, because it is merely an affair of a in a small compass .
well- practised judgment, and does not
1. - GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
1. There are three principal objects in (a) To conquer and destroy the ene
carrying on war
my's armed force.
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 111 .
(b) To get possession of the material decisive point. The success at that point
elements of aggression , and of the other will compensate for all defeats at secon
sources of existence of the hostile army. dary points .
(c) To gain public opinion . 7. The third principle is : not to lose
2. To attain the first of these objects, time. If no special and considerable
the chief operation must be directed advantage will arise by delay, it is impor
against the enemy's principal army, or at tant to commence work as quickly as
least against a very important portion of possible. By rapidity,many measures of
the hostile force ; for it must be beaten the enemy are nipped in the bud, and
before we can follow up the other two public opinion is gained in our favour.
objects with success . Surprise plays a much greater part in
3. In order to seize the material forces, strategy than in tactics ; it is the most
operations are directed against those powerful element of victory ; Alexander,
points at which those resources are chiefly Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus,
concentrated : principal towns, maga- Frederick II. , Napoleon, owe the brightest
zines, great fortresses. On the road to rays of their fame to their promptitude.
these, the enemy's principal force, or a 8. Lastly, the fourth principle is : to
considerable part of his army, will be follow up the success we gain with the
encountered. utmost energy:
4. Public opinion is ultimately gained The pursuit of the enemy when de
by great victories, and by the possession feated, is the only means of gathering up
of the enemy's capital. the fruits of victory .
5. The first and most important maxim 9. The first of these principles is the
which we can set before us for the attain- foundation of the three others. If we
ment of these objects, is : to employ all have followed the first principle, we can
the forces which we can make available venture any length with respect to the
with the utmost
energy In every modi- others, without risking our all. It gives
fication which manifests itself in these the means of continually creating new
respects, there is a shortcoming as re- forces behind us, and with fresh forces,
spects the object. Even if the result is every disaster may be repaired.
tolerably certain in itself, it is extremely In this, and not in going forward with
unwise not to use the utmost efforts to timid steps, lies that prudence which
make it perfectly certain ; for these efforts may be called wise.
can never produce injurious effects . Let 10. Small states, in the present day,
the country suffer ever so much by it, no cannot make any wars of conquest ; but,
disadvantage can arise from that, because at the same time, for a defensive war, even
the pressure of the war is the sooner re- their means are very great. Therefore
moved .
I am perfectly convinced : that whoever
The moral impression produced by calls forth all his powers in order to ap
vigorous preparatious is of infinite value; pear incessantly with new masses, who
of
every one feels certain of success : this is ever adopts every imaginable means
the best means of raising the spirits of preparation, whoever concentrates his
the nation .
force at the decisive point, whoever thus
6. The second principle is to concen- armed pursues a great object with reso.
trate our force as much as is possible at lution and energy , has done all that can
the point where the decisive blows are to be done in a general way for the stra
be struck, to run the risk even of being tegical conduct of the war, and that unless
at a disadvantage at other points, in he is altogether unfortunate in battle, he
order to make sure of the result at the will undoubtedly be victorious in the
· 112 ON WAR .
same measure as his adversary has fallen
short of this exertion and energy.
11. Due attention being paid to these
principles, the form in which the opera
tions are carried on, is in the end of little also just as well be attained by a tactic
consequence. I shall, however, try to
explain, in a few words, what is most
important.
In tactics, we seek always to get round
the enemy, that is to say, that portion
of his force against which our principal
attack is directed, partly because the
convergent action of the combatant force
is more advantageous than the parallel,
partly because it is the only method of
cutting the enemy off from his line of
retreat.
If this, which relates to the enemy and
his position tactically, is used strategi
cally, and applied to the enemy's theatre
of war (therefore, also, to his subsistence
lines) , then the separate columns, or
armies , which should envelop the enemy,
will be, in most cases, so far apart from
each other that they cannot take part in
one and the same battle . The enemy
will be in the middle, and may be able
to turn with the mass of his forces
against these corps singly, and beat them
in detail. Frederick II.'s campaigns fur
nish examples of this, more especially
those of 1757 and 1758 .
Now as the battle is the principle
affair, the decisive one, the party acting
on converging lines, unless he has a most
decisive superiority in numbers, will lose
by battles all the advantages which the
enveloping movement would have gained
for him ; for an operation against the
lines of communication only takes effect
very slowly, but victory in the battle very
quickly.
Therefore, in strategy, he who finds
himself in the midst of his enemies , is
better off than his opponent who tries to
envelop him , particularly if the forces
on each side are equal, and of course still
more so if there is an inferiority on the
enveloping side.
A strategic enveloping or turning
movement is no doubt avery effective
means of cutting the enemy off from his
line of retreat; but as this object may
al
turning movement , the strategic envelop
ing movement is therefore never advisable
unless we are (physically and morally) so
superior, that we shall Þe strong enough
atthe decisive point, and yet can atthe
same time dispense with the detatched
corps .
Napoleon never engaged in attempts
to turn his enemy strategically, although
he was so often , indeed almost always ,
both physically and morally superior.
Frederick II.only did it once,in the
attack on Bohemia, 1757. Certainly by
that means theAustrians were prevented
from bringing on a battle until they got
to Prague; but what was the benefitto
him of the conquest of Bohemia as far as
Prague, without a decisive battle ? The
battle of Kollin forced him to giveit up
again — a proofthat battles decideall. At
Prague he was obviously in dangerof
being attacked by the whole of the
Austrian forces before the arrival of
Schwerin . He would not have exposed
himself to this danger if he had marched
through Saxony with all his forces united.
The first battle would in that case pro
bably have been fought atBudin on the
Eger, and that would have been as deci
sive as the Battle of Prague. This con
centric march into Bohemia was unques.
tionably a consequence of the Prussian
army having been broken up during the
winter in cantonments in Silesia and
Saxony, and it is of importanceto observe,
that reasons of this kind , in most cases,
are more influential than the advantages
in the form of the disposition itself, for
thefacili ty of operations is favourable to
their rapid execution , and the friction
inher ent in theimmense machinery ofa
greatarmed force, is in any case so great,
that we should never add to it except
from necessity.
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 113

12. Besides this, the principle just made this possible without our being
stated,ofconcentrating asmuch aspossible placed at a disadvantage if opposed to an
at the decisive point, is opposed to the idea enemy who is concentrated in the old
of enveloping strategically, and the order manner ( with 70,000 to 100,000 men) at
of battle for our troops naturally springs one spot; for one of these corps, so
from that principle of itself. On that ac- organised as they now are, can sustain
count I said, with reason, that the form of itself for some time against an enemy
the order of battle is of little
consequence. twice or three times superior in numbers;
There is, however, one case in which the during this time other corps arrive, and
operating strategically against the enemy's therefore, even if this corps is actually
flanks leads to great results, similar to beaten, it will not have fought in vain,
those of a battle ; that is, when in a poor as we have already observed elsewhere.
or impoverished country the enemy, by Accordingly,now, single divisions or
great exertions, has formed large maga- corps take the field, marching separately
zines, on the preservation of which his either in line with each other, or in suc
operations entirely depend. In such a cession one after another, and only so
case it may perhaps be advisable not to far in connection, that, if they belong to
march with the mass of our forces against the same army, they can take part in
the enemy's principal force, but to push any battle which may occur.
forward against his base. For this there This makes it practicable to subsist
are, however, two conditions requisite : an army for a time without magazines.
(a .) That the enemy is so far from his It is facilitated by the organisation of
base that he will be forced by this means the corps itself, by its staff and its com
to make a long retreat, and missariat department.
(6. ) That with a few troops and the 15. When important reasons (as for
help of natural and artificial obstacles we instance the position of the enemy's prin
shall be able to harass him in such a man- cipal army) do not decide otherwise, one
ner on the road which his principal force should choose the richest and most pro
must take, that no conquests he can make ductive provinces to operate in , for
in that direction will compensate for the facility of subsistence promotes rapidity
loss of his base . of movement. There is nothing which
13. The subsistence of troops being a in importance surpasses the subsistence,
conditionwhich is indispensable in the con- except the position of the enemy's prin
duct of war, it has a great influence on cipal army, which we are seeking, the
the operations of the war, particularly situation of the capital city, or strong
in thisway, that it will only allow of the place which wewish to take. Allother
concentration of troops to a certain de- considerations, for instance, the advan
gree; and as it must be considered in the tageous form of drawing up the armed
choice of the line of operations , therefore force (orderof battle ), of which we have
it hasan
theatre influence
of war . in determining the already spoken, are, as a rule much less
important.
14. The subsistence for troops is pro- 16. In spite of this new method of
vided, whenever the state of a country subsisting, we are very far from being
allows of it, at the cost of the country, by able to dispense with all magazines,
requisitions
. and a wise commander, even if the re
According to the present mode of sources of the province are quite suf
making war, armies takeupconsiderably ficient, will notneglect to form magazines
more space than formerly. The forma- behind him as a provision against un
tion of separate independent corps has foreseen events, and so as to be able
VOL . III , I
114 ON WAR..
the more readily to concentrate his of those measures of precaution which
strength at certain points. This is one are no detriment to themain object.

II.-DEFENSIVE.
1. In politicallanguage, a defensive war gladly combine the tactical defensive
is one which a State carries on to maintain with the strategic, that is, we give battle
itsindependence : in strategy,adefensive in positions red beforehand;we do
er prepase
war is a campaign in which we limit so furth becau there is less risk of
ourselves to contending with the enemy our committing faults.
in a theatre of war which has been pre 3. In defensive war just as much as
pared by us for the purpose . Whether in the offensive, a great object should
the battles we fight in this theatre of be pursued . This can be nothing else
war are offensive or defensive , makes no than to annihilate the enemy's army,
difference in this respect . either in abattle,or by making his sub
2 We choose the strategic defensive sistence so difficult as to produce dis
chiefly when the enemy is superior in organisation and compel him to retreat,
urally,fortressesandentrenched sider
force.Natwhich are to be regarded as the
camps,
bywhiable he mus. tnWelli
ch losses ecessarilysuffer.com
ngton's campaign
chief preparations of a theatre of war, in the years 1810 and 1811 is an instance
afford great advantages, to which may be of this.
added knowledge of the country and the The defensive war, therefore, does not
possession of good maps and surveys . consist in an indolent waiting for events ;
With these advantages , a small army, or we must only pursue the waiting -for
an army which is based on a small State system where there is a palpable and
and limited resources , will be more in a decisive utility in that mode of proce
condition to oppose the enemy than with dure . e
That sort of calm befor a storm ,
out the aid of such assistance . whilst the offensive is gathering up new
There arebesides thetwo following ger
grounds upon which we may choose the
e forforgrea
forcous t blows,isextremely dan
the defender.
defensive form of war by preference. If the Austrians,after the battle of
First. - Ifthe poverty of the provinces Aspern , hadreinforced themselves to
the opeounrattionofstheofwa
on acc extonremofelysub'disisffitenculcet. hav
quersti Empeerodonr,wh icnhthe
e, the of nly
theytimcere tai mindigh
rest whic
took place before the battle of Wagram
andtheenemy must submit to ita terminat might have been advantageous to the lid
is, of ance
caseinst
the for the ,Russ
at ian
thismo y . t ( 18125 not
armmen hus boni
doso,th
at condition ; astheyh lost
g vonthatwasonlysomuc dist
Secondly .-- If the enemy has greater time for them, and it would have been
advantages for carrying on the war. In wiser if they had takenadvantage of
a theatre of war prepared, which we Napoleon's critical position to reap the
kno w , where all the surrounding circum
stances are in our favour, war is more fruits of their success at Aspern.
4. Fortresses are intended to occupy
easily conducted, there will not be so an important partof the enemy'sarmy in
many faults committed . In this case , besieging them . Thisperiod must, there
that is, when the little dependence to be fore, be taken advantage of to beat the
placed on our troops and generals com rest of the army. Our battles should be
pels us to resort to the defensive, we fought behind our fortresses, not in front
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 115

of them . At the same time, however, we columns which have forced their
way
must not quietly look on at their being through, will of themselves retire again.
captured , as Benningsen did during the The formation of mountain ranges in
siege of Dantzig . general is such that about the centre of
5. A great river, that is, such as we the masses, there are plateaux or plains
cannot build a bridge across without at a greater or less elevation, and the sides
considerable difficulty, rivers like the next to the level country are intersected
Danube, below Vienna, and the Lower by deep valleys forming the entrances
Rhine, afford a natural line of defence : or avenues. The defender, therefore, has
not by distributing our forces equally in the mountains a district in which he
along its banks, and seeking to hinder can make rapid movements right or left,
the
passage absolutely, which is a dan- whilst the attacking columns are separated
gerousmeasure, but by watching it, and from each other by steep , inaccessible
when the enemy passes then falling upon ridges. It is only a mountain mass of
him from all sides just at the moment this kind that is well adapted for a good
when he has not yet got all his forces defence. If it is rugged and impassable ,
under command, and is still hemmed in generally throughout, so that the corps
within a narrow space close to the river. on the defensive must be scattered and
The battle of Aspern is an instance. At disconnected, then to undertake the de
the battle of Wagram the Austrians, fence with the principal army is a dan
without any necessity, allowed the French gerous measure, for under such circum
to get possession of far too much space, stances all the advantages are on the
by which means they did away with the side of the assailant, who can fall upon
disadvantages peculiarly inherent to the any of the isolated posts with far su
passage of a river. perior numbers, as no pass, no single
6. Mountains are the second natural post is so strong that it cannot soon be
obstaclesof ground which afford a good taken by superior numbers.
line of defence, as we can either have 7. With regard to mountain warfare,
them in front, and only occupy them it is specially to be observed, that in it a
with a few light troops, treat them to a great deal depends on the aptitude of
certain extent as a river which the enemy subordinate officers, but still more on the
must
cross, and as soon as he debouches high spirit which animates the ranks.
with his single columns, fall upon one of Great skill in manoeuvring is not here
them with our whole weight, or we may requisite, but a militaryspirit and a
ourselves take position in the mountains. heart in the cause, for every one is more
In the last case, we must only defend the or less left to act independently ; this is
singlepasses with small corps, and a con- why national levies find their account in
siderable part of the army ( a third or a mountain warfare, for while they are
half) must remain in reserve, in order to deficient in the first quality, they possess
fall in superior numbers on any column the other in the highest degree.
which forces its way through. This 8. Lastly, in respect to the strategic
great reserve must, however, not be defensive, it is to be observed , that while
split up with a view toabsolutely pre- it is initself stronger than the offensive,
penting all the columnsfrompassing,
but we must, from the first, resolve to it should only be used to gain thefirst
great result, andthat if this object is
make use of it to attack that column attained, and peace does not immediately
which we suppose to be the strongest. follow uponthat, greaterresults can
If, in this way, we rout a consider- only be obtained by the offensive; for
able part of the enemy's force, the other whoever remains always on the defen
116 ON JAR ,

sive, exposes himself to the disadvantage it is almost sure in the end to become
of always carrying on the war at his own exhausted, and be obliged to submit.
expense. No state can endure that for We should therefore begin with the
more than a certain time; and therefore, defensive, that we may with the more
if it exposes itself to the blows of its ad- certainty end with the offensive.
versary without ever striking in return,

III . - ATTACK .
1. The strategic attack pursues the keep in view the possibility of a great
aim of the war directly, for it is aimed change of fortune. For this reason, he
directly at the destruction of the enemy's must provide points on the line of opera
armed force, whilst the strategic de tions suitable for refuge, in the event of
fenceseeksto obtain this objectpartly his armybeingbeaten.
only indirectly . From this it comes that tresses Such orare,fora
with entrenched camps, simply
the principles of the attack are already entrenched camps.
contained in the general principles of Large rivers afford the best means of
strategy. Only twosubjects require time.
checkingWetheshoul
pursd uit of an enemy forma
therefore secure the
special mention .
2. The first is the keeping the army passages across them with bridge heads,
constantly complete in men and arms. surrounded with a girdle of strong re
To the defender, this is relatively easier, doubts .
fromthe proximity of his resources. The For the defence of these points, and as
assai lant, although in mostcases pos- garrisons forimportant or less andfor
bessed of the resources of a powerful state, tresses, troops, in greater towns number:,
must bring his means more or less from a must be leftbehind,according as we have
distance, and therefore, of course , with to apprehend attacks from the enemy or
greater difficulty. That he may not run the hostility of the inhabitants of the
short in means , he must make such ar country. These, with the reinforcements
ran gements that thelevy of recruits and coming up, form new corps,which in
transport of arms anticipate his wants in case ofsuccess, follow the army, butin
these respects. The roads on his line of case of disaster, are stationed at the
operations must be incessantly covered the
with reinforcements and trains of sup- points whitch
retrea .
have beenfortified to secure
plies moving to the front; on those roads, Napoleon always showed great fore
military stations must be formed to ex sight in the provision hemade in this
pedite the transport. manner intherearofhis army; and in
3. Even in the most prosperous circum that way, even in his boldest operations,
stances , and with the greatest moral and he incurred lessrisks thanmight be ima
physical superiority , the assailant must gined at first sight.

IV . — ON THE PRACTICE IN WAR OF THE PRINCIPLES NOW LAID DOWN .

1. The principles of the art of war this kno wledge is so limi ted, that it can
are in themselves very simple, and are hardl y be compared with any other sci
ence , either in diversity or extent. Learn .

theymon
com rather dalth
rest sense;an ough intactstricsa
more than in not at all requisite, norareeven great
tegy upon special knowledge, still even powers of understanding. If any special
 SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION . 117

faculty of the understanding, besides a liar strength of mind and understanding

practised judgmentis required, it is clear ' to overcome this resistance. By this
from all that precedes, that it is a talent friction , many a good idea is lost, and
for artifice or stratagem . The exact we are obliged to lay down a plain,
contrary has been long maintained, but simple scheme, when by a somewhat
merely from a misplaced feeling of awe more complicated one, greater results
be attained.
regarding the subject, and from the might enumera
vanity of authors who have written on To te the causes of this fric
the subject. An impartial consideration tion in full is perhaps not possible, but
must convince us of this : but experience the following are the greatest :
tends to impress upon us this conviction 1. We always know much less of the
still more forcibly . In the late revolu- actual condition and of the designs of
tionary war, many men have made them- the enemy, than we assume on supposi
selves conspicuous as skilful generals, tion in forming our plans ; innumerable
often as generals of the first order, with doubts rise up at the moment of the
out having had the benefit of any military execution of a resolution , doubts caused
education . As regards Condé, Wallen- by the dangers to which we see we are
stein, Suwarrow, and many others, it is exposed, if it should prove that we have
at least a very doubtful point. been much deceived in the conjectures we
That the conduct itself of war is very have formed . That feeling of anxiety
difficult is a matter of no doubt ; but the which so easily seizes men in general in
difficulty is not that special learning, or the execution of great designs, then over
great genius, is required to comprehend powers us, and from this state of anxiety
the true principles of conducting war ; to a state of irresolution, from that to
that can be done by any well-organised halfmeasures, is a short step not per
head, with a mind free from prejudice, ceptible.
and not altogether ignorant of the sub- 2. Not only are we uncertain as to the
ject. Even the application of these prin- strength of the enemy, but rumour (all
cipleson a map, andonpaper,presents intelligence which we receive through
no difficulty; and even a good plan of outposts, spies, or by accident) increases
operations isstill no great masterpiece. his numbers. The great massesof the
The great difficulty
in execution is to adhere
to the principles steadfastly
which we have people are
danger timid by nature,
is invariably and thereby
exaggerated. All
adopted. the influences brought to bear on the
The object of this concluding observa- general, therefore, tend to give him a
tion, is tofix attention on this difficulty, false impression of the strength of the
and to give your Royal Highness a lucid enemy before him ; and herein lies a new
and distinct idea of it, for I look upon that source of irresolution .
as beingthe most important pointwhich I We cannot imagine the full extent of
can attain by this paper . this uncertainty ; and it is, therefore, im
The whole conduct of war is like the portant to preparefor itbeforehand.
action of a complicated machine, with an If we have quietly reflected on every
immense amount of friction ; so that com- thing beforehand, if we have impartially
binations which are easily made on considered, if we have sought for, and if
paper, can only be carried into execution we have made up our minds onthe pro
by very greatexertion. babilities of the case, we should not be
Therefore the free will,the mind of the ready to give up at once the first opinion,
general, finds itself impeded in its action but carefully criticise reports asthey come
at every instant, and it requiresa pecu- in, compareseveral with each other, send
 118
ON WAR .
out for further information , etc. Very war) will often find obstacles which they
often,bythismeans, false intelligence is represent as insuperable. They will
detected on the spot ; often the first in find the march too long, the fatigue too
formatireon is confirmedcertaint
;in bothy
cases, great, the subsistence impracticable. If
therefo , we attain to , and can we should listen to all these difficulties, as
form a resolution accordingly. If we can Frederick II. called them, we should
not obtain this certainty, then wemust say soon have to succumb to them, and remain
toour selves thatutina risk
carried outwitho
warnoth ing can be powerless and inactive instead of acting
; that the nature with force and energy.
of war never allows us thoroughly to see, To withstand all this, a degree of confi
at all times, which way we are going ; that dence in our own sagacity and convictions
ble willstillesnot in
s eupon uisite
the proba
proba ble,eve n if itdo alway rema
strik the isreq whichlikeis
themoment, butlooks
obstinacy at, whichcommonly
our senses at once ; and that if we have that r tanding
powe of the unders and
made judicious arrangements generally, character which wecall firmness,
we shall not be completely ruined at 5. None of the effects upon which we
once, even if there is one error. calculate inwar,come to pass soexactly
3. The uncertaintyas to the existing as any one would imagine whohas not
state of things at any given moment , watched war attentively and been ac
applies to our own army as well as the customed to it in reality.
enemy's. Our own army can seldom be We often make a mistake of several
kept so concentrated that we can at any hours as to the march of a column, and
moment clearly command a view of all yet we are unable to tellwhere to fino
anxious,then new doubts will thusarise present themselves
We shall wish to wait and see, and .a calculated which could notbe
upon beforehand ;
delay in the action of the whole is the expect to arrive at a certain point with
inevitable consequence. an army, and find ourselves obliged to
We must , therefore, feel so much con halt some miles short of it ; often a post
fidence in the arrangem ents we have which we have established ,renders much
made as to believe that they will meet less service than we expected ; one
our expectations . To this belongs in of the enemy's , on the contrary, much
especial manner a reliance on the sub more ; often the resources of a province
ordinate e
generals ; we must, therefor , do not amount to as much as we antici.
make it a rule to select officers upon pated, & c.
whom weca n rely, making every other Any such obstruction can only be got
consideration give way to that If we
. over by great efforts, which the general
have made the dispositions which are can only succeed in gettingOnlbyy stric tness
suitable , if we have provided for con by such
tingent mishaps, and so arranged that mea
bordering
ns , onlyonwheseverity:
n he is certain that the
in case such should occur during the
execution of our measures , we shall not utmost possible will be done, can he feel
be completely ruined , then we must step not
e
securexerc
that
isethese impediment
little influe
a great
s
nce on will
his
uncertainty.
4. When we want to carry on a war the object which he proposed to at
which causes a great strain upon our tain .
powers, then subordinate generals , and 6. We may feel certain that an army
is never in the condition in which a per
even the troops (if they are not used to
son following its operations in a room
 SUMIARY OF INSTRUCTION . 119

supposes it to be. If he is in favour of army is compelledsometimes to go inquest

the army, he will figure it to himself as of its subsistence, when it might be on
being from a third to a half stronger the way to victory,to brilliant successes.
and better than it really is. It is natural Through this, chiefly, the whole machine
enough that the commander should find acquires that unwieldiness by which the
himself in the same case in relation to the effects realised fall far short of the flight
first plan of his operations, that he should of great plans.
afterwards see his army melt away in a A general who, with a tyrannical
manner he never anticipated, his artillery power, demands from his troops the
and cavalry become unserviceable, & c. utmost efforts, the most extreme hard
Thus, what appeared to the observer and ships; an army accustomed to these sacri
the general as possible and easy at the fices through wars of long duration :
opening of the campaign, will often prove what advantages will they not have over
difficult or impossible in the execution . their opponents, how much more rapidly
Now, if the commander is a man , who, im- will they pursue their object in spite of
pelled bya lofty ambition , still follows his all obstacles ! With equally good plans, 1

object with boldness and energetic will, how different will be the result !
then he will attain it, whilst an ordinary 8. Generally, and in all the foregoing
man will think himself fully justified in cases, we cannot keep our eyes too in
abandoning
his army
it, owing to the condition of tently fixed on the following truth :
The sensuous impressions which come
Massena showed in Genoa and in Por- before us in the course of execution, are
tugal, the power which a general has more vivid than those obtained previously
over his troops through the strength of through mature reflection. They are,
his will ; in the one case by the force, however, only first appearances of things,
we might say the severity, of his charac- and that, as we know,seldom corresponds
ter, he drove the men to extraordinary exactly with reality. We are, therefore,
exertions, which were crowned with suc- in danger of sacrificing our mature re
cess ; in the other, in Portugal, he held flection to first appearances.
out, at least, much longer than any one That this first appearance, as a rule,
else would have done. produces fear and over caution, is owing
In most cases, the enemy's army finds to the natural timidity of man , who takes
itself in a similar condition ; think of only a partial view of everything.
Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus at Against this, we must, therefore, arm
Nuremberg, of Napoleon and Benningsen ourselves, and place a firm reliance on
after the battle of Eylau. The state of the results of our own past mature re
the enemy we do not see, our own is flections, in order to fortify ourselves by
before our eyes ; therefore, the latter that means against the weakening im
makes a much greater impression than pressions of the moment.
the former, because in ordinary mortals
sensuous impressions are more powerful In this difficulty of execution a great
than the language of the understanding. deal depends on the certainty and firmness
7. The subsistence of the troops in of our own convictions ; on that account,
whatever way it may be managed, the study of military history is therefore
(whether by magazines or requisitions), important, because by it we learn the
presents such difficulties that it must thing itself, we see the development of
always have a very decisive voice in the events themselves. The principles which
choice of measures . It is often opposed we have learnt by theoretical instruction
to the most effectual combination , and an are only suited to facilitate the study
 120
ON WAR.

of and direct our attention to the points moirs of General Scharnhorst, is a pat
of greatest importance in military his- tern of this kind of narration which
tory, cannot be surpassed. This narrative,
Your RoyalHighness must therefore especially the account of the sortie, and
make yourself acquainted with these the mode in which the garrison cuttheir
principles, with a view to proving them way through the enemy, will serve Your
by the study of military history, and Royal Highness as a criterion for the
seeing where they coincide with the style in which military history should be
course of actual events, and where they written .
are modified or overthrown by the same. No battle in the world has more
But, besides this, the study of military thoroughly convinced me, that in war
history is the only means of supplying we should not despair of success up to
the place of actual experience , by giving the last moment, and that the effects of
a clear idea of that which we have termed
the friction of the whole machine .
good principles, which can never manifest
To this end we must not confine our .
themselves in such a regular manner as
selves to the leading events, much less
we suppose, will unexpectedly make their
appearance, even in the most desperate
keep to the reasoning of historians, but cases, when we believe any such influ
study details as much as is possible.
For historians rarely make perfect fide ences are completely lost.
lity of representation their object : in Some great sentiment must stimulate
general , they desire to embellish the great abilities in the general, either
deeds of their army, or to prove a con
ambition , as in Cæsar, hatred of the
sonance between actual events and some enem y , as in Hannibaſ, the pride of
imaginary writing it. Much
instead of rules.They invent readi ng falling
history, Great.
gloriously,asin Frederick the
of history is not required for the above Open your heart to a feeling of this
object. The knowledge of a few sepa kind ! Be bold and astute in your de
rate battles, in their details, is more use
signs, firm and persevering in executing
ful than a general knowledge of several
them , determined tofind a gloriousend,
campaigns . On this account it is more
advantageous to read particular nar and destiny will press on your youthful
brow a radiant crown - fit emblem of a
rativesand journals than regular works prince, theraysofwhichwill carry
of history. The account of the defence
of Menin , in the year 1794 , in the me
your image into the bosom of your latest
descendants .
 121

ON THE ORGANIC DIVISION OF ARMED FORCES . *

That the grounds which determine the ( at least it would be an anomaly if he

division and strength of the different did ), but each more or less diminishes
parts of an army, and which have their the force ofthe original order, and takes
root in elementary tactics, are not very from the first idea something of its
distinct, and allow of much that is arbi- original precision. Besides this, if
trary, we must suppose, if we look at there are a number of subordinate divi
the various modes of formation which sions, the order takes considerably more
actually exist ; but no great reflection is time to reach its destination. From this
requireddetermine
to convince us that these grounds it follows that the divisions and subdivi
cannot the matter more ex- sions, by reason of which orders must
actly. What is usually adduced in rela- pass through many hands in succession,
tion to the subject, as , for instance, if a constitute a necessary evil. Here ends our
cavalry officer tries to prove that a cavalry philosophy, and we enter upon tactics
regiment can never be too strong, because and strategy.
otherwise it is not in a condition to do any- A mass entirely isolated which is op
thing, deserves no serious notice. This posed to the enemy as an independent
is the state of things as regards the small whole, whether great or small, has three
divisions with which elementary tactics parts which are essential, and without
is concerned — that is, companies, squad- which such a body can hardly beimagined,
rons, battalions,and regiments ; but it that is to say, one part which it throws
is much worse still with the larger divi- out in advance, one which in case of un
sions, which are beyond elementary tac- foreseen events it places in rear, and the
tics, and where thequestion depends on main body between these two parts.
higher tactics or the theory of the dis a.
positions for a battle in conjunction with
strategy. We shall now take up the sub b.
ject of these greater divisions— brigades, c.
divisions, corps, and armies,
Let us first consider for a moment, Therefore, if the division of the greater
the reasonable grounds (the philosophy) whole is made with a view to indepen
of the thing. Why are the masses, as dence, it must never have less than three
a universal rule, divided into parts ? parts if the permanent division is to be in
Plainly because one person can only accordance with that constant requirement
exercise direct command over a limited of independence which must naturally be
number. The general cannot take 50,000 an object. But it is easy to observe, that
soldiers and place each man upon a par; even these three parts do not constitute
ticular spot and keep him there, and quite a natural arrangement; for no one
order him to do this and not to do that, would willingly make his advanced and
which, if such a thing was conceivable, rear guards each of the same strength
would plainly be the best thing that with the centre or main body. There
could be done ; for none of the countless fore, it would be more natural to conceive
subordinate commanders ever intensifies the centre as consisting of at least two
* To serve as an elucidation of Chapter V. of Book V.
 122 ON TAR .

parts, consequently, to make a division added ; we then get the following strategic
of the whole into four parts in this figure :
order : a.

a. b. C. d. e. f.
b. C. 8. h.
d. From this we deduce as a result, that
a whole mass of troops should never be
But even here it is plain, we have not divided into less than three, or more
yet got to the most natural point. For, than eight parts. But still in this there
notwithstanding the depth which it is appears very little that is definite, for
usual now to give an order of battle , all what a number of different combinations
s
distribution of forces either tactical or may be made, if we reflect that we might
strategic, invariably assume the linear divide an army into 3x3x3, if we
form ; consequently, there arises of itself should basecorps,erdivisions, andbrigades
the want of a right wing, of a left wing, upon that numb , which would give
and ofa centre,and five maytherefore twenty-sevenbrigades,or into any other
now belooked upon as the natural num
ber of divisions in this form : possible product of the given factors.
But there are still some important
points remaining for consideration .
a. We have not entered upon the strength
b. c. d.
of battalions and regiments ,leaving that
for elementary tactics; from what has just
e. been said, it only followsthat we should
mak e thebrigades consist of not lessthan
This formation now allows of one, or three battalions . Upon thiswe certainly
inof case
the ofurg entl mass
principa y, of twopart
necessitbeing detacheds insi
anyst,oppo shal
andsiti on l; but
probitably difficnter
moreencou
is not ult
to limit the greatest strength which the
a friend of strongreserves,willperhaps brigade shouldhave. As a rule,a biz
findthepart inrear (reserve) too weak asgade is considered to besuch a body
can and must be guided by one man
will add, on that account, another part, strum
in order to have one - third in reserve . ly — ity
directental say,thrIfough
thatofishisto voice. thein
we adhere
Then the whole will be organised as to that, then it should not exceed a
under : strength of 4,000 or 5,000 men ; and,
a.
consequently, will consist of six or eight
battali ons, according to the strength of
b. c. d. the battalion. But here we must bring
e.
in another subject, which forms ane!
f. element innatio
the ninquir y . This element is
the combi of the different arms.
derable array,then That this combination should begin in a
very largehas, atoconsi
strategy remark , that such
bodyoftroops lower downthestepsthere
an a whole army, is a point on which there
army almost always finds it necessary to
detach parts to the right and left ; that, is but one opinion throughout Europe,
therefore, on this account with such a But some would only commence withit
force , two more parts must generally be in corps, thatis,masses of 20,000 to
Others would have it in
30,000 men
 ON THE ORGANIC DIVISION OF ARMFD FORCES. 123

divisions- that is, masses of from 8,000 there remain two to distribute amongst
to 12,000 men. We shall not enter into the rest of the troops, which allows a
this controversy at present, but confine mass of 4,000 infantry for a battery of
ourselves to this which will hardly be dis- eight guns. As this is the ordinary pro
puted, that the independence of any portion, it is evident that with our calcu
body of troops is chiefly constituted by lation, we come nearly to what has been
the combination of the three arms, and found to answer best in practice. After
that, therefore, at all events, for divi- this, we shall add no more in regard to
sions which are destined to find them- the size of a brigade , than that it should
selves frequently isolated in war, this consist accordingly of from three to five
combination is very desirable . thousand men .
Further, we have not only to take Although the field of division is limited
into consideration the combination of all on one side in this way, and on the other
three arms, but also that of two of them it was already limited by the strength of
namely , artillery and infantry. This the army as a given quantity, a great
combination, according to the generally number of combinations still always re
prevailing custom, takes place very much main possible, and we cannot let them
sooner, although artillerymen , excited be disposed of at once by a rigorous ap
by the example of cavalrymen, show no plication of the principle of the least
slight inclination to form again a little possible number of parts; we have still
army of their own . They have, however , to take into consideration some points of
as yet been obliged to content themselves a general nature and we must also
to be divided amongst the brigades . allow special considerations in particular
Through this combination, therefore, of cases to have their rights.
artillery with infantry, the idea of a First we must observe , that great bodies
brigade takes a somewhat different form , must be split into more parts than smaller
and the only question to be considered ones, in order to bemade sufficiently handy
is, what should be the minimum size of (as already noticed) , and that small bodies
į a body of infantry to which, as a rule, a with too many subdivisions or branches
portion of artillery must always be at- are not easy to handle .
tached in a permanent manner. If an army is formed into two principal
This question is more readily ans- corps, each of which has its own special
wered than one would at first sight commander, * that is as much as to neutra
suppose, for the number of guns which, lise the commandment-in -chief. Everyone
for every 1,000 men we can take into who has military experience will under
the field, seldom depends on our will, stand this without any further elucida
itis settled by a variety of other, partly tion. Itis not much better if the army
very remote, causes ; then, again, the is divided into three parts, for in such a
number of guns which are united in case there can be no expeditious move
a battery rests upon much more sub- ments,'no suitable dispositions for a battle,
stantial tactical grounds than any other without an incessant breaking up of these
similar organisation ; thus it is that three principal corps, by which their
we do not ask how many guns shall # The command is the true base of division. If
this mass
of infantry ( for instance, a field marshal commands 100,000 men, of which
a brigade) have ? but what mass of in- 50,000 are under the orders of a general specially
fantry is tobe joined to a battery of designated,whilst the field marshal in person con
artillery ? If we have, for example, ducts the other 50,000, formed in five divisions, a
case which often happens, the whole is not in
three guns per 1,000 men with the army, realitydivided in two parts,but into sis, only that
and then deduct one for the reserve, one of them is five times as large as the others.
 124 ON WAR .

commanders are very soon put out of there

of 4,000 men.veryInwell
fore,do suchwith
a force we could,
divisions only.
temper.
The greater the number of parts, the We could certainly divide this force into
greater becomes the power of the com five corps, the corps into four divisions,
mander-in -chief and the mobility of the and the division into four brigades, then
whole mass. There is, therefore, a reason each brigade would be 2,500 men strong.
for going as far as possible in this direc- To me, the first arrangement appears
tion. Asthere aremoremeans ofputting one
thebest;
orders in a train for execution at a head for,ininthe
step less firsttionplace,ithas
the grada of ranks,
quarters, like thatofthecommander of etc.
therefore orders are transmitted quicker,
Secondly, five branches are too few
an army, than with the limited staff of a
corps or division , therefore, on general for an army, it is not sufficiently pliable
grounds, it is best to divide an army into with that number ; the same applies to &
not less than eight parts. If other cir . corps divided into four divisions, and
cumstances require it, this number of 2,500 men form a weak brigade,of which
parts may be increased to nine or ten. there are in this scheme , eighty, instead
If there are more than ten parts , a diffi of which the other organisation makes
culty arises in transmitting orders with only fifty, and is therefore simpler . These
the necessary rapidity and exactitude, for advantages are sacrificed for the sake of
we must not forget, that it is not the mere having only to give orders direct to five
question of theorder, else an army might generals instead of ten .
have as many divisions as there are heads So far, general considerations extend,
in a company,butthatwithorders,many but the points which require tobedea
dir chion
whiect
s easierinqtouiries
it isand arrang nected
consix
aree for terort
or imp
ed,ein. particular cases areofinfinite
minanc
com
eight divisions than for twelve or fifteen . Î'en divisions may be easily
manded in a levelcountry; inwidely
Again , a division if it is small as re
gards absolute strength in numbers, one extended mountain positions the thing
h
whic there fore sed
may be suppo to form
may be perfectly impossible.
A great river which divides an army
part of a corps, can always make shift with
fewer parts than we have given as the creates a necessity forthe appointment of
normal number ; quite easily with four, a separate commander on one side. Gene
in case ofurgency,withthreo --Siuse
eight would be inconvenient, .beca
x and ral rules are powerless againsthe
t ularforce
its circumstances in all such partic
means are not sufficient to transmit orders
cases;of
however , it is to be remarked, that when
rapidly enough to so many parts. such special circumstances make their
This revision of our proper normal appearance, those disadvantages, which
number, gives as a result, that an army a multiplicity
should have at least five parts , and not of divisions otherwise pro
duces, generally disappear at the same
morethanten; that thedivision should time. Certainly, even here abuses nisam
not haveabove five,andmay be reduced arise asfor instance if badorganible
, , a
corps ,andboth the question of tits ambitionof individuals,or,out ofwant
strength, and the general question whe
ther it should exist at all, depend on the of firmness to resist personal considera
adjustment ofthe two other combinations. tions. But, however far the require
Two hundred thousand men in ten ments of particular cases may extend,
still experience teaches us that the sys
divisions, and the division split into five
eraionin g as
of gen
tem t on
brigades , gives the brigade a strength den divis l prin . is depen
ciplaesrule
 125

SKETCH OF A PLAN FOR TACTICS, OR THE THEORY

OF THE COMBAT .
(N.B.- According to this distribution, this first part is to be revised and completed ).

I. — INTRODUCTION : – DEFINITION OF B. — THE DIFFERENT ARMS COMBINED

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE IN ATTACK AND DEFENCE .
CONCEPTIONS OF STRATEGY AND
TACTICS . 1. Theory of the combination of
arms :
II.--GENERAL THEORY OF THE COMBAT a. Infantry and artillery.
( Combat - Cantonments — Camps - Marches). b. Infantry and cavalry.
1. Nature of the combat - Active c. Cavalry and artillery.
elements in the same- Hatred and hos d. All three united.
tility — Modification Other moral forces 2. Fixed divisions which are formed
-Judgment and talent. out of them :
2. More precise definition of a com- a. Brigades, Their order of battle,
bat—Independent combat_Partial com- 6. Divisions,
bat - How the latter arise . position, movement,
c. Corps, combat.
3. Object of the combat : Victory - d. Armies,
Degree, splendour, and weight of
victory.
IV.- BATTLES IN CONNECTION WITH
4. Causes of victory, that is of the COUNTRY AND GROUND.
enemy leaving the field .
5. Kinds of combat according to arms A.-ON THE INFLUENCE OF GROUND ON
-Close combat - Fire combat. THE COMBAT IN GENERAL .
6. Different acts of the combat - Des- 1. On the defensive.
tructive act-Decisive act. 2. On the attack.
7. Kinds of combat, according as its
motive is positive or negative - Attack N.B.- Our reflections must here leave the
and defence . proper logical chain, on account of practical
8. Plan of the combat – Strategicobject considerations. THE GROUND must be taken
of the combat - Its aim - Means - Deter- into view as soon as possible, and this can
mination of the kind of combat - Time not be done without our at once imagining
-Space - Reciprocal action—Conduct. to ourselves the coinbat as taking place under
one of the two forms, attack or defence; this
III.- COMBATS ; DEFINITE SUB -DIVI. is why the tuio subjects merge into one.
SIONS IN THE ABSTRACT, ( Formation
Order of Battle - Elementary Tactics). B.- GENERAL THEORY OF THE DEFENCE .
A. - THE DIFFERENT ARMS.
Effects produced in C.-DITTO, DITTO , ATTACK .
action by each arm— D.- DEFENSIVE COMBATS OF DEFINITE
1. Infantry. The formation and BODIES.
2. Artillery. Elementary tactics of
3. Cavalry. each in attack and 1. Of a small number of troops. 2. Of
defence based on those a brigade. 3. Of a division . 4. Of a
effects. corps. 5. Of an army.
 126
ON WAR .
E. - OFFENSIVE COMBATS OF DEFINITE 4. Battles - Diversity of objects
BODIES. Destruction of the enemy's armed force
1. Of a small number of troops. 2. Of -Possession of country.— Mere moral
a brigade . 3. Of a division . 4. Of a ascendancy - Credit of arms.
corps. 5. Of an army. a. Defensive battle without pre
paration . 6. In a prepared posi
tion . c. In an entrenched posi
V. - COMBATS WITH DEFINITE OBJECTS.
tion .
5. Retreats :
A. - DEFENCE . a. The simple retreat (the retiring)
1. Measures of security. in presence of the enemy ; a a,
a. Guards. b. Patrols. c. Supports. before a battle ; a b, in the course
d. Small posts . e. Chains of ad of the same; a c, after a battle .
vanced posts. f. Intermediate posts. 6. Strategic Retreat, that is sereral
g. Advanced guards . h . Rear consecutive simple retreats, in their
guards . i. Advanced corps. k. cover tactical dispositions.
ing the flanks on the march. l. de
tachments to procure intelligence . B. -THE ATTACK .
m. Detachments of observation . 1. Divided and treated according to
n. Reconnaissances. the objects of the defence.
2. Covering - 2. According to the particular objects
a. Of single posts. b. Of convoys . of the attack :
c. Of foraging parties. a. Surprise. 6. Cutting through the
3. Lines of posts — Diversity of ob enemy.
jects :
V1.-OF CAMPS AND CANTONMENTS.
In mount
a. Near ains. b. Along rivers.
morasses wood
c. . d. In s.
VII. - OF MARCHES . ។
 127

GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT.

I. - GENERAL THEORY OF THE COMBAT . g. If he perceives that his oppo
Object of the Combat. nent has too great a supe
1. What is the object of the combat ? 5. In
riority in moral
all these cases forces.
commander
а
a . Destruction of the enemy's armed
forces . may give up the combat, because he has
no hope of matters taking a favourable
b. To gain possession of some ob- turn , and has to apprehend that his sit
ject uation will become still worse than it
c. Merely victory for the credit of is at present.
our arms.

d. Two of these objects, or all three 6. Except

a retreat upon
is not thesetherefore,
one of, and,
justifiable grounds
taken together . cannot be the decision of the general
Theory of Victory. or commander.
7. But a retreat can be made in point
2. Any of these four objects can only of fact without his will.
be obtained by a victory .
a. If the troops, from want of
3. Victory is the retirement of the
enemy from the field of battle. courage or of good will, give
way .
4. The enemy is moved to this : b. If a panic drives them off.
a. If his loss is excessive . 8. Under these circumstances , the
a a, and he therefore fears he victory may be conceded to the enemy
will be overpowered ; against the will of the commander, and
a b, or finds that the object will even when the results springing from
cost him too much . the other relations enumerated from a
6. If the formation of his army , to f incline in our favour.
consequently the efficiency of 9. This case can and must often hap
the whole, is too much shaken. pen with small bodies of troops . The
c. If he begins to get on disadvan- short duration of the whole act often
tageous ground, and therefore hardly leaves the commander time to
has to fear excessive loss if he form a resolution .
continues the combat. (In this 10a. But with large masses, such a
is therefore included the loss case can only occur with parts of the
of the position .) force not easily with the whole. Should,
d. If the forin of the order of however, several parts yield the victory
battle is attended with too thus easily to the enemy, a disadvanta
great disadvantages. geous result for the whole may ensue in
e. If he is takenby surprise in those respects noted from a to e, and
any way, or suddenly attacked, thus the commander may be compelled
and therefore has not time to to resolve upon withdrawing from the
make suitable dispositions to field .
give his measures their proper 106. With a large mass, the disadvan
development. tageous relations specified under abc
f. If he perceives that his oppo- and d, do not exhibit themselves to the
nent is too superior to him in commander, in the arithmetical sum of all
numbers . partial disadvantages which have taken
 128 ON WAR .
place, for the general view is never so pends on the proportion which the number
complete, but they show themselves of trophies bears to the strength of the
where, being compressed into a narrow victorious army.
compass , they form an imposing whole . 18. There are therefore victories of
This may be the case either with the different kinds, and of many differ
ent
principalybody, or reso import
an luti ant part of degrees. Strictly speaking,there can be
that bod . The on then is de- no combat without a decision, conse
cide d bythis predominant feature of the quently without a victory; but the ordi
whole act.
nary use of language, and the nature of
11. Lastly, the commander may be the thing, require that we should only
prompted to give up the combat, and consider those results of combats as vic
therefore to retreat for reasons which do
tories which have been preceded by very
not lie in the combat, but which may be considerable efforts.
regarded as foreign to it, such as intelli 19. If the enemy contents himself with
gence, which does away with the object doing and
or materially alters the strategic rela, signs, justsufficientto ascertainour
as soon ashehas found themde
This would bea breaking offof out,givesway,we cannot callthat a vich
tions. bat
thecom , and does notbelong tothis tory; if he doesmore thanthat, it can
place , because it is a strategic, not a ng
only be done with a view to becomi
tactical act.
conquerer in reality, and, therefore, in
12. Thegiving up of the combat is, thatcase, ifhegives up the combat,he
therefore, an acknowledgment of the
temporary superiority of our opponent , is 20.
to be considered as conquered.
As a combat can only cease by
let it be either physically or morally, one or other, or both of the parties who
and a yielding to his will. In that consists have been incontact, retiring partially,
the first moral force of victory . therefore, it cannever be said,properly
13. Aswe can onlygiveupthe combat
by leaving the field of battle, therefore
speaking
, that bothpartieshavekepe
the retirement from the fieldis thesign of nature of the thing, andthe ordinary
this acknowledgment, the lowering of our use of language require us to under
flag, as it were. stand by the term battlefield , the po
des
14. But the sign of victory still deci sition of the principal masses of the con
nothi ng as to. itsThese
or splendour
ness, thing
greatthree importance tending
s often, cons armies,and because the first
equences of victory only commence
15. Thegreatness of a victory depends therefore there may bo battles which
on the greatness of the masses over
which it has been gained, as well as on remain quite indecisive.
the greatness of the trophies . Cap The combat is the means ofgaining a victory.
tured guns, prisoners, baggage taken , 21. The means to obtain victory is the
combat. As the points specified in No.4
fore, over small bodyoftroo
victory canabe gaine d. ps no great fore
fromalso thestab
atoge lish victotedryon,thethose
combat isthedirec re
16.s Theim
pend imptan
on thepor
ce
ortanc the ory
of vict
ofe the objede-
ct poin ts as itsmust
22. We
immenow e obje
diatmak cts
e ourselves ac
which it secures to us . The conquest of quainted with the combat in its different
an important position may make an in phases.
significant victory very important.
What is an independent combat ?
17. The splendour of a victory de ity y at
23. In real , ever comb may be
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 129

separated into as many single combats ligence supervenes, aimless instinct be

as there are combatants. But the indi- comes an act with a purpose.
vidual only appears as a separate item 33. In this manner the feelings are
when he fights singly, that is, indepen- made submissive to the understand
dently . ing.
24. From single combats the units 34. But we can never consider them
ascend to fresh units co - ordinately with as completely eliminated, nd the pure
the ascending scale of sub - divisions of object of reason substituted in their
command.
25. These units are bound together place
in the; object
for if ofthey weretheyswallowed
reason, up
would come
through the object and the plan, still not to life again spontaneously in the heat
so closely that the membersdo not retain of the combat .
a certain degree of independence. This 35. As our wars are not utterances of
becomes always greater the higher the the hostilityof individuals opposed to indi
rank of the units. How this gain of in- viduals, so the combat seems to be divested
dependence on the part of the members of all real hostility, and therefore to be a
takes place, we shall show afterwards purely reasonable action.
(No. 97 , etc. ) 36. But it is not so by any means.
26. Thus every total combat consists Partly there is never wanting a collective
of a great number of separate combats hatred between the parties, which then
in descending order of members, down manifests itself more or less effectively
to the lowest member acting indepen- in the individual, so that from hating
dently. and warring against a party, he hates
27. But a total combat consists also of and wars against the individual man as
separate combats following one another well ; partly in the course of a combat
in succession .
itself a real feeling of hostility is kin
28. All separate combats we call partial dled more or less in the individuals en
combats, and the whole of them a total gaged .
combat ; but we connect the concep- 37. Desire of fame, ambition , self-in
tion of a whole combat with the sup- terest, and esprit de corps, along with
posedcondition of a personal command, other feelings,take the place of hostility
and therefore only that belongs to one when that does not exist.
combat which is directed by one will. 38. Therefore, the mere will of the
(In cordon positions the limits between commander, the mere prescribed object,
the two can never be defined ). is seldom or never the sole motive of
29. What has been said here on the action in the combatants ; instead of that,
theory of combat, relates to the total a very notable portion of the emotional
combat, as well as to the partial combat . forces will always be in activity .
39. This activity is increased by the
Principles of the combat. circumstance of the combat moving in
the region of danger, in which all emo
30. Every fight is an expression of hos- tional forces have greater weight.
tility, which passes into combat instinc- 40. But even the intelligence which
tively. guides the combat, can never be a power
31. This instinct to attack and destroy purely of the understanding, and, there
the enemy is the real element of war . fore, the combat can never be a subject
32. Even amongst the most savage of pure calculation .
tribes, this impulse to hostility is not (a ) Because it is the collision of living
pure instinct alone; the reflecting intel- physical and moral forces, which can
VOL. III . K
 130 ON WAR .

only be estimated generally, but never 47. Weapons with which the enemy
subjected to any regular calculation. can be attacked while he is at a distance,
(6) Because the emotions which come are more instruments for the under
into play may make the combat a sub standing ; they allow the feelings, the
ject of enthusiasm , and through that a ' instinct for fighting' properly called,
subject for higher judgment. to remain almost at rest, and this so
41. The combat may, therefore, be an much the more according as the range
act of talent and genius, in opposition to of their effects is greater. With a sling
calculating reason. we can imagine to ourselves a certain
42. Now estthe feelings and the genius degree of anger accompanying the throw ;
which manif themselves in the combat there is less of this feeling in discharging
must be regarded as separate moral agen a musket, and still less in firing a candon
cies which, owing to their great diver shot.
sity and elasticity, incessantly break out 48. Although there are shades of
beyond the limits of calculating reason . difference, still all modern weapons may
be placed under one or other of two
take
and in practice .
greatponclasses,that
account of tħese forces in theory wea is, the
s, and fire -arm s; cut and thrise
the form er for
44. The more they are used to the close combat , the latter for fighting at a
utmost, the more vigorous and fruitful of distance .
results will be the combat . e 49. Therefor , it follows that there are
45. All inventions of art, such as arms, two modes of fighting - the close combat
organisation, exercise in tactics,theprin Chand tohand)and thecombat with fire
ciples of the use of the different arms in arms .
the combat, are restrictions on the natural 50. Both have for their object the des
instinct, which has to be led by indirect truction of the enemy.
means to a more efficient use of its 51. In close combat this effect is quite
powers . But the emotional forces will certain ; in the combat with fire-arms
not submit to be thus clipped, and if we it is only more or lessprobable. From
go too far in trying to make instruments this difference follows a very different
e . There musmt , ther
forc,werobthe
of them
and eforreimp
of thei , alwa n in thetwo
ulsyse sign52.ificAsatiothe destructmod fightid ngento
ionesin of han
be given them a certain room to play hand fighting is inevitable, the smallest
between the rules of theory and its prac- superiority either through advantages
tical execution . This entails the neces or in courage is decisive, and the party
a , or inferior in courage,
wisdom asrespects theory, and great triesto escapethe danger by fligh
tact of jud gment as respects practice .
t.
larly
53. This occurs so regu , so com .
Two modes of Fighting - Close Combat and ly
monts , inandwhic
figh sosoo n d
in all han to hand
h several are engaged,
Fire Combat. that the destructive effects properly be
46. Of all weapons which have yet longing to this kind of fight are very
been invented by human ingenuity, those h nished eby
dimi consiststherrather, andin itsdriving
muc effect prin
which bring the combatants into closest cipal
contact, those which are nearest to the the enemy offthefield , than in destroy
pugilistic encounter are the most natural, ing him .
and correspond most with instinct . we look for the prac
dagger and the battle - axe are moreThe so 54.effectof
tical If, therefore,
close combat, wemust place
than the lance , the javelin , or the sling . our object not in the destruction of the
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE TIIEORY OF TIIE COMBAT. 131

enemy, but in his expulsion from the field. 61. In each, however, there is a cer
The destruction becomes the means. tain amount of the effect pertaining to
55. As in the hand to hand fight, ori- both principles. The close combat is
ginally, the destruction of the enemy not devoid of destructive effects, neither
was the object, so in the combat with is the combat with fire - arms ineffectual
fire- arms the primary object is to put the to drive the enemy off the field .
enemy to flight, and the destruction is 62. The destructive effect of the
only the means. We fire upon the close combat is in most cases extreme
enemy to drive him away, and to spare
ourselves the close combat for which we ly insignificant, very often it amounts to
nil ; it would , therefore, hardly be taken
are not prepared. account of if it did not sometimes
56. But the danger caused by the com bccome of considerable importance by
bat with fire -arms is not quite inevita- increasing the number of prisoners.
ble, it is only more or less probable : 63. But it is well to observe that these
its effect, therefore, is not so great cases generally occur after the fire has
on the senses of individuals, and only produced considerable effect.
becomes great through continuance and 64. Close combat in the existing re
through its whole sum, which, as it does lation of arms would, therefore, have
not affect the senses so much, is not but an insignificant destructive effect
such a direct impression . It is there- without the assistance of fire.
fore not essentially necessary that one 65. The destructive force of fire
of the two sides should withdraw from arms in combat may by continuance be
under it. From this it follows that one intensified to the utmost extremity, thatis,
party is not put to flight at once, and to the shaking and extinction of courage.
in many cases may not be at all . 66. The consequence of that is, that
57. If this is the case then, as a by far the greatest share in the des
rule at the conclusion of the combat truction of the enemy's combatant
with fire -arms, the close combat must powers is due to the effect of fire
be resoi ted to in order to put the enemy arms.
to flight. 67. The weakening of the enemy
58. On the other hand, the destruc- through the fire combat, either
tive effect gains in intensity by continu Causes a. retreat,
his or,
ance of the fire combat just as much b . Serves as a preparation for the
as it loses in the close combat by the hand to hand encounter.
quick decision . 68. By putting the enemy to flight,
59. From this it follows, that instead which is the object of the hand-to
of the putting theenemyto flight being hand combat, the real victory may be
the general
that object
object is to beoflooked
the fire
forcombat, attained,
in the from the because driving the
field constitutes enemy
a victory.
direct effect of the applied means, that If the whole mass engaged is small,
is in the destruction and weakeningof whole,
then such a victory may embrace the
and be a decisive result.
the enemy's forces.
60. If the object of the close combat 69. But when the close combat has
is to drwe the enemy from thefield, that of only taken place between portions of the
the combat with fire-arms, to destroy his whole mass of forces, or when several
armed force, then the former is the real close combats in succession make up the
instrument for the decisive stroke, the whole combat, then the result in one
latter is to be regarded as the prepara- single onecan only be considered as a
tion . victory in a partial combat.
 132
ON WAR .

70. If the conquered division is a con use of it alone would hardly be considered
siderable part of the whole, then in its as a combatant in most cases, and in any
defeat it may carry the whole along with case would play a very unequal game.
it ; and, thus, from the victory over a 79. Except when small bodies only are
engaged,theor close
part,a victoryoverthewholemay imme- cavalry,
diately follow .
s consisting
bodiecombat entirely of
can never con
71. Even if a success in close combat stitute the whole attack. The larger the
does not amount to a victory over the masses engaged, the more artillery and
mass of the followi
ensures
enemy'sngforces,still
advantages
italways infantry comeintoplay, the less will it
the :- suffice for the end .
(a) Gain of ground. 80. The attack must, therefore, also
(6) Shaking of moral force. include in itself as much of the fire
( c) Disorder in the enemy's ranks. combat as is necessary ..
(d) Destruction of physical force. 81. In this, that is, in the fire -combat,
72. In a partial combat, the fire com both sides are to be regardedas upon an
bat is therefore to be regarded as a de equality, so far as respects the mode of
stroyin
sive g act,theclose combat asadeci- fighting. Therefore, thegreater thepro
act.
viewed in How
relationthese points
to the areto
total comb be
portionwith
at we
pared of fighting with fire-arms
close comba ascomo
t, the more the
shall consider at a future time. original inequality between attack and
Relation of the two forms of combat in re defence is diminished. s As regards the
gard to attack and defence. remaining disadvantage oftheclose com
bat, to which the assailant must ultimately
73. The combat consists, further, of have recoursetheymust
attack and defence . ; ntages bearecompensa
as inherentted in
74. The attack is the positive intention , for by such adva
the defence the negative. The first aims
that form ,and by superiority of numbers.
82. The fire-combat is the natural ele
at putting the enemy to flight ; the latter ment of the defensive.
merely at keeping possession. 83. When a successful result (the re
75. But this keeping possession is no treat of the assailant) is obtained by that
mere holding out, not passive endurance ; form of combat , there is no necessity to
its success depends on a vigorous re have recourse to close combat.
action. This re -action is the destruction 84. When that result is not obtained,
of the attacking forces. Therefore it and the assailant resorts to close combat,
is only the object, not the means, whic,h is
to be regarded as negative. the defender must do the same.
76. But as it follows of itself that if by85.
lly e
Genera , the defenc does not
any means exclude the close combat,
the defender maintains his position the if the advantages to be expected from it
adversary,must give way,
although the defender has the negative with fire -arms.
, the giving
wayo
also for the ene
f the er. thesignof victory Advantageous condcomba
my,is
defend itionst. in both forms of
86. We must now examine moreclosely
objec
of
t
atta,ckthe
.
close comba t isthe elem ent thena ture in general ofboth combats,i
78. But as close combat contains in order toascertainthe points which give
itself so little of the destructive principle, thepreponderance in the same.
the assailant who confines himself to the 87. The fire combat.
(a) Superiority in the use of the arms:
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR TIE TIEORY OF TIE COMBAT. 133

( this depends on the organisation and preponderating effect, because that which
the quality of the troops.) is gained through the number of shots,
b. Superiority in the formation (tacti- is lost again through a greater number
cal organisation ) and the elementary of the eneiny's taking effect.
tactics as established dispositions. (See Suppose that 50 men place themselves
Methodicism, p. 63, Vol. I.) upon the same extent of ground as 500
In a question of employment of opposite to them. Let 30 shots outof 50
regularly disciplined troops in thecombat, besupposed to strike the target, that is
these things donotcome into consideration, the quadrilateral occupied by the ene
because they are supposed to belong to the my'sbattalion ; then, out of the enemy's
idea of troops. But, as a subject of the 500 shots 300 will strike the quadri.
theory of the combat in its widest sense, lateral occupied by our fifty men. But
they may and should be considered. the 500 men stand ten times as close as
c. The number . the 50, therefore our balls hit ten times
d . The form of the line of battle so as many as the enemy's, and thus, by our
far as it is not already contained in b. 50 shots, exactly as many of the enemy
e. The ground. arehit as are hit on our side by his 500.*
88. As we are only now treating of Although this result does not exactly
theemployment of disciplined troops, we have correspond with the reality, and there is
nothing to do with a and b, they are only a small advantage in general on the side
to be taken into consideration as given of the superior numbers,still there is no
quantities. doubt that it is essentially correct; and
89 a. Superiority of numbers. that the efficacy on either side, that is, the
If two unequal bodies of infantry or result in a combat with fire arms, far from
artillery are drawn up opposite to each keeping exact pace with the superiority
other on parallel lines of the same extent, in numbers, is scarcely increasedat all by
then if every shot fired is directed like a that superiority.
target shot against a separate individual , This result is of the utmost importance,
the number of hits will be inpropor- for it constitutes the basis of that eco
tion tothe number of men firing The nomy of forces in the preparatory de
proportion of hits would bear just the structive act which may be regarded
same relation if the shots were directed as one of the surest means to victory.
against a full target, —therefore if the 89 b . Let it not be thought that this
mark was no longer a single man, but a result may lead to an absurdity ; and
battalion, a line, etc. This is, indeed, that, for example, two men (the smallest
also the way in which the shots fired by number who can take up the line of our
supposed target) must do just as much
skirmishers” inwar may for the most execution
part be estimated . But here the tar. as 2000, provided that the two
get is not full ; instead of that it is a men are placed at a distance apart equal
line of men with intervals between them. to the front of the 2000. If the 2000
The intervals decrease as the number of always fired directly to their front, that
men increases in a given space ; conse- might be the case. But if the number
quently, the effect of a fire -combat be- of the weaker side is so small that the
tween bodies of troops of unequal num stronger directs his concentrated fire
ber will be a sum made out of the number upon individuals , then naturally there
of those firing, and the number of the must follow a great difference in the
enemy's troops they are firing against ; effect, for,in such a case, our supposi
that is, in other words, the superiority * See chap. xii ., Book III.-Tr.
in number in a fire -combat produces no
 134
ON WAR .

tion of simple target-firing is set aside. ority in the use of weaponsdoes not make
Likewise, a very weak line of fire would as great a difference in close combat as
never oblige the enemy to engage in a in the fire combat ; and , on the other
fire combat : instead of that such a line hand, courage plays a most decisive part.
would be driven from the field by him at The subjects touched upon under 6 (No.
once .
We see, therefore, that the fore- 87) are especially important for cavalry,
going result is not to be carried to an ex the arm by which most close combats are
treme in application , but yet it is of great fought.
importance for the reasons given . Hun 94. In close combat number is much
dreds of times a line of fire has maintained more decisive than in the combat with
its ainst one of twice conse
ownageasy its stren gth t
quences, fire arms,itis almos the chief thing:
and it is what
to see 95. The form of the order of battle is
mayresul
force .
t from that intheeconomy of. alsomuch more decisive thanin the
combat with fire arms, and when the
89. C. We may,there fore, say that frontisextent
either ofthe opposing sideshas it inhis great
power to increase or reduce the mutual,
of,l"fron
paralle a smallinstead
vantageous .
t is themost ofada
that is, the total effect of the fire, accord- 96. The ground
ing as he brings or does not bring more a. As obstacle to approach . In this
combatants into the line which is firing.
consists by farits greatest efficacy in
90. The form oftheline of battle may be :- close combat.
a. With parallel fronts of equal length ; b. As a means of concealment . This
then it is the same for both sides.
favours a surprise, which is especially im
With parallel front, but out- portant in close combat.
b. .ing
flank y
the enem : then it is advan
tageous (but, as we may easily conceive , Analysis of the Combat .
the advantage is small, on account of 97. In No. 23 we have seen that every
the limited range of fire arms ) . combat is a whole, composed of many
c. members or parts, in which the inde
shotsaccount
on usedouble
ofthe
, and beca
effectofthe
the grea pendenc
ter extent inas e of the parts is veryunequal
much as itdiminishes by a descend
of front follows of itself from that form . ing scale . We shall now examine this
Forms the reverse of b and c are ob- point more closely .
viously disadvantageous. 98. We can easily imagine as a single
Ground advantageous in com
bat91. is
with fire arms member, such a number as can be led
into the fight by the word of command ;
a. By affording coverlikea breastwork . for instance, a battalion, a battery, or a
b . By intercepting theviewof the regiment of cavalr
enemy, thus forming an obstacle to his really in close ordeyr,, ifthese masses are
taking aim . 99. When the Word of command no
C. As an obstacle to approach , by longer suffices, a written or verbal Order
which the enemy is kept long under
commences.
our fire, and impeded inthe delivery of 100. The word of command admits of
his own fire .
92. In close combat the advantages no grada
part tions
of the , in
execu tion . tBut
poin fact,order
of the it ishasa
afforded by ground are the same as in
fire combat. degrees, from the utmost distinctness,
93. The two first subjects (a and b approaching to the word of command ,
down to the utmost generality. It is not
No:87)do
here comobser
. But wenotmust ve thatdera
eintoconsi tioni- sion
super the exec utioten .itself,Put
to execu onlya commis
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 135

101. No one subject to the word of will increase in its precision as it de

command has any will of his own ; but, scends the scale down to those parts
whenever instead of that word an order is which are governed by word of com
given, a certain independence of mem- mand .
bers begins, because the order is of a 106. Further, the independence of
general nature, and the will of the leader the parts will also differ according to the
must supply any insufficiency in its terms. circumstanc in which they are placed.
102. If a combat admitted of being Space, time, the character of the ground
perfectly pre-arranged and foreseen in all and country, and nature of the duty,
its coincident and successive parts and will diminish or increase this indepen
events if, that is to say, its plan could de- dence as respects one and the same sub
scend into the minutest details, as in the division .
construction of a piece of inanimate ma- 107. Besides this systematic division of
chinery, then the order would have none the entire combat into separate parts
of this indefiniteness. according to plan, a casual division may
103. But belligerents do not cease to also take place thus :
be men, and individuals can never be ( a) By our views expanding beyond
converted into machines having no will the limits of the original plan.
of their own ; and the ground on which (6) By an unforeseen separation of
they fight will seldom or never be a com- parts, which we intended to have kept
plete and bare level , which can exercise under word of command .
no influence on the combat. It is, there- 108. This fresh division depends on
fore, quite impossible to calculate before circumstances which cannot be fore
hand all that is to take place. seen.
104. This insufficiency ofplan increases 109. The consequence is unequal re
with the duration of the combat, and sult in parts which should have all been
with the number of the combatants. united as one whole (because, in point of
The close combat of a small troop is al- fact, they become placed in different
most completely contained in its plan ; relations) .
but the plan for a combat with fire-arms 110. Thus arises, at certain parts, the
of even very small bodies, can never be necessity for a changenot contemplated in
thoroughly complete to the samedegree, the general plan,
on account of its duration, and the inci- (a) That these parts may avoid disad
dents which spring up. Then again, the vantages of ground, or of numbers, or of
close combat of large masses, as, for in- position.
stance, of a cavalry division of 2,000 or ( 6) That advantages gained in all these
3,000 horse, cannotbe carried out so com- different respects, may be turned to ac
pletely in conformity with the original count.
plan that the will of its single leaders 111. The consequence of this is that,
is not frequently obliged to supplysome- involuntarily, often more or less de
thing. As for the plan for a great battle, signedly, a fire -combat passes into close
except as regards the preliminary part, combat, or the other way, the latter into
it can only be a very general outline. the former.
105. Aš this insufficiency of plan (dis- 112. The problem , then, is to make
position) increases with the time and these changes fit into the general plan ,
space which the combat takes, so, there- so that
fore, as a rule, a greater margin for con- (a) If they lead to a disadvantago, it
tingencies must be allowed to large than may be remedied in one way or another.
to smaller bodies of troops, and the order ( 6) If they lead to a success it may be
 136
ON WAR .

used, as far as possible, short of exposing for instance, there is nothing but thedif
us to the risk of a reverse .
ference of nationality; whilst in smaller
113. It is, therefore , the intentional or bodies there is to beadded that of corps
unintentional division of the total combat and of individuals; and, lastly, of special
into a greater or less number of minor, accidental circumstances, which in large
independent combats, which causes the bodies balance each other.
form of combat to change from close (c) The order of battle is so much the
combat to fire- combat, as well as from deeper, that is, there are so many more re
attack defence during
to , total com
the serves to renew the combat, as we shall
bat.
Now the whole still remains to be con see in the sequel. The number of par
sidered in this relation . tial combats, therefore, increases, and
consequently the duration of the total
The Comba t consists of two Acts — the De- combat, and by thatmeans theinfluence
structive and the Decisive Act. of the first moment, which is so very de
114. From the fire - combat, with its cisive in putting theenemy to flight, is
destructive principle, and from the close lessened.
combat with its principle of putting to 119. From the preceding number it
flight, according to No. 72, proceed two follows thatthe greater themassof the
different acts in the partial combat, the army, the greater must be the physical
destructive and the decisive act. destruction as a preparation for the de
115. The smaller the masses are, the cision.
more these two acts will resolve them 120. This preparation consists in this,
selves into one simple fire -combat, or one that the number of combatants dimin
close combat . ishes on both sides, butthe relation
116. The greater the masses , the more alters in our favour.
must these two acts be taken in a collec 121. The first of these is sufficient, if
tive sense, in such manner that the de we are already morally or physically su
structive act isandmad
simultaneous e up offire
successive a numb erof;
- combats perior; thesecond isrequisite,if such is
not the case .
and the decisive act in the same manner , 122. The destruction of the enemy's
of several close combats . combatant force is made up,
117. In this manner the division of a, Of allthat are put physically hors de
the combat not only continues , but also combat,-killed , wounded ,and prisoners.
extends itself more and more , the greater
b. Of whatever partis spent physically
the masses brought into conflict ; whilst and morally
the destructive act and the decisive act 123. After a fire combat of several
are further and further separated from hours' duration , in which a body of troops
each other in time .
has suffered severe loss, for instance, a
The Destructive Act . quarter or one-third ofitsnumbers, the
118. The greater the mass of troops, débris may, for the time, be looked upon
themore important becomes the physical as a heap of cinders, for
destruction , for a. The men are physically exhausted.
(a) The influence of the commander is b. They have spent their ammunition
80 much the less . c. Theiry arms want cleaning:
His influence
greater in close combat( than is
in fire-com d. Man have left the field with the
themselves
The molarge
balesstz). With inequalitwhole
ral masses much
y is soarmies wounded, although not
wounded.
, for rest
e. The
part thinkand
the day, theyif have they their
once done get
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 137

beyond the sphere of danger do not one -sixth of the whole ; there should ,
willingly return to it. therefore, remain five-sixths. But out
f. The feeling of courage with which of that five -sixths, in all probability only
they started has had the edge taken off, the untouched reserve, and some troops,
the longing for the fight is satisfied . which , although they have been in
g. The original organisation and for- action, have suffered very little, are,
mation are partly destroyed, or thrown in reality, to be regarded as serviceable,
into disorder . and the remainder (perhaps four -sixths)
124. The consequences, e and f, make may be looked upon for the present as a
their appearance , more or less, according caput mortuum.
as the combat has been successful or the 126. This diminution of the efficient
reverse .
A body of troops which has mass is the first aim of the destructive
gained ground, or successfully main- act ; the real decision can only be ac
tained the original position assigned to complished by smaller masses of troops.
it, can be made further use of more 127. But — although the absolute size
easily than one that has been repulsed. of the masses is not an unimportant mat
125 a. There are two deductions from ter, as fifty men opposed to fifty can pro
No. 123 which we must bring under ceed to a decision on the spot, while
notice . 50,000 opposed to 50,000 cannot SO
The first is the economy of force, which still it isthe relative, not the absolute size
is made by the use of a smaller number of the masses, which is an obstacle to the
of men in the combat with fire -arms decision . Thus if five - sixths of the whole
than the enemy employs. For, if the have measured their powers in the des
dilapidation of forces in the fire -com- tructive act, then both generals, even if
bat consists, not only in the loss of they havecontinued on an equality, will
those placed hors de combat, but further be much nearer to the final resolution
in this that all who have fought are which they have to make, and it is only
lowered in their powers ; then, naturally , a relatively small impulse which is re
this lowering of powers will be less on quired to bring on the decisive act. It
that side which brings the fewest troops is all the same whether the sixth part
into action . army of
remaining is a sixth of an
If 500 men * have been able to main- 30,000, therefore 5,000 men, or one -sixth
tain their ground against 1000, if the of an army of 150,000 men, that is,
losses are equal on each side, say 200 25,000 men.
men, then on the one side there will re- 128. The principal object of each side
main 300+ men who are fatigued, while in the destructive act is to work out for
the other side will have 800, of whom itself a preponderance for thedecisive act.
300 are fatigued, but 500 are fresh . 129. This superiority can be obtained
125 6. The second deduction is that by the destruction of the enemy's physical
the weakening of the enemy, conse force, but it may also be obtained by the
quently the dilapidation of the enemy's other causes enumerated under No. 4.
combative power, is of much greater extent 130. There is, therefore, in the des
than the mere number of killed, wounded, tructive act a natural endeavour to profit
and prisoners
This number wouldseem to represent
amounts to, perhaps , only byall the advantages which offer as far
as circumstances will admit.
131. Now the combat of large masses
According to chap. xii., page 109, Vol. I. , it is always split into several partial com
seems that this passage should read thus : -If “ out bats (No. 23) which are more or less in
of a body of 1,000 men, 500 have been placed in re dependent, and therefore must frequently
serve, and the remaining 500 men ,9
etc.
contain in themselves both a destructive
† 800 ? See chap. xii., p. 109, Vol. I.
 138
ON WAR

and a decisive act, if the advantages 139. As numbers are so little decisive
obtained from the first of these acts are
to be turned to account . in the fire-combat (No. 53), therefore the
endeavour naturally follows to keep up
132. Through the skilful and success . the combat with as few troops as pos
ful mixture ofthe close combat, we chiefly sible .
obtain the advantages which are to be
140. As the fire- combat predominates
derived from shaking theenemy'scourage, in the destructiveact,therefore the
creating disorder in his ranks, andgain greatest economyof forcemust be the
ing ground . prevailing principl e in the same.
133. Even the physical destruction 141. As numer ical force is so essential
of the enemy's forces is very much in in close combat , therefore for the decision
creased by that means , for prisoners can of partial combats in the destructive act,
only be made in close combat . superior numbers must frequently be
Thus we may conceive that if an employed .
enemy's battalion is shaken by our fire, 142. But upon the whole the character
if our bayonet attack drives it out of an of thrift must rule here also, and, in
advantageous position,and wefollowhim general,onlythose decisions areto the
inhisfli ghtwitha couple of squadrons, purpose which realise themselves of
this partial success may place important themselves as it were, without any great
advantages of all kinds in the scale of preponderance of numbers.
the general result ; but then it is a con 143. An inopportune endeavour to gain
n thatrious
ditiovicto done with
it betroop out involving the decision leads to the following con
this in difficulty for if sequences
,
our battalion and our squadron through (a .) If it is undertaken with economy of
this means should fall into the hands of our forces, we get involved with superior
superior forces of the enemy , then this forces.
partial decision has been ill- timed . (6.) If the requisite force is used, we
134. The utilising of these partial suc get exhausted before the right time.
cesses is in the hands of the subordinate 144. The question whether it is op
commanders,andgives a great advan- portune to try for a decision ,recursmoet
tagetors atthe
office whichofit
an armyhead sdivisionsed, frequen
hasexperienc tlyssduring thedestructive acti
neverthele
, as, itrespects
brigades, regiments, battalions, bat mate decision greatwhile
presentstheitself at the
teries, etc.
end of the destructive act.
135. Thus each of the two commanders 145. The destructive act on this ac
seeks to obtain for himself in the course
of the destructive act those advantages count naturally strives atcertain points
which bring about the decision , and at to pass into the decisive act, because no
all advantage developed in the course of
that act will attain completeness except
136. The most important of these throu the decis act,which is its
objects are always captured guns and gh ive
ground gained . necessary
146. Thecomplement.
more fruitful in results the
137.ased
The importance of the latter is means applied
incre if the enemy has made it an in the destructive act are,
object to defend a strong position . orthe greater the physical and moral
138. Thu s the dest ruct ive act on both supe y ofitythe
dencrior wholstro
, the e. nger will be this ten
sides, but especially on that of the as 147.iveBut resultshas
sailant, is a cautious advance towards the negat , orwhen
when the
theenemy are the
small or
supe
object.
riority, this tendency likewise may be so
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 139

21
rare and so feeble at isolated points, that, must be accompanied by the use of all
1 as respects the whole, it is much the same the personal means of inspiriting the
as if it did not exist at all. men, all the stimulating influence which
148. This natural tendency may lead the general has at his command.
to ill-timed decisions in partial combats
as well as in the total combat, but it is The Decisive Act.
very far from being an evil on that ac- 156. The decision is that event which
count ; it is rather a necessary property produces in one of the generals a reso
of the destructive act, because without it lution to quit the field.
much would be neglected. 157. The grounds for quitting the
149. The judgment of the leader at field we have given in No. 4. These
each point, and of the commander-in- grounds may come forth gradually by
chief in the total combat, must determine one small disaster after another being
whether an opportunity which presents it- heaped up in the course of the destruc
self is advantageous for a decisive blow or tive act, and the resolution may, there
not, that is, whether it may not lead to a fore, be taken without a really decisive
counter blow, and thus to a negative result. event. In such a case no decisive act in
150. The conduct of a combat in rela particular takes place.
tion to the preparation preceding the 158. But the resolution may also be
decisive stroke, or rather the preparation produced by one single, very disastrous
expressly for that stroke, consists, there- event, therefore, suddenly, when up to
fore, in organising a fire-combat, and, in that moment everything has been evenly
a wider sense, à destructive act, and balanced .
giving to it a proportionate duration, 159. Then that act of the enemy
that is, in only proceeding to the decisive which has called forth this resolution, is
stroke when it appears that the destruc- to be regarded as the decisive act.
tiveact has produced sufficient effect. 160. The most common case is that the
151. The judgment on this point must decision ripens gradually in the course of
be guided less by the clock , that is, less the destructive act, but the resolution of
by the mere relations of time, than by the vanquished gets its final impulse from
the events which have taken place, by some particular event. Therefore in this
the evident signs of a superiority having case also , the decisive act is to be con
been obtained .
sidered as having been given.
152. Now as the destructive act, if 161. If a decisive act is given, then it
attended with good results, strives of must be a positive action .
itself already towards the decisive act ; (a) It may be an attack ;
therefore the duty of the chief consists (6 ) Or, it may be only the advance of
principally in determining when and reserves hitherto held under cover.
where the moment arrives to give the 162. With small bodies, close combat
reins to this tendency . by a single charge is often decisive.
en
153. If the tendency towards the deci- 163. When larger masses are
sive act is very weak during the destruc- gaged, the attack bymeans of close com
tive act, that is a tolerably sure sign that bat may also suffice, but a single charge
victory cannot be calculated on. will then hardly be sufficient.
154. In such a case, therefore, the 164. If the masses are still larger,
chief and his generals will usually not there is then a mixture of the fire com
give but receive the decisive shock . bat, as in the case of horse artillery sup
155. If still it must be given, then it porting the charge of heavy masses of
takes place by an express order, which cavalry.
 140
ON WAR.

165. With great bodies composed of place

all arms, a decision can never result
the separate parts of his line in
safety, and to restore the connectionof
from close combat alone, a renewed fire- the whole in the best way he can for the
combat is necessary .
moment.
166. But this renewed fire - combat will
174. From what precedes it is evident
be of the nature of an attack itself, it will that, as in the preparatory acts, the ut
be carried out in close masses , therefore most economy of force must predominate,
with an action concentrated in time and so in the decisive act, to win the mastery
space, as a short preparation for the through numbers must be the ruling
real attack .
idea.
167. When the decision is not the
175. Just as in the preparatory acts,
result of a particular close combat, but endurance, firmness, and coolness are the
of a number of simultaneous and con
secutive combats of both kinds, it then first qualities, so in the decisive act,
becomes a distinct act belonging to the boldness and fiery spirit must predomi
nate .
entire combat, as has been already said 176. Usually only one of the opposing
in a general way, No. 115.
168. In this act the close combat pre commanders delivers the decidingstroke,
dominates . the other receives it.
169. In the same measure as the close
177. As long as all continues in equi
combat predominates, so will also the librium, he who gives the decisive blow
may be
offensive, although at certain points the
defensive may be preserved . ( a) The assailant.
170. Towards the close of a battle the ( 6) Or the defender.
178. As the assailant has the positive
increasretreat
lineof isaylways
ed jealous regarded with
, therefore a threat
object, itismostnatural that he should
against that line is always then a potent deliver it ; and, therefore, this is what
means of bringing on the decision . occurs most frequently.
179. But if the equil ibrium
is much
171.On that account, when circum- disturbed,
stances permit , the plan of the battle will
then the decision may be
be aimed at that point from the very first. given,
a. By the commander who has the ad
172. The more the battle, or combat , vantage.
develops itself in the sense of a plan of b. By the one who is under the dis
this kind , so much the more seriously the advantage.
enemy's line of retreat will be menace .d
173. Another great step towards vic 180. The first is plainly more natu
tory is breaking the order of formation . ral; and if this commander is also the
The regular formation in which the assai lant, it is stillmore natural : there
fore, there are few cases in which the
troops commence the action suffers con
siderably in the long destructive com decision does not emanate from this com
bats, in which they themselves wring out mander.
their strength. If this wear and tear 181. But if the defender is the party who
and exhau stion has reached a certain hasthe advantage, then it isalso natural
point , then a rapid advance in concen that he should give the decision, so that
trated masses on one side against the linethe relative situation which is produced
of battle of the other, may produce a by degrees, has more influence than the
degree of disorder which forbids the lat original intentionof offensive and de
ter
any longer to think of victory , and fensive.
calls in requisition all his powers to 182. When the decision is given by
the assailant ,although hehas palpably
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF TIE COMBAT. 141

the disadvantage, it looks like a last partly because the natural advantages of
attempt to gain his original object. If the defence ( position , order, surprise)
the defender who has gained advantages wear themselves out by degrees in the
gives him time to do so, it is certainly course of the combat, and, at last, there
consistent with the nature of the positive is not enough of them left ; partly be
intention of the assailant to make such a cause ( as we have said in No. 184 ) the
last attempt. positive principle acquires incessantly
183 a. A defender who, although de- more and more weight.
cidedly at a disadvantage, still proceeds
to give the decision, does that which is Their separation as regards Time.
contrary to the nature of things, and
which may be regarded as an act of des- 188 b. The view here propounded, that
peration . every combat is composed of two separate
183 6 The result in the decisive stage acts, will meet with strong opposition at
is conformable to the relations just de first sight.
veloped ; so that, as a rule, it will only be 189. This opposition will proceed partly
favourable to the side which gives the from a false view of the combat, which
decision if he is naturally led to do so by has become habitual, partly from an
the relations in which he stands. over pedantic importance being ascribed
184. When all is still in a state of to the idea of such a division .
equilibrium result
the side is general ly fa 190. We imagine to ourselves the op
vourable to the which gives the de. position between attack and defence as
cision , for at the moment when a battle is too decided, the two activities as too
ripe for decision, when the forces have completely antithetical, or, rather, we
worn themselves out on each other, the assume the antithesis to be where it is
positive principle is of much greater not to be found in practice.
191. From this it results that we
weight than at the commencement.
185. The general who receives the de- imagine the assailant from the first mo
cision may either determine on an imme- ment to the last, as steadily and unre
diate retreat in consequence, and decline mittingly striving to advance, and every
modification in that advance as an en
all further combat, or he may continuetirely involuntary and compulsory one,
the combat.
186. If he continues the engagement which proceeds directly from the resist
ance encountered .
do so
he can only men as
cem ent of his retreat, 192. According to this idea, nothing
a. A com
because he wants time to make the requi- would be morenatural than that every
attack should begin with the furious
site arrangements ; or, energy of an assault.
b. A virtual struggle through which 193. Still even those who adhere to
he still hopes for victory. this kind of idea have become accustomed
187. Ifstandsin
decision the general
very who accepts
favoura the to a preparatory act on the part of the
ble rela-
tions, he may in so doing also adhere to artillery, because it was too plain that
the defensive . without it an assault would generally be
188 a . But if the decision proceeds useless.
194. But otherwise that absolute ten
tion ofy thefromside
naturall advanta
the givin geous
g it, thensitua
the dencyto advance to the attack has been
considered so natural, that an attack
general
over to awho ortsless
accep
more active also
it must defenpass
ce, without a shot being fired is looked upon
as the ideal of perfection .
that is, he must oppose attack by attack,
 142
ON VAR .
Even Frederick the Great, up to the
time of the battle of Zorndorf, looked 202. We have granted that this dis.
tinction may fall to the ground in affairs
upon fire in the attack as something ex which
ceptionable. are quite of a minor nature (as,
for instance, between small bodies of
195. Although there has since been cavalry). The question now is whether
dispositionnumber
athere to modify
s
that notion,still it does not also cometo an end if the
the present time
are at masses attain to certain proportions ;not
who think that the assailant cannot
as to whether the employment of fire
make himself master of the important might cease, for that would bea contra
points in a position too soon. diction in itself, but whether the sharp
196. Those who make the greatest distinction between the twoactivities
concessions to fire, at the same time advo
cate an immediate advance to the attack , ceases, so that they can no longer be
considered as two separate acts.
the delivery of a few volleys by battalion 203. It may perhaps be maintained
close to the enemy's position and then
, that a battalion should fire before it
an onset with the bayonet.
charges with the bayonet; the onemust
197. Butmilitary history, and a glance precede the other, and thus twodifferent
at the nature of our arms, show that ab
acts take place, but only as regards the
solutely
attack is todesp
ise
the use of firein the
an absurdity.
battalion,notasrespects the greater
subdivision of the brigade, etc. These
198. A little acquaintance with the have no fire period and decision period ;
nature of the combat , and, above all, they seek to come in contact with the
actual experience , teach us also that a object pointed out to them as speedily
body of troops which has been engaged as possible, and must leave the way in
under fire is seldom fit for a vigorous
which it is to be done to the battalions.
assault. Therefore, the concession men
tioned in No. 196 is worth nothing. 204. Do we not perceive that in this
way all unity would be lost ? As one
199. Lastly , military history gives in lion sses
stancaesprem
to
witho ut numb
atur e advaernce ,advah,ontag
in whic wing battasucce
the necessary
es havea es to another,
fights quite close
revers nceof ononemust
and influe otheri
previously gained have had to be aban
doned withserious loss . Therefore, the and astheeffectof ourmusketryfireis
principle mentioned in No. 195 is also so small that it requires considerable
not admissible . duration to make it efficacious,the influ
maintaiedn accordingly ence just noticed must be greater and
200. We , that
the idea now allud to of an unmixed more decisive through that duration.
kind of attack , if we may use the expres Even on this ground alone, there must
yfalse be for the brigade as wellas for the bat
sion,isrsentirel
answe to a very ,
few becau se
extremely excepy as
itonl talion, tacertain general
divi
ivesion oftimede
tional cases. respects the destruct and the
201. But if a commencement with cisive combats.
205. But another more substantial
reason is, that for the decision we are
preparation greatbattl
consistent withinthea natur e arenot
e of thing s , then madeto usefresh troops, at least for ales
of itself there arises a distinction be that have not been engaged in thede
tween the preparation by fire for the de structive act ; but these must be taken
cision , and the decision itself, therefore , their the
from reserve,
natur andonthereserves
e, are comm by
property, and
between the two acts which we have
been discussing on that account cannot be divided be
forehand amongst the battalions.
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR TIE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 139

206. Now, as the necessity of a divi- for itself of its destructive act and its
sion in the combat passes on from the decisive act. Now, the taking of this vil
battalion to the brigade, therefore, from lage may have, more or less,an influence
that it passes on to the division , and on the ultimate decision of the whole ;
from the division to still larger bodies. but it is not in the nature of things that
207. But as the parts of a whole (divi- it should greatly influence, and much less
sions of the first order) always become that it should effect that decision of
more independent the larger the whole itself, because a brigade is too small a
is, therefore it is true the unity of the body to give a decision at the commence
whole will also press less stringently on ment of a battle ; but we may very
them , and thus it happens that in the well conceive that the effectual taking
course of a partial combat more decisive of this village, forms, nevertheless, part
acts may and will always take place ac- of the destructive measure by which
cording as the whole is greater. the enemy's force is to be shattered and
208. The decisions, when corps are reduced.
large, will therefore not unite them . On the other hand, if we suppose an
selves into a whole to the same degree order given to a considerable corps, per
as in the case of corps of smaller size, haps a third or a half of the whole force,
but will distribute themselves more as to take a certain important part of the
regards time and space ; still between the enemy's position, then the result ex
beginning and the end, a notable dis- pected through thiscorps may easily be so
tinction between the two different acts is important as to be decisive for the whole ;
always observable. and if this corps attains its object, no
209. Now the parts (corps) may be so further decisive act may then be neces
large, and their separation from each sary. Now, it is easy to conceive further,
other so wide, that although their action that, owing to distance and the nature of
in the combat is certainly still directed the country, very few orders can be trans
by the will of one General ( a necessary mitted to this corps in the course of the
condition to constitute an independent battle, consequently that both prepara
combat), yet this direction limitsitself its
to instructions at the commencement ,
torydiscretion
and decisive measures must be left to
. In this manner one com
or at most to a few orders in the course mon decisive act falls to the ground al
of the combat; in this ease, such a part together, and it is divided into separate
(corps) has in itself almost complete decisive acts of some of the great parts.
power to organise its whole combat. 212. This, indeed , frequently takes
210. The more important the decisions place in great battles, and a pedantic
which rest with a corps by its situation, notion of the severance of the two acts of
so much the more they will influence the which we conceive the battle to consist
decision of the whole ; indeed, we may would therefore be in contradiction with
even suppose the relation of some the course of such a battle.
parts to be such that in their decisions 213. Although we set up this distinc
that of the whole is at once contained, tion in the working of a battle as a point
and, therefore, a separate decisive act for of great importance, it is far from our
the whole is no longer required . intention to place importance on the
211. Example. In a great battle, in regular severance and division of these two
which the parts of the army of the first activities, and to insist upon that as a
rank are corps,a brigade may receive the practical principle ; we only wish to
order at the commencement to take a vil separate in idea two things which are
se
lage. For this purpo itwill make use essent ially differ ent, and to show how
 144
ON WAR.
this inherent difference governs of itself 219. Negligence in general there will be
the form of the combat. if a complete decision does not take place,
214. The difference in the form shows either from want of courage or from a
itself most plainly in small combats wrongview ofthesituation;the result
where the simple fire and close combat, of this is always waste of force, but it
form a complete contrast to each other. may further be a positive disadvantage ,
The contrast is less decided when the because the maturity of the decision does
parts are larger, because then in the two not quite depend upon the duration of
acts the two forms of combat from which the destructive act, but on other circum
they proceed unite themselves again ; stances as well, that is to say, on a fa
but the acts themselves are greater , take
more time , and consequently are further
vourable opportunity.
separated from each other in time.
215. There may be no separation also Plan of Battle — Definition.
as regards the whole in so far that the 220 a . The plan of the battle makes
decision has been already handed over to its unity possible ; every action in com
separate corps of the first order ; but still mon requires such unity. This unity is
ce
even then atra of itwil lbefound the nothing else butthe object of the communi
in
whole, as it must be our endeavour to bat ; from it proceed thedirectionswhich
bring the decisions ofthesedifferent require tobegiven to allthe different
corp s intoit be
whether ertwein relat
concthat ion ittoti
consider me, parts, in order toattain the objectin
neces
the best way. The appointment of the
sary that the decisions should take
p lace
simultaneously , or that the decisions object, andthetheref arrange mentsconsequent
upon it, form ore the plan.
should take place in a certain order of 220 b. We mean here, by plan, every
succession .
thing which is prescribed respecting the
216. The difference between these two battle, whether beforehand, atthecom:
acts will, therefore,never be completely mencement, or in the course oftheen:
lostlost
is thects
, asforrespe thewhole
whole will ,re-and in the gagement;'consequently, the wholeope
thatwhich
appear
elements of the first order . ration of the intelligence on matter.
217. This is the way which our view
220 c. But there is plainly an essen
in tial difference between such directions
on the one hand ; as must be and can be
stood,then,ontheonehand, it willnot givenpreviously, and those,on the other
willshortoftherealit
come
it
y, andon
direct the attention of thetheother,
whicreh the
hand, requi
leader of ment .
exigencies of the mo
a combat (let it be great or small, partial 220 d . The first constitutes the Plan in
or general) to giving each of the two acts
of activi ty re the
its due share, thatthe may the Condu
be neither precipitation nor negligence .
(ofthebattleer
properctsense,thelatt ). we may call
221. As these determinations which
218. Precipitation there will be if space
and time sufficient are not allowed to the the fromnt the
rivedmome callsreci
forth
procal chiefly
areactio de
n of the
destructive act, if things are broken across
the knee ;* an unfortunate issue of the opposing parties, we shall leave the
decision results, which either cannot be discussion and analysis of this difference
repaired at all, or at all events remains until we come to the subject of the reci
a substantial disadvantage. procal action .
222. A part of the plan lies ready
* Done hand over head .
made in the formation - (tactical organi
sation ) of the combatant forces, by which
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF TIIE COMBAT. 1:15

the great number of parts is reduced to 231 a . There are cases in which the
a few .
points named in No. 4, d e f g, which
223. In a partial combat this forma- lead to the retreat of the cenemy, may be
tionis a thing of more consequence than attained without any destruction of the
in the total combat ; in the former, it enemy's armed forces ; then the enemy is
often constitutes the whole plan, and the conquered by a manouvre and not by a
smaller the body, the more this will be the combat. But this is no victory, therefore
case .
A battalion in a great battle does only for use when we have something
not use many other dispositions than else than a victory for an object.
those prescribed by the regulations, and 231 b. In such cases, the employment
on the drill ground ; but that is not suf- of military force will still always imply
ficient for a division , there
directions become more
particular the idea certainly of a combat, therefore
necessa ry . of a destruction of the enemy's force, but
224. But in the total combat the forma- only as possible not as probable. For in
tion is seldom the whole plan , even for the as much as our views are aimed at some
smallest body : the plan often modifies thing else than the destruction of the
the formation to afford scope for special enemy's forces, we pre-suppose these
dispositions. A squadron undertaking , other things to be effectual, and that
the surprise of one of the enemy's small they will prevent any serious opposition
posts divides itself into several separate from taking place . If we cannot make
parts just as well as the largest army. such a pre -supposition, then we ought
Aim of the Plan . not to choose these other things for our
end, and if we err in the pre -supposition,
225. The object of the combat makes the plan will miss its aim.
the unity of the plan : we may regard 232. From the preceding number it
it as its aim, that is, the direction to follows, that whenever a considerable de.
which all activities should converge .
struction of the enemy's forces is the
226. The object of a combat is victory ; condition of victory, it must also be the
in other words, everything which is a chief object of the plan .
condition of victory, and which is included 233. Now, as a manouvre is not in
in No. 4 .
itself a combat, but a combat takes
227. None of the objects enumerated place if a manæuvre does not succeed,
in No. 4 can be attained in battle, except therefore neither can the rules which
by the destruction of the enemy's force, apply to total combat suit the case of a
which, therefore, appears to be the means manoeuvre ; and the particular things
for all. which are efficacious in a manouvre,
228. It is itself in most cases the prin- can contribute nothing to the theory of
cipal object as well. the combat .
229. If that is the case the plan is 234. Many mixed relations certainly
aimedat the greatest possible destruc- arise in practice, but that is no reason
tion of the enemy's forces. against separating things in theory which
230. When some of the other things in themselves are essentially different;
named No.1 are ofgreater
than theindestruction of the enemy's force, if
importance we know the nature of each part,then
the combination of them may easily be
it takes a subordinate place as a means ; made.
then the greatest possible is no longer 235. The destruction of the enemy's
demanded, but only a sufficient destruc- armed force is, therefore, in all cases the
tion, and we may then take the nearest aim, and the things named in No. 4,
way to the aim. bedef, are first called forth by it, but
VOL. III . L
146 ON VAR.

then certainly enter into reciprocal action springs of action in war , and involveour
with it as powers in themselves. selve in const disadv s ant
; for in antage
s ng
236. Such of these things as per most case the falli shortble
of the(true)
petually r h oida
recu — that is to say, are not line, whic is so unav and fre
the consequence of special relations— quent , is only compensated by our some
ought also properly to be regarded as times
244.overste pping
The mor e it.
favourable our pre
ts
effec ruction
of the dest enemy's
of the
forces . suppositions — that is to say, the greater
237. So far, therefore, as it is possible the risk we run, so much the greater are
the results which we expect by these
to establish anything quite general as same means, and therefore the objects
to the plan of a battle, it can only
relate to the most effectual application of whic
245h. we
Thhav e ine vie
e mor wew .risk the less the
our own forces to the destruction of the probability, and, consequently, the cer
s
enemy' .
tainty of the
resu lt.
Relation between the magnitude and certainty 246. The greatness of the result, and
of the result . the certainty of it, stand therefore in
238. In war , and therefore , of course , opposition to each other when the means
in combat, we have to deal with moral given are the same .
forces and effects which cannot be nicely
247. The first question now is, how
much value we should put upon one or
calculated ; there must, consequently , al other of these two opposite principles ?
ways remain a great uncertainty as to 248. Upon this nothing general can
the result of the means applied .
239. This isstill further increased by belaid 2n; onthecontrary,ofall
thenumber of contingencies with which pequendstienons rit isculthe
t oninthwaeparti cumstatnce
ar cironemos dess
operations in war are brought into con e st ce
In th fir pla , it is
tact . in each
det erminecase
d by. relations which , in many
240. Wherever there is uncertainty, cases, oblige us to run the greatest risks,
risk becomes an essential element.
ry a-
241. Torisk,intheordina accept coSecurondage ,th ly ngsit pur
are ethispir enterpri
of ely se
subjectivfamee,.
tion , means to bu ild upon things whiche which cannot be prescribed . We can
riske mo
ar in rethe wid
impr ablesen
obest thse le. posTo require of a commander that he should
is obtoabsup
an, pr

take it here in the latter sense.

. professional knowledge , and not will
over

cle arly-defined line between probability entin,sate must trust to nthimagetowitturnh thethis
and improbability, the idea might occur mean to the best adva
to us to make it the boundary line of risk, aid of his courage .
and hold the passing of that line as in Relation between the magnitude of the
admissible, that is , as risk in the re
stricted sense of the word . result and the price.
249. The second question in relation
243. But, in the first place, such a line to the destruction of the enemy's forces
is a chimera ; and, in the next, the com
bat is not an act of reflection only, but of con25cer ns the price to be paid for it.
0. With the intention of destroying
passion and courage as well. These things the enemy's forces, is certainly in gene
cannot be shut out : if we should try to more
confine them too closely , we should divest ral included the idea of destroying
our own powers of the mostpowerful than weshallinturn sacrifice on our own
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR TIE TIIEORY OF TIE COMBAT. 147

part ; but this is by no means a neces- combat, there are only two distinctions,
sary condition, for there may be cases ( for which always appear, and are therefore
instance, when we have a great supe- general; the first arises from the positive
riority in numbers) when the mere dimi- or negative intention , and is the distinc
nution of the enemy's forces is an advan- tion between attack or defence ; the other
tage, even if we pay for it by greater loss arises from the nature of arms, and is
on our own side. the distinction between the fire - combat
251. But even if we aim decidedly at and close combat.
destroying more of the enemy's force 258. In the strictest sense, defence
than we sacrifice on our own side, still should only be the warding off a blow,
there always remains the question how and should therefore require no other
great is that sacrifice to be, for according weapon than a shield .
to it the chance of the result naturally 259. But that would be a pure nega
rises and falls. tion, a state absolutely passive ; and
252. We readily perceive that the making war is anything but patient en
answer to this question depends on the durance ; the ideaof thorough passivity
value which we place on our forces, there can therefore never be laid at the root of
fore on individual interests. To these defence.
interests the decision must be left; and 260. Strictly considered, fire -arms, the
we can neither say that it is a rule to most passive of weapons, have still some
spare our own troops as much as pos- thing positive and active in their nature.
sible, or to make a lavish use of them . Now the defence makes use, in general,
Determination of the nature of combat for of the same
forms weapons, and also
of combatasthe of the
attack, same
both in
the separate parts ( corps, etc.) fire and close combat.
253. The plan of the battle fixes for 261. The defence is therefore to be
each single division where, when, and considered a contest just as much as the
how it is to fight — that is, it fixes time, attack.
place, and form of the combat. 262. The object of this contest can
254. Here, as well as everywhere, the be nothing but victory ; which is, there
general relations, that is, those pro fore, just as much an object for the de
ceeding from the abstract idea are to be fence as for the attack.
distinguished from those which the par 263. There is nothing to justify the
ticular case brings with it. conception of the defender's victory being
255. The manifold diversity in plans something negative ; if somewhat like it,
of battles must naturally proceed from in certain cases, that lies in particular
the special relations in each case, be conditions : into the conception of the de
cause when the special advantages and fence that notion must not enter, other
disadvantages are sought for and dis wise it reacts logically on the whole idea
covered, the former are brought into of combat, and introduces into it contra
use, and the latter are neutralised . dictions, or leads back again , by strict
256. But the general relations also deduction, to that absurdity, a state of
give certain results, and although few in absolute endurance and sufferance.
number and simple in form , still they 264. And yet there is a difference be
are very important, because they belong tween attack and defence, which, while
tothe very essence of the thing, and scon it is the only one in principle, is also a
stitute the basis in all other decision . very essential one ; it is, that the assailant
Attack and Defence. wills the action ( the combat), and calls it
257. In regard to the nature of the into life ; whilst the defender waits for it.
148 ON WAR.

265. This principle runs through all that the latter acts, the defender can no
war, therefore through thewholepro- longerattainhisobject
ng
by waiting and
efore, now acts just
vince of combat, and in it all differences not acti ; he, ther
between attack and defence have their as well as his opponent, and the differ
origin . ence ceases .
266. But whoever wills an action must 271 b. If weapply this, in the first place,
the whole combat only, then alldiffer
aim at something thereby, and this ob to
ence between attack and defence will con
ject must be something positive, because sist in this, that the one waits for theother;
the intention that nothing should be done, but the course of the actual combat will
could call forth no action . The offensive
must , therefore, have a positive object. not be further influenced by it.
267. Victory cannot be this object, for 272. But this principle of the defence
it is only a means . Even in a case where may : als o be applied to partial com
victory is sought entirely on account of bats it may be for the interest of corps,
itself , on account of the mere honour of
or parts of an army, that no change
arms, or to influence political negotia- ma
shouy ldalstak e place , and in thatwaythey
o be led to adopt the expecta
tions by its moral weight, still, that
effect, and not the victory itself, is always tive .
the object. 273. This is not only possible as re.
268. The defender, just as well as the gards branches and corps on the side of
aggressor, must have victory in view, but the defender, but also as respects those
in each the desire springs from a different on the side of the assailant ;it takes place
source ; in the offensive from the object in274
which the victory is to serve ; in the de . tyIt on
reali is both sidel, s.however , that it
natura
more frequently in the case
should occur er
fender, from the mere fact of the combat .
of the defend than in that of the assail
The one looks down upon it, as it were,
from a higher stand - point; the other ant, but this can only be shown when
theparticular circumstances in connection
looks up to it from a lower position, with the defensive principle come under
Whoever fights can only fight for the
victory .
269. Now, why does the defender fight, . ation .
consider
275 The more we imagine the defen
that is,ewhy
Becaus does
he wil accept
he con
l not cede the
thecombat
positive?
siv e principle descending to thesmallest
branches in a total combat, and the more

branches , so much the more passive be

because he wants to maintain the status
quo . This is the primary and necessary
object of the defender; whatever further
may attach itself to this is not necessary .
270. The necessary intention of the
defender, or rather the necessary part of
the defender's intention, is therefore
negative.
on 271a.Whereverthere is thisr,negativity
the part of the defende
that is, tai
wherever and whenever it is his interest
that nothing should be done, but that
things should remain as they are, he is
thereby enjoined not to act, but to wait
until his opponent acts ; but the moment
comes the whole resistance, so much the
more the def ence approaches to that point
of absolute endurance which we look
on .as
up276 Thane abs ntityin. this direction at
poiurd
which the advantage to thedefender of
waiting ceases, that is,the point where
itsnefficacy
is issat
extent it exhausted,where,
iated, we shalltoonly bebe
able to examine closely hereafter.
277. For the present all that we de
duce from what has been said, is that the
offensive or defensive intention not only
determines something as to the com
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 149

mencement of the combat, but may also amongst themselves, the plan of the battle
pervade its whole course—that by that has nothing to determine, as these are
means there are therefore in reality two determined already by conception, by the
different kinds of combats. formation ( tactical organisation ), and the
278. The plan of the combat must drill ground, and therefore, like the for
therefore determine in every case, whe- mation, belong to the stereotypic part of
ther as a whole it is to be an offensive the plan.
or defensive combat. 287. As to the use of these two forms
279. It must also determine this point of combat apart from each other, there
for those corps which have assigned to is no general rule, unless this can pass
them a mission different from that of the for such, that such separation must
general body. always be regarded as a necessary evil,
280. If we now leave out of considera- that is, as a less effective form of action .
tion for the present every particular cir- All cases in which we are obliged to
cumstance which might decide the choice make use of this weaker form , belong to
of attack and defence, then there is only the domain of particular circumstances.
one rule which presents itself - namely, Occasions for the use of the bayonet
that when we wish to defer the solution we must alone, such, for instance, as the execution
act defensively ; when we seek it, offensively. of a surprise, or when there is no time to
281. We shall see this principle come use fire -arms, or if we are sure of a great
into connection presently with another superiority of courage on our side, are
which will make it plainer. plainly only isolated cases.
Fire- Combat and Close - Combat. Determination of T'ime and Place.
282. The plan of the combat must 288. As to the determination of time
further determine the choice of the form and place, we have, in the first place, to
of combat in its relation to arms - that observe in reference to these two things,
is, fire -combat and close - combat. that in the total combat the determina
283. But these two forms are not so tion of place belongs to the defence
much branches of the combat as essential alone, the determination of time to the
elements of it. They result from the attack.
armament, they belong to each other, 289. But for partial combats, the plan
and only by the combination of the two either of an offensive, or of a defensive
together can the full power of the combat combat, has to give determinations re
be developed . specting both .
284. The truth of this view ( which Time.
otherwise is not absolute but only ap 290. The appointment of time for a
proximative,
of comprehendingthe
cases), shows majority
itself by the combina partial combat, which seemsatfirst sight
tion of
only to affect the subject at most in a few
batant, arms
and byin the
the hands
intimatofe one
unioncom
of points, takes, however, a different turu
on closer examination, and is seen to
different kinds of troops which has be penetrate it through and through with a
285.a necessit
come y . ation
But a separ of these two ruling idea, decisive in the highest degree ,
elements, and the use of the one without that is, the possibility of a successive use
of forces.
the other is not only possible , but very Successive use of Forces.
frequent
286. Inly respect
happensto. the mutual relations 291. Simultaneous action is, in itself,
of the two, and their natural order a fundamental condition of the common
 150 ON TAR .

action of separate forces. This is also the 295. This maximum determines itself
case in war,and particularly in the combat. entirely by the individual case, by the
For as the number of the combatants is a ground, the moral relations between the
factorin theproductof thesame,the refore opposing troops,andthe moreimme diate
Here it is
us
ceterisparibus , the simultaneo applica- object of the fire -combat.
allourforces, that is,the great
tion ofblage est enough to say that there is such a thing.
assem of them in time against an 296. The number of troops to be em
enemy who does not employ all his atonce, ployed simultaneouslyhas, therefore,a
willgive the victory,certainly in the first maximum , beyondwhicha waste takes
instance only ,over that partoftheenemy's place.
force which has been employed ; but as 297. In the same way the use of one
thisvict ory over a part of the enemy's and the samebody of troops has its
forces raises the moral force of the con limits. We have seen, in No. 123, how
queror,and lowers thatof thevanquished , troops under fire gradually becomeun
re gh
it follows, therefo ,that althou the riora tionblein; close
servicea but there sThe
combaist .like ise exhau
adetes
loss of physical force may be equal on
both sides, still this partial victory has tion of physical force is less there than in
the effect of raising the total forces of the fire -combat, but the moral effect produced
conqu eror and diminishing thoseof the by an unsuccessful issue is infinitely
vanquished, and that consequently itmay greater.
determine the result of the total combat . 298. Through this deterioration , which
292. But the deduction drawn in the forces used in action suffer, including as
well those not actually engaged, a new
tionswhi chdo notexist;inthefirst principlecomes intothe combat,whichis
place, that the number (of troops) must the inherent superiority of fresh troops
have no maximum ;and ,secondly,that oppos ed to those already used.
the use of one and the same force has 299. There is still a second subject for
no limits as long as there is anything rary
left of it. considerat ion, which consists a tempor
deterioration of forces inthat have
293. As regards the first of these been engaged in the crisis which occurs
points , the number of combatants is limi in every action.
ted at once by space, for all that cannot be 300. The close combat in practice may
brought into actual use are superfluous. be said to have no duration . In the mo
By it the depth and extent of the forma ment that the shock takes place between
tion of all combatants intended to act two cavalry regiments , the thing is de
simultaneously is limited , and conse cided , and the few seconds of actual
quently the number of combatants . sword -fight are of no consequence as re
294. But a much more important limi gards time : it is very much the same
tatio n of numbers lies in the nature of withinfantry and with large masses.
the fire - combat. We have seen ( No. 89c) But the affair is not then finished on that
that in it, within certain limits , the account ; the state of crisis which has
incring
rais number
easetheof stre hastheonly
ngth of theeffect of burst outwiththe decisionis not yet
fire - combat on
both sides ; that is, its total effects .
quite over ; the victorious regiment pur
Now this increased effect when it brings suing the vanquished at full speed, is
no advantage in itself for one side,
not the same regiment lately drawn up
on the field of battle in perfect order;
ceases then to be of service to that side ; l forceitsisphys
it therefore easily reaches a maximum in its mora
but, as a rule, icalnlyforce
certai intensi fied,
, aswell
that case .
as that resulting from military order in
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 151

its ranks have suffered. It is only by one after another, the duration of the whole
the loss which his adversary has suffered combat is considerably extended.
in moral strength, and by the circum- 309. This duration now brings into
stance that he is just as much disordered, view a fresh motive for the successive use
that the conqueror retains his superiority of forces, by introducing a new quantity
therefore, if a new adversary makes his into the calculation, which is the unfore
appearance with his moral force intact, seen event ,
and his ranks in perfect order, there can 310. ' f, in general, a successive use
be no question that,supposing the troops of troops is possible, then it follows that
equally good , he will beat the conqueror. we can no longer know how the enemy will
301. A similar crisis also takes place in employ his ; for only that portion which
the fire-combat, to such a degree that the is brought into action at once comes
side which has just been victorious by its within the scope of our observation, the
fire, and has driven back its enemy, still rest does not, and therefore we can only
finds itself, for the moment, in a decidedly form some general conjectures respecting
weakened condition it .
its ranks, and physical respects
as and order ina
moralforce, 311. By the mere duration of the action
condition which lasts until all that has there is brought into our reckoning an
been thrown into disorder is once more increased amount of pure chance, and
restored to its normal relations. that element naturally plays a more im.
302. What we have said here of portant part in war thananywhere else.
312. Ūnforeseen events require a ge
smaller divisions , holds good with re neral system of precaution , and this can
spect larger
303.to The onesis asinwell.
crisis itself greater in consist in nothing else than placing in
smaller divisions , because it has an effect rear a proportionate force, which is the
uniformly throughout the whole, but it reserve, properly speaking .
is of shorter duration , Depth of the Order of Battle.
espe304.
cialThe
ly ofweakest
a whole isarm
a ygeneral
; but itcrisis,
lasts 313. All battles which are to be fought
the longest in large armies often for by bodies of troops in succession, require
several hours.
from their very nature that fresh troops
should be forthcoming. These may either
305.ofAsthelong
crisis as the the
combat, conquer or red
conque is in has
the be quite fresh , that is, troops which have
in that crisis a means of still restoring not been engaged at all, or such as have
the combat, that is, of turning its result, been in action,but by rest have recovered
if he can bring forward fresh troops in more or less from their exhaustion . It
sufficient numbers.
is easy to see that this gives room for
many shades of difference .
306. In this manner , therefore, the 314. Both the use of quite fresh troops,
successive employment of troops is intro as well as the use of such as have re
duced in a second way, as an efficacious freshed themselves supposes that they
307.ipleBut
princ . if the successive employment have been in rear — that is, in a position
of troops in a series of combats following beyondthe region of destruction .
one after another is possible ; and if the 315. This also has its degrees, for the
simultaneous use is not unlimited , then it region of destruction does not end at once,
follows of itself that the forces, which but decreases gradually, until at last it
cannot efficacious
be become
action, may so ininsuccessi
simultaveneous
. ends
316.entirely.
The range of small arms and of
308. By this series of partial combats, grape, are well defined gradations.
 152 ON VAR .
1
317. The further a body of troops is time can be regarded as applied simul.
posted in rear, the fresher they will taneously . When the fronts are equal,
be when brought into action .
318. But no body of troops which has
such application is therefore limited by
the possibility of acting effectively. For
been within reachofan effective fire of instance, in fire-combat, three ranks
small
fresh .
arms, or of grape, canhe considered might perhaps fire at thesame time, but
six cannot.
319. We have , therefore, three reasons 325. We have shown in No. 89 that
for keeping a certain number of troops in two lines of fire of unequal strength as
rear.

They serve (a) to relieve or reinforce ex

regards numbers may be a match for
each other, and that a diminution (of
hausted troops, especially in fire - combat. numbers) on one side, if it does not ex
(b) To profit by the crisis in which ceed certain limits, has only the result
the conqueror is placed directly after his of reducing the mutual effect.
success .
326. But the more the destructive effect
(c) As a provision against unforeseen
events . of the fire-combat is diminished, the more
320. All troops kept back come under time is required to produce the necessary
these categories whatever arm they be effect. Therefore, that side which desires
long to, whether we call them a second chiefly to gain time (commonly thedefen
line or reserve , whether they are part of sive side) is interested in modifying,as
a division , or of the whole . much as possible, the total destructive
effect ofthe fire (thatis the sum of the
Polarity of the simultaneous and successive mutual fire ).
Use of Troops. 327. Further, this must also be an
321. As the simultaneous and the suc object with the side which is much the
cessive use of troops are opposed to one weaker in point of numbers, because,
another, and each has its advantages , when
relativethe
ly losses are. equal, his are always
greatest
they may be regarded as two poles, each
of which attracts the resolution to itself, 328. When the conditions are reversed,
. and by a the interests will be also.
where, they arein stateresoluti 329. When
hastening no special
the action interest
predominates for
brium provide d thatathis ofequili
on is ,itwith
founded on a right estimate of the oppos be the interest of both sides to do with
ing forces. as few troops as possible, that is, as
322. Now , we require to know the already said * (No. 896), only to enploy
laws of this polarity — that is, the advan so many that the enemy will not be in
tages and conditions of these two appli . duced to come to close quarters at once,
cations of force, and thereby also their owing to the smallness of our numbers.
s
relation with one another . 330. In thismanner, therefore, the
Thesbeimultaneous
323.may simultaneous employinent of forces in
forces intensifiedemployment of fire-combat, is limited by theerant,of fait
A. With equal fronts — both advantage, and both sides have to fall
(a ) In fire combat . back upon the successive use of the spare
( 6) In close combat . forces.
B. With a greaterfront, that is, envelop- numb
331. close
ersIn is combat
above all the superiority
thing in
s decisive,
ing.
324. Only those forces which and the simultaneous employment of troops
brought into efficient activity at the same
are is on that accountso much to bepreferred
to the successive, that the latter in mere
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE TIIEORY OF THE COMBAT. 153

theory is almost completely excluded, and which is possible by extending the front,
only becomes possible through accessory that is, in the enveloping form .
circumstances .
340. There are two ways in which we
332. Close combat is in fact a decision , may conceive a greater number of com
and one which lasts hardly any time; batants brought simultaneously into
this excludes the successive use of forces. action through a greater width of front,
333. But we have already said that the yiz . :
crisis of the close combat affords favour- 1. By extending our front so as to
able scope for the successive use of cause the enemy to extend his also . This
forces.
does not give us any superiority over the
334. Further, the decisions in partial enemy, but it has the effect of bringing
close combats belonging to a greater more forces into play on both sides .
whole are no absolute decisions; there- 2. By outflanking the enemy's front.
fore the application of our force to the 341. To bring more forces into action
further combats which are possible must on both sides can in very few cases be of
also be taken into consideration . any advantage to one of the two sides, it is
335. This leads then also to not using also uncertain whether the enemy will re
at one time more troops in close combat spond to this further extension of front.
than appear to be justnecessary to make 342. If he does not respond, then a
certain of the result. part of our front, that is of our forces,
336. As regards this point there is no will be either unemployed, or we must
other general rule, except that circum- apply the overlapping part of our front
stances which obstruct execution ( such to turn the enemy.
as a very courageous enemy, difficult 343. It is then only the apprehension
ground, &c. ), occasion a necessity for a of this turning which moves the enemy
greater number of troops. to extend as far as we have done.
337. But for the general theory, it is 344. If, however, the enemy is to be
of consequence to observe that the em- turned, it is plainly better to make ar
ployment of more troops than is necessary rangements for that purpose from the first,
in close combat is never so disadvan- andtherefore we shouldconsider an exten
tageous as in fire -combat, because in the sion of front only from that point of view.
first, the troops only become unservice- 345. Now, in the employment of troops,
able at the time of the crisis, not for a the enveloping form has this peculiar pro
continuance . perty, that it not only increases the number
338. The simultaneous employment of of troops simultaneously engaged on the
forces in the close combat is therefore two sides, but it also allows us (the party
subject to this rule, that it must in all using it) to bring more of them into ac
cases be sufficient toveproduce the result, tivity than the enemy can.
and that the successi use can in no way 346. If, for instance, a battalion with
make up for insufficiency, for the results a front 180 paces in length is surrounded,
cannot be added together as in fire -com and has to show front on four sides, and
bat ; and further, that when once the if the enemy is at a distance of musketry
point of sufficiency is reached, any greater range, ( 150 yards) from it, then there
simultaneo us applicatio n of forcebeco mes would be room for eight battalions to act
a waste of power. with effect against that single battalion.
339. Now that we have considered the 347. The enveloping form therefore
application of large bodies of troops in fire comes in here on account of this peculi
ng the arity ; but we must at the same time
depth close
and combat,
of the we increasi
same, by come to that bring under consideration its other
154 ON TAR.

specialities also, that is its advantages and quired to go over a certain space, cannot,
at the same time, be utilised for fighting.
disadvantages.
348. A second advantage of the en Now , all movements which do not lead
veloping form is the increased effect re perpendicularly on the enemy's line, have
sulting from the concentration of fire. tobemadeover a greater space by the
enveloping
349. A third advantage is its effect in velop partythan
ed, becau se the latter the partyen
by moves moreor
the interception of the enemy's retreat.
350. These three advantages of en less on the radii of the smaller circle, the
veloping, diminish according as the forces, former on the circumfere nceofthe greater,
or rather their fronts, become greater, and tant
which makes an impor nce.
differe
they increase the smaller the fronts are. 358. This gives the side enveloped the
351.Foras regards the first(No.345) ofadvan tageof a greater facility inthe use
the range of arms remains the same, his forces at different points.
whether the masses of troops be great or 359. But the unity of the whole is also
small (it being understood thatthey con lessened by the greater space covered,
sist of the same arms of the service ), because intelligence and orders must
the actual difference, therefore, between pass over greater distances .
the enveloping line and the line enveloped , 360. Both these disadvantages of en
which always remains the the
isa quantity veloping hincrease with Whtheincr
en theease in
re are
widt of front.
val ue isalways diminishing inproportion sign
as the front is extended .
onlyificaantfew battallargiones armi
; with theesy , areon the
in
352. To surround a battalion , at 150 other hand, they becoceme important - for
yards, eight battalions are required 361. The differen between radius
(No. 346 ) ; but ten battalions, on the and circumference isconstant ; therefore,
other hand, might besurrounded by gre r, lute
abso
theate diffateeren
the gre
ce beco
r the front bec omeys
mes alwa s;
only twenty battalions. and it is with absolute differences we
353. The enveloping form , however, is
seldom , if ever , carried out completely , are now concerned .
362. Besides, with quite small bodies
that is to say, to the complete circle, rarely
more than partially, and usua lly within of troops fewor noflank movements
180°. Now , if we imagine to ourselves occur, whilst they become more frequent
a body of the size of a considerable army , as the size of the masses increases.
we see plainly how little will remain of 363. Lastly, as regards interchange
the first of the above advantages under
tances
of communications, there is no difference
such cirums . as long as the whole space is only such
354. It is just the same with the second as can be overlooked .
advantage, as mayd beadv
see n age
ant at a glance. 364. Therefore ,ifthe advantages ofthe
355. The thir , also, of enveloping form are very great and the
course , notably diminishes by the greater disadvantages very small when the fronts
extension of the front ; although, here , are short; ifthe advantages diminish, and
some other relations also come into con the disadvantages increase with the ex
sideration . tension of front, it follows that therbre iu
must
356. But the enveloping form has also be 365.a poin t wher e ther e is an equili m .
age Beyond that point, therefore, the
a peculiar disadvant , which is, that the ger r
troops being, by that form , spread out extension of front can no lon offe
over a greater space, their efficient action any advantages over the successive use
is diminished in two respects. of troops ; but, on the contrary, disad
357. For instance , the timewhich is re
vantages arise.
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR TIE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 155

266. The equilibrium between the ad- 373. If, therefore, a certain length is
vantages of the successive use of forces, fixed for the necessary extent of front,
and those of a greater extent of front then it must increase with the size of the
masses .
( No. 341 ) must, therefore, be on this
side of that point. 374. The other advantage of the en
367. In order to find out this point of veloping form (the superiority in the
equilibrium , we must bring the advan- number acting simultaneously) leads to
tages of the enveloping form more dis- no determinate quantity for the front of
tinctly into view. The simplest way to a line; we must therefore confine our
do so is as follows : selves to saying that it diminishes with
368. A certain front is necessary in the extension of front.
order to exempt ourselves from the effect 375. Further, we must point out that
of the first of the two disadvantages of the simultaneous action of superior num
being surrounded . bers here spoken of, chiefly relates to
369. As respects the convergent musketry fire; for as long as artillery
(double) effect of fire, there is a length alone is in action, space will never be
of front where that completely ceases, wanting, even for the enveloped on his
namely, if the distance between the por- smallercurve to plant as many pieces as
tions of the line bent back, in case weare the enemy can on the greater curve.; be
surrounded by the enemy, exceeds that cause there never is enough artillery with
an army to cover the whole front of a
of the range of fire-arms.
370. But, in rear of every position , a continuous line. t be objected that the
space out of reach of fire is required 376. It canno
for the reserves, for those who command, enemy has still always an advantage in
etc., whose place is in rear of the front. the greater space, because his guns need
If these were exposed to fire from three not stand so close, and therefore are less
sides, then they could no longer fulfil liable to be struck ; for batteries cannot
the objects for which they are intended. be thus evenly distributed by single
371. As these details of themselves guns at equal intervals over a great
form considerable masses in large armies, space.
ly , require more room,
quentgreater 377. In a combat of artillery alone, or
and, consethe
therefore, the whole, the in one in which the artillery plays the
greater must be the space out of the principal part, the greater extent of the
reach of fire in rear of the front. Ac- enveloping front gives an advantage, and
cordingly, on this ground, the front must a greatone too, through the great range
increase as the of artillery, because that makes a great
372. But themasses increase
space (out . behind
of fire) difference in the extent of the two fronts.
a considerable mass of troops must be This case occurs, for example, with single
redoubts . But with armies in which the
greater,
etc., occupy onlyspace,
notmore because
but,the reserves,
besides that other arms of the service take the most
also , in order to afford greater security ; prominent part, and artillery only a
for, in the first place, the effect of stray secondary part, there is not this advan .
shots would be more serious amongst tage, because, as already said , there is
large masses of troops and military never any want of space even for the
trains than amongst a few battalions ; side378.
envelop ed.
secondly, the combats of large masses It is, therefore, principally in
last much longer, and, through that, the infantry combats that the advantage
which the greater front affords of
losses behind
troops are much greater
the front whoamongs t the
are not ac- bringing greater numbers into action
tually engaged in the combat.
 156 ON WAR .

simultaneously, must show itself. The such is the ordinary order of battle in two
difference of the two fronts in such a lines ; usually there is a third one behind,
case amounts tothree timestherange of consisting of cavalry, and besides that,
the musket ( if the envelopment reaches also, a reserve of s to , &c.
an angle of 180 °) , that is about 600 384. With very large masses (armies
paces. Before a front of 600 paces in of 100,000 to 150,000 or 200,000 ) we see
length, the enveloping line will then be the reserves always get greater (1 to });
double, which will be sensibly felt ; but à proof that armies have a continual
before a front of 3,000 paces the addi tendency to increase further beyond what
tional length would only be one- fifth, is required for the extent of front.
which is no advantage of any importance 385. We only introduce this now to
y
379. We may, therefore, say respect show more plainl the truth ofour demon
th
ing this point , that the leng of front is strati on by a glanc e at facts.
sufficient as soon as the difference result 386. Such, then, is the bearing of the
ing from the range of a musket shot first two advantages of enveloping. It is
ceases to give the enveloping line any different with the third .
387. The first two influence the cer
very marked superiority .
380. From what has just beensaid of tainty of the result by intensifying our
the two advantages of enveloping, it forces, the third does that also,but only
follows that small masses have a difficulty in with very short fronts.
obtaining the requisite develop nentof front ; 388. It
acts parti cularly
onthe coura ge
this is so true that we know for a fact of those engaged in the frontof the
that they are in most cases obliged to enem y's ting
line by crea a fear of losing
give up their regular order of formation, their line of retreat, an idea which has
and to extend much more . It rarely always a great influence onsoldiers.
happens that a single battalion , if left to 389. This is, however , only the case
depend on itself, will engage in a combat when the danger of being cut off is so
without extending its front beyond the imminent and evidres ent, thats the impres
traint ofdiscipline
ordinary length ( 150 and 200 paces ); in sion overpowersall
stead of keeping to that formation it will and of authority,and carries away the
divide into companies with intervals be soldier involuntarily,
tween them , then again will extend into 390. At greater distances, and if the
soldier is only led to a sense of danger
reserv
alto
e itwil
gether twictak
eupwi
l e , thre e or th
fourtheres
t indirectly
times as, mus ketry in bythe
his rea sound of asy
r, une artillery and
feelings
much room as it should regularly . may arise within him , but, unless his
381er.itBuistthegreat
easi er th
to attain the nece masses
essar y exte spirven
then pre alreadobey ver
it tis his yinyg th
bad,the se willof hishis
e orders
sion of front, as the front increases with superiors .
the masses (No. 373 ), although not in the 391. In this case, therefore, the ad
same proportion. vantage in cutting off the enemy's retreat,
382. Great masses have, therefore, no which appertains tothe enveloping side,
necessity to depart from their order of cannot be regarded as one which makes
formation, on the contrary , they are able success more secure, that is, more pro
to place troops in rear . bable, but only as onewhich increases
383. The consequence of this is,ng that the extent of a success already com
for large masses a kind of standi for
mation has been introduced , in which menced. 392. In this respect, also, the third
portions of the force are drawn up in rear ; advantage of enveloping issubject to
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 157

the counter-principle, that it is greatest will give the preference to the successive
with a short front, and decreases with use, the stronger and the bold to the
the extension of front, as is evident. simultaneous employment ofthe forces.
393. But this does not set aside the 400. It is natural that the assailant
principle, that greater masses should should be the stronger, or the bolder,
have a greater extent of front than small whether from the character of the com
ones , because as a retreat is never made mander or from necessity.
in the whole width of a position, but by 401. The enclosing form of combat, or
certain roads, so it follows of itself that that form which implies the simul
great masses require more time for a taneous use of forces on both sides in the
retreat than small ones; this longer time highest degree, is, therefore, natural to
therefore imposes the necessity of a the assailant.
larger front, that the enemy who envelops 402. The enclosed, that is, one limited
this front may not so speedily gain the to the successive application of forces,
points through which the line of retreat and which , on that account, is in danger
passes. of being surrounded, is, therefore , the
394. If (in accordance with No. 391 ) natural form of the defensive.
the third advantage of enveloping , in 403. In the first there is the tendency
the majority of cases (that is, when the to a quick solution, in the latter to gain
fronts are not too short), only influences time, and these tendencies are in harmony
the extent, but not the certainty, of suc- with the object of each form of combat.
cess, then it follows that it will have a 404. But in the nature of the defen
very different value, according to the sive there lies still another motive, which
relations and views of the combatants . inclines it to the deeper order of battle.
405. One of its most considerable ad
sult395. Whensethe
is otherwi probabil
small, ity of
the first the re
consider a- vantages , is the assistance of the country
tion must be to increase the probability; and ground, and localdefence of thesame
in such a case, therefore ,anadvantage constitutes an important element of this
which relatescannot
of the result principa lly
be oftomuch
the extent
conse- advanta ge. one
406. Now would think this should
quence . lead to the front being made as wide as
possible , in order to make the most of
396.edBut
oppos this) toadvanta
(No.if 365 ge is quite
the probabilit y of this advantage ; a one-sided view, which
success , in such case it becomes a posi- may be regarded as the chief cause of
tive disadvantage. commanders having been so often led to
397. In such a case, endeavour must occu py extensive positions.
be e ugh ntag e 407. But hitherto we have always sup
mad , thro the adva
successive use of forces, to counterb of the
al- posed the extension of front as either
ance those of the greater extent of front. causing the enemy to extend , in like man
393. We see, therefore, that the point ner, or as leading to outflanking, that is,
of indifference (or equilibrium) between to an envelopment of the enemy's front.
the two poles ofthesimultaneous and succes- 408. As long as we imagine both sides
sive application of our forces - of extension equally active , therefore apartfrom the
of frontand depth of position — isdifferently point ofview of offensive and defensiv e,
situated, not only according as the masses ion d
the applicat of a more extende front
are large or small, but also according to to envelop the enemy, presents no diffi
the relations and intentions of the re- culty . But as soon as we combine more
409.
spective weaker and the more prudent
parties.
399. The or less local defence with the combat in
 158 ON WAR .

front (as is done in the defensive), then lengths of the fronts ; and therefore, at
that application of the overlapping por• certain points, no longer counterbalance
tions of the front ceases ; it is either im the advantage of thesuccessive applica
possible , or very difficult, to combine local tion of force . To this law the assailant
defence with outflanking. is subject as well as the defender.
410. In order rightly to appreciate 416. Now, here we have to consider
this difficulty, we must always bear in extension of front of two kinds ; that
mind the form which the case assumes which the defender fixes by the position
in reality when our view of an enemy's which he takes up, and that which the
measures is intercepted by the natural assailant is obliged to adopt with a view
means of cover which the ground affords, to outflanking his enemy.
and therefore troops employed to defend 417. If the extension in the first case
any
deceive d andlar
particu localit
held y mayty:be easily flank
in inactivi is so ing
greatvanis
thatallthe advantag
h or becom es of ive
e ineffect out,
411. From this it follows, that in the then that movement must be given up ;
defensive it is to be considered a decided the assailant must then seek to gain an
disadvantage to occupy a greater front advantage in another way, as we shall
than that which the enemy necessarily presently see .
requires for the deployment of his forces. 418. But if the defenders' front is as
412. The necessary extent of front for small as can possibly be, if the assailant,
the offensive we shall examine hereafter ; at the same time, has a right to look
here we have only to observe , that if the for advantages by outflanking and en
offe nsive takes up too narrow'a front,thevelopingment
,still, again ,thelimits of this
defensive does not punish him for it, envelop must be fixed .
through having made his own front 419. This limit is determined by the
wid ve
ment. byanoffensi envelopi
e - movet,but
counteratfirs
ng ing
disamov tagents inhe
dvaneme rent anyed envel
which is tocarri
ops
too far
413. It is, therefore, certain that the (Nos. 356 and 365);
defender, in order that he may not, in any 420. These disadvantages arise when
.
case, incur the disadvantage of too wide the envelopment is attempted againsta
a front, willalways take up thenarrowest front exceeding the lengthwhich would
evidently verymuc
that means he can placethemore troops consistsintoo
in reserve ; at the same time these reserves
h greaterifthefamily
wide an envelopment of a
are never likely to be left inactive , like short line.
of 421. When the assailant has these
fied with the narrowest front, and seeks advantages of the enemy in the succes
to preserve the greatest depth, that is to sive einployment of forcethrough his
say, as long as he follows the natural short line, must tellwith more weight.
422. Now, it certainly appears that the
same degree there will be an opposite defender who adopts the narrow,front
will make theextent of his frontasgreat retain alltheadvantages ofthes
as possible , or, in otherwords, envelop use of forces on his side : forif
uccessing
the assailant
his enemy as far as possible . adop ts a front as small,and, therefore,
415. But this is a tendency, and no law does not outilank his enemy, then it is
for wehave seen thate neke advantages
of this envelopment diminish with the
tothe
successive use of their forces ;but if the
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE TIEORY OF THE COMBAT. 159

assailant envelops his opponent, then the cessive employment of forces. They not
latter must oppose a front in every direc only checkover extension on the part of
tion in which he is threatened , and, the defender, but also stop the assailant
therefore, fight with the same extent of from overstepping certain limits in en
front (except the trifling difference be veloping ; without, however, stopping
tween the extent of concentric circles, the tendency to extend within these
which is not worth noticing). With re limits .
spect to this there are four points which 428. But this tendency will be weak
claim our attention . ened or completely done away with if
the defender has extended himself too
423. In the first place, let the assailant
contract his front as much as he pleases, far.
429. Under these circumstances cer
there is always an advantage for the tainly the defender, being deficient in
defender in the combat changing from the
form of one in extended order and which masses in reserve, cannot punish the as
will be quickly decided into one which sailant for his too great extension in his
is concentrated and prolonged, for the attempt to envelop, but the advantages
prolongation of the combat is in favour of theenvelopment are as it is too small
of the defensivė. in such a case.
424. Secondly, the defender, even if 430. The assailant will, therefore, now
enveloped by his adversary, is not always no longer seek the advantages of en
obligedto oppose a parallel front to each veloping if his relations are not such
of the divisions surrounding him ; he may that cutting off is a point of great im
attack them in flank or rear, for which portance to him. In this way, there
fore, the tendency to enveloping is di
the geometrical relations are just those minished
which afford the best opportunity ; but .
this is at once a successive use of forces, 431. But it will be entirely done away
for in that it is not at all a necessary con with if the defender has taken up a front
of such extent that the assailant can leave
dition that the troops employed later part of it inactive, for that is to
should be employed exactly as the first a great
used, or that the last brought forward decided gain.
him a
should take up the ground occupied by to 432. In such cases, the assailant ceases
the first, as we shall see presently more look for advantages in extension and
ing, and looks for them in the
plainly. Withoutplacingtroops in re envelop direction, that is, in the concen
serve it would not be possible to envelop opposite
tration of his forces against some one
the enveloping force in this manner . to perceive that this
425. Thirdly, by the short front, with point. It is easy
same as a deep order of
strong reserves in rear, there is a pos signifies the
sibility of the enemy carrying his en battle.
433. How far the assailant may carry
veloping movement too far (No. 420 ), of the contraction of the front of his posi
which advantage may then betaken, just depends on,
by means of the forces placed in rear in tion,
a . The size of the masses.
reserve .

426. Fourthly, in the last place, there b. The extent of the enemy's front, and
c. His state of preparation to assume
is an advantage to the defenderin being a counter
secured by this means against the oppo -offensive .
434. With small forces it is disadvan
site error of a waste of force, through tageous to leave any part of the enemy's
portions of the front not being attacked front inactive ; for, as the spaces are
427. These are the advantages of a small, everything can be seen, and such
deep order of battle, that is of the suc
 160 ON WAR.

parts can on the instant be applied to we see that the point where the simul
active purposes elsewhere. taneous and the successive use of troops
435. From this follows of itself, that balance each other is different, according
also with larger masses and fronts the to the mass of troops in reserve, according
front attacked must not be too small, to the proportion of Furce, according to
because otherwise the disadvantage just situation and object,according to Boldness
noticed would arise, at least partially . and Prudence.
436. But, in general, it is natural that 445. That country and ground have
when the assailant has good reason to likewise a great influence is, of course,
seek for his advantage in a concentra understood, and it only receives this bare
tion of his forces, on account of the mention,because all application is here
excessive extension of front, or the pas- left out of sight.
sivity of the defender, he can go further in 446. With such manifold connections
contracting the extent of his front than and complex relations, no absolute num
the defender, because the latter,through but
the too great extension of his front, is
bersthere
can must somel quantit
be fixedstillasbenorma ies;
unit which
not prepared for an offensive counter serves as a fixed point for these complex
action against the enveloping movement. changeable relations.
437. The greater the front of the de 447. Now there are two such guides,
fender , the greater will be the number one on each side ; first a certain depth ,
of its parts which the assailant can leave which allows of the simultaneous action
unassailed . of all the forces, may be looked upon as
438. The same will be the case the one guide . To reduce this depth for the
more the intention of local defensive is sakeof increasing the extension of front,
distinctly pronounced ; must therefore beregarded as anecessary
439. And, lastly, the greater the masses evil. This, therefore, determines the ne
are generally. cessary depth. The second guide is the
440. Theassailant will therefore find security ofthe reserve ,ofwhich we have
the most advantage in a concentration of cess
his forces if all these favourable circumalread y spoken. This determines the ne
ary extension .
stances are combined, namely, large 448. The necessary depth just men.
, tioned lies at the foundation of all stand
dealof local defenceonthepart of the ing form ations ;weshallnotbe able to
enemy this until hereafter, when we come
prove
441. This subject cannot be finished to treat specially ofthe order ofthe (three)
until we examine the relations of
space . arms ,
449. But before we can bring our
ment of forces. We hare only here to
call the attention of our readers to the
sion, in anticipation of the above tio
resunlt,
we must inquire into thedetermina it
of
point to
only thathe
tthe motwaliveofs for
rene the itrelat e not
same comb placwise
at like e, as. that hassome influence upon
with fresh troops, but also to every
subsequent (or ulterior) employment of Determination of Place.
reserve troops. 450. The determination of place answers
443. In this subsequent use, there is the question where the combat is to be,
supreme advantage, as will be seen in the whole as for the parts.
sequel.
as 451. Thethe
well for place of combat forthewhole
444. From the preceding exposition, emanates from strategy, with which we
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 161

are not now concerned. We have only out, etc. We now anticipate this, only
here to deal with the construction of the in order to guard againsta confusion of
ideas. The indifference which we see in
combat
both parties have therefor
; we must, come intoe, suppose
contact, that
the this case lies only in the form of the order
place of the combat will then generally of 458. battle.
The nature of the form in con
be either where the enemy's army is ( in
the attack ), or where we can wait for it centric segments of circles, (orportions
(on the defensive ). of polygons, which is the same) has been
452. As regards the determination of already sufliciently developed ; it is the
place for the members of the whole, it enveloping and enveloped order.
decides the geometrical form which the 459. The question of the placing of
combatants on both sides should assume the parts in space would be fully settled
in the combat. by the geometrical form of the normal
453. We leave out of sight at present order of battle if it was necessary that
the forms of detail which are contained some of our troops should be opposed to
in the regular (normal ) formation which those of the enemy in every direction .
we shall consider afterwards. This, however, is not necessary ; it is
454. The geometrical form of the whole much more aquestionin each particular
may be reduced to two types — namely, case : should all parts of the enemy's line be
to the parallel, and to that in concentric engaged or not ? and in the latter case,
segments of circles. Every other form which ?
460. If we can leave a part of the
runs into one of these .
enemy's force unattacked, we become by
posed in whatever
455. toInbefact, parts
actual confli ct are
mustsup
be that means stronger for the contest with
supposed in parallel lines. If, therefore, the rest , either by the simultaneous or
an army should deploy perpendicularly successive use of our forces.
's
By that
to the alignment of the other, the latter means a part of the enemy force may
have to contend with the whole of our army.
must either change its front completely, 461. Thus we shall either becompletely
andit mustat
or leastparallel
place itself with the
do so witha other,
portion of superior to the enemy at the points at
its line. But in the latter case, the other which we want our forces, or we shall at
army must then wheel round that portion least have a stronger force than the
ofitsline againstwhichno part ofthe general relations between the twoarmies
is to
if it an be would give .
enemy's linehas and thus ,arises
wheeled order 462 But these points may be taken
brought
of battle into use ;
in concentr ic pieces of circles or to represent the whole, provided that we
need not engage the others ; there is,
polygonal parts . therefore, an artificial augmentation of
be 456.
consiThe
deredrectil inearferen
as indif is plainly
ordert, forthe to our forces, by a greater concentration of
rela-
same in space .
tionsofthe two parties are precisely alike. the463 .It is evident that this means
457. But we cannot say thatthe recti
linear form only arises from the direct and forms a most important element in any
(as appears at firstsight); planof a battle ; it isthatwhich ismost
parallelalso
attack sive
take place lel
placi himself paral
mayng by totheandefen
obliq 464.ally
ue gener used.
The point now is therefore to
attack . In this case the other circum- examine this subject closer, in order to
stances will not certainly always be alike, determine the parts of an enemy's force
which in this sense should be taken to
good,often
for oftethe
n it new
will posit
not beionquit not ied
wille carr be constitute the whole .
M
VOL. III.
162 ON WAR.

465. We have stated in No. 4 , the mo along with it in its fate, then we have by
tives which determine the retreat of thatmeans also discovered the part of
one of the combatants in a battle . It is the whole against which the forces in
plain that the circumstances from which tended to fight the real struggle must be
these motives arise, affect either the whole directed .
of the force, or at least such an essential 473. If we leave out of sight all
part of it as surpasses all the rest in circumstances of ground, we have only
importance , andtherefore carries them position and magnitude (numbers) by
along with it in its fate . which to determine the part to be
466. That these circumstances affect attacked. We shall first consider the
the whole of the force, we can easily numbers .
conceive if the mass is small, but not 474. Here there are two cases to be
if it is large. In such case certainly distinguished ; the first, if we unite our
the motivesgiven underd f g concern the oppoforces againsta part ofthe enemy's and
se none to the rest of his army; the
whole, but the others, especially the loss,
affect only certain parts, for with large second,if we oppose to the remaining
mas ses it isextremely improbable that ispartplaainlsmaly la forcemere
all parts have suffered alike . concentrly to noccup
atio y it.esEachin
offorc
467. Now those parts whose condition space.
is the cause of a retreat, must naturally 475. The first of these questions, viz.
beconsidlerable inityrelation to thewhole; how large a partoftheenemy'sforro
we shal for brev sake call them the must we necessarily engage, is evidently
the same as to how small can we make the
vanquished.
468. These vanquished parts may width ofd our front ? We have already
either be contiguous to each other, or discusse that subject in No. 433, and
they may be more or less interspersed foll g:
owinIn
through the whole . 476. order the better to explain the
469. There is no reason to consider subject in the second case,we shall bers
othe r .Ifonecorps of anarmyiscom- posisuctiveh casandaective
pletely beaten but all the rest intact, in that ifasweourselves;itfollowers
take steps to beat
the smaller portion of his armywith the
bet ter than if the losses had been otini farger traction ofour own,hewill do the
formly distributed over the whole army . same on his side .
470. The second case supposes an equal 477. Therefore, if we would have the
employment of the opposing forces ; but total result in our favour, we must so
ᏔᎾ
are only occupied at present with arrange that the part of the enemy's
the effect of an unequal application of army which we mean to defeat, shall bear
forces, one that is concentrated more at i, greater proportion tohiswhole forcwee
a single or at certain points ; we have , than the portion of our force which
therefore, only to do with the first case .risk losing bears to the whole of our
171. If the vanquished parts are close
to each other , they may be regarded army. 478. If, for instance , we would employ
collectively as a whole,
too d and we mean it in the principal action three -fourths of
to be so unders when we speak of our force, and use one-fourth for the
the divisions or points attacked or beaten . occupation of that part of the enemy's
472. If we can determine the situa army not attacked, then the portion of
tion and relation of that part which the enemy's army which we engage se
dominates over and will carry the whole riously should exceed one- fourth , should
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR TILE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 163

be about one-third . In this case, if the force with two - thirds of his, there is still
result is for us on one side, and against us a probability of success for him in the
on the other, still, with three - fourths total result, because the remaining one
of our force, we have beaten one-third of third of his force will hardly get into
the enemy's ; whilst he, with two -thirds difficulty to an equal degree.
of his, has only conquered one fourth of 484. But it would be wrong to go fur
our's — the advantage is, therefore , mani- ther with this train of reasoning, and draw
festly in our favour. the conclusion , that if the defensive took
479. If we are so superior to the enemy no positive action at all against the
in numbers, that three - fourths of our weaker portion of the assailant's force (a
force is sufficient to ensure us a victory case which very often happens) , victory
over half of his, then the total result would likewise follow in that case also
would be still more to our advantage. in favourof the assailant ; for, in cases in
480. The stronger we are in numbers which the party attacked does not seek
relatively the greater may be that por- to indemnify himself on the weaker por
tion of the enemy's force which we en- tion of the enemy's force, his chief reason
gage seriously, and the greater will then for not doing so is because he has still the
be the result. The weaker we are, the means of making the victory of our princi
smaller must be tho portion seriously at- pal force doubtful, by bringing into action
tacked, which is in accordance with the against it a portion of that part of his
natural law, that the weak should concen army which has not been attacked .
trate his forces the most. 485. The smaller the portion of the
481. But, in all this, it is tacitly sup enemy's force is which we attack, tho
posed that the enemy is occupied as long more possible this becomes , partly on
in beating our weak division as we are account of spaces and distance being less,
incompleting our victoryover the larger partly, and more especially, because the
portion of his force. Should this not be moral power of victory over a smaller
80, and that there is a considerable dif- mass is so very much less ; if the mass
of the enemy's force which is conquered
ference in time, then he might still be is small , he does not so soon lose head
able to use a further part of his troops
against our principal force. and heart to apply his still remaining
482. But now , as a rule, a victory is means to the work of restoration.
d er
gaine quick in propo rtion the in-
as 486. It is only if the enemy is in such
equality between the contendingforces is a position that he is neither able to do the
greater ; hence, we cannot make the force one nor the other ; that is, neither to in.
demnify himself by a positive victory
which ; we
please losinagresonab
risk bear
it must , as small as we over
le propor- our weaker portion, nor to bring
tion to the enemy's force, which it is to forward his spare forces to oppose the
keep occupied. Concentration has,there- principal attack, orif irresolution pre
fore, the weaker vents his doing so, that then the assail
483.limits
The on
supposit side.in No. 476,
ion made ant can hope to conquer him with eyen
is, however, very seldom realised. Usu- a relatively very small force, by means of
ally, a part of the defender's force is tied concentration .
to some locality, so that he is not able to 487. Theory must not, however, leave
it to be inferred that it is the defender
use the lex talionis as quickly as is
sary ; when that is the case,the assai neces
lant, only who is subject to the disadvantage
of not being able to indemnify himself
in conce ntrat
somewhat exceed ing his forces
e may, rtion ,
even rly ntration s
the abov propo prope for the conce of force
and, ifhe canbeatone-thirdof the enemy's madeby his adversary; it has also to
164 ON WAR .

point out that either of the two parties, 494. The wings, because there we may
either the assailant or the defender, may turn the enemy's force.
be involved in such a situation . 495. The flanks, because we may ex 1
pect to fight there upon a spot on which
488. The assemblage of forces more the enemy is not prepared, and to impede 1
e
than arerproportionat at some one poin t,
in orde to be superior in numbers at his retreat .
that point is, in point of fact, always 496. The rear, just the same as the 1
founded on the hope of surprising the flanks, only that the expectation of ob
enemy, so that he shall neither have structing or completely intercepting his
time to bring up sufficient forces to the retreat is here more predominant.
spot nor to set on foot measures of re
497. But in this action against flanks
taliation . The hope of the surprise suc and rear, the supposition is necessarily
ing,onfoubein
ceedluti
reso
ndsgitse lf esseiest
the earl
lly eon, that
ntiamad the implied thatwe can compel the enemyto
oppose forces to us there ; when we are not
is on the initiative . certain that our appearance there will
489. But this advantage of the initiative have this effect, the measure becomes
hasalsoagain its disadvantage, of which dangerous : for where there is no enem
morewillbesaid hereafter ; wemerely to attack, weare h
inactivecipa l if thisis
, and
remark here, that it is no absolute advan the case wit the prin body, we
tage, the effects of which must show them shou ld undoubtedly miss our object.
498. Such a case as that of an enemy
selves in all cases .
490. But if we even leave out of con. uncovering his flanks and rear, certainly
urs now very rarely , still it does hap
sideration the grounds for the success of occ
surprise which arecontained pen ,and most easily, when the enemy
an intended iati
in the init ve, so that no objective indemnifies himself byoffensiv e cou
Hohenl en r,
indnte
motive remains , and that success has rises
enterplitz m
nothing on its side but luck , still, even Aus exagra
ter , are(Wa mples, which may be
that is not to be rejected in theory , for quo499
ted Theeatt
. her ). ack of the centre (by which
war is aga me from which it is impossible we understand nothing elsethan a part of
to exclude venture . It, therefore, remains the front, which is not a wing, ) has this
allowable , in the absence of all other property, that it may lead to a separation
motives , to concen trate a part of our
forces on a venture , in the hope of sur of partswhich is commonly termed break
prising the enemy with them . the. line.
ing500 Breaking the line is plainly the
491. If the surprise succeeds on either
side, whether it betheoffensive orde- oppositeofenvelopment. Both measures
fensive side which succeeds , there will in the event of victory ,have a very de
follow a certain inability on the part of structive effect on the enemy's forces,
t
the force surprised , to redress itself by a but each in a diffteren manner, that is,
ret492. ry str
aliatoAs yetoke . have been engaged in a . Envelopmen contributes to the cer
we tainty of the result, by itsmoral effect in
the consideration of the proportions of lowering the courage of the enemy's
the part or point to be attacked, we now
come to its position . the centre contributes to
b. Breaking
troops.
493. If we leave out every local and ens ure suc ces s by enabling us to keep our
other particular ci rcumstance , then we ed ether
forces moreunit tog e
. We hav
can only distinguish the wings, flanks, rear already treated of both.
and centre, as points which have peculi 6. The envelopment may lead directly
arities of their own, to the destructionof the enemy's army, if
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 165

it is madewith very superior numbers, and the commander or general, which is,that
succeeds. If it leads to victory, the early he keeps the principal parts of his force
results are in every case greater by that more in hand.
meansthan by breaking the enemy's line. 506. Although in a battle, the will of
d. Breaking the enemy's line can only the general and his intelligence conduct
lead indirectly to the destruction of the whole, still this willand this intelli
his army, and its effects are hardly gence can only reach the lower ranks
shown so much on the first day, but much diluted, and the further the troops
cally rdsthe are from the general-in -chief the more
rather
501.strategi
Thebrea kingafterwa
through . enemy's will this be the case ; the importance
army by massing our principal force and independence of subordinates then
against one point, supposes an excessive increase, and that at the expense of
supreme will.
lengththis
forin of the
form on
of front attack theicul
parttheofdiff enemty yof; the507 . But it is both natural, and as
occupying the remainder of the enemy's long as no anomaly arises, also advan
force with few troops isgreater , because tageous, that thể commander -in -chief
the enemy's forces nearest to the princi- should retain direct control to theut
most extent which circumstances will
pal attack may easily join in opposing it.
Now, in an attack on the centre, there allow .
are such forces on both sides ; in an at
Reciprocal Action.
528. In respect to the application of
k on The
tac502. k , onl
a flanconse y oneone
quenc this is, that
of side. forces in combat , we have now exhausted
such a central attack may easily end in a everything which can be deduced gene
very disadvantageous form of combat rally fromthe nature of those forces.
through a convergent counter attack. 509. We have only one subject still
503. The choice, therefore, between to examine,which is the reciprocal action
these two points of attack, must be made of the plans and acts of the two
according to the existing relations of the sides .
moment. Length of front, the nature 510. As the plan of combat, properly
and direction of the line of retreat, the so called , can only determine so much
of the action as can be foreseen , it
military
and chara s of the
cteristics
qualitie of enemy's troops,
their gener al, limits itself usually to three things,
lastly, the d mine viz. :
groun must deter
choice. We shall consider these subjectsthe 1. The general outline.
2. The preparations.
3. The details of the commencement .
more fully in the sequel.
tion504.
of We
forces one sed
at suppo
have thefor
point the ntra
conce real 511. Nothing but the commencement
attack ; but it may, no doubt, also take can in reality be laid down completely by
place at several points, at two or three, the plan : the progress demands new ar
without ceasing to be a a concentration rangements and orders, proceeding from
of forces against a part of the enemy's circumstances : these are the conduct of
force. At the
every incre ase insame
the time,
numbno
er doub t, bys the512.
of point battle.
Naturally , it is desirable that
the strength of the principle is weakened . the principles of the plan should be
505. As yet, we have only taken into followed in the conduct , for means and
view the objective advantages of such a end always remain the same ; therefore ,
concentration, that is, a more favourable if it cannot always be done, we can only
relation of force at the capitalpoint; look upon that as an imperfection which
cannot be avoided .
but there is also a subjective motive for
166 ON WAR.

513. The conduct of a battle is unde- the root of the whole theory of positions,
niably a very different thing to making in as faras it belongs to tactics.
a plan for one. The latter is done out of 519. The assailant, certainly, also ex
the region of danger, and in perfect amines the ground before the fight com 1
leisure; the former takes place always mences, but only imperfectly, for the
under the pressure of the moment. defender is in possession of it, and does
The plan always decides things from not allow him to make a full examination
a more elevated standpoint, with a wider everywhere. Whatever he can, in some
sphere of vision : the conduct is regu measure , ascertain from a distance, serves
lated by, indeed , is often forcibly carried him to lay down his plan.
away by that which is the nearest and 520. If the defender, besides the ad
mosť individual. We shall speak here- vantage of the mereknowledge ofthe if he
after of the difference in the character of ground, makes another use of it;
these two functions of the intelligence, makes use of it for local defence, the
but here we leave them out of consi- result is a more or less definite disposition
deration, and contentourselves with of his forces in detail;by that means, his
having drawn a line between them as adversary may find out his plans, and
distinct epochs. take them into account in making his
514. If we imagine both parties in this own.
situation, that neither ofns them knows 521. This is, therefore, the first calcu
anything of the dispositio of his oppo . lation made on the enemy's actual moves.
ment, then each of them can only make 522. In most cases this is to be re
his ownconformably withthegeneral garded as the stage atwhich the plans of
principles of theory. A great partof both parties end , thatwhich takesplace
this lies- called
the so
dy inthe
alreaeleme ntary forma tion, and
tactics of an 523.quent
in, subse
army
ly , belon
In comb ats gsintowhic neitht.er of
the hconduc
which are naturally founded only on the two parties can be considered as
what is general. really the defender, because both advance
515. But it is evident that a disposi- to the encounter, formation, order of
tion which only rests upon thatwhich is battle, and elementary tactics (asregu:
can never hav
general,twhich e the same efficacy lardisposition somewhat modified by
withtha
circumstances .
is built upon individua; ground ),come inin place of a plan pro
perly so - called.
516. Consequently, it must be a very 524. This happens very frequently
tions after tage
great advan to combi
the enem ne ourdispo
y, and si- withsmallbodies,seldomer with large
with refer masses.
ence to those of the enemy, it is the ad 525. But if action is divided into
vantage of the second hand, at cards. attack and defence, then the assailant, as
517. Seldom , if ever , is a battle ar far as respects reciprocal action, has
ranged without special regard to indivi evidently the advantage at the stage
dual circumstances. The first circum mentioned inNo. 522. It is true that he
stance , of which there must always be has assumed the initiative, but his oppo
some knowledge , is the ground. nent, by his defensive dispositions,has
518. In knowledge of the ground the been obliged to disclose , in great part,
defender has the advantage in general in what he means to do.
an especial degree ; for he alone knows ex 526. This is the ground on which, in
actlye andbeforehandthespoton
battl is to take place ; and , therewhichthe
fore, bas theory, the attackthe most
sidered as by farhas beenhitherto.com
advantageous
time to examine the locality fully. Here is form of combat.
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 167

527. But to regard the attack as the course of action as far as there are avail .
most advantageous, or, to use a more able data, and that the field of the con
distinct expression, as the strongest form of duct is only to commence where the plan
combat leads to an absurdity, as we shall no longer suffices. The conduct is there
show hereafter. This has been over- fore only a substitute for a plan, and so
looked. far, is to be regarded as a necessary evil .
528. The error in the conclusion arises 535. But let it be quite understood,
we are only speaking ofplans for which
from dover-
tione valuing
in No. 525. theThat advangetage
advanta menis there are real motives . Dispositions which
important in connection with the reci- have necessarily an individual tendency,
procal action, but that is not everything . must not be founded upon arbitrary
To be able to makeuse of the ground hypothesis, but
as an ally, and thereby, to a certain ex-
upon regular data .
536. Where , therefore , data are want
tent, to increase our forces, is in very ing, there the fixed dispositions of the
many cases of greater importance , and plan should cease, for it is plainly better
that a thing should remain undetermined ,
might be, in most cases, with proper that is, be placed under the care of
dispositions.
529, But wrong use of ground (very general principles, than that it should
extended positions), and afalse system of be determined in a manner not adapted
ces
defence ( pure passivity ), have no doubt to circumstan , which subsequent ly
givento the advantage which the assailant arise .
has of keeping his measures in the back 537. Every plan which enters too
much into the detail of the course of the
ground,errors
these undue theimpor
an alone tance
attack isindeb to combat, is therefore faulty and ruinous ,
, and ted
for detail does not depend merely on
for the
tice, succedsses
beyon thewhich
natural measns
it obtai urein of
prac
its general grounds, but on other particu
lars, which it is impossible to know
efficacy . e li- befo rehand
genc e isAsnotthe
530. ineduenc
confinfl the intel
to theofplan properly .
538. When we reflect how the influ
ue
80 called, we must purs our exam ina- ence of single circumstances (accidental
tion of the reciprocal action through the as well as others) increases with time
and space , we may see how it is that
ince The
prov531. se uct.
cond
of thecour or duration of the bat- very wide and complex movements
tle, is the province of the conduct of the seldom succeed , and that they often
lead to disaster .
battlertion
propo : butasthis
the succe ssive isusegrea
duration forceins
of ter 539. Here lies the chief cause of the
danger of all very complex and elabo
more
is 532 . The ore,. where much depends rate plans of battles. They are all
refyed
emplo
on the conduct, there must be a great founded, often without itstbeing known ,
on a mass of insignifican suppositions,
th inNow
dep533. ariser
the ord thebatt
es of le tion
ques . , whether a great part of which prove inexact.
540. In place of unduly extending the
it is better to entrust more to the plan or
plan, it is better to leave rather more to
to the conduct .
534. It were evidently absurd know . the conduct.
ingly to leave unexamined any datum 541. But this supposes (according to
which may come to hand, or to leave it 532) a deep order of battle ,that is, strong
out
has of
anyacco
valuunte in
as our
regadeli thetion
rdsbera s, osed
prop if it reserves .
542. We have seen ( 525 ) that as re
course of action . But that is as much as spects reciprocal action , the attack reaches
to say that the plan should prescribe the furthest in his plan .
168 ON WAR .

543. On the other hand, the defensive, ferently good, or that no suitable one is to
through (knowledge of) the ground, has be found, or that time is wanting to pre
many reasons to determine beforehand pare one , in the same measure will the 1
the course of his combat, that is, to enter defender remain behind the assailant in
his plan.
into Were
far544. the determination of his plans, and have l
we to stop at this point of to trust the more to the conduct.
view , we should say that the plans of 553. This result therefore shows again 1
the defensive reach much further than that it is the defender who must more
thoseofthe offensive;andthat,there- particularly look tothe successive use of
fore, the latter leaves much more to the forces.
conduct . 554. We have seen before that only
have the advantage
545. But this advantage of the de- large masses can
a narrow front, and we may now
fensive only exists in appearance, not in of cei ve additional motives for the de
reality . We must be careful not to for per
get that the dispositions which relate to fender to guard himself against the
the ground are only preparatory measures danger of an undue extension of hisplan
founded upon suppositions, not upon any a ruinous scattering of his forces on account
actual measures of the enemy . of the nature of the ground, and further
546. It is only because these supposi that he should place his security in the
tions are in general very probable , and aid which lies in the conduct, that is, in
only when they are so, that they as well 555g. reser
stron Fromvesthis
. the evident deduction
as the dispositions based on them have is , that the relation of the defence to
any real value.
547. But this condition attaching to the attack improves in proportion as the
es increase .
the suppositions of the defender, and the mass
556. Duration of the combat, that is,
measures which he therefore adopts , strong reserves , and the successive use of
naturally limits these very much , and
compels him to be very circumspect in them as much tas possi ble constitute, there
his plans and dispositions. fore, the firs condition in the conduct ;
548. If he has gone too far with the and the advantage in these things must
the assailant may slip away, and then bring with it superiority in the conduct,
there is on the spot a dead power, that is, apart from the talent of him who applies
a waste of power. them ; for the highest talent cannot be
Such may be the effect ofposi- brought
549.which are too extended, and the and into
we ma fully wel
y ver playl imawithout
gine thameans
t the
tions
too frequent use of local defence. one who is less skilful, but has the most
550. Both these very errors have often means at command, gains the upper hand
shown the injury to the defender from in the course of the combat.
an undue extension of his plan , and 557. Now , there is still a second ob
the advantage which the offensive jective condition which confers in general
may derive from a rational extension an advantage in the conduct , and thisis
of his. quite on the side of the defensive : it is
551.Onlyvery strong positions give adv
the plans of the defensive more scope theant
acquaintancewiththecountry.What
age this must give when resolu
than the plan of the assailant can have, tions arerequired which must be made
but they must be positions which are without examination , and in the pressure
strong in every point of view . of events, is evident in itself.
552. On the other hand , in proportion 558. It lies in the nature of things
as the position available is only indif that the determinations of the plan con.
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 169

cern more the divisions of higher order, 565. This difference of circumstances
and those of the conduct more the in- consists in three things in particular :
ferior ones; consequently that each sin- namely, in the want of data, in the want
gle determination of the latter is of lesser of time, and in danger.
importance ; but as these latter are natu- 566. Things which, had we a complete
rally much more numerous, the difference view of the situation, and of all the great
in importance between plan and conduct interrelations, would be to us of prim
is by that means partly balanced. importance, may not be so if that com
559. Further, it lies in the nature of plete view is wanting ; other things,
the thing that reciprocal action has its therefore, and, as a matter of course,
own special field in the conduct ; and circumstances more distinct, then become
also that it never ceases there because the predomi nant.
two parties are in sight of each other; and 567. Consequently , if the plan of a
consequently that it either causes or modi- combat is more a geometrical drawing,
then the conduct (or command ) is more
fies560.
the Now,
greatest of the rdisposit
partdefende
if the ions.
is specially a perspective one ; the former is more a
led by his interest to saveupforces ground plan, the latter more of a picture.
How this defect may be repaired we
for the conduct (No. 553), if he has a shall see hereafter .
general advantage in their use (No. 557), 568. The want of time, besides limi
the condusct,
it follow thatnotheonly
can,make
by super theydis-
goodiorit in tingour ability to make a general survey
advantage in which he is placed by the of objects, has also an influence on the
reciprocal action out of the plans, but power of reflection . Itis less a judicial,
alsoattain a superiority in the reciprocal deliberative, critical judgment than mere
tact ; that is, a readiness of judgment
action generally
561. What ever . may be the relation in acquired by practice, which is in
then effec
tive . mind.
This we must also bear
this respect between the opposing parties, 569. That the immediate feeling of
in partwill
there ar cases s,beup
iculalway to a cert
anende avou tobet danger (to ourselves and others) should
ainr poin
influence the bare understanding , is in
the last to take measures,in order to be human nature .
able, when doing so, to take those of the 570. If, then, the judgment of the
enem y into
562. endeant.vour is the
Thisaccou real ground understanding is in thatwayfettered and
weakened, where can it fly to for support ?
of theht
broug much usegerinreser
intostron ves,armi
large which
es are
in -Only to courage. y
571. Here, plainl , courage of a two
modern times.
563. Wehave no hesitation in saying fold kind is requisite : courage not to be
that in this means there is, next to overpowered by personal danger, and
ground , the best principle of defence for courage to calculate upon the uncertain,
and upon that to frame a course of action .
all considerable masses . 572. The second is usually called
acter said
Charhave of Com mandther
. e is a courage of the mind ( courage d'esprit);
564. We that for the first there is no name which
difference between the character of the satisfies the law of antithesis, because the
determinations which form the plan, and other term just mentioned is not itself
thoscaus
the e ofh this
e whic formis,the
that theuct
cond circ a batt
ofumst le s:
ance corr ect.
573. If we ask ourselves what is
under which the intelligence does its courage in its original sense , it is per
sonal sacrifice in danger; and from this
work are different.
170 ON WAR .

point we must also start, for upon it 581. In both ways courage gets an
everything rests at last. objective sphere of action. It both stimu
574. Such a feeling of devotion may lates self-sacrifice, and influences the use
proceed from two sources of quite different of the forces made subject to it.
kinds ; first, from indifference to danger , 582. When courage has excluded from
whether it proceeds from the organism of the mind all over-vivid impressions of
the individual, indifference to life, or danger, it acts on the faculties of the
habituation to danger ; and secondly, under standing. These become free,be
cause they are no longer under the pres
from a positive motive, -love of glory ,
love of country, enthusiasm of anykind. sure of anxiety.
575. The first only is to be regarded 583. But it will certainly not create
as true courage which is inborn , or has powers of understanding, whero they
become second nature ; and it has this cha- have no existence , still less will it beget
racteristic, that it is completely identified discernment .
with the being, therefore never fails. 584. Therefore , where there is a
576. It is different with the courage discern .
want of understanding and
which springs from positive feelings. ment, courage mayoften lead to very
These place themselves opposition
in to
g res
wron measu .
585. Of quite another origin is that
the impressions ofdanger, and therefore cour
all depends naturally on their relation to age which has been termed courage ;
the same. There arecases in which they of the mind .Itsprings from a convic
are far more powerful than indifference tion of the necessity of venturing, or even
from a superior judgment to which the
to the sense of danger ; there are others
in which it is the most powerful. The risk appears less than itdoes to others.
one (indifference to danger) leaves the 586. This conviction may also spring
judgment cool, and leads tostedfastness; but
up initmen who haveno
onlybecom persgeonal
es coura , couragt,
that is to
the other ( feeling ) makesmen more enter
prising, and leads to boldness. say, it only becomes a power which sup
577.Ifwith such positive impulses the portstheman and keepsuphisequanimity
indifference to danger is combined, there under the pressure of themoment and of
is, then, the most complete personal awak
courage
dangerwhen itreac
ens and elevat
ts onnobler
es their thefeeli ngs,
powers ;
.
578.The courage we have as yet been bute on thisaccou nt quitexpres
e corrsion
rag of the mind , is notthe
considering is something quite subjective, ect ,,forcome
it
it relates merely to personal sacrifice, and never springs from theintelligence itsel.f
ma y, on that account,becalled personal ings,
courage . thatndthes
But thaandt themi e feeliengs
maygiv rise, by
tofeela
the
579. But, now, it is natural that any continued influence of the thinking
onewho places no great value on the facu
sacrifice of his own person will not rate lties , maybeintensified every one
knows by experience.
587. Whilst, on the one hand, per
very high the offering up of others (who ,
in consequence of his position , are made l
sona cour
means,
age
heightens
orts
suppthe ,powers
and, by
of that
the
subject to his will ). He
ertywhichhe candisposa
them as proplike
of just like his own person . the ,
mind awakens and animates the emo.
tional
of
580. In who through
manner, he powers ; the two approach each
some positive feeling, is drawn into dan other, and may combine, that is, pro
ger, will either infuse this feeling into duce one and the same result in com
others, or think himself justified in ma man d . This,however, cour om age ens.
king them subservient to his feelings. The manifestations of seld happhave
 GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT. 171

generally something of the character of power of taking a general and compre

their origin. hensive view is the more required.
588. When great personal courage is 595. Now certainly the higher position
united to high intelligence, then the has always a wider horizon - overlooks
the whole much better than a lower one ;
command must naturally be nearest to still the most commanding view which
perfection .
589. The courage proceeding from can be obtained in a high position in the
convictions of the reason is naturally course of an action is insufficient, and it
connected chiefly with the incurring of is therefore, also, chiefly there where so
risks in reliance on uncertain things and much must be done by tact of judgment,
of good fortune, and has less to do with and in reliance on good fortune.
personal danger ; for the latter cannot 596. This becomes always more the cha
easily becomea cause of much intellec- racteristic of the command as the combat
tual activity. advances , for as the combat advances ,
590. We see, therefore , that in the the condition of things deviates so much
conduct of the combat, that is, in the the further from the first state with which
tumult of the moment and of danger the we were acquainted .
feeling powers support the mind, and 597. The longer the combat has lasted,
the latter mustawaken the powers of the moreaccidents (that is events not
feeling. calculated upon ) have taken place in it ;
591. Such a lofty condition ofsoul is re- therefore themoreeverything has loosened
quisite if the judgment withouta fullview , itself from the bonds of regularity, tho
without leisure, under the most violent more everything appears disorderly and
confused here and there .
pressure of passing events is to make re 598. But the further the combat is
soluti ons which
This may shall
be calle hit ary
d milit talent.point. advanced , the more the decisions begin
the right
592. If we consider a combat with its to multiply themselves, the faster they
mass of great and small branches, and follow in succession ,the less time remains
consideration.
the actions proceedingfrom these, it for599. Thus it happens that by degrees
strikes us at once that the courage which even the higher branches,-especially at
domineds
proce inferinal
in theperso
ates from or regio ion pre,
devotn,thatis particular points and moments, —are
drawn into the vortex, where personal
rules more over the secondary branches, courage is worth more than reflection ,
the other, more overwethedesc
593. The further
higher . order and constitutes almost everything.
end the
of this distribution, so much the simpler 600. In this way in every combat the
combinations exhaust themselves gradu
becomes
ncarl y comm acti
the on sense mese all
becoefor
on , ther that ise ally ,and at last it isalmost courage
themor
required, but so much the greater be- alone which continues to fight and act.
comes the personal danger, and conse- 601. We see, therefore, that it is
quently personal courage is so much the courage, and intelligence elevated by it,es
which have to overcone the difficulti
Theredhigh
594.requi
more . er we ascend in this that oppose themselves to the execution
of command. How far they can do so or
fraugr,htthewith
orde rtantesand
impoquenc
moreconse becom thee
theesmor not is not the question , because the ad
action of individuals, because the sub . versary is in the same situation ; our
errors and mistakes , therefore, in the
jects decideedonbywhic
less thos indiv the swhol
h idual areemore or majority of cases, will be balanced by
isde-
pendent . From this it follows that the his. But that which is an important
172 ON WAR .
point is that we should not be inferior to sible be conducted from a high stand
the adversary in courage and intelligence, atta
point , wheresuch
ined a point
, will at leas cannoted bein
t be carri
but above all things in the first.
602. At the same time there is still some certain direction from a secondary
one quality which is here of great im- point.
portance : it is the tact of judgment. This We shall try to make this plainerby
is not purely an inborn talent; it is chiefly an illustration . When in the tempest of
practice which familiarises us with facts a great battle a general of division is
thrown out of his connection with the
and appearances, and makes the dis
covery of the truth, therefore a right he
gener al still risk
shouldplan, and an uncertain
is attack whethe
or not,
r
then
judgment, almost habitual. Herein con
sists the chief value of experience in war, if he resolves upon making an attack, in
as well as the great advantage whichit both
doing so theonl y wayto feel satisfied,
gives anarmy. as regards his own action and the
603. Lastly, we have still to observe wholebattle, is bystrivingnot
ances
that, if circumst in the conduct of e ack
mak his att ssful, merely to
succe but also to
war always invest what is near with an obtain such a success as will repair any
undue importance over that which is reverse which may have in the meantime
urredSuch
higher ormore remote , this imperfect occ604. a er
at oth poisentsof. action
cour called

for by the commander,in theuncertainty in arestricted sense resolute.Theview,

tomakehisactionatleast decisive.This namely, that chance canonlybegoverned
will be done if he strives to realise all in this manner -leads to resolution, which
prevents any half measures, and is the
from it.In this manner thewhole of most brilliant quality intheconduct of a
the action ) which should always if pos- great battle.
 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES .
( The volumes are distinguished by Roman numerals, thus — i., ii., and iii., and the pages by figures in
the ordinary way) .
Action - see Convergent
Action in war planned in twilight, i. 54
Action of force - true sphere of, ii . 180, 183
Activities outside of combat, i. 45
Activity - principle of, i. 115
Advance guard and outposts - strategic eyes, i.18 ;
distinction between, ii. 20 ; for centre and flanks,
strength and purpose of, i. 23 ; systems of
Frederick and Napoleon, ii. 21
Advanced corps - mode of action of, ii. 25 ; resist
ance to be offered by, ii. 26, 27 ; how affected
by the position of main body, ii. 28
Advance-when premature, iii. 142
Alexander - Emperor, i. 17 ; the Great, i. 87 ;
wars of, iii. 50
Ally — as a means of defence, ii. 81
Alpine passes, iii. 13
Alps — Ñorican, i. 70, 82 ; passage of, i. 105, ii.
127, 129, 133 ; Rauhe Alp, i. 141
Alsace, ii. 114
Alvinzi, ü. 127
Amselvoen , iii. 17
Amsterdam , iï. 17
Anglo -Dutch army, ii. 25
Archduke Charles, iii. 100
Armed forces - organic division of,iii. 121
Arms— relation of the three, ii. 5 ; special pro
perties of each of the three, ib. ; proportion of
the three, ii . 8, 9, 10, 11 ; difficulty of arriving
at best combination of, ii. 6, 7 ; intluence of ter
rain on, ii. 65 , iii. 96
Armies— fusion ofn allied, iii. 88 , 89
Army - conceptio of, i. 2 ;' three situations of
outside of the combat, ü. 17 ; classification ofthe
wants of, ii. 55 ; like a tree, ii . 57 ; relation
between size of and space it occupies , ii. 167,
168 ; dependence of on depôts, ii. 55-7 ; general
disposition of, ii. 16 ; import ance of subdivi
sion of, ii. 200 ; arrangement of, iii. 96 ; divi
sions of, üü . 99 ; parts of, üi. 124
Army of Louis XIV . - character of, iii. 53
Army staff - see Staff - branches of, i. 43
Art or science of war - difference between it and
other arts, i. 32 ; sense in which formerly under
lery i.- 48,
stood,
Artil over61numerous, ii. 54 ; preponderance
of, ii. 7, 8, iii. 96 ; its fire of greater effect than
that of infantry, iii. 103 ; in action , iii. 155 ;
combat of alone, iii. 155 ; when used , üi. 104
Aspern - battle of, ii. 141 , iii. 114
Assailant - dangers of the, ii. 20 ; circumstances
favourable to, iii. 160 ; how increase of strength
gained by, iii. 35 ; causes of the decrease of
strength of, iii. 35 ; advantages and disadvan
tages of, co -existent, üi. 35 ; causes of weakness
in, iii . 36 ; means of, iii. 22 ; advantage of, over
defender , iii. 23s
Assembly of force in space, i. 108 ; in time, i. 108
Attack -concentric nd divergent form of, ii. 97 ,
iii. 112 ; object of, ii. 194, iii. 17 ; means of,
consist of armed force only, iii. 3 ; influence of
fortresses on , iii . 3 ; territory the object of, iii.
4 ; gradation conceivable in, iii. 4 ; decreasing
force of, iii. 4 ; causes which strengthen the, iii.
5 ; success of, its causes , iii. 5 ; flank more
efficacious than enveloping , iii. 7 ; stages of
rest in, iii. 2 ; strategical, iii. 2, 116 ; leads to
defence, iii. 3 ;principles of, strictly active in,
iii. 3 ; culminating point of, iii. 5 ; right dis
cernment of, essential, iii. 6 ; of army in can
tonments , üi. 28 ; of centre, iii. 165 ; conver
gent- counter, iii. 165 ; of convoys, iii. 26 ; of
cordon lines , iii . 14 ; of defensive positions,
iii. 10 ; enemy's capital, object of the, iii.
19 ; enveloping form of, iii. 16 , 153, 154 ; of
fortresses, iii. 23 ; general principles for, iii.
101 ; in rear, iii. 19 ; of inundations, iii. 17 ;
of morasses , iii. 17 ; of woods, iii. 17 ; of iso
lated positions, iii. 15 ; method of, iii. 104 ;
and by divisions, üi. 102
 174 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES .
Attack and Defence- distinction between, iii. 147
Auerstadt - battle of, üi. 80 ; effort to restore com
bat, i. 135, ii. 102, 187
Augsburg, üi. 106
Austerlitz - battle of, i. 77, üi. 7, 8, 57, 164
Austria, ii. 10, 128 ; and the Seven Years' War, iii.
76
Austrians, the, üi . 100 ; in the Netherlands in
1793-4, iii . 88 ; on the Lower Rhine, iii. 10.
Austrian Succession War, ii. 131
BALANCE of power , ii. 81
Barclay, ii. 163, 172.
Base - breadth of, ii, 207
Base of operations, i. 60, ü. 64 ; constitution of, ii.
56 , 57
Battle - order of, easier to determine than use of,
i. 54 ; character of modern , i. 123 ; mutual under
standing as to, i. 139 ; use of, i. 149 ; great and
decisive, i. 150 ; general difference between offen
sive and defensive, ii. 97 ; conduct of a , iii. 166 ;
depth of order of, iii. 151 , 158 ; form of order of,
üi. 134 ; order of, in concentric segments of cir
cles, iii. 161 ; narrow front of, iii. 158 ; plan of
defined , iii, 144 ; rectilinear order of, üïi. 161 ;
successful, üi. 21 ; weakness of circular order in ,
iii. 25 ; not the only means of destroying the
enemy's force , iii. 6 ; offensive, its characteristics,
jii. 7 ; in lines formed to envelop, iii. 7 ; delay
in decision of an object to defensive, iii. 8 ;
hastening the decision of an objectto the offen
sive, üii. 8 ; begun by artillery , iii. 104 ; offen
sive reasons, see Offensive.
Battalion - number required to surround one, iii.
154
Bayonet attack , üi. 108, 142
Belle Alliance ( Waterloo ), i. 132, 145, ii. 210
Bellegarde, üri. 9
Benningsen , iii. 115, 119
Beresina, ii. 157
Berlin , ii. 36
Bevern - Duke of, ii. 196, üi. 11
Besieger's lines, ii. 14
Blücher , i. 73, 139, ii. 23, 39, 43, 210, iii. 76
Bodily exertion in war, i. 37
Bohemia , i. 105, ii. 69, 203, iii. 71
Boldness and resolution – difference between , i.
96, 97
Borodino - battle of, i. 132 , 156 , ii. 4, 38, 74
Bragation, ii. 38, 163, 172
Breaking - the line, iii. 164 , 165 ; the centre, ii , 164
Breslau - battle of, ii. 197 , iii. 11
Brigade- strength of, ü . 14, ii . 124 ; single, in
fluence of in great battle , iii. 105
Brunswick - Duke of, ii. 150 , 172 , 198 , iii. 17
Bülow , ii. 43, 207, 210 ; in Holland in 1814, iïi.
77
Buonaparte - see Battles, Auerstadt, Austerlitz ,
Belle Alliance , Jena , Wagram , etc.
Spain, Italy , France See Russia ,
Bunzelwitz, ii. 117 ; entrenched camp of, iü . 74
CÆSAR, üi. 120
Cambray, iii. 25
Campaign, ii. 2, 3 ; sauntering through one,ii.
193 ; in which a great decision is intended, iii.
17 ; of 1812, üi. 61 ; Duke of Wellington's in
1810 and 1811 , iii. 114
Campaigns — the, of 1813 and 1814, iii. 55; be.
tween civilised nations, iii. 38 ; of the French
in the reign of Louis XIV., iii. 22
Camp - entrenched, attack of, ü. 11
Campo Formio - peace of, i. 71
Camps - branch of the art of war, ii. 46 ; strate
observations on, ii.
gically considered , ii, 28, 29 ;
29
Cantonment - branch of art of war, i. 46 ; attack
of army in, iii. 28 ; bow to attack, üi. 30
Causes - true difficulty of ascertaining, i. 67, 70
Cavalry - preponderance of, ii. 7, 8; engagement,
üi . 150
Centre - breaking the, iii. 164
Chalons, i. 119
Chambray, ii. 38
Champ Aubert - battle of, i. 73
Chance, i. 77
Character - military, i. 53 ; of modern war,i. 120
Charleroi, ii. 27, 43
Charles XII. , i. 35, 87, 101
Charles, Archduke, i. 70, 141
Ciney, ii. 43
Circumvallation-lines of, üi. 25
Close combat, iii. 149; use of troops in, iii. 163.
See Combat
Collin. See Kollin
Colberg, ii. 114, 117
Columns — separation into, iii. 20
Comba t guidance tion of, i. 19; description of, 1,
of, first
36, 37-; concep appears in sieges, i.
47 ; object of, i. '89, 125, 127, ii. 127 ;
formation for, conduct andresult of, i. 121;
simple idea of, i. 125 ;classification of motives
for,i. 133 ; duration of, i. 134 ; decision of,i.
135 ; restoration of , i. 135; renewal of, i. 138 ;
avoiding,i. 140 ; compelling enemy to, i. 111;
night, nature of, motives for, i. 161-163; signi
fication of, ii. 201; for honour ofarms, ii. 200 ;
change of form in, iii. 135, 136; consists of two
acts, destructive and decisive,iii. 136; forms of,
in relation to attack and defence, iii. 132 ; sepa
rate, partial, and whole,iï . 129; nature of, for
separate parts, and form ,ii. 147 ; close and fire,
ii. 5, ü 130, 132 ; principles of, ii. 129
Combination of arms - strategic, ii. 15
Command - cool tobepreferred to fiery heads
for, i. 36 ; of ground, ii.64 ;advantages of, not
; cter of,
absolute, ii.64; unity of,ii. 180 chara
iii. 169 ; defined, ii. 123 ; when nearest to per
fection, iii.171 ;wordof, mustbe strictly obeyed,
iii. 135
Commanders - qualifications and appointments of,
iii. 90
Communication lines of, ii. 58 ; definition of, ii.
 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES.
68 ; establishment of, in enemy's country, ii. 59 ;
change of, ii. 59 ; situation of, dependant on
geographical features, 59 ; interruption of, ii.
59, 60) ; choice of, ii. 60 ; relation to front of a
position, ii. 110 ; operations against, ii. 157, 160
Concentration, i. 108; of force, i. 182
Concentrated action, iii. 75
Concentric attack - advantages of, ii. 76; compari
son of advantages of concentric and eccentric
form , ü . 77 ; plan of, iii. 101. See Attack
Condé, ü . 148, ii. 17, 25
Condottieri — the, iii. 50
Conduct of war- vague ideas on , i . 48 ; real
appears accidentally , i.49 ; theory of, its principal
difficulty, i. 52 ; not the making of powder and
cannon , i . 57
Confidence - necessity of, üi. 118, 119
Conquest - must be speedy to be complete , üü . 59
Conquests — the Roman, iii. 49 , 50
Convergent — action, ii. 171; convergence of attack
and divergence of defence, ü . 76
Convoys, ii. 202 ; attack of, iii. 26 ; defence of, iii.
26 ; when in danger, iii. 27 ; capture of, at Dom
städtel, iii. 27.
Cordon -- explanation of term , ii, 152, 153
Corps - strength of, ii. 124
Counterstroke in retreat, i. 160, ii. 95, 96
Country and ground, ü. 60 ; relation of composi
tion of an army to the character of, ii. 111
Country - covering by lines, ii. 196, 197
Coup d'ail, i. 25
Courage — its influence on judgment, i. 51 ; per
sonal and moral, iii. 169 ; difference defined , iii.
170
Criticism , i. 67 ; definition of, ib . ; wide sphere of,
ib.; mode of conducting, i. 74 , 78
Crimea, ii. 83, 154
Crusade, üü . 9
Czaslau - battle of, ii. 87
Czernitscheff, ü. 145
DANGER in war, i. 36, 53
Dantzig - siege of, ii . 115
Data — uncertainty of all in war, i. 54 ; the effect
of any measure the best, i. 54
Daun, General, i. 87, 102, 138, 148, ii. 21, 157,
195 , 199 , 203 , üï . 16, 27 , 39
Davoust, i. 135, ii. 38, iii. 100
Deciding stroke –delivery of, ii . 140
Decision - when required by one, cannot be refused
by the other, i. 22 ; actual and bloodless, i. 20,
23 ; a moral power, i. 98 ; supreme, i. 114 ;
moment of, in the combat, i. 135, 136 : circum
stances influencing, i. 137, ü. 182, 190 ; partial,
iii. 138 ; ill-timed, ü. 139 ; hastening the, see
Battle, iii. 8
Decisive act — the, iii. 139
Decisive blow - difference between at commence
ment and at ond, ii . 166
Decisive point - strength at, i. 111
Defence, ii. 67, iii. 1 ; conception of, ii. 67 ; advan
175
tages of, ü. 67 ; assumption of the offensive
form , ü. 68 ; extent of the means of, ii. 79 ;
landwehr as a means of, ii. 79 ; fortresses,
people, nationalarmaments, allies, as means of, ii.
80, 81; forms of carrying on, ii. 87 ; active prin
ciple in , ii. 91 ; circumstances influencing form
of, ii. 94 ; of streams and rivers, ii. 133 ; ele
ments of, ii. 181 ; of a theatre of war when no
decision is sought, ii. 193; efforts for, ii. 194 ;
steps to be taken when attack passes by de
fender's position, ii. 183 ; example in illustration
of, ii . 186 ; active, illustrated in various battles,
iii. 100 ; of convoys, iii. 26 ; of cordon lines, üi.
14 ; of isolated points (defiles, buildings, en
closures, towns and villages), iii 109 ; offensive
principle in, iii. 2 ; leads to offensive, iii. 3 ;
maxim of importance for, iii. 110 ; of inunda
tions, iii. 17 ; morasses, iii. 17 ; woods, iii. 17
Defensive - its characteristic, i. 17 , 22 ; form of
war , i. 118 ; stronger form of war, ii. 75 ; strate
gic character of, ii. 78 ; definition of, ii . 78 ;
offensive, an essential element in, i . 78 ;
sacrifices attendant on, ii. 88, 89 ; the true
principle of, ü . 90 ; battle, ii. 95, 96 ; on
both sides, ii. 193 : form of war in what its
superiority consists, iii. 39 ; positions, attack of,
iii. 10 ; war, iï . 114
Delay — see Battle, ü. 8
Demonstration , i. 162
Denain , üi. 14
Depôts - dependence of an army on, ii. 55, 57
Destruction - of enemy's forces, i. 16, iii. 6 ; of
enemy's army takes precedence of occupation of
country as an aim in war, ii. 179 ; see Attack ,
object of, iii. 4 , 6
Destructive act—the, iii. 137
Development of front - difficult for small masses,
iii. 156
De Witt, ii. 149
Dike, ii. 146, 147
Discrimination, i. 38, 39
Disposition - of masses, i. 139 ; in old form of an
army, if divided, like an earth -worm cut in two,
ii. 12 ; strategic, of the parts of an army, i.
15 ; general of an army, ü . 16 ; governed by
certain points, ii. 16-19
Diversion , üi. 32 ; advantages of, iii. 33 ; execution
of a , ii. 33
Division - of an army into parts, ü. 13, 14 ; of
forces, ii. 163, 179, 180
Divisions - strength of, üi. 124
Dohna, ü . 187
Dresden, i . 101 , 104, ii. 97, 163, ü, 26
Drissa, ii. 114 , 117, 168, 172, 210
Duke Ferdinand , iii. 100
Duttlingen - surprise at, üi. 29
Dwina, ii. 157
ECCENTRIC form of attack , ii. 76
Economy of forces, i . 116
Elbe, ii. 3, 24 , 145
176 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES .
Elements - effect of immoveable, ii. 191 , 192
Elster, ü. 95
Encampment - formerly a withdrawal behind the
scenes, ii. 16
Enclosing, iii. 7
End and means in war , i. 14
Enemy - overthrow of the, üi. 56, 58
Enemy's loss—summary of, iii. 136, 7
Energy - necessity of, üi. 99
English , i. 101
Entrenchments - construction of, no part of theory
of conduct of war, i. 46 ; object of, üi. 11 ;
when indispensable, iii. 108
Enveloping, ii. 97, 109, iii. 134 ; enveloping force
enveloped , üi. 159
Envelopment, iii. 164 ; strategic, ii. 73
Equilibrium - disturbance of, in action, i. 143
Etoges– battle of, i. 73
Eugene, iii. 14, 28
European states - policy of in war, iii. 63
Examples - value of, i. 80 ; use of, i. 81 ; super
ficial treatment of, i. 82, 83 ; value of those
drawn from ancient times, i. 84 ; to illustrate
attack , iii. 5
Exertion - bodily, in war, i. 37, 38
Expectation - state of, ü . 86 ; seldom fully real
ised, ii , 193
Expeditions - to North Holland, 1799, iii. 33 ; to
Walcheren, 1809, iii. 33
Experience - by it objects partially distinguished,
when all is pitch dark to the novice, i. 42
Eylau - battle of, ii. 119
Fabius, i . 140, ü. 91 , 195
Fatigue - bodily, to be practised, to accustom the
mind to it, i. 42
Fear of losing line of retreat - its influence on
soldiers, iii. 156
Feldkirch - position of, iii. 13
Fenquières, i. 82
Field fortification , iii. 11
Fighting - mode of modified by weapons, i. 43 ;
modes of, üi. 130
Fight - the conduct of war, i. 43, 44 ; and the
preparation for it, separate activities, i . 44
Fink's corps, i. 141 , ii. 201
Fire attack, iii. 142
Fire combat, iii. 149
Firing lines, iii. 152
Flank attack - see Attack
Flank - effect of directing a force on, i. 137;
positions, ii. 117, 163 ; operating against, ii.
157,
161
161 ; action of, when most effectual, ii.
Flanks - action against, iii. 164 ; danger of long,
ii. 37
Fleurus - battle of, ii. 16
Force - assembly of in space, i. 108 ; in time, i.
108 ; employment of, i. 110 ; estimation , i. 112 ;
economy of, i. 115, ii. 192 ; division of, ü . 163
Forees - intelligent, only visible to inner eye, i. 51 ;
division of, iii. 20 ; how to estimate strength of,
iii. 59
Forests - defence of, ii. 150 ; peculiar influence of,
ii. 150
Forms - easier to prescribe for a war aimed at &
great decision , than for one which has not that
aim , ii. 207
Fortification - field, ü. 11 , 96, 99 ; permanent,
iii. 96
Fortress - capture of, iii. 21 80 ; effect of
Fortresses - as means of defence,
on defensive, ii. 87, 98 ; as depôts, ii. 100; as
protection to towns, ü . 100 ; as barriers,ü . 101 ;
astactical points d'appui, ii. 101 ; as places of
refuge, ii. 101 ; offensive power of, ü. 102 ;
means of covering provinces, ü. 104 ; as forces
of a general arming of nation, ii. 104 ; for de.
fence of rivers and mountains, ii. 104 ; situation
of, ii. 105, 108 ; frontier, ü. 106, 107 ; use of,
ii. 189, 190 ; as covering an extended line of
defence and a country, ii. 196, 197 ; attack of,
iii. 23 ; advantage of, iii. 23; what decides the
choice in attacking, iii. 24 ; of Netherlands, iii.
25
ué, ii. Prussia in 1798 and 1806, iii. 45
France and 201
Fouq
France, invasion of,iii. 91, 92, 93 ; in 1814, iii.
78
Franconia, i. 105, ii. 203
French campaign of 1812 -character of, iii. 85
Frederick the Great- see Battles, Leuthen, Ros
bach, Prague,etc. ; also Seven Years' War, Sile
sia, Bohemia, etc.
Freiberg - battle of, i . 122
French, i. 101, 136; Revolution, ii. 29,45, 131 ;
retreat of, in 1813, ii. 170
Friction, 39, 40
Friedland — battle of, i. 77, ii . 57
Front - change of, ii. 161
GENERAL action - its decision , i. 141 ; effects of
victory in , i . 145 ; use of, i . 149
Gener al - estimate which one general forms of an:
other, ii. 192 ; extent of his direct control, iii.
165
General- in -chief - should be a member of the
cabinet, iïi. 68
Genius for
Geom etricalwar,
elemi .ent , 35; in tactics and stra
23,, i.34115
tegy, i . 116
German mile, ii. 27
y, -i.empe
Germans 101 rors of, ü . 9; South , in relation
to Upper Rhine, ii. 106; in 1813,iii. 76
Giant mountains, ii. 133
Goldbery - combat of, ii. 39
Grape tire — its efficacy, iü . 108
Gravity - centres of, in armed forces, ii. 181
Grawert, i . 66, ii . 156, 198
Greeks, i. 101, 106
Gross -gorschen, ii. 10
 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES . 177

Ground — strategic advantage of, ii. 73 ; knowledge Kollin , battle of, i. 101 , 148, ii. 88
of the, iii. 166; points of importance in use of, Kunersdorf, i. 122, 138
iii. 110 ; principles for use of, iii. 106
Guess - a general must guess at many things, iii. Laon — night attack, i. 137, ii. 210
40 Lascy, General, i . 88, 104, ii. 36
Gustavus Adolphus, iii. 11957; had his centre of Landshut, ii . 201 , 209
gravity in his arny, iii. Laudon, General, i. 104, 138, č. 211 , ü. 27
Landrecy — siege of, iii. 28 , and in 1712, iii. 24
HAARLEM, Sea of, iii. 17 Leignitz -battle of, i. 88, 105 , 138, ii. 100
Habit, i. 42 Leipsic -battle . 101 , ï. 39, 97, 163 , 210 ;
te inof,a icorner,
Buonapar with his back against
Handful of men, etc. — origin of phrase, ii. 119 the wall , ii. 95
Hannibal, i. 83, 140, 195, iii. 120
Henry IV., i. 35 Leuthen - battle of, i. 101 , 102, 148, ü. 101
Henry - Prince, ii. 145, 153 Liege , ü . 43
Hills --advantages and disadvantages of, ii. 108 Ligny, ii. 27, 43
Hoche, i. 70 Lille, iii . 26
Lines, ü. 113, 151 , 152 ; interior, ii. 207 ; breaking
Hochkirch , battle of, i. 122, ii. 21,199 the , iii. 161
Hohenfriedberg , battle of, ii. 87, 90, 95 Little— the, always depends on the great, iii. 57
Hohenlinden, battle of, iii. 8, 100, 164
Hohenlohe, i. 66, 135 Locality - sense of, i. 32, 56
Holland -character and influence of its inunda Lodi, ii. 209
tions, ii. 147 , 148 Lorraine, duke of, iii. 29
Honour , i. 28 , 29 Losses -in physical and moral force, i. 128 ;
measurement of, i. 129 ; of French at Moscow ,
Hostile feeling, i. 52
ü. 91
Hungary, ii. 44 Louis of Baden, ii. 14
IMAGINATION, i. 33 Louis, Prince, i. 66
Inactive assailant, ii . 93 Louis XIV. , ii. 9, 44 , iü . 51
Louis XI . , of France, üi. 51
Infantry - combat of, iii. 155 Low Countries — wars of, üi. 21
Information in war, i . 38 , 39
Lowenburg — combat of, ii. 39
Intelligence -- how to test accuracy of, iii. 117, 118 Lusatia, i . 105 , ii. 36
Interior lines - advantage of,ii. 76 Luxemburg, Marshal, ii. 16, 148
Intrenched camp , ii. 112, 116
Intrenchment - aid of, ii. 111
Inundation - examples of use of as means of de MACDONALD), Marshal, i . 23, 23, 143
Magazines, ii. 51 ; attack of, iï. 21
fence, ü. 149 ; attack of, iii. 17 ; defence of, iii.
17 Magdeburg, ii. 101
Invasion, iii. 34 ; definition of, i. 17 ; of Prussia Mahrattas , i . 101
Maine, ii . 163
by French, 1806, ii. 186 Malo Jaroslawitz, battle of, ii. 167
Italy, ü. 106, 127 Manæuvres - strategic, ii. 161, 204, 206, ü . 16
Manœuvring, iii. 15 ; more offensive than defensive,
JANIZARY, i, 97 iii. 25
Jena, i. 66, 132 ; effort to restore combat at, i.

2.
Mantua, siege of, i. 72 , 74
135, ii. 187 , iii. 7 , 8 Marches - branch of the Art of war , i. 45, ii. 30 ;
Jomini, ü. 207 primary conditions in , ii. 30 ; columns of march ,
Jump - no one jumps half of a wide ditch first, üi. ii . 30 ; two kinds of, ii. 30, 31 ; during Seven
60 Years' War, ii. 31 ; of a single column, ii. 32 ;
Judgment — tact of, iü . 172 direction of, ii . 32; separate roads for different
columns on , ii. 33 ; order of, ii . 34, iii. 106 ;
KALKREUTH, i. 135 length of, ii. 35 ; time and distance in connec
Kaluga, ii . 39, 57, 163, 170 tion with, ii. 35 ; distinctive effects of, ii . 37 , 38 ;
Kappeldorf, i . 66 examples of losses from , ii . 39 ; flank, ii. 200
Katholisch Hunnersdorf, battle of,i. 132 Marengo, battleof, iii. 7
Katsbach, battle of, ii. 39, 97 , ii . 8 Maria Theresa, iii. 54
Kesseldorf, battle of, i . 132, üi. 30 Mark Brandenburg, i . 105, 114, ii. 22
Key of the country - great war steed of military Marmont, i. 141 , ii. 209
writers, ii. 154 ; ideas concerning, ii. 155, 156 Massena, ii . 173 , iii. 119
Kiew , ii. 170 Massenbach , General, i . 101 , ii. 156
Kloster Seeven, convention of, ii . 209 Mature reflections — result of, not to be lightly dis
Knowledge - requisitenature of, for war, i. 58, 59, carded, üi. 119
60
N
 178 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES .

Maxen, ï . 201 Murat, Prince, ü. 25, 38

Maxims - directed upon material things, i. 50 Musketry fire, iii. 108, 155
Means and end in war, i. 14 Mutual understanding to a battle, i. 139
Meissen , ü. 13
Memel, siege of, ii. 3 NARVA-battle of, i. 101
Mergentheim , surprise at, iii. 29 National - armament, as means of defence, ii. 31 ;
Method, oulives itself, i. 66 levies, employment of, ii. 176, 177
Methodicism , i . 63 Negligence, iii. 144
Meuse, ü. 143 Neerwinden -battle of, ii. 16
Middle Ages, the, iii. 49 Neisse-battle of, i. 104
Military - act, special property of leader, i. 28 ; Nerisheim- battle of, i. 141
maintenance of force branch of art of war, i. Netherlands, ii. 25 ; fortresses of,iii. 25
45, 47 ; history , criticism , i. 75 ; virtue of an Ney- Marshal, ü. 22
army, i. 93 ; and the individual, i . 93 ; virtue, Niemen - River, ii. 37, 38, 74
its influence , i. 94 ; virtue is for the parts what Night combat, i. 161
the genius of the general is for the whole, i. 95 : Nimeguen, ü. 143
absence of in an army, i. 95 ; origin of, i. 95 ; Nossen - battle of, i. 104
spirit, i. 94 ; forces, consideration of, ii. 1 ; dia Numbers - superior, value of, i. 100, 101, ii. 3 ;
lectics, deception in, ii. 94 ; fame, importance of, unequal, ü . 4
iii. 22 ;history, its importance as a study, iii. Nuremberg, . 106, ü. 119
119, 120; opinion , value of in political considera
tions, iii. 67 ; talent, iii. 171 OBSERVATION - most wars a state of, ü. 181 ;
Militia --- as defensive means, ii. 79
mutual state of, ii. 204, 206
Mincio, ii. 9 Obstacles — to approach, use of, iii. 108 ; to success,
Mind-strength of, i. 29 iii. 118
Minden, battle of, ü. 188, iii. 100
Mockern, combat (surprise), ii. 39 Obstinacy, i . 32
Oder, ü. 145
Modes of proceeding - theoretical rather than Offensive - if it were the stronger form , then the
absolute , i. 64 defensive would be unnecessary, ü . 69; and de
Mollendorf, General, ii. 198 fensive, their relations in tactics, ïi. 70 ; and in
Mollwitz - battle of, ü. 9, 87, iii. 30 strategy, ij. 72 ; an essential element of defen
Montalembert, i. 101 . sive, ü . 78; campaign, consideration of, ii. 93 ;
Montecuculi , iii. 16 battle, reasons for resorting to, ii.188; when
Montenotte - combat of, ii. 209
Montereau - combat of, i. 73, 102 decision notsought,ii.208; battle, reasons for
defender resorting to, ii. 187. Soe Attack
Montmirail - combat of, i. 73, 102, 139 Offensive means - mixture of with defence, ii. 203
Moral - qualities and forces, their efforts, i.51, 52; Olmütz, ii. 37, 108, 157 ; siege of, in 1758, iii.
forces, i. 91 , 92 ; powers, boldness, i. 96 ; de
cision , i. 98 ; perseverance, i. 99 ; forces, great 24, 26, 37
influence of, in strategy, ii. 75 ; superiority , im Orange — Prince of, ü. 149
portance of, üi. 22 Order of battle, ii. 11; definition of, ii. 11, 12, 15
Morasses -- attack of, iü. 17 ; defence of, iii. 17 Order of formation - breaking the, iï . 140
Moravia , ii. 69 Oudinot - Marshal, ii. 22
Moreau , General, i. 70, 141 , iii. 100 Out -flanking, üü . 157, 158
Mormont - battle of, i. 73 Outpost, ü . 24 ; value of, iii. 29
Moscow , i. 71, 77, 112, 119 , č. 3 , 38 , 39 , 91 , 163 ,
iii. 46, 84 PARALLEL march - in pursuit, methods of counter
Moselle, ü. 141, 146 acting, i. 158 üï. 55 ; how it might have been
Mountains - defence of, ii. 119 , 130 , iii. 13 ; column Paris, i.73,89,
like a serpent toiling over, ii. 119 ; laboratory of covered in 1813, ii. 170
hostile forces, ii. 126 ; general defeated there in Parth , ii. 95
an extended position should be tried by court Parts of the enemy's line to be engaged, iii. 161
martial, ü. 133 ; nature of combats in, ii. 120 , Passage - forcing passage of river, üi. 9
123 ; use to be made of, in strategy , ii . 124, Passarge — River, ii. 25
126 ; as a strategic barrier, ü . 127 ; their in Pedant- -conquerors
Peace inwar, leaves in the of,
alwaysuslovers ii, 78,
lurch when help
fluence on decisive battles , ii. 127 ; and on com
munications, ii. 127; influence of in relation to is most
People wanted,ofiii.in97strategy, i . 74 ; moans of
---support
provisioning armies, ii. 128 ; as lines of defence,
ii . 12, 115 ; attack of, iii. 12 , 13 , 14 ; positions, defence, ii. 80 ; war, conditions of, and mode of
not suited to decisive battles, iii. 13
Munich , ii. 106 's ngwaron,-pheno
carryi
People ii. 174menon 176 century, ii. 173
, 175, of19th
Perseverance, i. 99
 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES .
Persians, i. 101
Phillipsburg , fortress of, ii. 107
Phul,General, ü. 163, 172
Pirna – intrenched camp at, ii. 114, 116, 188, iii.
11 , 13
Place - determination of, ii. 160
Plan - defensive reaches further than offensive,
iii. 168 ; of war, when destruction of enemy is
the object, iii. 75
Pleiss, ii. 95
Point - weak, draws down blows on itself, ii. 121
Poland - partition of, ii. 82, 83 ; Russians at home
there long before, ii. 83 ; woods of, iii . 17
Polarity of troops— simultaneous and successive
use of, iii. 152
Policy in war, iï . 63 , 66
Political alliances -changes of, iii. 37
Pomerania , i. 105
Population - agricultural and artisan , in their in
fluenceon the subsistence of an army, ii. 47,
52 ; their influence on method of war, ii. 52
Positions - war of, ii. 71 ; maintenance of, ii. 87 ;
defensive, ii. 108, 109 ; defensive, strategic
properties of, ii. 110 ; setting before, like a dog
before game, ii. 116 ; passing by a position,
ii. 109, 110, 183, 184, 185 ; strong, ii. 112;
occupation of, ü . 115 ; operations against, ii.
115 ; intrenched, ii. 117 ; lateral or eccentric,
ü. 170 ; false , üü . 119 ; see Attack , iii. 7
Posts - war of, ii. 199
Power - relation of, ii. 3
Powers of mind and soul required, i. 24
Prague, iii. 8, 112
Precipitation, iii. 144
Presence of mind, i. 27
Promptitude - characteristic of great generals, iii.
111
Proportion of three arms, ii. 8, 11
Provence, iii. 71
Prussia, i. 114, 120 ; conquest of by France in
1806, iii. 58 ; position of, if attacked by France
and Russia simultaneously, iii. 76
Prussia and France in 1798 and 1806, iii. 45
Prussian army - mobility of,iii. 101
Prussians - campaign of in 1787, iü. 17
Public opinion - how gained, iii. 111
Pursuit - pursuer ventures more than pursued , i.
52, 153, 154 ; hard, i. 157 ; conduct of, iii. 106
Puysegur - General, i. 33
Pyrenees, ü. 129
RAPIDITY - element of surprise, i. 103
Ranzan - General, üi. 29
Ratisbon, iii. 79, 100
Re-action - living, i. 53, 54
Rear - action against, ü . 162, iii. 164 ; protection
of, iü . 20 ; troops in, iii. 152
Reciprocal action, iii. 165
Relation between magnitude and certainty of re
sult, iii. 146
Republics — the old, üi. 49
179
Requisition-subsisting an army by, affects dura
tion of war, ii. 52
Reserve - strategic use of, i. 113, 114 ; moral in
fluence of, i. 136 , 144 ; necessity of, iii. 98 ; to
be used for final decision, iii . 142
Resistance - methods of, ii . 85 ; successive, in de
fence of theatre of war, ii. 191 ; means of, iii.
iii. 3
Resolution, i. 26, iii. 172 ; effects of weak, ii . 93
Result-the greater the result, the greater the
danger, ii. 162
Retreat - after lost battle, i. 159 ; in separate
bodies, i. 160, 161 ; caused by fear of the sword,
not by want of provisions, ii. 90 ; action against
enemy's line of, ii. 162 ; into 'interior of the
country, ii. 164, 165 ; execution of, ii. 169,
172 ; Russian in 1812, ii. 169 ; change in direc
tion of line of, ii. 170 ; divergent, ii, 171 ; cir
cumstances which favour, ü. 167 ; line of, iii.
140 ; line of, which deviates from direct, dan
gerous , iii. 19
Retreating force -its advantages over its pursuers,
ii. 168
Reverso - greatest danger of, üï . 39
Rhine, ii. 128, 143
Risk, iü . 146
River - direct defence of, ii. 134, 135 ; means of
crossing, ii. 137 ; islands in, ii. 136 ; small,
mode of defending, ii. 134, 144 : at right angles
to strategic front, ii. 145 ; passage of, üi. 8, 10 ;
important in defence, iii. 8 , 10 ; of Lombardy,
iii. 9 ; effectof in great solution, iii. 10 ; as line
of defence, iü . 115
Roads - value of, on what dependent , ii . 58
Romans - expeditions of, ü. 9 ; conquests of, iii.
49, 50
Rome -how she became great, iii. 49
Rosbach - battle of, i. 101, 102, 141 , i. 87, ii .
100
Rüchel - General, i. 135, ii. 209
Rules — the best are just what genius does, i. 51 ;
for different arms of the service, ii. 104
Russia, i. 105, 120, ii. 44 ; campaign in , i. 111 ;
in 1812 ; iii. 73 ; woods of, üi. 17
Russian campaign - the, iii. 57 ; did not miscarry
because Buonaparte advanced too swiftly or too
far, iii. 84
SAAL , i . 114 ; Prussian position on, ii. 117, 118,
186
Saalfeld , i . 66
Saxe - Marshal, ii. 196
Saxony,troops,
Saxon i . 105,iii
ii.. 12
39 ; and the Seven Years' War,
iii. 76 ; its strategical importance to Frederick
the Great, 70
Scale - importiïi.
ance of a right one in laying out
work in war, ii. 208 ; right, means how ascer
tained , iii. 48
Scharnhorst - General, ii. 25 , iii. 27
Schmotseifen , position of, iii. 13
180 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES .

30 ; of Alsace in 1674, üi. 30 ; of Frederick the

Schwartzenburg, i . 73 , 102 Great, by Neipperg , iii. 30 ; of the Duke of
Schweidnitz, ii . 36 Lorraine, by Frederick the Great, iï . 30
Schwerin , üi. 112
Secrecy -- element of surprise, i. 103 Suspension of the act in warfare, i. 117
Security and existence of an army, ii. 17 Swamps - defence of, ii. 146 , 147 1
Separate columns- difficulty of attack in , iii. 87 Tact required like that of the man of the world, i.
Seven Years' War, i . 140, ii. 9 , 10 , 31 , 32 , 36, 71 ,
iii. 70 41
Tactics, branch of art of war, i. 44, 48, iii. 98 ;
Shelter and subsistence of army lead to its dispo applied or higher, iii. 96 ; as regards attack or
sition in divisions, ii. 19 defence of convoys, iii. 26 ; definition of,ii.
Siege- of Landreci, 1712 , üi . 24 ; of Olmütz, 95 , 96 ; guide to, ' iii. 127 ; sketch of plan for,
1758, iii. 24 ; covering a, üi. 24 ; train, iii. 24 iii. 125
Silberberg, fortress of, ü. 108
Silesia, i. 87, 104 ; war in , i. 140, iii. 47 ; army of, Tagliamento , river, i. 70
ii. 2 , 22 , 23 , 39 ; war in , üü . 47 Tagus - River, ii. 37
Smolensk, ii. 38 , 167 Tartars, ii . 10, 83, üi. 49
Sombreff, ii. 43 Tauentzien - General, i. 66
Technical terms use of, i. 79
Soor, battle of, i. 132, ü. 87 Templehof, i. 101 , 104, ú . 31, 202, iï . 11, 27
Space-relations between size of army and , ii.
167, ii. 160 Tension and rest, i . 121
ts n-, obs ations on,nceii: 29
Spain , ii. 52 , 129 Ten
Terrai ii. erv
61; influe of,ii. 61 ; on general and
Spanish monarchy—the, iï . 51 individuals, ii. 62 ; on proportion ofarms,ii. 63
Staff of an army - instance of a many - headed, ii. Territory - object of attack, iü . 4 ; abandonment
187 ; influence of, ii. 197
Steinkirch - battle of, ii. 16
of, ii . 166, 167 ; occupation of, when a direct
Stollhofen , lines of, üi. 14 object, ii. 181
Stratagem- definition of, i. 106 Terutino,
Thea . 25 - conception of, ii. 2 ; assistance of
tre ofiiwar
Strategic - division of an army, ii. 13 ; surprise, in strategy. ii. 74 ; defence of, ii. 178, 181;
ii . 73; combination never all sufficient, ii. 92 ; attack of, with a view to a decision, iii. 17 ;
manouvring, see Manœuvre attack of, without a view to a great decision, iï.
Strategy - branch of art of war , i. 44, 48 : con
ception of, i. 56, 57 ; no victory in , success in 20 ; strip of territory, object of, iii.21 ng
is the preparation and utilising tactical victories,
Theorist in war-like one teaching swimmi on
ii. 73 ; definition of, i. 85 , iii. 95 , 97 ; elements dry yland
Theor , i. 41
, estab lishment of, i. 48, 50, 56 ; applica
of, i. 90 ; leading principles of successful action
in, ü. 72 ; in attack and defence, iii. 2 ; general tion of in strategy, i. 85
principles of, ii. 110, 111 . See Successive Thielman, ii. 43
Streams - peculiar influence of, ii. 144, 145 Thirty
Time, i.Years' War, ii. 9,
56 ; combinati of iiwith
on 71, . 25,space,
50 i. 102 ;
Strength - military, diminishes with advance, ii. appointment of, for partial combat,ii.149
164
Subject - treatment of in criticism , i. 79 Timidity - retarding principle in war, i. 118.
Subsistence, ii. 43 ; gradual development of a Tolstoy -Osterman , ii.38
system of, ii . 44 , 45 ; four methods of, ü . 46 ; Topography, ïi. 197 , 198
on inhabitants, ii. 46, 48 ; by enforced exac Torgau , battle of, iii. 11
tions, ii. 48 ; by regular requisitions, ii. 48, Tormasow , ii. 171
49 ; difficulties of on retreat, i . 50 , 51 ; from Torres Vedras, ii. 89, 90, 114, iii. 11
magazines, ii. 51 ; when acting on offensive Troops, iii. 96;glued togetherbythe drill book,
i: 95 ; disposition of, with different qualifica
and on defensive, ii. 53; on retreat, ii. 165,
166, 168 ; importance of, ii. 202 ; of troops, tions, iii. 89, 90 ; principles foruseof,iii. 103
how provided, iii. 113 Truth - weak motive of action , i . 35
Success — improbability of, and excessive price of, Tschitschagof, ii. 157
i . 15, 16 ; in battle, iii. 21 Turenne, ii. 149, iï . 16, 25, 29
Successive - resistance, inconsistent with nature of
strategy , ii. 191 ; use of forces, iii. 149 Turning, iii. 7
Sudetics, ii. 108, 131 Tyrol, i. 106
Superior numbers, i. 100, iii. 133 ULM , ii. 29, iii. 79
Surprise, i. 103 ; examples of, i. 104, 105, 137 ; Uncertainty, i. 54, 118, iü . 117
advantage of, iii. 103 ; of the French , by Duke
Ferdinand , iii. 30 ; in strategy, iii. 111 ; result VALENCIENNES , iii. 25
of successful, iii. 164
Surprises - value of, jü, 28, 29 ; by Turenne, iii. Valmy - battle of, i. 122
Vanquished portion of army, iii. 162
 INDEX TO THE THREE VOLUMES.
Vendeans, ii. 2
Victory - moral value of, ii. 130 ; elements compos
ing, ii. 131 ; effects of, nature of, ii. 145 ; effect
greater on conquered than conqueror, ii. 146 ;
effect on nation, ii. 147 ; on the subsequent
course of the war, ii. 148 ; points on which its
efficacy depends, ii. 151 ; strategic means of
utilising, ii. 152; principles of, ii. 70 ; how in
fluenced by advantage of ground, attack from
several quarters, surprises , i. 70 ; division of
these elements between offensive and defensive,
ii. 70, 71 ; effect of, on a country, ii. 179 ; extent
of its influence, ii. 191 ; culminating point of,
üi. 2, 34 ; first use of, iii. 19 ; means of, iii . 128 ;
partial, ii . 150 ; sphere of action of, iii. 17 ; the
aim of attack , iii. 17 ; theory of, iii. 127
Vienna, i . 70
Villach, i. 70
Villars, iii. 14, 26
Virtue, Military — see Military
Vosges, i. 101 , ii. 133, 153
WAGR
M - battle of, i. 77, üi. 8, 11 , 100, 102, 164
Wall of China, ii. 151
Wallenstein, iï. 119
War - a chameleon, i. 13 ; its complicated and
variable nature, i. 1 , 13 ; definition of, i. 1 ;
modifying principles in practice, i. 4, 5 ; end
and means of, i. 14, 18 ; comprises three general
objects, i . 14 ; a dangerous edifice, i. 38 ; a sea
full of rocks, i. 41 ; theoretical division of and
connection between its parts, i. 47, 48 ; theory
of, i. 49 ; as an art or science , i. 61 ; analysis
of the term , i. 108 ; aggressive nature of, i.
117; as an armed neutrality, i. 119 ; on the
character of modern, i. 120 ; dynamic law in,
i. 121; art of, not a mere act of the understand
ing, ii. 205 ; aim of, iii. 4 ; as an instrument of
policy, iii. 65, 67 ; between Austria and France,
iii. 76 ; carried on without allies, iï . 64 ; ends
in, defined, iü . 56 ; general prínciples and theory
of, iii. 97 ; in defensive, iii . 98 ; historical survey
of system of, iii. 54, 55, 56 ; interdependence of
parts in, iii. 46 ; nothing decided in untilthe final
result, iii. 46 ; magnitude of the object of, iii.
48 ; necessity of exertion in, üi. 48 ; methodical
Wertheimer, Lea & Co., Printers, Finsbury Circus.
181
offensive, iï . 60 ; merely another kind of writ
ing and language for political thoughts, iii. 65 ;
example of an alliance of States against France,
iii. 90, 91 ; offensive, limited object, iii. 70 ; of a
small state against a greater, üi. 63 ; practice
in , of principles laid down, ii . 116 ; plan of,
iii. 42 ; theory of, iii. 43 ; absolute and real, iï .
43 ; when we may engage in , iii. 44 ; part of
political intercourse, iii.65 ; position of France
in , against Austria and Prussia, iii. 77, 92, 93 ;
qualifications necessary for minister of, iii. 68 ;
theatre of, iii . 17. See Thirty Years', Seven
Years', Silesia .
Wars — the, against Buonaparte, iii. 64 ; between
France and England,iii. 51 ; of nineteenth cen
tury, character of, ii. 182.
Waterloo-see Belle Alliance
Ways— diversity of, leading to the end in war, i. 18
Weapons, iï . 130 ; not essential to conception of
fighting, i. 43
Wearying outthe enemy, i. 17
Weather - effects of, i, 40, 56
Wedel, ü . 187
Weimar, ü. 209
Wellington's campaigns of 1810-11 , iii. 114
Westphalia - peace of, ii . 44 , 175
Will — force of, i. 28 ; strong, stands like an obelisk
in the middle of the art of war , i . 40 ; strength
of, i. 86 ; commanding, required in conduct of
war, ii. 201
Wilna , ii. 38, 39 , 191 , 209
Winzengerode, ii. 143
Witepsk , ein
ü. 167
Wittgenst , General, i. 74, ii. 157
Woods — advantages and disadvantages of, üü . 107 ;
attack of, iii. 17 ; defence of, iii. 17
Wrede, ii. 163
Wurtemburg, ii. 38, 39 ; Prince of, i. 74, 114
Wurtzburg, ii. 106
YORK , General, i. 137, ü, 39
ZIETHEN , General, ii . 27, 43
Zorndorf - battle of, iii. 142
Züllichau , battle of, ii. 187
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