Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Analysis of The Drivers of Radicalization
Analysis of The Drivers of Radicalization
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. .…………………1
Executive Summary
This article reports on field research undertaken in Kyrgyzstan during November 2016. It
explores radicalization to violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan in general as well as women’s
roles within Kyrgyzstan both in becoming violent extremists and in preventing and
countering violent extremism.
Relatively recent inter-ethnic clashes in the south of the country, high unemployment,
rapid shifts and changes in ideological, economic, and political structures following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, an inpouring of Arab and Central Asian ideologies and
funding that favor a strictly conservative practice of Islam, proximity to Afghanistan, the
rise of global ultra-conservative traditions and jihadi narratives—against a backdrop of
the Iraq and Syria crisis—and the increasing anti-government sentiments, especially on
the part of ethnic minorities and marginalized populations, are found to serve as
important internal and external radicalizing factors in Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan ranks first among the Central Asian republics in terms of both total and per
capita contributions of foreign fighters and travelers to the Syrian and the Iraq conflict,
with many primarily joining ISIS. The majority of the foreign fighters have traveled from
the predominantly Uzbek-populated south of the country. ISIS in Syria and Iraq and its
local affiliates are the primary groups operating and radicalizing Kyrgyz people into
violent extremism. However, nonviolent, but seditious, groups in the country may also
function as “conveyer belts” into violent extremism.
While extremists in Kyrgyzstan include both men and women—far more men than
women—the largest manifestation of them is from among the pool of those who have
traveled to Syria. Kyrgyz female involvement in violent extremism is less than males, but
still significant, with 22 percent of those having traveled to Syria and Iraq including
females. While counter-terrorism officials often spoke of women as having little
personal agency in their decisions to travel to Syria and Iraq, this report will present
counter-examples of women taking the lead role in radicalizing family members, being
Internet recruiters themselves, and showing a great deal of personal agency.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 1
Introduction
The Kyrgyz State Commission on Religious Affairs identifies nineteen illegal groups
in Kyrgyzstan, sixteen of them as terrorist groups and three as extremist groups.
The primary groups operating and radicalizing Kyrgyz people into violent extremism
are militant jihadi groups operating in Syria and Iraq, primarily ISIS and its local
affiliates. However, nonviolent, but seditious, groups may in some cases function as
“conveyer belts” into violent extremism. Concerns exist over groups such as Hizb ut-
Tahrir (HT), which is illegal in Kyrgyzstan, as well as dawa religious versus political
groups, such as Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), which are concerned with spreading a
conservative Deobandi version of Islam and some Salafi groups with teachings close
to Takfiri groups (i.e. condemning and punishing all others, including Muslims, who
do not adhere to their strict and violent interpretation of Islam).
Kyrgyz extremist national groups also exist and have become increasingly powerful
in recent years, although this report is limited to studying the primary forces of
violent extremism among Kyrgyz coming from groups operating out of Syria and Iraq
or on the ground in Kyrgyzstan that provided ideological support or actual
cooperation with groups like ISIS. It should, however, be noted that the nationalist
extremist groups operating in Kyrgyzstan and abroad use violence and extreme
humiliation to target female Kyrgyz migrant workers abroad, as well as Kyrgyz girls
with boyfriends of another nationality, sexual minorities, and sex workers within
Kyrgyzstan. Some human rights defenders and organizations argue that nationalist
extremist groups operating within Kyrgyzstan, such as the “Patriots,” “Kyrk-Choro,”
and “Kyrgyz Choroloru” are government created and funded organizations.1 Former
migration minister, Aigul Ryskulova, stated “it should not be excluded that these
nationalist groups abroad are supported by nationalist-politicians and nationalist
radical groups in Kyrgyzstan; therefore, these guys (Kyrgyz male migrants) engage in
such actions, which allegedly aim to protect honor and dignity of the nation.”2
1
See for example
http://www.gezitter.org/society/43921_kyilyim_shamyi_est_opaseniya_chto_gruppu_patriotyi_
sozdala_vlast_/
2
Cited in “From Asia to Siberia or In search of “New World” the condition of migrants from
Central Asia in the Baikal Siberia”, Ulan-Ude, 2013, p.58; Another study of their impact on Kyrgyz
women may be important to carry out.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 2
Upwards of 38,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have joined Sunni militant
groups in Iraq and Syria, including ISIS and al-Qaeda, since the start of the Syrian
conflict in 2011.4 Central Asians are well represented as foreign fighters, with the
region being the third largest point of origin for foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.
While many of the Central Asian countries do not report official statistics on foreign
fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq, the counter terrorism bodies in Central Asia
estimate the numbers at two thousand six hundred foreign fighters.5 Others
estimate the numbers higher, at four thousand foreign fighters to have originated
from Central Asia since 2012, with two thousand five hundred reportedly arriving in
the 2014-2015 timeframe alone.6
Using the available data for comparisons in the Central Asian region, Kyrgyzstan ranks
first in terms of both total and in per capita contributions (per million of its citizens),
with Uzbekistan coming in second. (See Figure One). Counter-terrorism officials in
Kyrgyzstan reported figures of 863 total foreign fighters between 2010 and June 2016,
with 188 of them being women.7 One hundred and thirty-five of the travelers are
underage, with 91 departing with family members. The majority of foreign fighters
(77.5%) traveled from the south of the country, predominantly populated by ethnic
Uzbeks.
Multiple radicalizing factors and vulnerabilities exist in Kyrgyzstan. Relatively recent
inter-ethnic clashes in the south of the country, high unemployment, rapid shifts and
changes in ideological, economic, and political structures following the collapse of the
3
Web-page of GKDR (translated from Russian). Retrieved from
http://religion.gov.kg/ru/relgion_organization/тыюу-салынган-диний-бирикмелер/
4
NCTC Director Nicholas Rasmussen testimony before the House Committee on Homeland
Security. Retrieved from https://homeland.house.gov/files/documents/02-11-15-McCaul-
Open.pdf. The Soufan Group report dated 2015 estimates the number to be between 27,000-
31,000.
5
Regional anti-terrorist structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, based on the data
provided by the anti-terrorist bodies of Central Asian states for the period of 2013-2015.
Retrieved from https://riss.ru/analitycs/26820/
6
F. T., Bouffard, M., King, K., & Vickowski, G. (October, 2016). The return of foreign fighters to
Central Asia: Implications for U.S. counterterrorism policy. National Defense University.
Retrieved from http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-
Perspectives-21.pdf
7
Interview with Erlan Bakiev, Kyrgyzstan Counter-Terrorism Police (Tenth Unit), November 24,
2016.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 3
Soviet Union, an inpouring of Arab and Central Asian ideologies and funding that favor a
strictly conservative practice of Islam, proximity to Afghanistan, the rise of global ultra-
Figure One: Central Asian Foreign Fighter Breakdown by Country
Source: ICSR and INSS (2015).8
conservative traditions and jihadi narratives—against a backdrop of the Iraq and Syria
crisis—and the increasing anti-government sentiments, especially on the part of ethnic
8
Data reported by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) appear to be
low. See, for example, International Center for the Study of Radicalization (January 26, 2015).
“Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the
1980s;” http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-
afghanistan-conflict-1980s/ content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf; Lynch
F. T., Bouffard, M., King, K., & Vickowski, G. “The return of foreign fighters to Central Asia:
Implications for U.S. counterterrorism policy.” Data contained in the latter report reflect both
2014 and 2015 findings. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, and Macedonia
numbers have been updated and reflect 2015 findings. Note that data are gathered based on
official government estimates, UN reports, think-tank research reports, academic sources, and
other open source and secondary sources. There are methodological weaknesses associated
with collecting data about foreign fighters, specifically in that 1) data reporting entities often fail
to disclose their data collection criteria and methodology, hence potentially affecting the
accuracy of data, 2) while the number often reflects all foreign fighters traveling to join violent
groups in Iraq and Syria, others report such number by deducting the number of returnees and
those who have died, and 3) women and children are omitted in some reports, while in others
they are not. Data gathered from 1) returnees, 2) Kyrgyzstan Police and domestic security
agencies, and 3) open sources of information. Data collected on individual foreign fighters
(returnees), from those currently in Syria and Iraq fighting, and deceased.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 4
9
Sageman, M. (2008). Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press; Taarnby, M., & Hallundbaek, L. (2010). Al-Shabaab: The
internationalization of militant Islamism in Somalia and the implications for radicalisation
processes in Europe. Ministry of Justice. Copenhagen.
10
Barlett, J., & Miller, C. (2014). The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between
violent and non-violent radicalization.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2 (1), 1-21.
11
Ibid., p.2
12
Schmid, P.A. (2013). Radicalisation, de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation: A Conceptual
discussion and literature review. International Centre for Counter Terrorism. The Hague, p. 10.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 5
Methodology
The report relies on field research undertaken in Kyrgyzstan between November 24 and
Dec 4, 2016. An exploratory and qualitative research design was utilized to map
unknown territory in Kyrgyzstan—that is, map the roles of women in extremism as well
as examine the extent to which women are recognized and used by the government and
non-governmental actors to prevent and counter violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan. The
authors first engaged in a review of policies, strategies, and programs on countering
violent extremism in the country. The focus was on understanding the extent to which
current Kyrgyz governmental policies and programs integrate gender perspectives. Such
approach, alongside consultations with the UN Women’s Office in Bishkek and use of an
in-country UN Women’s hired consultant, led to identifying key participants who
became subjects of the research. Interviews served as the primary data collection
method, along with the collection of existing and in-draft policy reports. Semi-structured
and open-ended interview questions were employed to allow research participants to
identify and elaborate on problem areas, explain who could be trusted for solutions, and
identify key gaps and opportunities for effective interventions and solutions.
Interviews were conducted with government officials, members of international and
non-governmental organizations, embassy officials, community leaders, religious
scholars, teachers, judges, NGO leaders, students, and ordinary citizens. Interviews were
also conducted with extremists themselves and their family and community members in
13
Lorenzo, V. (2010). Countering radicalization in America. United States Insitute of Peace.
Washington, D.C.
14
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). What is violent extremism. Retrieved from
https://cve.fbi.gov/whatis/
15
United Nations, Resolution, 2178 (2014), p.2. Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf
16
Ibid.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 6
prison and the community. Although interviews served as a primary data collection
method, the authors also relied on secondary sources and secondary data analysis,
including key economic, employment, social, and health factors that may contribute to
radicalization and violent extremism Likewise, all available credible reports on the
phenomena generated by government, international organizations, and NGOs were
collected. The entirety was then analyzed to understand better the roles of women in
violent extremism, their vulnerabilities and motivations for joining such groups, as well
as the potential to involve them in prevention and intervention efforts from the side of
government, nongovernmental, and community interventions.
The following groups of respondents were interviewed:
• State police (Ministry of Internal Affairs Central and Regional)
• National security representatives (GKNB Central and Regional)
• State civilian representatives
• Representatives of national and international organizations, including non-
governmental organizations with experience and knowledge about issues of
violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan (e.g. UNDP, Female Breast Cancer NGO director,
Search for Common Ground, etc.)
• U.S. Embassy representatives
• University professors and subject matter experts
• Islamic leaders/teachers, including women Islamic leaders/teachers
• Madrassa and Islamic preschool teachers and directors
• Madrassa students
• Community groups
• Select UN agencies (e.g. UN Women and UNDP)
• Human rights legal advocates
• Judges
• Ordinary citizens.
• Convicted extremists (i.e. those in prison)
• Community and family members of known extremists, including those departed
to and deceased in Iraq and Syria
The authors traveled to Bishkek, Osh, Jalal-Abad, Aravan, Issy- Kul, and Bokombaevo
village to interview and gain primary and secondary data from police, State Committee
for National Security (GKNB) officials, NGO leaders and actors, students, lawyers, judges,
religious leaders, university professors, and actual extremists and their family or
community members. The researchers also gained permission to enter a female prison
facility near Bishkek, located in the village of Stepnoe, to interview five convicted female
extremists, two with ideological ties to a group aligned with ISIS. Interviews were aimed
at having a good balance between secondary sources (e.g. government, NGO,
international organizations, etc.) and primary data sources (e.g. actual extremists and
their community and family members) to learn about female roles in violent extremism
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 7
and how females can also be activated and supported to aid in prevention and spread of
extremism in Kyrgyzstan.
Some Internet content about those involved in violent extremism, posted in their own
words (e.g. on their social media accounts), was also collected after returning from
Kyrgyzstan to enhance primary data collection. Data collection methods also consisted
of building upon a two-decades career of interviewing and studying extremists and
terrorists around the globe, and a thorough knowledge of existing literature and data on
extremists and terrorist groups, such as al-Nusra and ISIS. Likewise, given that the first
author spent the last year interviewing ISIS defectors globally, she was quite
knowledgeable about their methods of recruitment, indoctrination, networks of
funding, and travel, and was able to interview explicitly on these topics with all subjects
who were able to divulge information of this type. Guiding questions for the field
research were sent to the UN Women’s Office in Istanbul to help with the mission
preparation.
17
Speckhard, A. (February 25, 2016). The lethal cocktail of terrorism: The four necessary
ingredients that go into making a terrorist & fifty individual vulnerabilities/motivations that may
also play a role. International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism: Brief Report. Retrieved
from http://www.icsve.org/brief-reports/the-lethal-cocktail-of-terrorism/
18
For more details in Russian, see https://www.nur.kz/822561-likvidirovannye-v-bishkeke-
terrorist.html, https://www.nur.kz/821504-v-rezultate-specoperacii-v-centre-bi.html
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 8
• Recruitment into Salafi, TJ, or HT groups that lay the groundwork for recruitment
into groups like ISIS that claim to be building the “Caliphate.”
• Desire to build and live inside an Islamic Caliphate and under Shariah law
• Desire and need (i.e. financial dependency) to keep familial ties intact when one
member of the family is convinced to go to Syria
• Offers of marriage and potential for adventure for women living without many
possibilities
• Calls and reassurances of safety; material rewards and spiritual righteousness
from family members and friendship networks
While extremists in Kyrgyzstan include both men and women—far more men than
women—the largest manifestation of them is from among the pool of those who have
traveled to Syria. There are also extremists operating on the ground who are
determined to attack locally, as evidenced by shoot-outs between terrorists and police
and security officers in Kyrgyzstan in January 2011 and July 2015; the prison escape of
nine prisoners convicted on religious extremism and terrorism related charges in
October 2015; and the recent attack on the Chinese Embassy on August 30, 2016,
organized by Uighur terrorists affiliated with Syrian Jabhat-al-Nusra. 19-
With ISIS likely losing its ability to hold significant territory in Syria and Iraq, coupled
with evidence that it increasingly calling for attacks at home, alongside the return of
ideologically and weapons trained foreign fighters, the levels of extremism in Kyrgyzstan
may in the near future become more of a local problem versus one of foreign fighter
recruitment.
19
See for example http://www.kabar.kg/law-and-order/full/12346; http://www.nisi.kg/110-
novosti-kyrgyzstana-na-glavnuyu/158-gknb-ustanovleny-organizatory-i-ispolniteli-vzryva-v-
posolstve-kitaya-v-bishkeke.html
20
Official data provided by the 10th department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the U.N.
Kyrgyzstan Office, valid as of July 2016.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 10
Likewise, some had children born there or traveled with children young enough to have
no knowledge of their home country, language, or culture. We learned of some stopped
from traveling, some of these women with small infants.
Demographic data on Kyrgyz foreign fighters are either lacking or are incomplete. Some
may be hidden from authorities by covering their travel to Syria as work migration or
other travel, or simply having gone unnoticed by authorities and unreported by their
families and community members who may fear the repercussions for them should they
return to Kyrgyzstan—ISIS returnees are usually sentenced between 3 to 20 years,
depending on circumstances and consequences of criminal acts.21 While official data are
lacking, the interview data suggest that the age range of foreign fighters from
Kyrgyzstan is generally between 22-27 and most, if not all, fall into four categories of
underemployed or unemployment status: never had a permanent employment, were
unemployed, were employed part-time, or are still students. A majority of them come
from below average or poor financial and economic backgrounds. Many are married
with children.
21
According to data provided by members of the State Service on Punishments Execution.
22
ISIS has managed to call the largest migration of foreign fighters ever to a battlefield.
Estimates are that approximately 38,000 foreign fighters have left for Syria and Iraq—many to
ISIS. Zarqawi’s earlier call to jihad with al-Qaeda in Iraq produced only 5000 foreign fighters,
while the “jihad” in Afghanistan produced less than 2000 foreign fighters.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 11
in Dabiq (Syria) and inviting all Muslims to join the ultimate apocalyptic battles. The
ideological call is made to invoke a sense of duty while also promising materialistic
benefits (e.g. free housing, cars, food, wives, slaves and propane allowances) alongside
the chance to live by what ISIS proclaims as a truly Islamic lifestyle under Shariah law.
The terrorist groups’ propaganda and appealing narratives spread prolifically over the
Internet, showing both the atrocities of Assad and the appeal of joining the End Times
prophetic battle and building the ISIS “Caliphate,” along with the spiritual and
materialistic benefits accrued by doing so, creating a powerful worldwide appeal. In
Kyrgyzstan, the presence and widespread influence of TJ and HT teachings had already
laid a fertile ground for ISIS recruiters to appeal to come join their “Caliphate.”
Networks operating on the ground in Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Turkey (where Kyrgyz
migrants work) that provided financing and logistical support to travel to Syria also
easily facilitated the movement of Kyrgyz into the conflict zone.
The ISIS invitation to militant “jihad” was successful for numerous reasons, including the
advent of social media and the ability to cast an enormous propaganda net with
immediate feedback as to who liked, re-tweeted, and otherwise endorsed their
materials, allowing them to make contact with vulnerable individuals and seduce them
into traveling to the battleground. Among those Kyrgyz who have traveled to Iraq and
Syria during the last two years, or are currently engaged with terrorist groups in Iraq and
Syria, specifically those who we were able to access for interviews directly or indirectly
through relatives as well as gain information through data from police reports, we
learned that the most common methods of recruitment were Internet-based. The
primary motivating factors for joining included: religious and ideological motives that
invoked the struggle as jihad in the name of Allah, protection of all Muslims by non-
Muslims, and the creation of an “Islamic State” and establishment of a Caliphate,
alongside strong economic motivations—that is, the lack of employment, under-
employment, poor salaries, and demanding slave-like conditions facing migrant workers
in the face of promises of much better salary and housing conditions under ISIS.23
23
Kyrgyzstan Police Conference Presentation; Interviews, Kyrgyzstan Police, October 17-18,
2016.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 12
fall of the former Soviet Union, when Turkey and Gulf country influences and large
amounts of money and conservative religious materials quickly entered Kyrgyzstan, with
many actors intent on building mosques and spread their versions of Islam. The later
introduced Salafi and Wahhabi streams of Islam into the country, creating identity
confusion for some Kyrgyz. Salafi Islam can be protective against militant jihadi
ideologies of groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda if taught in ways that denounce their call to
violence in the name of “jihad” and condemn Takfiri extremes (i.e. denouncing and
allowing for killing Muslims who do not adhere to their strict interpretations of Islam).
However, if it is not taught in this manner, Salafi streams of Islam can also provide a
ready gateway into more extremist Takfiri streams of thinking and acting endorsed by
groups like ISIS.
In the case of the former Soviet Union countries, the long established and functioning
state apparatus and Communist ideology was suddenly dismantled, making way for
governance that in many cases failed to provide fairly and well to the Kyrgyz people who
experienced spiritual yearnings during and under the atheist Soviet regime. Educational
institutions weakened, and literacy rates fell. Employment and provision of basic
services were no longer guaranteed. Likewise, ideological indoctrination into
Communism, starting with Pioneers to Komsomol to Party membership, no longer was
part of the Kyrgyz and Soviet identity formation. As trust in government institutions
lessened and governance was viewed as corrupt and failed in many regards, religious
groups and leaders emerged as providing a new trusted ideology and paths for finding
success in this life and the next. Salafi groups emerged, and with small infusions of
foreign money were able to buy attractive meeting spaces, support Salafi teachers, and
create communities where mutual support, both financial and spiritual, proliferated. It is
within such a societal context that ISIS emerged, promoting extremist black and white
thinking and promising clear Muslim identity to those who travel to join and live under
their “Caliphate, “thereby removing any questions in those searching for their Muslim
identity and believing that ISIS could lead them to find their way living as true and good
Muslims.
The ISIS ideological narrative is that Muslims, Muslims lands, and even Islam itself are
under attack and that all Muslims have a duty to migrate and come to fight jihad.
Likewise, the Islamic ummah is considered one big family, promoting the idea of “fictive
kin” ties to all other Muslims and the duty to support. Assad’s atrocities certainly
supported the narrative of Muslims under attack, which led to some Kyrgyz traveling to
Syria. In Batken, the most radical Muslims separated from the Tablighi Jamaat to form
the Yakyn Inkar group,24 and those who went to Syria from there expressed a desire to
support their Muslim brothers in Syria.25 Uzbek and other minorities may have been
24
More about this group in Russian can be found at
http://www.asiaterra.info/ekstremizm/jakyn-inkar-novye-missionery-islama-v-kirgizii
25
According to the police and members of the crime prevention center in Batken province.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 13
particularly susceptible to ISIS claims of providing a clear and good identity, as discussed
in the section below.
Interestingly, the lack of government repression could also play a role in Kyrgyz
representation in ISIS ranks. Neighboring countries have outlawed TJ and HT, and have
limited the preaching and influx of Saudi teachers and money. Karimov’s Uzbekistan was
credited with gruesome torture and executions of HT members. Yet, with this high level
of repression, Uzbekistan has a similar number of foreign fighters as Kyrgyzstan,
although a much higher population, so the per capita rates are much lower. While
difficult to interpret, it but may be that open government policies also contribute to
ideologies and groups to more freely enter the Kyrgyz dialogue and provide fertile
ground for recruitment, whereas highly repressive policies in neighboring Uzbekistan
fuel the movement of fighters from Uzbekistan into Syria, as well as migration of Uzbek
ideologues and HT members into Kyrgyzstan.
The ability to escape dysfunctional, overly strict, and conservative families and their
expectations motivated others to break loose by traveling to Syria. Arranged marriages
are still widely prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, and even bride kidnappings still exist. Young
wives leave their families to live with their extended family members, often essentially
becoming slaves to their in-laws with little redress if they are unhappy, as some
respondents explained. Some families force their female in-laws into migrant work,
separating them from support networks, and even their children, sometimes with their
husband staying unemployed at home. In migrant status, they are then deeply
vulnerable to seduction into extremist groups.
Many Uzbek respondents stated that husbands are often oppressive and overrule their
wives quiet easily. Second unofficial marriages, including to second wives and underage
girls, are often religiously approved. Women who become financially dependent have
very little say in their homes, and may fear standing up to their husbands for fear of
abandonment, priority given to a second wife, or threats of, or actual violence. This all
contributes to making them acquiescent to recruitment by their spouses. Police and
security officials frequently referred to this phenomenon as “zombification.”
Men and women in migrant status were said to frequently take lovers and have illicit
relationships while abroad, creating vulnerabilities for both those who stay home and
those who migrate. Uneducated women in Kyrgyzstan who remain dependent on their
working migrant husbands often feel that they must put up with any demands, as they
can easily be replaced by lovers and second unofficial wives taken in migration status or
at home.
The legal age of marriage is 18, unless a girl is pregnant, in which case she can legally
marry at age 16. Despite this, Kyrgyz respondents said that Uzbek girls can be married as
young as 13 in unofficial marriages in which the marriage contract (nikah) is presided
over by local imams. Government training for imams is said to have curtailed this
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 15
26
According to the data of the Republican Narcological Center. Retrieved from
http://kloop.kg/blog/2016/11/10/v-kyrgyzstane-predlagayut-zapretit-prodazhu-alkogolya-posl-
22-00/
27
Results of the public opinion survey conducted by the sociological company “El-Pikir” in 2014.
http://easttime.ru/news/kyrgyzstan/statistika-trudovoi-migratsii-iz-kyrgyzstana/6923
28
National Institute for Strategic Studies of Kyrgyz Republic. (2016). Kyrgyzstan: Extended
migration profile 2010-2015, pp.61-62. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/ChE/Desktop/Migration-
Profile-Extended-Kyrgyzstan-Rus-2010-2015.pdf
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 16
29
See
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SL.UEM.1524.ZS&country=
30
Speckhard, A. The lethal cocktail of terrorism: The four necessary ingredients that go into
making a terrorist & fifty individual vulnerabilities/motivations that may also play a role.
31
Yasmin Green, personal communication, 2016.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 17
Kyrgyz salaries range from 1060 to 30,000 soms per month for agriculture-related low-
paid jobs to the financial consultancy correspondingly, while the cost of living in
Kyrgyzstan as of early January 2016 reaches up to 5377 soms.32 This salary range is from
$15 to $433 whereas ISIS defectors informed of us salaries above the $200 range per
month, with thousand dollar bonuses paid for involvement in raids and the ability to
loot homes and steal thousands of dollars with impunity.33 Clearly, the salaries in ISIS
were, until recently, highly competitive with Kyrgyz salaries.
Women who work or stay at home are reported by our respondents and themselves to
be expected to be “slaves” to their husbands and families and are expected to work long
and hard hours without question. Likewise, migrant workers often are demanded to
work long hours on a daily basis. In contrast to local Kyrgyz salaries and work
expectations, ISIS salary offers were reported as ranging from $100 USD to far more
than that, with some respondents reporting signing bonuses as high as $3000. A Kyrgyz
woman who literally works as a “slave” in her home, or in a migrant job, could compare
her situation to what was promised by ISIS—a nice home, food and fuel allowance, the
possibility of having a slave, versus being one, and a good salary. In addition to salaries,
many ISIS defectors have reported to the authors, supplementary income in the
thousands of dollars derived from looting houses in territory that ISIS overtook or in
bonuses for taking part in ISIS raids.34 The brutality of ISIS, the demands upon women to
remarry if their husbands are killed and the dangers of living in a conflict zone, all
counter balance the material rewards, but little may have been known about this side of
the equation for those who went to join ISIS.
Unmarried men and women with poor prospects of marriage also might find the allure
to ISIS powerful propaganda. Unemployed men in Kyrgyzstan whose families cannot
provide for their new family may find it hard to obtain wives but are promised them
inside ISIS, as are women promised husbands, and free housing and the ability to
practice a traditional Islamic lifestyle.
Familial Ties
Females who traveled to Syria from Kyrgyzstan, as discussed in the ensuing sections,
were nearly all married, although single women have both gone and been stopped from
going by the police. While Kyrgyzstan police and intelligence officials interviewed (all
men) depicted wives who traveled to Syria as traditional wives obedient to their
husbands and without any personal agency, our research shows that such claims may
hold ground in some cases, but not in all. Women whose husbands go to ISIS fear
disobeying their husbands, abandonment, financial harm, and violence. There is also a
desire and financial need to keep family ties intact when one member of the family was
convinced to go to Syria. In some cases, entire families traveled together to Syria while
in others the instigating family member was a woman.
In summary, the trajectories into violent extremism and terrorism in Kyrgyzstan share
commonalities with other theaters, but as research have shown in multiple other
venues, the individual motivations and vulnerabilities for terrorism are always
contextual. That said, the lethal cocktail of terrorism nearly always involves exposure to
a terrorist group, it’s ideology, and some level of social support for endorsing both.
Vulnerabilities and motivating factors alone are not sufficient to make a violent
extremist.36
Counter-Terrorism Legislation
To combat violent extremism and terrorism in the country, the Kyrgyzstan government
has not yet developed a comprehensive and coherent program on countering violent
extremism. They have, however, adopted the Law on Counterterrorism, enacted in
2006. In January 2014 President signed the law on changes and amendments to the law
on counterterrorism, intended to strengthen counter terrorism related measures.37 In
July 2015, amendments were also made into the Criminal Code, such as article 226-4,
which made participation in foreign conflicts a crime punishable by 5-8 years in prison in
case of the absence of the previous preparatory actions and wage earning intent, while
36
Speckhard, A. The lethal cocktail of terrorism: The four necessary ingredients that go into
making a terrorist & fifty individual vulnerabilities/motivations that may also play a role;
Speckhard, A. (2012). Talking to terrorists: Understanding the psycho-social motivations of
militant jihadi terrorists, mass hostage takers, suicide bombers & martyrs. McLean, VA:
Advances Press, LLC.
37
See
http://www.president.kg/ru/news/zakony/3305_v_zakon_o_protivodeystvii_terrorizmu_vnesen
yi_izmeneniya_i_dopolneniya/
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 19
38
See http://online.adviser.kg/Document/?link_id=1000871480
39
See https://tengrinews.kz/sng/uchastie-boevyih-deystviyah-storone-terroristov-296163/
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 20
40
See https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38221/Kyrgyzstan-Extremism-LA-
Final.pdf
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 21
for those already on the terrorist trajectory, effective steps must be taken to reverse
such trajectories and stop already radicalized individuals from seeding violent ideologies
both in prisons and outside of them—spreading the dangers to Kyrgyz society. This
requires thorough knowledge, monitoring, and good rehabilitation programs for those
already deeply involved, and effective prevention and intervention practices for those
being drawn into such groups. For those who cannot be rehabilitated, suitable prison
practices must be put in place to keep them isolated from other prisoners vulnerable to
being recruited.
The aforementioned reflect Kyrgyzstan and the international community’s resolve and
simultaneous and complementary efforts to prevent the spread of violent extremism in
the country. Despite strong and effective responses on the part of the Kyrgyzstan
government and the international community to halt support for violent extremism and
travel to Syria and Iraq, the current situation remains both dangerous and volatile.
Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are expected to return home, and some who are not
originally from the Kyrgyzstan may even choose to migrate to the Kyrgyzstan if they find
that they can slip in and live under the radar of a government and security services,
which is more liberal than some of their repressive neighboring countries. There is some
evidence of ISIS returnees having migrated to northern Afghanistan or hiding in Russia.
Security officials stated that those who are known to the police would be arrested upon
their return and subsequently convicted and imprisoned if deemed a threat to society.
In addition, police and security organs are cooperating with their counterparts in Russia,
Central Asia, Turkey, Europe, and the United States, including with Interpol, to be aware
of travel out of Syria and Iraq back to Kyrgyzstan of their own citizens and those in
possession of fake Kyrgyz passports. Likewise, both police and security were working in
vulnerable communities to nurture trust and informants regarding returnees and
unusual activity related to violent extremism. Open source Internet is also being
monitored. It remains unclear, however, as to how well Kyrgyz security agencies are
able to penetrate encrypted applications, such as WhatsApp and Telegram, over which
ISIS members frequently communicate.
Police have posted ISIS defector interviews subtitled in local languages (produced in the
Breaking the ISIS Brand—ISIS Defector Counter-Narrative Project by the International
Center for the Study of Violent Extremism) on their official website and wish to use
them for denouncing ISIS, training, prevention, and intervention activities.41 The GKNB
and police in Osh, Bishkek, Jalal-Abad, and Issy- Kul expressed interest in using such
materials in prevention, education, and intervention work, and enthusiastically received
ISIS defector videos produced in Kyrgyz, Russian, and Uzbek to use for such
interventions. Prison officials did the same and expressed interest in using them both
for training purposes and rehabilitating former extremists.
41
Videos can be retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCumpEsozixbl-
PyKw12hmnw
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 22
The Osh GKNB also shared their efforts at making videos about how those who go to ISIS
impact their families and community members left behind and were very enthusiastic
about collaborating on future videos. The State Commission on Religious Affairs has also
produced videos, although more cognitive than emotional in nature, denouncing ISIS
and other violent extremist groups. Many of the police and GKNB officials expressed
strong interest in continuing to receive ICSVE’s Breaking the ISIS Brand ISIS defector
videos subtitled in the three relevant languages, and also seeing Central Asian ISIS
defectors as the main actors denouncing ISIS, or Central Asians appearing in the “b-roll”
of such videos, to make a closer link to the Kyrgyz vulnerable populations.
In Osh, the GKNB told us that they were working on a “Safe Mahala” project and
creatively videotaping members of the family members and communities of those who
had gone to Syria to show other communities the repercussions in terms of social
stigma and discomfort suffered by families of those left behind. The videos were,
according to the officials, intended to be used for education and prevention to provide
powerful examples of how families have been largely ostracized and left alone to deal
with their grief and confusion when their adult children leave to Syria. A foreign
consulting professional, however, cautioned that the “Safe Mahala” project also
includes extremely repressive measures, including home destructions from the
government to communities and families whose members travel to Syria. Whether this
is true or not, remains unclear.42
Furthermore, Kyrgyz national police have implemented an anti-ISIS online recruitment
group. They work together with university student volunteers to identify and block
violent extremist YouTube videos and other online recruitment materials. The counter-
terrorism police also learned to replace ISIS and other violent extremist recruitment
videos, redirecting them to messages from the Kyrgyz mufti denouncing violent
extremism. It was promising to find Kyrgyz national police and security officials already
using creative and ingenious strategies that arguably are far ahead of their [many]
Western counterparts to fight ISIS online and face-to face recruitment in the country.
Kyrgyz officials should be strongly encouraged to continue in their creative and youth-
culture oriented (that reach the most vulnerable populations) national counter-
terrorism initiatives and strategies.
42
Anonymous consultant comments. December 2016.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 23
43
See http://rus.azattyk.org/a/27192770.html
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 24
strong territorial fights between Tablighi Jamaat, Salafi schools, and Hanafi schools over
turf and power. It may also not be possible to drive more conservative religious views
from the secular government’s position without violating freedom of religious
expression.
While there is a broad, national-level discussion on violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan,
particularly regarding the role of religious education as a potential protective factor,
there is a limited discussion on the role of women as supporters, facilitators, and direct
participants in violent extremism—one of the topics that this research and report
addresses. More specifically, there is limited policy or programmatic discussion on the
role of women in preventing violent extremism and their use in religious ministries. The
State Commission on religious affairs, for instance, has no plans to train or make use of
female “imams.” There were discussions by the GKNB to make use of female NGO
leaders who have regular access to some of the most vulnerable religious populations of
men and women, but little other discussion of how to empower women in prevention
roles.
Through the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the government of Kyrgyzstan (Ministry of Internal Affairs) has also organized crime
prevention centers in most communities that include representatives of local self-
governance (LSG), female, and youth councils under the LSGs, local police, local imams,
and the elderly.44
44
Police chief interview in Issy- Kul. Interviews with a crime prevention center members in
Batken.
45
Issyk-Kul Region, GKNB informal interview.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 26
Estimates are that of the 863 Kyrgyz who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join Islamic
State, around 188 are females and girls. These figures are underreported, however, as
some parents and families do not report their foreign fighter relatives to the authorities
for various reasons. It is also difficult to track the status of those on migration. Similar to
many parts of the world, there is no single explanation for the motivations that drive
women to join ISIS, which represents a challenge when it comes to seeking solutions to
minimize the risk and recruitment of Kyrgyz women into violent extremism. However, all
of the factors discussed previously, alongside those specific to women, are active among
Kyrgyz females.
Female Migration
ISIS limits women’s roles by encouraging them to be in traditional marriages and bear
children for the cause. However, ISIS also encourages foreign fighter females to join the
hisbah (morality police), and also allows them to teach, provide health care, and carry
out other professional roles as long as these roles are segregated to interacting with
children and other women. Some are put to the task of online recruiting.46
Similar to other countries (e.g. Kosovo) where numbers are available, the numbers and
rates of Kyrgyz women returning from ISIS are lower than that of men. We learned of
only three women who had returned, one in prison and the other two living free.47 It is
unlikely that so many more women were killed and thus not returning, but may point to
the difficulties for women of escaping ISIS. The fact that women in ISIS are expected to
marry, and those who are widowed when their fighter husbands are killed are expected
to remarry, indicates that ISIS women almost continually live under the control of their
ISIS spouses. In the brief time that some find themselves unmarried, they likely find it
extremely difficult to escape ISIS, given that they may not have access to funds to hire a
smuggler and cannot easily move about on their own, and if they place themselves in
the hands of a smuggler, they may then be raped or have sexual favors extorted by the
smuggler, a common story in our research with ISIS defectors worldwide. Thus, women
in ISIS depend very heavily on their partners to be able to escape the group and men
also find it hard to escape, risking their lives to do so.
While female agency in deciding to go to Syria and Iraq mostly likely exists in greater
proportion than male police credit them with, females whose husbands were
determined to go created both opportunities and vulnerabilities for Kyrgyz females. The
chance to earn much more money was a strong incentive for females who left. One
grandmother in Issy- Kul is credited with believing that ISIS would pay a $3,000 signing
bonus per family member upon arrival and thus encouraged nine of her family members
to travel with her. Later she managed to smuggle out her 12-year-old grandson with a
message of hopeless despair that things were far different than she had thought, and
that they would never be able to escape.
The likely imminent return of foreign fighters to Kyrgyzstan occurring as the ability of
ISIS to hold territory is diminished also means more terrorist convictions and
imprisonments of married male foreign fighters where wives are often judged less
severely and not imprisoned for traveling to ISIS. This means that spouses of imprisoned
46
Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. S. (2016). ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate:
Advances Press, LLC.
47
Data from the interviews with representatives of law enforcement bodies.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 28
homegrown extremists and foreign fighters, or women whose husbands were killed in
such activities, will live in communities likely experiencing social stigma and
vulnerability. Two females we learned about who had returned from Syria were both
living freely but did not want to speak about their ordeals, likely reflecting the stigma
they experienced upon return. Likewise, imprisoned female extremists expressed
concerns about the social stigma they would face and likely inability to remarry as a
result when they would be released from prison.
Females may also act as facilitators and encourage travel into terrorist groups. Police
told us of two female recruiters active inside of Kyrgyzstan trying to recruit other
women through the Internet.48 In two other cases, we learned of females playing the
lead instigator role in getting their extended families to join them in travel to Syria.
Family members often say they were blindsided by their sons or daughters leaving for
Syria, yet we also found female community members in closed mahala areas in the
south of Kyrgyzstan loath to judge their community members for having joined ISIS—
preferring to say they did not support the “jihad” in Syria but could not possibly
condemn their neighbors’ motives. In some ways, this may also condone their travel to
Syria.
In terms of prevention, female roles are still not fully activated in Kyrgyzstan, but could
be. Female teachers, family members, intelligence agents, psychologists, social workers,
health care workers, and clerics have yet to be worked into serious prevention roles and
48
See http://central.asia-news.com/ru/articles/cnmi_ca/newsbriefs/2016/09/15/newsbrief-02
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 29
in sufficient numbers, to protect their Kyrgyz women from recruitment. The current
government policies do not specify a priority on using females over males, even when
dealing with females in many of these roles, leaving the question open. In terms of
religious authority, there appears to be a strong preference for using male imams and
denial that women could be used in a religious/prevention teaching capacity.
Those who are imprisoned will need rehabilitation in prison and special prison services
that are not yet in place, but plans have been discussed to build such programs with
UNDOC assisting in the plan for male prisoners only. As prison sentences are relatively
long, it is important to isolate highly indoctrinated and weapons trained individuals from
others they may indoctrinate and train, and they must be carefully dealt with before
they are returned to their communities. And when they are returned, social stigma that
may cause them further grievances contributing to their return to terrorism or a deeper
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 31
An overlooked area of concern is that it is only males that have been convicted thus far;
however, if wives also return and are not imprisoned they also will face issues of
reintegration and need for treatment. ISIS members, male and female, have been
exposed to multiple traumas (e.g. beheadings, crucifixions) and violence and rejection of
anyone not adhering to their violent Takfiri beliefs have become normalized for them.
Women whose husbands are in prison also need special programs, as terrorist groups
have repeatedly shown their willingness to recruit and use women in suicide missions,
particularly when they are angry, desperate, or feel strong grievances, which may be the
case for them. As ISIS loses its territory, it has turned increasingly to calling for and
guiding on the ground homegrown terror attacks and may call such women into action.
Women who have lived under ISIS, and women who are indoctrinated into its thinking
and vulnerable while their husbands are in prison, may be the easiest to recruit into
terrorist attacks or aid to recruit others.
Female Policing
Female-led police associations and female police officers that are representative of the
population they are tasked to help and protect could also help with PVE efforts. While
the Tenth Department of the National Police includes female officers, we did not learn
of any initiatives using females in counter-terrorism roles. While female officers may be
more responsive to females and their families affected by the phenomenon of
radicalization by virtue of their gender, and vice versa, though the overall and individual
skillset of an officer must be considered as well. Female police hopefully have fewer
gender stereotypes applied to the women they are trying to protect than their male
counterparts may have. UNODC data for 2014 reveals that 13% in the police system in
Kyrgyzstan are women, but those who are certified as police are only 6.3%, which is too
small to support much female involvement in community policing. So, there is another
interrelated issue for females to be involved in CVE on the policing level, all in an effort
to increase female qualified specialists to work as police.
Female community members can often be very useful in keeping tabs on the community
and reporting suspicious activities, including leaving to and returning from ISIS. It is
important, however, to elaborate on specific strategies that ensure that women in
vulnerable communities are not recruited into counter-terrorism roles or as informants
solely as security tools to spy on their communities, targeting specific individuals, which
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 32
would likely create a backlash. It is rather more important to ask them to be more aware
of what is happening in their households, communities, etc. and to intervene in a more
natural manner with assistance, versus simply becoming informants. Trainings that
could help them to become avenues of education and prevention are likely useful in this
regard.
Moreover, future policies should clearly spell out the distinction between women’s
integration in CVE efforts and counterterrorism efforts rooted in intelligence activities.
This is especially important, as women who trust that the government is fully vested in
fighting terrorist recruitment and is not simply repressive, will likely turn to it for help,
but they may, on the other hand, become more insecure about participating in CVE
efforts and not report themselves and their family and community members out of fear
of arrests and police scrutiny. CVE efforts must prove themselves to women, and all
stakeholders, as being truly protective of the community members, even those
radicalizing, versus simply repressive, a problem that is common to all Western states
grappling with terrorist recruitment on their soils. Failure to make such distinctions may
prevent women from seeking access to important and available services—that is, it may
discourage from accessing services for fear of exposing family and community members,
and even oneself.
A serious concern that was not adequately addressed in our inquiries into how violent
extremism occurs in Kyrgyzstan was the threats and dangers that are posed to males
and females that speak out against violent extremism, for instance, the case of Kadyr
Malikov, a well-known male Islamic expert recently attacked by those who are affiliated
with ISIS. Malikov argued that those who attacked him belong to the Takfiri group.49 The
state has an interest in protecting both religious freedoms and ensuring that voices that
speak out against violent extremism do not become the victims of it.
Many respondents agreed that mothers have a great emotional pull on their children
and are therefore essential to creating effective counter- messaging. Emphasis has also
been placed on including mothers, sisters, wives, and other female family members in
counter-narrative messaging and equipping and training them to argue persuasively
against terrorist propaganda. Yet, these actors need powerful tools to help them speak
and act effectively against terrorist groups to delegitimize them inside their families and
49
See
http://zanoza.kg/doc/339277_kadyr_malikov_gotov_poprosit_pomilovaniia_za_napadavshego_
esli_on_raskaetsia.html
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 33
communities, such as ISIS defector videos and real stories of how ISIS did not come
through on their promises.
Many parents are unaware of the terrorist propaganda that exists on the Internet or
how to speak against it. Just like parents and schools equip youth with messages about
safe sex and the dangers of drug use, the same needs to occur for terrorist ideologies—
to inoculate youth against such ideologies. Short education modules to be offered in 8th-
grade civics class, or earlier, on the current virulent ideologies that youth are currently
exposed to and rational arguments to steer them clear of such groups are needed.
Likewise, parents need to be equipped to guide their children through the morass of
online terrorist propaganda that promises them significance, meaning, purpose,
material benefits and the chance to live a religious lifestyle, albeit one that embraces
rejecting, if not outright killing, those who do not adhere to their violent interpretation
of Islam. While youth imbibe such poison, parents, particularly mothers, need to be
equipped to be able to guide their children and guard them against believing the lies
that such terrorist groups spread and the dangers of participating in these groups.
Without easily accessible tools to do so, mothers are likely to fail in this task.
Mothers without Borders offers a good model of enhancing parenting skills and creating
a pyramid of prevention efforts that can cascade through a large number of mothers.
We recommend training mothers and educators on prevention efforts and perhaps even
following a similar model in identifying key female figures from young university
women, female clerics, social workers, mothers, police, and others to be equipped to
act against violent extremism in vulnerable communities and throughout Kyrgyzstan
through being equipped with adequate knowledge and readily accessible tools to fight
ISIS and other extremist groups’ propaganda and training them to train others.
The tools that mothers can use to have the “extremism” talk with their children before
they encounter terrorist propaganda and recruiters do not yet exist in adequate forms
to easily and fully equip mothers. Nor do they exist to adequately and quickly equip
male or female teachers, police, university students, imams, etc. to effectively fight
groups like ISIS.
Cogent cognitive arguments should be made against extremist ideologies. However,
cognitive arguments are not enough, as clearly evidenced by the U.K.’s Prevent efforts
that fell flat in the face of al-Qaeda and ISIS being extremely adept at using graphic
images and emotions to seduce youth and propel them along the terrorist trajectory.
Emotion based and graphic multimedia tools to counter violent extremist groups need
to be developed to fight these groups.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 34
As the current violent extremist groups operating in Kyrgyzstan are using the Internet-
based multimedia tools that use emotions to capture the hearts and minds of youth, we
recommend using the same—loading them to the Internet and making them available
for offline use to facilitate discussions at home, classrooms, youth centers, mosques etc.
These tools should adequately portray what groups like ISIS are and are not, and the
ways in which extremist violence are illegitimate in Islam and generally. The stories of
ISIS defectors denouncing the group with their inside perspective of how they fell prey
to it are powerful examples of messengers with full information, enough to emotionally
discredit this group. They are especially powerful if their stories are portrayed in video
format; however, many schools and police districts and NGOs told us they would need
the equipment to show the videos, or else they could be distributed as DVDs.
We focus-tested the Breaking the ISIS Brand defector videos made by the International
Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) and found them to spark lively
discussions with Kyrgyz counterterrorism professionals and youth. Such tools equip and
make it easy to powerfully fight back for a teacher, security official, police officer, or
mother who is trying to counter ISIS propaganda coming at youth over the Internet. We
played them to various community leaders who also recognized their power and
usefulness in fighting ISIS. Additional such materials are sorely needed.
Youth, females included, can be trained to be active, under adult supervision, on social
media, identifying those who are endorsing violent extremism and countering them
with opposing Internet-based materials. A recent Google project tested this concept of
contacting individuals on Facebook who were endorsing extremist groups. It resulted in
a fifty-eight percent response rate from those contacted. The dangers in doing such
work are significant, however, as some of the responses were to try to talk the
intervener into the extremist ideology. As the Kyrgyz police, in cooperation with
university students, have already begun Internet monitoring and take-down efforts, we
recommend training them to take this even further—to contacting those individuals
who retweet, endorse, and like ISIS materials to provide them with countering ISIS
online narratives.
Youth and adults, females included, can also be activated to take down violent
extremists messaging through actively reporting it to social media companies. Youth, in
particular, may be willing to work with police carrying out such efforts as it gives them a
purpose and the possibility to work with adults they admire. Given that Kyrgyzstan
police are already working on this, we recommend that such efforts be expanded.
We also recommend efforts be made to spotlight male and female role models, sports
figures and other youth “heroes,” speaking out against violent extremism and to
promote youth campaigns that undermine extremist narratives. These could also
include counter narrative religious messaging spotlighting female (religious) models that
could be accessed via the Internet or telephone immediately by vulnerable female
populations if they need help.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 35
There is a need for both government incentives and voluntary initiatives that could
serve to further incentivize women’s engagement and help to shape effective counter
extremist messages.
While encouraging the dissemination of counter narratives is crucial, it is equally
important and necessary to provide authoritative and appropriate communication
channels to assist in prevention and intervention efforts. The respondents identified
some of them, including police, security, NGOs, religious leaders, and community
leaders.
Another good tool is to use creative and community-engaging methods, such as “forum-
theaters” with plays with a counter-terrorism theme performed by local community
members. This could be done under the guidance and support of a professional director
and with involvement by the audience in what the outcomes and consequence will be of
important radicalizing questions raised in the production.
During the course of our interviews, including our research in other parts of the world,
we learned that women are likely to work with religious authorities they trust. When
working with vulnerable and religiously conservative women, it is necessary to involve
women as facilitators of treatment, and often, religious women are the best equipped
to reach vulnerable and religiously isolated community members that may fall prey to
ISIS recruitment. We also learned that because a great deal of authority rests in the
hands of male-dominated religious authorities and institutions, women may be
distrustful of such authorities and not feel respected by them. Or if they are highly
conservative, they may avoid interactions with male religious leaders and prefer to be
taught by other women or their spouses at home.
While in Kyrgyzstan only males become imams, this does not mean that women cannot
be trained to be “spiritual leaders.” Similar to the Morchidat Program introduced in
Morocco in 2005,50 women receiving the same training as the male imams could serve
to practice religious practices traditionally reserved for the male imams and provide
religious education—to other women—in mosques, prisons, and families of those
affected by the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In Kyrgyzstan, “Mutakalim,” a faith-
based NGO aiming to protect and promote Muslim women rights, is already working on
such issues. Women religious authorities can also be paired with individuals active on
social media and to run helplines and rapid intervention teams to counter propaganda
and recruitment into extremist and terrorist groups. When equipping religious leaders
50
Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-women-morchidat-
idUSKBN0O40MG20150519
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 36
to fight extremism, one must also be aware of whatever religious agendas these actors
have in mind as well and protecting their staff from themselves being recruited.
When it comes to religion and religious issues, it appears the government only invites
men to meetings about countering extremism and as a matter of routine does not
include female religious leaders. In this regard, it is important to not duplicate the
sexism often inherent in religious groups but instead include the voices of female
religious authorities and encourage their active participation in government led
initiatives to fight violent extremism. The government must also remain transparent
about the selection criteria used to form partnerships with religious authorities to
address the issue of radicalization and extremism in the country and the inclusion of
female religious leaders equal to their inclusion of male leaders. In the case of
Kyrgyzstan, the State Commission on Religious Affairs respondents said they want to be
“neutral” and have the religious community decide for themselves about the role and
representation of men and women. They do not want to propose “positive
discrimination,” for instance, to increase the role of women in the muftiat.
When it comes to penetrating closed Salafi groups and mahalas, it may be useful to
prepare Islamic arguments based on scriptures and to have such messaging possibly
emanating from individuals practicing Salafi Islam, although government involvement
and employment of Salafi messengers remains a contentious issue. This is primarily
because these groups also promote anti-homosexual and anti-feminist teachings that
oppose Western democratic values, and even sometimes argue against participation in
democratic society itself, including voting—all issues that would likely outweigh using
them as the government paid messengers. That said the Kyrgyzstan government could
invite Salafi voluntary participation in fighting extremism through sermons, Internet
messaging, and written tracts denouncing terrorist groups that endorse Takfiri practices.
They can also require oversight of Salafi imams, require training for Salafi imams in
scriptures that counter Takfiri ideologies, consider limiting foreign investments in
mosques, buildings and infrastructure, and paying imams salaries, or as the Religious
Commission has put forward, promoting “an indigenous form of Islam in Kyrgyzstan.”
These are delicate issues, however, as they possibly involve restrictions on the freedom
to practice religion and involve politics among the various religious actors.
Some of the respondents pointed out how living in patriarchal societies and not being
able to make decisions outside their husbands, brothers, and husbands could serve as
an incentive for women to join violent extremist groups to regain self-esteem and
empowerment. Officially, by the beginning of 2016, the unemployment of Kyrgyz
women was 48.9%, meaning living independently is highly unlikely whereas ISIS beckons
women with the possibility of employment and salaries competitive to their male
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 37
counterparts.51 Although a highly misogynist organization, ISIS did offer free, spacious
housing to its foreign fighters, food and propane allowances, and invited female foreign
fighters to join the hisbah, or ISIS morality police, taking positions of authority in the ISIS
community. Hisbah female members answer to almost no one and enjoy high status in
the ISIS community, which may offer more freedom and power to Kyrgyz women than
those from rural backgrounds would normally enjoy. Likewise, the materialistic benefits
may entice them.
Some explained that to challenge extremism, one must also stand up to traditional
patriarchal and traditional gender roles that suppress women’s participation in private
and public life—to empower them so that foreign enticements hold less power for
them. In this regard, the role of women’s influence and power in a Kyrgyz family
remains a highly-debated issue, particularly in the southern Uzbek communities, and
empowering them to choose between traditional and more modern roles is likely a
difficult task fraught with potential repercussions both positive and negative. When it
comes to allowing and enabling women to participate in counter radicalization and
counterterrorism efforts, future CVE strategies must also ensure that they do not too
strongly threaten traditional relationships between genders within certain
[conservative] communities and cultures in Kyrgyzstan in ways that might create a
backlash to these initiatives or outright rejection of them.
There is a need to reach out to parents whose offspring and spouses of those who have
died in Iraq and Syria and who still hold strong beliefs and convictions about their
relative’s involvement in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict. Those who are grieving family
members who died in Syria and Iraq for ISIS may refer to them as heroic or “martyrs.” In
this regard, it is necessary to provide assistance and support to such families to help
them in their grief while also speaking out against terrorism, as glorifying involvement in
groups like ISIS just promotes more involvement. This is especially important so as to
prevent a further radicalization cycle within the families and communities these
relatives are influencing. While dealing with trauma is difficult, it is equally important to
understand and investigate emotional and psychological dimensions of women,
including of their family members in general, who are mourning their children’s death
and struggling to come to terms with the death of their loved ones in the service of a
terrorist group. It is also important not to collectively penalize the whole family for their
adult children’s involvement or for feeling confused about their son or daughter having
made the ultimate sacrifice for a cause that unlikely represents the mother or spouse’s
true feelings.
51
See http://www.easttime.ru/news/kyrgyzstan/bezrabotitsa-v-kyrgyzstane-na-nachalo-2016-
goda/10697
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 38
52
Interview, S, MJ., October 19, 2016.
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 39
intervention could have been and then begin constructing them in ways that are truly
effective.
There should also be a clear conceptualization on what the role of Kyrgyzstan women
should be in relation to:
1) Challenging violent ideology and promoting moderate teachings and
moderate views of Islam
2) Understanding and being fully equipped to speak back about the false claims
of extremist groups, including their materialist and utopian claims
3) Equipping women with powerful prevention tools and training
4) Preventing recruitment
5) Supporting and engaging directly with those vulnerable through interventions
in communities and prisons
6) Focusing on community resilience; and
7) Addressing grievances, perceived or real, that are exploited by extremists
during the radicalization process.
This research revealed both national and international actors’ resolve in not only
identifying and diverting violent extremism but also supporting women and their
families in disengaging from violent extremism. In the context of the latter, the
respondents stressed the need to establish appropriate referral mechanisms for services
to help radicalized individuals and the families of radicalized individuals—services that
now barely exist.
The common theme that emerged during the interviews was that referral mechanisms
are important in mobilizing all qualified stakeholders to deliver effective preventative
interventions that cater to individual needs. In other words, referral mechanisms allow
for mobilizing qualified and credible professionals to deliver effective interventions. This
is especially important given that law enforcement and security professionals may not
necessarily possess the required skillsets and expertise, and requiring training and
support. There also needs to be transparency when it comes to criteria used to select
actors (e.g. civil society, non-governmental, etc.) to participate in such a mechanism.
There also needs to be transparency on how interventions are assessed and what it is
comprised of, as there is a need to be transparent on how referral information is
retained/shared with others. Equally important, there need to be clear guidelines that
spell out the relationship with the government (e.g. law enforcement) and how referral
information is shared with them for preventative and investigative purposes.
Finally, we encourage future research on these topics to also include in-depth interviews
with returnees from Syria and Iraq now in prison and their female family members
residing in their respective communities to gain additional perspectives on their
trajectory into terrorism and how they might rehabilitate, and to learn more about
women’s roles in these groups. We recommend in-depth and psychological interviews
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 40
with these populations of returnees and their wives, some of whom also spent time as
ISIS members, and their mothers and sisters to learn more details about women’s
involvement in the groups and how prevention might have occurred and could occur in
the future.
Summary
Kyrgyz citizens have, unfortunately, been seduced into joining the conflict in Syria and
Iraq, including joining ISIS ranks, in large numbers compared to other countries in the
Central Asian region. Kyrgyz authorities are working hard and effectively to curb travel
to the conflict areas in Iraq and Syria and to prevent and intervene in the radicalization
process both among Kyrgyz migrant workers and on the ground in Kyrgyzstan. With
continued efforts to stand up hotlines, create rapid intervention teams, fight against and
remove ISIS propaganda, arrest recruiters and, most importantly, address the
vulnerabilities that exist among the population that resonate with terrorist claims, the
country is headed in the right path and towards diminishing further extremist activities
in the country.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS:
Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown
University in the School of Medicine and Director of the International Center for the
Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) where she heads the Breaking the ISIS Brand—ISIS
Defectors Interviews Project. She is the author of: Talking to Terrorists, Bride of ISIS and
coauthor of ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate; Undercover Jihadi;
and Warrior Princess. Dr. Speckhard has interviewed nearly 500 terrorists, their family
members and supporters in various parts of the world including Gaza, West Bank,
Chechnya, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and many countries in Europe. In 2007, she was
responsible for designing the psychological and Islamic challenge aspects of the
Detainee Rehabilitation Program in Iraq to be applied to 20,000 + detainees and 800
juveniles. She is a sought after counterterrorism experts and has consulted to NATO,
OSCE, foreign governments and to the U.S. Senate & House, Departments of State,
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Health & Human Services, CIA and FBI and CNN,
BBC, NPR, Fox News, MSNBC, CTV, and in Time, The New York Times, The Washington
Post, London Times and many other publications. Her publications are found here:
https://georgetown.academia.edu/AnneSpeckhardWebsite: http://www.icsve.org
Ardian Shajkovci, Ph.D. - is the Director of Research and a Senior Research Fellow at the
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE). He has been collecting
interviews with ISIS defectors and studying their trajectories into and out of terrorism as
well as training key stakeholders in law enforcement, intelligence, educators, and other
Analysis of Drivers of Radicalization and Extremism in Kyrgyzstan 41