I.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
- That branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines the
competence of the administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual
remedies for the violation of his rights.

Powers of Administrative Bodies.

1. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
- This is the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power

- Proceedings partake of the character of judicial proceedings.
- Administrative body is normally granted the authority to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, provided they do not increase, diminish or modify substantive rights, and
subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5(5), Art VIII, Constitution].
- The requisites of procedural due process must be complied with.

3. Determinative powers
1. Enabling: to permit or allow something which the law undertakes to regulate, e.g.,
grant or denial of licenses to engage in a particular business.
2. Directing: illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or the Bureau of
Customs.
3. Dispensing: to exempt from a general prohibition,or relieve an individual or
corporation from an affirmative duty, e.g., authority of zoning boards to vary provisions
of zoning ordinances, or the authority of the Acceptance Board of the Philippine Army to
relieve certain persons from military training.
4. Examining: also called the investigatory power; consists in requiring production of
books, papers, etc., the attendance of witnesses and compelling their testimony.

A. Definition and Scope

2. Kinds:
a) Statutes setting up administrative authorities.
b) Rules, regulations or orders of such administrative authorities promulgated pursuant to
the purposes for which they were created.
c) Determinations, decisions and orders of such administrative authorities made in the
settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.
d) Body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and effect of
determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities.

3. Administration.
a) Meaning. Understood in two different senses:
 i) As a function: the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law or will of the State as
expressed by competent authority.
ii) As an organization: that group or aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of
government are for the time being.

b) Distinguished from government.

c) Kinds:
i) Internal: legal side of public administration, e.g., matters concerning personnel, fiscal
and planning activities.
ii) External: deals with problems of government regulations, e.g., regulation of lawful
calling or profession, industries or businesses.

B. Administrative Agencies

1. Definition
1. Defined. Organ of government, other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects
the rights of private parties either through adjudication or rule-making.
2. Creation. They are created either by:
a) Constitutional provision;
b) Legislative enactment; or
c) Authority of law.

3. Criterion: A body or agency is administrative where its function is primarily regulatory even if
it conducts hearings and determines controversies to carry out its regulatory duty. On its rule-
making authority, it is administrative when it does not have discretion to determine what the law
shall be but merely prescribes details for the enforcement of the law.

4. Types:
TYPE Example
a) Bodies set up to function in situations Bureau of Lands.
where the government is offering some
gratuity, grant or special privilege
b) Bodies set up to function in situations BIR
wherein the government is seeking to carry on
certain of the actual business of government,
c) Bodies set up to function in situations MWSS
wherein the government is performing some
business service for the public
d) Bodies set up to function in situations LTFRB.
wherein the government is seeking to regulate
business affected with public interest
e) Bodies set up to function in situations SEC
wherein the government is seeking under the
police power to regulate private business and
 individuals
f) Bodies set up to function in situations ECC
wherein the government is seeking to adjust
individual controversies because of a strong
social policy involved
g) Bodies set up to make the government a GSIS.
private party

Sec. 2(4), (11), Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including
a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein.|

(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate,

administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the
principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or
council.

Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 90482 (1991)

DOCTRINE:
It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. 

An administrative agency is defined as “[a] government body charged with administering and
implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers’ compensation commissions, and
the like. The term ‘agency’ includes any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority, board or bureau.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Whether the Sugar Regulatory Administration may
Republic Planters Bank (RPB) filed a lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of
complaint in the RTC for sum of the Philippines - NO
money/delivery of personal property
with restraining order and/or HELD:
preliminary injunction against The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner
Philippine Sugar Commission Sugar Regulatory Administration may not lawfully
(PHILSUCOM) and the National bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the
Sugar Trading Corporation Philippines and that the Office of the Government
(NASUTRA). Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to
represent said petitioner in this case.
They asked the court to order
PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA to Section 3 of said Executive Order 18, s. 1986
render a faithful account of different enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but
bank accounts being held; to render a it does not specifically include the power to represent
 faithful inventory of all the sugar the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or
stocks for the crop year 84-85; to against it, nor the power to sue and be sued although
remit dollar accounts held; to deliver it has the power to "enter, make and execute
sugar stocks of crop year 84-85; pay routinary contracts as may be necessary for or
interests and penalties for accounts incidental to the attainment of its purposes between
covered by unpaid sugar quedans, any persons, firms, public or private, and the
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of Government of the Philippines" and "[t]o do all such
the suit other things, transact such other businesses and
PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA perform such functions directly or indirectly
entered into a Compromise incidental or conducive to the attainment of the
Agreement. purposes of the Sugar Regulatory Administration."
It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA
Private respondents assert that the the power to represent the Republic of the
SRA and RPB do not have the legal Philippines in suits filed by or against the latter.
authority to sue for and in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines. The words or authorized by the President are not
found in the law. We are not aware of any law,
They further argued that petitioners decree or executive order which amended Section 1
have no legal personality to initiate the of P.D. No. 1415 by inserting therein said words.
instant petition for SRA is not a party Besides, even granting for the sake of argument that
in the case before the trial court; the such words are written into the law, such exception
only reason why it became involved cannot confer upon the OGCC authority to represent
was because of the contempt the SRA. The exception simply means that although
proceedings initiated by private the OGCC is theprincipal law office of all
respondents against SRA's Arsenio government-owned and controlled corporations
Yulo, Carlos Ledesma and Bibiano including their subsidiaries, the President may not
Sabino; RPB was a signatory to the allow it to act as lawyer for a specified government-
Compromise Agreement as a Trustee owned or controlled corporation or a subsidiary
and, as such, regarded itself as only a thereof. It will be noted that under Section 1 of P.D.
nominal party and in a series of No. 478 the President may authorize the OSG to
pleadings it recognized the final and represent government-owned or controlled
executory nature of the decision corporations. In short, the exception limits, rather
approving the compromise agreement. than expands, the authority of the OGCC. Thus, the
so-called approval by the Executive Secretary of the
request of OGCC to represent the SRA is based on an
erroneous interpretation of the law.

Only the Solicitor General can bring or defend

actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
and that actions filed in the name of the Republic if
not initiated by the Solicitor General will be
summarily dismissed.

2. Creation and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

Eugenio vs. CSC, G.R. No. 115863 (1995)
DOCTRINE:

It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished
by the legislature.
FACTS: ISSUE:
Whether CESB can only be abolished by the
Deputy Director of the Philippine legislature - YES
Nuclear Research Institute, Eugenio
applied for a Career Executive Service HELD:
(CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank.
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive
On August 2, 1993, she was given a Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential
CES eligibility. On September 15, Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which
1993, she was recommended to the adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan. 
President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB
was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of
Service Commission passed rulings that the creation and abolition of public
ResolutionNo.93-4359. Part of it says offices is primarily a legislative function.
“Foregoing premises considered, the
Civil Service Commission hereby From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
resolves to streamline, reorganize and autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
effect changes in its organizational respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be
Executive Service Board, shall now be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of
known as the Office for Career building up executive manpower in the government
Executive Service of the Civil Service with a broad and positive outlook.” The essential
Commission.” (Basically wala na autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by
CESO) its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
Petitioner filed an action to nullify Res control of respondent Commission.
No. 93-4359 stating that the CSC
usurped the Legislative functions of
congress (in violation of the
constitution) when it abolished CESB
(an office created by law)

Sec. 31 in relation to Secs. 21-23, Book III, Administrative Code

SECTION 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. — The

President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any
of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System,
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of
the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies.

CHAPTER 8 - Organization of the Office of the President

SECTION 21. Organization. — The Office of the President shall consist of the Office of the
President Proper and the agencies under it.

SECTION 22. Office of the President Proper. — (1) The Office of the President Proper shall
consist of the Private Office, the Executive Office, the Common Staff Support System, and the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System;

(2) The Executive Office refers to the Offices of the Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive
Secretaries and Assistant Executive Secretaries;

(3) The Common Staff Support System embraces the offices or units under the general
categories of development and management, general government administration and internal
administration; and

(4) The Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System includes such special assistants or
advisers as may be needed by the President.

SECTION 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President. — The agencies under the
Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President,
those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any special
department.
Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012)
DOCTRINE:

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.

E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.

FACTS: ISSUE:

In 2001, PGMA issued EO 12 creating WON E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR

the Presidential Anti-Graft USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO
with the power to investigate or hear ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES - NO
administrative cases or complaints for
possible graft and corruption against
presidential appointees.In 2010, HELD:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
issued (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGCThe President has Continuing Authority to
and transferring its functions to theReorganize the Executive Department under E.O.
Office of the Deputy Executive 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O.
Secretary for Legal 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
Affairs
(ODESLA). 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority
to reorganize the offices under him in order to
Respondent Finance Secretary Cesar achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. 
V. Purisima filed before the IAD-
ODESLA a complaint affidavit for Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of
grave misconduct against petitioner its functions to a division specially created within the
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
the Board of Trustees of the Local President under his continuing "delegated legislative
Water Utilities Administration authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to
(LWUA) which arose from the E.O. 292. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a
purchase of LWUA of shares of stock virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure
 of Express Savings Bank, Inc. of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him
to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move
Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam because a of transferring functions and offices from one unit to
case is already pending before the another
Office of the Ombudsman.
Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
Moreover, petitioner assails the President Proper, the reorganization by way of
constitutionality of EO 13. He abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to
contends that the President is not the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of
authorized under any existing law to E.O. 292.
create the Investigative and The abolition of the PAGC did not require the
Adjudicatory Division, Office of the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal duties and functions that pertained to the defunct
Affairs (IAD-ODESLA). anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the
Office of the President Proper. The reorganization
required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the

reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating
corruption in the government and promoting
economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed,
the economical effects of the reorganization is shown
by the fact that while Congress had initially
appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in
the 2010 annual budget,no separate or added funding
of such a considerable amount was ever required
after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-
ODESLA.

PETITION DISMISSED.

Biraogo, supra
DOCTRINE:

“Commission’s members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims,

and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past
abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and
recommend institutional reforms.”

To say that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is borne out of a restructuring of the
Office of the President under Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
292, is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
“restructure”—an “alteration of an existing structure”—the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Is the PTC a valid office?
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July HELD:
30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the No, although it was validly created. The creation of
President with the primary task to offices is primarily a legislative function, but the
investigate reports of graft and President may do so either from a valid delegation
corruption committed by third-level from Congress or his inherent duty as Chief
public officers and employees, their Executive on ensuring faithful execution. The PTC is
co-principals, accomplices and not created from the restructuring of the Office of the
accessories during the previous President as it was only recently created. The allowed
administration, and to submit its forms of restructuring are: (1) abolish/consolidate
finding and recommendations to the offices, (2) transfer office from OP to dept and vv,
President, Congress and the and (3) transfer function from OP to dept and vv. The
Ombudsman. PTC would have been constitutional if not for
violating the equal protection clause (focuses only on
The Philippine Truth Commission Arroyo administration).
(PTC) is an ad hoc body formed under
the Office of the President with the
primary task of investigating reports
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in
of graft and corruption committed by
other countries which have been created as official,
third-level public officers and
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies “to
employees during the previous
establish the facts and context of serious violations of
administration. The PTC shall have all
human rights or of international humanitarian law in
the powers of an investigative body
a country’s past.” They are usually established by
but not of a quasi-judicial body. 
states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
PTC has all the powers of an transitional justice.
investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or Truth commissions have been described as bodies
render awards in disputes between that share the following characteristics:
contending parties. All it can do is
 gather, collect and assess evidence of (1) they examine only past events;
graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over
subpoena powers but it has no power a period of time, as opposed to a particular event;
to cite people in contempt, much less
(3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
with the submission of a report containing
finding body, it cannot determine from
conclusions and recommendations; and
such facts if probable cause exists as
to warrant the filing of an information (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or
in our courts of law. Petitioners empowered by the State.
asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions.

3. Control of Administrative Action

Sec. 17, Art. VII;
Secs. 21-22, Art. VI;
Sec.1, Art. VIII;
Secs 12-13, Art. XI;
Art. 7, Civil Code

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof.

SECTION 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating
to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use
of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit
for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and
with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
 (8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Mondano vs. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708 (1955)

DOCTRINE:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DEPARTMENT HEAD AS AGENT OF THE PRESIDENT
HAS DlRECT CONTROL ONLY OVER BUREAUS AND OFFICES UNDER His
JURISDICTION BUT NOT OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—The department head as
agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does
not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined
to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over
which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law (section 10,
paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department
head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that
reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in
office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10,
article VII, of the Constitution.

The provincial supervision over municipal officials is lodged in the provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers
for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." (Section 2188, Revised
Administrative Code). If the charges are serious he shall refer the matter to the provincial
board and "may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
officer in question." (Ibid.) But where, as in the present case, the municipal officer was
charged with rape and concubinage which have nothing to do with the perf ormance of his
duties as mayor of the municipality nor do they constitute or involve neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office, as provided for in
section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the
provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. Hence, his suspension as mayor of the
municipality is unlawful and without authority of law.

FACTS: ISSUE:

The petitioner is the duly elected and Whether the investigation the provincial board the
qualified mayor of the municipality of charges against the petitioner, municipal mayor of
Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any
February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de of those specified in the Revised Administrative
Mosende filed a sworn complaint with Code is authorized and legal - NO
the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee accusing him of (1)
rape committed on her daughter HELD:
Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the
daughter in a place other than the Constitution provides: "The President shall have
conjugal dwelling. control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local
Assistant Executive Secretary governments as may be provided by law, and take
indorsed the complaint to the care that the laws be faithfully executed."
respondent provincial governor for
immediate investigation, appropriate Under this constitutional provision the President has
action and report. been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of
The provincial governor issued all local governments over which he has been granted
Administrative Order No. 8 only the power of general supervision as may be
suspending the petitioner from office. provided by law.

Thereafter, the Provincial Board The Department head as agent of the President has
proceeded to hear the charges direct control and supervision over all bureaus and
preferred against the petitioner over offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in
his objection. section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code,
but he does not have the same control of local
The petitioner prays for a writ of governments as that exercised by him over bureaus
prohibition with preliminary and offices under his jurisdiction.
injunction to enjoin the respondents
from further proceeding with the Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of
hearing of the administrative case any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
against him and for a declaration that bureau or office under his department is confined to
the order of suspension issued by the bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not
respondent provincial governor is extend to local governments over which, as already
illegal and without legal effect. stated, the President exercises only general
supervision as may be provided by law.
 In administrative law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.

The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged

the provincial supervision over municipal officials in
the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive
and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude."

The charges preferred against the petitioner,

municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not
being those or any of those specified in section 2188
of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation
of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the
petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is,
consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.

Supervision
Overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform these duties.
Control
the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.

Hontiveros vs. TRB, G.R. No. 181293 (2013)

DOCTRINE:

Same; Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; The doctrine of qualified political agency
declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the
President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through
executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of
the President unless disapproved by the latter.

Same; Same; There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President,
unless repudiated by the latter.—There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the
act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the
DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true
even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on 24 January 2006,
specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into
by the TRB.

FACTS: ISSUE:

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the
created on 31 March 1977 by DOTC Secretary was valid - YES
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in
order to supervise and regulate, on HELD:
behalf of the government, the
collection of toll fees and the Approval of the AS TOA by the DOTC Secretary
operation of toll facilities by the was approval by the President, unless repudiated
private sector. by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA
by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as
On the same date, P.D. 1113 was approval by the President. The same would be
issued granting to the Construction true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in
and Development Corporation of the which the President, on 24 January 2006,
Philippines (now Philippine National specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the
Construction Corporation or PNCC) authority to approve contracts entered into by the
the right, privilege, and authority to TRB..
construct, operate, and maintain toll
facilities in the North and South Luzon
Toll Expressways for a period of 30 The doctrine of qualified political agency declares
years starting 1 May 1977. that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the
circumstances require the President to act personally,
TRB and PNCC later entered into a executive and administrative functions are exercised
Toll Operation Agreement, which through executive departments headed by cabinet
prescribed the operating conditions of secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of
the right granted to PNCC under P.D. the President unless disapproved by the latter.
1113.
As explained in Villena v. Executive Secretary, 67
Phil. 451 (1939), this doctrine is rooted in the
On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Constitution: x x x With reference to the Executive
Philippines, through the TRB, Department of the government, there is one purpose
CMMTC, and PNCC executed the which is crystal clear and is readily visible without
assailed Amendment to the the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
Supplemental Toll Operation establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
Agreement (ASTOA).
Petitioners claim that the approval by
the DOTC Secretary of the AS TOA
could not take the place of the
presidential approval required under
P.D. 111344 and P.D. 189445
concerning the franchise granted to
PNCC.
The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with
the enunciation of the principle that “The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.” This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold
office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the President’s
bosom confidence,” and, in the language of Attorney-
General Cushing, “are subject to the direction of the
President.”
Without minimizing the importance of the heads of
the various departments, their personality is in reality
but the projection of that of the President. Stated
otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief
Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United
States, “each head of a department is, and must be,
the President’s alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.” Secretaries of departments, of
course, exercise certain powers under the law but the
law cannot impair or in any way affect the
constitutional power of control and direction of the
President.
As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted
departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this
is by mere concession of the executive, in the
absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If
the President, then, is the authority in the Executive
Department, he assumes the corresponding
responsibility. The head of a department is a man of
his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is
the executive, not any of his secretaries.
In this case, petitioners raise the power of Congress
to grant franchises as a constitutional question. They
allege that the execution of the ASTOA and the
MOA, the approval of the AS TOA by the DOTC
Secretary and the issuance of the TOC infringed on
 the constitutional power of Congress, which has the
sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of
public utilities. This Court has had a few occasions to
rule that a franchise from Congress is not required
before each and every public utility may operate.
Unless there is a law that specifically requires a
franchise for the operation of a public utility,
particular agencies in the executive branch may issue
authorizations and licenses for the operation of
certain classes of public utilities.79 In the instant
case, there is no law that states that a legislative
franchise is necessary for the operation of toll
facilities.

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs. IAC, 146 SCRA 294 (1986)

DOCTRINE:
The power of Philippine Gamefowl Commission over mayors in granting local cockpit
licenses is merely to supervise that the latter complies with its guidelines. It cannot disapprove
a license granted by the mayor and ipso facto issue a cockpit license to another.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Does the PGC have the power to issue the license?
This case involves a conflict of
jurisdiction between the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission and the HELD:
municipal government of Bogo, Cebu,
both of which claim the power to issue No. It is the municipal mayor, with authority of
licenses for the operation of cockpits in Sanggunian, who can issue such permits. The PGC
the said town. can only supervise mayors in granting licences,
but not review, disapprove, or substitute judgment
The issue arose when Hee Acusar, who (these now constitute control, which the PGC does
was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, not have).
was ordered to relocate the same
pursuant to P.D. No. 449, the When it comes to ordinary, local cockpits, it is the
Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the mayor with the authority of the Sanggunian and on
ground that it was situated in a tertiary the basis of guidelines issued by the Philippine
commercial zone, a prohibited area. 1 Gamefowl Commission, who has primary
Although the period of grace for such authority to issue permits. PGC licensing power is
relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 limited to international derbies only.
by P.D. 1535, Acusar failed to comply
with the requirement, as a result of which The substantial evidence in this case shows that
the Philippine Constabulary considered Hee Acusar's existing cockpit falls within the
the cockpit phased out. To add to his prohibited zone. His license was, therefore,
troubles, the Court of First Instance of correctly revoked by the mayor for failure to
Cebu, in a petition to compel the relocate within the time given and he cannot thus
municipal mayor to issue Acusar a invoke the prior operator rule.—
permit to operate a cockpit, declared that
he had waived his right to a renewal
thereof because of his failure to relocate.

An order to
relocate was
given under
P.D. No. 449,
The
Cockfighting
Law, to Hee
Acusar
who was
operating the
lone cockpit in
Bogo. The
cockpit was
said to be
situated in a
tertiary
commercial
zone – a
prohibited
area. Mr.
Acusar,
however,
failed to
relocate during
the
grace period
granted to
him. Sevilla
was then
granted by
Mayor
Martinez a
license to
operate
cockpit.
Under the law,
only one
cockpit is
allowed by
law in cities or
municipalities
with a
population
of not more
than one
hundred
thousand. In
line with this,
he can’t
operate a
cockpit
anymore
in the said
place. Acusar
went to the
Philippine
Gamefowl
Commission
seeking a
renewal of
his cockpit
license and the
cancellation of
Sevilla's.
Philippine
Gamefowl
Commission
then issued its
resolution on
the merits of
Acusar's
petition
and ordered
Mayor
Martinez and
the
Sangguniang
Bayan "to
issue the
necessary
mayor's
permit in favor
of Hee
Acusar" and
"to cancel
and/or revoke
the mayor's
permit in favor
of
Engr. Santiago
A. Sevilla
Acusar was supposed to relocate his
cockpit in Bogo, Cebu but failed to do so
in time. As such, the CFI deemed that he
has waived his rights to the cockpit.
Mayor Martinez now issued the license
to Sevilla to which Acusar objected.
After the Court dismissed his complaint,
he went to the Phil Gamefowl
Commission to have his  license re-
issued and succeeded. 

An order to
relocate was
given under
P.D. No. 449,
The
Cockfighting
Law, to Hee
Acusar
who was
operating the
lone cockpit in
Bogo. The
cockpit was
said to be
situated in a
tertiary
commercial
zone – a
prohibited
area. Mr.
Acusar,
however,
failed to
relocate during
the
grace period
granted to
him. Sevilla
was then
granted by
Mayor
Martinez a
license to
operate
cockpit.
Under the law,
only one
cockpit is
allowed by
law in cities or
municipalities
with a
population
of not more
than one
hundred
thousand. In
line with this,
he can’t
operate a
cockpit
anymore
in the said
place. Acusar
went to the
Philippine
Gamefowl
Commission
seeking a
renewal of
his cockpit
license and the
cancellation of
Sevilla's.
Philippine
Gamefowl
Commission
then issued its
resolution on
the merits of
Acusar's
petition
and ordered
Mayor
Martinez and
the
Sangguniang
Bayan "to
issue the
necessary
mayor's
permit in favor
of Hee
Acusar" and
"to cancel
and/or revoke
the mayor's
permit in favor
of
Engr. Santiago
A. Sevil
Macalintal vs. COMELEC, supra
DOCTRINE:
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to “issue
the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within
sixty days from the effectivity of this Act.” This provision of law follows the usual procedure in
drafting rules and regulations to implement a law—the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in
recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.47
Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only
if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve,
review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.

FACTS: ISSUE:
1. WON RA 9189 is constitutional - YES
Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a 2. WON the provision that Congress shall
member of the Philippine Bar, sought “review, revise, amend and approve the
to declare certain provisions of Implementing Rules and Regulations
Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An promulgated by the Commission” is valid - NO
Act Providing for A System of
Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines HELD:
Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as
unconstitutional. Petitioner contended 1. YES (except for some provisions). Contrary
that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d) circumvents
because it violates Section 1, Article V the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
of the 1987 Constitution which prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting
requires that thevoter must be a in compliance with the constitutional mandate.
resident in the Philippines for at least Such mandate expressly requires that Congress
one year and in the place where he provide a system of absentee voting that
proposes to vote for at least six necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen
months immediately preceding anm of the Philippines abroad" is not physically
election.  present in the country. The provisions of Sections
5(d) and 11 are components of the system of
Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No.
in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed
support his claim. In that case, the the affidavit is deemed to have retained his
Court held that a "green card" holder domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to
immigrant to the United States is have lost his domicile by his physical absence
deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the
Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section
1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature
should not be allowed to circumvent
the requirement of the Constitution on
the right of suffrage by providing a 2.
condition thereon which in effect
amends or alters the aforesaid
residence requirement to qualify a
Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act."
the right of suffrage should not be
granted to anyone who, on the date of
the election, does not possess the
qualifications provided for by Section
1, Article V of the Constitution.
from this country. His having become an
immigrant or permanent resident of his host
country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore,
under the law, he must be given the opportunity
to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile the Philippines by executing the
affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the
law.
NO. By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No.
9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC
to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to
effectively implement the provisions of this Act
This provision of law follows the usual procedure
in drafting rules and regulations to implement a
law — the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and
regulations implementing the law it has enacted,
in recognition of the administrative expertise of
that agency in its particular field of operation.
Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and
complete. The legislative function may spring
back to Congress relative to the same law only if
that body deems it proper to review, amend and
revise the law, but certainly not to approve,
review, revise and amend the IRR of the
COMELEC. By vesting itself with the powers to
approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority.

PUNO:
1. NO. The intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission to apply the
residence requirements to absentee voters is evident from its deliberations. They precisely
used the phrase "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD" to stress that the absentee voter
must have all the qualifications in Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution. In the course
of the deliberations, Fr. Bernas perceived a problem that may arise from the meaning of
the second residence requirement on the place of registration and voting. As noted, a
qualified voter normally registers and votes in the place where he is domiciled or has
 resided for six months. Fr. Bernas feared that the second residence requirement may pose
a constitutional obstacle to absentee voting "unless the vote of the person who is absent is
a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile." 

Physical presence is not a mere test of intent but the "principal confirming evidence of the
intention of the person." Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a domiciliary of
another country. Until then, he does not possess the necessary requisites and therefore,
cannot be considered a qualified voter.

2. NO. The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the
constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed
with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its
responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our
election laws belongs to this categoryof powers as this has been vested exclusively by the
1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the
exercise of its oversight powers.

If IRR is illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the courts can strike them down
inan appropriate case. This power is vested to the courts under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution defining the scope of judicial power, and more specifically under Section
5, Article VIII empowering this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, "all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question."

Again, this power is exclusive and is not meant to be shared by any other branch or
agency of the government.

ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima, supra

DOCTRINE:

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to

present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself
or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove
such regulations before they take effect; Congress has two options when enacting legislation
to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence—it can itself
formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the

law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such
rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have
been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a
power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

FACTS: ISSUE:
Whether the IRR is valid - YES
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and HELD:
collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.  Administrative regulations enacted by administrative
agencies to implement and interpret the law which
The Department of Finance, they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
Department of Budget and and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations
Management, National Economic partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
Development Authority, Bureau of binding as if they have been written in the statute
Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law
and the Civil Service Commission and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
were tasked to promulgate and issue legality until they are set aside with finality in an
the implementing rules and regulations appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in
of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may
Congressional Oversight Committee not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
created for such purpose. stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
Abakada Guro Party list, invoking exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the
their right as taxpayers, filed a petition IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
questioning the constitutionality of RA conformed with the provisions of RA9335, Congress
9335. Among other things, they assail arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
the creation of a congressional exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution
oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of From the moment the law becomes effective, any
separation of powers. While the provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
legislative function is deemed its members to play any role in the implementation or
accomplished and completed upon the enforcement of the law violates the principle of
enactment and approval of the law, the separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
creation of the congressional oversight Under this principle,a provision that requires
committee  permits legislative Congress or its members to approve the
participation in the implementation implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
and enforcement of the law.  effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any
directive or ruling made by the members of the
executive branch charged with the implementation of
the law.

The requirement that the implementing rules of a law

be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule
on presentment. Legislative power (or the power to
propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in
Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate
and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of
legislative power requires the act of both chambers.
Corollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one
of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or
both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative
veto and a congressional committee legislative veto
are invalid.