Jurnal 2

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 36, 621– 648 (2000)
doi:10.1006/jesp.2000.1423, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on
Effects of Individual versus Mixed Individual and Group

Experience in Rule Induction on Group Member Learning
and Group Performance
Felix C. Brodbeck and Tobias Greitemeyer
Ludwig-Maximilians Universitaet, Munich, Germany
Received December 30, 1998; revised November 1, 1999; accepted December 13, 1999
This study investigated the effects of individual experience versus mixed individual and
group experience on individual and group performance in rule induction. Random series
of eight rule-induction tasks were performed by sets of three participants randomly
assigned to either individual training (performing all tasks in a nominal group) or to mixed
training (alternating nominal and collaborative group task performance). Subsequent
individual and group performance were measured. A general positive group-to-individual
transfer was shown. In the individual posttest, mixed-training participants performed error
checking more promptly and as a result generated fewer nonplausible final solutions than
did individual-training participants. In the group posttest, mixed-training groups were
superior in collective error checking and more effective in collective truth detection than
were individual-training groups. Discussion focuses on how group experience in rule
induction influences group member learning and subsequent group performance. © 2000
Academic Press
Groups are often employed for problem solving and decision making in
organizations because it is assumed that group task performance typically sur-
passes that of an individual working alone. This assumption has received em-
pirical support for a wide range of problem-solving tasks (e.g., Hill, 1982). The
group superiority over the average individual can be explained by the greater
number of resources in a group that allows for combination of individual
contributions. When group performance is evaluated against normative standards
The research reported in this article was made possible by grants from the German Research
Community (DFG, Fr 472/16-3/4) to the first author. We gratefully acknowledge the comments from
Elisabeth Brauner, Caroline Bush, Dieter Frey, John Levine, Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Michael West, and
three anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of this article and thank those who participated in
the study.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to Felix C. Brodbeck, Department of Psychology,
Ludwig-Maximilians Universitaet, Leopoldstrasse 13, 80802 Munich, Germany. E-mail:
Brodbeck@psy.uni-muenchen.de.
621
0022-1031/00 $35.00
Copyright © 2000 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
622 BRODBECK AND GREITEMEYER
that take combination of individual resources into account, empirical research

supports the view that groups most often fail to perform at the level of their
potential productivity or to surpass it (for reviews see, e.g., Brown, 1988; Gigone
& Hastie, 1997; Hare, Blumberg, Davies, & Kent, 1984; Hastie, 1986; Hill, 1982;
Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Lamm & Trommsdorf, 1973; Lorge, Fox,
Davitz, & Brenner, 1958; Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989; Steiner, 1972; Stroebe,
Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996). The evidence is basically in accord with the notion
of process loss in group performance (Steiner, 1972).
Process loss during social combination of individual resources is critical to the
productivity of work groups in applied settings. Thus, it is not surprising that this
issue has been widely studied by group researchers. However, group task
performance can serve other functions besides the social combination of indi-
vidual contributions. It can serve as a mechanism to enhance group-member
motivation and goal commitment (e.g., Anderson & Thomas, 1996) and it can
serve as a learning mechanism (for reviews see, e.g., Argote, 1993; Argote &
McGrath, 1993; Brodbeck, 1996; Hertz-Lazarowitz & Miller, 1992; Levine,
Resnick, & Higgins, 1993). In most laboratory group research, considerably less
attention has been given both to group-member learning and whole-group learn-
ing following from prior group task performance than to the processes by which
individual resources are combined to yield a group product (cf. Hinsz et al.,
1997). In the present study, we thus focused on investigating collaborative
performance in groups as a learning mechanism resulting in individual- and
group-level benefits.
Individual Profit from Group Task Performance

One focus of our study is on the possibility of positive group-to-individual
transfer (G-I transfer, cf. Laughlin & Sweeney, 1977) in which individual
performance is improved due to participation in a foregoing collaborative group
context. Prior group task participation has an influence on members’ knowledge
and skills for performing subsequent tasks individually by bringing about, for
example, exchange of individual concepts for effective problem solving (Stasson,
Kameda, Parks, Zimmermann, & Davis, 1991), interpersonal cognitive conflict
(Doise & Mugny, 1979), cognitive conflict resolution (Nastasi & Clements,
1992), and interpersonal correction of contradictions and errors (Azmitia &
Montgomery, 1993).
For problem-solving tasks, empirical evidence supports the existence of pos-
itive G-I transfer if the same task is performed first in the group context and
subsequently by individual members (e.g., Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Such indi-
vidual benefits have been labeled specific G-I transfer. The individual benefit that
extends to different problems of the same class has been designated general G-I
transfer (Stasson et al., 1991). Several studies that attempted to demonstrate
general G-I transfer for rule induction tasks have failed (e.g., Hollingshead, 1998;
Laughlin & Barth, 1981; Laughlin & Sweeney, 1977). Stasson et al. (1991)
presented evidence for general positive G-I transfer for mathematical problems
RULE INDUCTION 623
with demonstrably correct solutions. They reasoned that the ease with which
effective rules or strategies can be made evident and adopted by other group
members might determine the occurrence of general positive G-I transfer. They
further argued that the reason why general positive G-I transfer cannot be
demonstrated for rule induction is that in these tasks effective strategies cannot
be made evident easily and thus are not adopted by other group members.
In our view the failure to demonstrate general positive G-I transfer in rule
induction may have two other causes. First, in the previous studies of rule
induction, only one or two group tasks were induced. As shown in the work of
McGlynn and Schick (1973), it may take more than one or two tasks for learning
effects to occur. Second, previous studies mainly focused on strategies for
detecting correct solutions rather than on strategies for rejecting nonplausible
solutions (e.g., Crott, Giesel, & Hoffmann, 1998; Hollingshead, 1998; Laughlin,
Bonner, & Altermatt, 1999; Laughlin, Magley, & Shupe, 1997). As is described
in more detail below, strategies for rejecting nonplausible solutions in rule
induction should be easy to demonstrate, and thus, according to Stasson et al.’s
(1991) reasoning, they should lead to general G-I transfer.
Rule induction is described by Laughlin and Hollingshead (1995) as the search
for descriptive, predictive, and explanatory generalizations, rules, and principles.
Individuals or members of a group observe patterns and regularities in a partic-
ular domain and propose hypotheses to account for them. They then evaluate the
hypotheses by observation and experiment and revise them accordingly. Re-
search teams, medical diagnostic teams, or audit teams conducting analytical
reviews use collective rule induction in various applied fields (cf. Laughlin,
VanderStoep, & Hollingshead, 1991). For rule-induction tasks as described by
Laughlin et al. there is an unlimited set of plausible hypotheses to start with. This
needs to be reduced via systematic testing of evidence during multiple task steps.
As the constraints imposed by the accumulation of evidence reduce the number
of possible hypotheses, the correct hypothesis (arbitrarily selected by the re-
searcher) acquires distinctiveness because of its relative simplicity or elegance
compared to other hypotheses that are also consistent with the evidence (Mc-
Glynn, Tubbs, & Holzhausen, 1995).
Demonstrability of hypothesis quality in rule induction. Inductive tasks are
both intellective and judgmental. For inductive tasks, any proposed hypothesis is
either plausible or nonplausible. Plausible hypotheses are consistent with avail-
able evidence, whereas nonplausible hypotheses are inconsistent with available
evidence. A proposed nonplausible hypothesis can be demonstrated to be incor-
rect by failing to correspond to the available evidence. As Laughlin and Holl-
ingshead (1995) describe it, this aspect of an induction task is intellective because
incorrectness can be made evident to other persons in a group context (high
demonstrability). One of the plausible hypotheses may be arbitrarily designated
as correct by a researcher in an experiment or by social consensus outside of an
experiment. A proposed plausible hypothesis cannot be demonstrated to be
uniquely correct relative to any other plausible hypothesis that is also consistent
with the available evidence. This aspect of rule induction is judgmental because
correctness cannot be unequivocally demonstrated (low demonstrability).
Demonstrability of strategies for optimal rule induction. Inductive reasoning
involves learning general systematic approaches or algorithms for hypothesis
generation and selection of instances to test the hypotheses generated, called
strategies (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Johnson, 1971; Laughlin, 1973).
For the subtask of generating plausible and rejecting nonplausible hypotheses
in multistep rule-induction tasks, we assumed that rather simple strategies of
error checking suffice to ensure that the likelihood of a nonplausible final
solution is reduced. Error checking is defined as the monitoring of interim
hypotheses for their correspondence with the available evidence. Error checking
can be performed in two ways, either by anticipative error avoidance or by post
hoc error management (cf. Frese & Zapf, 1994; Zapf, Brodbeck, Frese, Peters,
& Prümper, 1992). In the context of rule induction, error avoidance means
thoroughly checking an imagined hypothesis for potential errors before expli-
cating it; that is, before actually testing it (in the case of individual rule induction)
or before suggesting it to other group members (in the case of collective rule
induction). Error management means checking for potential errors when the
consequences of hypothesis explication are apparent, as when, for example,
actual hypothesis testing resulted in unexpected evidence (in the case of indi-
vidual rule induction) or when the communication of one’s individual hypothesis
to other group members resulted in unexpected disagreement (e.g., when group
members say, “The hypothesis you suggested can’t be plausible because of the
evidence obtained so far!”). In both instances an unexpected consequence casts
some doubt about the plausibility of the hypothesis under consideration and post
hoc checking for its correspondence with the available evidence seems to be a
sensible strategy for ensuring that a large number of plausible hypotheses are
tested in the course of the overall rule-induction task. Both types of error
checking (error avoidance and error management) are preconditions for optimal
performance of multistep rule-induction tasks. The more a correspondence be-
tween interim hypotheses and the available evidence is ensured, the more
efficiently can rule induction proceed. Furthermore, post hoc error management
is a strategy with high demonstrability in the group collaborative context because
it becomes self-evident during social episodes of mutual error checking. In
contrast, error avoidance is a strategy with low demonstrability in the group
collaborative context because it is performed privately (i.e., before hypothesis
explication), and thus it is not evident to other group members during collective
rule induction.
For the subtask of inducing correct hypotheses in multistep rule induction,
various strategies have been investigated in the literature (e.g., Laughlin et al.,
1997). Here we concentrate on the so-called “focusing” strategy, which describes
an effective and complex attribute-testing procedure for concept attainment
(Bruner et al., 1956; Laughlin, 1968; McGlynn & Schick, 1973). Focusing is
defined as a two-step attribute-testing strategy. A test of an initially held hypoth-
RULE INDUCTION 625
esis leads to the generation of a new hypothesis in which at least one attribute of
the original hypothesis has changed. A positive test result (i.e., confirmation of
the new hypothesis) indicates that the changed attribute is irrelevant, whereas a
negative instance (i.e., disconfirmation of the new hypothesis) indicates that the
changed attribute is relevant for hypothesis development (Laughlin, 1968,1973).
Complex hypothesis testing strategies, such as focusing, are less self-evident and
demonstrable in a collaborative group context than error-checking strategies such
as error management. As a more or less direct manifestation of Popper’s
Falsification Principle (Johnson, 1971; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Laughlin, 1973),
focusing is comparatively complex and difficult to understand. For a previously
unknown task context, as the rule-induction paradigm from Laughlin et al. (1991)
can be for university student participants, verbal explanation, extra effort, and
time are required to demonstrate the profitable application of focusing to others
in a group collaborative context. On the other hand, error management is
self-evident in the group collaborative context. Hypotheses that are proposed to
the group by one group member can be “checked” by others. When an incon-
sistency is diagnosed and pointed out in public, the underlying error-checking
strategy (and its effectiveness) is apparent and does not need to be further
elaborated or explicitly discussed with others.
In summary, generating plausible solutions in multistep rule-induction tasks is
assumed to be subject to general G-I transfer because in the group collaborative
context, effective error-checking strategies apparent in social episodes are self-
evident (high demonstrability) and thus can be adopted by group members. In
contrast, generating correct solutions is not assumed to be subject to general G-I
transfer because effective strategies of hypothesis testing, such as focusing, are
not self-evident during collective task performance (low demonstrability).
Hypothesis 1: General G-I transfer in rule induction occurs for error checking rather than
for hypothesis testing strategies.
Because error checking should increase the rejection rate of nonplausible

interim hypotheses during multistep rule induction, we further expect that general
G-I transfer for error checking extends to the quality of final solutions (i.e., lower
proportions of nonplausible final solutions).
Group Profit from Group Task Performance

The second focus of our study is on the possibility of whole-group learning.
Prior experience in group task participation also affects group functioning as a
whole, for example, via transactive memory systems (e.g., Liang, Moreland, &
Argote, 1995; Wegner, 1986), group-level integrative complexity (Gruenfeld &
Hollingshead, 1993), social processing of information (Davis & Harless, 1996),
and emergent abstract representations (Schwartz, 1995).
Since Marjorie Shaw (1932) published the hypothesis stating that collective
error correction results in superior group problem-solving performance, the idea
of groups as error checkers has remained salient in group research. However,

even today little is known about how and when face-to-face interaction serves to
correct individual-level errors (Tindale, 1993). And virtually no research has
addressed the question of whether group members and whole groups can improve
error-checking performance as a consequence of prior collaboration in problem-
solving tasks.
Studying the effects of G-I transfer on the use of error-checking strategies in
subsequent group performance gives insights into these issues. In rule induction,
nonplausible hypotheses are mainly uncorrelated among group members (cf.
Laughlin, 1988; Laughlin, Chandler, Shupe, Magley, & Hulbert, 1995; Laughlin
& Hollingshead, 1995; Laughlin et al., 1991) and therefore belong to the class of
“idiosyncratic errors” that are likely to be checked by groups (Davis & Harless,
1996). Thus, a nonplausible hypothesis suggested to the group by one group
member is likely to be demonstrated as incorrect by another group member. Such
an episode is evident and observable by each group member. The particular
error-management strategy implicit in this social episode (i.e., monitoring the
correspondence between a proposed hypothesis and the available evidence) can
be adopted by observation or by direct experience. Once adopted as a useful tool
for a particular task type, this strategy is likely to be employed in subsequent
individual performances of similar tasks (see Hypothesis 1 above). Furthermore,
error-checking skills adopted from prior collaborative work also can be profitably
employed in subsequent collaborative task performances. There is no plausible
reason to believe that error checking is performed only in a later individual task
setting. Thus, we expect that experience in collective rule induction also facili-
tates subsequent group performance in collective error checking.
Hypothesis 2: Experience in collective induction facilitates subsequent group performance

in collective error checking.
Because collective error checking should increase the rejection rate of non-
plausible interim hypotheses during multistep collective induction, we further
expect that group experience improves the quality of final solutions (i.e., lower
proportions of nonplausible final group solutions).
In summary, the present study addresses assumptions derived from prior
research and theorizing about small-group problem solving and group-member
learning. The basic assumption is that the demonstrability of effective task
performance strategies predicts general positive G-I transfer. More specifically,
we test the hypothesis that collaborative rule induction facilitates individual
learning of error-checking strategies rather than of hypothesis testing strategies.
Furthermore, it is expected that whole groups benefit from experience in collec-
tive induction. More specifically, groups experienced in collective induction
perform collective error checking better than inexperienced groups.
RULE INDUCTION 627
TABLE 1
Experimental Design
Pretest Posttest
Training condition Nominal Training phase Nominal Group
Individual training I I I I I I I I I G
Mixed training I G I G I G I G I G
Task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note. I ⫽ nominal group setting; G ⫽ collaborative group setting.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants were 132 students (48 women and 84 men) from German univer-
sities and technical colleges in Munich who received DM 30 (about $16) for their
participation. The experimental design was a mixed-factorial design with indi-
vidual training versus mixed individual and group training as a between-group
factor and repeated measurement (pretest and posttest) as a within-group factor.
Three stages of the experiment are distinguished (see Table 1): (a) the pretest at
Task 1 for measuring individual performance in a nominal group setting, (b) the
training phase from Task 2 to Task 8 in which the experimental conditions were
introduced, and (c) the posttest measuring individual performance in a nominal
group setting (Task 9) and whole-group performance in a collaborative setting
(Task 10).
Experimental task. The rule-induction paradigm as described in Laughlin et al.
(1991) was used (see also Hollingshead, 1998; Laughlin & Hollingshead, 1995).
A rule had to be induced that partitioned a deck of 52 playing cards with four
suits (clubs ⫽ C, diamonds ⫽ D, hearts ⫽ H, spades ⫽ S) of 13 cards (ace ⫽ 1,
two ⫽ 2, . . . , jacks ⫽ 11, queens ⫽ 12, kings ⫽ 13) into examples and
nonexamples of the rule. The instructions indicated that the rule could be based
on suit, number, color (red ⫽ r, black ⫽ b), or any combination of numerical and
logical operations on these attributes (e.g., odd ⫽ o, even ⫽ e). The rule sequence
length consisted of either three or four cards. Each trial began with a card that
was known to be an example of the rule. There were four types of rules: (a)
combination of suits (e.g., S-S-H-C), (b) combination of colors (e.g., r-r-b), (c)
combination of odd and even numbers (e.g., e-o-e), and (d) combination of color
and odd versus even numbers (e.g., ro-bo-re). The sequence length of the latter
type always amounted to three cards. A total of 10 different rules existed: r-r-b-b,
r-r-b, be-ro-be, bo-re-be, ro-so-re, S-D-S-D, e-o-e, C-C-S, e-e-o-e, and S-S-H-C.
The most difficult rule was S-S-H-C (32% solution rate) and the easiest rule was
r-r-b-b (71% solution rate). All 10 rules were permuted randomly across the 10
tasks in a way that two three-person groups, one for each experimental condition,
shared the same random sequence of tasks (sibling groups). Thus, task difficulty
was randomly distributed across task positions and balanced between experi-
mental conditions.
Procedure and Instructions

Participants were randomly assigned to sets of three people and to each
experimental condition. The experimenters made sure that well-acquainted indi-
viduals were not tested in the same group. At the very beginning, all participants
were informed that they could improve their capability for problem solving and
teamwork in this experiment. A practice task was conducted in order to acquaint
them with the general requirements for performing the experimental task accu-
rately. In each experimental condition, participants were informed about the
respective overall scheme of the 10 tasks (see Table 1). After the individual
pretest (Task 1), a series of 7 rule-induction tasks were performed by the sets of
three participants assigned to either individual training or mixed training. In the
individual-training condition, all rule-induction tasks were solved individually in
nominal groups of three persons. In the mixed-training condition, Task 2 was
solved collaboratively in a face-to-face group context, Task 3 was solved coac-
tively in a nominal group setting, Task 4 collaboratively, and so on until the 8th
rule-induction task. We considered at least four collective tasks to be necessary
for significant effects of social interaction on learning (cf. McGlynn & Schick,
1973; McGlynn et al., 1995). Individual and collective tasks were alternated so
that mixed-training participants had the opportunity to individually process and
practice whatever they may have observed or experienced during prior group
collaboration. The individual processing of social interactive experiences was
recently shown to be an important precondition for the occurence of positive G-I
transfer (Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). After the training phase, at Task 9,
individual performance was measured in the nominal group setting and at Task
10, group performance was measured in the collaborative setting.
Subjects were also asked to respond to questionnaire items before and after the
practice trial as well as before and after the posttests. After completion, the
experimenter thanked the participants and paid them for their participation,
explained the purpose of the experiment, answered any questions, and asked
them not to discuss the experiment with any potential future participants. The
experiment took around 4 h to complete.
Procedure for coactive performance of individual rule induction. Sets of three
participants performed the same task by themselves in the presence of the two
other group members. Communication was not allowed and the activities of other
group members concerning their rule-induction tasks and the feedback given by
the experimenter to interim hypotheses could not be observed. Confronted with
one card on the table that was an example of the rule, each individual noted an
interim hypothesis on a protocol sheet. Then, any of the 52 cards could be chosen
and placed to the right of the last example card of the rule. The card played was
also documented. The experimenter informed each participant whether the se-
lected card was an example or nonexample of the rule by nonverbal feedback;
RULE INDUCTION 629
that is, examples of the rule stayed at the right of the last example and nonex-
amples were placed below the last card played. No further feedback was given
during task performance. A maximum of 10 steps per task was allowed (each step
comprised individual hypothesis formation, card selection, and feedback). Fi-
nally, each player informed the experimenter about the final hypothesis and was
given feedback whether it corresponded with the target rule. This final outcome
feedback was made public to all group members as part of a cooperative reward
scheme (see below).
Procedure for collaborative performance of collective induction. Sets of three
participants performed the task collaboratively as a group. Confronted with one
card on the table that was an example of the rule, each group member noted an
interim hypothesis on a private protocol sheet. Then, group members decided
collectively on a group hypothesis (noting it in the group protocol) and on which
of the 52 cards to play (also noting it in the group protocol) in order to test their
group hypothesis. Next, the experimenter informed the group whether the se-
lected card was an example or nonexample of the rule by placing it on the
respective position. A maximum of 10 steps (individual and group hypothesis
formation, group card selection, and group feedback) per task was allowed.
Finally, the experimenter was informed about the final group hypothesis and gave
feedback about its correctness. A similar cooperative reward scheme as for
individual training was used (see below).
Time restriction. Individuals and groups worked under the same time restric-
tion of 10 min for each task. In the instruction, it was stated that time is irrelevant
to performance evaluation but that time limits would be strictly enforced and that
making use of all 10 steps would be most beneficial to problem solving. Under
time restriction, an increase in effectiveness of task performance strategies means
making more efficient use of the information given during either individual or
collective task performance.
Cooperative goal structure. In order to induce a sense of solidarity and
cooperation and to ensure comparable levels of group goal commitment and
motivation among members of all groups, the following circumstances were
introduced in both experimental conditions: (a) physical copresence of two other
group members, (b) the expectation of future collaboration between members, (c)
feedback on the correctness of the individuals’ and the groups’ final solutions
after each task, and (d) cooperative structure of monetary reward for correct
solutions per task. 1 Several measures were taken after the training phase to
control for motivational differences that might result from the different group
1
In addition to the financial reward given for participation, each individual was paid a bonus of up
to 15 German Marks (about $8) based on group performance in all 10 tasks. Per task, a maximum of
15 points could be achieved, either 5 points for every individual’s correct hypothesis in the individual
task format or 15 points for a correct group hypothesis in the collaborative task format. The number
of points achieved in each condition could reach a total maximum of 150, and 0.10 German Marks
per point were given to the group to be equally shared among group members. Points credited to
individual group members and the whole group for each task were displayed on a flip chart in such
settings (nominal vs collaborative) and could exert a confounding influence on

learning benefits we expected to ensue from mixed training. Before and after the
training phase no significant differences were found for various measures of
individual motivation (general and task-specific self-efficacy, cf. Jerusalem &
Schwarzer, 1981; preference of working alone vs collectively, cf. Davis, 1969;
self-orientedness vs collective orientation, cf. Wagner, 1995) and collective
motivation (interpersonal attractiveness and group task attractiveness, cf. Zac-
caro & McCoy, 1988). The only significant difference that was found indicated
that individual-training groups put greater faith in their collective efficacy (per-
ceived group potency, cf. Whitney, 1994) than did mixed-training groups [F(1,
42) ⫽ 6.03, p ⬍ .05]. This motivational effect is unlikely to be confounded
with learning benefits from mixed training because it points in the opposite
direction.
Dependent Variables
Performance measures. As noted in the individual and group protocol, correct,
plausible, and nonplausible hypotheses were assessed for each task step (interim
hypotheses), for the final solution (final hypothesis), for each person during
individual and collective rule induction, and for each group during collective rule
induction. A correct hypothesis exactly matches the arbitrarily selected rule. A
plausible hypothesis means that the assumed rule matches the available evidence
(the cards played) but not the correct rule. A nonplausible hypothesis means that
the available evidence does not match the proposed rule.
Individual error checking. Error checking was defined as either anticipative
error avoidance or post hoc error management. Error avoidance was operation-
alized as generating no nonplausible interim hypothesis throughout the task
before stating the final hypothesis. In this case, a raw score of 1.00 for optimal
error checking was given. When at least one nonplausible interim hypothesis
occurs during task performance, error management comes into play. It can be
performed either immediately at the next step of the task, at any other later stage,
or not at all throughout the task. Error management is operationalized as the
immediacy of correcting nonplausible interim hypotheses that occur during task
performance. If a nonplausible interim hypothesis is corrected promptly in a
subsequent task step (n ⫹ 1), error checking is again optimal (raw score ⫽
1.00). However, if a nonplausible hypothesis is not corrected at step n ⫹ 1 but
at step n ⫹ 2, a raw score of .50 (1 error/2 steps) is given. If a nonplausible
hypothesis is not corrected until step n ⫹ 3, the raw score is .33 (1 error/3 steps)
and so on. If nonplausible hypotheses are not corrected at all, a raw score of .00
results. The error-management formula also covers the case in which several
nonplausible hypotheses occur during one task. For example, if the first non-
a way that it was clear to the participants who had solved which problems and how many points were
earned by the whole group and each group member.
RULE INDUCTION 631
plausible hypothesis is corrected at step n ⫹ 1 and the second one is corrected

at step n ⫹ 2, the raw score is .75 (((1 error/1 steps) ⫹ (1 error/2 steps))/2
errors). Overall, this measure estimates the immediacy of error checking, from
very immediate by error avoidance or prompt error correction (raw values ⫽
1.00) to not at all (raw value ⫽ .00).
Error checking in a group collaborative context. Three aspects of error
checking in groups are differentiated. Individual error checking in a group
context is based on the individual interim hypotheses suggested during group
performance. It is measured with the formula described above. This variable
estimates the group members’ tendency to avoid or immediately correct their
own nonplausible hypotheses during collaborative problem solving. Group-level
error checking is based on the interim hypotheses resulting from group decision
making. It is also measured with the formula described above. This variable
estimates the tendency of a whole group to avoid or to immediately correct the
group decisional preference for nonplausible hypotheses. Mutual error checking
takes into account that a nonplausible hypothesis of one group member, once
made public, can be checked by other group members and thus is not adopted by
the whole group. With social decision scheme analysis (cf. Davis, 1973), the
conditional probabilities from all possible distributions of the quality of individ-
ual interim hypotheses (nonplausible vs plausible or correct) per task step to the
quality of the group level interim hypotheses (nonplausible vs plausible or
correct) were analyzed. This measure estimates how successful group members
are in rejecting individual nonplausible hypotheses suggested by one, two, or all
three of their group members.
Individual focusing. The truth-detection strategy of focusing was assessed on
the basis of the interim hypotheses suggested and the cards played, as noted in
the individual and group protocols. Several raters (blind to the experimental
conditions and assumptions) were trained to rate an instance of focusing by using
two rules (cf. Laughlin, 1973; McGlynn & Schick, 1973): First, a hypothesis or
card choice must contain information on one or more new attributes when
compared to a previous card choice. In the experiment, three or four cards fitting
the rule constitute one rule sequence. Thus, after finishing the first sequence,
participants should test attributes in relation to the cards played on the relevant
position in the first sequence. Focusing was scored when testing resulted in
information that was previously not proven irrelevant. Second, the hypotheses
following each card choice had to be tenable. The concept of focusing is clear on
rule-induction tasks with a specified number of attributes (e.g., Laughlin, 1973).
However, in the rule-induction paradigm from Laughlin et al. (1991) there is an
infinite number of possible attributes. Hence, the attributes to be considered by
the raters were limited to a finite set that covers most of the cases found in the
protocols, namely, number characteristics (odd vs even), color, and suit. By using
these attributes, focusing could be assessed in more than 95% of all cases. Some
further attributes (e.g., ascending or descending numbers) were also assessed if
the raters could identify them properly on the basis of the protocols. Interrater
reliability was established with two independent raters who coded the same N ⫽
40 tasks randomly chosen from the nominal pretest and posttest across the two
experimental conditions. The estimated interrater reliability was r ⫽ .96. In
order to obtain a proportional focusing score (distributed from .00 to 1.00), the
number of individual hypotheses that satisfied the two rules was divided by the
number of hypotheses proposed during one complete task.
Collective focusing. For collective focusing the same calculation as for indi-
vidual focusing was conducted for the group interim hypotheses. There is only
one measure for collective focusing because in the group context only the group
as a whole selects a card for hypothesis testing.
RESULTS
Logic of Analysis
Because we considered at least four collective tasks to be necessary for
significant effects of social interaction on learning (cf. McGlynn & Schick, 1973;
McGlynn et al., 1995) planned comparisons for pre- and posttest performance
between the experimental training conditions were conducted. For descriptive
and explorative purposes, performance data during the training phase were also
assessed. In Table 2, performance data for use of strategies (error checking and
focusing) and quality of final solutions (correct, plausible, and nonplausible) are
described across tasks (pretest, training phase, and posttests). Overall we were
interested in benefits to group members and to whole groups from mixed training
as compared to individual training. The analyses concentrating on group-member
benefits include an evaluation of how assigned training affects individual stra-
tegic behavior and the quality of final solutions. Furthermore, error-checking
strategies are explored as potential mediator variables for the hypothesized
association between mixed training and low proportions of nonplausible final
solutions. Analyses concentrating on group benefits include an examination of
how assigned training affects collective strategic behavior and the quality of final
group solutions. Furthermore, it is explored whether the hypothesized general
G-I transfer for individual error checking extends to group performance.
Individual Performance Issues

Individual benefits in performance strategies. We first examined differences in
the use of error-checking and focusing strategies by individual participants
before and after either individual training or mixed (individual and group)
training with a repeated-measures ANOVA (see Table 2 for nominal pretest and
posttest results). The proportional performance data were arcsin-transformed, as
recommended by Winer (1962, see also McGlynn et al., 1995). Because
participants were nested in groups the assumption of independent individual units
is likely to be violated (Kenny & Judd, 1986). Even in the nominal group
settings, group members may influence one another to some extent. Because
there were not enough groups in the overall sample to conduct a powerful test of
RULE INDUCTION 633
TABLE 2
Proportional Data for Individual and Group Performance by Individual
versus Mixed Training across Tasks
Pretest Posttest
Training condition
dependent variable Nominal Training phase Nominal Group
Individual training I I I I I I I I I G
Ind. error checking .84 n .87 n .86 n .91 n .82 .91
Group error checking — — — — — — — — — .85
Mutual error
checking — — — — — — — — — .69
Individual focusing .17 n .17 n .26 n .31 n .29 —
Group focusing — — — — — — — — — .29
Correct solution .36 .42 .51 .48 .38 .59 .68 .60 .62 .59
Plausible solution .55 .38 .28 .38 .47 .35 .26 .32 .27 .36
Nonplausible solution .09 .20 .21 .14 .15 .06 .06 .08 .11 .05
Mixed training I G I G I G I G I G
Ind. error checking .73 .85 .82 n .76 n .86 .82 .93 .88
Group error checking — .87 — n — n — .93 — .98
Mutual error
checking — .75 — .71 — .79 — .62 — .90
Individual focusing .12 — .21 — .20 — .29 — .24 —
Group focusing — .15 — n — n — .21 — .32
Correct solution .33 .32 .51 .41 .55 .53 .47 .68 .55 .82
Plausible solution .50 .45 .35 .45 .32 .33 .44 .23 .42 .18
Nonplausible solution .17 .23 .14 .14 .14 .14 .09 .09 .03 .00
Task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Note. I ⫽ nominal setting; G ⫽ collaborative setting; — ⫽ not applicable; n ⫽ not assessed.
nonindependence, group means of individual performance measures were ana-

lyzed, thereby controlling for nonindependence within groups (Kenny, Kashy, &
Bolger, 1998, pp. 239 –240). Planned comparisons were conducted by two
repeated-measures ANOVAs with group versus mixed training as a between-
groups factor and pretest (Task 1) versus posttest (Task 9) as within-groups
factors; once for error checking and once for focusing as the dependent variable.
For error checking as the dependent variable, no main effect for the treatment
factor [F(1, 42) ⫽ 0.03, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .00, p ⫽ .855], a significant main effect
for the repeated-measures factor [F(1, 42) ⫽ 7.55, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .15, p ⫽ .009],
and a significant two-way interaction [F(1, 42) ⫽ 7.38, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .15, p ⫽
.010] resulted. The form of the two-way interaction is shown in the upper part
of Fig. 1. Follow-up comparisons showed that in the mixed-training condition,
the immediacy of individual error checking increased significantly from pretest
(mean proportion ⫽ .73, SD ⫽ .28) to posttest (mean proportion ⫽ .93, SD ⫽
.13) [F(1, 21) ⫽ 15.26, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .42, p ⫽ .001]. In the individual training
FIG. 1. Immediacy of individual error checking per task (upper part of figure) and mean
proportions of individual focusing per task step (lower part) as a function of training condition
(individual vs mixed) and task (nominal pretest and nominal posttest).
condition, no significant change in error-checking behavior from pretest (mean

proportion ⫽ .84, SD ⫽ .19) to posttest (mean proportion ⫽ .82, SD ⫽ .22) was
evident [F(1, 21) ⫽ 0.00, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .00, p ⫽ .983]. At the posttest, the
difference in error checking between training conditions was marginally signif-
icant [F(1, 42) ⫽ 3.46, ␩ 2 ⫽ .08, p ⫽ .07]. Trend analysis with a
repeated-measures ANOVA across pretest, training phase, and posttest (Tasks 1,
3, 5, 7, and 9; see Table 2) yielded a significant linear change in error checking
for the mixed-training condition [mean proportions .73, .82, .76, .86, .93; F(1,
18) ⫽ 20.12, p ⬍ .001] but not for the individual-training condition [mean
proportions .84, .87, .86, .91, .82; F(1, 21) ⫽ 0.51, p ⫽ .484]. No significant
higher order trend (quadratic or cubic) was found.
For focusing as the dependent variable, no significant main effect for the
treatment factor [F(1, 42) ⫽ 2.52, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .06, p ⫽ .120], a significant
main effect for the repeated-measures factor [F(1, 42) ⫽ 20.61, partial ␩ 2 ⫽
.33, p ⬍ .001], and no significant two-way interaction [F(1, 42) ⫽ 0.01,
RULE INDUCTION 635
partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .00, p ⫽ .943] resulted (see lower part of Fig. 1). Focusing
increased significantly from pretest to posttest in both training conditions: in the
mixed-training condition [pretest: mean proportion ⫽ .12, SD ⫽ .10; posttest:
mean proportion ⫽ .24, SD ⫽ .15; F(1, 21) ⫽ 14.30, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .40, p ⫽
.001] and in the individual-training condition [pretest: mean proportion ⫽ .17,
SD ⫽ .42; posttest; mean proportion ⫽ .29, SD ⫽ .14; F(1, 21) ⫽ 7.95,
partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .28, p ⫽ .01]. At the posttest, no significant difference in focusing
between training conditions was shown [F(1, 42) ⫽ 1.12, ␩ 2 ⫽ .03, p ⫽
.296]. Trend analysis with a repeated-measures ANOVA across pretest, training
phase, and posttest (Tasks 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9; see Table 2) yielded a significant
linear change in focusing for the mixed-training condition [mean proportions .12,
.21, .20, .29, .24; F(1, 21) ⫽ 13.48, p ⬍ .001] and the individual-training
condition [mean proportions .17, .17, .26, .31, .29; F(1, 21) ⫽ 12.77, p ⫽
.002]. No significant higher order trend (quadratic or cubic) was found.
In summary, the findings correspond with Hypothesis 1. On the one hand,
individuals improve their error-checking performance more with mixed training
than with individual training (i.e., general G-I transfer) and on the other hand, in
the use of focusing strategies, individuals do not benefit differentially from the
training conditions.
Individual benefits in quality of final solutions. We examined differences in
quality of final individual solutions before and after either individual training or
mixed training (see Table 2 for nominal pretest and posttest results). Again,
group means of individual performance data were used and the proportional data
per group were arcsin-transformed. Planned comparisons were conducted by two
repeated-measures analyses of variance with group versus mixed training as the
between-groups factor and pretest (Task 1) versus posttest (Task 9) as the
within-groups factor; once for proportions of nonplausible final solutions and
once for proportions of correct final solutions.
For nonplausible final solutions, no main effect for the treatment factor [F(1,
42) ⫽ 0.00, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .00, p ⫽ 1.000], a marginally significant main effect
for the repeated-measures factor [F(1, 42) ⫽ 4.06, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .09, p ⫽ .050],
and a significant two-way interaction [F(1, 42) ⫽ 6.72, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .14, p ⫽
.013] resulted. The form of the two-way interaction is shown in the lower part
of Fig. 2. Follow-up comparisons showed that in the mixed-training condition,
nonplausible final solutions decreased significantly from pretest (mean propor-
tion ⫽ .17, SD ⫽ .20) to posttest (mean proportion ⫽ .03, SD ⫽ .10) [F(1,
21) ⫽ 10.23, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .33, p ⫽ .004]. In the individual training condition,
no significant change from pretest (mean proportion ⫽ .09, SD ⫽ .15) to
posttest (mean proportion ⫽ .11, SD ⫽ .19) was evident [F(1, 21) ⫽ 0.17,
partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .01, p ⫽ .682]. At the posttest, the difference in proportions of
nonplausible final solutions between training conditions was close to marginal
significance [F(1, 42) ⫽ 2.78, ␩ 2 ⫽ .06, p ⫽ .103]. Trend analysis with a
repeated-measures ANOVA across pretest, training phase, and posttest (Tasks 1,
3, 5, 7, and 9; see Table 2) yielded a significant linear change in nonplausible
FIG. 2. Proportions of nonplausible (lower part of figure) and correct final solutions (upper part)
as a function of training condition (individual vs mixed) and task (nominal pretest and nominal
posttest).
final solutions for the mixed-training condition [mean proportions .17, .14, .14,
.09, .03; F(1, 21) ⫽ 15.09, p ⬍ .001] but not for the individual-training
condition [mean proportions .09, .21, .15, .06, .11; F(1, 21) ⫽ 1.28, p ⫽ .270].
No significant higher order trend (quadratic or cubic) was found.
For correct final solutions, no significant main effect for the treatment factor
[F(1, 42) ⫽ 1.08, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .02, p ⫽ .305], a significant main effect for the
repeated-measures factor [F(1, 42) ⫽ 9.83, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .19, p ⫽ .003], and
no significant two-way interaction [F(1, 42) ⫽ 0.20, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .01, p ⫽
.660] resulted (see upper part of Fig. 2). Correct final solution increased from
pretest to posttest in both training conditions: in the mixed-training condition
[pretest mean proportion ⫽ .33, SD ⫽ .23; posttest mean proportion ⫽ .55,
SD ⫽ .32; F(1, 21) ⫽ 4.14, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .17, p ⫽ .055] and in the
individual-training condition [pretest mean proportion ⫽ .36, SD ⫽ .29; posttest
mean proportion ⫽ .62, SD ⫽ .35; F(1, 21) ⫽ 5.69, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .21, p ⫽
.027]. At the posttest, no significant difference in correct final solutions between
RULE INDUCTION 637
training conditions was shown [F(1, 42) ⫽ 0.77, ␩ 2 ⫽ .02, p ⫽ .384]. Trend
analysis with a repeated-measures ANOVA across pretest, training phase, and
posttest (Tasks 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9; see Table 2) yielded no significant linear change
in correct final solutions for the mixed-training condition [mean proportions .33,
.51, .55, .47, .55; F(1, 21) ⫽ 2.35, p ⫽ .140]. However, for the individual-
training condition a significant linear change was evident [mean proportions .36,
.51, .38, .68, .62; F(1, 21) ⫽ 7.26, p ⫽ .014]. No significant higher order trend
(quadratic or cubic) was found.
In summary, when compared to individual-training participants, mixed-train-
ing participants improve particularly in terms of rejecting nonplausible final
solutions rather than in terms of detecting correct final solutions. The pattern of
findings for quality of final individual solutions is in accord with Hypothesis 1
and with the findings obtained by examining individual task performance strat-
egies.
Mediational properties of error-checking strategies. We examined which of
the two error-checking strategies determined the mixed-training profit for non-
plausible final solutions in the individual posttest. Remember that error checking
was conceptually differentiated into error avoidance and error management.
Optimal error avoidance was operationalized as the lack of nonplausible interim
hypothesis proposition throughout task performance before stating the final
hypothesis. Optimal error management was operationalized as prompt correction
of nonplausible interim hypotheses occurring during task performance. Our aim
was to test whether anticipative error avoidance or post hoc error management
serves as a mediator for the association between mixed training and reduced
proportions of nonplausible final hypotheses demonstrated above. This research
question was examined using the individual participant as the unit of analysis
because causal relationships between particular behavioral strategies of partici-
pants and their individual outcome performance were tested. Moreover, because
some of the analyses involve a subset of people (who commit errors) scattered
across groups, controlling for nonindependence of participants’ responses due to
common group membership by using group means (Kenny et al., 1998) was not
feasible.
Post hoc error correction is contingent upon the occurrence of interim non-
plausible hypotheses during task performance. In other words, error correction
can occur only after error avoidance has failed. Thus, for logical reasons, the
mediating properties of error avoidance had to be tested first. According to Baron
and Kenny (1986) significant bivariate relationships between the three variables
that are usually part of a mediator model—the independent, the dependent, and
the mediator variable—need to be demonstrated before testing for mediation is
justified. The quality of final solution, when examined on the individual level of
analysis, is a dichotomous variable (in our case, 1 ⫽ nonplausible vs 0 ⫽
plausible or correct), hence between-group comparisons were conducted with
2 ⫻ 2 chi-squared cross-classification analysis using r as the measure of asso-
ciation [for 2 ⫻ 2 contingency tables r is identical to the ␸ (phi) measure]. Error
avoidance (1 ⫽ successful, 0 ⫽ unsuccessful) is marginally associated with

nonplausible final hypotheses (r ⫽ ⫺.15, p ⫽ .083, N ⫽ 132). Moreover,
error avoidance is not significantly associated with training condition (1 ⫽ mixed,
0 ⫽ individual training), r ⫽ .05, p ⫽ .476, N ⫽ 132. Therefore, the
hypothesis that error avoidance mediates the positive G-I transfer effect found for
nonplausible hypotheses cannot be tested.
For investigating error management as a mediator variable, the subsample of
participants who failed to successfully avoid nonplausible hypotheses throughout
the task was analyzed. During the posttest, about 39% (N ⫽ 52) of all subjects
generated at least one nonplausible interim hypothesis, 36% (N ⫽ 24) in the
individual-training condition and 41% (N ⫽ 28) in the mixed-training condition.
Based on the subsample of the 52 error-prone participants, significant bivariate
relationships were found between training condition and immediacy of post hoc
error correction (r s ⫽ .44, p ⫽ .001), between training condition and non-
plausible final hypotheses (r ⫽ ⫺.27, p ⫽ .053), and between immediacy of
post hoc error correction and nonplausible final hypotheses (r s ⫽ ⫺.54, p ⬍
.001). Thus, further testing for causal mediation is justified. This was done using
the hierarchical regression method described in Baron and Kenny (1986). In the
first hierarchical regression equation, nonplausible final hypotheses were re-
gressed on training, R 2 ⫽ .07, ␤ ⫽ ⫺.27, p ⫽ .053. In the second regression
equation, error management was introduced before regressing nonplausible final
hypotheses on training, ⌬R 2 ⫽ .00, ␤ ⫽ ⫺.01, p ⫽ .913. The reduction in the
values of R 2 and ␤ before controlling for error management (R 2 ⫽ .07, ␤ ⫽
⫺.27) and after controlling for error management (⌬R 2 ⫽ .00, ␤ ⫽ ⫺.01)
indicates a mediation effect (see Fig. 3). 2
In summary, the mixed-training benefit for nonplausible final hypotheses
seems to be mediated by post hoc error management rather than by anticipative
error avoidance.
Group Performance Issues

Group benefits in performance strategies. Three aspects of error checking
during group performance were analyzed: (a) individual error checking in a
group context—the group members’ average immediacy of error checking con-
cerning their own interim hypotheses during collaborative task performance; (b)
group error checking—the immediacy of error checking concerning the group
decisions about interim group hypotheses; (c) mutual error checking—the pro-
portion of instances where groups rejected nonplausible interim hypotheses
2
Logistic regression is more appropriate than linear regression because the criterion variable is
dichotomous. Because logistic regression does not deliver estimates of association similar to the more
commonly known coefficients ( ␤ , R 2 , and ⌬R 2 ), linear regression results are reported in the text. By
using logistic regression the same results were obtained. Without controlling for post hoc error
correction, the training condition is associated with nonplausible final hypotheses (R ⫽ ⫺.16,
Wald ⫽ 2.98, p ⫽.084). After controlling for post hoc error correction, the training condition is
unrelated to proportion of nonplausible final hypotheses (⌬R ⫽ .00, Wald ⫽ 0.55, p ⫽ .457).
RULE INDUCTION 639
FIG. 3. Error management as a mediator of the relationship between mixed training and
nonplausible final solutions at the nominal posttest. Standardized ␤-weights are reported (**p ⫽
.001; ***p ⬍ .001; §p ⫽ .053).
proposed by one, two, or all three group members. We examined Hypothesis 2,

stating that error checking in groups profits from mixed (individual and group)
training, using these three variables. The proportional data were arcsin-trans-
formed before testing and the three dependent variables were tested separately
(see Table 2 for group performance at task 2 and group posttest results). 3
Individual error checking per group. We conducted a one-way ANOVA with
training condition as the between-subjects factor and group means of individual
error checking as the dependent variable. No significant difference between
individual training (mean proportion ⫽ .91, SD ⫽ .15) and mixed training
(mean proportion ⫽ .88, SD ⫽ .17) was evident [F(1, 42) ⫽ 0.75, ␩ 2 ⫽ .02,
p ⫽ .392]. In mixed-training groups, individual error checking did not improve
significantly from the group pretest at Task 2 (mean proportion ⫽ .85, SD ⫽
.24) to the group posttest at Task 10 (mean proportion ⫽ .88, SD ⫽ .17) [F(1,
21) ⫽ 0.00, ␩ 2 ⫽ .00, p ⫽ .991].
Group-level error checking. For group-level error checking, a one-way AN-
COVA was conducted between training conditions with average individual error
checking per group as a covariate because the group-level criterion for group
error checking is contaminated by individual-level performance of error checking
[contamination was substantial, F(1, 41) ⫽ 9.71, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .19, p ⫽ .003].
The ANCOVA resulted in a significant main effect for the training condition
[F(1, 41) ⫽ 4.71, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .10, p ⫽ .036], showing that independent of
individual error checking, mixed-training groups as a whole corrected group-
level errors significantly more promptly in the posttest (.98, SD ⫽ .11) than did
individual-training groups (.85, SD ⫽ .32). Furthermore, mixed-training groups
improved their collective error-checking behavior considerably from a mean
proportion of .87 (SD ⫽ .30) in the pretest to .98 (SD ⫽ .11) in the posttest.
3
Conducting a MANOVA for all three error-checking variables was not feasible. The group-level
criterion for group error checking is contaminated with the average individual error-checking
performance per group. In a multivariate analysis, one cannot control for multilevel cross-contami-
nation between dependent variables. Furthermore, the SDS data for error correction are dichotomous
and thus do not meet the assumptions for inclusion in analysis of variance.
TABLE 3
Frequencies of Plausible and Nonplausible Interim Group Hypotheses for Each Distribution
of Plausible and Nonplausible Interim Group Member Hypotheses
Mixed training Individual training

Initial
Pretest (task 2) Posttest (task 10) Posttest (task 10)
distribution of
group members Plausible Nonplausible Plausible Nonplausible Plausible Nonplausible
a
(3P, 0N) 158 0 187 1 184 1
(2P, 1N) 32 3 29 3 24 5
(1P, 2N) 6 6 5 1 0 5
(0P, 3N) 0 5 2 0 0 1
Sum 196 14 223 5 208 12

a
Groups in which three individual hypotheses were at least plausible and zero nonplausible. The
other rows are for the other possible distributions of plausible or correct (P) and nonplausible (N)
individual hypotheses.
The repeated-measures ANCOVA with average individual error checking con-

sidered as a covariate separately in the pretest [F(1, 20) ⫽ 14.60, p ⬍ .01] and
the posttest [F(1, 20) ⫽ 8.45, p ⬍ .01] resulted in a significant increase in
group-level error checking from pretest to posttest [F(1, 20) ⫽ 5.66, partial
␩ 2 ⫽ .22, p ⫽ .027].
Mutual error checking. Group processes resulting in the rejection of individual
nonplausible hypotheses were examined with the social decision scheme ap-
proach. The extent of mutual error checking was estimated on the basis of
transitions from initial distributions of interim group member hypotheses to
interim group hypotheses (see Table 3). Of specific interest are distributions with
at least one nonplausible hypothesis (2P, 1N or 1P, 2N, or 0P, 3N). The
proportion of these distributions that resulted in plausible (or correct) group
hypotheses is taken as an estimate of successful mutual error checking. In the
posttest, mixed-training groups adopted only 4 nonplausible hypotheses of 40
distributions that comprised one, two, or three nonplausible group member
hypotheses (see Table 3). This translates into an error-checking rate of .90.
Individual-training groups adopted 11 of 35, which renders an error-checking
rate of only .69 (see also Table 2). The posttest proportions for individual- versus
mixed-training groups were compared by using a 2 ⫻ 2 chi-squared test resulting
in a significant effect [ ␹ 2 (1, N ⫽ 75) ⫽ 5.36, r ⫽ .27, p ⫽ .021].
Furthermore, in the first collective induction task (see Table 3, Task 2), 14
nonplausible hypotheses out of 52 initial distributions with at least one nonplau-
sible hypothesis were adopted by the mixed-training groups, which renders an
error-checking rate of .75. The pretest and posttest error-checking rates of
mixed-training groups were compared using the chi-squared test, again resulting
in a significant effect [ ␹ 2 (1, N ⫽ 92) ⫽ 4.11, r ⫽ .21, p ⫽ .043]. This
indicates an increased collective error-checking rate for mixed-training groups.
RULE INDUCTION 641
In summary, some support is given to Hypothesis 2 stating that error-checking

performance in groups profits from mixed training. More specifically, the evi-
dence endorses the assumption that individual-level benefits for checking one’s
own errors (i.e., general G-I transfer) do not directly extend to individual
performance in the collaborative group context. Mixed-training benefits to whole
groups were only evident for error checking on the group level and for mutual
error checking.
Collective focusing. For the (arcsin-transformed) proportions of collective
focusing in the group posttest, no significant difference between mixed-training
groups (mean proportion ⫽ .32, SD ⫽ .21) and individual-training groups
(mean proportion ⫽ .29, SD ⫽ .22) was evident [F(1, 42) ⫽ 0.14, ␩ 2 ⫽ .00,
p ⫽ .711]. In the mixed-training condition, the increase from the group pretest
(mean proportion ⫽ .15, SD ⫽ .17) to the group posttest (.32, SD ⫽ .21) was
not significant [F(1, 21) ⫽ 2.34, partial ␩ 2 ⫽ .10, p ⫽ .141].
Group benefits in quality of final solution. The difference in nonplausible final
solutions between mixed-trained groups (.00) and individual-trained groups (.05)
at the group posttest was tested by using the 2 ⫻ 2 chi-squared test. The
difference was not significant [ ␹ 2 (1, N ⫽ 44) ⫽ 1.02, r ⫽ .15, p ⫽ .311].
The difference in correct final solutions between mixed-training groups (.82) and
individual-training groups (.59) at the group posttest was marginally significant
[ ␹ 2 (1, N ⫽ 44) ⫽ 2.73, r ⫽ .25, p ⫽ .099], indicating some group benefit
from mixed training for collective truth detection.
DISCUSSION
Individual Benefits from Prior Group Performance
This study’s findings of group-member benefits from mixed (group and
individual) training extend the first demonstration of a general positive G-I
transfer reported by Stasson et al. (1991) to the rule-induction subtask of
generating plausible and rejecting nonplausible hypotheses. Stasson et al. (1991)
assumed general positive G-I transfer to occur for tasks that approach the
“truth-wins” criterion in group performance due to high demonstrability of
task-relevant concepts in the group context (p. 27). In our study, this assumption
was supported for self-evident strategies in rule induction by showing general
positive G-I transfer for error management (high demonstrability) and not for
error avoidance (low demonstrability) and focusing behavior (low demonstrabil-
ity). We infer that individual learning benefits from prior group performance (in
the form of mixed training) are more likely to occur for strategies that are of high
demonstrability in a group collaborative context than for strategies of low
demonstrability.
The additionally obtained mixed training benefit for rejecting nonplausible
final solutions was mediated by improvements in error management rather than
in error avoidance. This finding is very intuitive. Before idiosyncratic errors can
be checked by groups and the error-management strategy implicit in this social
episode can be adopted by other group members, errors first need to be made and
they need to be pointed out in public. It is very difficult to learn from errors that
are avoided or not publicly expressed. Thus, error avoidance is good for group
performance but does not impact on group-member learning.
Some implications of the above results for theory and research are tenable.
Laughlin and Jaccard (1975) demonstrated the profitability of vicarious learning
when observing dyads that performed rule-induction tasks collectively. However,
they did not show exactly what was being observed and learned that could
mediate the performance-enhancing effect. It is tenable that individuals profit
from vicarious experiences made during collective induction by observing social
episodes in which the effective use of particular task performance strategies is
made evident. For the results presented here, it is reasonable to assume that the
error-checking strategy (i.e., monitoring the correspondence between a proposed
hypothesis and the available evidence) was adopted via vicarious experience of
collective error-checking behavior. Future research could investigate whether the
factors known to enhance vicarious learning and the processes involved (cf.
Bandura, 1986) apply when social episodes of collective induction are observed.
It would be also of interest to discern whether active involvement in such social
episodes (e.g., public suggestion of a hypothesis that is pointed out to be
nonplausible) enhances the learning effect as opposed to passive observation, as
studied by Laughlin and Jaccard (1975).
By drawing on the concept of demonstrability (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986), some
further research questions can be derived. The concept of demonstrability plays
a central role in the theory of collective decision making presented by Laughlin
and Hollingshead (1995). The theory specifies several factors that enhance the
demonstrability of facilitative individual contributions during collective task
performance: (a) group consensus about a valid conceptual system (e.g., a theory,
an algorithm, a technical language); (b) the amount of information available on
the task; (c) the ability, motivation, and time invested by group members to
identify others’ contributions to task performance that may turn out to be more
beneficial than their own contributions; and (d) the ability, motivation, and time
invested by group members to convince others of the benefits of their own
contributions as compared to contributions of others. In the light of the factors (c)
and (d), the present study’s finding of a general positive G-I transfer for error
management and not for focusing might be a consequence of the time restriction
of 10 min per task that was imposed on all groups. The groups did not have
enough time to demonstrate the benefits of the complex focusing strategy
because this would have required verbalization, extra effort, and time. Because
the error-management strategy is self-evident, no additional time and effort was
needed for demonstrating the benefits that result from using it.
Future research might investigate whether it is possible to raise the demon-
strability of complex effective hypothesis testing strategies in a way that results
in positive general G-I transfer. The theoretical and empirical work by Doise and
Mugny (1979) and Nastasi and Clements (1992) about group-member learning
RULE INDUCTION 643
benefits as a consequence of cognitive conflict and cognitive (not social) conflict

resolution seems to be a promising starting point for such an endeavor.
Group Benefits from Prior Group Performance

The present study’s findings of whole-group benefits in collective error check-
ing shed some new light on the issue of multilevel learning in groups (cf. Argote,
1993). McGlynn et al. (1995) investigated the subtask of hypothesis generation
in rule induction and concluded tentatively, “We speculate that [ . . . ] the task
has a learning component reflecting the increasing ability of subjects to generate
plausible and eliminate nonplausible hypotheses. Full communication may have
accelerated learning” (p. 76). However, they did not differentiate the various
levels at which learning via collective induction in groups can occur. Results
from the present study enable a discrimination of at least three components in
group learning: (a) individual learning transfer to subsequent individual task
performance (i.e., G-I transfer), (b) individual learning transfer to subsequent
collective task performance, and (c) learning to collaborate in a group context.
Most interestingly, the higher inclination of mixed-training participants to check
their own errors during individual task performance (i.e., G-I transfer) was not
transferred to subsequent group task performance. Individual- and mixed-training
participants checked their own nonplausible interim hypotheses during group
performance to a similar extent. Instead, independent of their performance in
checking their own errors, participants of mixed-training groups were superior to
individual-training participants in group error checking (i.e., post hoc correction
of nonplausible interim group hypotheses) and mutual error checking (i.e.,
collective rejection of individual level nonplausible hypotheses suggested to the
group). Obviously, mixed-training participants learned to collaborate better on
collective error-checking activities than did individual-training participants. This
finding somewhat contradicts the “social information processing” view of groups
described by Davis and Harless (1996). They found that groups performing
iterative, unitary problem-solving tasks on the whole learned to better reject
idiosyncratic errors than even the best members in nominal groups and specu-
lated that groups learned to better identify their best member. The results from
the present study permit a somewhat different view. What was learned from prior
collective induction was the ability to better check errors in the group decisions
made and errors made by other group members—including the group’s “best
member.”
Although in the present study no evidence was presented that a group sur-
passes its potential level of productivity by improvements in error-checking
behavior, its findings might serve to stimulate the debate about the possibility of
process gain via group learning. Combining the assumption of groups as superior
error checkers with the idea of general positive G-I transfer for error-checking
behavior opens a new line of reasoning for the existence of process gain. If
individuals profit from prior group experience in a way that their socially
combined resources (e.g., via collective error checking) surpass the nominal
group potential, process gain should result. However, this type of synergy would
not be obtained “free of charge.” Group-member learning requires, for instance,
repeated group task performance, extra effort and cognitive investments by group
members, and time. The possible reason why the assumption of process gain
forwarded by Shaw (1932) and others (e.g., Collins & Guetzkow, 1964) received
only fragmentary empirical support might lie in the preferred use of ad hoc
groups in experimental studies that performed only one or two tasks collabora-
tively, thereby preventing facilitative effects of group-member learning to be-
come manifest as a performance surplus on later occasions (for further experi-
mental evidence of this effect and a theoretical account, see Brodbeck &
Greitemeyer, 2000).
Differences between individual and group performance have often been at-
tributed to motivational variables (for reviews, see Kerr, 1983; Paulus & Dzin-
dolet, 1993; Shepperd, 1993). In our study, the different group settings (nominal
vs collaborative) might have caused motivational differences that were con-
founded with learning benefits from mixed training. Therefore, the same moti-
vational circumstances were induced in both experimental conditions: (a) co-
presence of two other group members, (b) cooperative reward structure, (c)
feedback on individual and group performance to all group members, and (d) the
expectation to work collaboratively in future tasks. Additionally, several vari-
ables were measured to statistically control for motivational differences between
the training conditions. Apart from one exception, which was contrary to the
assumed confounding effect, no significant differences were found. This raises
our confidence in the assumption that during mixed training participants actually
learn to use more effective strategies for rejecting nonplausible hypothesis in rule
induction than do individual-training participants.
Limitations and Generalizations

In our experiment, nonplausible interim hypotheses (errors) were generated
during the nominal posttest task by nearly half of the subjects. Thus, the
performance processes investigated in the present study are limited to multistep
problem-solving tasks of some difficulty (partly due to time restrictions) so that
errors are likely to occur— even after substantial training. In general, designing
experimental situations that are both difficult (so that errors will be made) and
involve time restrictions seems to be more realistic and true to life than exper-
imental designs without these two elements.
The errors investigated in the present study are of the “idiosyncratic” type (i.e.,
individual errors are randomly distributed). Idiosyncratic errors are likely to be
detected and corrected by others in a group. Thus, the results presented cannot be
generalized to tasks comprising errors that are based on population stereotypes
(i.e., individual errors are correlated among group members). Under this condi-
tion, errors are less likely to be detected and corrected by others in a group (cf.
Davis & Harless, 1996; Reagan-Cirincione, 1994; Tindale, 1993) and the “truth
RULE INDUCTION 645
wins” criterion for demonstrability is not fulfilled to a sufficient extent for

group-training benefits to occur.
The finding of a general positive G-I transfer is mainly generalizable to group
problem-solving tasks that contain subtasks for which facilitative strategies can
be demonstrated. It should not be generalized to group decision-making tasks
without further consideration of the informational basis for demonstrability. As
is argued by Tindale (1993), demonstrability is dependent on a shared belief
system. When group members share a belief system that builds upon inappro-
priate knowledge or strategies, an “error wins” process is likely to result.
Small groups are often called upon to perform rule-induction tasks. Everyday
examples are scientific research teams that examine evidence, develop hypoth-
eses, and test them against new evidence; or medical staff that collectively induce
hypotheses based on medical examination and test them against new medical
evidence; or expert committees and task forces for estimating environmental risk
potentials of new technology (for more examples, see Laughlin et al., 1991).
Thus, it is not surprising that rule induction in groups is a vital research domain.
Very recently several studies about the hypothesis-testing subtask of rule induc-
tion have been published (e.g., Crott et al., 1998; Hollingshead, 1998; Laughlin
et al., 1999). However, many natural groups in which collective induction is per-
formed aim to reduce the likelihood of human error remaining undetected. Often
high costs are involved when error checking fails to be successful. Therefore, we
believe that research on factors that facilitate the rejection of nonplausible final
solutions and error checking in groups is also of high practical value.
CONCLUSION
This study extends previous research on group-member learning and problem
solving in two ways. First, results suggest that individual learning benefits from
prior group performance are more likely to occur for subtasks that involve
strategies of high demonstrability in the group context (error checking) than for
subtasks that involve strategies of low demonstrability (error avoidance and
focusing). Second, the evidence suggested that the social combination of indi-
vidual resources can improve as a result of prior experience in collaborative
problem solving, particularly in terms of improving collective error checking.
Our findings suggest that face-to-face interaction in the course of repeatedly
performing problem-solving tasks facilitates group-member learning and group
learning.
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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 36, 621– 648 (2000)

doi:10.1006/jesp.2000.1423, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

Effects of Individual versus Mixed Individual and Group

Felix C. Brodbeck and Tobias Greitemeyer

Ludwig-Maximilians Universitaet, Munich, Germany

that take combination of individual resources into account, empirical research

Individual Profit from Group Task Performance

Because error checking should increase the rejection rate of nonplausible

Group Profit from Group Task Performance

of groups as error checkers has remained salient in group research. However,

Hypothesis 2: Experience in collective induction facilitates subsequent group performance

Note. I ⫽ nominal group setting; G ⫽ collaborative group setting.

Procedure and Instructions

settings (nominal vs collaborative) and could exert a confounding influence on

plausible hypothesis is corrected at step n ⫹ 1 and the second one is corrected

Individual Performance Issues

Note. I ⫽ nominal setting; G ⫽ collaborative setting; — ⫽ not applicable; n ⫽ not assessed.

nonindependence, group means of individual performance measures were ana-

condition, no significant change in error-checking behavior from pretest (mean

avoidance (1 ⫽ successful, 0 ⫽ unsuccessful) is marginally associated with

Group Performance Issues

proposed by one, two, or all three group members. We examined Hypothesis 2,

Mixed training Individual training

Sum 196 14 223 5 208 12

The repeated-measures ANCOVA with average individual error checking con-

In summary, some support is given to Hypothesis 2 stating that error-checking

benefits as a consequence of cognitive conflict and cognitive (not social) conflict

Group Benefits from Prior Group Performance

Limitations and Generalizations

wins” criterion for demonstrability is not fulfilled to a sufficient extent for

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