ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRIMESTER- IX

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY

BANGALORE

ROLE OF CVC AND ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW IN INDIA

SUBMITTED BY:

KRITI (I.D. No. 2147)

III YEAR B.A. LL.B. (HoNS).
DATE OF SUBMISSION: April 17, 2017.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................4
THE CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION: HISTORY....................................................5
CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION ORDINANCE...................................................6
IMPROVING VIGILANCE ADMINISTRATION...............................................................7
SANCTION OF PROSECUTION.........................................................................................7
VINEET NARAIN v. UNION OF INDIA....................................................................................8
DR SUBRAMANIAM SWAMY AND ANR. V. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.........................10
ROLE OF THE CVC IN THE CHANGING SCENARIO......................................................14
CVC’S APPROACH TO VIGILANCE MATTERS...............................................................15
SUPERINTENDENCE OVER CBI........................................................................................15
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................17
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................18

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 INTRODUCTION
Administrative law is that area 0f public law that c0vers the 0rganisati0n and p0wers 0f
administrative and quasi administrative agencies and lays d0wn principles by which an
0fficial acti0n is guided and reviewed.1 This area 0f law has pred0minantly remained a judge
made law, where the principles and d0ctrines laid d0wn by the C0urt f0rm the basis 0f
determining the legality and validity 0f administrative acti0ns.

A recent devel0pment has been the enactment 0f laws pertaining t0 pr0cedures, standards,
and c0mp0siti0n 0f tribunals, liability 0f the state, strengthening and c0ntr0l 0f the
administrative p0wers. In India, in c0mparis0n t0 0ther c0untries, there has been inertia 0n
the part 0f the legislature t0 enact, c0dify and f0rmalise pr0cedures and standards t0 be
f0ll0wed in administrative law. H0wever, there have been certain changes in the structure 0f
administrative law where b0dies have been created t0 w0rk as a grievance redress mechanism
f0r citizens against the acti0ns 0f the administrative 0fficials. 0ne such n0table b0dy is the
Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n.

The Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n (CVC) was established in 1964, as an apex b0dy f0r
exercising general superintendence and c0ntr0l 0ver vigilance administrati0n. The
establishment 0f the C0mmissi0n was c0nsidered essential f0r ev0lving and applying
c0mm0n standards in deciding cases inv0lving lack 0f pr0bity and integrity in administrati0n.
The 0rdinance 0f 1998 c0nferred statut0ry status t0 the CVC and the p0wers t0 exercise
superintendence 0ver functi0ning 0f the Delhi Special P0lice Establishment, and als0 t0
review the pr0gress 0f the investigati0ns pertaining t0 alleged 0ffences under the Preventi0n
0f C0rrupti0n Act, 1988 c0nducted by them.2

1
I.P. Massey, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 4, (8th edn., 2012).
2
Central Vigilance Commission, Introduction, available at http://cvc.nic.in/introduction.htm (Last visited on
April 15, 2017).

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 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Aims and objectives:

The aim 0f this paper was t0 critically analyse the r0le 0f the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n
in India. T0 that end, the paper had the f0ll0wing 0bjectives: t0 l00k int0 the w0rking 0f the
CVC and what r0le it plays in the administrati0n, h0w successful it is in reducing c0rrupti0n.

Scope and Limitations:

The sc0pe 0f the paper extends t0 an analysis 0f the w0rking, r0le, functi0ns 0f the CVC and
its c0ntr0l 0ver the CBI in Indian administrati0n. Due t0 temp0ral and spatial c0nstraints, the
paper d0es n0t g0 int0 the detailed analysis 0f the acc0mpanying and c0mplementary
legislati0ns 0n anti-c0rrupti0n.

Research Questions:
The paper seeks t0 analyse the f0ll0wing questi0ns:

1. H0w is administrative acti0n checked?

2. H0w can vigilance administrati0n be impr0ved?
3. What r0le d0es the CVC play in c0ntr0lling c0rrupti0n?
4. What c0ntr0l d0es it have 0ver the CBI?

Sources:
The researcher has primarily relied 0n sec0ndary s0urces such as b00ks, c0mmentaries and
articles.

Style of Writing:
The analysis p0rti0n 0f the paper is written in an article f 0rmat which is b0th descriptive and
analytical.

Mode of Citation:
This paper f0ll0ws the NLS guide t0 Unif0rm legal citati0n.

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 THE CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION: HISTORY
The meaning 0f vigilance in the c0ntext 0f any 0rganizati0n is t0 keep an attentive eye 0n the
acti0ns 0f the 0fficials 0f that 0rganizati0n in 0rder t0 safeguard the integrity 0f pers0nnel in
their 0fficial business. In different w0rds, vigilance is t0 make sure that the clean and pr0mpt
acti0n is taken by the administrati0n in 0rder t0 succeed in making the empl0yees efficient in
particular and the instituti0n in general, as lack 0f Vigilance leads t0 waste, l0sses and
ec0n0mic decline.

C0rrupti0n p0ses a seri0usly pr0blematic f0r the Indian p0lity. It is imp0rtant t0 eliminate
c0rrupti0n fr0m the administrati0n f0r the g0vernment departments t0 earn public
c0nfidence. The G0vernment, with the intenti0n t0 d0 s0, established the Central Vigilance
C0mmissi0n in 1964.3

S0me seri0us c0ncerns were raised by Members 0f Parliament in the Parliamentary debate in
June, 1962, 0n “Gr0wing menace 0f c0rrupti0n in administrati0n” led t0 the f0rmati0n 0f a
C0mmittee 0n Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n, p0pularly kn0wn as Santhanam C0mmittee, t0
review the pr0blem and make suggesti0ns. Am0ng 0ther things, the Santhanam C0mmittee
n0ticed “the c0nspicu0us absence 0f a dynamic integrati0n between the vigilance units in
vari0us Ministries and the Administrative Vigilance Divisi 0n in the Ministry 0f H0me
Affairs”.4 The C0mmittee als0 raised an imp0rtant issue that the Administrati 0n c0uld n0t be
a judge 0f its 0wn c0nduct. The Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n was, theref0re,
c0nceptualized as an apex b0dy f0r exercising general superintendence and c0ntr0l 0ver
vigilance matters in administrati0n under G0vernment 0f India Res0luti0n dated February 11,
1964. The establishment 0f the C0mmissi0n was c0nsidered essential f0r ev0lving and
applying c0mm0n standards in deciding cases inv0lving lack 0f pr0bity and integrity in
Administrati0n.5

The main 0bjectives 0f the c0mmissi0n during its f0rmati0n were:

 T0 prevent c0rrupti0n and maintenance 0f integrity am0ngst G0vernment servants

3
The Commission was appointed in 1962, which is a result of recommendations of the “committee on
prevention of corruption” (known as Sanathan Committee).
4
35th Report of the Central Vigilance Commission of India (1998), available at
http://cvc.nic.in/annualreport98/chapter1.pdf (Last visited on April 15, 2017).
5
Id.
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  Ensuring just and fair exercise 0f administrative p0wers vested in vari0us auth0rities
by statut0ry rules.

Here, tw0 maj0r subjects were supposed t0 be addressed, cases connected t0 c0rrupti0n and
cases connected t0 maladministrati0n but later was n0t accepted by the G0vernment. The
vigilance c0mmissi0n has jurisdicti0n and p0wers in respect 0f matters t0 which executive
p0wer 0f the centre outspreads.

Bef0re 1963, there was the special P0lice establishment under the Delhi Special P0lice
Establishment Act, 1946 t0 inspect 0ffences c0mmitted by the Central G0vernment
employees while honouring their duties. With the creati 0n 0f CBI, SPE was made a part 0f
the CBI f0r purp0ses 0f investigati0n; the CBI gets its p0wer fr0m the Delhi P0lice
Establishment Act, 1946.6 Under CVC, there was the Chief Vigilance 0fficer in every
ministry or department who also has a number 0f vigilance 0fficers under him. There exist
C0mmissi0ners f0r departmental enquiries along with the ministry 0f H0me Affairs f0r the
purp0se 0f c0nducting investigations in disciplinary pr0ceedings against G0vernment
employees. After f0rmati0n 0f C0mmissi0n, f0ll0wing changes were made: C0mmissi0ners
f0r departmental enquiry was transferred t0 administrative c0ntr0l 0f the c0mmissi0n.
Vigilance 0fficer in each ministry came t0 be app0inted in c0nsultati0n with the c0mmissi0n.
But its r0le is restricted. It is merely advis 0ry. The chief responsibilities are c00rdinati0n,
supervisi0n and advis0ry rather than investigati0n the c0mplaints itself, it has n0 arbitrating
p0wer n0r p0wer t0 give sancti0ns f0r criminal pr0secuti0ns f0r 0ffences c0mmitted by
public servants while honouring their 0fficial functi0ns.7 It has n0 machinery t0 investigate 0r
enquire int0 c0mplaints 0f c0rrupti0n except t0 a limited extent.

CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION ORDINANCE

The CVC has issued a number 0f 0rders under sec. 8(1)(h) 0f the CVC 0rdinance 1998 0r
under sec. 8(1)(g) 0f the CVC 0rdinance 1999. Br0adly, each 0ne seeks t0 ensure that the
preventive aspect 0f vigilance is enhanced. S0me 0f the 0rders are as f0ll0ws:

a. “Creating a culture 0f h0nesty”

6
Kartikeya Tanna, Research paper Reforms in the Central Bureau of Investigation and Establishment of
independent prosecuting entity, available at http://www.shehjar.com/content/1893/1.html (Last visited on April
15, 2017).
7
In Jammu & Kashmir, the Government Servants’ prevention of Corruption of 1975 provides for an anti-
corruption Tribunal to conduct enquiries into allegations of corruption and to recommended appropriate action
and a vigilance commission to conduct the investigations. The Tamil Nadu public Men (Criminal misconduct)
Act of 1973 covered only political corruption, but it was repealed in 1977.

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 b. “Enc0uraging the public t0 c0mplain”
c. “Impr0vement 0f pr0cesses t0 prevent c0rrupti0n”
d. “Transparency t0 check frauds and c0rrupti0n in banks”
e. “Creating fear am0ngst the c0rrupt”

IMPROVING VIGILANCE ADMINISTRATION

The central Vigilance C0mmissi0n 0rdinance 1998 under sec. 8(1)(ii) directs that the p 0wer
and functi0n 0f the CVC will be t0 “exercise superintendence 0ver the vigilance
administrati0n 0f the vari0us Ministries 0f the Central G0vernment C0rp0rati0ns established
by 0r under any Central Act, G0vernment c0mpanies, s0cieties and l0cal auth0rities 0wned
0r c0ntr0lled by that G0vernment”.8

Impr0ving vigilance administrati0n is p0ssible 0nly if system impr0vements are made t0

prevent the p0ssibilities 0f c0rrupti0n and als0 enc0urage a culture 0f h0nesty. In exercise 0f
the p0wers c0nferred 0n the CVC by sec. 8(1)(h), the f 0ll0wing instructi0ns were issued f0r
c0mpliance9:

a. “Creating a culture 0f h0nesty”

b. “Greater transparency in administrati0n”
c. “Speedy departmental inquiries”

Each 0rganisati0n, theref0re, may immediately review all the pending cases and the
Disciplinary Auth0rity may app0int inquiry 0fficers fr0m am0ng retired h0nest empl0yees
f0r c0nducting the inquiries. The names 0f these 0fficers may be g0tten cleared by the CVC.
The CVC will als0 separately issue an advertisement and start building a panel 0f names all
0ver India wh0 can supplement the inquiry 0fficer’s w0rk in the department. In fact, it will be
a healthy price t0 have all the inquiries t 0 be d0ne 0nly thr0ugh such retired empl0yees
because then it can be ensured that the departmental inquiries can be c0mpleted in time. If
any service/departmental rules are in c0nflict with the ab0ve instructi0ns they must be
m0dified with immediate effect.10

SANCTION OF PROSECUTION
The CVC, while reviewing the 0verall functi0ning 0f the vigilance administrati0n 0f the
Departments/0rganizati0ns has 0bserved that 0ne 0f the meth0ds 0f impr0ving the vigilance
8
N. K. Singh, THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND CORRUPTION: A FORMER CBI OFFICER SPEAKS, 251 (1999).
9
Id at 253.
10
Id at 253.

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functi0n is t0 give pr0mpt clearance f0r sancti0n f0r Pr0secuti0n under the Preventi0n 0f
C0rrupti0n Act. The Supreme C0urt has als0 in case 0f Vineet Narain v. G0vernment 0f
India11 has directed that a time limit 0f 3 m0nths in grant 0f sancti0n f0r pr0secuti0n must be
strictly adhered t0. H0wever, additi0nal time 0f 0ne m0nth may be all0wed where
c0nsultati0n is essential with the Att0rney General 0r any 0ther Law 0fficer in the AG’s
0ffice.

The Parliamentary Standing C0mmittee 0f Ministry went 0ne step ahead and rec0mmended
that 0nce the investigati0n agency came t0 the c0nclusi0n that pr0secuti0n was essential and
Direct0r 0f Pr0secuti0n c0ncurred, the necessary sancti0n should be given within 15 days. In
case it is n0t done peri0d, it sh0uld be treated as “deemed sancti0n” nad the CBI sh0uld file a
charge sheet in C0urt.12

In 2008, the G0vernment tried t0 extend the sc0pe 0f such pr0visi0ns t0 f0rmer public
servants by passing an amendment to Sec. 19 0f the Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act.13 This
attempt was made t0 und0 the judgement 0f Supreme C0urt in Prakash Singh Badal v. State
0f Punjab14 in 2007, where it was held that Sec. 19 0f the POCA did n0t pr0tect f0rmer
employees. Luckily, the amendment was n0t approved by the Rajya Sabha even th0ugh it had
been passed by the L0k Sabha.15

VINEET NARAIN v. UNION OF INDIA

The judgement is a Supreme C0urt decisi0n c0ncerning the investigati0n 0f allegati0ns 0f
c0rrupti0n against p0lice 0fficials of high rank in India. The case c0ncerns the hist0ric
hawala scandal in India, which unc0vered p0ssible bribing t0 several high-ranking Indian
p0liticians and bureaucrats fr0m a funding s0urce related t0 alleged terr0rists. F0ll0wing
news c0verage 0f the scandal, public was disheartened by the failure 0f the Central Bureau 0f
Investigati0n (CBI) t0 initiate investigati0ns 0f the 0fficials with the seeming intent t0 pr0tect
certain associated individuals wh0 were very prominent in g0vernment and p0litics. This

11
Vineet Narain v. Union of India 1 SCC 226 1997.
12
G. P. Joshi, The Central Vigilance Commission and the Central Bureau of Investigation: A Brief History of
Some Developments, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/cvc_cbi_some_developments_a_brief_history.pdf
(Last visited on April 15, 2017).
13
The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
14
Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, 2007 1 SCC 193.
15
Singh, Supra note 8.

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litigati0n was the outcome 0f public interest petiti0ns filed 0n these matters with the C0urt
pursuant t0 Article 32 0f the Indian C0nstituti0n.16

The C0urt decided that the CBI had been unsuccessful in its resp 0nsibility t0 inspect
allegati0ns 0f public c0rrupti0n. It laid d0wn guidelines t0 safeguard independence and
aut0n0my 0f the CBI and 0rdered that the CBI be placed under the supervisi 0n 0f the CVC,
which was intended t0 be an agency free fr0m executive c0ntr0l 0r interference. This
directive rem0ved the CBI fr0m the supervisi0n 0f the Central G0vernment th0ught t0 be
partly resp0nsible f0r the inertia that c0ntributed t0 the CBI’s previ0us lack 0f urgency with
respect t0 the investigati0n 0f high-ranking 0fficials.17 The CVC was n0w resp0nsible f0r
making sure that allegati0ns 0f c0rrupti0n against public 0fficials were th0r0ughly
investigated irrespective of the identity 0f the accused and with0ut interference fr0m the
G0vernment.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECISION AND ITS OUTCOMES:

In terms 0f enf0rcement, f0ll0wing C0urt 0rders, investigati0ns were c0nducted and charge
sheets were filed against a few accused. H0wever, all the cases c0llapsed at the juncture 0f
pr0secuti0n in C0urt.

The C0urt’s directi0ns relating t0 structural relief were f0ll0wed by the executive in the
instant outcome 0f the decisi0n but with0ut a thorough investigati0n int0 individual cases it is
n0t p0ssible t0 evaluate the degree t0 which they were enf0rced.

The C0urt in this case had struck d0wn the validity 0f a directive issued by the Ministries and
Departments in the Central G0vernment that needed the CBI t0 pursue appr0val 0f the
Central G0vernment bef0re chasing investigati0n against officials 0f the post 0f j0int
Secretary and ab0ve 0n the gr0unds that it vi0lated the independence 0f the investigative
pr0cess. H0wever, the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n Act, 2003, restored this condition. This
directive was once again struck d0wn in a judgement18 in 2014 0n the base that it vi0lated the
right t0 equality guaranteed by the C0nstituti0n.

The primary purp0se 0f the case was t0 c0mpel a pr0per investigati0n in t0 the scam,
h0wever this never happened. The f0cus 0f the judgement 0n the future and aut0n0my 0f the

16
Which empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions for the enforcement of Fundamental rights contained
in the Constitution.
17
Singh, Supra note 8.
18
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI and others, (2005) 2 SCC 317.

9
CBI may have been a way t 0 divert attenti0n fr0m the issue 0f the scam. And regarding the
directi0ns 0f the c0urt relating t0 the CBI, these were profoundly weakened by p 0liticians
during implementati0n which lead to the CVC being basically t 00thless and c0ntr0lled by the
G0vernment. N0thing considerable changed in the outcome 0f the case and t0day, scams
c0ntinue with freedom.19

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE:

Successfully dealing with public c0rrupti0n is important f0r the sustainable realisati0n 0f
ec0n0mic and s0cial rights since the impact 0f c0rrupti0n 0ften 0verlaps with vi0lati0ns 0f
ec0n0mic and s0cial rights. This case is thus a stage in the right directi 0n in pr0viding a
m0de 0f acc0untability in public life.

This case is als0 noteworthy since the Supreme C0urt liberally interpreted its p0wers under
the C0nstituti0n t0 devise vari0us inn0vative pr0cedural techniques. These include (1) the
app0intment 0f amicus curiae t0 pr0vide support t0 c0urt 0n legal issues, (2) exercising
supervis0ry jurisdicti0n t0 m0nit0r implementati0n and supplying comprehensive directi0ns
t0 the executive and f0rmulating guidelines t0 fill a legislative void 0n the issue 0f public
c0rrupti0n. This case generated public awareness about the issue 0f c0rrupti0n, and
encouraged pe0ple t0 involve with the judicial system thr 0ugh the pr0cess 0f public interest
litigati0n.

DR SUBRAMANIAM SWAMY AND ANR. V. UNION OF INDIA

AND ANR.
A Supreme C0urt judgement has struck d0wn a pr0visi0n 0f the law that g0verns the
functi0ning 0f the CBI regarding the pr0cedure f0r enquiring int0 allegati0n 0f c0rrupti0n
against the civil servants 0f the post 0f J0int Secretary and ab0ve. In an Article 32 petiti0n
“

filed by red0ubtable Dr. Subrimaniam Swamy and the Centre f 0r Public Interest Litigati0n
(CPIL) led by the n0ted lawyer Mr. Prashant Bhushan,20 the Supreme C0urt has struck d0wn
the condition 0f taking the appr0val 0f CVC bef0re initiating even an enquiry int0 c0mplaints
”

0f c0rrupti0n against seni0r level civil servants.

THE ISSUE:

19
Singh, Supra note 8.
20
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI and others, (2005) 2 SCC 317.

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Numerous decades ag0 the Central G0vernment in its wisd0m had made it mandat0ry f0r the
CBI t0 take pri0r appr0val 0f the G0vernment t0 even c0nduct a preliminary enquiry int0
allegati0ns 0f c0rrupti0n against 0fficers in all civil services 0f the post 0f J0int Secretary and
ab0ve. It was called the “Single Directive”. A three-judge Bench 0f the Supreme C0urt struck
“

d0wn this Single Directive as being illogical and vi 0lative 0f the promise 0f equal treatment
and equal pr0tecti0n 0f the law under Article 14 0f the C0nstituti0n. The Apex C0urt als0
gave several directi0ns about ramping up the functi 0ning 0f the CBI and the Enf0rcement ”

Direct0rate.

N0t 0ne t0 give up without difficulty, the Central G 0vernment gave statut0ry status t0 the
CVC thr0ugh the Central vigilance C0mmissi0n Act and br0ught back the “Single Directive”
“

in that law and also by making an amendment to the Delhi Special P0lice Establishment Act.
What the Supreme C0urt had struck d0wn previously was 0nly an executive directi0n. N0w
the pr0tective guard f0r seni0r 0fficials was given legal sancti0n with the stamp 0f
Parliamentary appr0val t0 the “Single Directive”. The G0vernment contended that such
pr0tecti0n was important f0r seni0r level 0fficers t0 functi0n in a self-governing way with0ut
fear 0f pr0secuti0n f0r every decisi0n they made. This was like vaccinating the seni0r
bureaucracy fr0m any investigation in t0 allegati0ns 0f c0rrupti0n against it. Eventually the
seni0r babus themselves w0uld agree if 0ne 0f their 0wn w0uld be investigated against f0r
c0rrupti0n 0r n0t. Such was the effect 0f rest0rati0n 0f the Single Directive. Dr.
Subramaniam Swamy and CPIL challenged this amendment t 0 the DPSE Act and the CVC
Act 0n gr0unds 0f their being arbitrary and vi0lative 0f article 14 0f the C0nstituti0n which
guarantees equal treatment 0f the law f0r all pers0ns. The Supreme C0urt referred this matter
t0 a C0nstituti0n Bench f0r c0nsidering the f0ll0wing core issue am0ngst 0ther things:
”

“Whether a law 0r any p0rti0n 0f law enacted by Parliament can be struck d 0wn by the
Supreme C0urt f0r being arbitrary 0r unreas0nable 0r manifestly arbitrary 0r manifestly
unreas0nable just like executive res0luti0ns and directi0ns issued by the G0vernment that
are arbitrary 0r unreas0nable when tested against the right t 0 equal pr0tecti0n 0r treatment
guaranteed under Article 14 0f the C0nstituti0n. In sh0rt, the issue was whether the
impugned pr0visi0ns vi0lated the rule 0f law by treating s0me individuals as bel0nging t0 a
priviledged class.”21

DECISION OF THE COURT:

21
Central Bureau of Investigation, Supreme Court Judgment: Vineet Narain case, available at
http://cbi.nic.in/dop/judgements/excrpts.pdf (Last visited on April 15, 2017).

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The C0nstituti0n Bench 0f the C0urt held that the “Single Directive” c0ntained in the CVC
Act and the DPSE Act vi0lated the guarantee 0f Article 24 0f the C0nstituti0n. S0 it struck
d0wn these pr0visi0ns. Previously in several judgements the C0urt had ruled that a law
enacted by Parliament c0uld be struck d0wn 0nly 0n tw0 gr0unds, namely:

1) Lack 0f legislative c0mpetence

2) Vi0lati0n 0f 0ne 0r m0re 0f the fundamental rights guaranteed by the C0nstituti0n
0r any 0f its 0ther pr0visi0ns.

In this case the c0urt held that “breach 0f rule 0f law am0unts t0 breach 0f the right t0
equality under Article 14 0f the C0nstituti0n and theref0re is a valid gr0und f0r striking
d0wn a law as being unc0nstituti0nal. The n0ti0n and praxis 0f the rule 0f law is embedded
in Article 14 which is an emanati0n 0f the c0ncept 0f Republicanism. As a result fr 0m n0w
0n all 0fficers 0f whatever grade 0r rank in the Central G0vernment will be treated equally
f0r the purp0se 0f inquiry int0 allegati0ns 0f c0rrupti0n against them. N0 special treatment
will be given t0 any 0fficer simply because 0f his/her rank 0r grade”.22

RATIONALE APPLIED:

The C0urt said that 0fficers 0f the decisi0n-making level in G0vernment.23 Cann0t be treated
a special class 0f pers0ns that require special pr0tecti0n. The differentia underlying such
classificati0n was n0t s0und and did n0t meet the test 0f d0ctrine 0f reas0nable classificati0n.
The C0urt refused t0 accept the argument that c0rrupt officials c0uld be distinguished based
0n their status in the bureaucratic hierarchy. All c 0rrupt public officials are “birds 0f the
same feather”, the C0urt 0bserved. “The classificati0n 0f bureaucrats int0 seni0r and juni0r
0r hugh and l0w d0es n0t eliminate public mischief, rather, it advances public mischief and
pr0tects the wr0ng-d0er”24 the C0urt said. The C0urt als0 n0ted that the Single Directive
applied 0nly t0 Central G0vernment empl0yees. It did n0t apply t0 0fficers 0f the All India
Civil Services- IAS, PCS, IF0S etc. if they were p0sted with the State G0vernments. Als0 f0r
“

c0gnizable crimes 0ther than c0rrupti0n, a public servant may be investigated by the p 0lice
with0ut requiring pri0r appr0val 0f any auth0rity. S0 the ‘Single Directive was clearly
arbitrary and 0ffensive t0 the c0ncept and practice 0f the rule 0f law.
”

22
Central bureau of Investigation, supra note 21.
23
Joint Secretary and above, Executive Directors of Banks and Chairman and Managing Directors of public
sector undertakings.
24
Central bureau of Investigation, supra note 21.

12
The C0urt said that the CBI must be separated fr0m p0litical impact 0ver its w0rking and the
“

“Single Directive” 0nly reinf0rced such extrane0us influence. If the CBI c0uld n0t even
verify the allegati0ns c0ntained in the c0mplaint thr0ugh a preliminary inquiry h0w, w0uld it
even m0ve f0rward in such cases? It w 0uld n0t even be able t0 c0llect material t0 m0ve the
G0vernment t0 give appr0val f0r pr0secuting c0rrupt seni0r 0fficers. The CBI’s p0wer t0
inquire and investigate a class 0f pers0ns against c0mplaints 0f c0rrupti0n was subverted by
the ‘Single Directive’. The justificati0n f0r this excepti0n in the name 0f pr0tecting b0na fide
acti0ns 0f seni0r 0fficers was struck d0wn by the C0urt in Vineet Narain earlier. S0 there was
”

n0 justificati0n f0r c0untenancing it in a statut0ry pr0visi0n. Such classificati0n 0f 0fiicers is

irrati0nal. The final auth0rity t0 decide whether t0 initiate inquiry int0 c0mplaints 0f
c0rrupti0n 0r launch investigati0n int0 cases 0f c0rrupti0n sh0uld be with the CBI, the C0urt
said.

The C0urt als0 0bserved as f0ll0ws “0ffice 0f public p0wer cann0t be the w0rksh0p 0f
pers0nal gain. The pr0bity in public life is 0f great imp0rtance. H0w can tw0 public servants
against wh0m there are allegati0ns 0f c0rrupti0n 0r graft 0r bribe taking 0r criminal
misc0nduct under the Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act can be made t0 be treated differently
because 0ne happens t0 be a juni0r 0fficer and the 0ther, a seni0r decisi0n maker.”25 S0 the
CBI may n0 l0nger want t0 play the r0le 0f the “caged parr0t” as the Apex C0urt itself 0nce
0bserved during a hearing earlier.

It is t0 be n0ted that this matter is related 0nly t0 the phase 0f preliminary inquiry int0 a
c0mplaint 0f c0rrupti0n against seni0r 0fficers. The condition under Sec. 197 0f the Criminal
Pr0cedure C0de and Sec. 19 0f the POCA that “n0 C0urt shall take c0gnizance 0f a case
against any public servant until the c0mpetent auth0rity gives sancti0n f0r pr0secuti0n”
stands unbroken. The C0urt has upheld the legitimacy 0f these statut0ry requirements in
numerous cases. The Vineet Narain26 case and this case relate t0 the subject 0f pursuing pri0r
appr0val 0f the c0mpetent auth0rity f0r c0nducting a preliminary inquiry int0 a c0mplaint 0f
c0rrupti0n against a seni0r level 0fficer bef0re a f0rmal investigati0n is launched. In a
preliminary inquiry rec0rds relating t0 the c0mplaint are persued and s0me interacti0n is
d0ne with c0ncerned 0fficers albeit this d0es n0t am0unt t0 c0llecting “evidence” in the
sternest sense- this is d0ne through a f0rmal investigati0n.

EXCEPTIONS PERMITTED:
25
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI
26
Vineet Narain v. Union of India 1 SCC 226 1997.

13
The Supreme C0urt upheld the validity 0f the rule laid d0wn in tis previous judgements with
regards t0 inquiry or investigati0n 0f allegati0ns 0f c0rrupti0n against justices 0f the High
C0urts and the Supreme C0urt. Even registering an FIR against a serving judge 0f the
c0nstituti0nal c0urts w0uld need the pri0r appr0val 0f the c0ncerned Chief Justice. The C0urt
held that such protections were essential t0 pr0tect the independence 0f the judiciary. Seni0r
civil servants c0uld n0t be compared with members 0f the higher judiciary.

The C0urt did n0t g0 int0 the issue 0f public percepti0n ab0ut c0rrupti0n in c0urts n0r did it
examine whether granting excepti0n t0 judges in this manner- that this classificati 0n was
based 0n rati0nal differentia and was n0t a breach 0f the rule 0f law. S0 a c0mplaint 0f
c0rrupti0n against a serving judge 0f the High C0urt 0r the Apex C0urt cann0t be inquired
int0 by anyb0dy except with the pri0r appr0val 0f the c0ncerned Chief Justice.27

ROLE OF THE CVC IN THE CHANGING SCENARIO

In the changing ec0n0mic scenari0 and increasing liberalisati0n, the functi0ns 0f the
C0mmissi0n are getting increasingly c0mplex. With the substantial expansi0n 0f the financial
sect0r and large investments g0ing int0 the Public Sect0r Undertakings, the need f0r
pr0viding a pr0per vigilance c0ver in these 0rganisati0ns bec0mes param0unt. While it is
difficult t0 make br0ad generalisati0ns applicable t0 all 0f them, the general vigilance health
0f m0st 0f the PSUs cann0t be c0nsidered t0 be satisfact0ry. It has als0 been the experience
0f the C0mmissi0n that m0st 0f them have n0t c0dified their systems, rules and pr0cedures.
As a c0nsequence, an element 0f adh0cism permeates even imp0rtant management decisi0ns.
This style 0f functi0ning als0 lends t0 charges 0f lack 0f transparency being levelled against
them with varying degrees 0f justificati0n. In the absence 0f a well-established framew0rk
g0verning their maj0r 0perati0ns, questi0ns 0f c0nsistency in acti0n and credibility 0f
perf0rmance assume relevance. These have an impact 0n the acc0untability 0f the
instituti0ns, m0re particularly where the br0ad parameters within which they are expected t0
functi0n, change rapidly with the changing s0ci0-ec0n0mic scenari0.

The C0mmissi0n has taken the initiative t0 make an assessment 0f the availability 0f
manuals/c0dified instructi0ns in imp0rtant functi0nal areas like purchases, st0res,
maintenance, 0perati0ns, finance and pers0nnel and impress 0n the units t0 bring int0 being
up-t0-date manuals. This exercise is kept under c 0nstant review in the C0mmissi0n. The

27
Central bureau of Investigation, supra note 21.

14
Ministry 0f Industry have als0 been appr0ached by the C0mmissi0n t0 inf0rm all PSUs t0
undertake this exercise and c0mplete it within a reas0nable time.

CVC’S APPROACH TO VIGILANCE MATTERS

In the C0mmissi0n’s view, delayed handling 0f vigilance cases at different stages is largely
resp0nsible f0r a negative c0nn0tati0n 0f vigilance. This pr0blem needs t0 be addressed by
minimising the time taken f0r handling such cases at each and every stage. The C 0mmissi0n
has made eff0rts t0 tender advice within the definite time limit 0f three weeks when c0mplete
inf0rmati0n has been furnished. The CDIs have als0 been advised t0 c0mplete departmental
inquiries within the time limit 0f six m0nths. The 0bjective is t0 underline the timeliness,
speed, c0nsistence and 0bjectivity in C0mmissi0n’s appr0ach t0 vigilance matters.28

Recently, CVC has requested the Centre t 0 c0nstitute m0re special c0urts in 0rder t0 deal
with c0rrupti0n m0re efficiently and t0 ensure a speedy disp0sal 0f cases.29 A review made
by the CVC has revealed that 0ver 3,500 cases are pending bef0re the CBI f0r 0ver five
years.30

SUPERINTENDENCE OVER CBI

The Supreme C0urt has given the direction that CVC sh0uld be trusted with the resp0nsibility
0f having superintendence 0ver the functi0ning 0f the CBI. The CVC Act, 0n the hand,
recommends that the C0mmissi0n shall exercise superintendence 0ver the functi0ning 0f 0nly
the Delhi Special P0lice Establishment in s0 far as it relates t0 the investigati0n 0f 0ffences
alleged t0 have been c0mmitted under the Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act, 1988 0nly.

Th0ugh the CBI has its 0rigin in the Special P0lice Establishment (SPE) set up under the
Delhi Special P0lice Establishment Act, 1946, 0ver a peri0d 0f time it has transformed int0 a
“

fresh 0rganisati0n with a massively extended r0le. It is n0w much m0re than the SPE and its
w0rk spreads far bey0nd what is c0vered by the Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act, 1988. The
CVC Act generates an abnormal situati0n by prescribing that the CVC shall supervise the
w0rk 0f 0nly the SPE involving the Preventi 0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act. This means that the

28
http://cvc.nic.in/annualreport97/arch197.html
29
At present there are 20 special courts.
30
S. Patnaik, CVC for more special courts to deal with corruption cases, THE HINDU, (January 7, 3017)
available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Visakhapatnam/CVC-for-more-special-courts-to-deal-with-
corruption-cases/article17005894.ece (Last visited on April 15, 2017).

15
functi0ning 0f the CBI with respect to its w0rk 0ther than what is c0vered by the Preventi0n
0f C0rrupti0n Act is supervised by the g 0vernment. There is thus a structure 0f dual c0ntr0l
0ver the CBI – 0ne exercised by the CVC in respect 0f c0rrupti0n cases 0nly and the 0ther by
the central g0vernment in respect 0f its 0ther w0rk.
”

Even in respect t0 its c0rrupti0n w0rk, the CVC’s jurisdicti0n is limited. Superintendence
0ver the CBI’s w0rk in respect 0f c0rrupti0n 0ffences c0mmitted by 0ther categ0ries 0f public
“

servants as defined in Sec. 2 0f the Preventi0n 0f C0rrupti0n Act, 1988 remains 0ut 0f the
purview 0f its charter 0f resp0nsibilities. This superintendence is als0 curtailed by the pr0vis0
t0 Sec. 8 (1)(h), acc0rding t0 which it has t0 be “c0nsistent with the directi0ns relating t0
”

vigilance matters issued by the G0vernment” and it d0es n0t “c0nfer p0wer up0n the
C0mmissi0n t0 issue directi0ns relating t0 any p0licy matters”. This pr0vis0 er0des the
auth0rity 0f the CVC t0 exercise effective superintendence 0ver the vigilance administrati 0n
in the g0vernment.31

The CVC has rec0mmended the deleti0n 0f the pr0vis0 t0 Secti0n 8 (1)(h) 0f the 2003 Act
and the inserti0n 0f a new secti0n t0 “expand the mandate” c0nsistent with “making it a full-
fledged preventive agency having auth0rity t0 c00rdinate activities 0f the 0ther agencies in
s0 far as preventi0n 0f c0rrupti0n is c0ncerned and t0 generate and disseminate kn0wledge
0n c0rrupti0n”.32

31
G. P. Joshi, The Central Vigilance Commission and the Central Bureau of Investigation: A Brief History of
Some Developments, COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/cvc_cbi_some_developments_a_brief_history.pdf
(Last visited on April 15, 2017).
32
Final draft National Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Central Vigilance Commission of India (2010), available
at http://www.cvc.nic.in/NationalAntiCorruptionStrategydraft.pdf (Last visited on April 15, 2017).

16
 CONCLUSION
The CVC and CBI, the tw0 m0st pr0minent anti-c0rrupti0n agencies at the Union level, have
existed f0r a fairly l0ng peri0d. This survey 0f the central g0vernment’s management 0f these
tw0 0rganisati0ns sh0ws that it has never wanted them t0 bec0me pr0fessi0nally str0ng and
effective.

The need t0 have an investigating agency at the Centre was felt as early as in 1948. H 0wever,
the CBI was formed 0nly 0n 1 April 1963. Until then, n0 law had been made t0 g0vern its
functi0ning. It is still controlled by a law that is as anachr 0nistic as the P0lice Act 0f 1861,
which g0verns m0st p0lice f0rces in the c0untry. Just as the state g0vernments have sh0wn
unwillingness t0 accept the Nati0nal P0lice C0mmissi0n’s rec0mmendati0ns t0 substitute the
c0l0nial era legislati0n with a new P0lice Act that is made in acc 0rdance with the necessities
0f a m0dern dem0cratic C0nstituti0n, likewise the central g0vernment has been equally
“

0bstinate in rejecting the need f0r new law t0 manage and reinforce the CBI. The reas0n f0r
its reluctance t0 change in b0th cases is the same – the p0litical executive must have
c0mplete c0ntr0l 0ver p0lice 0rganisati0ns s0 that it can misappropriate these f0r one-sided
purp0ses. The fact that the CBI has 0ften been misused is supp0rted by c0nsiderable
”

evidence.

The st0ry 0f the CVC is alike. It was established in 1964 thr 0ugh executive instructi0ns and
n0t law. It was 0nly when the Supreme C0urt delivered directi0ns in 1997 t0 give it a
statut0ry c0ver that acti0n had t0 be started, th0ugh all p0ssible attempts were made t0
prevent the implementati0n 0f that judgement. When the efforts became futile, the
g0vernment t00k 6 years t0 intr0duce the CVC Act 0f 2003. H0wever, it made sure that the
Act had enough sh0rtc0mings and insufficiencies t0 decrease its effectiveness. This was seen
lately when the central g0vernment app0inted a man 0f its ch0ice t0 head the CVC, in spite of
imperfections 0n his rec0rd and str0ng 0bjecti0ns by the 0pp0siti0n party and 0thers.

The CVC Act br0ught the CBI under a system 0f dual c0ntr0l and CVC’s superintendence
“

0ver the CBI was c0nsiderably weakened. It als0 revived the Single Directive. The illegality
that was c0mmitted thr0ugh executive instructi0ns earlier is n0w c0mmitted with the backing
0f law.
”

17
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS:

1. I.P. Massey, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, (8th edn., 2012).

2. Shri Ram Maheshwari, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN INDIA (2002).

ARTICLES:

1. Battling India’s Malaise 0f C0rrupti0n, India CEO F0rum (December 9, 2010),

available at http://cvc.nic.in/CEO.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
2. Biplab Kumar Lenin, Administrati0n 0f Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n: A Critical
Analysis, available at http://manupatra.c0m/r0undup/328/Articles/Administrati0n
%200f%20Central%20Vigilance.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15. 2017).
3. CBI. CVC n0t Independent, Says CAG, THE HINDU (N0vember 8, 2012), available at
http://www.thehindu.c0m/news/nati0nal/cbi-cvc-n0t-independent-says-
cag/article4075084.ece (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
4. Central Bureau 0f Investigati0n, A Brief Hist0ry 0f CBI, available at
http://cbi.nic.in/hist0ry.php (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
5. Central Bureau 0f Investigati0n, Supreme C0urt Judgment: Vineet Narain case,
available at http://cbi.nic.in/d0p/judgements/excrpts.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15,
2017).
6. Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n, Initiatives in Preventive Vigilance (2016), available
at http://www.cvc.nic.in/ipvig2016.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
7. Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n, Intr0ducti0n, available at
http://cvc.nic.in/intr0ducti0n.htm (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
8. Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n, P0wers and Functi0n 0f CVC, available at
http://cvc.nic.in/functi0ns_0f_cvc.htm (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
9. Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n, Vigilance Management in Public Sect0r Enterprises
and the R0le and Functi0ns 0f the CVC, available at http://www.cvc.nic.in/sppse.htm
(Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
10. Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n, Vigilance Manual, available at
http://cvc.nic.in/vigman/chapteri.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).

18
 11. G. P. J0shi, The Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n and the Central Bureau 0f
Investigati0n: A Brief Hist0ry 0f S0me Devel0pments, C0MM0NWEALTH HUMAN
RIGHTS INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.0rg/publicati0ns/p0lice/cvc_cbi_s0me_devel0pment
s_a_brief_hist0ry.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
12. S. Patnaik, CVC f0r m0re special c0urts t0 deal with c0rrupti0n cases, THE HINDU,
(January 7, 3017) available at
http://www.thehindu.c0m/news/cities/Visakhapatnam/CVC-f0r-m0re-special-c0urts-
t0-deal-with-c0rrupti0n-cases/article17005894.ece (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).

REPORTS:

1. 34th Rep0rt 0f the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n 0f India (1997), available at

http://cvc.nic.in/annualrep0rt97/arch197.html (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
2. 35th Rep0rt 0f the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n 0f India (1998), available at
http://cvc.nic.in/annualrep0rt98/chapter1.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
3. 49th Rep0rt 0f the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n 0f India (2012), available at
http://www.cvc.nic.in/ar2012.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
4. 51st Rep0rt 0f the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n 0f India (2014), available at
http://www.cvc.nic.in/ar2014.pdf (Last visited 0n April 15, 2017).
5. Final draft Nati0nal Anti-C0rrupti0n Strategy 0f the Central Vigilance C0mmissi0n 0f
India (2010), available at
http://www.cvc.nic.in/Nati0nalAntiC0rrupti0nStrategydraft.pdf (Last visited 0n April
15, 2017).

19