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The CEDAW Committee and the Protection of Women’s Rights

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 THE CEDAW COMMITTEE AND

THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Shahrul Mizan Ismail

________________________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

It is pivotal to view the CEDAW Committee as a treaty body, originally formed with the traditional duty of

ensuring compliance to the substantive provisions of the Women‟s Convention. Thus, its operational

framework and philosophical foundations (which may limit the overall performance of its functions) is

derived from the Women‟s Convention. It is therefore quintessential for us to understand that whatever

conceptual, structural or procedural limitations that may restrict the Convention in „promoting and protecting

the rights of women‟ would ultimately affects the degree of efficacy of the CEDAW Committee in performing

the same mission.

The writer does not intend to concentrate his discussion mainly on the procedural deficiencies of the

CEDAW Committee such as time constraint issues, limited resources and backlog of reports etc, which has

been argued by many commentators to be the stumbling block towards a more active and effective protection

or promotion of the rights of women. Instead, much of the writer‟s essay would be focusing on the conceptual

barricades that are inherent in the underlying philosophy of CEDAW, the structural weaknesses which may

have arisen from CEDAW‟s initial set-up and basic structure, and finally the technical cordons that are

genuine in the model of enforcement on which the Committee is expected to act. It is the writer‟s hypothesis

that the effectiveness of the Committee in protecting and promoting the rights of women ultimately depends

on the original mandates and limits prescribed by CEDAW itself. The writer would like to contend that these

guidelines are the only rules within which the Committee is expected to act. As much as the Committee would

1
want to contribute in a more effective way towards protecting and promoting the rights of women, it cannot

exceed these lines or manifestly run astray from the true spirit of the treaty authority it is supposed to serve.

CONCEPTUAL BARRICADES

The extent to which the Committee could function in protecting and promoting the rights of women

largely depends on the operational framework dictated by the Women‟s Convention. As the treaty body which

was formed to foster compliance towards international obligations entrenched in the Convention, the

Committee‟s efforts are logically governed by the same underlying principle which forms the root of the said

treaty. The corpus of the substantive provisions of CEDAW (including the rules which guide the practice of

the committee in ensuring compliance to the treaty obligations) were mainly based on the principle of equality

and non-discrimination, as commonly understood in the realm international human rights law.1 Therefore, in

assessing the „effectiveness‟ of the CEDAW Committee, the question arises as to whether the subscription to

the principle of equality and non discrimination, and the use of human rights as the dais, would actually lead

to better protection and promotion of the rights of women.

It has been submitted that the field of human rights offers the suitable “framework for debate over

basic values and conceptions of good society”.2 In addition, it is also reported that even if a treaty of human

rights is not perfectly drafted, its mere existence forms a normative legal basis for the international

community.3 Certain commentators have further argued that the resort to human rights as the platform for

action would bring the entire human rights structure to bear.4 Apart from being obligatory upon state parties

that are members to its treaty obligation system, international human rights law provides a corresponding

legal basis within these states, furnishing accountability in domestic arena and opening avenues for claim of

1
Douglass Cassel & Jill Guzman, „The Law & Reality of Discrimination Against Women‟ in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M Koening,
Women & International Human Rights Law, Transnational Publishers, (1999), Volume 1, at pp. 287-319 at pg 287-294; Berta
Esparanza Hernandez-Truyol, „Human Rights Through a Gendered Lense‟, in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M Koening, op cit.
2
Hillary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, Juris Publishing &
Manchester University Press, (2000), at pg 209.
3
Ibid, at pg 210.
4
Ibid.

2
active and effective remedies.5 Charlesworth and Chinkin rightly pointed out that “[b]ecause women in most

societies operate from such a disadvantaged position, rights discourse offers a recognized vocabulary to frame

political and social wrongs.”6 The writer concede on the point that, even an ineffectively drafted treaty would

still be useful, to at least create a normative legal basis for the global community and that the option of human

rights mechanism would pull the whole structure of human rights to bear. However, the rest of the above

mentioned ingredients of human rights enforcement namely the obligatory nature of the law, the

accountability of states, and the purported effectual remedies are in reality, not always available.

The writer would like contend that whilst all the aforesaid may practically be true, the language of

equality and human rights could at times be obstructing against transformative outcomes. 7 According to

Charlesworth and Chinkin, women‟s experiences and concerns could not, in all circumstances, easily be

encoded into the „narrow, individualistic language of right‟8. It is argued that the „rights discourse overly

simplifies power relations and their promises are constantly thwarted by structural inequalities of power‟.9

Thus, translating the essentials of women‟s affairs into the restricted terminologies and expressions of human

rights may result into „creating new sites for the subtle oppression of women‟. 10 Certain other writers

critically claimed that the language of rights is usually indefinite and highly prone to manipulation. 11 As

rightly stated by Charlesworth and Chinkin, “[r]ecourse to the language of rights may give rhetorical flourish

to an argument, but provides only an ephemeral polemical advantage, often obscuring the need for political

5
Ibid; quoted by the writers from Commission on Human Rights, Right to Food, High Comissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/21, 15 January 1998.
6
Supra, note 2.
7
Dianne Otto, „A Post Beijing Reflection on the Limitation and Potential of Human Rights Discourse‟, in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean
M Koening, op cit.
8
Supra, note 2, at pg 208; as mentioned in R. West, „Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law‟ (1989) University of Chicago
Legal Forum, at pg 59.
9
Supra, note 2, at pg 208; quoted by E. Gross, „What is Feminist Theory?‟ in C. Patemean and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges:
Social and Political Theory, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, (1986) at pg 192.
10
Supra, note 2.
11
Ibid, at pg 209.

3
and social change”12 In fact, it is averred that the assertion of a legal right is actually a mischaracterisation of

social experience.13 The individualism promoted by the traditional understanding of rights ignored „the

relational nature of social life‟ and assumed the inevitability of social antagonism in society. 14

And in the case of CEDAW, this situation is worsened by the relatively weak language of its

obligating provisions.15 Although the „equality‟ mission was originally inspired by the provisions of the Race

Convention, the operative language of CEDAW is much weaker than the former. The obligations that are

imposed on the state parties were mostly constructed in a qualified language, and typically employ the term

„taking all appropriate measures‟, which indicates excessive entrusting of women‟s rights in the discretion of

individual states.16

Apart from the shortcomings found in the discourse of human rights, the over reliance of CEDAW on

the principle of equality could also lead to another conceptual block.17 As correctly highlighted by

Charlesworth and Chinkin, “the fundamental problem for women is not simply discriminatory treatment

compared with men, although this is a manifestation of a larger problem. Women are in inferior position

because they lack real economic, social and political power both in the public and private world”. 18 Thus, by

focusing on „equality and non-discrimination‟, the Women‟s Convention would unconsciously neglect other

problems faced by women worldwide, which do not necessarily relates to the issue of inequality of treatment

on the basis of sex. This would subsequently affect the ability of the CEDAW Committee to recognize and to

12
Ibid; as mentioned in M. Tushnet, „An Essay on Rights‟, 62 Texas Law Review (1984) 1363 at 1371-2.
13
Ibid; as mentioned in P. Gabel & P. Harris, „Building Power and Breaking Images: A Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of
Law‟, 11 New York Review of Law and Social Change (1982-83) 369 at pg 375-6.
14
Supra, note 2, at pg 209; as mentioned in M. Tushnet, „Rights: An Essay in Informal Polical Theory‟, 17 Politics and Society
(1989) 403 at 410.
15
Supra, note 2, at pg 220.
16
Ibid.
17
The liberal feminist approach, which identifies sexual equality with equal treatment, explains the centrality of the norm of non-
discrimination, rather than a fuller set of rights, in the international law on women‟s rights. As comparison, analyse the language
and the underlying principle which govern the provisions of the Children‟s convention, which stresses the implementation and the
realization of the children rights as a whole instead of rights that are related to one particular concept.
18
Noreen Burrows has written, “[f]or most women, what it is to be human is to work long hours in agriculture or the home, to
receive little or no remuneration, and to be faced with political and legal processes which ignores their contribution to society and
accord no recognition of their particular needs.” Supra, note 2, at pg 230.

4
protect those „rights that are specific to women‟s gendered experience and corporeality‟. 19 Diane Otto gave

the example of gendered violence which was not directly acknowledged by the actual provisions of the

Convention, despite the fact that this problem has always been „sacrosanct‟, traditional agenda of women‟s

emancipatory movement in the past. The Women‟s Convention also fails to make any explicit reference to the

predicaments faced by lesbians, „rendering the applicability of its anti-discrimination provisions to lesbians

“as women” equivocal‟20.

By providing access for women to important areas such as employment, education, participation in

government and most importantly, reproductive information and choices „on equal terms with men‟, the

Convention completely ignores the “highly gendered form of the institution involved and the need for

structural change.”21 Instead, it compels the fitting of women‟s rights into the distinctive and limited

manifestation of the human rights enjoyed by men. Charlesworth and Chinkin elaborated further averring that

the absence of an explicit prohibition of violence against women is perhaps due to conceptual difficulties of

“compressing a harm characterised as private into the public frame of the Convention, or perhaps because it

does not fit directly into the equality model”.22 Otto was right when she said the equality paradigm merely

enables women to limitedly argue that they are entitled to enjoy the same opportunities and outcomes granted

to men.23 In fact, Article 4 endorsement of affirmative action programme indirectly assumes that these

measures will allow women to perform exactly like men.24

STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES

19
Supra, note 7, at pg 120. The writer referred to Article 4(1) which discusses an allowance for temporary special measures to
accelerate the attainment of equality between women and men but specifically stating that this “shall in now way entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal separate standards”.
20
Supra, note 7, at pg 121.
21
Ibid, at pg 120.
22
Supra, note 2, at pg 231.
23
Supra, note 7, at pg 115-116.
24
Article 4 provides: “[a]doption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between
men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality
of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.”

5
The Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women is obviously an international treaty.

Theoretically, it is true that the practice of international human rights which comes under the banner of

universalism usually stretches beyond the restricted boundaries of state sovereignty. 25 Under the human rights

treaty system, states should and could be made accountable to international authorities (such as the CEDAW

Committee) for domestic acts affecting human rights.26 This is because by becoming a party to a treaty, states

undertake to be bound with the obligations under international law, of ensuring that their domestic

legislations, policies or practices meet the conditions of the treaty and are consistent with its human rights

standards.27 Bayefsky correctly said “international human rights law treaties usually seeks to encourage a

serious national process or review of laws, policies and practices against treaty standards, and to engage in

reform through partnerships among member of civil society.”28 According to Brynes, the monitoring

procedures of a human rights treaty such as CEDAW, may provide the impetus to exert international pressure

on state-parties.29 He interestingly admitted that “[i]f members of a supervisory body are strongly critical of a

state or express the view that the state has not carried out its obligations under the treaty, this can serve to put

some pressure on a government, particularly if the proceedings receive publicity internationally and

nationally.”30 Jacobson predicts that this would eventually lead to the formulation of a detailed and official

assessment of the condition of women in that state, that may have not been discovered previously.31

Despite all of the above, it is crucial to remember that obligations of states in any treaty under

international law are based on consent. In other words states are bound because they have initially agreed to

25
Anne F. Bayefsky, How to Complain to the UN Human Rights Treaty System, Transnational Publishers, (2002), at pg 1.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid, at pg 4.
28
Ibid, at pg 1.
29
Andrew Byrnes, „Using International Human Rights Law and Procedures to Advance Women‟s Human Rights‟, in Kelly D.
Askin & Dorean M Koening, op cit., at 83.
30
Ibid, at pg 105; on the function of the reporting procedure, please refer to Phillip Alston, „The Purpose of Reporting‟ in United
Nations, Manual on Human Rights Reporting 13 (1991).
31
Roberta Jacobson, „The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women‟ in P. Alston (ed.) The United Nations
and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press (1992), at pg 455.

6
be bound.32 Since the field of international human rights law is mainly governed by the ordinary norms of

international legal system, the effectiveness of its treaty obligations is also essentially depending on the

aforesaid voluntary nature of compliance33. Byrnes rightly said that “the limitations of international law

generally when it comes to enforcement of binding standards are well known, and the international human

rights law is of no exceptions.” The „sacred‟ doctrine of state sovereignty and the lack of sanctions or

punishments within the ambit of treaty enforcement under International Law has made it almost impossible to

ensure compliance towards human rights treaty obligations.

By virtue of article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states parties to any

conventions are entitled to make reservations so long as they do not conflict with the object and purpose of the

convention. Reservations are unilateral declarations made by a state when ratifying a treaty, intended to

exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty to that particular state34. Reservations

allow a state to ratify an international treaty without obligating itself to provisions it does not wish to

undertake.35 By January 2000, 67 member states parties had made reservations to the Convention, making

CEDAW the treaty with the highest number of reservations when compared to other international instruments

of human rights36. Riddle astutely observed that “the accountability of state parties to the Women's

Convention may have actually encouraged state parties to make reservations to forestall criticism from the

progress reports submitted by states to CEDAW concerning the steps they have taken to implement the

Convention. In other words, in order to avoid adhering to provisions it does not intend to implement, a state

will try to define its obligation as narrowly as possible.”37

32
Supra, note 25, at pg 4.
33
Supra, note 25.
34
Henry J. Steiner & Phillip Alston, International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text Materials, Oxford
University Press, (2nd Ed), pg. 439.
35
Jennifer Riddle, „Making Cedaw Universal: A Critique Of Cedaw's Reservation Regime Under
Article 28 And The Effectiveness Of The Reporting Process‟ 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 605.
36
Supra, note 34, at pg 442.
37
Supra, note 35.

7
 CEDAW Committee, through General Recommendation No. 4 and reiterated in General

Recommendation No. 20, had expressed its concerns with regards to the significant number of reservations

entered into by member states, which even include reservations that goes against the very purpose and object

of the Convention. Despite the numerous calls by the Committee for member states to reconsider and
38
withdraw their reservations, the reservations remain to be the main impediment against a more effective

monitoring functions of the Committee untill the present day. According to Cook, CEDAW under its Article

18, attempts to deal with reservations through the reporting process, which encourages the removal of those

reservations.39 According to the practice of the Committee, during the reporting process, the state must

explain why the reservation is necessary, and prove that such reservation is coherent with other reservations it

has made previously in relation to other treaty obligations, and state the effect or rationale it intends to secure

with the said reservation.40 The state would also be required to address the issue of whether, when and how it

intends to withdraw the said reservation.41 Alas, even the said reporting system is found to be ineffective

when dealing with the high number of reservations42 According to Riddle, “even though the CEDAW

Committee has attempted to pressure states to remove reservations, they have no recognized authority to

define the object and purpose of CEDAW, much less to set standards for reservations and invalidate

reservations deemed incompatible. As a result, few states have removed their reservations, and the

implementation of CEDAW provisions has been particularly discouraging in states with broad reservations.”43

CEDAW Committee lacks any mandate or authority to even independently decide as to whether a reservation

goes against the object and purpose of the treaty. 44 According to Clark, the General Assembly and the United

38
Please refer to General Recommendation No 4 & 20.
39
Supra, note 35.
40
Supra, note 35.
41
Ibid.
42
ibid.
43
Ibid; as mentioned in Julie A. Minor, „An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women‟, 24 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 137, 144 (1994).
44
Ibid.

8
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) statements indicates that the CEDAW Committee is

discouraged from criticising reservations.45

All of these reservations would clearly hinder the main objective of the Convention, and at the same

time would hamper the monitoring function of the CEDAW Committee i.e. to eliminate all forms of

discrimination which is one of many other ways in which rights of women could be uphold. Bayefsky

correctly identified that reservations may substantially or procedurally limit the ability of an individual to

successfully make a case against a particular state party through the Communications Procedure embodied in

the Optional Protocol especially if the state in question has not even ratified the said protocol. The Committee

would also be unable to impel compliance upon states for substantial obligations that may arise from

provisions reserved by the state-parties

Another structural weakness that may seriously affect the effectiveness of the CEDAW Committee

relates to the issue of mainstreaming and marginalisation of women‟s rights. According to Charlesworth and

Chinkin, the formation of a specific branch of human rights dedicated for women such as CEDAW, has led to

its marginalization.46 Ever since established, the CEDAW Committee has always been labeled as the „poor

relation‟ of other treaty bodies, „left outside the mainstream of human rights work within the United Nations

and neglected by the international human rights community‟.47 Unlike other human rights treaty bodies,

whose secretariat is provided by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the CEDAW

Committee is “serviced both technically and substantively by the Division for the Advancement of Women”.

The Committee‟s sessions have never been held at the Centre for Human Rights (now the Office of the UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights) in Geneva like its other sister bodies.48 It is suggested that this

45
Ibid; as mentioned in Belinda Clark, „The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and The Convention on Discrimination
Against Women‟, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 281, 317 (1991). Ms. Clark is a former New Zealand delegate to the Third Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly.
46
Supra, note 2, at pg 218-219.
47
Mara R. Bustello, „The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women At The Crossroads‟ in P. Alston and J.
Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge University Press, (2000), at pg 81.
48
Ibid, at pg 82.

9
deliberate attempt of separating the so-called „general‟ and „women‟ matters seriously disadvantages

women.49 According to Jacobson, “the different servicing arrangements for the Committee, and its

geographical separation from the other United Nations human rights treaty bodies, has meant that the

Committee‟s jurisprudential approach and practices have developed, to a large extent, with little reference to

the approach and practices of other treaty bodies.”50 There is a strategic dilemma to this issue. While the

attempt to protect and promote the rights of women through „a more generally applicable measures‟ (like the

ICCPR, ICESCR etc) has caused women‟s concerns to be inundated beneath other „more global issues‟, “the

price of the creation of a separate institutional mechanisms and special measures that deal with women within

the UN system has typically been the creation of a „woman‟s ghetto‟, given less power, fewer resources and a

lower priority than „mainstream‟ human rights bodies.”

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES

Under the Women‟s Convention, the CEDAW Committee is prescribed with five main apparatus to perform

its monitoring function, namely (a) the Reporting Procedure51; (b) the Exceptional Reporting Procedure52; (c)

the Inquiry Procedure53; (d) the Complaint or Communications Procedure54; and (e) General

Comments/Recommendations of the Committee.

(a) The Reporting Procedure

According to Article 18 of the Women‟s Convention, state parties are obligated to submit an initial report

within one year subsequent to the Convention coming into effect for that particular state, and to produce

49
Supra, note 2, at pg 218-219.
50
Supra, note 47, at pg 83.
51
Article 18.
52
Ibid.
53
Article 8 of the Optional Protocol.
54
Article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

10
regularly, periodic reports every four years thereon.55 This procedure also governs the situation where the

Committee had specifically requested any particular state to formulate a report other than those report stated

above.56 The reporting procedure under Article 18 aims at analyzing the progress in complying with the treaty

provisions and the obstacles faced in performing it.57 The reporting procedure also has an important function

of ascertaining reasons behind reservations and in identifying the expected time when reservations will be

withdrawn.58

Through the reporting procedure, the Committee contributes in promoting and protecting the rights of

women by generating a Concluding Comment based on the state party‟s report, and the facts stated therein.

The comment would subsequently be delivered to the state in question, a copy of which would be included in

the Annual Report of the Committee.59 The Comment sent to the state would include suggestions and

recommendations from the Committee with regards to ways and means how the state could work towards

complying with the provisions of the Convention.

Backlog of reports60 and time constraint61 are the obstacles of the reporting procedure faced by the

CEDAW Committee. Within a short period of meeting time, the Committee has a long list of reports due to be

considered. State would normally wait up to three years before its reports could be considered, and when the

time comes, it would have to furnish additional information to update the reports. Currently, the Committee is

considering ten reports per session, and it is the maximum number, in order to have a quality report review. It

is said that even if the Committee considers ten reports per session, it would take roughly ten years to solve

the backlog reports problem62.

55
Michael O. Flaherty, Human Rights and the UN Practice before the Treaty Bodies. (2nd ed) Martinuss Nijhoff, (2002) at pg 107.
56
Ibid, pg 107.
57
Ibid, pg107-108.
58
Ibid, pg107-108.
59
Ibid, pg 111.
60
Supra, note 47, at pg 84-86.
61
Ibid, at pg 82.
62
Ibid, at pg 85-86.

11
(b) The Exceptional Reporting Procedure

Apart from the regular reporting procedure mentioned above, Article 18 of the Convention also empowered

the Committee to request any state party to submit reports on exceptional basis. This procedure is designed

with the purpose of ascertaining any relevant information in relation to any actual or potential violation of the

Convention.

Since the reporting procedure is exceptional in nature, there are two conditions that needs to be

fulfilled before the Committee can resort to this method monitoring compliance namely (1) the existence of a

reliable and adequate information indicating grave or systematic violations of women‟s human rights; and the

(2) the violation should be gender-based or is directed at women because of their sex.63

(c) The Inquiry Procedure

The inquiry procedure enables the Committee to conduct an inquiry and investigation with regards to any

suspected violation of the Convention by any state party. The said inquiry and investigation is done on its own

initiative and are based on certain information it receives from any reliable source.64

Upon deciding to conduct an inquiry, the Committee would invite the government to render its co-

operation including if appropriate the provision of facilities for the conducting of one or more visiting

missions.

(d) The Complaints or Communications Procedure

The communication procedure permits individuals or group of individuals to communicate their complaint of

any violations under the Convention directly to the Committee. After considering the admissibility and the

merit of the communication through information gathered from exchange of correspondence between the

parties, the Committee will adopt its Views on the matter65.

63
Supra, note 55, at pg 117.
64
Ibid, at pg 121; supra, note 2, at pg 245.
65
Supra, note 55, at pg 118-120; supra, note 2, at pg 245.

12
 However, this procedure suffers from few shortcomings that could hamper its effectiveness. One of

the main shortcomings is that under the UN procedure, the Views adopted by the Committee are not binding

upon the State66. The State is not bound to agree with the Committee‟s Views. Another shortcoming is that

State could refuse to entertain the complaint67, or it could also enter reservations to restrict or modify the legal

effect of the complaint lodge against it 68. The procedure is also slow and time-consuming, whereby the

complainant has to wait long before her complaint is heard by the Committee. One of the main requirements

is that the complainant must firstly exhaust all domestic remedies before she could communicate her

complaint to the Committee69.

(e) The General Recommendation

General Recommendations are the Committee‟s official statements that elaborate on the meaning of treaty

obligations. It provides guidance on the procedural and substantive provisions of the treaty. It is also the

Committee's interpretation of treaty rights under the Convention70.

CONCLUSION

Presuming that every each of the above procedures work smoothly as expected, could we then say that the

CEDAW Committee is effective in promoting and protecting the rights of women worldwide? The writer

wishes to reaffirm his stance in concluding this essay i.e. the question of how effective could the Committee

protect and promote the rights of women could not be resolved by merely looking into procedural deficiencies

which affects only the annual routine of the Committee. Even if all states obediently comply to the reporting,

exceptional reporting, inquiry and communication procedures of the CEDAW Committee, to what extent can

these procedures effectively promote if not to protect the rights of women? How much could a state reporting

obligation or a non-binding view of the CEDAW Committee do in performing the aforesaid mission? It is
66
Supra, note 29, at pg 99; Charlesworth, pg 245.
67
Supra, note 25, at pg 46 & 134.
68
Ibid, at pg 94.
69
Ibid, at pg 95.
70
Supra, note 25, at pg xxi; see also http://www.bayefsky.com.

13
undoubtedly true that these measures are in the long run beneficial to the general emancipatory movement of

women‟s rights. Nevertheless, one fact remains unalterable i.e not all violations of the rights of women occur

within the four corners of the principle of equality and not all problems affecting in women worldwide could

be translated in the language of human rights.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrew Byrnes, „Using International Human Rights Law and Procedures to Advance Women‟s Human
Rights‟, in Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M Koening, Women & International Human Rights Law,
Transnational Publishers, (1999), Volume 1.
Anne F. Bayefsky, How to Complain to the UN Human Rights Treaty System, Transnational Publishers,
(2002).
Belinda Clark, „The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and The Convention on Discrimination
Against Women‟, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 281, 317 (1991).
Berta Esparanza Hernandez-Truyol, „Human Rights Through a Gendered Lense‟, in Kelly D. Askin &
Dorean M Koening, Women & International Human Rights Law, Transnational Publishers, (1999),
Volume 1.
Commission on Human Rights, Right to Food, High Comissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/21, 15 January 1998.
Dianne Otto, „A Post Beijing Reflection on the Limitation and Potential of Human Rights Discourse‟, in
Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M Koening, Women & International Human Rights Law, Transnational
Publishers, (1999), Volume 1.
Douglass Cassel & Jill Guzman, „The Law & Reality of Discrimination Against Women‟ in Kelly D. Askin
& Dorean M Koening, Women & International Human Rights Law, Transnational Publishers, (1999),
Volume 1.
E. Gross, „What is Feminist Theory?‟ in C. Patemean and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and
Political Theory, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, (1986).
Henry J. Steiner & Phillip Alston, International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text
Materials, Oxford University Press, (2nd Ed).
Hillary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, Juris
Publishing & Manchester University Press, (2000).
Jennifer Riddle, „Making Cedaw Universal: A Critique Of Cedaw's Reservation Regime Under Article 28
And The Effectiveness Of The Reporting Process‟ 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 605.
Julie A. Minor, „An Analysis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women‟, 24 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 137, 144 (1994).
M. Tushnet, „An Essay on Rights‟, 62 Texas Law Review (1984) 1363.
M. Tushnet, „Rights: An Essay in Informal Polical Theory‟, 17 Politics and Society (1989) 403.
Mara R. Bustello, „The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women At The Crossroads‟
in P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge
University Press, (2000).
Michael O. Flaherty, Human Rights and the UN Practice before the Treaty Bodies. (2nd ed) Martinuss
Nijhoff, (2002).

14
P. Gabel & P. Harris, „Building Power and Breaking Images: A Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of
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