CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

This chapter presents the data which address the questions posed in Chapter I

with the object of analyzing the rule provided under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Revised

Rules of the Sandiganbayan,1 creating a special division consisting of five (5) justices in

deciding a criminal action, whether it is in accordance with the rule of proof beyond

reasonable doubt. As earlier discussed, the natural consequence of this setup is having

a variation and conflicting opinions at the first level of determination. This study focuses

on this implication particularly in having a majority opinion favoring conviction despite

the presence of reasonable doubt found by the dissenting justices.

I. The rule of proof beyond reasonable doubt as provided by the Rules of

Court and discussed in Court decisions

a. Compliance of the rule in regular trial courts

First, this study deals with the analysis on the determination on when is the rule

of proof beyond reasonable doubt complied with generally by trial courts as given by the

rules and by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Rule 133, Section 2 of the

Rules of Court introduces this weight of evidence, to wit:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a

criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly.
Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

1
 This provision may be break down into the following statements: that an accused

is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt; and that

reasonable doubt does not imply the presence of absolute certainty but only requires

moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind.

The following elements, in order to justify that the proof is beyond reasonable

doubt, may also be derived from the above-mentioned provision: that there be proof or

evidence; that the totality of such is in such degree as would produce moral certainty to

an unprejudiced mind; and such moral certainty is inclined to the guilt of the accused. If

one of these elements is not present, it can be said that there is presence of reasonable

doubt and therefore the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

What is only needed therefore in deciding criminal cases, at the same time to say

that a conviction is based on proof beyond reasonable doubt, is that the totality of the

proof or evidence admitted by the court will give moral certainty. When admitted, it

presupposes compliance with the Rules of Evidence with regard the rules of

admissibility and competency, unless such is waived for failure to raise a proper

objection2.

The rule also mentioned that proof beyond reasonable doubt refers to such

degree that would produce conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The rule is silent,

however, on how such degree is measured – how to determine that it has reached such

extent that would induce an unprejudiced mind. It only implies that it depends on a

case-to-case basis. In order to ease the burden in determining the guilt, the elements of

the crimes and the exact prohibited acts are provided by the Revised Penal Code and

expressly, by the various special penal laws. As such, the admissibility and
2
consequently the guilt are determined by depending on these elements provided by the

Code or the penal laws. As the Court has pronounced, “The determination of the guilt of

an accused hinges on how a court appreciates evidentiary matters in relation to the

requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.3”

The principles serving as guidelines in determining an accused’ guilt are given by the

Court and in Guilbemer Franco vs People4, it discussed that:

“It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the

guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on
mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions." …the Court
has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations,
one of which being consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is
thus insufficient to support a conviction.”

Concisely, moral certainty is based on the evidence submitted to the court and

appreciated by the Court. The determination on when such certainty, as to produce

conviction, may be obtained solely depends wholly in the totality of those evidence and

facts surrounding the case. Noteworthy is that the Court also included above the

Equipoise Rule. With this rule, as indicated above, if the evidence admitted are so

balanced as to have two or more interpretations – one for innocence and one for guilt –

it is considered equal to reasonable doubt and shall result to acquittal 5. The inclusion of

this rule and other rules like “in dubio pro reo”6 implies that these rules are also required

to be observed and considered in the appreciation of evidence and the facts

3
People of the Philippines vs Willington Rodriguez y Hermosa, G.R. No.211721, September 20, 2017
4

6
surrounding the case, consequently on whether there will be moral certainty as to

warrant conviction.

On the other hand, what does the law then mean when it mentions of

“unprejudiced mind”? In the case of People vs Rodriguez7, the Court laid the following

discussion:

“… In other words, the conscience must be satisfied that the

accused is responsible for the offense charged. Reasonable
doubt does not refer to any doubt or a mere possible doubt
… It is that state of the case which, after a comparison of all
the evidence, does not lead the judge to have in his mind a
moral certainty of the truth of the charge...”

In addition and in connection therewith, the Court discussed in the case of People vs

Mahinay8 that:

“It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge… a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.”

From the foregoing, it implies that when the law mentions unprejudiced mind, it refers to

the conscience or the mind of the judge, the reason and understanding of those who are

bound to act conscientiously upon it – referring also to judges trying and hearing the

criminal case.

From the foregoing, it may be derived that the second and third sentence of Rule

133, section 2 of the Rules of Court may be interpreted as to mean that proof beyond

reasonable doubt does not need absolute certainty but only such degree of admitted

7
Ibid
8
proof or evidence as to lead the mind and conscience of the judge to convict the person

charged of an offense.

b. Compliance with the rule in consideration of the “special” nature of

the Sandiganbayan

Having settled on how shall proof beyond reasonable doubt is complied and

manifested generally in trial courts, in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence, the

question will now be as regards how it should be manifested in special courts

particularly the Sandiganbayan.

The fact is settled that the Sandiganbayan is a special 9 trial court10 exercising

original and exclusive jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases arising from graft and

corrupt practices11 of certain public officers12. In order to meet the particularities of its

special jurisdiction, it is authorized by law 13 to promulgate its own rules to govern its

procedures in handling such cases as well as for its internal operations. This authority is

conferred as follows:

Section 9. Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan

shall have the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure
and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall
govern its proceedings.

Section 10. Authority over internal affairs. The

Sandiganbayan shall administer its own internal affairs and may
adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the
allocation of cases among them, the rotation of justices and
other matters relating to its business.

9
R.A. No. 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) classifies the Sandiganbayan as "[A]
special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice
… x x x (Section 1)."
10
R. A. No. 8249, Section 2, empowers the Sandiganbayan to "hold sessions x x x for the trial and determination of
cases filed with it.
11

12

13
 This authority was amended by Section 4 of RA 7975 14 which rule still presently

stands. The amendment provides that:

Section 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby

amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and
proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure,
except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases
among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and
other matters relating to the internal operations of the court
which shall be inforced until repealed or modified by the
Supreme Court."

A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that Sandiganbayan was originally

authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure, apart from the rules intended for its

internal affairs. The amendment, however, divested such authority from the

Sandiganbayan. As such, the Sandiganbayan does not have the authority to promulgate

its own rules of procedure like its own rules on the admissibility and competency of

evidence that may be submitted to them. In this regard, it is similar with regular trial

courts as it shall follow the Rules of Evidence provided by the Rules of Court and is

consequently bound to comply with the rule of proof beyond reasonable doubt in

deciding criminal cases. This implies that the elements of this rule as discussed earlier

may also be used to determine how should said rule be manifested as to prove a

person’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

As mentioned there should be proof or evidence submitted and admitted by the

Court in accordance with the Rules of Evidence – admissible and competent. The

14
courts in appreciating said evidence should consider them together with all the factual

circumstances surrounding such case and the principles provided by the Court.

Next thing to consider is that the totality of evidence admitted shall produce a

moral certainty to an unprejudiced mind and as discussed above, the latter refers to the

conscience and mind of the judge trying the case. The Sandiganbayan, in contrast to

regular trial courts where decisions are made by one judge, is a collegial body

comprised of divisions, generally consisting of three members each 15. How does this

collegial nature of Sandiganbayan fair and meet the definition of unprejudiced mind?

Referring back from how unprejudiced mind is defined, it refers to the conscience

or the mind of the judge, the reason and understanding of those who are bound to act

conscientiously upon it – referring also to judges trying and hearing the criminal case.

What may be noticed in this pronouncement is that it refers to the reason and

understanding of those bound to act upon the case. There is no rule as limiting the

number of minds to determine and to appreciate the submitted evidence of a certain

case. As such, having three judges sitting in court to try a case does not defy the rule of

proof beyond reasonable doubt when it mentions “unprejudiced mind”.

In addition, this collegial nature of the Sandiganbayan is mentioned in the

landmark case of Nunez vs Sandiganbayan16. In this case, the Court resolved the raised

allegations of unconstitutionality regarding, PD 1606, the law which created the

Sandiganbayan. The Court, speaking through Justice Fernando said: “the Constitution

specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan

precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely,

15
Section 1, Republic Act No. 10660, July 28, 2014 amending Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
16
dishonesty in the public service”. Justice Barredo, in his concurring opinion, discussed

the essence of the collegial nature of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

“… the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full

consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts
where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant
jurisprudence that the appellate courts should rely on the
evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges, except in cases
where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by
them. With more reason should this rule apply to the review of
the decision of a collegiate trial court. xxx”

To reiterate, Sandiganbayan is a special court particularly exercising jurisdiction

over criminal offenses of public officers the urgency to be met by its justices is the

implications of dishonesty in the public service. In this regard, the Sandiganbayan, in

deciding through a collegial body is justified to have a better guarantee of a real and full

consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts in the presence of three

judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. This

is also to make sure that the evaluation of evidence will be appropriate and sufficient

enough to be relied upon by the Supreme Courts in case the accused, convicted in the

Sandiganbayan, will resort to an appeal. This is in consideration of the rule providing

that the only available appeal under the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan shall only

be in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law.

II. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan and the
rule of proof beyond reasonable doubt

The rule of proving a person’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is grounded on

the right of an accused to be presumed innocent mandated by the Constitution.

Corollary, this shall be included in the rules that governs the Sandiganbayan and shall

be manifested and showed in its proceedings.

The preceding discussion showed the justification of the collegial nature in the

conduct of deciding cases at the Sandiganbayan. But as initially introduced, a

unanimous decision cannot always be resorted to. In such case, the Internal Rules

provides:

“Sec. 2. Votes Required to Decide. – The unanimous

vote of three (3) justices in a decision shall be necessary for the
rendition of a judgment or final order. In the event a unanimous
vote is not obtained, the Presiding Justice shall designate by
raffle, on rotation basis, two (2) Justices from all the other
members of the Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them
forming a Special Division of five (5) Justices, and the vote of a
majority of such Special Division shall be necessary for the
rendition of a judgment or final order.”

This rule effectively provides a remedy to address the mentioned situation. Two

additional justices will be chosen by draw lots to sit with them and only a majority vote is

required to have a decision. As primarily discussed and opined, this naturally results to

a variation of opinions, which are often contradicting – majority for conviction, minority

for acquittal or the reverse. This is a natural consequence in a collegial body consisting

of persons with different perspective and understanding and is also observed in other

higher courts also deciding through a collegial body. However, it must be emphasized

that the Sandiganbayan, in cases where it exercises exclusive and original jurisdiction,

serves as the first level court, a trial court having the advantage of observing the

demeanor of the parties during the trial 17 compared to the higher courts which generally

only refer with the factual findings of the former.

17
 One case decided by the Sandiganbayan, which applied the abovementioned

rule, is the case of Entienza vs Sandiganbayan.18 In this case, the accused was charged

and convicted for Falsification of Public Document penalized under paragraph 4, Article

171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Entienza was, at the time of the commission of

the crime, the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Calauag, Quezon. The charge against him

sprung from the complaint of one Adriano Marana who claimed of having been given of

a falsified document – a certification of employment stating that a certain Annaliza De

Torres Prudente is a municipal employee when in fact, after careful scrutiny of Marana,

is not. Prudente happens to be the former live-in partner of Mayor Entienza with whom

he had two (2) children. The said certification was allegedly signed and issued by the

accused as testified in court by Marana and through a video recording by Prudente. The

signature was allegedly that of the accused as testified by one Alpuerto who worked in

accused’ office during the period of 2002-2006.

To analyze this case, the elements earlier provided maybe resorted upon. First,

are the evidence in the case admitted by the court all admissible? As mentioned by

Justice Martires in his dissenting opinion, the Certificate of Employment was not offered

in accordance with Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The video recordings of

Prudente, testifying as regards the reason why the Certificate was allegedly issued,

were not testified and authenticated in court since Prudente was not presented as

witness.

The second consideration is whether the totality of evidence presented produces

a moral certainty favoring conviction to an unprejudiced mind. The ponencia was

favored by three (3) of the five (5) justices present in the proceedings. The former
18
concurred for conviction ruling that all the elements of falsification of a public document

are all present and conviction was determined as follows:

a. The Certificate of Employment is a public document as defined under

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and with reference to

Black’s Law Dictionary;

b. It was issued by Entienza, the incumbent Mayor then and authorized to

issue such Certification. This determination is after the failure of

Entienza to prove his allegation that his signature was forged; and

c. The facts stated therein are all false as proven by the testimony of the

HR representative.

Justice Martires, in his dissenting opinion, countered the foregoing bases as

follows:

a. The Certificate of Employment was not offered in accordance with the

provision of the Rules of Court – there is no public record and no

corroboration from a legal custodian. Moreover, the municipal

administrator, in charge with all the documents that shall bear the

signature of the accused, testified that the document does not bear

her initials which means, as per standard office procedures, it did not

come from their office or was not issued by the accused;

b. The document came into the possession of Marana in a very irregular

and unverifiable way19 and this was testified by him but was not

corroborated;

19
 It is noticed from the foregoing that the major point is the public document subject

of the case which refers to the Certificate of Employment. As pointed by Associate

Justice Samuel Martires20, though the document in question squarely fits the definition

of public document as provided under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and

Black’s Law Dictionary (cited in the decision), it shall still be offered in accordance with

the manner provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules 21 which the prosecution

failed to comply with. The case now lacks a proof of official record signifying that the

document was issued in an official capacity. As such, the certification cannot be

considered as a public document and assuming that the signature thereon is that of the

accused, the first element is still not present considering that the document is not a

public document or at the very least, is not intended to serve as such. Another point

noted by Justice Martires is the manner on how Marana obtained such document.

According to the case, it was merely handed to him by an unknown person when he

was about to leave the office 22 of the accused and without actually witnessing the

signing of such. Alpuerto merely said that it was given to her by Prudente for

safekeeping but she did not, likewise, witnessed the signing of the document.

A reading of the decision shows that the main basis of Entienza’s conviction is

the failure to prove his allegation of forgery considering that once an accused As

pointed by Justice Martires, the issue is not whether the Office of the Mayor is

authorized to issue such certificate but is whether the document is really issued by the

accused23 as to consider it as a public document. Failing to address this issue and the

20

21

22
Facts decision
23
Dissent
fact that no one among the prosecution witnesses saw the accused signing the subject

document amounts to a reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Noteworthy is that

this dissent is not discussed nor mentioned in the ponencia in order to compare the

contradicting appreciation of facts and evidence.

Another case worthy of being cited in this study is the case of Republic vs

Dumaluan24. In this case, Doloreich Dumaluan was the incumbent Mayor of Panglao,

Bohol during the period of the commission of the crime. The case involves an alleged

violation of Section3(f) of Republic Act 3019. As found by the court, Bohol Resort and

Development Incorporation (BRDI) was applying for a building permit for the

construction of additional establishments within its property, Bohol Beach Club. One of

the requirements to obtain such permit is the locational clearance allegedly being issued

by the accused Dumaluan. Lagumbay, BBC’s officer in charge with transactions relating

with real estates, went to the accused three times regarding the clearance application.

First, he was told by the accused that the latter will first check the area. After this

meeting Dumaluan ordered one of the defense witness to checked the area being

applied for and it was then that he knew that it was the lot he has a claim with. On the

second meeting, the accused told him that the latter has an adverse claim over the lot

upon where the establishments are to be constructed. The accused has a pending case

against BBC, PENRO and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Bohol regarding the

ownership of the subject lot. Such case was filed before the third appointment between

the accused and BBC on October 2005. The locational clearance was already drafted in

May 2005 by the Municipal Engineering, even before the completion of the

requirements in September 2005. However, it was only issued in December 2005 when
24
the accused was suspended and the Vice Mayor, holding office that time, was the one

who attested such.

Dumaluan’s conviction was based by majority of the justices on the following:

a. The elements for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 are

present:

i. Evidence provided that the accused is a public officer; that in

the mind of the majority of justices, there is no sufficient

justification as regards the refusal of the accused to do what

was demanded or requested from him to be done; that

reasonable time has lapsed from the demand; and the refusal

was for obtaining from a person interested as to such any

pecuniary or material benefit

b. The pending civil case filed by the accused against BBC, PENRO and

the Register of Deeds did not amount to sufficient justification

considering the Torrens title presented by BBC covering the subject

property. The court followed the principle of indefeasibility of the title

unless nullified by the court and further stated that adverse claim

cannot negate the legal effects of such title.

Two justices dissented the ponencia, namely Justice Musngi and Justice Samuel

Martires. Justice Martires shared his opinion and contrary perception as follows:

a. There is sufficient justification as to the refusal of Dumaluan because

the right to acquire and own a property is a right not prohibited by the

Constitution
 b. Such right is not lost by assuming public office and property rights of a

public official should not be subservient to that of a private individual

for that will be tantamount to a punishment of public office

c. The Local Government Code is silent as to who shall issue locational

clearance or certifications. It only mentions the duty of the Mayor to

direct the formulation of the municipal development plan; and

d. According to existing laws particularly related in issuing locational

clearances, the mayor does not have authority to issue such contrary

to what was claimed prosecutor witness Asilo.

The decision of conviction is focally based on the reason that majority concurred

in finding that there is no sufficient justification for the refusal issuing the locational

clearance or certification or that the reason posed by the accused for his refusal was not

considered to be a sufficient justification.

On the issue of authority, the court solely based its discussion on the testimonies

of prosecutor witness Asilo. In deciding the issue as regards the adverse claim of

Dumaluan over the subject lot, the court maintained that considering that a Torrens title

in the name of BBC covers the subject lot, it is indefeasible. As such, relying solely on

the indefeasibility of said title, in the minds of majority of the justices, it is just right to

issue the locational clearance or certification.

However, what may be noticed in the ponencia, as compared to the dissenting

opinion, the former failed to resort to legal authorities in justifying their reasons in

convicting the accused. As mentioned, they solely referred on the testimonies of

prosecutor witness Asilo regarding on who has authority to issue the locational
clearance or certification and when shall it be issued. In the dissenting opinion, Justice

Martires provided the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code in showing

that it is silent as to who shall issue locational clearance and certification. He also

provided the issuance of HLURB and then President Fidel V. Ramos showing that the

authority to issue said instruments are not lodged with the municipal mayor. The

discussion regarding the claim over the subject property was countered by considering

the rights of a person over his property as provided by the Constitution which the

ponencia did not dwell upon. As such, it can be considered that there is a reasonable

doubt as to whether the justification given by the accused is sufficient or not which

determination is warranted as to fully justify his conviction.

The foregoing analysis of the two cases, decided in accordance with Rule 9,

Section 2 of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, shows how the decisions of

Sandiganbayan do not comply with the rule of reasonable doubt. The first case

manifests questions on the admissibility of the evidence and also the irregular way such

document was given to the prosecutor’s witness. These matters were, however, not

mentioned and dwelled upon in the ponencia as to answer the doubts arising from the

facts and circumstances surrounding the case. The latter case shows that the ponencia

fails to resort to the provisions of relevant laws which should also be relied other than to

solely rely on the testimony of the witness. The rights mentioned in the dissenting

opinions are not just statutory but are provided by the Constitution and as such it should

have been addressed by the majority opinion as well.

III. The present rules applicable to the Sandiganbayan in order to address

the implications of Rule 9, Section 2 of its internal rules

 A party unsatisfied with the decision of the Sandiganbayan, is entitled to the

remedies of Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial under Rule 10 of its Internal Rules.

Rule 10, Section 2 provides the rules on who shall decide or act upon the motion for

reconsideration. The first rule provides that the motion shall be acted upon by the

ponente and the other members of the Division who participated in the decision or

resolution sought to be reconsidered, irrespective of whether or not such members are

already in other Divisions at the time the said motions were filed 25. This is anchored on

the reason that a Motion for Reconsideration is an opportunity for the court to correct

any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual

circumstances of the case26. And by saying “court”, it should be the very same judges or

justices who tried and decided the case, originally.

The case of People vs Dumaluan was moved to be reconsidered. The motion

was acted upon by the same set of justices who tried and heard the same. However, in

the Resolution27, it is noticed that the Court merely maintained its prior position. This is

primarily because the accused did not produce any additional evidence. Nonetheless,

such motion could have been a good opportunity to discuss the case further by

incorporating the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Martires but it was not done –

the dissenting opinion was reiterated in the Resolution still invoking the contrary position

based on the right of the accused over his alleged property.

The case of Entienza was also moved to be reconsidered, however, only the

chairperson of the division, the ponente, remained from the original special division who

25

26
Republic vs Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et. al, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
27
tried and heard the case28. The other members were replaced following the rules

provided under Rule 10, Section 2(b) 29. In its Resolution30, Justice Cabotaje-Tang

reiterated the discussion prior made and presented in the ponencia. The resolution

addressed the point made by Justice Martires as regards the inadmissibility of the video

recordings by emphasizing that the such video recordings were not considered in

deciding the case. However, the Resolution still failed to discuss the matter regarding

the non-compliance with Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court concerning the

manner on how the public document should be offered in the case as well as the fact

that there was no record, as well as the legal custodian’s testimony that it was not

issued from the office of the accused.

What may be implied from the foregoing is that despite having the opportunity,

both granted to the losing party as well as the court, a complete discussion as to

address all matters surrounding the case and to justify that the accused is indeed guilty

beyond reasonable doubt is not done. This is despite having reconsidered the decision

and reviewing the original decision together with all the records of the case in

accordance with the applicable rules provided.

The next resort that the aggrieved party may pursue is to appeal the decision to

the Supreme Court in the manner provided under Rule 11, Section 1 of the Internal

Rules. Though it may be said that the review with the Supreme Court may touch upon

the contradicting points giving rise to reasonable doubts, it cannot be used as a

constant resort of the losing accused which may result to congestion of cases with the

Supreme Court. Moreover, it will negate the essence of having the Sandiganbayan as a

28

29

30
special court intended to try cases involving graft and corrupt practices if at the end, the

finality of resolving the issues would still be relayed with the Supreme Court.

a. The Rules and Republic Act No.10660 amending Republic Act No.
8249

Another consideration for this study is RA 10660 which was particularly

mentioned in some provisions of the Internal Rules. The effectivity of this amendment is

reflected in the Internal Rules under Rule 9, Section 4, to wit:

Sec. 4. Voting Requirement for Cases Arising from

the Offenses Cmmitted after the Effectivity of R.A. No.
10660. – The above notwithstanding, for cases arising from
offenses after the effectivity of RA No. 10660, the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Division
shall be necessary to render judgment or final order.

Another provision connected is that under