Go vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a CoC to run for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Baybay, Leyte on
February 27, 2001. On February 28, 2001 at 11:47 pm, she filed a CoC with the Provincial
Election Supervisor for the position of Governor of the Province of leyte and simultaneously
attempted to file her Affidavit of Withdrawal for the position of Mayor. The provincial
Election Supervisor refused to accept such Affidavit on the reason that according to a
COMELEC Resolution, such Affidavit shall be filed with the Municipality where she filed her
CoC for the position of Mayor. Time constrained, Petitioner sent her Affidavit through fax
and was brought by her father to the Municipal Election Supervisor on 12:28am, March 1,
2001 – 28 minutes after the deadline of filing CoCs.

Herein Private Respondents Montejo and Antoni filed petitions to deny due course or cancel
the CoC of Petitioner – both on the positions of Governor and Mayor. The Provincial Election
Supervisor Atty. Manuel L. Villegas referred the case with the Law Department of COMELEC
in Manila and inhibited himself as the person who refused to accept the Affidavit.

The Law Department made a study of the case without giving petitioner the opportunity to
be heard. In its Report and Recommendation, it gave due course with the petition and
cancelled the CoCs of Petitioner on both positions. The reposrt was based under Section 73
of the OEC stating that no person shall be eligible for more than one office in the same
election and in case he files more than one CoC, he shall not be elegible for both. COMELEC
en Banc approved said recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner should be disqualified

HELD: No.

The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28
a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. We hold
that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was
effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.

There is nothing in Section 73 which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it
can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election
director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which
the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20
November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed,16 such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience.
Jalosjos vs COMELEC and Cardino

FACTS:

Jalosjos and Cardino were both candidates for the Mayor of Dapitan city, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the OEC to
deny due course and to cancel the CoC of Jalosjos asserting the latter’s conviction of a
crime amounting to a false material representation. Jalosjos countered such claim by stating
that he was granted probation and was able to fulfill the conditions of such.

The COMELEC ruled in favor of Cardino and cancelled Jalojos’ CoC. COMELEC en banc
denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the cancellation of the CoC is proper

Whether the petition resorted by Cardino is proper

Whether the COMELEC erred in ruling that the rule on succession provided by the
LGC shall apply

HELD:

1. Yes.
Jalosjos was convicted of the crime of Robbery with a penalty of prision mayor
coming with it are accessory penalties pf temporary and perpetual absolute
disqualification to exercise the right of suffrage. These accessory penalties are
effective from the time the judgment of conviction became final. On this note, the
COMELEC should have already denied the CoC Jalosjos filed because the finality of
conviction is a notice to the COMEEC of the disqualification of theconvict from
running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office
and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.

Also, being convicted as to such, he made a false material representation in stating

in his CoC that he is eligible to run. Under Section 78 of the OEC a verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. Section 74 requires the candidate to
state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office."

2. Yes.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, in this case, the
denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that
is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office.
If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is
false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate.
 What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40
of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the
choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.

3. Yes.
Decisions of the Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if
the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations
where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a
legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such
void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All
votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such
non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election,
prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.
Amora vs COMELEC and Olandria

FACTS:

Petitioner filed his CoC for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, he was the incumbent
Mayor of said Municipality. Olandria is a candidate for councilor who belongs to the same
party as that of Olaivar, Amora’s opponent for the Mayor position. Olandria filed a petition
for disqualification against Amora alleging that the latter’s CoC was not properly sworn and
violated the Rules of Notarial Practice because Amora failed to produce a competent
evidence of his identity for he only presented a Community Tax Certificate.

COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running as Mayor of Candijay.
Amora moved for reconsideration and pending its resolution, he won and was promulgated
as the Mayor of the Municipality. A week thereafter, however, his motion for reconsideration
was denied. The COMELEC ruled that CTC is not a competent evidence of identity and said
that the original petition was not based under Section 68 of the OEC but under Section 73
and was allegedly properly filed under COMELEC Resolution No. 8696.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC is correct in disqualifying petitioner

HELD: No.

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly
sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of
the imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the
specific wording of the OEC in Section 68 or in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking

in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of mayor.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does
it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. The
proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the pertinent
provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation, correctly or incorrectly, of
a petitioner. the COMELEC should have dismissed his petition outright.

A petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false.

The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68
is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never
filed a CoC.

RE: Issue on Notary

Competent evidence of identity is only required when the affiant is not personally known to
the Notary Public. As alleged, petitioner being the incumbent Mayor, it is impossible for the
Notary Public not to know him.
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must
yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective officials.