JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PERSONAL LAWS FROM 2010: WOMEN’S SUCCESSION RIGHTS

FINAL DRAFT
UTSAV SAXENA
ROLL NO. 2018055

1. INTRODUCTION
It has been a sick adage that ‘women (daughter) is a liability of parents before marriage and a
chattel of her husband after marriage’1 which is rooted in the minds of the people belonging to
the orthodox community in India. This perspective have compelled the women of our country to
hold the backseat and quietly suffer all sort of discrimination. The country witnessed a change
when we transformed from ‘British India’ to ‘Independent India’ and in 1950 give ourselves the
Constitution. The Preamble to the Indian Constitution begins with “we the people” and this
refers to each and every lawful citizen of country without any form of discrimination. Thus, it
becomes the duty of the legislation and judiciary to assure that laws prevailing in the
Independent India is in consonance to the Constitution, especially with the basic structure.
The paper discuss in details the journey of Women Rights especially in cases of Succession from
pre-independence to post independence. The paper is divided into 3 parts, the first parts discuss
in details the Hindu Women’s property rights in the ancient period in which the previous adage
suits the best. Women are considered as mere chattel of her husband and is compelled to be at
the backward position. This showcased the sick mentality of the society and deep rooted
patriarchal structure. The second part of the paper discusses the statutory development in
granting Hindu women rights post-independence which portrays the significant growth in
achieving gender equality. Lastly, the third part of the paper analyse the judicial contribution in
achieving the objective of gender equality in personal laws.
2. WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE ANCIENT PERIOD
History has witnessed alteration regarding the restrictions imposed on the property rights of
Hindu women. The modern laws governing such rights are much liberal in comparison to that of

1
Hirday N. Patwari, The Status of Women as Depicted by Manu in the Manusmriti, Nirmukta, Accessed on 12th May
2020 at 22:57 IST, available at http://nirmukta.com/2011/08/27/the-status-of-women-as-depicted-by-manu-in-
the-manusmriti/.

1
ancient Hindu society. Though, the ancient Hindu society had the provision regarding women’s
property but it was not absolute.2
Eventually, the introduction of myriad and different schools of Hindu law broadened the precinct
of the concept of Stridhan both in its literal and legal interpretation. Thus, this allowed women
more rights to certain forms of property.3 Later, with the passage of time, various statutory
legislations were incorporated which were drafted with the objective of removing barriers and
ensuring Hindu women absolute and equal rights in property which will be discussed in second
half of the paper. Some of these Legislations are The Indian Succession Act of 1925, The Hindu
Succession Act of 1956, and The Hindu Succession Amendment Act of 2005 etc. 4

2.1. PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HINDU WOMEN UNDER SCHOOLS

As earlier discussed the rights of Hindu women were mentioned under the Smritis and then
eventually were evolved in digests and commentaries. These commentaries and digests includes
modern law of Hindu succession but commentaries made with reference to the former
commentaries incorporated different perspective on the ancient texts due to which such
commentaries are not considered as an authority in every region of the country but in some.5
This ambiguity lead to the emergence of schools with conflicting doctrines. The paper will
manly discuss the two most critical and significant schools of Hindu law i.e. Mitakshara and
Dayabhaga.6 The Mitakshara School of Hindu law is developed through the interpretation of
Yagnavalkya’s text by Sage Vigneswara, whereas on the other hand the Dayabhaga School
developed from the commentary authored by Sage Jimootvahana. The rules made by these
schools are still followed as the basic principles for inheritance law in India.7
Some other nuances between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga is as follows: Mitakshara is based on
proximity of blood whereas Dayabhaga follows the religious efficacy; the interpretation of the
term ‘Sapinda’ also differs in both of the School as Mitakshara Schools consider the nearest

2
K. Jaishankar & Debarati Haldar, Manusmriti: A Critique of the Criminal Justice Tenets in the Ancient Hindu Code,
Vol. 4, (2004), Accessed on May 5 at 22:58 IST, available at www.erces.com/joumal/articles/
archives/v03/v03_05.htm.
3
3, G. Bhuler, Manu IX: Manusmriti the Laws of Manu, in Sacred Books of the East 56, Vol. 3 (1886), accessed on
6th May, 2020 at 22:59 IST, available at http://www.hinduwebsite.com/sacredscripts/laws_of_manu.htm.
4
Id.
5
Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law Codified and Uncodified, pp. 346-347 (10th ed., Allahabad L. Agency 1995).
6
Debarati Halder and K. Jaishankar, “PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HINDU WOMEN: A FEMINIST REVIEW OF SUCCESSION LAWS
OF ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN INDIA”, Vol. 24, Journal of Law and Religion, pp. 663-687.
7
Ibid.

2
‘Sapinda’ as the one who is nearest in blood but Dayabhaga interprets it as the one who offers
greates spiritual benefit by making offerings of ‘Pinda’. 8 The major setback in both of the
schools is that the concept of Female’s property right was not originated and the property was
vested with the male heir.9

3. WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER STATUTORY LAWS

The beginning of Hindu Law reform which aimed at codification and subsequent development of
the Hindu Law which commenced with establishing the Hindu Law committee which was a four
member committee which was headed by B.N Rau and was also known as the “Rau Comittee”
set up in 1941. The main reason or the aim to establish this committee was to look into the issue
of the Deshmukh Act, and to formulate laws which took into consideration the introduction of
new afemale heirs was not made on the behest of the deceased person’s own daughter, further
the committee was also to look into the issue of abolishment of women’s limited estate. Second
Committee came in 1944. The committee tabled its report in 1947. The orthodox Hindu
community posed strong opposition against the introduction of monogamy, divorce, abolition of
coparcenary and inheritance to daughters.
The State prioritizes the unification of Hindu law rather than women’s inheritance rights due to
which the coparcenary system under the Mitakshara School of law was left undisturbed.
Eventually this withheld women’s from taking share in the ancestral property.10

3.1. HINDU WOMEN'S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937

Although the British Raj introduced uniform laws for myriad social institutions but still the
practice of the Hindu customary laws and rules prevailed as they recognized different laws for
inheritance thus, the inheritance laws continued be practiced under the Mitakshara and
Dayabhaga Laws but till the twentieth century.
The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 was considered as the first law passed under
the British Raj with the motive of making a uniform law of succession for Hindu women. The
Act was unique and marked the end of the most controversial debate over the characteristics of
Stridhan which essentially means that it is the possessions of women which have been given to
8
Manpreet Kaur, WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS – A HISTORICAL PROSPECTIVE , accessed on 6th May, 2020 at 23:03 IST,
available on http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/20322/6/06_chapter%20ii.pdf.
9
Id.
10
Manjit Singh, WOMEN PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HINDU, CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM , accessed on 6th
May, 2020 at 23:32 IST, available at http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/8148/8/08_chapter%204.

3
the woman at the time of her marriage and can be of any nature. What all objects and items are
considered as stridhan were laid down in the case of Pratibha Rani V. Suraj Kumar11.In this case
it was established what all comes under stridhan gifts which are made at the time of the bridal
procession while the bride is being led from her residence of her parents to that of her husband
further also gifts made in token of love, that is, those made by her father-in-law and mother-in-
law and those made at the time of the bride making obeisance at the feet of elders, Gifts made by
the father of the bride, Gifts made by the mother of the bride, Gifts made by the brother of the
bride.12
Stridhan established women’s right over landed properties inherited from the male owners but to
a limited extent.
The law for the purpose of inheritance recognized in particular 3 types of widow’s i.e. intestate
man’s widow; widow of a pre-deceased son; and widow of a pre-deceased grandson who is the
son of a predeceased father. These widows were entitled to a share in the undivided interest of a
Mitakshara coparcener.13
The objective behind the law was to improve the treatment of Hindu women. Even after
implementation of this Law the ancient ‘Shastric’ Law survived intact. The major drawback of
this act is that it does not provide any relief to a woman when the deceased husband has disposed
his property by will.

3.2. THE HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956

This section will focus on the changes brought by this Act in improving the condition of Hindu
women in the country. The Act amended the concept of limited estate and allowed women to
hold absolute ownership in inherited property akin to that of men. The daughter of a predeceased
son and the daughter of daughter were classified as Class-I heir and were entitled to the share
akin to that of the Son and other Class-I heirs.14
The daughters were also classified as Class-I heir which marked an end to age old discrimination
on the basis of sex. Similarly the discrimination has also be terminated in cases of succession and
men and women are treated equally if they belong to the same degree of relationship. Women
11
1985 SCR (3) 191
12
Pamphalet on streedhan,Jharkhand state legal service authority ,http://ijtr.nic.in/family
%20matters/11%20Pamphlet%20Streedhan.pdf
13
Janaki Nair, Women and Law in Colonial India: A Social History 196, Vol. 11, Gender & History, Available at
file:///E:/NLUM/law%20Semesters/4%20SEMESTER/Family%20Law%202/Janki.pdf.
14
Id.

4
will no longer be disinherited on the ground of unchastity. 15 The major drawback of this Act was
that it still did not entitled the Hindu women the Status of coparcener due to which she still had
to depend on the male counterparts of the family.

3.3. HINDU SUCCESSION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2005

3.3.1. SECTION 6: AMENDMENT ACT
Amendment were made to section 6 of the act which now provides that the daughter becomes a
coparcener because of her birth in the joint family just like the son. The section 6 of the Hindu
succession act states that:

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.―(1) On and from the commencement of the
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), in a Joint Hindu family governed by the
Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,― (a) by birth become a coparcener in her
own right the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenery property as
she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the
said coparcenery property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener
shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing
contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including
any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day
of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-
section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be
regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in
force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a
Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of
2005), his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall
devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by
survivorship, and the coparcenery property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a
partition had taken place and,― (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a
son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got
had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-
deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a

15
Supra at 10.

5
pre-deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she
been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of
the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be.

(4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), no
court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the
recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground
of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to
discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the
commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), nothing contained
in this sub-section shall affect― (a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son,
grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) any alienation made in respect of or in
satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the
rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been
enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005) had not been
enacted.

(5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before
the 20th day of December, 2004”16

The daughters are entitled to similar rights and responsibilities/liability as that of the son; and
any reference to a Hindu daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; The share of
the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter shall be allotted to the surviving child of such
pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; The share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-
deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter shall be allotted to the child of such pre deceased
child of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter.17

3.3.2. SECTION 25: AMENDMENT ACT

The Act omitted to confer all daughters (including married daughters) the same rights as sons to
reside in or seek partition of the parental dwelling house. Further, the removal of Section 4(2) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 entitled the women to have inheritance right on agricultural
16
Hindu Sucession Act, 1956, section 6.
Bhamoy Das, Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act (2005): Equality for Women, Accessed on 8th may, 2020 at
17

18:23 IST, available at https://www.thoughtco.com/hindu-women-and-property-rights-177040.

6
property. The Honourable Supreme Court in Sekar v. Geetha 18 affirmed the amendment made to
the Act and stated that the parliamentary objective behind such amendment is clear as to curtail
the discrimination and confer Hindu women absolute right over the inherited property as well as
the right to claim partition of the JHF property as provided for in terms of Section 23 of the Act.

4. JUDICIAL APPROACH AND PRONOUNCEMENTS

4.1. PERSONAL LAWS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The judiciary since the beginning has obscured its stance in adjudicating matters in relation to
personal laws. In various landmark judgments the court held that personal laws do not fall under
the preview of Part III of the constitution of India due to which they cannot be challenged on the
basis of being violative of fundamental rights.19 Whereas in catena of judgments the Supreme
Court has adjudicated personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights specially under
Article 14, Article 15 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 20 The area of concern in above
mix-up is that the Judiciary has not yet framed a uniform understanding in relation to personal
laws and Article 13 of the Constitution which attracts a perspective showcasing arbitrary
discretion of the courts in admitting and adjudicating issues pertaining to personal laws.
Observing the trend from Narsu Appa Mali21 case to recent Sabrimala22 or Triple-Talaq23 case, it
is reasonable to draw a conclusion that in the constitutional era it is necessary for the courts to
exercise their power under Article 13 over the personal laws and adjudicate them under the
touchstone of the fundamental rights under Part III of the constitution. Every personal law to an
extent has being discriminatory against women and possess strong patriarchal roots. In the earlier
developments these orthodox notions may prevail but post 1950 the prologue of the preamble
“we the people of India” does not create a divide between man and woman and thus these
notions must not prevail in the contemporary context.24

18
Sekar v. Geetha, AIR 2009 SC 2649.
19
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707; Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India, 1994 1 SCC 713;
Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. v. Union of India, 1997 3 SCC 573.
20
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, 1996 8 SCC 525; Anil Kumar Mhasi v. Union of
India, 1994 5 SCC 704; Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, 1999 2 SCC 228; N. Adithyan v. Travancore
Devaswom Board & Ors, 2002 8 SCC 106.
21
The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 BOM 84.
22
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006.
23
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 9 SCC 1.
24
Mihir Desai, Flip-Flop on Personal Laws, Indian Support Together, Vol. 3, accessed on 12th May, 2020 at 15:53
IST, available on: http://indiatogether.org/combatlaw/vol3/issue4/flipflop.htm.

7
The Honourable court must take a definite stand on the issue of admitting and adjudicating
personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights as to avoid any arbitrary discretion. Akin
to other personal laws the Hindu succession laws were also hit by the patriarchal notion and the
Judiciary through various cases in consonance with the legislature have eradicated such gender
discrimination. This section will analyse various judgments in relation to women succession
rights especially under the Hindu Succession (amendment) Act, 2005.

4.2. HINDU WOMEN’S SUCCESSION RIGHTS

The most significant Act which was implemented to eradicate the discrimination faced by the
Hindu women in relation to her identity and rights in a Joint Hindu family was the Hindu
Succession (amendment) Act, 2005. As discussed earlier the 2005 amendment has incorporated
Section 6 which acknowledges women as a coparcener and granted them the rights akin to any
other member in the Joint Hindu Family. The section bring along with it confusion on the
grounds of interpretation which was duly adjudicated by the Court in catena of judgments.
The Supreme Court in Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Anr. v. Chakiri Yanadi & Anr 25 considered
the issue that whether the daughters were entitled to the benefits of Hindu Succession
(amendment) Act, 2005 where in the course of the formation of the bill and before passing of the
final decree of partition. The court held that though the final decree is required to be in
conformity with the preliminary decree but this does entail that the preliminary decree prior to
the implementation of the final decree cannot be altered or amended under in the event of
changed or supervening circumstances even if no appeal has been made against such preliminary
decree.
This issue arise due to dilemma that whether the daughter will eligible to property if the
preliminary decree for partition has been filed after the death of the father. The court to address
this issue relied on Prakash v.  Phulavati26 and held that if the preliminary decree lies with the
court then such decree is open to amendment. 27 The issue with others was further clarified by the
Supreme Court in other cases.

25
Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Anr. v. Chakiri Yanadi & Anr, AIR 2012 SC 169.
26
Prakash v.  Phulavati, 2016 2 SCC 36.
27
Dhyan Chinnappa, Continuance of confusion: Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, Bar& Bench, accessed on
12th May, 2020 at 17:32 IST, available at https://www.barandbench.com/columns/confusion-section-6-hindu-
succession-act.

8
The Supreme Court in Vaishali S. Ganorkar & others v. Satish Keshavrao Ganorkar & others28
adjudicated on the issue that whether the Amendment Act has a prospective or retrospective
effect. The issue was significant because the decision will possess a direct effect on the
controversial issue of the rights, acknowledged through the Amendment Act, of women born
before 2005 as in contrast to the one born post 2005.
The court considered the obiter in the case of Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari v. Omprakash
Shankar Bhandari29 in which the court presumed that if the daughter is born prior to the
amendment and will get right only after death of her father, then it will affect the value of the
daughter’s property as there lies a possibility that other coparcener may initiate partition before
the death of the father.
Considering the above issue the court adopted a new approach i.e. ‘Retroactive Statue.’ Under
this mode of interpretation the Statue neither operate backwards nor does it take away vested
rights, but it provides rights to those daughters who are alive at the time of the Amendment Act,
irrespective of the fact of their date of birth i.e. prior or post to 2005. Under the circumstances
when the coparcener dies before 2005, then the pre-amended law is applicable whereas all the
daughters who are alive Ipso Facto becomes coparceners. Thus the only requirement is that the
person concerned must be in existence/living when the Act is applied.30
In the most recent Judgment of Danamma Suman Surpur & ANR. Vs. Amar & Ors 31 the court
took into consideration the issue of partition pre and post father’s death as taken in the Phulavati
case32 in addition to 2 other issues. The issues were:
1. “Whether, the appellants (daughters) of a coparcener could be denied their share on the
ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, cannot be
treated as coparceners?”
2. “Whether, with the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the appellants
would become coparcener “by birth” in their “own right in the same manner as the son”
and are, therefore, entitled to equal share as that of a son?”33
28
Vaishali S. Ganorkar & others v. Satish Keshavrao Ganorkar & others, AIR 2012 Bombay 101.
29
Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari v. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, 2014 5 CTC 353.
30
Vera Shrivastav, Daughters are entitled to Ancestral Property, Live Law, Accessed on 12th May, 2020 at 17:52
IST, available at, http://www.livelaw.in/daughters-entitled-ancestral-property-bombay-high-court-full-bench-read-
judgment/.
31
Danamma Suman Surpur & ANR. Vs. Amar & Ors, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 63.
32
Supra at 24.
33
Sameer Mehta, Important Judgments on Property Rights of Women/Daughters in India, Vakilo India, Accessed on
12th May, 2020 at 18:09 IST, available at https://www.vakilno1.com/legal-news/important-judgments-on-property-

9
The first issue has already been discussed in the above part of this section. The court addressed
the second issue and held that the section manifestly states that the daughter of a coparcener in a
JHF is entitled to being a coparcener by birth akin to the right bestowed in the son previous to
this amending act. Thus, it can be inferred that the very factum of birth in a coparcenary creates
the coparcenary irrespective of the gender. This judgment has not only empowered women but
also neutralized the age old patriarchal structure of the country. Now women’s are entitled to
every right possessed by men in a Joint Hindu Family. Thus, a women is a coparcener; entitled to
share in the Joint Hindu Family Property; can claim partition; can challenge partition; and is the
absolute owner of the inherited property etcetera.
The Supreme Court balance the issue of the rights of daughter born before 2005 on these three
judgments. The analysis of these three judgments highlights the current position of Law. The
situation can be determined when the father passes away after 09.09.2005 (hereinafter ‘time’)
then the daughter is entitled to share whereas if the father passes away before ‘time’ then the
rights of daughter depends upon the suit pending in the court, if the final decree is not made then
she is entitled but if the decree is executed then she cannot claim.
The verdict in the Phulavati34 case has clearly stated that no female coparcener can claim a right
in Joint Hindu Family Property if her father passes away before the ‘time’ as well as cannot
initiate proceedings for partition. Whereas some relaxation has been granted by the court in the
Danamma’s35 case in which if a suit is pending by a male coparcener and the court decides in
favour of the male coparcener then the female coparcener will also be eligible for share in the
property irrespective of the date of her father’s death.
A significant observation can be that the law eradicates discrimination in the modern time period
i.e. after the amendment and does not consider or compensate for the discrimination done prior
to the act. An addition which should be brought to the Act either thorough the legislation or the
judiciary is to allow women to challenge the partition which took place before her father’s death
and before this Amendment i.e. partition claimed by any male coparcener. This encourage the
principle that a daughter is entitled to a share notwithstanding the date on which the father passes
away. This may seem as a tedious task but this can be introduced under Article 15(3) 36 of the

rights-of-women-daughters-in-india.html.
34
Prakash v. Phulavati, 2016 2 SCC 36.
35
Danamma Suman Surpur & ANR. Vs. Amar & Ors, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 63.
36
Article 15(3), Constitution of India

10
constitution of India as to lift the women of the country. 37 Additionally, the Delhi High Court in
Mrs. Sujata Sharma vs Shri Manu Gupta & Ors 38 extended the status of Karta to the women
entitling her with the right and liability of Karta in a JHF if situation arises so.
The Court in Smt. Lokamani and others .Vrs. Smt Mahadevamma and others39 clarified the scope
of The Repealing and Amending Act, 2015 which repeals the Hindu Succession (amendment)
Act, 2005 in whole but does not affect Section 6 of the Act. The rationale behind 2015
amendment can be ascertained as a legislative spring cleaning, and not make any change to the
existing law. The judiciary must interpret and eradicate any notion of gender biasness or sick
patriarchal structure to lead the country towards equality.

5. CONCLUSION
A human rights based approach needs to be adopted by the legislature while formulating any
laws, policies and regulations to achieve equality as far as property rights of women are
concerned. Improving the status of property rights of women is a matter not only of human rights
and gender equality; it is a fundamental principle that underlines economic development for all
the people, which envisages the principle of poverty reduction and economic growth.
The Amendment of Hindu Succession Act of 1956 in 2005 is a total commitment for the women
empowerment and provides more and more property rights to women in the Mitakshara system
which was mainly patriarchal one. Making daughters as a member of coparcenary and giving
them equal rights as other male coparceners is indeed a very bold step to provide new arena of
rights to females.

37
Dhyan Chinnappa, Continuance of confusion: Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, Bar& Bench, accessed on
12th May, 2020 at 21:52 IST, available at https://www.barandbench.com/columns/confusion-section-6-hindu-
succession-act.
38
Mrs. Sujata Sharma v. Shri Manu Gupta & Ors. 226 (2016) DLT 647.
39
Smt. Lokamani and others .Vrs. Smt Mahadevamma and others, AIR 2016 Karnataka 4.

11
The nature of judicial decision is also undergoing radical change from being ambivalent to being
indisputable and certain. The judges now consider the exact language of the statute to a lesser
extent and place their reasoning on the social benefit and intention attached to the legislation.
Even after the inception of the new Act in 2005, discrimination of women toward succession has
not been fully wiped out. The reasons are both sociological and historical in nature. Constant
evaluation of the legal principles and interpretation of texts finally made a woman a right holder
equal to her male counterpart.
She can now demand the right over ancestral property when she is unmarried or even when she
is married; as a wife she has equal rights over her husband's property and she can have a safer
old age with her acquired property out of partition, inheritance or share. But still aims should be
made to ensure whether these rights are actually being realized by the women, and judiciary has
a significant role to play in ensuring equality.

6. REFERENCES
1. BOOKS

 Law of Intestate and Testamentary Succession (2006) by Paras Diwan, Universal

Law publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd, Delhi.

12
  Family Law Lectures (2009) by Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur

2. ARTICLES

 Property Rights of Hindu Women: A Feminist Review of Succession Laws of

Ancient, Medieval, and Modern India. Debarati Halder and K. Jaishankar ,
Journal of Law and ReligionVol. 24, No. 2 (2008-2009)
 Inheritance of Indian women: a perspective, Sona Khan India International
Centre Quarterly Vol. 27, No. 2, MARGINALISED (SUMMER 2000), pp. 139-
154.
 Kharat, Shital, Effect of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 – Judicial
Response (February 6, 2017). Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2912
662.

3. CASESXBadrinarayan Shankar Bhandari v. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, 2014 5 CTC

353.......................................................................................................................................7
Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Anr. v. Chakiri Yanadi & Anr, AIR 2012 SC 169............................6
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373
OF 2006.......................................................................................................................................6
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707……………………………………………….5
Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India, 1994 1 SCC 713……………………………………………
5
Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. v. Union of India, 1997 3 SCC 573............................5
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, 1996 8 SCC
525……………...5
Anil Kumar Mhasi v. Union of India, 1994 5 SCC 704……………………………………………
5
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, 1999 2 SCC
228……………………………………...5
N. Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors, 2002 8 SCC 106..........................................5

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Mrs. Sujata Sharma v. Shri Manu Gupta & Ors. 226 (2016) DLT 647..........................................9
Prakash  v. Phulavati, 2016 2 SCC 36............................................................................................7
Sekar v. Geetha, AIR 2009 SC 2649...............................................................................................5
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017 9 SCC 1..............................................................................6
Smt. Lokamani and others .Vrs. Smt Mahadevamma and others, AIR 2016 Karnataka 4..............9
The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 BOM 84.....................................................6
Vaishali S. Ganorkar & others v. Satish Keshavrao Ganorkar & others, AIR 2012 Bombay 101.
.....................................................................................................................................................7

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