Chapter VIII

Comparing Nāṭyaśāstra With Similar Works: An Attempt

prajñā vivekaṃ labhate bhinnairāgamadarśanaiḥ |

kiyadvā śakyamunnetuṃ svatarkamanudhāvatā ||
-Vākyapadīya, Vākya Kāṇḍa (Kāṇḍa II), Verse 484i

The intellect attains perfection through the study of different

thought traditions. How much can one understood by following
one’s own reasoning (only)?

8.1. Introduction

The idea of comparative study for proper and complete understanding of any concept has
existed in India since ages. This is evident from Bhartṛhari’s aforementioned observation
where he emphasizes that a study of different streams of thought remains essential for
attaining perfection and clarity of the human intellect because a person who limits himself/
herself to only one stream of thought and stubbornly persists with his own reasoning only
cannot possibly fathom the complete reality. Similar echoes are found in the Suśruta Saṃhitā:

ekaṃ śāstramadhīyāno na vidyācchāstraniścayam |

tasmādbahuśrutaḥ śāstraṃ vijānīyāccikitsakaḥ ||
-Suśruta Saṃhitā, Sūtrasthānaṃ (1.4.7)ii

Meaning: Having studied merely one Śāstra a man cannot claim of

comprehensive knowledge. Thus, one (a physician) must study many
branches of knowledge.

The present chapter is an attempt in keeping with this ancient Indian tradition. In the earlier
chapters, the various communication concepts available in the Nāṭyaśāstra have been duly
deliberated upon in the process of analysing and assessing the scope and extent of the
Nāṭyaśāstra as a treatise on human communication that offers the possibility of understanding
the subject in a more comprehensive manner even in the contemporary age. Nonetheless,
before drawing the thesis to a conclusion, it only seems appropriate to attempt a comparison
of the Nāṭyaśāstra with similar other works from different civilizations that too have offered
significant communication insights to posterity.

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The task, however, is easier said than done for the challenges before the researcher in making
such an attempt are no small. The first challenge, of course, is the selection of similar works.
What work(s) is/are to be taken and what to be left out? The gamut of didactic literature from
ancient India alone is vast. What to speak of the world literature of the ancient times! The
second challenge is the linguistic constraint involved in the case of the foreign texts (Greek,
Egyptian, Chinese etc.) which limits the scope of doing a comparative analysis to the
renderings by the translators rather than the text per se. The third and perhaps the most severe
challenge is the limitation of time. The deliberations on the earlier chapters have taken much
of the researcher’s allotted time and it would perhaps have been wiser to leave a comparative
analysis for some time in the future. Yet, a brief attempt shall be made here to compare the
Nāṭyaśāstra with a few other works before concluding the thesis.

8.2. Two Texts from Ancient Egypt

As observed earlier, McCroskey (1996) traces the earliest instances of communication

education to ‘an ancient Egyptian essay written in about 3000 B.C. consisting of advice on
how to speak effectively and addressed to Kagemni, the eldest son of the Pharaoh Huni’
(McCroskey, 1996, p. 234) and ‘the Precepts composed in Egypt about 2675 B.C. by Ptah-
Hotep and written for the guidance of the Pharaoh’s son’ (ibid.). With regards to the
instructions for Kagemni, McCroskey’s observation seems over-exaggerated for two reasons.
First, the entire instruction (as available today) is so brief that it can hardly be called an
‘essay’. Secondly, the entire instruction contains communication insights as little as follows:

“The respectful man prospers,

Praised is the modest one,
The tent is open to the silent,
The seat of the quiet is spacious.
Do not chatter!
Knives are sharp against the blunderer.
Without hurry except when he faults …
Let your name go forth
(II, I) While your mouth is silent.
When you are summoned, don’t boast of strength
Among those your age, lest you be opposed.
One knows not what may happen,

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 What god does when he punishes.” (Lichtheim, 1975, pp. 59-60)

While factually speaking it may well qualify as among the earliest instructions on effective
speaking, the said instruction seems just a passing reference in the ‘essay’ on certain general
instructions for better living. Besides, many such scattered references may be found in
various ancient works. For instance, in the Ṛg Veda, the earliest ancient Indian text available
today having been passed down to us from the unknown antiquity through the oral tradition
for generations, one came come across the following observation:

saktum iva titaunā punanto yatra dhīrā manasā vācam akrata |

atrā sakhāyaḥ sakhyāni jānate bhadraiṣāṃ lakṣmīr nihitādhi vāci || (R.V., 10.071.02)

Meaning: “Where the wise seers (i.e. those who were to be characterized by
dhīḥ), cleaning it like ground meal with a sieve, produced Speech by means of
their intentional thought (manaḥ), then the partners (in a collective interest)
became conscious of their partnership; their auspicious ‘sign’ (prognostication
of luck and prosperity) was placed on speech.” (Gonda, 1963, p. 107)

Beyond the obvious reference to intra-personal communication in the given observation, the
observation also subtly explains the inter-relation between the former and higher
communication forms. Only when the human mind can refine abstract thoughts into desirable
expressive forms, communication ‘desirability’ can be upheld in the ‘collective’ realm.

Such scattered observations can be found in abundance upon searching the treasure trove of
ancient world literature. However, as observed in the introduction of the present thesis, the
mere availability of certain communication concepts in a text is not adequate to justify its
appropriation as a communication treatise. Further, in the case of the ‘Instructions for
Kagemni’, the communication-related content is so little that it cannot qualify by any stretch
of imagination for a comparison with the Nāṭyaśāstra.

McCroskey’s observation on the ‘Precepts’/‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’, however, is well-

placed and merits serious attention by communication scholars across the globe. With regards
to the condition, structure and content of the text, Lichtheim (1975) observes:

“This long work has survived in four copies, three of which are written on
papyrus rolls while the fourth, containing only the beginning, is on a wooden
tablet. The only complete version is that of Papyrus Prisse of the Bibliothèque

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 Nationale, which dates from the Middle Kingdom. The other two papyri, both
in the British Museum, are from the Middle and New Kingdoms, respectively.
The wooden tablet, Carnarvon Tablet I in the Cairo Museum, also dates from
the New Kingdom. The version of P. Prisse differs considerably from that of
the other three copies … The work consists of thirty-seven maxims framed by
a prologue and an epilogue. Each maxim is developed as a unit of at least
four, and rarely more than twelve, sentences and clauses. In one case, maxims
2-4, a theme is developed over three consecutive maxims thus forming a
larger whole. Some themes and topics recur several times, an indication of
their importance in the scale of values. Taken together, the thirty-seven
maxims do not amount to a comprehensive moral code, nor are they strung
together in any logical order. But they touch upon the most important aspects
of human relations and they focus on the basic virtues. The cardinal virtues
are self-control, moderation, kindness, generosity, justice, and truthfulness
tempered by discretion. These virtues are to be practiced alike toward all
people. No martial virtues are mentioned. The ideal man is a man of peace.”
(Lichtheim, 1975, pp. 61-62)

Understandably, Lichtheim (1975) chooses the only available complete version of the text,
i.e., Papyrus Prisse for translation. An earlier translation by Gunn (1912) and a more recent
translation in Simpson (2003, pp. 130-148) too have been consulted by the present researcher.
Regarding the content of the text, Simpson (2003) observes:

“In general, the text appears as a handbook of etiquette and proper conduct
and is obviously addressed to members of the nobility and upper classes. The
major purpose of the text was a very practical and pragmatic one, for it
provides guidelines of conduct designed to aid the reader or hearer in getting
ahead in life and in being successful, both personally and financially. At the
same time, the text also has a certain moral value with its stress on Ma’at and
the doing of what is right. It is also extremely optimistic in its general outlook,
i.e., if one behaves in the right and proper fashion, all will be well.” (Simpson,
2003, p. 129)

Gunn (1912) observes ‘the period of Ptah-hotep to be 3550 B.C.’ (p. 24) and goes on to
translate the thirty-six maxims available in the Papyrus Prisse. It, however, makes no

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distinction between the maxims and the ‘epilogue’ as done by Lichtheim (1975) and proceeds
with the translation in a continuous numeric order (38-43) except for a brief interlude in
between and a distinctive sign-off note at the end. The translation in Simpson (2003) is
claimed to ‘have followed the text of Papyrus Prisse for the most part but having inserted
lines from one of the other extant versions where it seemed appropriate’ (p. 130). Like Gunn
(1912), it too makes no distinction between the maxims and the ‘epilogue’. There is neither a
brief interlude in between nor a distinctive sign-off note at the end. Understandably, the
numeric order extends up to 45 unlike Gunn (1912) who stops at 43. All the three
translations, however, distinctly classify the ‘prologue’ from the rest of the text.

Considering the limitation of being unable to consult the said text in person due to linguistic
constraint, the present researcher cannot comment on the exact structure of the same
(Prologue-Maxims-Epilogue). Overall, the content of the said text remains more or less the
same in all the three translations. Let us now briefly summarize the communication-related
concepts available in the ‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’. For the present purpose, the researcher
has decided to consult all the available translations owing to personal linguistic constraint.
Wherever the translations have shown variant meanings, the majority view has been retained.

Ptahhotep begins by observing that good speech is a rarity yet it may be found in the most
unlikely places. (1) Thereafter, he refers to three types of communicatees (superior, equal and
inferior) and prescribes different modes of communicating with each of these types. In
communicating with superiors, one should fold the arms and bend the back and speak with
reverence and self-control and in agreement with his views. In communicating with equals,
one’s position is to be asserted and consolidated by pointing out the flaws in the
communicatee’s observations. In communicating with inferiors, one must observe
compassion, self-control and leniency. (2-4) If one is assigned the task of delivering a
message, the message must be delivered faithfully (as it is given to the messenger) and due
care must be taken not to utter anything that may cause a rift between the message sender and
the receiver. (8) Silence and humility must be exercised in speech wherever they are needed.
(9-10) A person (son) who speaks evil is to be shunned. (12) In an official meeting, one must
stand and sit according to one’s allotted position, perform one’s assigned duty (if any) and be
attentive to the speaker(s). (13) In the company of general masses, one is to become a leader
by gaining support for himself through trust-building and self-control in speech regarding
matters of the community. (14) Actions are to be reported truthfully with one’s personal

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observations before the council in a fluent and easy manner. (15) A man of authority should
patiently listen to one who has suffered for though all the grievances of a sufferer can never
be addressed, a patient and sympathetic hearing will soothe the sufferer’s heart. (17)
Defamatory words should neither be repeated nor listened to. (23) A reputable man sitting in
the council of his master should focus on excellence (for his reputation is at stake). So, he
must not speak unnecessarily. Only the proficient can speak ably in a council for speech is
the hardest of all human tasks and can be put to accomplish only by an expert. (24)
Gentleness of speech begets respect while dominance, aggression and arrogance beget the
speaker unnecessary hassles. (25) A superior should be gently informed of what is useful to
them and cooperated with in public activities for he/she shall reciprocate accordingly. (26) In
settling a dispute, one should speak in an unbiased manner. (28) One seeking to know the
character of friend should ask the person directly rather than asking someone close to him.
Opinion should be formed only after having tested his heart through direct conversations. If
the person turns out to be unfit for friendship, one must practice self-restraint and discretion
in one’s speech and leave the rest to the Lord for no man can escape one’s destiny. (33) The
vile must be punished fittingly and admonished sternly because deriding acts of vice is also a
way of encouraging virtuous acts. (36)

This then is a brief summary of the communication-related concepts available in the maxims
of the ‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’. The ‘epilogue’ reiterates that the observations made by
Ptahhotep should be duly heeded to in communicating with others. Further, it is observed that
the speech should be guided by the heart (lit. tongue should be controlled by the heart). Also,
the importance of being a good hearer/ listener is stressed upon. A good hearer creates
goodwill and ends up being a well-listened speaker. Hearing, it is said, is guided by the heart
and a good hearer, it is further added, is one who pays heed to and does exactly what is told
to him/her. Some more qualities and benefits of a good hearer are accordingly discussed. In
his final remarks, Ptahhotep sums up his earlier instructions with the following observations:

1. One must listen well to become well-remembered speaker.

2. One should speak only after having attained mastery over the subject in question.
3. One must conceal his emotions and control his mouth while speaking to officials.
4. One must consciously speak of things that matter, i.e., one must avoid irrelevant talk.

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Now that we have gone through a short summary of the communication-related concepts
available in the ‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’, let us briefly evaluate how it fares as a
communication ‘treatise’ in relation to the Nāṭyaśāstra.

In all fairness, no comparison can be made between the two texts as far as the volume of
communication content availability is concerned. Though Ptahhotep makes some general
observations on the art of effectively utilizing verbal communication in daily affairs, he does
not go deep into the practical intricacies of verbal communication which have been
exhaustively discussed in the Nāṭyaśāstra. Neither do we come across anything significant as
far as non-verbal communication is concerned in the ‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’ for Ptahhotep
treats the subject very sparingly. The Nāṭyaśāstra, on the other hand, takes up the subject of
non-verbal communication including aspects of paralanguage for detailed discussion.

However, some common points do emerge between the two texts. For instance, Ptahhotep
classifies communicatees into three kinds—superior, equal and inferior. That the Nāṭyaśāstra
too makes a similar audience classification has been adequately discussed in the earlier
chapters. The other contextual qualities of a good communicator observed by Ptahhotep such
as patience, self-control, compassion, humility, linguistic proficiency, gentleness, avoidance
of slander etc. have also been duly recognized in the Nāṭyaśāstra. Concerning the qualities of
a good communicatee/listener, the Nāṭyaśāstra provides us a more exhaustive list than the
‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’.

Thus, it seems fair to conclude that while the ‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’ stands hors concours,
the Nāṭyaśāstra significantly overshadows the former in its ability to contribute pertinent
insights to modern communication scholarship.

8.3. Two Texts from Ancient Greece

In this section, two texts from ancient Greece shall be taken up for a comparative analysis
with the Nāṭyaśāstra, these being the Poetics and the Rhetoric, both attributed to the
renowned Greek philosopher, Aristotle. The choice of taking up these two particular texts
should not be surprising to the initiated. As for the uninitiated, the primary reason behind
choosing these two texts is their subject matter of discussion. The Poetics, like the
Nāṭyaśāstra, focuses on the art of dramatic representation. However, unlike the Nāṭyaśāstra
where all forms of dramatic representations have been discussed in vivid detail, Aristotle’s
chief concern in the Poetics is ‘tragedy’. The Rhetoric, on the other hand, deals with the

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subject of effective speaking, another subject that has been adequately discussed by Bharata
Muni in the Nāṭyaśāstra.

There is another reason behind choosing the Rhetoric for a comparison with the Nāṭyaśāstra.
As observed earlier in the present thesis, the Rhetoric seems to be the chief “foundation”
(Foss, 2009, p. 853) upon which the edifice of modern Western Communication Thought has
been systematically constructed and continues to be built higher. As Woelfel (1987) observes:

“Although communication as a formal discipline is one of the youngest of the

sciences, it has roots which extend back through the arts and philosophy at
least as far back as the Greeks. Even today, Aristotle’s rhetoric plays an
important part in the training of many communication scholars.” (Woelfel,
1987, p. 299)

Further emphasizing on the immense influence that the Rhetoric continues to cast upon the
general modern communication intelligentsia in their thinking and conceptualization of
communication ideas, Woelfel (1987) observes:

“Although there is considerable diversity of opinion among modern

communication theorists, it is probably fair to say that most current Western
communication theory is underlaid by a common general theory whose roots
lie in the model of Aristotle … Furthermore, again in the spirit of Aristotle,
most communication theories imply a “threshold” model of effects, such that
accumulations of forces in favor of the performance of a behavior yield no
result until they outweigh those opposing its performance. Once they exceed
this threshold level the behavior is performed as a discrete unit or act.”
(Woelfel, 1987, pp. 315, 316)

The reasons behind excessively depending on the Rhetoric for communication

conceptualization shall be discussed duly. For the moment, let us focus on the comparative
analysis in the communication perspective. Incidentally, the first steps towards such an
attempt were taken by Yadava (1987) who observed:

“One can find parallels in Bharat Muni’s concept of Sadharanikara [sic: recte
Sadharanikaran] and Aristotle’s concept of Rhetoric. Of course, Aristotle’s
thoughts and writings have been extensively researched and interpreted by

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 philosophers and scientists, but hardly any study of Bharat's contribution to
the understanding of communication has been done. Both systematized the art
of communication in their respective cultural contexts. There seem to be some
basic differences in their approaches. Aristotle viewed rhetoric as inherently
persuasive. Bharat Muni veiwed [sic: recte viewed] Sadharanikaran as
pleasurable responses, Rasa Swadan, through arousal of Sthai Bhava,
permanent mood(s) leading to harmony and bliss (Ananda). In rhetoric, the
communicator tries to persuade the receiver through dialogue and debate. In
Sadharanikaran the communicator communicates with the receiver/audience
with the help of speech, gestures, and other visuals, which are essential parts
of dramatics. The message is conveyed, and there is response on the part of
the receiver. The receiver is not passive, but the response is not necessarily in
the form of dialogue or argument. The receiver not only accepts the message
willingly but in the process derives genuine satisfaction and pleasure or
Ananda. He communicates this back to the communicator as well.” (Yadava,
1987, p. 167)

Yadava (1998) further observed:

“The Western concept of communication can be traced to and consists of

further elaborations of Aristotle’s concept of rhetoric, the art of persuasive
speech. Essentially, communication in Western thought amounts to “dialogue”
between “equals” with a view to “persuade.” But in Indian thought as
reflected in the concept of Sadharanikaran, communication is sharing
among/between “unequals” but Sahridayas with a view to not just persuade
one or the other as such but to enjoy the very process of sharing.” (Yadava,
1998, p. 189)

Incidentally, Yadava’s association of Western Communication Thought with ‘dialogue

between equals’ fits in with the West’s conceptualization of each man’s place in the societal
structure. The West believes that all men are born equal and they constantly strive to maintain
this equality in whatever manner possible, at times even at the cost of conflict(s). But how
can all men ever be born as equals? Different people are born and brought up in different
circumstances. So the proposition of all men having been born as equals can never be true.
Hence, Indian thought duly recognizes that men are born as ‘unequals’ but they constantly

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strive towards ‘equality’ through their efforts. Thus, a virtuous life lived, in Indian thought, is
the journey from ‘inequality’ (among humans) to ‘equality’ (among humans) and ultimate
‘union’ (with the Supreme Lord). So, it transpires that communication between/among
humans, in Indian thought, is ‘sharing of thoughts between/ among unequals’, facilitated by
acquired equality/commonness of hearts, i.e., sahṛdayatā.

Let us now begin with the present assignment at hand. Compared to the ‘Instruction of
Ptahhotep’, both the Poetics and the Rhetoric are significantly longer texts. Therefore, it is
difficult for the researcher to do a minute analysis of these texts presently. Such an effort may
be taken up in the future. In the present work, only some of the key concepts from both these
texts shall be taken up with due observations in support of the similarity or dissimilarity of
these concepts vis-à-vis the Nāṭyaśāstra. Additionally, in the event of finding any refreshing
concept which has not been touched upon in the Nāṭyaśāstra, it shall be duly highlighted.

8.4. The Poetics vis-à-vis the Nāṭyaśāstra

As in the case of the ‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’, personal linguistic constraint in

understanding the Greek language renders the researcher unable to consult the text of the
Poetics in person. Therefore, four translations of the said text have been consulted chiefly.
The first is the oldest known translation of the Poetics available to us today rendered by
Thomas Twining in 1789. Twining (1789) has been retained with a view to observe if the
newer translations have made any significant changes in their readings compared to the oldest
one. The second translation consulted is one that came almost 110 years after the oldest one,
this being the translation and commentary by Whalley et al. (1997). Two more translations by
Heath (1996) and Kenny (2013) have also been consulted. As a general rule, wherever the
translations have shown variant meanings, the majority view has been retained. Occasionally,
the works by Butcher (1895), Bywater (1909), Cooper (1913, 1922, 1923), Fyfe (1952),
Lucas (1980), Janko (1987), Benardete and Davis (2002), Sachs (2006) and Gupta (2007)
have also been consulted for possible variant readings and clarifications.

Already, comparisons between the Poetics and the Nāṭyaśāstra have been made by doyens
such as Pandey (1950, 1956), Chaudhury (1953), Sen (1954, 1966) and closer in time by the
likes of Pathak (1998), Ley (2000), Schechner (2001) and Ray (2008). To them, I
acknowledge my indebtedness for showing me the way forward. However, any such attempt
by a mainstream communication scholar appears unprecedented. So, I acknowledge my

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greater indebtedness to modern communication scholarship in being encouraged to take up
the present task.

Aristotle begins by observing that his subject of discussion is the “poietic art” (Whalley et al.,
p. 45), more specifically how ‘poietic art’ is to be brought into reality. From the observations
that follow, Aristotle’s aim in the Poetics appears to be explaining ‘poietic art’ in relation to
Plato’s concept of mimēsisiii. Interestingly, as Whalley et al. (1997, p. 46) observe, “Aristotle
does not define either ‘the poietic art’ or mimēsis; he leaves both open for exploration and for
progressive self-definition in the body of the discussion.” He merely observes that ‘mimēseis’
(plural of mimēsis) includes various forms such as ‘epic poetry’, ‘tragedy’, ‘comedy’,
‘dithyrambics’ and ‘aspects of music’ and that these forms can be differentiated from one
another based on three factors:

1. Difference in form of expression: Colour, shape, voice, rhythm, language, melody etc.
2. Difference in subject/ character of expression: Superior, inferior and equal
3. Difference in manner of expression: Narration and dramatization

In this connection, some initial comparisons may be drawn between the Poetics and the
Nāṭyaśāstra. The concept of ‘nāṭya’ seems to bear some similarity with Aristotle’s
conceptualization of ‘poietic art’. However, unlike Aristotle who does not define ‘poietic art’,
Bharata Muni defines nāṭya in the Nāṭyaśāstra as a representation of the happenings of the
three worlds (Chapter I, Verse 106). He further observes (N.S., Verses 118-121):

‘… a mimicry (anukaraṇa) of the world with its Seven Divisions (sapta

dvīpa) has been made a rule of in the drama (nāṭya). Stories taken out of
Vedic works as well as Semi-historical Tales (itihāsa) so embellished that
they are capable of giving pleasure, is called drama (nāṭya). A mimicry of the
exploits of gods, Aṣuras, kings as well as house-holders in this world, is called
drama. And when human nature with its joys and sorrows, is depicted by
means of Representation through Gestures, and the like (i.e. Words, Costume,
and Temperament or Sattva) it is called drama.’ (Ghosh, 1951, p. 16)

But the real problem is with the word ‘mimēsis’. With regards to this particular word, Cooper
(1913) observes:

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 “This word mimesis is likely to cause trouble on a first reading of the Poetics.
To begin with, it implies, but does not signify, the prime activity of the poet,
or of the artist in the widest sense – what we might call the poetic or artistic
imagination. It implies the existence of this imagination, but does not directly
stand for such a power. It signifies the copying by the poet or artist of the
thing he has imagined, the representing of his image in a medium – language,
or pigments, or musical notes – which may be perceived by the senses. This is
its primary meaning. The poet has his conception of a story, or the musician
has his conception of a theme, and he puts this conception into rhythmical
language or musical notes. He does not copy the work of another; he imitates
or embodies the inner form or soul of his own making in an outer medium for
the senses of his audience. Nor does he copy any work of nature. Thus Cicero,
speaking of Phidias, says: ‘Neither did this artist, when he carved the image of
Jupiter or Minerva, set before him any one human figure as a pattern which he
was to copy; but having a more perfect idea of beauty fixed in his mind, this
he steadily contemplated, and to the imitation of this all his skill and labor
were directed.’ So much for the inner meaning of the word. Outwardly,
mimesis means the result of the poet’s effort, the imitation as it at length
appears to the senses, the finished work of art – Oedipus the King of
Sophocles, the statue as Phidias left it, or, let us say, Leonardo’s portrait of
Mona Lisa.” (Cooper, 1913, p. xxv)

However, as observed in the endnotes of this thesis, this particular word has been variously
translated by different translators. While most have preferred to translate it as ‘imitation’,
some have preferred to go with ‘representation’. Unfortunately, the terms ‘imitation’ and
‘representation’ have markedly different connotations in the English lexicon. Hence, it is
difficult to definitively conclude from the translations what Aristotle actually meant by
mimēsis. To that effect, Janko (1987, p. xv) goes on to observe, “The Greeks drew no clear
distinction between imitation, copying, impersonation and representation—all these concepts
were included in the word mimēsis.” The Nāṭyaśāstra, on the other hand, lays down very
specific rules with regards to impersonation. Accordingly, impersonation is said to be of three
kinds: anurūpā (natural), virūpā (unnatural) and rūpānusāriṇī (imitative). The details of these
three kinds of impersonation are described as follows (N.S., Chapter XXXV, Verses 28-32):

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 “When women impersonate female characters and men male characters, and
their ages are similar to that of the characters represented, the impersonation is
called ‘natural’ (anurūpā). When a boy takes up the role of an old man or an
old man takes up that of a boy and betrays his own nature in acting, the
representation is called ‘unnatural’ (virūpā). When a man assumes a woman's
character, the impersonation is called ‘imitative’ (rūpānusāriṇī) by the best
actors. A woman also may assume if she likes, a man’s role in actual practice.
But an old and a young man should not try [to imitate] each other’s manners.”
(Ghosh, 1961, p. 217)

Keeping all these factors, a different approach is hereby taken. In the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata
Muni uses three distinct words to represent ‘imitation’, ‘expression’ and ‘representation’,
these being ‘anukaraṇa’, ‘abhinaya’ and ‘nāṭya’ respectively. However, considering that
‘poietic art’ comes close to ‘nāṭya’, mimēsis cannot be an equivalent of ‘nāṭya’. So, it must be
a something similar to either anukaraṇa (imitation) or abhinaya (expression). However,
Aristotle includes a wide range of forms such as epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, dithyrambics
and aspects of music under mimēsis. Therefore, it seems highly implausible that Aristotle
would have used mimēsis in the limited sense of ‘imitation’ (anukaraṇa). Rather, it appears to
the present researcher’s limited understanding that Aristotle had probably used the expression
mimēsis in the sense of expression (abhinaya). That would justify his inclusion of various
expressive forms under one umbrella of mimēsis.

However, this interpretation is not without limitations because later in the Poetics, Aristotle
may have actually used the expression ‘mimēsis’ in the sense of ‘imitation’ while observing
that ‘mimēsis’ is known to be a natural birth trait among human beings and that it serves the
purpose of both education and delight. Whalley et al. (1997) try to resolve this issue through
a linguistic analysis of the word. They observe:

“In the introductory sections and later, Aristotle keeps mimeisthai and its
cognates flexible and does not ossify mimesis by a verbal or technical
definition. The change here to the common-sense meaning is therefore
noticeable, but there is no reason to limit the definition of his sophisticated
usage to the limited sense of this passage.” (Whalley et al., p. 56)

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But then, here again the expression ‘mimēsis’ may well be used in the sense of ‘expression’
rather than ‘imitation’ because ‘imitation’ requires a certain degree of skill unlike
‘expression’ that comes naturally to all human beings irrespective of their age or skill. Thus,
not all babies can ‘imitate’ but all babies can certainly ‘express’ in some way. Further,
‘expression’ serves the dual purposes of education and delight. In the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata
Muni too observes that the dramatic representation serves various purposes such as diversion
and firmness of mind, relief to unhappy people, education to the masses, general good and so
on. (N.S., Chapter I, Verses 110-115)

As regards to the difference in form of expression such as colour, shape, voice, rhythm,
language, melody etc., Bharata Muni has adequately discussed all these forms of expression
through his four-fold classification of abhinaya which has already been discussed in detail.
As for the difference in subject/ character of expression as superior, inferior and equal,
Bharata Muni too has given a three-fold classification with regards to the characters in a play
in Chapter XXXIV, Verses 3-14 which too has been discussed earlier.

Concerning the difference in manner of expression as either ‘narration’ or ‘dramatization’,

Bharata Muni does not make any such specific distinction but the existence of such a
distinction seems implicit in the verse where Indra requests Lord Brahma to create another
Veda because the existing Vedas are not to be ‘listened’ by those born as Śūdras.iv Thereafter,
Lord Brahma decided to create the Nāṭyaśāstra, the elements of which were taken from the
four existing Vedas. Thus, a clear distinction in the manner of content expression emerges.
The earlier Vedas must have been narrated and some were allowed to listen to them while
others were not. On the other hand, the Nāṭya-Veda was envisaged to be presented through
dramatization. So, it seems fair to say that the Nāṭyaśāstra too acknowledges both ‘narration’
and ‘dramatization’ as manners of content expression. However, Bharata Muni’s concern in
the Nāṭyaśāstra is with ‘dramatization’, not with narration or story-telling. Therefore, he does
not take up the subject-matter of ‘narration’ for any discussion.

In the section on ‘difference in form of expression’, Aristotle observes that an art form that
merely uses language without proper utilization of prose or verse is unknown of (lit.,
unnamed). Bharata Muni too observes that language (pada, lit. sentence) can be constructed
by two forms only—verse/ poetry (nibaddha) and prose (cūrṇa). Only these two forms have
the quality of giving rise to meanings upon being accompanied by the rules of grammar

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(śabda-vidhāna). (Chapter XV, Verses 35-36)v Thus, any linguistic form without proper
utilization of prose or verse is not known in the Nāṭyaśāstra too.

In the section on ‘difference in subject/ character of expression’, Aristotle observes that the
aim of ‘tragedy’ is to show characters as ‘superior’ and that of ‘comedy’ to show characters
as ‘inferior’ compared to the audience. Further, in the section, Aristotle distinctly shows his
apathy for ‘comedy’ in saying that it is the mimēsis of inferior people. Tragedy, in contrast,
he later observes, is the mimēsis of superior people. This perhaps, also explains why Aristotle
does not discuss the subject of ‘comedy’ in detail. Though there have been efforts by many
scholars to establish the existence of another treatise by Aristotle or perhaps an extension of
the Poetics which supposedly dealt with aspects of comedy, it cannot be said with certainty
because such a work is yet to be discovered.

Incidentally, Cooper (1922) endeavours to present an Aristotelian theory of comedy based on

‘everything he could find in Aristotle, in his teacher Plato, or in his successors, that might aid
in reconstructing Aristotle’s views on comedy’ (Cooper, 1922, p. ix). Janko (1987) too
attempts a hypothetical reconstruction of Poetics II based on a document named ‘Tractatus
Coislinianus’ and some ‘fragments’. However, most scholars agree that a separate treatise by
Aristotle on ‘comedy’ actually does not exist. In this regard, Gupta (2007) observes:

“… Aristotle promises to deal with epic and comedy ‘later’: perhaps he later
forgot about comedy, or perhaps he dealt with it in the (now) non-existent
second part of the Poetics. We might mention here the curious document
usually called the Tractatus Coislinianus, a document uniquely preserved in a
tenth century manuscript containing what appears to be an ‘Aristotelian’
theory of comedy. The terms used and the treatment of the subject alike
suggest an Aristotelian connection, or at any rate, one with his Academy;
much of it however survives in a garbled form, which has given rise to the
interesting speculation that it constitutes the lecture-notes of some
incompetent student!” (Gupta, 2007, pp. xxiii-xxiv)

Bharata Muni, on the other hand, discusses both ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’ in considerable
detail. With regards to Aristotle’s views on the two forms, Bharata Muni appears to make a
similar distinction in his observations that the Comic Sentiment (hāsya rasa) “is mostly to be
seen in women and persons of the inferior type” (Ghosh, 1951, p. 110) (N.S., Chapter VI,

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Verse 51)vi and the Heroic Sentiment (vīra rasa) “relates to the superior type of persons and
has energy as its basis”vii (Ghosh, 1951, p. 114). However, he further observes that Comic
Sentiment has six varieties and ascribes two varieties each to the superior, middling and
inferior type of persons. In this connection, it is said:

smitamatha hasitaṃ vihasitamupahasitañcāpahasitamatihasitam |

dvau dvau bhedau syātāmuttamamadhyādhamaprakṛtau || 52 ||
smitahasite jyeṣṭhānāṃ madhyānāṃ vihasitopahasite ca |
adhamānāmapahasitaṃ hyatihasitaṃ cāpi vijñeyam || 53 ||
-(N.S., Chapter VI, Verses 52-53) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 86)]

Meaning: They (the six varieties of Comic Sentiment) are: smita (slight
smile), hasita (full smile), vihasita (gentle laughter), upahasita (laughter of
ridicule), apahasita (vulgar laughter) and atihasita (excessive laughter). In
divisions of two, the six varieties are known to belong to the superior, the
middling and the inferior types of persons respectively. The first two, smita
and hasita belong to persons of the superior type, the next two, vihasita and
upahasita belong to persons of the middling type and the last two, apahasita
and atihasita belong to persons of the inferior type.

Bharata Muni further observes that the comic situations arising in a play should be expressed
accordingly for catering to the respective types of spectators (superior, middling or inferior).
Thus, the comic sentiment is to be known to be of two kinds: self-centred
(ātmasamuttha/svasamuttha) and centred in others (parasamuttha) and it relates to the three
types of persons (superior, middling and inferior) with the help of its six varieties. (N.S.,
Chapter VI, Verses 60-61)viii Therefore, Bharata Muni’s initial observations regarding the
Comic Sentiment in relation to women and persons of the inferior type appear to be merely
general in nature because he himself makes observations regarding all classes of people while
commenting on the practical reality of the Comic Sentiment.

Coming to Aristotle’s views on his principle subject for the Poetics, i.e., ‘tragedy’, Aristotle
indeed deals in considerable detail on the subject. He defines ‘tragedy’ as follows:

‘A tragedy, then, is a mimesis of an action that is [morally] serious and

purposeful, having magnitude; uttered in heightened language and [using] each
of its resources [i.e. dialogue and song] separately in the various sections [of the

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 play], [the action presented] by people acting rather than by narration; bringing
about through [a process of] pity and fear [in the events enacted] the purification
of those destructive or painful acts.’ (Whalley et al., 1997, pp. 67, 69)

Aristotle’s idea of a ‘tragic hero’ being purified in the end is similar to Bharata Muni’s
observation that a ‘hero’ is one, who from being in misfortune or distress, ultimately attains
elevation and in cases where there are more than one such tragic characters, the one whose
misfortune and elevation are found to be prominent is to be called the ‘hero’. (N.S., Chapter
XXXIV, Verses 23-24)

Coming back to Aristotle’s definition of ‘tragedy’, it bears remarkable similarity with

Bharata Muni’s observations on the Heroic Sentiment (vīra rasa), its Determinants (vibhāva)
and Consequents (anubhāva) and its representative Dominant State (sthāyi-bhāva), i.e.,
energy (utsāha bhāva). With regards to the vīra rasa and utsāha bhāva, Bharata Muni
observes (N.S., Chapter VI, Verses 67-68ix and Chapter VII, Verse 21x):

‘(Now) the Heroic (vīra) Sentiment, relates to the superior type of persons and
has energy as its basis. This is created by Determinants such as presence of
mind, perseverance, diplomacy, discipline, military strength, aggressiveness,
reputation of might, influence and the like. It is to be represented on the
stage by Consequents such as firmness, patience, heroism, charity, diplomacy
and the like. Transitory States in it are contentment, judgement, pride,
agitation, energy (vega), ferocity, indignation, remembrance, horripilation
and the like. There are two Āryās [on these points]: The Heroic Sentiment arises
from energy, perseverance, optimism, absence of surprise, and presence of
mind and [such other] special conditions [of the spirit]. This Heroic Sentiment
is to be properly represented on the stage by firmness, patience, heroism,
pride, energy, aggressiveness, influence and censuring words … Energy
(utsāha) relates to persons of the superior type. It is caused by Determinants
such as absence of sadness, power, patience, heroism and the like. It is to be
represented on the stage by Consequents such as steadiness, munificence,
boldness of an undertaking, and the like. On this point there is a Śloka: Energy
which has effort as its basis and which grows out of alertness and such other
qualities, should be represented on the stage by acts of vigilance and the like.’
(Ghosh, 1951, pp. 114, 123-124)

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In the Poetics, Aristotle adds that tragedy is a mimesis “not of men, of actions—of life, of
happiness and unhappiness, for happiness consists in action, and the supreme good itself, the
very end of life” (Twining, 1789, pp. 76-77). This observation again is very similar to Bharata
Muni’s observation that there is no exclusive representation of anyone in the nāṭya for the
drama is a merely a representation of the state of the Three Worlds (bhāvanākīrtana). (N.S.,
Chapter I, Verse 106)xi Of course, Bharata Muni was concerned with all forms of dramatic
representations. So, he does not make a specific mention of ‘tragedy’. But, it surely is
implicit in his observation.

In the Poetics, Aristotle mentions six elements of a ‘tragedy’ which determine its outcome:
plot, character, speech/diction, reasoning, spectacle/decorative elements and music/lyric
poetry. Of these, Aristotle discusses plot, character and diction in vivid detail in the Poetics
for he considers these three to be the chief elements of ‘tragedy’. Plot, says, Aristotle, is the
‘soul’ of ‘tragedy. In the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata Muni too refers to the ‘plot’ (itivṛtta) as the
body (śarīraṃ) of poetry (Chapter XXI, Verse 1: itivṛttaṃ tu kāvyasya śarīraṃ parikīrtitam).
Aristotle goes on to discuss various aspects related to the plot such as its elements,
components, kinds, etc.

Aristotle’s discussion on ‘character’ is essentially about his vision of the qualities of a ‘tragic
hero’. Thus, he attributes four such qualities to an ‘ideal’ tragic hero: goodness,
appropriateness, resemblance and consistency. Concerning the qualities to be exhibited by a
hero in a play, Ācārya Dhanañjaya makes the following observations in the Daśarūpakam:

śobhā vilāso mādhuryaṃ gāmbhīryaṃ sthairyatejasī |

lalitaudāryamityaṣṭau sattvajāḥ pauruṣā guṇāḥ || 10 ||
nīce ghṛṇādhike spardhā śobhāyāṃ śauryadakṣate |
gatiḥ sadhairyā dṛṣṭiśca vilāse sasmitaṃ vacaḥ || 11 ||
ślakṣṇo vikāro mādhuryaṃ saṃkṣobhe sumahatyapi |
gāmbhīryaṃ yatprabhāvena vikāro nopalakṣyate || 12 ||
vyavasāyādacalanaṃ sthairyaṃ vighnakulādapi |
adhikṣepādyasahanaṃ tejaḥ prāṇātyayeṣvapi || 13 ||
śṛṅgārākāraceṣṭātvaṃ sahajaṃ lalitaṃ mṛdu |
priyoktyājīvitāddānamaudāryaṃ sadupagrahaḥ || 14 ||
-[(D.R., Chapter II, Verses 10-14) (Paṇsīkar, 1917, pp. 41-42)]

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 Meaning: ““The eight manly qualities that spring from one’s nature are:
Beauty of Character (śobhā), Vivacity (vilāsa), Equanimity (mādhurya), Poise
(gāmbhīrya), Firmness (sthairya), Sense of Honor (tejas), Light-heartedness
(lalita), and Magnanimity (audārya). In Beauty of Character (śobhā) [are
comprised] compassion for the lowly, emulation of one's superiors, heroism,
and cleverness. Vivacity (vilāsa) includes a firm step and glance and a
laughing voice. Equanimity (mādhurya) [means] slight change of demeanor
even in very great agitation. Poise (gāmbhīrya) [means] that, because of
strength of character, no change of demeanor whatsoever is observed [even in
very great agitation]. Firmness (sthairya) is the not being swerved from one's
determination even by a multitude of obstacles. Sense of Honor (tejas) is the
not enduring insults and the like, even at the cost of one’s life. Light
heartedness (lalita) is the natural sweet appearance and demeanor of love.
Magnanimity (audārya) is the giving up of even as much as (a) one’s life with
a kindly word, [and] the propitiation of the virtuous.” (Haas, 1912, pp. 45-48)

Here, it must be mentioned that the qualities that are to be exhibited by a hero in a play as
mentioned by Ācārya Dhanañjaya are exactly the same that Bharata Muni lists as the various
aspects of a man’s sattva in the Nāṭyaśāstra:

śobhā vilāso mādhuryaṃ sthairyaṃ gāmbhīryameva ca |

lalitaudāryatejāṃsi sattvabhedāstu pauruṣāḥ || 31 ||
-(N.S., Chapter XXIV, Verse 31) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 172)]

Meaning: “Brilliant Character (śobhā), Graceful Bearing (vilāsa), Self-

possession (mādhurya), Steadiness (sthairya), Gravity (gāmbhīrya),
Sportiveness (lalita), Nobility (audārya) and Spirit (tejas) are the different
aspects of the male Temperament.” (Ghosh, 1951, p. 445)]

Thus, it is essentially Bharata Muni’s view that a hero must possess eight qualities. So, while
Aristotle lists four qualities of a ‘tragic hero’, Bharata Muni gives a list of eight qualities
concerning the hero. However, Bharata Muni’s vision of the ‘hero’ is a bit intricate. This is
perhaps because he was not dealing with ‘tragedy’ only. Or perhaps because the Nāṭyaśāstra
was created for the common masses and, therefore, the hero needed to be someone with
whom the common masses could identify or relate themselves. It is in this connection that

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Bharata Muni draws a fine line of distinction between Prakaraṇa and Nāṭikā as follows (N.S.,
Chapter XX, Verses 48-52 and 59-63):

‘The play (lit. where) in which the writer prakurute (devises) by his own genius
an original plot with its Hero, and works up its elaboration (śarīra), is called the
Prakaraṇa. When a playwright constructs a play with an original (lit. invented)
Germ and a plot which is not connected with Ṛṣis’ works and which that play has
gathered from some other works and has some marvellous qualities in it, the same
is also called the Prakaraṇa. The plot and its elaboration as the basis of the
Sentiments, which have been prescribed in case of the Nāṭaka are also to be
applied with [the detail of] their characteristics to the Prakaraṇa in all its Junctures
(sandhi). The varied exploits of Brahmins, merchants, ministers, priests, officers
[of the king] and leaders of the army [when presented in a play] are to be known
as the Prakaraṇa. The Prakaraṇa should be known as not made up with an exalted
Hero. And it does not contain the character of any god, has no story of king’s
enjoyment, and it is connected with the men outside [the royal palace] ... In a play
of the Nāṭikā (Nāṭī) class producers are to recognise a more or less well-known
variety of these two (the Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa). Different in origin from the
[two types of plays] the Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa, its plot should be invented, the
Hero should be a king and it should be based on [an incident relating to music or
affairs of the harem. And it contains an abundance of female characters, has four
Acts, graceful gestures as its soul; well-arranged constituents, many dances, songs
and recitations, and love's enjoyment are its chief features. The Nāṭikā should be
known also to contain [a display of] royal manners, [fit of] anger, its pacification,
and [acts of] deceit (dambha), and to have the Hero, his queen, the female
Messenger and the attendants [as its dramatis personae]. The characteristics of the
Nāṭaka and the Prakaraṇa have been briefly described by me (thus).’ (Ghosh,
1951, pp. 362-365)

Naturally, Bharata Muni does not go for a stereotype class of ‘hero’ who always has to be
valiant and intense. Instead, he explores the various possibilities of the making of a hero and
observes that heroes can be of four types. All the four types of heroes must, of course,
possess one primary quality, i.e., self-control (dhīra). But, it is when this one quality
combines with one of the four more qualities [uddhata (vehemence), lalita (light-

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heartedness), udātta (exaltedness) and praśānta (calmness)] of a hero that it gives rise to a
specific type of ‘hero. [N.S., Chapter XVIII, Verse 31 and N.S., Chapter XXXIV, Verse 18-
19 (C.E.)]

Thus, a hero can be one of the following four kinds: dhīroddhata (self-controlled and
vehement), dhīralalita (self-controlled and light-hearted), dhīrodātta (self-controlled and
exalted) and dhīrapraśānta (self-controlled and calm). Unfortunately, Bharata Muni himself
does not describe the characteristics of these four kinds of heroes. He merely observes that
the gods (devā) are known to be dhīroddhata (self-controlled and vehement), the kings (nṛpā)
are known to be dhīralalita (self-controlled and light-hearted), the ministers or councilors
(senāpati, amātya) are known to be dhīrodātta (self-controlled and exalted) and the Brahmins
and merchants (brāhmaṇā, vāṇija) are known to be dhīrapraśānta (self-controlled and calm).
[N.S., Chapter XXXIV, Verse 19-20 (C.E.)]

But, fortunately for us, Ācārya Dhanañjaya again comes to our rescue by describing these
four kinds of heroes in the Daśarūpakam as follows:

bhedaiścaturdhā lalitaśāntodāttoddhatairayam |
niścinto dhīralalitaḥ kalāsaktaḥ sukhī mṛduḥ || 3 ||
sāmānyaguṇayuktastu dhīraśānto dvijādikaḥ |
mahāsattvo’tigambhīraḥ kṣamāvānavikatthanaḥ || 4 ||
sthiro nigūḍhāhaṇkāro dhīrodātto dṛḍhavrataḥ |
darpamātsaryabhūyiṣṭho māyāchadmaparāyaṇaḥ || 4 ||
dhīroddhatastvahaṇkāro calaścaṇḍo vikattthanaḥ | (5)
-[(D.R., Chapter II, Verses 3-5) (Paṇsīkar, 1917, pp. 36-38)]

Meaning: “He [i. e. the Hero] is of four kinds, being light-hearted (lalita),
calm (śānta), exalted (udātta), or vehement (uddhata). The self-controlled and
light-hearted [Hero] (dhīralalita) is free from anxiety, fond of the arts [song,
dance, etc.], happy, and gentle. The self-controlled and calm [Hero]
(dhīraśānta) is a Brahman or the like, possessed of the generic merits [of a
Hero]. The self-controlled and exalted [Hero] (dhīrodātta) is of great
excellence, exceedingly serious, forbearing, not boastful, resolute, with self-
assertion suppressed, and firm of purpose. The self-controlled and vehement
[Hero] (dhīroddhata) is altogether dominated by pride and jealousy, wholly

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 devoted to magic practices and deceit, self-assertive, fickle, irascible, and
boastful.” (Haas, 1912, pp. 40-42)

Incidentally, in the beginning of Chapter II, Ācārya Dhanañjaya also refers to the intrinsic
characteristics of the hero as follows:

netā vinīto madhurastyāgī dakṣaḥ priyaṃvadaḥ |

raktalokaḥ śucirvāṅmī rūḍhavaṃśaḥ sthiro yuvā || 1 ||
buddhyutsāhasmṛtiprajñākalāmānasamanvitaḥ |
śūro dṛḍhaśca tejasvī śāstracakṣuśca dhārmikaḥ || 2 ||
-[(D.R., Chapter II, Verses 1-2) (Paṇsīkar, 1917, p. 35)]

Meaning: “The Hero should be well-bred, charming, liberal, clever, affable,

popular, upright, eloquent, of exalted lineage, resolute, and young; endowed
with intelligence, energy, memory, wisdom, [skill in the] arts, and pride;
heroic, mighty, vigorous, familiar with the codes, and a just observer of laws.”
(Haas, 1912, p. 40)

Coming back to the Nāṭyaśāstra, unlike Aristotle who discusses the qualities of a ‘hero’ only,
Bharata Muni duly discusses the qualities required for the role of a heroine as well. In this
regard, it is observed (Chapter XXXV, Verses 84-86):

“A woman with the following qualities should be given the role of a Heroine: she
should be endowed with a good physical form, good qualities, character and
young age and should possess gold necklace and garlands and should be shining,
affectionate, sweet, and should possess charming words with a lovely voice and
should be steady (lit. unperturbed) in the exercise (yogyā), and conversant with
Laya and Tāla and Sentiments, and should have all kinds of ornaments and be
dressed with garlands and scents.” (Ghosh, 1961, p. 225)

In the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata Muni also mentions ten natural graces for women, these being līlā
(sportive mimicry), vilāsa (amorous gesture), vicchitti [carelessness (in dressing/
decoration)], vibhrama (confusion), kilakiñcita (hysterical mood), moṭṭāyita (manifestation of
affection), kuṭṭamita (pretended anger), bibboka (affected coldness), lalita (lolling) and vihṛta
(want of response) and seven involuntary graces for women, these being śobhā (beauty),
kānti (charm), mādhurya (delicacy), dīpti (radiance), dhairya (self-control), prāgalbhya

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(courage) and audārya (dignity). (N.S., Chapter XXIV, Verses 12-13 and 24) Ācārya
Dhanañjaya too recognizes these seventeen graces. However, he considers feeling (bhāva),
emotion (hāva) and passion (helā) as three internal graces (śarīrajāḥ, lit., of the body),
thereby, observing the total number of graces of (young) women to be twenty. (D.R., Chapter
II, Verse 30)xii Thus, due recognition of the qualities and characteristics of both men and
women has been envisaged in the Indian tradition.

Coming back to the Poetics, with regards to ‘diction’, Aristotle discusses certain aspects
concerning use of proper grammar and qualities of poetic style. Though he does not elaborate
much on diction, he duly observes that “diction should be handled with particular care in
those parts in which little is happening, and which are expressive neither of character nor of
reasoning; excessively brilliant diction overshadows character and reasoning” (Heath, 1996,
p. 42).

Of ‘reasoning’, Aristotle deems it fit to be discussed in the Rhetoric considering the subject-
matter of the same, i.e., proving, persuading and establishing. Aristotle treatment of
‘spectacle’ and ‘music’ is very sparing and rather apathetic. Concerning ‘music’, Aristotle
merely observes that of all the sources of pleasure known, it is the most important. None-the-
less, ‘music’ also appears to have a structural significance in the making of a ‘tragedy’ in
Aristotle’s view for he later describes each of the various sections of a tragedy: the prologue,
the episode, the finale and the choral part in relation to ‘music’ as follows:

1. Prologos (Prologue): That which precedes the opening chorus

2. Epeisodion (Episode): That which comes between two complete choral songs
3. Exodos (Finale): That which comes after the final chorus
4. Choral Parts: Parados (first complete chorus sung either on entry, i.e., the opening
chorus), stasima (a choral song without anapaests or trochees) and kommos (a general
lamentation by the chorus and the actors together)

Aristotle clearly does not have a high regard for ‘spectacle’ for he remarks that though it does
have the ability of being appealing, it is dispensable as the success of ‘tragedy’ is not known
to depend on ‘spectacle’. And yet Aristotle acknowledges that fear/terror and pity may be
evokes through ‘spectacle’ though he advises against such a use of ‘spectacle’:

“Terror and pity may be raised by decoration—the mere spectacle; but they
may also arise from the circumstances of the action itself, which is far

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 preferable and shows a superior Poet, For the fable should be so constructed,
that, without the assistance of the sight, its incidents may excite horror and
commisseration [sic recte: commiseration] in those, who hear them only: an
effect, which every one, who hears the fable of the Oedipus, must experience.
But, to produce this effect by means of the decoration, discovers want of art in
the Poet; who must also be supplied, by the public, with an expensive
apparatus. As to those Poets, who make use of the decoration in order to
produce, not the terrible, but the marvellous only, their purpose has nothing in
common with that of Tragedy. For we are not to seek for every fort of
pleasure from Tragedy, but for that only which is proper to the species. Since,
therefore, it is the business of the Tragic Poet to give that pleasure, which
arises from pity and terror, through imitation, it is evident, that he ought to
produce that effect by the circumstances of the action itself.” (Twining, 1789,
pp. 89-90)

At the very end of the Poetics, Aristotle also appears to observe that ‘tragedy’ is superior than
‘epic’ because it contains the additional elements of ‘music and spectacle/decoration’
[Reference to (Twining, 1789, p. 134) and (Heath, 1996, p. 47)] that are sources of intense
pleasure. However, it cannot be denied that Aristotle deals with both ‘spectacle’ and ‘music’
to a very limited effect in the Poetics. The same is true of ‘reasoning’ as well, the discussion
of which Aristotle reserves for the Rhetoric.

Bharata Muni, on the other hand, comprehensively discusses all the six aspects: plot,
character, diction, reasoning, spectacle and music in the Nāṭyaśāstra. The present thesis has
touched upon all these aspects as discussed in the Nāṭyaśāstra except for the available
discussions on ‘spectacle’ and ‘music’. However, that both ‘spectacle’ and ‘music’ hold an
important place in the nāṭya is evident from the following observation by Ghosh (1951):

“The terms like rūpaka or rūpa (representation) and prekṣā (spectacle), all
denoting dramatic works, also characterise the Hindu dramas and show their
difference from the drama of the Greeks who laid emphasis on action and not on
the spectacle. Of the six parts of the tragedy, the most typical of the Greek
dramatic productions, Aristotle puts emphasis on the fable or the plot and
considers decoration to be unimportant … But in case of the Hindu dramas the
decoration (i.e. the costumes and make-up) mostly plays an important part.

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 Equally with five other elements such as gestures and postures (āṅgika), words
(vācika), the representation of the Temperament (sattva), it gives the Nāṭya its
characteristic form. But in the theatre of the Greeks, it was not the case. In the
performance of the tragedies, for example, they did not care much for the
spectacle, if the declamation was properly made. For Aristotle himself says that,
“the power of tragedy is felt without representation and actors” (II.III). Another
peculiarity of the Hindu dramas was their general dependence on dance (nṛtya),
song (gīta), and instrumental music (vādya). Though the chorus of the Greek
tragedy introduced in it some sort of dance and songs, the function of these
elements seem to have been considerably different in the Hindu drama. The
ancient Indian play was produced through words, gestures, postures, costumes,
make-up, songs and dances of actors, and the instrumental music was played
during the performance whenever necessary. But these different elements did
not play an equal part in all the plays or different types of play. According as the
emphasis was to be put on words, music, or dance, a play or its individual part
partook of the nature of what the moderns would call ‘drama’, ‘opera’, ‘ballet’
or ‘dramatic spectacle’.” (Ghosh, 1951, pp. xlii-xliii)

In the present section, a comparative observation has been made with regards to certain
concepts in the Poetics and the Nāṭyaśāstra. While a more in-depth analysis of the Poetics
would certainly have brought to fore more points of similarity and dissimilarity between
these two ancient texts, such an effort is not possible on the part of the researcher presently
owing to paucity of time. However, it is quite evident that the two texts, though presenting
occasional differences in opinion, also show similar remarkable similarities in the vision of
Bharata Muni and Aristotle. Yet, the Poetics does lag behind the Nāṭyaśāstra on certain
counts. First, in its treatment of the various aspects concerning the dramatic presentation, the
Nāṭyaśāstra leaps ahead by a handsome margin. Besides, Aristotle, unlike Bharata Muni,
gives little consideration to the intrapersonal activity in humans that invisibly supports the
external representations barring the general references to the involvement of human emotions
in a ‘tragedy’. Most of all, Aristotle strangely does not bother to discuss anything on aspects
of non-verbal communication except for once when he observes that “the poet should work
out his play, to the best of his power, with appropriate gestures” (Butcher, 1895, p. 59). Given
the subject of his discussion in the Poetics, one would have expected Aristotle to at least

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touch on the immense importance of non-verbal communication in a dramatic representation
of ‘tragedy’. Unfortunately, nothing as such happens.

8.5. The Rhetoric vis-à-vis the Nāṭyaśāstra

The Rhetoric is undoubtedly Aristotle’s chef d’oeuvre. Both in terms of volume and treatment
of content, it overwhelmingly overshadows the Poetics. The reason behind this, perhaps,
remains in Aristotle’s different approaches for the two respective works. While his aim, in the
Poetics, appears to be to summarize the subject-matter of ‘poietic art’, in the Rhetoric, he sets
out to elucidate the subject-matter of ‘rhetoric’. Hence, the two works show considerable
variation in every way. In all, the Rhetoric consists of three books. Book I deals with aspects
of rhetoric per se; Book II deals with the subject of the speaker/rhetorician and; Book III
deals with the subject-matter of diction/style in rhetoric practice.

As in the case of the Poetics, the researcher has to repose his faith in the available translations
of the Rhetoric for the present endeavour. Therefore, five translations of the said text, most of
which have been introduced with detailed analysis of the text by the translators, have been
consulted for possible variant readings and clarifications, these being the works by Gillies
(1823), Buckley (1872), Jebb (1909), Roberts (1924) and Freese (1926). Similarly, as with
the Poetics, only some of the key concepts from the Rhetoric shall be deliberated over with
observations in support of their similarity or dissimilarity vis-à-vis the Nāṭyaśāstra.
Additionally, any refreshing concept in the Rhetoric which has not been touched upon in the
Nāṭyaśāstra shall be duly highlighted.

A brief note of admission is due here. Even a cursory reading of the Rhetoric brings to fore
its immense significance in ‘speech’ studies. However, given the considerable volume of the
Rhetoric, paucity of time forbids a minute analysis of the text presently. Therefore, the
opinion presented here owes much to the analysis of the text by the translators rather than the
entire translation per se. The researcher has also relied greatly upon the copious observations
made by Thomas Hobbes in his ‘brief’ account of the Rhetoric published originally in 1681
and later reprinted in Molesworth (1840) and Buckley (1872). Notwithstanding the
extraordinary genius of these scholars, any oversight in faithfully presenting Aristotle’s
observations in the Rhetoric in the present work is earnestly regretted.

Well then, the subject of discussion in the Rhetoric is the art of speech construction, more
specifically the effective use of rhetoric in communication. Aristotle begins Book I by

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observing that rhetoric comes naturally (either at random or from habit) to all human beings
irrespective of their learning or specialization as does also the art of dialectic, i.e., the nature
of inquiry. None-the-less, dialectic must be accompanied by proofs which will help in
rhetoric. Thus, essentially rhetoric is to be necessarily accompanied by proofs. Interestingly,
Aristotle appears to observe that the function of rhetoric is not persuasion per se but “to
discover the available means of persuasion in each case” (Jebb, 1909, p. 5). All the
translators have concurred on this view. Incidentally Hobbes (1681) presents Aristotle’s view
of rhetoric as “that faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any
Subject to win belief in the hearer” (Buckley, 1872, p. 276).

Thus, it appears that Aristotle was chiefly concerned with viewing rhetoric as the ability to
discover means of ‘persuasion’ such as winning the trust/belief of the communicatees in the
first place, which in turn, would complement the communicator(s) in persuading the former.
This reading is significant because it does not present Aristotle as one viewing ‘persuasion’
as the primary guiding motive behind communication as has generally been interpreted by
modern communication scholars. Rather, he appears to view ‘persuasion’ as a natural
corollary to winning belief in the listener. This view would concur, to a certain extent though
not completely, with the Indian view of communication as being essentially an act of
establishing commonness with the communicatee(s) which is followed by the fulfilment of
the associated functions falling in the scheme of natural order.

Unfortunately, modern communication scholarship has, by and large, appeared to interprete

Aristotle’s view of ‘rhetoric’ as being motivated by ‘persuasion per se’ rather than
‘discovering means of persuasion’. This is perhaps because the West invariably associates
every act of communication with a successful outcome. As Cushman and Kincaid (1987)
observe:

“In fact, the introduction of the term, “success,” emphasizes an instrumental

aspect of communication which is so often associated with Western ways of
thinking in general. If success is limited to external criteria, to the effective
manipulation of the external world including other people, then the Western
bias of this definition is evident and can be traced back to Aristotle’s
principles of rhetoric. On the other hand, if success is interpreted more
broadly we can make room for a greater variety of approaches to

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 communication, perhaps even those which are compatible with Eastern ways
of thinking.” (Cushman & Kincaid, 1987, p. 2)

Hence, Aristotle’s principles of rhetoric have been subjected to biased interpretation. Of

course, ‘success’, as a general term, indeed applies to all the outcomes that Aristotle
associates with ‘rhetoric’, viz., ‘correction’, ‘instruction’, ‘suggestion’ and ‘defence’. None-
the-less, a critical understanding of Aristotle’s vision of ‘rhetoric’ might render a more
humane view of ‘persuasion’, which Aristotle observes, consists of either ‘rhetorical’ or ‘non-
rhetorical’xiii proofs. The former has to be invented and is known to be of three kinds: ethos
(ethics), pathos (emotions) and logos (logic). Thus, Aristotle opines that a communicator
must ‘be able (1) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, (2) to
understand the emotions—that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and
the way in which they are excited, and (3) to reason logically’ (Roberts (1924, p. 7) in order
to succeed in any act of ‘persuasion’.

So, a communicator must be ethical, touch the emotions of his/her communicatees and apply
the principles of reasoning/logic. These then are the three kinds of ‘rhetorical’ proofs
according to Aristotle. Aristotle explains these three kinds of ‘rhetorical’ proofs as follows:

“Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three
kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the
second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the
proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is
so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully
and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is,
and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are
divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what
the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to
speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that
the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his
power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the
most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may
come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our
judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are

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 pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that
present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject
shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly,
persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth
or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case
in question.” (Roberts (1924, p. 7)

Understandably, Aristotle concludes that ‘rhetoric’, therefore, appears to be an off-shoot of

‘dialectic’ (reasoning/logic) and ‘ethics’ (moral philosophy). This view too appears to be in
general concurrence with the Indian view of communication where communication has to be
necessarily accompanied by the principles of ethicality, emotional appeal and application of
logic or reasoning. In Chapter VII of the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata Muni recognises many
rhetorical tools of reasoning such as parallelism (udāharaṇa), causation (hetu), favourable
precedent (dṛṣṭānta), unfavourable precedent (nidarśana), convincing explanation (nirukta),
distinction (viśeṣaṇa), inference from similitude (tulya-tarka) and pointed utterance
(upadiṣṭa) as lakṣaṇas (excellent points of composition). Further, as observed in the earlier
chapter, in the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata Muni emphasizes that a communicator must possess the
qualities of ‘intelligence, strength, physical beauty, knowledge of time and tempo,
appreciation of the States and the Sentiments, proper age, curiosity, acquisition of knowledge
and arts, their retention, vocal music, dances, suppression of stage-fright, and enthusiasm’
(Ghosh, 1951, p. 526). Aristotle too observes in Book I of the Rhetoric that ‘the component
parts of virtue (in a speaker) are justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity,
liberality, mildness, wisdom (both practical and speculative)’ (Freese, 1926, p. xxxiv).

Considering that Aristotle closely associates ‘rhetoric’ with ‘persuasion’, much of Book I,
which revolves around the subject of rhetoric per se, deals with various aspects concerning
the same. These include discussions on the two kinds of logical proofs: deductive and
inductive, elements of persuasive argumentation such as examples and enthymemes, i.e.,
syllogisms, the three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative/political, forensic/legal,
epideictic/ceremonial, two types of human actions: involuntary and voluntary, the seven
causes of human actions: four voluntary (habit, reason, anger and desire/lust) and three
involuntary (chance, nature and compulsion), two kinds of human actions: good or apparently
good and pleasant or apparently pleasant, rules regarding just and unjust actions (written and
unwritten) and so on.

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It must be mentioned that logic or reasoning is not Bharata Muni’s chief concern in the
Nāṭyaśāstra given the subject of the treatise which is essentially representation of thoughts/
ideas, not argumentation. Thus, though he touches upon the aspects concerning logic and
persuasion, he does not bother to vividly deliberate on them. It should not, however, be
assumed that ‘Indian Communication Thought’ does not offer insights on the role of
‘reasoning/logic’ in communication practices. Considerable insights are available on the
subject in the various texts related to the Indian philosophical systems. Though all the
philosophical systems have much to offer in this regard, the Nyāya school of Indian
philosophy (Nyāya Darśana) offers the most systemic and in-depth view. As Matilal
(1998)xiv observed:

“Logic developed in ancient India from the tradition of vādavidyā, a discipline

dealing with the categories of debate over various religious, philosophical,
moral, and doctrinal issues. There were several vāda manuals available around
the beginning of the Christian era … Of these manuals, the one found in the
Nyāyasūtras of Akṣapāda Gautama (circa 150 AD) is comparatively more
systemic than others.” (Matilal, 1998, p. 2)

With regards to the various aspects concerning human actions, their causes, rules regarding
actions (written and unwritten), the subject has been discussed in abundance by the ancient
Indian sages in the Dharmaśāstras. However, the Nāṭyaśāstra understandably deliberates on
them in a very cursory manner as the chief subject of the Nāṭyaśāstra is the desirable
representation of thoughts/ideas, not anything else.

Book II of the Rhetoric, as observed earlier, concerns the subject of the ‘speaker’.
Specifically, Aristotle’s submission may be summarized as follows:

“Since rhetoric—political and forensic rhetoric, at any rate—exists to affect

the giving of decisions, the orator must not only try to make the argument of
his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also (1) make his own
character look right and (2) put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right
frame of mind. As to his own character: he should make his audience feel that
he possesses prudence, virtue, and goodwill.” (Roberts, 1924, p. x)

Thus, a communicator must possess three qualities: prudence, virtue, and goodwill. However,
the mere possession of these qualities is not good enough. One must also be able to duly

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convince the audience of being possessed with these qualities. Of these three qualities,
Aristotle discusses prudence (practical wisdom) and virtue in Book I. In Book II, he
specifically focuses on ‘goodwill’. ‘Goodwill’, says Aristotle, can be acquired through a
sound knowledge of ‘emotions’, which in turn, requires consideration of three things:

1. Its nature, i.e., the various ‘states’ of mind that give rise to different emotions
2. Its antecedents, i.e., the people/things that give rise to emotions
3. Its context, i.e., the occasions that give rise to emotions

With regards to the various ‘states’ of mind that give rise to different emotions, Aristotle
discusses fourteen states in all, each in binary opposition to another, the combinations being
thus: ‘anger and calmness’, ‘friendship and enmity’, ‘fear and boldness’, ‘shame and
shamelessness’, ‘kindness and unkindness’, ‘pity and indignation’ and ‘envy and emulation’.
Elucidating on the instance of ‘anger’, Aristotle observes that the same principle holds true
for other emotions as well. Aristotle’s view is reproduced here from Roberts (1924):

“Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the
state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they
usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not
enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we
shall be unable to arouse anger in any one. The same is true of the other
emotions.” (Roberts, 1924)

With regards to the people/things that give rise to emotions, Aristotle recommends the
classification of audience into three categories based on their ‘age’ and ‘fortunes’. Thus,
audience are to classified according to their ‘age’ as young, middle-aged and old and
according to their ‘fortunes’ with regards to their birth (high and low), wealth (rich and poor),
power (powerful and powerless), fortune (fortunate and unfortunate). In the Nāṭyaśāstra,
Bharata Muni too recommends the classification of audience based on their gender, age,
social strata and so on. These aspects have already been discussed in the preceding chapters.
So, it seems pointless to repeat the same here.

Strangely, Aristotle does not deliberate upon ‘context’, i.e., the occasions that give rise to
emotions. Instead, what follows the observations concerning people/things that give rise to
emotions is ‘a brief retrospect followed by an introduction to the analysis of the ‘universal’
classes of argument which are applicable to all special premises derived from special

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branches of knowledge’ (Jebb, 1909, p. xxv). However, Aristotle’s non-deliberation on the
subject of ‘contexts’ for emotions does not surprise the present researcher. As mentioned in
the sixth chapter of the present thesis, the determinants of human emotions (vibhāvas) are
infinite. So, no text can possibly treat the subject in an exhaustive manner. This perhaps
justifies why Aristotle does not comment on the ‘contexts’ pertaining to the ‘emotions’.
Bharata Muni, on the other hand, does deliberate on the vibhāvas (determinants of human
emotions, viz., people, things, occasions etc.). However, he does not ascribe any specific
number of such determinants. The observations of Bharata Muni on the various ‘states’ of
mind that give rise to different emotions too have been discussed in detail earlier in this
thesis. So, a repetition is consciously avoided here.

What however is really intriguing is Aristotle’s abrupt return to discussing aspects on rhetoric
per se in Book II which should ideally have been included in Book I. Though the present
researcher has some thoughts on the same, they may be reserved for a later discussion in the
future. With regards to Aristotle’s observations in the remaining portion of Book II, Jebb
(1909) summarizes the same as follows:

‘These (the ‘universal’) classes of argument are (1) the topic of the possible
and impossible; (2) the topic of fact past and of fact future; (3) the topic of
degree; (4) the topic of amplification and depreciation (xix). The proofs
common to all branches of rhetoric are example and enthymeme. There are
two kinds of example, involving the use of either historical or artificial
parallels, the latter including fables (xx). A maxim, or general statement
concerned with objects of action, is an incomplete enthymeme (xxi). Then
follow general precepts on the enthymeme. (1) The rhetorical reasoner must
not draw his conclusion from points that are too remote; (2) he must leave out
those propositions which his audience can readily supply; (3) he must know
the special facts from which enthymemes can be derived in each subject.
Enthymemes are of two kinds:—demonstrative, and refutative (xxii). Then
follows an enumeration of twenty-eight heads of argument from which
enthymemes can be constructed; the ‘demonstrative’ enthymeme is almost
exclusively treated, but the ‘refutative’ can be inferred from it (xxiii). Next
succeed ten topics of apparent, or sham, enthymemes (xxiv). An argument
may be refuted, either by opposing enthymeme to enthymeme, or by bringing

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 an objection against a particular point (xxv). The Book ends with
supplementary criticisms, apparently meant to correct errors made by previous
writers on rhetoric, (1) ‘Amplification and depreciation’ are not a mere topic
of an enthymeme; they form one of the ‘common topics’ of c. xviii. (2)
‘Destructive’ enthymemes are not different in kind from ‘constructive.’ This
may suffice for the inventive province of rhetoric,—the way to find
arguments, and the way to refute them (xxvi).’ (Jebb, 1909, pp. xxv-xxvi)

Roberts (1924) and Freese (1926) do not observe ‘amplification and depreciation’ as a
separate general line of argument. They are of the opinion that Aristotle puts them within the
topic of ‘degree’ of greatness or smallness. This view seems more acceptable. However, both
Roberts (1924) and Freese (1926) observe ‘fact past’ and ‘fact future’ as two distinct general
lines of argument. This seems unlikely because both of them have one common association,
i.e., analogy based on a particular time zone. The present researcher, therefore, proposes a
new reading. According to him, Aristotle appears to define the various classes of argument
based on a three-fold criterion:

1. Probability: The possible and the impossible

2. Time: The past fact and the future fact
3. Significance: Greatness or smallness [which includes amplification (for greatness) and
depreciation (for smallness)

Here, let us briefly recall the Bharata Muni’s reference to seven expressive forms of verbal
representation based on their usage (Chapter XXIV, Verses 58-70):

1. Pratyakṣaśca: An expression that concerns a matter of immediate perception

2. Parokṣaśca: An expression that concerns a matter of non-immediate perception
3. Vartamānaśca/ Vartamānakālaśca: An expression that concerns the present time
4. Vṛttakālaśca: An expression that concerns the past time
5. Bhaviṣyakālaśca: An expression that concerns the future time
6. Ātmasthaśca: An expression concerning a matter related to the speaker’s own self
7. Parasthaśca: An expression not concerning a matter related to the speaker’s own self

Another way of understanding these seven forms may be their three-fold classification based
on the following principles:

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1. Based on Perception: Pratyakṣaśca and Parokṣaśca
2. Based on Time: Vartamānaśca, Vṛttakālaśca and Bhaviṣyakālaśca
3. Based on Relation: Ātmasthaśca and Parasthaśca

Though Bharata Muni’s three-fold classification does not match exactly with Aristotle’s
three-fold criterion, yet some comparison may certainly be made. Interestingly, ‘an
expression that concerns a matter of immediate perception’ is generally considered as
‘possible’ and ‘an expression that concerns a matter of non-immediate perception’ runs the
risk of being perceived as ‘non-possible’ by some. Further, ‘an expression that concerns a
matter related to the speaker’s own self’ is generally accorded a ‘greater’ degree of
importance which is naturally followed by ‘amplification’ while ‘an expression that doesn’t
concern a matter related to the speaker’s own self’ is generally reduced to a ‘smaller’ degree
of importance and may be subjected to further ‘depreciation’. With regards to time, Bharata
Muni includes the ‘present’ too alongside the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ for consideration of
rhetoric construction. So then, here too we may find some parallels between the respective
views of Aristotle and Bharata Muni.

Coming to the two proofs common to all branches of rhetoric, example and enthymeme, it
has already been observed earlier in the present chapter that Bharata Muni has mentioned
many rhetorical tools of reasoning in the Nāṭyaśāstra such as parallelism (udāharaṇa),
causation (hetu), favourable precedent (dṛṣṭānta), unfavourable precedent (nidarśana),
convincing explanation (nirukta), distinction (viśeṣaṇa), inference from similitude (tulya-
tarka) and pointed utterance (upadiṣṭa). Of these, parallelism, favourable precedent,
unfavourable precedent, pointed utterance are essentially various types of examples while
causation and inference from similitude are aspects of syllogism.

As mentioned earlier, Bharata Muni’s chief concern in the Nāṭyaśāstra is with faithful
representation of thoughts/ideas, not argumentation. Understandably, he does not bother to
deliberate much on aspects of logic/reasoning. However, here and there, he makes an
occasional reference that reflects his sound knowledge on the subject of ‘reasoning’ as well.
For instance, in Chapter XXXII, Verse 512, he refers to positive reasoning (ūha) and negative
reasoning (apoha) as two qualities that a teacher must possess. It clearly shows Bharata
Muni’s awareness regarding the two kinds of enthymemes that Aristotle speaks of: “(a) the
demonstrative, formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; (b) the refutative,
formed by the conjunction of incompatible propositions” (Roberts, 1924, p. xi).

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So much for Aristotle’s observations in Book II of the Rhetoric, let us move to Book III. As
observed earlier, Book III deals with the subject matter of diction/style in rhetoric practice.
Aristotle begins by observing that a mere knowledge of subject, i.e., what is to be said is not
good enough. One must also know how to articulate thoughts properly. Thus, a speaker must
duly heed to three aspects in total with regards to speech construction:

1. The means of persuasion, i.e., proofs,

2. The style or language to be used, and
3. The (proper) order of arranging the various parts of the speech.

Since Aristotle already discusses the means/sources of persuasion in significant detail in

Books I & II, his primary subjects of deliberation in Book III are the various aspects of
‘language’ such as ‘style’, ‘parts of speech’ and their ‘arrangement’ etc. Let us now consider
some of the salient points from Book III.

So then, a speaker must heed to the style or language to be used in speech construction. But
then, what points are to be considered in speech construction? According to Aristotle, the two
chief qualities of good speech construction are ‘clarity’ and ‘appropriateness’ while the faults
to be avoided are four in number: “(i) misuse of compound words; (2) employment of strange
words; (3) long, unseasonable, or frequent epithets; (4) inappropriate metaphors” (Roberts,
1924, p. xii). In the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata Muni too gives a list of ten merits/ qualities (guṇas)
and ten faults/ defects (doṣas) to be taken into consideration while framing any message.
These have discussed in the chapter on vācikābhinaya.

Aristotle further observes that “the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry” (ibid.)
and goes on to draw a distinction between oral and written styles. None-the-less, “in every
case a composition should be easy to read, easy to deliver; it should avoid solecisms arising
from a neglect of symmetry; it should also avoid long parentheses” (Jebb, 1909, p. xxvi).
With regards to good style, Aristotle observes:

“The foundation of good style is correctness of language, which is discussed

under five heads: (i) right use of connecting words; (2) use of special, and not
vague general, terms; (3) avoidance of ambiguity; (4) observance of gender;
(5) correct indication of grammatical number.” (Roberts, 1924, p. xii)

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Thus, Aristotle duly emphasizes on the importance of grammatical precision in good
composition. He further adds that prose style becomes impressive upon heeding to the
following aspects:

1. Using descriptions instead of simple names in general

2. Using names, not descriptions where conciseness is required
3. Using suitable metaphors and epithets for illustrations but not poetical colours
4. Using plural number instead of singular number
5. Avoiding joining of two words with one article when both words need to be treated
separately, i.e., separate articles
6. Using conjunctions and other connective words suitably
7. Describing by means of negation wherever required such as in describing an object by
qualities not possessed by it

It has observed earlier in the present thesis that Bharata Muni too makes a distinction
between verse/ poetry (nibaddha) and prose (cūrṇa) in the Nāṭyaśāstra and lays down
different rules for usage of words concerning these two forms. Further, Bharata Muni has also
discussed aspects of composition (both oral and written) and grammar in significant details.
Of course, the specifics of discussion by Bharata Muni and Aristotle on language and style
will show variance because they take up two altogether different languages for consideration.
None-the-less, in their general overview, they show considerable similarity of thought which
raises the possibility of some common connection between the two ancient languages,
Sanskrit and Greek or perhaps even a common source of origin. As Sir William Jones (1786)
had observed:

“The Sanscrit [sic recte: Sanskrit] language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a

wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the
Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a
stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than
could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no
philologer could examine them all three without believing them to have
sprung from some common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists: there is a
similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the
Gothick and the Celtick, though blended with a very different idiom, had the
same origin with the Sanscrit [sic recte: Sanskrit]; and the old Persian might

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 be added to the same family, if this were the place for discussing any question
concerning the antiquities of Persia.” (Elmes, 1824, pp. 28-29)

Thus, a comparative analysis of the works by Bharata Muni and Aristotle is also likely to be
profitable to researchers of language, particularly in philology, in the future. Coming to the
quality of appropriateness, Aristotle observes that it consists in adapting oneself to ‘the
emotions of the hearers, the character of the speaker and the nature of the subject’ (Roberts,
1924, p. xiii). Bharata Muni too has emphasized much on the importance of
‘appropriateness’, not only in verbal expressions but also in non-verbal forms such as hand
movements, face expressions etc. These have already been discussed.

Aristotle further observes that prose should not be metrical but should contain rhythm and
that the linguistic styles may be either continuous/running or periodic, i.e., marked by pauses.
With regards to periodic style, it is observed that “a period may be defined as a portion of
speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken
in at a glance. It may have one member (clause), or more than one” (Roberts, 1924, p. xiii).
After having discussed a few more concepts related to ‘appropriateness’ such as the use of
smart and popular words, believable representation of actions, taking a context-specific
approach to deciding what is the appropriate style (as in writing, speaking) and superfluous
styles, Aristotle proceeds to discuss the subject-matter of ‘arrangement’.

In the Nāṭyaśāstra, Bharata Muni too observes that ‘words used in prose are neither
schematically combined nor do they have the number of their syllables regulated and they
contain as many syllables as are required to express the meaning in view’ (Ghosh, 1951, p.
256). (N.S., Chapter XV, Verse 37) Further, it is observed that the ‘pause’ should be given
only when an expression gives ‘complete meaning’ (as in the part preceding the pause should
have clarity of meaning on its own). (N.S., Chapter XV, Verse 90) The other aspects such as
using easily understandable words, believable representation of actions, taking a context-
specific approach to communication and the superfluous styles of expression have also been
touched upon by Bharata Muni. Thus, here too we find a similarity of opinions.

With regards to the subject-matter of ‘arrangement’, Aristotle observes that all speeches
essentially consist of two parts: (1) the statement, and (2) the proof. Two more parts may be
added (though not always necessary): (1) an introduction/exordium, and (2) an epilogue.
Aristotle does not seem to give much importance to either the introduction or the epilogue.

451
With regards to ‘introduction’ in prose, Aristotle likens it to the ‘prologue’ in poetry and the
‘prelude’ in music. He further adds that, should an introduction be added, it should hint at the
aim of the speech and serve two purposes:

1. Arousing or allaying the prejudice of the listeners

2. Amplifying or depreciating the upcoming subject matter in question

According to Aristotle, introductions are rarely found (and should preferably be avoided) in
conversations where the listeners are familiar with the subject-matter of discussion. Still, they
may be used in certain cases such as:

1. The speaker’s self-introduction

2. The introduction of the speaker’s opponents
3. Emphasizing on the importance of the subject in discussion
4. Linguistic embellishment

Thereafter, Aristotle briefly goes back to briefly discussing general aspects of rhetoric such as
narration, argumentation, proofs, enthymemes/syllogisms, interrogation and ridicule. The
observations on narration, argumentation, proofs and enthymemes/syllogisms are context-
specific and deal with their usage on various occasions. With regards to Aristotle’s
observations on the usage of interrogation and ridicule, they have been summarized by
Roberts (1924) as follows:

“The best moment to employ interrogation is when your opponent has so

answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in
absurdity. In replying to questions, you must meet them, if they are
ambiguous, by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer. Jests are
supposed to be of some service in controversy. Gorgias said that you should
kill your opponents’ earnestness with jesting and their jesting with
earnestness; in which he was right. Jests have been classified in the Poetics.
Some are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such
as become you. Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery; the ironical
man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to amuse other people.” (Roberts,
1924, p. xv)

452
With regards to ‘epilogue’ in prose, a summarized view of Aristotle’s opinion is hereby
presented vide Roberts (1924):

“Epilogue (Peroration, Conclusion). This has four parts. You must (1) make
the audience well disposed towards yourself and ill disposed towards your
opponent, (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required
kind of emotion in your hearers, and (4) refresh their memories by means of a
recapitulation. In your closing words you may dispense with conjunctions, and
thereby mark the difference between the oration and the peroration: ‘I have
done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your
judgement.’” (Roberts, 1924, p. xv)

Aristotle’s treatment of the subject-matter of ‘arrangement’ is in line with his vision of

‘rhetoric’ being a facilitator of ‘persuasion’. Understandably, he considers ‘statement’ and
‘proof’ to be the fundamental elements of speech while relegating ‘introduction’ and
‘epilogue’ to a nigh dispensable status. Further, the discussions on persuasive elements such
as narration, argumentation, proofs, enthymemes/syllogisms in connection with the
‘arrangement’ with speech show his conviction that ‘arrangement’ must be in sync with the
‘means’ rather than the other way around.

In the Nāṭyaśāstra, we do not come across any specific division of ‘speech parts’. However,
as regards to the construction of the ‘principal communication act’, Bharata Muni does
mention five segments (sandhis) of the plot (Chapter XXI, Verse 36):

1. Mukha: The opening phase

2. Pratimukha: The progression phase
3. Garbha: The development phase
4. Vimarśa: The observation/pause phase
5. Nirvahaṇa: The concluding phase

Each of the plot segments/phases is associated with certain communication instruments

(aṅgas) that are expected to help in the fulfillment of the purpose of the concerned
segment/phase. These have been mentioned in the earlier chapter. Bharata Muni’s exhaustive
treatment on these five sandhis renders it difficult to compare it with Aristotle’s rather over-
simplistic division of ‘speech parts’. None-the-less, some parallels may be drawn. For
instance, ‘introduction’ may correspond to the ‘opening phase’, ‘statement’ and ‘proof’ may

453
correspond to ‘progression, development and observation phases’ while ‘epilogue’ may
correspond to the ‘concluding phase’. However, unlike Aristotle, Bharata Muni does not
consider any of these phases to be optional. Hence, there is also a visible difference in their
respective view-points.

This concludes the present section concerning a comparative observation of certain concepts
in the Rhetoric and the Nāṭyaśāstra. Needless to say, the analysis can hardly be called
exhaustive and a more in-depth analysis of the Rhetoric facilitated by the first-hand
knowledge of the Greek language will surely bring to light more points of similarity and
dissimilarity between these two ancient texts. None-the-less, it appears from the present
overview that the two texts do present some remarkable similarities in the vision of Bharata
Muni and Aristotle accompanied by occasional differences, both obvious and understandable,
to the sensible readers.

Beyond the obvious reasons behind certain differing opinions of Bharata Muni and Aristotle,
such as the linguistic and cultural differences in ancient India and Greece that must have
significantly contributed to the thoughts presented in their respective works, another
important reason is of course the way these two thinkers have perceived ‘communication’.
While Aristotle perceives ‘communication’, more specifically ‘rhetoric’, as a facilitator of
‘persuasion’ and discusses the subject accordingly, Bharata Muni does not appear to have
been bound by any such limitation of having to discuss ‘communication’ specifically in
relation to ‘persuasion’. Rather, ‘communication’ is perceived, as the natural flow of human
thoughts from one sentient being to the other in accordance with the various mental states and
sentiments, by Bharata Muni. Therefore, the Nāṭyaśāstra presents ‘communication’ in all its
shades along its natural course accompanied by its subtle intricacies as though projecting it as
being akin to a majestic river of thoughts with many tributaries and distributaries shaping its
course all along the way.

Another obvious reason of difference is the subject-matter that these two great thinkers
choose for deliberation. Aristotle’s chief concern in the Rhetoric is with ‘speaking’, more
specifically, public speaking (though occasionally he also discusses aspects of writing) which
severely limits the scope of the Rhetoric. Bharata Muni, on the other hand, discusses various
aspects of human communication including the ‘thought processing’ that goes into its
actualisation. Though Aristotle too discusses certain aspects of ‘thought processing’ such as
the fourteen ‘states’ of mind that give rise to different emotions, Bharata Muni’s observations

454
on the subject are far more exhaustive and presented in ample details with suitable
explanations and illustrations.

Last but not the least, the Rhetoric similar to the Poetics, fails to address the subject-matter of
non-verbal communication. But then, this is understandable given Aristotle’s self-proclaimed
focus of discussion in the Rhetoric. The Nāṭyaśāstra, on the other hand, discusses non-verbal
communication in considerable detail with observations on the aṅgas (major limbs), upāṅgas
(minor limbs) and pratyaṅgas (ancillary body parts).

8.6. Summative Recapitulation

In the present chapter, a brief comparison has been made of the observations in the
Nāṭyaśāstra with two ancient Egyptian texts: the ‘Instructions for Kagemni’ and the
‘Instruction of Ptahhotep’ and two ancient Greek texts, the Poetics and the Rhetoric. The
selection of these texts was done based on the possibility of finding communication-related
concepts in them that bear contemporary relevance. The selection now stands substantiated
given that all these texts indeed do offer communication insights to posterity. Initially, the
researcher had envisaged the inclusion of at least one more text from the Indian antiquity
itself for comparison with the Nāṭyaśāstra. But, paucity of time has rendered the researcher
unable to proceed on those lines presently. Hence, such an attempt is reserved for a later time.

From the discussions in the present chapter, we can conclude that while all the concerned
texts offer relevant insights to modern communication scholarship, none but the Nāṭyaśāstra
alone offers comprehensive insights on the intricacies of non-verbal communication. It is not
to be assumed however that the ancient Egyptians and Greeks or for that matter other
civilizations did not recognize the ability of non-verbal communication in conveying
meanings. [Reference to Gruber (1980), Klopper (2005), Calabro (2014), Westhead (2015)]
Yet, it is unfortunate that “most ancient societies have not bequeathed to modern times a
treatise on ritual gestures” (Calabro, 2014, p. 146), let alone a treatise that discusses both
verbal and non-verbal communication together in a comprehensive manner.

In this regard, the Nāṭyaśāstra seems to be the lone exception with its detailed insights on all
possible aspects of human communication, viz., vocal, non-vocal, auxiliary, varied etc. Thus,
prima facie, it seems fair enough to conclude from the preceding discussions that the
Nāṭyaśāstra is the only text available to us today from the ancient age that discusses human
communication in all its totality. I rest my case drawing inspiration from Oliver (1971):

455
 ‘Much undoubtedly remains hidden from so exterior a view as mine, and
much that I have found will appear differently to inquirers having other
backgrounds and interests. My best hope is that this initial effort to discern
and describe communication concepts from different cultures will lead to
further and more definitive investigations.’xv

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(Also the Poetic of Aristotle, Literally Translated, With a Selection of Notes, an
Analysis, and Questions) (Revised Edition). London: Bell & Dalby.
Butcher, S. H. (1895). The Poetics of Aristotle (Translated with a Critical Text). London and
New York: Macmillan and Co.
Bywater, I. (1909). Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (A Revised Text with Critical Introduction,
Translation and Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Calabro, D. (2014). Understanding Ritual Hand Gestures of the Ancient World: Some Basic
Tools. In M. B. Brown, J. M. Bradshaw, S. D. Ricks & J. S. Thompson (Eds.), Ancient
Temple Worship (Proceedings of The Expound Symposium: 14 May 2011) (Temple on
Mount Zion Series 1) (pp. 143-157). Orem, UT: The Interpreter Foundation.
Chaudhury, P. (1953). Studies in Comparative Aesthetics. Visvabharati, Santiniketan:
Santiniketan Press.
Cooper, L. (1913). Aristotle on the Art of Poetry: An Amplified Version with Supplementary
Illustrations for Students of English. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Cooper, L. (1922). An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy with an Adaptation of the Poetics and a
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Cooper, L. (1923). The Poetics of Aristotle: Its Meaning and Influence. Boston,
Massachusetts: Marshall Jones Company.
Cushman, D. P., & Kincaid, D. L. (1987). Introduction and Initial Insights. In D. L. Kincaid
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Elmes, J. (Ed.). (1824). Discourses Delivered Before the Asiatic Society: and Miscellaneous
Papers, on the Religion, Poetry, Literature, Etc. of the Nations of India by Sir William
Jones with an Essay on his Name, Talents, and Character by the Right Hon.
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Freese, J. H. (1926). Aristotle with an English Translation: The “Art” of Rhetoric. London:
William Heinemann.
Fyfe, W. H. (1952). Aristotle’s Art of Poetry: A Greek View of Poetry and Drama with an
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8.8. Further Notes and References

i
The numbering of the verse is in accordance with (Iyer, 1983, p. 326).

ii
The numbering of the verse is in accordance with (Āchārya & Āchārya, 1945, p. 14).

iii
The term ‘mimēsis’, like many words from the Sanskrit language, appears to carry many
connotations. Kenny (2013), ‘after having experimented with several renderings such as
mimicry, copying, portrayal, and imitation finally opts for representation’ (p. xvi). Most other
translators, however, seem to prefer the word ‘imitation’ over ‘representation’ in connection
with ‘mimēsis’. Twining (1789, p. 65) and Heath (1996, p. 3) too translate the word as
‘imitation’. Placed in such a confusing situation, the researcher is forced to go with Whalley
et al. (1997) who simply retain the word ‘mimēsis’ (plural ‘mimēseis’) instead of going for
any translation.

iv
na vedavyavahāro’yaṃ saṃśrāvyaḥ śūdrajātiṣu |
(N.S., Chapter I, Verse 12) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 2)]

v
ebhiḥ śabdavidhānairvistāravyañjanārthasaṃyuktaiḥ |
padabandhāḥ kartavyā vrittanibandhāstu cūrṇā vā || 35 ||
vibhaktyantaṃ padaṃ jñeyaṃ nibaddhaṃ cūrṇameva ca |
tatra cūrṇapadasyeha bahirbodhata lakṣaṇam || 36 ||
-(N.S., Chapter XV, Verses 35-36) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 44)]

vi
vikṛtākārairvākyairaṅgavikārairvikṛtaveṣaiśca |
hāsayati janaṃ yasmāt tasmad jñeyo raso hāsyaḥ || 50 ||
strīnīcaprakṛtāveṣa bhūyiṣṭhaṃ dṛśyate rasaḥ |
ṣaḍ bhedāścāsya vijñeyāstāṃśca vakṣyāmyahaṃ punaḥ || 51 ||
-(N.S., Chapter VI, Verses 50-51) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 86)]

vii
atha vīro nāma uttamaprakṛtirutsāhātmakaḥ |
(Introduction to vīra rasa, NS, Chapter VI) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 88)]

viii
hāsasthāni yāni syuḥ kāryotpannāni nāṭake |

460
uttamādhamamadhyānāmevaṃ tāni prayojayet || 60 ||
evamātmasamutthaṃ ca tathā parasamutthitaṃ |
dvividhastriprakṛtikaḥ ṣaḍbhedo’tha rasaḥ smṛtaḥ || 61 ||
-(N.S., Chapter VI, Verses 60-61) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 87)]

ix
atha vīro nāmottamaprakṛtirutsāhātmakaḥ | sa ca asammohādhyavasāyanayavinayabala-
parākramaśaktipratāpaprabhāvādibhirvibhāvairutpadyate | tasya sthairyaśauryadhairyatyāga-
vaiśāradyādibhiranubhāvairabhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ | sañcāribhāvāścāsya
dhṛtimatigarvavega- ugryāmarṣasmṛtiromāñcādayaḥ |
atrārye bhavataḥ -
utsāhādhyavasāyādaviṣāditvādavismayāmohāt |
vividhādarthaviśeṣādvīraraso nāma sambhavati || 67 ||
sthitidhairyavīryagarvairutsāhaparākramaprabhāvaiśca |
vākyaiścākṣepakṛtairvīrarasaḥ samyagabhineyaḥ || 68 ||
-(N.S., Chapter VI, Verses 67-68) Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 88)]

x
utsāho nāma uttamaprakṛtiḥ | sa cāviṣādaśaktidhairya-śauryādibhirvibhāvairutpadyate |
tasya syairyatyāgārambhavaiśāradyādibhiranubhāvairabhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ |
atra ślokaḥ -
asammohādibhirvyakto vyavasāyanayātmakaḥ |
utsāhastvabhineyo’sāvapramādakriyādibhiḥ || 21 ||
-(N.S., Chapter VI, Verses 21) Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 95)]

xi
naikāntato’tra bhavatāṃ devānāṃ cātra bhāvanam |
trailokyāsyāsya sarvasya nāṭyaṃ bhāvānukīrtanam || 106 ||
-(N.S., Chapter I, Verse 106) [Chowkhamba Edition (Ghosh, 1967, p. 10)]

xii
yauvane sattvajāḥ strīṇāmalaṇkārāstu viṃśatiḥ |
bhāvo hāvaśca helā ca trayastatra śarīrajāḥ || 30 ||
-[(D.R., Chapter II, Verse 30) (Paṇsīkar, 1917, p. 51)]

xiii
By ‘non-rhetorical’ proofs, Aristotle means “such things as are not supplied by the speaker
but are there at the outset witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so
on” (Roberts (1924, p. 6). Such proofs are to be used as they exist.

461
xiv
Prof. Bimal Krishna Matilal passed away untimely in 1991. The book ‘The Character of
Logic in India’ was published posthumously under the editorship of Jonardon Ganeri and
Heeraman Tiwari. The book is a collection of Prof. Matilal’s own works, some published
earlier and some in preparation for the said book itself.

xv
Adapted from (Oliver, 1971, p. ix).

462