Two Different Notions of Value-Form: In Case of Isaac Rubin

January 10 2011

Isaac Rubin’s value-form theory has been so influential in generating one of the most
crucial breaking-throughs in the value controversy during the last thirty years or so. It
expanded the vision of Marx’s value theory beyond Ricardian paradigm to incorporate
important, but largely ignored, issues such as money and exchange. However, the way Rubin
deals with the concept of value-form seems to be problematic. First of all, in Marx there are
two different notions of value-form: i) value-form referring to value itself as a (social) form,
ii) value-form as form of appearance of value. 1 (In order to avoid confusion, in the rest of the
paper I will consistently use value-form for the first and form of value for the second except
when I directly quote Rubin or Marx.)
Marx does not explicitly make a distinction; but from the way he presents it should be
obvious that distinguishing the two is important in grasping Marx’s concept of value in its
totality, and that Marx’s primary emphasis lies in the second notion of value-form, i.e. form
of appearance of value, as the third section of Chapter 1 of Capital I is wholly devoted to it.
However, while acknowledging the existence of the two different meanings of value-form,
Rubin privileges value-form over form of value almost dismissing the importance of the latter
and therefore section 3 of the first chapter of Capital I as well. This biased aspect of Rubin’s
value-form theory is strikingly demonstrated in Chapter 12 of his famous Essays in Marx’s
Labour Theory of Value (Essays hereafter).
Before examining Rubin’s reasoning in the chapter, we briefly discuss the structure of
value concept as presented in Chapter 1 of Capital I as a point of reference.

Marx’s presentation of the structure of value concept in its totality

First of all, Marx’s dialectical method of presentation in Chapter 1 of Capital I consists of
two movements: analytical movement from exchange-value to value and synthetic movement
from value back to exchange-value.2 Analytical movement corresponds to section 1 and 2
where Marx using the power of abstraction derives intrinsic value from analyzing relative

1
See below for more in detail.
M
2
This dialectical method is demonstrated more in detail in Introduction to Grundrisse. This dual
movement corresponds to Hegel’s analytical method and synthetic method.
M
1
exchange-value of commodity; and synthetic movement corresponds to the notorious section
3 where Marx shows how value appears in exchange-value, i.e. its form.
Within this dialectical framework, value concept is presented in three dimensions;
substance, magnitude, and form. First, abstract labour as the substance of value (which
constitutes qualitative analysis) and socially necessary labour time as the magnitude of value
(which constitutes quantitative analysis) are examined independently of its form.3 This is done
in relation to the direct production process in section 1 and 2. 4 Second, the form of value is
analyzed in section 3 investigating the way substance and magnitude of value already
determined in the production sphere are expressed in exchange value through the exchange
process. It should be emphasized here that Marx’s notion of value in its totality is
demonstrated against these three dimensions, i.e. substance, magnitude and form. Lastly,
value is analyzed itself as a form in section 4; form which characterizes all economic
categories such as value, exchange value, price, and capital, etc. as an expression of social
production relation among people. In particular, form is discussed in relation to the
commodity fetishism which is a product of the social structure of the commodity economy.
The fact that value as a form is examined at the last section of the chapter does not
indicate that form aspect of value is not crucial in grasping value in its totality. Rather it is a
more precise reading of Marx to understand ‘value-form as a product of fetishistic structure
of commodity economy’ in section 4 as a presupposition of Marx’s presentation of value in
three dimensions in the previous sections. The structure of value concept presented in the
whole chapter could be succinctly put as follows: Value conceived as a form itself exists in
three dimensions, i.e. substance, magnitude, and form of appearance.
From this way of understanding value concept, it becomes clear that we have two
different value-forms; form of appearance of value and form as value itself. However, as far

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The following statement is important which Marx makes right after he completed analyzing the
substance of value and right before he moves on to analyze the magnitude of value: “The progress of
the investigation will lead us back to exchange-value as the necessary mode of expression, or form of
appearance, of value. For the present, however, we must consider the nature of value independently of
its form of appearance.” (Marx 1976, p.128)
M
4
There seems to be an widely accepted idea among commentators that the initial chapters of Capital I
is mostly confined to the analysis of the sphere of exchange whereas the direct production site comes
into the picture not until the end of Chapter 6 where an attention is called onto the ‘hidden abode of
production’. However, the shift to the back of “this noisy sphere” is made not in order to bring the
production site into the discussion but to reveal the origin of M ; the point is that the production
realm is discussed already in the first chapter as a site of value creation.
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as I know, Marxist literature that deals with the value-form theory seems to be insensitive to
this distinction of the two different meanings of value-form. 5 Two reasons might be
considered: i) One same term Wertform is used for both notions of value-form in Capital I;
the confusion gets worse when we compare this to any English edition where Wertform is
translated into ‘value-form’ at one place and ‘form of value’ at another, inconsistently. ii) A
contextual reading of the passages where Marx uses the term appears to prove that he does
not take the distinction seriously. Rubin notices the distinction but privileges one (value-
form) at the expense of the other (form of value). This is what we problematize in the rest of
the paper.

Rubin’s value-form theory.

Rubin defines value as a (social) form; more precisely, form is identified with function or
property which things acquire in the commodity economy for its social role of mediating and
expressing the production relations among people. This is Rubin’s unique conception of value
as value-form. Throughout the whole Essays, form of value as contrast to value-form barely
receives attention. This bias of Rubin’s value-form theory is most manifestly presented in
Chapter 12 of Essays titled “Content and Form of Value”. There Rubin provides a systematic
annotation on the first chapter of Capital 1 closely following Marx’s logical steps, so the
chapter explicitly shows the theoretical status of the concept of value-form within Rubin’s
framework.
First of all, the chapter begins with commenting on the very first movement from
exchange value to value in the first section of chapter 1 in Capital I, emphasizing that this
movement is devised as a critique of Bailey. From this comment we verify that Rubin has a
clear awareness of the importance of the concept of intrinsic value as opposed to relative
concept of exchange-value and of its regulating law rooted in the production sphere. In
particular, following Marx, Rubin writes that value has to be analyzed ‘independently of’ its
form, exchange-value. Now exchange-value is set aside for a moment, and value in its
substance and magnitude is the sole focus of the analysis just as was the case with Marx as
we have seen above.
Abruptly, however, Rubin, quoting Marx, makes an argument that value concept needs to

5 M Reuten (1993) and Arthur (2004) are two exceptions to my knowledge. Their recognition of the
existence of the two meanings of Wertform and of Marx’s ambiguous usage of the term in Capital is
similar to mine.
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be examined in terms of substance, magnitude, and form. This argument, which by itself is
correct, is ‘abrupt’ since Rubin is currently at the stage of analysis, following Marx’s method
of presentation, where substance and magnitude of value are being analyzed independently of
its form. Rubin himself knows this. So he makes an excuse for bringing ‘the form’ into the
picture already at this too early stage is to overcome the widespread ‘false impression that ….
labour is value.’ (111)6 And he goes on to say that “Labor cannot be identified with value.
Labor is only the substance of value, and in order to obtain value in the full sense of the
word, labor as the substance of value must be treated in its inseparable connection with the
social "value form (Wertform).”” (112) Rubin is right to characterizes the relation between
labour and value as that of expression, i.e. value is a category that expresses labour; thus
value itself should be conceived as form expressing the content, labour. (111-2) From this an
argument is made that value has to be analyzed in terms not only of substance and magnitude
but also of form. However, Rubin is well aware that he has just made a logical step into a
stage of analyzing value independently of its form. Thus he comes up with a strategy to
resolve this dilemma as follows:

In order to include in the concept of value the properties of the social form of the
product of labor and thus show the inadmissibility of identifying the concept of value
with the concept of labor, an identification which was often approached by popular
presentations of Marx … i.e. in order to include the form of value in the concept of
value itself … we have to split [exchange-value] … into two forms: Wertform [value-
form] and Tauschwert [exchange-value]. (115)7

And he defines each of the two forms respectively as:

…the social form which has not yet acquired a concrete form,…. and the form which
already has a concrete and independent form. (116)8

Rubin’s strategy can be summarized into two steps: i) Split exchange-value, which has
been set aside temporarily in order to analyze value in isolation from its form, into value-

6 M As for citation from Rubin’s Essays I will put only pages.

7 M
Wordings are reordered.
8 M
In our terminology, the former would be value-form and the latter the form of value.
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form and the form of value. ii) Bring the former into the scene at the current stage of value
analysis independently of its form, and keep the latter set aside for a little more. To his own
satisfaction, Rubin has safely established the three dimensions of the value concept to be
examined at this too early stage where value is being analyzed independently of exchange-
value or the form of value.
Now since Rubin bases his strategic argument on Marx’s remark that value has to be
analyzed in terms of substance, magnitude, and form, we have to ask which notion of form
Marx is referring to in that remark. It is obvious that Rubin thinks that value-form is being
referred to, not to the form of value. However, this is rather easily disproved from various
pages in Chapter one of Capital I where the form of appearance of value are alluded or
directly mentioned when Marx notes that substance and magnitude of value are to be
analyzed independently of its form.9 Moreover, a philological explanation Rubin gives to
support his own argument rather refutes his case; Rubin first brings up the fact that Marx’s
emphasis on analyzing value in their totality – substance, magnitude, and form – was
repeated several times in the first German edition of Capital I, but was excluded all together
from its second edition. Then, in order to show that the exclusion does not prove that Marx
dropped it, Rubin points out that in the second edition the three-dimension approach to value
concept is reflected in the way Marx organized and titled each section of the first chapter of
Capital I.10 However, notice that Marx’s third section is entirely devoted to an analysis of the
form of value, not to that of the value-form as Rubin seems to wrongly presuppose here.
After all, Rubin was right and was successful in proving the continuing significance of the
three-dimension approach to value in the second German edition; however, the evidence he
provided rather disproves another claim of his that ‘form’ there refers to value-form.
In order to make sense of Rubin and correctly understand his intention, we can conjecture
two possible scenarios which underlie his strategy of splitting exchange-value into value-
form and form of value as follows.

9 M For example, consider the following statement which Marx makes right after he completed
analyzing the substance of value and right before he moves on to analyze the magnitude of value:
“The progress of the investigation will lead us back to exchange-value as the necessary mode of
expression, or form of appearance, of value. For the present, however, we must consider the nature of
value independently of its form of appearance.” (Marx 1976, p.128)
10 M “The first section is titled “Substance of Value and Magnitude of Value”, the third section
“Form of Value or Exchange Value” and the second one is only a supplement to the first section”
(112).
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 Scenario I: Replace the form of value with the value-form and maintain three
dimensionality of value as of magnitude, substance, and value-form.
Scenario II: Add value-form as the fourth dimension into Marx’s three dimensions and
constitute value concept in four dimensions, i.e. magnitude, substance, form of value, value-
form.

Below we will examine these two possible cases and their theoretical consequences.

Scenario I. Replacing form of value with value-form (Value in three dimensions)

First of all, it should be noted that in either case Rubin is well aware of the fact that Marx
is emphasizing the totality of the value concept when he (Marx) states that value should be
conceived in terms of its three dimensions. (112) However, the problem is Rubin takes this
statement of Marx as a support for his reasoning at the stage of value analysis in isolation
from its form. This strongly implies that for Rubin the value concept can be conceived in its
totality without considering the form of value. In terms of the structure of Chapter one of
Capital I, for Rubin the concept of value has been fully grasped already in the first two
sections which correspond to the stage of analysis where Rubin is currently in, i.e. where
value is being examined independently of its form before section 3. The logical conclusion is
that for Rubin Marx’s section 3 is not of necessity in grasping the value concept in its
totality! This is strikingly reflected in the Essays which, proclaiming to be about Marx’s
labour theory of value, has no pages at all devoted to Marx’s section 3, probably the most
important and difficult part of Capital I. Rubin even makes a comment that downplays the
importance of the form of value complaining that in Marx’s analysis in Chapter 1 of Capital I
the form of value overshadowed the value-form. (114)
The intended/unintended result of Rubin’s case is that the form of value is replaced by the
value-form. This result is consistent with the following fact: After having split exchange-
value into value-form and form of value and having included the former into the early stage
of analysis of value concept independently of its form, Rubin never revisits the form of value
which has been left for a later discussion. Remind Marx’s method; the main idea was
‘returning back to its initial stage’ through the ‘round-trip’ movement; the first movement
from exchange-value to value, and the second from value back to exchange-value. However,
as presented in Chapter 12 of the Essays, Rubin does start with exchange-value but he never
returns back to it. Thus, Marx’s section 3 which is about this second movement of ‘returning
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back’ is out of sight in Rubin. Consequently, Rubin’s presentation of value theory lacks what
Marx pointed out as missing in Ricardo, i.e. “any elucidation of the internal connection
between value and the form of value, or exchange-value.”11

Scenario 2. Adding value-form as the fourth dimension (Value in four dimensions)

Rather than taking Rubin to have entirely replaced the form of value with the value-form,
we could think of a more generous interpretation of Rubin. Considering the fundamental
importance of the concept of value as a social form in Marx’s theory which however was
largely ignored within the Marxian tradition, and which is not clearly emphasized enough
even in Marx, Rubin could have felt it necessary to make the value-form more explicit by
adding it as the fourth dimension of value. Marx did devote the last section of Chapter 1 of
Capital I for discussing value conceived as a social form. There it is shown that the concept
of value-form is crucial in grasping the nature of value, especially its mystical character in
relation to the commodity fetishism. In this sense, basically, formulating the value concept in
four dimensions wouldn’t likely to raise a serious objection. 12 But we have to consider the
following point.
If value is conceived in four dimensions instead of three, the topological complexity of
the category of value becomes more manifest. By topological complexity I refer to the fact
that value concept is constituted in double content/form relation; the first content/form
relation between labour and value, and the second between value and exchange-value. Note
that value is a form at one level of abstraction, and content at the other. 13 However, Rubin is
not sensitive to this complexity; he only attends to the first content/form relation and ignores
the second all together. That is, as mentioned above, in Essays there is no account on Marx’s
section 3 which is about the content/form relation between value and exchange-value.
In sum, in either case of scenario I or scenario II, Rubin’s value-form theory is biased in
that it privileges value-form and almost ignores the importance of form of value.

What explains Rubin’s biased value-form theory?

11 M See Marx 1976, p.177. fn.38. Likitkijsomboon (1995: 91) correctly points out that value and
exchange value are collapsed to each other in Rubin.
12 M However, between the following two propositions, the former seems to capture Marx’s value
concept more correctly: i) Value as value-form has three dimensions of substance, magnitude, and
form of value. ii) Value has four dimensions of substance, magnitude, value-form and form of value.
13 M Arthur describes it as “dialectically organized totality”. (Arthur 2004, p.37)
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 The next question that immediately follows is why Rubin in the first place attempted to
include ‘form’ dimension at the too early stage of the analysis where only substance and
magnitude of value are being considered independently of its form, and consequently,
intended or not, replaced ‘the form of appearance of value’ by ‘value as a social form’ even
though he knew so well that both notions of value-form exist in Marx.
Remind that the reason Rubin provides is to refute the widespread misconception that
directly identifies labour and value; he insists that labour and value should be understood in
the content-form relation. Here we have to carefully see what Rubin means by labour as
content (substance) of value. We find a clue in Chapter 13 of Essays titled “Social Labour”.
First of all, the planned economy and the commodity economy are contrasted as follows: in
the former, the central agent “equalizes different forms of labour in advance, comparing them
by means of given measuring units, after which the products of labour are exchanged
proportionally, according to the already measured and equalized quantities of labour which
they contained”, whereas in the latter, “labour could not be accepted as a convenient standard
of value due to the absence of precisely established units of labour with which to measure
various forms of labour different from each other in terms of intensity, qualification, etc.”
(125) That is, the equalization of the products of labour occurs in advance in the planned
economy while in the commodity economy it “takes place in reality every day in the process
of Market exchange.” Notice furthermore that for Rubin the standard of value “which is
indispensible for this equalization” in the commodity economy is money. (125)
In this respect, Rubin blames previous traditional Marxists for i) not understanding this
essential characteristic of the commodity economy as contrast to the planned economy; ii)
thinking that the task of value theory is “to find a standard of value which would make it
possible in practice to compare and measure the quantity of value products in the act of
market exchange; and iii) regarding the labour theory of value as emphasizing “labour
precisely as this practical standard of value.” Then how does Rubin understand Marx’s notion
of labour as substance or “immanent standard” of value? It is claimed that ““immanent
standard” does not … mean the quantity [of labour] as a unit of measure.” (126) Form Rubin
the notion of labour as ‘immanent standard has a very narrow and thin meaning as follows:
“Marx’s statement that labour is an immanent standard of value must be understood only in
the sense that quantitative changes of labour necessary for the production of the product bring
about quantitative changes in the value of the product.” Rubin even expresses his
dissatisfaction with Marx’s usage of the term “immanent standard” as follows: “[Marx’s
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usage of the term] cannot be treated as completely successful, since in a superficial reading
this term makes the reader think mainly about a measure of equalization rather than of causal
analysis of quantitative changes of events.” (126-7)
Such is Rubin’s understanding of the content/form relation between labour and value. It is
problematic in the following sense. Even though Rubin analyzes value based upon labour,
such labour itself as a substance of value is a category established only through the exchange
mechanism; i.e. “labours are equalized through the act of exchange.” Therefore, in Rubin the
equalization of labours does not precede, is not the objective basis of, the equalization of
products of labour, but they take place simultaneously in and through the act of monetary
exchange.
Therefore, for Rubin, the true standard of value is money not labour. Rubin’s mistake here
is to confuse between intrinsic measure (labour) and extrinsic measure (money) of value.
Notice that for Marx the latter is the necessary form of appearance of the former. And an
explanation of why this is so is what Marx’s section 3 is all about. However, for Rubin who
dismisses any theoretical attempts to seek for a unit of measure of value independently of
exchange, and who thus rejects the notion of labour as such unit of measure, it is a
‘necessary’ consequence that there is no logic that proceeds from the intrinsic measure
(labour) to extrinsic measure (money) as is the case in Marx’s section 3. So to speak, there is
no theoretical requirement for the analysis of form of value within Rubin’s system. This
explains why no single page is given to Marx’s section 3 in the whole book of Essays and
thus why Rubin does not pay any attention to the form of value replacing it with the value-
form.

Conclusion: implication for money theory

One fatal result that follows from Rubin’s ignoring the form of value is the arbitrary,
problematic nature of money in Rubin’s system. Notice that Marx demonstrates money as
originating from the dialectical development of value-form from the simplest form to the
most complicated and ‘dazzling’ form of value. Therefore, there can be no adequate theory
on the origin and nature of money without the analysis of value-form of Marx’s section 3.14 In

14 M Likitkijsoomboon demonstrates this point quite clearly. See Likitkijsoomboon 1995, p.79, 82
where he states: “Marx’s theory of money is logically grounded in his theory of labor-value and
value-form.”
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point of fact, there is no systematic account of money in the Essays.15 Nonetheless, some sort
of thesis on money seems to emerge as a necessary byproduct of Rubin’s form-analytic-
approach; i.e. thesis that conceives money as a decisive social institution for overcoming the
atomistic, anarchic nature of private economy by socially validating individual products into
commodity with value. That is, Rubin’s theory of money, if there is one, could be state that
money is a social institution which makes the emergence of value and abstract labour
possible in commodity economy. This theory of money is deficient since here money is not
explained but merely brought from without as contract to Marx’s money theory in section 3.
This has had a lasting effect on the followers of Rubin variously called Rubin School, value-
form interpretation, or sociological paradigmatic approach generating the so-called
circulationist view that conceives value and abstract labour as established through being
exchange with money in the sphere of exchange. This perspective is problematic since it
involves an inverted understanding of the relation of value and price, the latter determining
the former.

Reference

Arthur, Chris 2004, “Money and the Form of Value”, in The Constitution of Capital,
Bellafiore & Taylor (eds).
Likitkijsomboon, P. 1995. “Marxian Theories of Value-Form” Review of Radical Political
Economics 27(2).

15 M This is an interesting point since Rubin has been hailed by value-form tradition as shed light
on the importance of money within the value debate.
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Marx, Karl 1973, Grundrisse, Penguin.
Marx, Karl 1976, Capital Vol.1, Penguin.
Reuten, Geert 1993, “Difficult Labor of a Theory of Social Value: Metaphors and Systematic
Dialectics at the Beginning of Marx’s Capital”, in Marx’s Method in Capital, Moseley
(eds).
Rubin, Isaac 1972 (1928), Essays of Marx’s Labour Theory of Value.

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