Japan and the World Economy

13 (2001) 83±93

Policy Piece
Reforming the Japanese civil service: evaluation
of the Hashimoto Reform, 1996±1997
Kunio Tanigaki*,1
Jingu-mae 5-4-2-104, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150-0001, Japan
Accepted 30 November 2000

Abstract

The Hashimoto Reform of 1996±1997, the largest-scale administrative reform effort in Japan,
was not so much appreciated by the public in Japan. However, it showed signi®cant
accomplishment in solving the traditional problems in the Japanese civil service, and promoted a
more performance-based discussion about its function. But its shortcomings are as instructive as its
success. It failed in improving stubborn sectionalism by averting a drastic reform in the personnel
management system, and lacked a strategy focused on service orientation which is indispensable to
improve accountability of the civil service. # 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Civil service reform; Sectionalism; Accountability

1. A global reform movement in public management and the Japanese civil service

1.1. `European style' and `American style'

Since the 1980s, the reform movement in public management has spread from European
countries to North America. The aggressive style of reform in the UK and New Zealand are
often labeled as the `new public management', aimed at shrinking the size of government
and imposing a market-style discipline on government, and has spread to Australia and
Canada.2
These reforms are in general divided into two or three types. Some scholars distinguish
between the continental western European (including the Nordic countries) type and the
*
Tel.: ‡81-3-5485-0856; fax: ‡81-3-5485-0856.
E-mail address: tokirin@aol.com (K. Tanigaki).
1
Director of Postal Sawing Department, Kinki Bureau of Postal Services and Former Visiting Scholar at
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University.
2
For example, see Kettl (2000), pp. 1±3, OECD (1997), pp. 7±30, and Shirakawa and Fujitsu Soken (1998),
pp. 127±191.

0922-1425/01/$ ± see front matter # 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 9 2 2 - 1 4 2 5 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 6 4 - 5
84 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93

Anglo-Saxon (including the UK and New Zealand) type.3 While the Anglo-Saxon type
adopts a radical reform such as privatization and the use of market-type mechanism, the
Nordic type is reluctant to adopt an impatient privatization method, but seeks ef®ciency
and effectiveness in the long-run management reforms.
Compared with those two European type reforms, that in the US showed remarkably
different responses. The US was a relative latecomer. It was only in 1993, after the Clinton
administration was inaugurated, that the US government initiated a large-scale reform.
Kettl (2000) classi®ed a global reform movement in public management into two models,
namely `Westminster-style reform' shaped by the path-breaking effort of the New Zealand
and the UK government, and `American-style reinvention', which was more incremental
and more sweeping than the Westminster-style reform.4 The characteristics of the
Westminster-style reform are, according to him, demonstrating a cutting-edge approach,
which has spread to other Westminster-style governments, including Australia and Canada.
The New Zealand reforms laid its foundation for changes in budgeting and accounting
tactics, including an output-driven accrual accounting system.
By contrast, the US reform was more politicized. The NPR (the National Performance
Review) is the Clinton±Gore administration's initiative to reform. After the Presidential
Election of 1993, Vice President Al Gore pursued three different reinventions in its ®rst 6
years. Phase I emphasized how the government works and Phase II transferred its goal to
what the government should be doing.5 In Phase III from 1998, NPR put in place ®ve sets of
actions.6

1.2. `Nakasone Reform' and `Hashimoto Reform'

In Japan, on the other hand, there have been many reform efforts since 1946, as many
as 17.7 But despite these efforts, many watchers conclude that the civil service, namely
the Ministries and Agencies, has been successful to protect their power and organiza-
tions against reform attempts from the political side. The most famous reform is that of
1981±1986, which is called `Nakasone Reform' or `Doko-Rincho', named after the
chairman of the `Second Special Administrative Examination Committee'. This com-
mittee proclaimed a small government and had achieved privatization of three public
corporations, namely, National Railway, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, and Japan
Tobacco.

3
See Ferlie et al. (1996), pp. 15±20 and OECD (1997), pp. 27±29.
4
See Kettl (2000), pp. 7±29.
5
See Kamensky (1999).
6
Those were: (1) achieve outcomes no one agency can achieve; (2) agencies use a balanced set of measures;
(3) create an electronic government; (4) transform agencies with the greatest impact on America; (5) mobilize
America's real heroes to get the message out. Kettl points out the problem of Phase III as follows. ``The gap
between megapolitics (especially the broad political battles between the administration and Congress) and
frontline management (especially the experiments managers tried to improve results) had been a problem during
Phases I and II. In Phase III, with more expansive promises and even tougher political battles, the gap threatened
to widen even more.''; see Kettl (2000), p. 19.
7
The large-scale reform had been set up since 1962. The 1962 reform is said to take Hoover Commission
(1947±1949, 1953±1955) in US as its model. See Shirakawa and Fujitsu Soken (1998), pp. 16±25.
 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93 85

However, they stayed within a traditional tactic level. Japan was extremely slow to
recognize the signi®cance of the new public management movement. It was around 1993
that the new paradigm became relatively well known in Japan, and was in 1996 that it
became a visible political issue.
In 1996, the then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto launched a reform of the civil
service (hereafter `Hashimoto Reform'). On 19 November, Mr. Hashimoto had set up the
Administrative Reform Council. This council published two reports in 1 year, namely, the
Interim Report (3 September 1997) and the Final Report (3 December 1997).8 However,
this effort was not welcomed so much by the public. Some were very critical. Why could
not this reform satisfy the public? Is it fair to conclude that the Hashimoto Reform was
unsuccessful like former similar efforts in Japan?

2. The Hashimoto Reform and criticism

2.1. Background

The Hashimoto Reform has three different forces as its backgrounds, namely, economic,
social, and political. Its economic and social backgrounds can be seen in the so-called
`Hashimoto Vision of 1996' of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).9 It contended
necessity of reform of the civil service by two slogans, namely, `Sudden Change of the
Japanese Economy and Social Structure' and `Globalization and Mega-competition'. The
®rst one implies that Japan is facing complex and serious problems along the increase of
social security cost for elderly people, a huge amount of ®nancial de®cit, and a serious
after-effect of bubble burst economy. The second one indicated that with spreading-out of
market economy, ®rms came to expand their business area beyond the national borders to
survive severe competition.
Also, in recent years, inef®ciency and mediocrity of the civil service has become visible,
and there have been a series of government of®cials' scandals.10 Administrative reform has
naturally become one of the main political issues.
But the Hashimoto Reform was most directly and strongly backed by political force, that
was the General Election of October 1996, in which the LDP pledged a large-scale
administrative reform. The LDP has been the dominant political party in Japan and then
headed by the Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. The reality showed that it was a
countermeasure against the then most powerful opposition party, the New Frontier Party,
which announced a large-scale reform of the government in the early stage of the Election,
including the reduction of the number of Ministries and Agencies (from 22 to 10). This
announcement had stimulated other opposite parties, and as a result the administrative

8
The recommendations of the Final Report were enacted by the `Basic Law on Government Agency Reform
of 1998'.
9
For example, see Igarashi and Ogawa (1999), pp. 4±5.
10
For example, in 1996, blood authorized by the Ministry of Health and Welfare proved to be infected with
AIDS virus. Those who used the drug also became infected. After the fact disclosed, two former high officials of
the Ministry were arrested.
86 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93

reform became the largest political issue in the Election. Mr. Hashimoto proposed a half-
reduction of the number of Ministries and Agencies in the central government.11

2.2. Problems and solutions

The Final Report states the philosophy and objectives of the reform to be as follows.12
``To reform a governmental organization that has grown excessively large and rigid, and to
realize a streamlined, ef®cient, and transparent government that permits effective execu-
tion of important state functions.''
This indicates three values that the government ought to possess, namely, ef®ciency,
transparency, and effectiveness. Based on the recognition that the current government
organization has become `excessively large and rigid', it targets a downsizing through
reorganization.
Also, the Final Report showed clearly the reform members' recognition of the
dif®culties of Japanese civil service in the post-World War II period.13 These are: (1)
lack of ¯exibility of policy-drafting divisions which pay too much attention to the existing
interests of each industry; (2) inef®ciency of policy-execution divisions; (3) closed process
of decision-making, lack of policy evaluation and feedback system; (4) weak coordination
among Ministries and Agencies.
Under these recognitions, the Final Report recommended four sets of prescriptions,
namely, (1) reinforcing cabinet functions, (2) a new conceptual framework for central
government Ministries and Agencies, (3) cutting back government functions, increasing
ef®ciency, etc., and (4) reforming the civil service system. However, these proposals faced
severe criticism from the public. According to the public opinion poll of the Nikkei Newspaper
on 9 December 1997, 58 percent of the respondents were not satis®ed with this reform. Also,
the Tokyo Newspaper of 14 December showed 62 percent of respondents did not support it.

2.3. Perspectives of critics

The editorial of the Asahi Newspaper on 4 December showed the typical criticism of
Japanese newspapers against this effort.
```Is it worthwhile to call this a reform?' It is just a merger of Ministries and Agencies,
and a change of names. It would never provide any quality change in the civil service.
Regarding the removal of the monetary policy planning function from the Ministry of
Finance (MOF), no conclusion was reached. The main initiatives in the Interim Report
were ruthlessly smashed including privatization of the Postal Savings and the separation of
the National Tax Administration Agency from MOF.''
Typical criticisms were based on both the process and the results of the reform, and many
of them came from the comparison between the Interim Report and the Final Report. In

11
As a result of the Election, the LDP acquired 239 seats among 500 seats in the House of Representatives,
and the second Hashimoto cabinet was inaugurated under cooperation of the Social Democratic Party and the
New Party Sakigake on 7 November.
12
See the Final Report, I, 2 at Japanese Prime Minister's web site.
13
See the Final Report (Japanese), I, 2.
 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93 87

fact, the Interim Report had provoked a controversy. It proposed a drastic change of the
civil service for the ®rst time, including reducing the number of the Ministries and
ministerial level Agencies from 22 to 13, removing monetary policy planning function
from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and privatizing the Postal Savings Service and the
Postal Insurance Service. The Ministry of Finance was supposed to be the strongest power
in Japanese Ministries and Agencies, and privatizing the Postal Services was regarded as
the largest target of downsizing the government.
But the Final Report, 3 months after the Interim Report, stated that the split of the
Ministry of Finance should be under `further studies', and decided the Postal Services
should be a new type of state-run corporation. Mass media criticized the process of how Mr.
Hashimoto gave up those `main initiatives' after facing heavy resistance from of®cers in
the Ministries and politicians. In this way, the Hashimoto Reform was recognized as a mere
fumbling of the number of Ministries and Agencies, and people were disappointed at the
Prime Minster's leadership that could not accomplish these tasks.14
However, these responses had simpli®ed this reform effort too much. What matters is not
the number of Ministries nor the process of the reform reported by mass media, but the
quality of the civil service such as how the government works better. The reform should be
examined from two perspectives. The ®rst one is, in a domestic context, whether or not this
effort accurately recognized the inherent problems of the Japanese civil service and
proposed right solutions to them. The second perspective is, along with the lessons of
worldwide reform movement in public management, what kinds of prescriptions were
missing in this effort to enhance the quality of the Japanese civil service.

3. Characteristics of the Japanese civil service and the Hashimoto Reform

3.1. Characteristics and problems of the Japanese civil service

3.1.1. Strong influence and centralization

There have been considerable amounts of research on the Japanese civil service. Brie¯y,
the civil service is marked by three characteristics, namely, great in¯uence, strong
sectionalism, and poor accountability.15
First, it is so in¯uential that it is sometimes said to surpass the political power. One
reason is that leaderships of the Prime Minister and political parties have not been so strong
since the Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Constitution (1889) located the Prime Minister as a
head of cabinet members who were on the same level, and these members should be,
respectively, responsible for the support to the Emperor.16

14
Another reason why this reform was unpopular was its bad timing. When Japanese economy was suffering
from serious recession after the bubble burst, such attempt which could lead to shrinking economy was not easy
to be welcomed. It was on the same day when Mr. Hashimoto announced the conclusions of the last intensive
discussion of the Administrative Reform Council (1997), that Japanese mass media reported the bankruptcy of
the Yamaichi Security Company, which lasted 100 years until that time (22 November 1997).
15
For example, see Muramastu (1994) and Konishi (1997).
16
See Konishi (1997), pp. 89±90.
88 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93

After the World War II, the new Constitution adopts the parliamentary system, whose
power is concentrated in a legislature which selects among its members a Prime Minister
and his or her cabinet of®cers. The supreme power should belong to the parliament, and
political parties hold a dominant position. In spite of these changes, however, the Japanese
civil service has still been successful in keeping its power. Konishi (1997) argues that the
General Headquarters of the Occupation Forces (GHQ) were responsible for this. It did not
dismantle the existing civil service system, instead utilized it as if it were branch of®ces.17
Another reason lies in the poor structure for support and assistance to the Prime Minister.
Though, Japanese central government has 23 Ministries and Ministerial level agencies,18
the Prime Minister is directly assisted only by the Prime Minister's Residence. It had
around 60 personnel in 1999 and ®ve special assistants to the Prime Minister. But four of
them are civil professionals, not political appointees. In contrast to the White House and
Executive Of®ce of the President (E.O.P.) in the US, the Japanese Prime Minister does not
receive strong support from these organizations.

3.1.2. Sectionalism
The second characteristic of the Japanese civil service is the strong sectionalism. It
comes partly from poor leadership of the Prime Minister, but owes more to the human
resource management system of the central government. The Japanese civil service has the
National Personnel Authority in the central government, which is responsible for qualify-
ing examination systems of the government of®cials. However, in fact, the National
Personnel Authority does not play a signi®cant role in recruiting new of®cials. It is the
Ministries and Agencies that give interviews to candidates to determine whether the
candidates are suitable or not, and then they adopt them as government of®cials. The
Ministries and Agencies are responsible for human resource management of the of®cials
with whom they have once been af®liated, including their promotions, pension plans, and
even second jobs. Thus, loyalties of government of®cials tend to stay within each Ministry
or Agency, rather than the Prime Minister. Sectionalism usually leads to the so-called
`jurisdiction dispute' among Ministries and Agencies. One of the most famous con¯icts is
the one between the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) over the control of the telecommunications
industry.19

3.1.3. Poor accountability

Thirdly, it lacks accountability, namely, a responsibility to answer to the public. Poor
accountability comes mainly from `ex ante' control system. Usually, government of®cers
pay much attention to the advanced planning, arrangement, and guidance, but pay little to
the outcome. This means poor accountability is partly caused by poor accounting system

17
See Konishi (1997), pp. 92±100.
18
This number includes the Financial Reconstruction Commission.
19
Muramastu (1994) describes the characteristics of the Japanese civil service as `Maximum Mobilization
System'. That is, Japanese Ministries and Agencies have mobilized every resource such as human beings, private
companies, and local government, and forms a kind of network with pressure groups and politicians. See
Muramastu (1994), pp. 24±36.
 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93 89

and poor evaluation of policies. Good examples are seen in the process of the national
budget building. Of®cials in the Ministries and Agencies lend a tremendous amount of
energy to acquiring a larger allocation than the previous year, mobilizing politicians, local
government of®cials, and pressure groups for lobbying. However, they pay less attention to
how it was used or what kind of effects it has provided. Budget once acquired by one
Ministry is regarded as its vested right. Settlement of national account is not given so much
importance, so as a result, the existing budget allocations among the Ministries and
Agencies are rarely altered, even if policy-priorities had been changed.

3.2. Evaluation in a domestic context

The Final Report in the Hashimoto Reform seems to accurately grasp the problems of
the Japanese civil service mentioned above.
First, `poor ¯exibility' is caused by jurisdiction disputes among those of®cials who stick
to keeping interests and competence of their own Ministries. Second, inef®ciency of the
`policy-execution divisions' comes from insuf®cient evaluation capabilities of these
divisions. Third, `poor evaluation' makes the decision-making process more opaque.
Fourth, `weak coordination structure among Ministries' has its origin in poor leadership of
the Prime Minister. These points coincide exactly with two sets of inherent problems of the
Japanese civil service. The ®rst and the fourth points come from the strong sectionalism,
and the second and the third points are concerned with its poor accountability. Its
prescription is, therefore, expected to provide a fair improvement of the traditional
Japanese civil service quality.
However, it has a serious problem. The fundamental cause of sectionalism was not
removed. What maintains the strong sectionalism is not the structure of organization, but
the current personnel management system. Because of®cers are adopted by each Ministry
or Agency, respectively, their loyalties tend to stay within the Ministry or Agency rather
than the Prime Minister. Despite the accurate recognition regarding the problems caused by
sectionalism, the Hashimoto Reform ®nally averted the full reform of the personnel
management system by concluding that it was `primary perspectives and directions'.
Therefore, the Basic Law on Government Agency Reform of 1998 also avoided to
introduce a uni®ed system of personnel management system, stating `further studies
are necessary to introduce (article 48)'.

4. The Hashimoto Reform in a new paradigm

4.1. New public management

Many scholars argued for the availability of strategies in the new reform movement. For
example, Ferlie et al. (1996) classi®ed new public management into four ideal models,
namely, Model 1 (The Ef®ciency Drive), Model 2 (Downsizing and Decentralization),
Model 3 (In Search of Excellence), and Model 4 (Public Service Orientation). Model 1 can
be seen as the earliest model to emerge, dominant throughout the early and mid-1980s, and
the driver of it is often seen as the new Thatcherite political economy. Model 4 can be
90 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93

characterized by such key indicators as a major concern with service quality, re¯ection of
user concerns, values in the management process, etc.20 Also, Borins (1998) picks up ®ve
components of the key ideas of new public management in the Westminster governments,
including high-quality services that citizens value and autonomy of public managers.21
Kettl (2000) summarized these basic strategies and values of a global reform movement
in public management since 1980s into the following six components:22

1. productivity (how can government produce more services with less tax money?);
2. marketization (how can government use market-style incentives to root out the
pathologies of government bureaucracy?);
3. service orientation (how can government better connect with citizens?);
4. decentralization (how can government make programs more responsive and
effective?);
5. policy (how can government improve its capacity to devise and track policy?);
6. accountability for results (how can government improve their ability to deliver what
they promise?).

The Hashimoto Reform has deliberately followed the Westminster style reform stra-
tegies, and fruits of this effort are never small. First, Japanese reform efforts have
consistently sought after enhancement of `productivity' of the civil service. The Hashimoto
Reform was also devoted in this traditional way. The Final Report had recommended the
big reduction of the Ministries and downsizing of the civil service. From 2001, the current
23 Ministries and ministerial level Agencies will be merged into 14.23 Also, it suggested
cutting back the total number of secretariats and bureaus, with the current total of 128 to be
reduced to around 90.
Second, the Hashimoto Reform will promote `market-style management'. It established
the Independent Administrative Corporations and the Postal Public Corporations. Third, it
will improve government's capacity to devise and track `policy' by separating the
government's policy-drafting function from policy-execution function to contribute the
creation of high-level policy planning and drafting capabilities. Ministry's internal bureaus
will give priority to the planning and drafting of policies.
Fourth, it will enhance `accountability' of the civil service by augmenting policy
evaluation. It will convert the traditional policy-making of the government from `ex ante
control' to `ex post review', and government of®cials will focus their decisions much more
on results rather than on processes. In fact, after the Final Report, the Management and
Coordination Agency has decided to establish the `Evaluation Bureau' and the Ministry of
Construction also started to reform the existing evaluation system of public work projects.
Also, as a result of introduction of policy evaluation, government has launched public
accounting rule change. The Ministry of Finance published a balance sheet of National
Account on 10 October 2000 for the ®rst time in its history.

20
See Ferlie et al. (1996), pp. 10±15.
21
See Borins (1998), p. 9.
22
See Kettl (2000), pp. 1±3.
23
This number includes the Finance Agency.
 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93 91

4.2. Reinvention in the US

However, compared with the US reform, the Hashimoto Reform showed a sharp
contrast in its focus notwithstanding that the two reform efforts share similar back-
grounds. In a global reform movement, governments have tried to put citizens ®rst to
make programs more responsive and to recover public trust. The reinvention in the US is
a more thoroughgoing reform effort particularly seeking after the value of service
orientation, and closer decision-makings to the front lines. Its core principles are: (1)
cutting red tape, (2) putting customers ®rst, (3) empowering employees to get results,
and (4) cutting back to basics.24 The NPR regarded citizens as customers and put
customer satisfaction as a key to measure their success. Gore advocated the `Business-
like Government' based on two principles, namely, `focus on customers' and `listen to
workers'.25 `Town Hall Meeting' was an indispensable path to grasp the customer's
needs. It created the `Cross-Agency Taskforces' consisting of 250 career civil servants,
and set up `Hammer Award' to empower the federal employees who had reinvented their
workplace of the government.
By contrast, the Hashimoto Reform gave little attention to the citizens and front-line
workers. Most of its focus was on the Ministries and Agencies and of®cers in the central
government. The Administrative Reform Council consisted of 15 members placing Mr.
Hashimoto as the chairperson, but it did not include any professional civil of®cers, `who
knows government best Ð who knows what works, what does not, and how things ought to
be changed'.26 It spent a lot of time in discussions concerned with reorganization and
downsizing, but little thought was given to the citizens as its customers. In this sense, even
though the Hashimoto Reform tried to introduce the Westminster-style new management,
it lacked one of the most important values that Kettl et al. (1996) pointed as `service
orientation', and therefore, enhancing the accountability is still halfway.
Furthermore, its surprising that the NPR, at least in Phase I, showed genuine
accomplishments in only half a year. The NPR web page boasts, ``Working against a
six-month deadline ensured the work crisp and not over-analyzed.''. By contrast, the
Hashimoto Reform took 1 year to publish the Final Report, and it will take 3 years more
until its recommendations such as establishment of new Ministries and Agencies are
implemented. These are reasons why the Hashimoto Reform could not arouse people's
sympathy.

5. Conclusion Ð critical issues for reforming the Japanese civil service

The Hashimoto Reform is the ®rst effort that tried to adopt a new paradigm of civil
service reform, especially the European-type reform strategies, including results-based
policy evaluation. It is obviously premature to judge this effort as a failure from the
viewpoints based only on reorganization and privatization, or comparison between the

24
See Gore (1993).
25
See Gore (1997), p. 2.
26
Gore, (1993).
92 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93

Interim Report and the Final Report. But its shortcomings are also instructive for the future
reform of the Japanese civil service. First, in a domestic context, the Hashimoto Reform
has failed in reforming the personnel management system that has caused sectionalism.
Second, it lacked the value of `service orientation', which both Ferlie et al. (1996) and
Borins (1998) pointed out as a key component of the new public management. Therefore,
the next step for reforming the Japanese civil service includes two critical strategies.
Firstly, reforming the personnel management system is a core issue for removing the
stubborn sectionalism in the Japanese civil service. That is, the National Personnel
Authority should unify the human resource management, at least of high of®cials (for
example, the upper deputy director level) in the central government. These of®cers should
be collectively recruited and take any position in all Ministries and Agencies as leaders
who do not belong to any speci®c Ministry or Agency. Hereby, it will become easier for the
Prime Minister and cabinet to recover the leadership, and each Ministry would lose its
centripetal force. This could provide huge bene®ts to the government, including a decrease
of sterile jurisdiction disputes among Ministries, and ¯exible and timely appointment of
of®cers into urgent tasks. It would also bring about the nation-level perspectives to the
government of®cials who are now so frustrated by conventional daily works.27
Secondly, new public management is, in a sense, a movement to reform the front lines
where civil service connects to the citizens. It must be the citizens who ultimately evaluate
the performance and credibility of the civil service. The reform of the Japanese civil service
should highlight more improvement of government's service deliveries in its front lines.
Also, policy evaluation does not work enough without program-level evaluations. Ueyama
(1999) argues that the public management should be evaluated on each program-basis, not
on policy-basis, and distinguishes this `performance measurement' from `policy evalua-
tion'.28 In the US, the Congress established the framework of result-oriented public
management as `the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993 (GPRA)'. This law
emphasized initiating program performance as its purpose with a series of pilot projects in
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, and improving
Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on
results, service quality, and customer satisfaction.29 Thus, establishing a program perfor-
mance measurement system (especially in front lines) with an accrual-basis accounting
rule is the key strategy for improving administrative accountability in Japan.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Ryuzo Sato and Professor Rama Ramachandran of the
Center for Japan±US Business and Economic Studies at New York University, and

27
Some people argue that it is not realistic for the National Personnel Authority to handle all government
officials, of which number is over 1 million. But such discussion is meaningless. The number that the Authority
should be responsible of, at best, is 13,000 personnel, because what causes sectionalism are high officials and its
candidates in the central government. See Kawakita (1999), pp. 86±88.
28
See Ueyama (1999), pp. 24±26.
29
The Government Performance and Result Act of 1993, Section 2 (2) Purposes 1 and 2.
 K. Tanigaki / Japan and the World Economy 13 (2001) 83±93 93

Professor Mariko Tanigaki of University of Tokyo for their insightful comments and
suggestions. I would also like to thank Ms. Robin Duffy for her helpful assistance with the
English corrections.

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