Model Building and Deficition of Science GILBERT 1991

You might also like

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 7

JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING VOL. 28, NO. 1, PP.

73-79 (1991)

MODEL BUILDING AND A DEFINITION OF SCIENCE

STEVEN W. GILBERT
Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan 48309-4401

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to introduce a definition of science which may be
useful as an alternative to those which are typically found in the literature, and to
present research indicating its potential effectiveness. Science is a multifaceted activity
which may be operationally defined in a number of ways. It is therefore important for
changes in the goals of science education to be accompanied by a critical reexamination
of current conceptualizations of science. For example, educators have recognized that
an understanding of the nature of science and the knowledge it produces is a necessary
part of science literacy (Clark & Holler, 1986; Fensham, 1983; Miller, 1984; Wagner,
1983). Current operational definitions of science as process may not meet these needs.
Are there alternative definitions which better incorporate both the process of science
and the nature of its product?
One possibility is to define science as a process of constructing predictive conceptual
models. This definition unites both the processes and product of science, and identifies
model building as a superordinate process skill. Within this framework, the purpose
of research is to produce models which represent consistent, predictive relationships.
These models are representations of “target” systems existing in the ambient world.
They are the systems of words, numbers, pictures, programs, actions, and concrete
images that constitute scientific communications (Figure 1). In essence, the definition
includes virtually all of the products of science, is consistent with the expanded
definition of models evident in the literature (see Kuhn, 1970; Lunetta & Hofstein,
1981; Miller, 1978; Stevens & Collins, 1980), and unifies scientific fields which oper-
ate with diverse methodologies.
Any new definition must, of course, be shown to be better in some respect than
those that are currently in use. Some preliminary questions must be answered about
this definition in order to determine whether or not it is likely to be understood and
effective. Do students have enough of a conceptualization of a model for this definition
to have an immediate impact? If so, what is the nature of the potential effect?

0 1991 by the National Association for Research in Science Teaching


Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0022-4308191/010073-07$04.00
14 GILBERT

Data B w e Data tables, dleqrams. plctures, flgures. drawlngs, maps,


graphs, traclnps, rewrdlnps

Rapresentations1 Concrete repllcas, scale models. copies. examples, samples,


demmstratlons, prototypes

Analwua Analqlcal Images, concrete analcques. medlcal lab animals,

Slmulatlon Computer slmulatlons. games, role pls/lnQ. mockups


artiftclal tornados, artlf1ctal earthquakes

Procedural Dlrectlons, systems of rules, executlve systems. schemata,


archetypes. puldellnas, m a t r l m .

Concrptual/thmretlcl Verbal and wrltten descrlptlons, mathematical formulae,


Ideals. standards, predictions, hypotheses, concept networks,
semantlc maps, "Yes" diagrams, outlines, reports.

Fig. 1. Examples of Models in Nominal Classifications

Description of the Study


This study was undertaken to answer two questions related to the educational
effectiveness of the suggested definition: First, what conceptualizations of science and
models do students possess? Second, is there reason to believe that the students'
knowledge of models could transfer in a desirable way to their developing knowledge
of science? To answer these questions, a survey was given to a sample of university
undergraduates. The specific purpose of the survey was to

1. obtain descriptive written responses to six statements describing the nature of


science and scientific knowledge
2. obtain descriptive responses to analogous statements describing the nature of
models and model building
3. identify general patterns in the responses to these statements which might be
of significance to science educators
4. compare beliefs about models and science in order to evaluate the potential
for transfer of significant relationships from one concept to the other.

The subjects were 687 undergraduate students in a lecture-only introductory biology


course at a large public university in the Southwest. The students were on average
19.8 years old; 59% were freshmen. There were approximately equal numbers of males
and females in the classes. Most of the students had an average of 2.4 years of high
MODEL BUILDING 75

school science coursework and were taking their first university science course. Few
intended to pursue a career in science. There was no reason to believe that these
students were not reasonably representative of the student population in general.
Two sets of six statements each were prepared. One set dealt with the nature of
scientific knowledge and research, and the second set dealt with the nature of models
and model building. Each statement in the models set was analogous to a counterpart
in the science set. The science statements were first adapted from the Views ofscience-
Technology-Society(VOSTS) instrument used by Aikenhead, Fleming and Ryan (1987),
and the Nature of Science Knowledge Scale (NSKS) developed by Rubba and Anderson
(1978). Each statement was based on a different assumption about science. The as-
sumptions are that (1) error is an accepted part of research; (2) methodology follows
from the intent of the scientist; (3) the theories and concepts of the various sciences
interact to create a uniform structure; (4) science is intuitive and creative as well as
logical; (5) the views and actions of scientists are influenced by their social environment;
and (6) scientific knowledge is constructed by humans and is, therefore, artificial. The
statements in the science set were then modified to create the analogous set dealing
with models and model building. The 12 statements that make up the two sets are
shown in Table I.
Each statement was printed individually on a half-sheet of paper along with
instructions identical to those used on the VOSTS. Students were first asked to mark
whether they agreed with the statement, disagreed, or couldn’t tell. They were then
asked to provide a reason for their choice by writing a two to five-sentence justification.
Copies of the 12 different instruments were alternately assorted into stacks, so that an
approximately equal number of each of the statements would be given to the students.
The instruments were distributed to the students enrolled in eight different sections
of introductory biology. Each student received one statement, which he or she responded
to in class,. The data were collected on the first day of class. Instructors indicated that
they had not given instruction on the nature of science or scientific knowledge prior
to the administration of this instrument.
There were 42-67 responses collected for each statement. These were read for
their major ideas, and the results were based on the justifications rather than the marked
responses. There were two readings for each statement: The first was to identify the
major ideas, and the second to collect data. An “other” category was created to include
responses which did not indicate clear agreement or disagreement with the statement
as it was presented.
Each justification was unique, and each student responded to only one statement.
Therefore standard indicators of reliability and internal consistency were not used.
The difference in the pattern of responses for each analogous pair of statements was
evaluated for significance using the chi-square test. In addition, the justifications were
examined for qualitative differences, some of which are discussed in the next section.

Results and Discussion


Students substantially disagreed with the idea that scientific knowledge is artificial.
The results are shown in Table I. and does not show nature as it really is. Only three
students ( 5 % ) suggested in their justifications that this statement was correct. On the
other hand, a majority of the students agreed that a model is an artificial representation.
Many of the students who disagreed with the science statement appeared in their
76 GILBERT

TABLE I
Student Responses to Analogous Statements about Science and Model Building

Agree Dlsagree Other


- - -
Statement N n X n X n I g

Scientiflc knowledgs 1sartiflcia1anddoes


not show nature as i t really is 58 3 5 39 67 16 28

A model 01 an object or event I s artiflclal


anddoes not show the object or event as
i t really 1s 56 34 61 9 16 13 23

x2=(2, M= 1 1 4 ) = 4 9 1 , *p' 005

In order to be &cepted. scientlf1C


knowlcrdge must contain noerrors 42 11 26 24 58 7 16

In order to be accepted. a model must


contain nnerrors 67 18 27 41 61 8 12

x2=(2. M= 109)=047. n s

The laws,theories andconcept; of blology,


chemistry and physics interwt wlth a h
other 56 32 57 6 I1 18 32

The m m l s of biology, chemistry and


physlcs interact wlth esch other 65 25 39 6 9 34 52

x2=(2, ki= 1 2 1 ) = 5 I , ns

Wkntlflc work Isa Icqical p r m e s ~rattier


,
thdn intuitive and c r e a t w 54 16 30 31 58 7 12

Building models i s a pracess that i s logical


rather than intuitlve and creative 58 13 22 26 45 19 33

x 1 = ( 2 , .Lj= 1 1 2 ) - 6 1 6 , n s

The mlal environment of a scientlst w l l l


not influence thecontent of the knowledge
he or she proposes 52 6 12 31 60 15 28

The social environment of a model-bullder


w l l l not Influence the content 01the model
which he or she constructs 59 3 5 39 66 17 29

x2=(2, M = 111)= 164, n s

The best scientists w i l l be those who follow


the same scientiflc method, whatever the
problem 57 6 11 45 79 6 10

People who are best at bulldlng models


w l l l use the same approach, whatever the
problem. 58 5 9 21 36 32 55

x2=(2. M- 1 1 5 ) - 2 7 . 5 , * R < 005


MODEL BUILDING 17

justifications to equate the term “artificial” with “false,” rather than with “of human
manufacture.” A similar interpretation did not appear in justifications for the models
statement-an indication of the interactive effects of concepts with each other. The
difference between responses to the science and the model statement was significant
for chi-square test at a level of p < 0.005.
The operational definition of science as model building is intended to help students
understand that knowledge is a human construct, and is therefore artificial. The attribute
of artificiality that students appear to associate with models may help make the distinction
between knowledge and reality. Students do not relate artificiality to the concept of
science, and when they are asked to, they appear to given it a very negative connotation.
On the other hand, the concept of artificiality appears to be perceived more correctly
in a models context.
The second pair of statements in Table I deals with the acceptability of error in
science and model building. The response patterns for each are very similar, and there
is no statistical difference between the groups. Students tend to agree that both scientific
knowledge and models can and will contain errors, although over one-fourth wrote
justifications containing views to the contrary. A review of the justifications indicated
that the primary source of the majority’s agreement was a nonspecific belief that error
is a normal and necessary part of all human activities. This was true for both the
science and models statements.
A majority of the students (57%) agreed that the laws, theories, and concepts of
the academic science disciplines interact with each other, while only 38% of the students
queried stated that the models produced by the various sciences were interactive.
However, in both groups there were only a few students who disagreed with the
respective statements. Many seemed to be confused by the statements, including a
majority (53%) of the students asked about models. Approximately one-fifth of the
students in each group (20% and 22%) wrote that they had not studied enough science
in school to be able to respond to their statement appropriately. This suggests that
traditional academic divisions mitigate against the unity that should characterize science.
Overall, the chi-square test did not indicate a difference between the groups.
Most of the students agreed that scientific research requires intuition and creativity,
as well as logic. It was clear from the justifications, however, that about 30% of the
students regard science as a systematic, linear process. These students tend to equate
fact, research, and logic. Surprisingly, creativity and intuition were acknowledged as
a part of model building by only 45% of the students. Ten percent (10%) believed
that model building was almost entirely logical, while 12% stated that a model was a
replica requiring no creativity to build. One explanation for this pattern of response
is that students have a relatively narrow and stereotypical view of models as three-
dimensional concrete objects constructed for recreation or instruction. It seems clear
that if science is going to be defined as a process of model building, then priority must
be given to expanding the conceptualization of models that most students seem to
hold. Despite the qualitative differences apparent in the justifications, no significant
differences were found in the response patterns of the two groups.
A small majority of students agreed that scientists are influenced by their social
environments. Theirjustifications were, in most cases, based on a superordinate assump-
tion that people in general cannot help but be influenced by their surroundings. Only
a small percentage (12%) of the students felt that scientists were somehow isolated
from such influences. When students were asked whether or not the social environment
78 GILBERT

would influence a model builder, 66% responded affirmatively. Only three individuals
(5%) felt that a model builder is not at all influenced by the environment. The difference
between the groups was not found to be significant.
Primarily because of their belief in the superordinate value of diversity, a majority
(79%) of the students rejected the idea that the best scientists are those that follow the
same scientific method for every problem. The results show that students do not
generally believe that there is one “scientific method” that can be used to solve all
problems. On the other hand, 37% of the students supported the use of a variety of
approaches in building models. A significant minority (25%) felt that a consistent
approach was important to solving a problem, but did not deal directly with model
building in their justifications. This group is primarily responsible for the large number
of responses in the “other” category. Such generalized responses could reflect confusion
about the statement among students operating with a restricted stereotype of a model.
Students who have built models from kits may well believe that there is only one
correct way to build a model, but may also respond in a more “correct” way to the
tone of the statement. While the difference between the groups was significant to the
p < 0.005 level on a chi-square test, the meaning of the difference is not clear.

Summary
Several conclusions are apparent from the discussion. First, it appears that defining
science as a process of model building could promote science literacy in the students
by helping to establish the concept of the artificiality of knowledge. This concept is
based on the constructivist philosophy that knowledge is something that must be built
within the individual mind (Glasersfeld, 1985) and, by extension, in the collective
communications of science and society. While it is not necessary to deny the existence
of reality to accept this philosophy, it is necessary to conceptualize knowledge as an
artifact that can, at best, estimate reality. If it is the goal of the educator to develop
this idea, then a definition of science as model building may be an effective approach
to take.
Second, the value of a models-based definition of science depends heavily upon
a broad conceptualization of a model. Given the importance of models to science, the
development of this understanding is a desirable goal, even if one chooses not to
accept the constructivist philosophy. The importance of models to traditional scientists
is well documented (Black, 1962; Hempel, 1965; Leatherdale, 1974), and thus an
understanding of the nature of models and model building is an integral component
of science literacy. It seems apparent from the results of this survey that a broad
understanding of the concept is lacking among students.
A third conclusion of this research is that the formal organization of science
education into discrete disciplines appears to work against the kind of unitary understand-
ing of science most educators seek. The fact that one-fifth of the students surveyed
could not comment on the unity of science fields and models because they had not
taken enough science supports this conclusion. If unity is a serious goal of science
education, then more needs to be done to integrate the various sciences throughout
the school curriculum. While this recommendation is not new, the findings from this
research support its being acted upon.
Finally, the justifications suggest that these students based at least some of their
judgements about the nature of science and scientists on their understanding of more
MODEL BUILDING 79

general human characteristics and social interactions. They did not appear to strongly
accept the stereotypes of rigid adherence to logic, a single scientific method, or the
social isolation of the scientist. Making an effort to make science and scientists more
familiar and human could help to break down many of the undesirable stereotypes that
are part of our culture.
A major point of this research is that it is important to identify criteria which can
be supported by operational definitions that differ from those in use today. It is also
important to determine what is likely to be achieved by using new definitions. From
the results of this research, it appears that an operational definition of science as the
building of models showing predictive relationships has the potential to promote science
literacy and the achievement of nationally recognized goals.

References
Aikenhead, G., Fleming, R., & Ryan, A. (1987). High school graduates’ beliefs
about science-technology-society. I. Methods and issues in monitoring student views.
Science Education, 71, 145-161.
Black, M. (1962). Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Clark, M. & Holler, L. (1986). Teaching science within the limits of science.
Journal of College Science Teaching, 8 .
Fensham, P. (1983). A research base for new objectives of science teaching.
Science Education, 6 7 , 3-12.
Glasersfeld, E. (1985). Reconstructing the concept of knowledge. Archives de
Psychologie, 55, 91 -101.
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientijc Explanation. New York: The Free Press.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientijc Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Leatherdale, W. (1974). The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in Science.
Oxford: North Holland.
Lunetta, V. & Hofstein, A. (1981). Simulations in science education. Science
Education, 65, 243-252.
Miller, J. (1978). Living Systems. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Miller, R. (1984). Science teaching for the citizen of the future. Science Education,
68, 403-410.
Rubba, P. & Anderson, H. (1978). Development of an instrument to assess secondary
school students’ understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. Science Education,
62, 449-458.
Stevens, R. & Collins, A. (1980). Multiple conceptual models of a complex
system. In R. Snow, P-A Federico, & W. Montage, Eds., Aptitude, Learning and
Instruction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Vol. 2.
Wagner, P. (1983). The nature of paradigmatic shifts and the goals of science
education. Science Education, 6 7 , 605-613.

Manuscript accepted August 1, 1990.

You might also like