Pacete vs Carriaga

231 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her former husband
Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property.  She averred in her complaint that she was
married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979.  Reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue
living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an

extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the
date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the
court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March
17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file their
answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of
Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of
Pacete to Clarita.

HELD:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.  In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take
care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract. 

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is

further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18
of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.  Therefore, “if
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.”

On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a

complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), 

The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979.

They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November
1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. On 18
December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a
second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20
December 1979.

On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for
twenty (20) days to be counted from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January
1980. The Order of the court was mailed to defendants' counsel on 11
January 1980. Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05
February 1980, again filed another motion (dated 18 January 1980) for an
extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day
period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following
day, or on 06 February 1980, the court denied this last motion on the
ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first
extension had expired."1

The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default,

which the court forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to
present her evidence.2 The court received plaintiff's evidence during the
hearings held on 15, 20, 21 and 22 February 1980.

Macadangdang vs CA
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio

Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two
years and had 6 children.  They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari
store in Davao City.  Through hard work and good fortune, their business
grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and
corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc.  Their relationship
became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations.  Married
life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent
left for Cebu for good.  When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of
the illicit affairs of her estranged husband.  She then decided to take the
initial action.  In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal

separation has effect on the legal separation.

HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect
on the legal separation.  When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the
separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to
a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property,
have not yet been commenced nor terminated.   

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on
the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate
succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining
properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final

decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code
provides the effects of the decree of legal separation.  These legal effects
ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the
judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the
share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.