Natural Hazards 28: 211–228, 2003.

211
© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Disaster Management and Community Planning,

and Public Participation: How to Achieve
Sustainable Hazard Mitigation

LAURIE PEARCE
University of British Columbia, 5750 Indian River Drive, North Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada V7G 1L3, E-Mail: LauriePearce@shaw.ca

(Received: 7 July 2001, accepted in final form: 19 March 2002)

Abstract. The paper offers first a brief historical overview of disaster management planning. Second,
it reviews Australian and American research findings and show that they urge the field of disaster
management to shift its focus from response and recovery to sustainable hazard mitigation. It is
argued that in order for this shift to occur, it is necessary to integrate disaster management and
community planning. Current practice seldom reflects such a synthesis, and this is one of the reasons
why hazard awareness is absent from local decision-making processes. Third, it is asserted that if
mitigative strategies are to be successfully implemented, then the disaster management process must
incorporate public participation at the local decision-making level. The paper concludes with a case
study of California’s Portola Valley, which demonstrates that when public participation is integ-
rated into disaster management planning and community planning, the result is sustainable hazard
mitigation.

Key words: public participation, community planning, sustainable hazard mitigation, disaster man-
agement planning.

1. Historical Overview of Disaster Management Planning

Historically, disaster management planning in North America has been viewed
from a para-military perspective (Scanlon, 1982); that is, it has been conducted
for, not with, the community (Laughy, 1991).
The field of disaster management
originated during the Cold War, when planning for nuclear war and the building
of bomb shelters was encouraged. Once the threat of nuclear war ebbed, concern
turned towards responding to natural disasters. Interestingly, Drabek (1991) points
out that in the United States disaster management planning is based on civil de-
fence and natural disaster responses as well as on behavioural science research.
Nevertheless, as Petak (1985, p. 3) notes, “public administration, as a discipline,
has generally neglected to consider emergency management within the mainstream
of its activities.” According to Aguirre (1994, p. 3), “it is very seldom that local

Unless otherwise stated, I use the term “community” to mean “all the people living in a specific
locality” (Oxford Canadian Dictionary).
212 LAURIE PEARCE

governments attempt to educate the public to the hazards that threaten them.” This
is true despite the fact that surveys indicate that the public would welcome such
efforts (Drabek, 1986, p. 23).
Not surprisingly, there appears to be a relationship between the degree to which
communities accept disaster management planning and the degree to which they
experience disasters: the greater the exposure to disasters, the greater the interest in
disaster management (Drabek, 1986). If one were to designate those areas with the
strongest community-based disaster management plans, they would undoubtedly
be those with full-time emergency coordinators. As Kreps (1991) found, whether
or not a community has an effective emergency management department depends,
to a large extent, on the credibility given to it by local government officials (Kreps,
1991, p. 48). He concludes that there is no current work, either in Canada or the
United States, that exhibits a comprehensive understanding of local government
emergency management strategies and their effectiveness.
Rubin (1991, p. 240) observes that community members are becoming increas-
ingly frustrated not only with being excluded from the decision-making processes
involved in community planning, but also with being excluded from those involved
in disaster management planning. Fortunately, public participation is gradually
becoming an accepted part of the disaster management process. One example of
this has swept up the Pacific coast from California to Canada and involves the
push to develop neighbourhood emergency programs. These programs (e.g. the
Home Emergency Response Organization System [HEROS] in Coquitlam, British
Columbia) entail recruiting a leader and volunteers from each neighbourhood.
Their tasks are: (1) to complete a neighbourhood inventory of equipment (e.g.
chainsaws) and skills (e.g. nursing) that could be useful during and after a disaster;
(2) to develop a list of special-needs situations (e.g. elderly people living alone);
and (3) to arrange for local stockpiling of medical supplies, food and water. In
return, the community provides basic emergency training, basic Search and Rescue
(SAR) training first-aid training, and financial assistance with regard to equipment
costs.
Similarly, in Australia recent findings suggest that disaster management is shift-
ing its focus from response and recovery issues to mitigation issues (although not
much has been done in terms of developing recovery plans) – a shift that involves a
viable role for public participation. The Australia/New Zealand Risk Management
Standard (Australia and New Zealand Standards Associations, 1995, p. 360) states
that “risk management is a framework for the systematic application of manage-
ment policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, analyzing, eval-
uating, treating and monitoring risk.” It is recognized that while a top-down policy
is needed, it is really the local-level bottom-up policy that provides the impetus for
the implementation of mitigation strategies and a successful disaster management
process. Salter (cited in Disaster Preparedness Resources Centre, 1998, p. 179)
summarizes the shift in disaster management as follows (Figure 1):
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 213
From To
· Hazards → · Vulnerability
· Reactive → · Proactive
· Single Agency → · Partnerships
· Science Driven → · Multidisciplinary Approach
· Response Management → · Risk Management
· Planning for Communities → · Planning with Communities
· Communicating to Communities → · Communicating with Communities
Figure 1. The shift in disaster management strategies.

There are several interesting aspects to this shift in disaster management plan-
ning. First, it takes the focus away from specific hazards and incorporates general
vulnerabilities into the disaster management process. While these vulnerabilities
include property concerns (e.g. poorly constructed buildings), they also include
concerns about people living in the community. Second, the shift from reactive
to proactive measures moves disaster management from a focus on response and
recovery activities to a focus on community planning (e.g. land-use policies, flood-
plain management, etc.). Third, this multidisciplinary approach to disaster manage-
ment recognizes the many interests that exist in the community, and by striving to
create partnerships, attempts to balance competing interests while working towards
common goals. Fourth, emphasis on working and relating with communities puts
a strong onus on disaster managers and community planners to involve the public
in their planning.
The work in Australia and New Zealand parallels the recent work completed by
hazards experts and researchers for the second Reassessment of Natural Hazards
in the United States, summarized by Mileti (1999). In the mid 1990s many top
U.S. hazards experts met and collaborated on this work, which was completed in
1998. Based on its findings, Mileti (1999, p. 2) concludes that, if we are to ensure
“sustainable hazard mitigation,” then disaster management planning must shift its
focus from response and recovery, which means that it must take into account
both community planning and public participation. He argues that sustainable haz-
ard mitigation requires: (1) maintaining and enhancing environmental quality (i.e.
human activities should not reduce the carrying capacity of the ecosystem), (2)
maintaining and enhancing people’s quality of life, (3) fostering local resilience
and responsibility, (4) recognizing that vibrant local economies are essential, (5)
ensuring inter- and intra-generational equity (i.e. not destroying a future genera-
tion’s opportunity by allowing the present generation to exhaust resources), and
(6) adopting local consensus building.
Godschalk et al. (1998) are very clear about the need to complete hazard, risk
and vulnerability analyses before attempting to integrate sustainable hazard mit-
igation and community planning. They believe that while state and federal gov-
ernments and agencies have a role to play in establishing mitigation policies, it is
up to local communities to initiate and implement those policies that will lead to
214 LAURIE PEARCE

the adoption of mitigative strategies. Given the obvious links between sustainable
hazard mitigation and community planning, it behooves us to address the links
between the latter and disaster management planning.

2. Integrating Disaster Management Planning and Community Planning

Community planning and disaster management planning are rooted in very dif-
ferent ideologies, although they do share some common features: both have been
conducted in isolation from the community; both are concerned with the physical
community (e.g. buildings, infrastructure, etc.) as well as the human community;
both are based in local government; and both take a predictive approach to plan-
ning. They differ in that community planning has a long academic heritage and
is rich in theory and design, is long range, is comprehensive, and has often been
criticized for being overly optimistic “both about our analytical capabilities and
about the altruism of community members” (Hodge, 1991, p. 182). Disaster man-
agement planning, on the other hand, has only emerged since the mid-1950s and
has often been seen as a second career for retired police officers and members
of the military. It is only very recently that academic institutions have begun to
offer degrees in this field. Disaster management has tended to be concerned with
the short-term situation (e.g. rebuilding damaged homes in flood plains), to have a
narrow focus, and to be pessimistic. For example, in many cases disaster managers
have unrealistically focused on worst-case scenarios such as the nuclear bomb that
destroys entire countries.
Both community planning and disaster management planning can make im-
portant contributions to community safety, thus it is quite surprising that the two
disciplines are not more highly integrated. According to Myers (1997, p. 1):
People who work to manage natural hazards must repackage themselves and
what they know from the local community’s viewpoint, across adjustments
and across hazards, but in context of non-hazards community goals. Our re-
search is telling us that local stakeholders’ capacity to manage their own
environment, resources, and hazards must be increased, and that it is the locals
who must decide what they are willing to lose in future disasters.
As catastrophic losses from disasters mount, previous disaster management
strategies are seen to be ineffective. Change seems inevitable, and the trend is
clear: ensure more community involvement, ensure basic responsibility at the local
level and ensure that there are links between disaster management planning and
community planning. On a practical level, the links between disaster management
planning and community planning seem abundant. Indeed, they may lead to zon-
ing bylaws to avoid high-risk areas, building codes to reduce the consequences
of hazards, mitigation strategies to offset the potential of hazards and so on. Yet,
traditionally disaster management planning and community planning have not been
linked. Why not?
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 215

To begin with, disaster managers and community planners come from very dif-
ferent backgrounds, the former being comfortable with phrases such as “command
and control,” “incident command system,” “emergency responders,” and “aid to
the civil power,” and the latter being more familiar with phrases such as “not in
my backyard (NIMBY)”, “community empowerment,” ’special interest groups,”
and “public forums.” Furthermore, disaster managers see things differently than do
community planners. For example, to local community planners, the gentrification
of older unreinforced masonry buildings represents an opportunity to preserve local
history and culture as well as to bring in tourist dollars; to disaster managers,
these edifices represent collapsed buildings during an earthquake. However, des-
pite their different orientations and backgrounds, both community planners and
disaster managers have similar goals: to make the community as safe and as secure
as possible while maintaining its cultural heritage and maximizing the quality of
human life.
In looking at the relationship between disaster management planning and com-
munity planning, we need to consider two kinds of phenomena: (1) those planning
activities that occur before the disaster, and (2) those that occur during or after the
disaster. Mitigation activities occur in all phases of disaster management and are
usually conducive to cooperation and coordination between the disaster manager
and the community planner. For example, most communities have official plans
that plot their progress and future development. Discussions around these plans
should include the local disaster manager as well as community planners. New
developments should not be built without considering both existing and potential
hazards and risks. This is especially important with regard to schools, hospitals
and other critical facilities. As communities retrofit existing infrastructure, disaster
managers as well as community planners should be directly involved in discussions
and decision making.
When a community has not been included in the policy and decision-making
processes, in post-disaster situations it often finds itself caught between contrasting
philosophies. For example, some people will want the community to return to pre-
disaster conditions, while others will want to take the opportunity to pursue various
other planning goals (Central United States Earthquake Consortium, 1993, p. 44).
The challenge, therefore, is twofold: (1) to integrate the processes of community
planning and disaster management planning so that both are working towards the
same goals, and (2) to encourage a high degree of community participation. Con-
sider the following principles, which are cited in Australia’s Safe Community
Program (Salter, cited in Disaster Preparedness Resources Centre, 1998, p. 127):
• Listen to the community – let them define what they believe are the most
important problems;
• Mobilize all members of a community creatively;
• Coordinate efforts at a regional level;
• Raise public awareness of the importance of managing risk; and
• Ensure that powerful interest groups support the community efforts.
216 LAURIE PEARCE

The above principles are representative of the social mobilization tradition within
community planning (Friedmann, 1992): people in their own communities have
to take their destiny into their own hands; the community should determine its
own future; individual and collective needs must be balanced; and there must be a
move towards self-reliance. As is evident, both this particular community planning
tradition and the disaster management tradition espoused in the Safe Community
Program stress the importance of public participation.
Godschalk et al. (1998), in presenting four community planning options, offer
an excellent framework for sustainable hazard mitigation. Their four options con-
cern: (1) stakeholder participation, (2) planning components, (3) plan types and
(4) mitigation strategy. The first option involves the degree to which community
help and support is enlisted in formulating and implementing the mitigation plan.
The second option integrates the hazard, risk and vulnerability assessment into
community values and is then used to formulate policy and planning actions in
order to meet community expectations. The third option involves deciding whether
or not the sustainable hazard mitigation plan should be fully integrated with the
community development plan. (In all but a few situations, Godschalk et al. (1998)
strongly advocate incorporating the two plans.) The final option – determining
which mitigation strategy the community chooses – involves answering the follow-
ing questions: (1) what is the degree of cooperation? (2) which local authority will
take the lead role? (3) how will the strategy affect current development as opposed
to future development? (4) to what degree will hazards be controlled and how will
this be affected by human behaviour? (5) what will be the emphasis on pre-disaster
as opposed to post- disaster activities? and (6) to what degree will outside partners
be involved? Godschalk et al. suggest that the results of an adequate hazard, risk
and vulnerability analysis may well determine the mitigation strategy that the com-
munity finally adopts. However, a great deal of the impetus for adopting these four
options will depend on the degree of community support.

3. Why Include the Public

If community planners and disaster managers ignore the local community, then
they decrease their chance of providing reasonable solutions to disaster-related
problems. As Britton (1989, p. 17) points out, following a cyclone in Darwin,
Australia, there was “a rift between the public and the planners, and the destruction
of public confidence contributed significantly to the failure of the planners to bring
about changes in land use that were desirable . . . By 1977, as reconstruction neared
completion, land use change in Darwin had, if anything, reinforced the pre-cyclone
trends which the planners had tried to halt.”
For too long officials have not wanted to reveal hazards and risks to their re-
spective communities, fearing that panic would prevail or that people would flee.
Yet, the widespread success of HEROS, and other similar neighbourhood pro-
grams, discussed earlier in this paper, demonstrate the contrary. Community mem-
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 217

bers have the right to know and to understand what hazards to expect, and they
also have the right to participate in making difficult decisions. According to the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1995, p. 37), all
disaster research in the past decade has clearly indicated that community members
in disaster-stricken areas already knew of both the risks and (for the most part) the
remedies: “The gap has been in the political will to apply remedies prior to full-
scale disaster and to commit resources to this vital developmental need rather than,
for example, to the building up of a sophisticated armoury.”
In order for community members to influence politicians, they need to have
access to the information essential to rational decision making. As the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1995, p. 37) points out, the
public’s right to information is a fundamental feature of democracy and is essential
to disaster preparedness: “Once people have access to information as a right –
not just from their country’s government, local authorities, companies and interest
groups, but also from international organizations and aid agencies, they can then
plan for themselves, make informed choices, and act to reduce their vulnerability.”
Of course a community is not monolithic, and, as Boothroyd and Anderson (1983,
p. 6) discuss, those involved in social planning must continuously address the ques-
tion: “planning for whom?” For if the differences within any given community are
not addressed prior to a disaster, then typically they hamper recovery efforts.
When the public is not involved in the disaster management process, it often,
not surprisingly, challenges the decisions and actions of those in command. The
following quote regarding the Italian Mezzogiorno earthquake in November 1980
exemplifies what may happen when a community is left out of the post-disaster
planning process.

And in Calitiri, a town of 3,400 persons, an old man politely stopped a convoy
of vans that had arrived to take villagers out of the storm-battered highlands
and to hotels along the Amalfi coast. “You are a good and capable man, but
don’t come again,” the old man said to the young police captain who was in
charge of the relocation job. “This is where we lived, and this is where we
want to die” (Ward, 1989, p. 281).

The disadvantaged (e.g. the poor, the sick, the marginalized) need to be able to
gain access to information about, and to have a say in the development of, mitig-
ative strategies. For example, as Bolin (1993, pp. 45–46) points out with regard to
the earthquake in Whittier Narrows, a suburb of Los Angeles, the construction that
followed it resulted in reduced low-rent housing and increased rents in commercial
buildings. Because of a twenty-one-month delay in completing the comprehensive
reconstruction plans (it took the city government seventeen months to appoint a
consulting firm to prepare a plan for the uptown area), the Whittier Narrows’ Earth-
quake Relief Fund ($420,000), originally intended to provide relief to all victims,
ended up going exclusively towards grants for small businesses that agreed to stay
in the uptown area.
218 LAURIE PEARCE

In post-disaster situations, the poor and visible minorities are always the most
affected and constitute the majority of those who need alternate housing, coun-
selling and other social services. This is true in both developed countries and in
developing countries. The poor and the disenfranchised must not be overlooked in
disaster planning activities – especially today, when “the ability of local groups
to respond to crisis and the more chronic problems of vulnerability is becoming
increasingly important as the traditional welfare net provided by governments is
being eroded in almost all countries of the world” (International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1995, p. 16).

4. How to Ensure Public Participation

Of course, in spite of its importance with regard to sustainable hazard mitigation, it
is not always easy to integrate public participation and disaster management. With
this in mind, Lash (1995, p. 82) cites the US Environmental Protection Agency’s
1990 Scientific Advisory Board, whose objectives for public advisory committees
involved “help[ing] educate the public about the technical aspects of environmental
risks, and help[ing] educate the government about the subjective values that the
public attaches to such risks.” In other words, how citizens are invited to particip-
ate in disaster management is critical to the success of that participation. Recent
work by Dorcey and McDaniels (1999), while focusing on public participation in
Canadian environmental issues, has much to offer in terms of public participation
in hazard mitigation. After all, both environmental risk management and hazard
mitigation deal with complex issues concerning risk, and both concern themselves
with sustainable development. Using British Columbia as an example, Dorcey and
McDaniels document the plethora of multi-stakeholder consensus processes that
proliferated in the early 1990s; however, by the mid 1990s enthusiasm had waned,
and many processes ceased operating as funding dwindled and stakeholders (in-
cluding governments) became fatigued by, and disenchanted with, the process. In
many cases, public participation was seen to contribute to the problem rather than
to aid in the solution. For example, some studies were “. . . seen by some as unpro-
ductive in resolving issues and too time consuming and costly. The experiments
with public involvement were criticized for delaying the process, overemphasiz-
ing the interests of the active publics, and usurping the role of elected officials.
There were commonly delays of up to two years in responding to recommenda-
tions, which frustrated the heightened expectations that had been created by public
involvement and sometimes meant that the recommendations were overtaken by
events” (Dorcey and McDaniels, 1999, p. 13).


Dorcey and McDaniels (1999, p. 6) use the term “citizen involvement” to mean “processes
for the involvement of citizens in advising and making decisions on matters under government
authority, that augment or supplant decision making through established channels of representative
government.” It encompasses such phrases as “public participation,” ’stakeholder involvement” and
other similar terms.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 219

Nonetheless, Dorcey and McDaniels (1999) point out that, while the need for
public participation was queried in the 1980s and 1990s, in the twenty-first century
the question is not “if” public participation should be utilized but “how.” They
argue that there has been a general shift, at least in principle, from a managerial per-
spective (which trusts elected officials and administrators to act in the public good)
to a pluralist perspective (which views government as an arbitrator among various
organized interest groups). Citizens have become increasingly interested in a popu-
lar perspective (which calls for the direct participation of citizens, rather than their
representatives, in making policy). Thomas (1995) sees the increased education of
citizens as a root cause of this shift. Accompanying this change in perspective has
been an increasing interest in applying negotiation, facilitation and mediation tech-
niques to the public participation process. There has also been increasing interest
in co-management,

which displays a move towards a related perspective – the
shared power perspective – which is based on citizen empowerment. According to
Dorcey and McDaniels (1999, p. 23):

Participation in voluntary associations, embodying norms of trust, reciprocity,

tolerance, and inclusion, and activating networks of public communication,
are believed to build and maintain the social capital upon which the vitality of
the governance system and sustainable development are dependent.

Providing citizens with information is of course essential, but it is not suffi-

cient. Many communities have available, and even distribute, an assortment of
brochures and pamphlets. However, regardless of whether or not this material is
read (never mind implemented), communities must do more to ensure that their
residents become an integral part of their disaster management processes. Posting
notices for opportunities to participate is important, but unless emergency planners
make active efforts to directly involve community residents in the planning process,
these opportunities may be ignored.
What can be done about the difficulty of getting disaster management programs
established and getting local governments to recognize their importance? I would
suggest that rather than asking ourselves how community participation can become
an effective process within disaster management, we should be assuming that com-
munity participation will ensure that disaster management will become an effective
process within the community. According to Berke and French (1994, p. 247),
high levels of government must dedicate themselves to encouraging community
commitment to disaster planning. This dedication may manifest itself through edu-
cation and consensus-building processes that heighten citizen ownership of any
given disaster management plan. For example, Beatley and Berke (1993) discuss


The National Round Table of the Environment and the Economy, 1998, (cited in Dorcey and
McDaniels, 1999) adopted the following definition of co-management: “co-management is a sys-
tem that enables a sharing of decision making power, responsibility, and risk between governments
and stakeholders, including but not limited to resources users, environmental interests, experts, and
wealth generators.”
220 LAURIE PEARCE

the progress made in Charleston, South Carolina, which has held a number of pro-
fessional workshops and community information forums, and which is also home
to such educational groups as the Earthquake Education Center at Baptist College.
Experts, community officials, and elected representatives have to ensure that com-
munity planning processes are designed to “allow the integration of specialized
technical and abstract knowledge with local concrete knowledge and feelings . . . ”
(Boothroyd and Anderson, 1983, p. 11).
The British Columbia Round Table produced a report that suggested that public
participation needed to be used more effectively than is now the case and that
consensus-based multi- stakeholder approaches to hazard mitigation should not
be used in every case (Dorcey, cited in Dorcey and McDaniels, 1999). Clearly
many stakeholders have an interest in sustainable hazard mitigation, but does this
mean that it is always appropriate to use a consensus-based approach? Dorcey and
McDaniels (1999, p. 31) argue that many of the difficulties in applying consensus-
based approaches to mitigation occur when participants expect to be empowered
to make decisions and then are disappointed. They argue that it is essential that
stakeholders understand that their task is to make recommendations. If risk man-
agement is defined as the process by which stakeholders can translate findings
into recommendations for action, and by which they can provide information to
communities so that they may forestall disaster through the implementation of
effective mitigation strategies, then I would argue that, although a consensus-based
approach to sustainable hazard mitigation is always desirable, it may not always be
possible.
In order to decide when a consensus-based approach to public participation
should be used, Dorcey and McDaniels (1999) refer to the contingent approach
developed by Thomas (1995), based on the work of Vroom and Yetton (1973)
and Vroom and Jago (1988). Thomas argues that dealing effectively with public
issues amounts to attaining a balance between “quality” and “acceptability”. His
“Effective Decision Model” (Thomas, 1995, p. 38) provides the disaster manager
with a series of questions that need to be asked in order to identify which of
five basic approaches to public participation – autonomous managerial decision,
modified autonomous managerial decision, segmented public consultation, unitary
public consultation and public decision – best suits the issue at hand (Figure 2).
Thomas presents a number of ways of involving the public in the decision-
making process, and depending upon the degree of public involvement, different
implementation methods (e.g, public meetings, surveys, etc.) will be appropri-
ate. Although it is not always possible to use advisory committees (as will be
discussed below), many communities find that they can be useful. According to
Thomas, an advisory committee can be composed of “representatives from inter-
ested groups, including business, labor unions, and agency staff as well as cit-
izen groups” (Thomas, 1995, p. 125). The committee typically holds a series of
meetings and hearings involving experts and policy makers on the one hand, and
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 221

Figure 2. The Effective Decision Model of public involvement. Source: After Thomas (1995,
p. 74).

selected members of the public and interest groups on the other (Keeney et al.,
1990, p. 1013).
Thomas’s findings suggest that the use of an advisory committee has several
advantages: (1) when there are multi-stakeholders involved, it may be easier to
reach consensus through an advisory committee than through a public meeting; (2)
the honour of membership encourages participants to think on behalf of the entire
community rather than on behalf of their own special interest group; and (3) it can
serve as an important vehicle for building public acceptance. While the use of an
advisory committee may be appropriate for communities that contain a number of
interested individuals and groups, it may not be appropriate for very small com-
munities where there is little public interest in disaster management. In yet other
communities, particularly those that have recently had a disaster, there may be large
numbers of stakeholders who have an interest in participating in the sustainable
hazard mitigation process. In this case, additional implementation methods (e.g.
public hearings) may be required to supplement the advisory committee.
222 LAURIE PEARCE

Choosing the best way to involve members of the public is therefore critical
and will, as Aguirre (1994, p. 5) indicates, involve instilling in them a sense of
individual responsibility vis-à-vis disaster preparedness. As Salter (cited in Dis-
aster Preparedness Resources Centre, 1998, p. 127) posits, “the community that
has established capabilities for building relationships, organizing community in-
tervention, and achieving results has taken the valuable first steps for becoming a
Safe Community.”
I now offer an example of what can happen when community planning and
disaster management are fully integrated, and when public participation is given a
crucial place in this process.

5. The Portola Valley: A Case of Fully Integrated Approach to Disaster

Management
On 20 July 1964 residents voted to incorporate Portola Valley, a town of approxim-
ately nine square miles located south of San Francisco, so that they could control
its development and so better preserve and protect its natural and diverse environ-
ment. The public was very much concerned with maintaining the character of the
community and of the open spaces, which included brush, trees, hills and steep
mountains (Mader et al., 1988).
Passing through the valley’s floor is the San Andreas Fault. Landslides are com-
mon west of the fault, where steep slopes rise to 1,600 feet, while east of the fault,
where rolling hills top 400 feet, land movement is negligible. Although most of
the Portola Valley’s human population lives in the east, development pressures and
growth have caused developers to stake out projects in the less geologically stable
lands west of the fault. For this town of approximately 4,300 residents, the expenses
incurred in such development come to $1.1 million and are not nearly enough to
cover the costs of repairing the potential damage caused by an earthquake or a
heavy landslide.
Immediately after incorporation, the town established a conservation committee
whose mandate was to develop recommendations that would help conserve the nat-
ural setting and character of the valley. Dwight Crowder, a geologist and resident
of Portola Valley, was appointed to the committee and was the first to recom-
mend that geological conditions be taken into account when considering zoning,
subdivision and site development regulations. By familiarizing himself with the
planning process and town regulations, Crowder was able to develop specific and
feasible recommendations for considering geological conditions within the context
of community planning. He suggested that:
• a town engineering geologist be retained,
• development of steep slopes be restricted,
• geological hazards be mapped,
• development be set back from faults,
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 223

• subdivisions and site development be reviewed with respect to geological haz-

ards, and
• lot sizes be allowed to fit the terrain (Mader et al., 1988, p. 8).
Although he translated difficult geological data into practical terms and edu-
cated the town council as to the importance of considering geological conditions
when making its regulations, the council did not incorporate his recommendations
into its 1965 general plan. However, in May 1967 a new residential subdivision
development, along with a large portion of a public road, was destroyed by a large
landslide. At around the same time, a recently approved subdivision was damaged
by another landslide, which destroyed a home. Although county funds were used to
repair most of the damage, the costs were well above what the newly incorporated
town could afford.
Following the 1967 slide, the town council returned to Crowder and asked him
to form a geologic hazards committee. He decided that the committee would be
comprised of one attorney; one geologist; one local consulting engineering geo-
logist; one local research geologist; and one soils or foundation engineer. The
committee’s mandate was to assist in minimizing geological hazards-related losses
to developers, homeowners and the town (Mader et al., 1988). Shortly after the
committee was formed the town planner joined it as an advisor in the hope of trans-
lating the effects of geological concerns into feasible proposals for town expansion.
Since 1965 Crowder had been discussing with the town planner his geological
concerns regarding land development. In August 1967 the committee made three
significant recommendations to the town:
• retain an engineering geologist to advise on matters relating to geological
hazards;
• ensure that all ordinances and regulations that could be affected by geological
hazards have in place procedures to mitigate potential losses; and
• compile a geologic “hazards map” of the town. (Mader et al., 1988, p. 9).
The interpretive hazards map, indicating the locations of all possible geological
hazards, was of special significance to the town as it was to be designed so that
it could be understood by non-geologists. In February 1968 the council approved
the implementation of all three recommendations forwarded by the Geologic Haz-
ards Committee. Immediately, the building inspector was to re-evaluate certain
existing lots for potential geologic hazards, and the town planner insisted that all
development applications contain a soil report or, if necessary, a geological report.
All permits for buildings used for public assembly were henceforth required to
submit a geologic report along with their building application. The position of
town geologist was created not only to ascertain the possible geologic hazards
close to town development, but also to oversee and review all subdivision maps
and all soil reports submitted by developers. As well, the town geologist was to
manage the preparation of a geological hazards map that would guide all future
town developments.
224 LAURIE PEARCE

Using aerial photographs, field examinations and other pertinent sources, the
town council, guided by the town geologist, drew up a preliminary map of Portola
Valley and the portion of the San Andreas Fault that passes through the town at
a scale of 1:1,000 (Mader et al., 1988, p. 13). Due to fault movement in the past,
the town geologist recommended that “a belt 100 feet wide [should] be respected
in considering development” (Mader et al., 1988, p. 16) and that properties that
traverse the fault should require developers to present more detailed information.
He also requested that with the help of the town council he form an ad hoc com-
mittee that would outline specific criteria needed to guide any development close
to the fault. In 1971 the ad hoc committee included the town planner, the town geo-
logist, the town building inspector, the town engineer, two engineering geologists
and a civil engineer. The recommendations proposed by this committee included
improving the scale of the hazards map to 1:500, ensuring that houses currently
on the fault would not be removed but would be reviewed, and resolving that
setback requirements for developments along the fault would be applied uniformly
to all properties. In 1972 the committee set forth standards to guide all types of
development along or near the fault:
• Within a 100-foot-wide band along the entire length of the fault, no buildings
for human occupancy should be permitted.
• Within a 250-foot-wide band along the entire length of the fault, only single-
family residences limited to single-story, wood-frame construction should be
permitted.
• Beyond a 250-foot-wide band along the entire length of the fault, no specific
setbacks are necessary (Mader et al., 1988, p. 18).
In mid-1972 the town planner incorporated these recommendations into a draft
of the proposed permanent zoning regulations. This draft was reviewed by the ad
hoc review committee and was discussed at public hearings with property owners
within the fault zone. The regulations prevented or restricted only new development
within the fault zone; existing buildings did not require removal and their rebuild-
ing would not be prevented. Since the new regulations allowed existing houses to be
left untouched, the property owners agreed to the implementation of the proposed
regulations. In February 1973 the town council adopted these permanent zoning
regulations.
In 1974 the more precise geological map of Portola Valley and its surrounding
area was completed. Although the map was prepared and used by geologists, local
residents also referred to it in order to understand how it might affect them. The
geological map was entitled “Movement Potential of Undisturbed Ground,” and its
legend contained and explained the four basic categories of land stability, ranging
from “relatively stable ground” to “unstable ground characterized by seasonally
active down slope movement.” However, since the establishing of a property’s po-
tential land movement was integral to its development potential, the town council
wanted to investigate how to measure that movement and to create guidelines that
would apply consistently to all development applications. In essence, it “did not
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 225

want to give property owners false hope” regarding the future development of their
properties (Mader et al., 1988, p. 25).
To establish precise guidelines, the ad hoc geological committee was formed
and in March 1974 issued its report. Among other things, it recommended reducing
the permitted density of development according to the extent of the property’s
geologic hazard (as measured by the land movement potential map). It also re-
commended allowing owners whose properties fell within both stable and unstable
land categories a higher density of development on the former in order to encourage
them to leave the latter as open space. Since much of the land west of the fault is
steep, the committee recommended the incorporation of slope- density regulations.
In fact, Portola Valley was one of the first communities to pioneer the establishment
of slope-density regulations in its zoning regulations. The idea for these new regu-
lations “emerged from the work of the town’s planning consultant and a citizens”
committee formed to advise” on the Geologic Hazards Committee’s general plan
(Mader et al., 1988, p. 27). The main support for the slope-density regulations came
from the public’s desire to encourage low-density development in certain areas
in order to preserve the natural environment and the character of the town. The
combination of a reduced yield for unstable land and slope regulations (including
provisions for cluster development) not only created safer land developments, but
also encouraged development “that is compatible with the natural environment of
the community” (Mader et al., 1988, p. 30).
Analysis of the Portola Valley experience suggests that the town’s success lies in
its ability to fully integrate disaster management planning and community planning
with a high degree of public participation. It was the public’s interest in preserving
the town’s setting, not a concern with geologic conditions, that resulted in Portola
Valley forming a conservation committee. It was only after the major landslides of
1967 that the Portola Valley incorporated geology into its planning. Yet the public’s
drive for scenic preservation did not change. The popular desire to preserve the
town’s character worked in tandem with the Geologic Hazards Committee’s desire
to limit development in certain areas and to encourage open space; thus, there was
no public outcry when the town council set regulations that limited development in
the outlying areas west of the fault. Although geological and safety concerns, not
public opinion, were the main criteria for establishing development regulations, the
end result was the same: a 60 per cent reduction in the initially proposed amount of
land to be developed west of the fault. In other words, the wishes of the general
population were both directly and indirectly satisfied by the Geologic Hazards
Committee’s proposed development regulations.
If one takes a close look at the demands and concerns of the residents whose
lands were to be directly affected by the development regulations, it becomes clear
that there are two reasons why land owners offered no opposition to the new devel-
opment regulations: (1) the location of Portola Valley and (2) the way in which the
Geologic Hazards Committee proposed concerns regarding enforcement. Most of
Portola Valley’s development lay to the east of the fault, where among small, rolling
226 LAURIE PEARCE

hills geologic hazards are low. The proposed 1965 subdivision and development
plans covered the land to the west of the fault, where due to steep mountains and
cliffs there were few residences. Although relatively few owners would be affected
by the new regulations, the Geologic Hazards Committee foresaw the need for the
latter to ensure the safety of both present and future residents.
The drawing up of a geologic map detailing the nature and the relative seri-
ousness of geologic hazard potential in the Portola Valley area created a base of
information for both the council and property owners. Because this map was used
to serve the town geologist, the town planner, the developer and the land owners, it
was revised to enable non-geologists to read and understand it. Also, the Geologic
Hazards Committee worked towards standardizing the criteria for evaluating the
potential hazard of a property (by encouraging clustering and establishing slope-
density formulae), thus making the assessment of development applications more
equitable. As long as the property owners understood the potential geologic hazards
and what they were able to do, and as long as they felt that they were being treated
fairly, they were unlikely to balk at the new regulations. Also, property owners
were assured that previously existing structures would not have to be torn down
or removed, nor would there be any restrictions placed upon attempts to rebuild or
modify them. This concession was crucial: as long as the property owners did not
have to modify their present situation, they were generally willing to comply with
the new regulations.
This concern for addressing the needs of property owners and involving them
in the process of implementing new regulations ensured that things ran smoothly.
As long as the public’s concerns were listened to and considered, new regulations
(which may, at first, have seemed foreign and intrusive) were seen as necessary
and helpful. In the case of Portola Valley, many steps were taken to ensure that
both public and geological needs were met. Indeed, the Portola Valley experi-
ence provides a clear demonstration of how public participation, when combined
with disaster management planning and community planning, results in sustainable
hazard mitigation.

6. Conclusion
Recent Australian and American research has urged the field of disaster manage-
ment to shift its focus from response and recovery to sustainable hazard mitigation.
In this paper it is argued that in order for this shift to occur, it is necessary to
integrate disaster management and community planning. Current practice seldom
reflects such a synthesis, and this is one of the reasons why hazard awareness
is absent from local decision-making processes. Although disaster management
planning has not traditionally been linked with community planning, the emerging
focus on sustainable hazard mitigation clearly calls for the integration of these
two disciplines. It is also clear that any successful approach to sustainable haz-
ard mitigation must be participatory in nature and must be linked with the local
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABLE HAZARD MITIGATION 227

decision-making level. Thomas’s (1995) Effective Decision Model of Public In-

volvement shows that, in most situations, shared public decision making is crucial
to any effective approach to mitigation. As is demonstrated in the Portola Valley
case study, public participation in combination with both disaster management
planning and community planning results in sustainable hazard mitigation.

Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Anthony Dorcey, Wayne Greene, Peter Nemetz and
Olav Slaymaker (all from University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.); and
Peter Anderson (from Simon Fraser University, Bernaby, BC) for their assistance in
the completion of my doctoral dissertation, a portion of which was adapted for this
paper. I also thank Dave Etkin (Environment Canada, Toronto, Ontario), Slobodan
P. Simonovic (Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, London, Ontario) and
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic (University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario) for their com-
ments and criticisms on an earlier draft of the paper.

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