Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061

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Nuclear Engineering and Design

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/nucengdes

Development of severe accident mitigation technology and analysis

for SMART
Rae-Joon Park *, Jaehyun Ham, Sang Ho Kim, Sung Il Kim, Byeonghee Lee, Jongtae Kim
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 1045 Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon 34039, Republic of Korea

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Severe accident mitigation technology was developed and evaluated for a small integral reactor of SMART. The
Small integral reactor containment pressure and hydrogen behavior were analyzed using MELCOR computer code (Sandia National
Severe accident mitigation Laboratory, 2018) in the SBO (Station Black Out) sequence, which was selected from PSA (Probabilistic Safety
Station blackout
Assessment) results for the SMART. The severe accident mitigation technology to improve the SMART safety
External reactor vessel cooling
Hydrogen control
include reactor vessel depressurization using the ADS (Automatic Depressurization System) to prevent DCH
Containment integrity (Direct Containment Heating) in case of a reactor vessel failure, a reactor cavity flooding using the CFS (Cavity
Flooding System) with the IRWST (In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank) for the IVR-ERVC (In-Vessel
corium Retention through External Reactor Vessel Cooling) to prevent the reactor vessel failure, and a hydrogen
control system of PARs (Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners) to remove hazards from hydrogen combustion
considering the amount of hydrogen to be generated by 100% fuel cladding oxidation. The MELCOR results
showed that the containment pressures during the SBO sequence was below the design pressure, which meant
that the containment integrity is maintained during a severe accident in the SMART. The hydrogen mole fraction
of the containment was much lower than the hydrogen safety criteria of 10 vol%, which meant that the possi­
bility of the hydrogen burn in the containment was negligible. For this reason, it could be concluded that the
hydrogen was controlled by the hydrogen moving path and the hydrogen control system of PARs in the SBO
sequence of the SMART.

1. Introduction
The Korean small integral reactor of SMART (System-integrated
Modular Advanced ReacTor) has been developed, which contains core,
reactor coolant pumps, steam generators and pressurizer within a single
reactor pressure vessel, as shown in Fig. 1. For the safety enhancement,
SMART has the design characteristics of adopting the inherent and
passive safety, simplified safety, and advanced man-machine interface
systems. The nominal thermal power of SMART is 365 MWth. Fig. 2
shows the schematic diagram of the SMART containment. The
containment is divided into two part of LCA (Lower Containment Area)
and UCA (Upper Containment Area) by CPRSS (Containment Pressure
and Radioactivity Suppression System).
The CPRSS in the SMART is an ESF (Engineered Safety Feature)
system, the functions of which are to suppress the increase of pressure
and temperature in the containment following accidents such as LOCA
(Loss Of Coolant Accident) and MSLB (Main Steam Line Break), and to
remove the radioactive fission products from the LCA of the
containment. The system keeps the containment pressure and temper­
ature from exceeding the design values with sufficient margin during 72
h without AC power sources or operator actions. After 72 h, the system
performs the heat and fission product removal functions continuously
with the support of the non-safety system.
It is necessary to develop and evaluate the severe accident mitigation
technology for new designed safety feature and containment of the
SMART using severe accident computer codes, such as MELCOR (SAND,
2018a, 2018b), MAAP5 (EPRI, 2013), ASTEC (Accident Source Term
Evaluation Code) (Chatelard et al, 2016), and SCDAP/RELAP5 (Siefken
et al., 2001). Many studies for operating and developing nuclear power
plants had been performed to evaluate the severe accident mitigation
technology for various severe accident sequences using MELCOR (F.
Martin-Fuertes et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2015), MAAP5
(Park et al., 2012; Park and Ahn, 2015), ASTEC (Atanasova et al., 2012;
Stefanova et al., 2015), and SCDAP/RELAP5 (Park et al., 2006, 2008,
2013; Park and Hong, 2011).
Severe accident mitigation technology was developed and the severe

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: rjpark@kaeri.re.kr (R.-J. Park).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nucengdes.2021.111061
Received 8 June 2020; Received in revised form 16 December 2020; Accepted 5 January 2021
Available online 27 January 2021
0029-5493/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
R.-J. Park et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061

accident progression in the representative accident sequence of the SBO
(Station BlackOut) for the SMART was evaluated using the MELCOR
computer code. In particular, the containment pressure and hydrogen
behavior during a severe accident had been analyzed to solve the
containment integrity and the hydrogen issue in the SMART, respec­
tively. The SBO sequence was selected from PSA (Probabilistic Safety
Assessment) results for the SMART. For this reason, the severe accident
sequence of the SBO with the hydrogen behavior for the SMART were
evaluated for this purpose in detail. In addition, the performance of the
IVR-ERVC (In-Vessel corium Retention through External Reactor Vessel
Cooling) and the containment integrity under the SBO sequence without
the PRHRS (Passive Residual Heat Removal System) and the PSIS
(Passive Safety Injection System) were evaluated in this study.
2. Development of severe accident management technology for
SMART
The concept of the basic design of SMART to terminate the pro­
gression of severe accidents is to prevent the reactor vessel failure by
cooling the external reactor vessel wall using the method to fill the
reactor cavity with cooling water, which is the IVR-ERVC. If reactor
vessel failure is prevented, the integrity of the containment can be
maintained by preventing the progression of the ex-vessel severe acci­
dent. The IVR-ERVC is used in the accident management of the existing
LWR (Light Water Reactor) and for the severe accident mitigation design
for the Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR). In addition, the SMART
is designed to assure the safety sufficiently against ex-vessel severe ac­
cident phenomena in terms of the defense-in-depth. The severe accident
mitigation design of SMART is focused on the following severe accident
issues.
• In-Vessel and Ex-Vessel FCI (Fuel Coolant Interaction) s
• IVR-ERVC
• HPME (High Pressure Melt Ejection) and DCH (Direct Containment
Heating)
• MCCI (Molten Core Concrete Interaction)
• Combustible Gas Combustion and Explosion
• Containment Over-temperature or Over-pressure
• Containment Bypass by STGR (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) and
so on
The severe accident mitigation design of SMART is same as the se­
vere accident mitigation of existing next-generation LWR like APR1400.
Therefore, there is no new severe accident phenomenon or issue with
respect to SMART design. As it is possible to use the results of experi­
mental and analytical studies to resolve the issues of severe accidents in
the existing LWR and the concept of the designs for severe accidents in
the existing LWR has sufficient reliability, it is possible to apply such
results to SMART. The severe accident management technology to
improve the SMART safety was developed as follows;

Control Rod Drive

ICI Nozzles Mechanism

Pressurizer

Reactor Coolant
Pump

Steam
Nozzle

Upper Guide
Structure
Steam
Generator Core Support Barrel

Feed water
Nozzle

Flow Mixing
Header Assembly
Lower Core
Support Plate
Core

Flow Skirt

Fig. 1. Schematic of SMART reactor vessel.

2
R.-J. Park et al.
• Vessel depressurization using ADS (Automatic Depressurization
System) to prevent DCH in case of a reactor vessel failure
• Reactor cavity flooding using the CFS (Cavity Flooding System) with
the IRWST (In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank) for the
IVR-ERVC to prevent the reactor vessel failure
• Hydrogen control to remove hazards from hydrogen combustion
considering the amount of hydrogen to be generated by 100% fuel
cladding oxidation.
To achieve this developed severe accident management technology,
the severe accident mitigation system for the SMART was developed as
follows:
• The safety depressurization system of the ADS to prevent the DCH by
the HPME is installed to make low pressure in the reactor vessel
before the reactor vessel failure.
• The system that cools down the outer wall of the reactor vessel is
installed in order to cool the molten core material inside the reactor
vessel using the CFS with the IRWST for the IVR-ERVC.
• Hydrogen mitigation system of the PAR (Passive Autocatalytic
Recombiner) is installed to remove hazards from hydrogen com­
bustion considering the amount of hydrogen to be generated by
100% fuel cladding oxidation.
• The SMART has the pathway to release the hydrogen in core to the
UCA of the containment through the ADS, SIT (Safety Injection Tank)
room, associated piping, and the RRT (Radioactive material Removal
Tank) for hydrogen control.
• SMART containment has very large volume so that hydrogen is
mixed well and hydrogen concentration is maintained uniformly at
low level. The total volume of the LCA and the UCA are
Fig. 2. Schematic of SMART containment.
3
Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061
approximately 10,000 m3 and 50,000 m3, respectively. Also, the
containment is designed firmly enough to withstand hydrogen
combustion.
• The ACSS (Ancillary Containment Spray System) that provides to
prevent a catastrophic failure of the UCA of the containment. The
ACSS flow rate provides sufficient heat removal to prevent the upper
containment pressure from exceeding the containment performance
criteria, and function to remove the fission products in the UCA of
the containment during severe accidents.
3. MELCOR input model and analysis method
MELCOR version 2.2 is used to simulate accident sequence of the
SBO for the SMART. MELCOR, developed at the SNL for the US NRC
(Nuclear Regulation Commission), is a comprehensive analysis code that
can simulate the severe accident progress of LWR. It can model various
severe accident phenomena such as thermo-hydraulic reactions in the
RCS and in the containment, core damage and relocation, MCCI,
hydrogen behavior, and transport of fission products.
MELCOR input model of the SMART was developed for severe ac­
cident sequence analysis. Fig. 3 shows MELCOR nodalization for the
SMART. The developed input model was based on technical reports of
SMART design. Main systems of the SMART, such as reactor pressure
vessel, which includes reactor coolant pump, pressurizer, and steam
generator, ADS, and piping system, were considered in the input model.
For the containment analysis, the UCA and LCA including IRWST and
RRT were considered for SMART containment analysis.
In the case of ERVC failure scenario, lower head failure was detected.
In order to evaluate the lower head failure accurately, the lower head
was divided into 10 segments in the MELCOR simulation with consid­
ering the fuel nodalization and height. The lower head wall consists of
R.-J. Park et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061

Fig. 3. MELCOR input nodalization for SMART.

five nodes and the temperature of the structures and pressures deter­ minimum heat flux, based upon the temperature difference outer vessel
mine the reactor vessel failure. The wall thickness of the lower head wall wall surface and coolant saturation in the reactor cavity; stable film
is approximately 0.2 m with the same gap between each node. Reactor boiling, which depends upon the orientation of the boiling surface. The
pressure vessel including active fuel was modeled by 16 axial levels and boundaries between the heat transfer regimes are determined by a
5 rings, and only 10 axial levels contained active fuel. Axial level 5 correlation for the CHF (El-Genk, 1992). More details on the IVR-ERVC
simulated the core support plate and axial level 16 is the upper plenum model are explained in MELCOR manual (SAND, 2018a, 2018b). Limi­
region. The steady-state simulation was performed to validate MELCOR tations of the MELCOR model to simulate the IVR-ERVC are a transient
input model, which showed a good agreement with the design operating crust behavior in the corium pool and two phase flow behavior in the
conditions of the SMART, as shown in Table 1. annulus gap between the outer reactor vessel wall and the insulator of
IVR-ERVC to prevent the reactor vessel failure for the SMART was the reactor vessel.
analyzed using the MELCOR computer code. The CFS with the IRWST Hydrogen behavior was analyzed using the MELCOR computer code
was modeled for a reactor cavity flooding to achieve the IVR-ERVC. for the representative severe accident scenario of the SBO. The pressure
MELCOR model for this analysis is divided into two parts: heat trans­ was analyzed for 72 h of severe accident initiation in condition with the
fer from corium pool in the lower plenum to the reactor vessel wall and most conservative defined condition for the pressurization point of view.
boiling heat transfer from the outer reactor vessel wall to the water in The purpose of hydrogen behavior and concentration analysis during a
the reactor cavity. Heat transfer coefficients in the corium pool to the severe accident is to verify that, when hydrogen mitigation system of
vessel wall are based on an empirical correlations obtained from ex­ PARs is taken into account. That is, the purpose of this analysis is to
periments. The empirical correlation must be used to evaluate the verify that the hydrogen mitigation feature maintains the uniform
normalized local heat transfer profile in the corium pool. An empirical hydrogen concentration at 10 vol% lower.
correlation (Bonnet and Seiler, 2000) for relating the local heat transfer Therefore, the detailed analysis goals of hydrogen analysis in
to maximum heat transfer coefficient is as a function of latitude along containment are as follows.
corium pool in the lower plenum of the reactor vessel. The downward-
facing pool boiling of MELCOR model treats three heat transfer re­ • Hydrogen mixing in the containment is assured.
gimes: fully developed nucleate boiling with no dependence on the • It is verified that the uniform hydrogen concentration in the
orientation of the boiling surface; transition boiling between the fully containment is 10 vol% or lower when the hydrogen mitigation
developed and film boiling regimes, in which the heat flux is obtained by system of the PARs is operated.
logarithmic interpolation between the CHF (Critical Heat Flux) and the • When hydrogen is generated by 100% fuel cladding oxidation, the
containment integrity shall be maintained if the hydrogen mitigation
Table 1 system is operated.
Comparison of the SMART operating condition with MELCOR results.
Parameter Unit SMART Design MELCOR
The following methodology is used in order to satisfy the hydrogen
Value Results analysis goal for the SBO sequence of the SMART.
Core Heat Output MW 365 365.7
Coolant Flow Rate in Core Inlet kg/s 2507 2449 • Hydrogen distribution analysis and the efficiency analysis of the
Core Inlet Temperature K 568.7 585.4 hydrogen mitigation system of PARs in the containment.
Core Outlet Temperature K 594.1 608.3 • All AC powers of on-site and off-site are lost with no recovery of
Pressurizer Pressure MPa 15.0 14.9 electricity.
Steam Flow Rate (per SG) kg/s 47.7 47.6
Feed Water Flow Rate (per SG) kg/s 47.7 47.7
• The hydrogen release rate is defined by multiplying the originally
Feed Water Temperature at SG K 503.2 503.0 calculated rate by a factor so that the total amount of hydrogen
Inlet released to the containment becomes equivalent to 100% fuel clad­
Steam Pressure at SG Outlet MPa 5.62 5.77 ding oxidation.

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R.-J. Park et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061

The MELCOR ESF package models the physics for the various ESFs Table 2
including PARs. The PAR package constitutes a subpackage within the MELCOR results on major events in SBO sequence.
ESF package and calculates the rate of hydrogen removal generated by Event Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
PAR type. The default MELCOR model is based on the Fisher model, (hr) (hr) (hr)
which is parametric model developed for a particular type of PAR unit Transient Initiated 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Fischer, 1995). The type of the PAR used the NIS type PAR (Blanchat Reactor Trip, Main Feed Water Pump Trip 0.0 0.0 0.0
and Malliakos, 1998). More details on the hydrogen removal model First Open of SRV in Pressurizer 0.64 0.64 0.64
including performance equation using the PAR are explained in MEL­ Fuel Top Uncovered 9.32 9.32 9.32
Fuel Bottom Uncovered 11.83 11.83 11.83
COR manual. Total 31 PARs for SMART containment were considered to SAMG Entry Condition(CET Temperature 12.15 12.15 12.15
control the hydrogen concentration in the SIT room, CMT (Core Makeup > 923 K)
Tank) room, space between the CMT room and the LCA annulus, CPRSS CFS Start N/A 12.65 12.65
lid of the LCA, the IRWST, and the UCA. These PARs are modeled for the Core Relocation Start 14.19 14.05 14.05
Core Support Plate Failure 15.89 15.68 15.68
MELCOR analysis. It was assumed that the PAR starts when the
Lower Plenum Dryout 18.49 18.95 18.95
hydrogen and oxygen mole fractions reach 2 vol% and 3 vol%, respec­ Reactor Pressure Vessel Failure 19.70 N/A N/A
tively, and it stops both mole fractions are below 0.5 vol%. A MELCOR Initiation of MCCI with CFS Start 19.70 N/A N/A
analysis for the total amount of hydrogen release to be equivalent the
100% fuel cladding oxidation was performed by additional hydrogen
injection as a constant rate in the core region with considering the Korean SAMG. The liquid water flow rate was determined with
hydrogen generation mass, which was calculated using the MELCOR. considering the water head of IRWSTs and LCA pipe elevations. The
main difference between Case 2 and 3 is that additional metal-water
4. MELCOR results and discussion reaction was considered in the Case 3 for conservative calculation on
hydrogen concentration. Although 100% fuel cladding oxidation inside
The reactor core, the main feed water pump and the RCP (Reactor the reactor vessel will not react with the steam, 100% fuel cladding
Coolant Pump) are shut down at the initiation of SBO accident. Because oxidation was assumed in the Case 3 simulation to generate a large
the PRHRS and PSIS are assumed to be failed, the steam in the RPV amount of hydrogen. It is tried to find the hydrogen safety results in the
(Reactor Pressure Vessel) is released periodically to the LCA of the SMART plant with the Case 3 simulation.
containment through the SRV (Safety Relief Valve) on the upper head of As shown in Table 2, SBO starts at zero second. The accident pro­
the pressurizer by high pressure. The steam moves to the IRWST and the gressions are the same in all three cases before they reach the SAMG
RRT through the pressure relief line and the radioactive transport line. entry condition. Since the different assumptions play their role after the
Partial steam condensation occurred during this transportation. Rest of major core degradation, the MELCOR results have a little difference
the steam moves to the UCA of the containment as a final destination. between Cases 1 and 2, which occurs after the SAMG entry condition.
Because the LCA pressure exceeds 1.6 bar, the steam in the SIT room Cases 2 and 3 shows similar accident progression, but Case 1 shows
moves to the IRWST through emergency cool-down tank heat slightly faster core degradation. Both Cases 2 and 3 cause no reactor
exchanger. The flow path from the SIT room to the IRWST is closed at 30 vessel failure by the ERVC, which means the reactor vessel is intact.
min after the time when the SAMG (Severe Accident Management However, in Case 1, the lower head vessel failed due to the absence of
Guideline) entry condition is satisfied. If the CET (Core Exit Tempera­ the ERVC at 19.7 h, which results in MCCI in the reactor cavity.
ture) exceeds 923 K during a severe accident sequence in SMART, the
operator leaves the EOP (Emergency Operation Procedure) for the DBA 4.1. Case 1: Fail of the IVR-ERVC
(Design Basis Accident) and uses the SAMG for the severe accident. At
the same time, valves on the ADS and the flow path between SIT room The relocated corium mass from the core in the LHV (Lower Head
and RRT are opened. Vessel) was analyzed to evaluate the performance of the ERVC during
Through the ADS, gas in the RPV which includes the hydrogen the SBO sequence for the SMART. Fig. 4 shows the relocated corium
created by fuel cladding oxidation moves to the RRT. Non-condensable mass in the LHV of Case 1. The MELCOR results show that the mass of
gas including the hydrogen moves to the UCA of the containment as the the corium in the LHV rapidly increases at approximately 17 h, because
final destination through the RRT, so the pressure in the UCA constantly the core support plate in the bottom of the core fails by the residual heat
increases. Pressure in the RPV decreases after the initiation of the ADS,
however, the coolant is not refilled because the PSIS is assumed to be
failed. If the CFS cannot operate, there is no way to remove the residual
heat, so the corium drops into the reactor cavity after the RPV failure by
creep. In this case, the MCCI was occurred in the reactor cavity, but the
CFS was operated to mitigate concrete ablation. If the CFS can operate,
however, the LCA from the bottom to the middle height of the RPV
submerges in the coolant from the IRWST at 30 min after fulfillment of
the SAMG entry condition. In this case, IVR (In-Vessel Retention) can be
successfully done by the ERVC.
Total three different accident scenarios were considered in this
analysis. Case 1 was assumed that the ERVC failure condition, which
means the reactor vessel failure. Case 2 was assumed that ERVC is
available with considering real hydrogen generation, which means no
reactor vessel failure. Case 3 considered that the ERVC was also avail­
able with 100% fuel cladding oxidation. The accident sequence of three
cases with major events was summarized in Table 2. In the Cases 2 and 3,
ERVC was applied. It was assumed that the ERVC system start after 30
min when the SAMG entry condition reached, which means that the
operator makes action for the ERVC to prevent a reactor vessel failure. In
general, 30 min was assumed to prepare the operator action time in the Fig. 4. MELCOR results on the relocated corium mass in the LHV of Case 1.

5
R.-J. Park et al. Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061

from the corium. The RPV fails so that the mass rapidly decreases at
19.7 h. In this time, the corium moves to the reactor cavity, which results
in MCCI in the reactor cavity. The CFS was operated to mitigate the
concrete ablation in this Case.
The pressures in the LCA and the UCA of the containment were
analyzed to evaluate the containment integrity during the SBO sequence
for the SMART. Fig. 5 shows the containment pressure in Case 1. The
RPV pressure decreased by the initiation of the ADS so that the steam
transportation through the pressurizer SRVs stopped since 30 min after
the SAMG entry. Meanwhile, the LCA steam transported to the UCA
through the RRT, and condensed on walls. For this reason, the LCA
pressure decreased until the RPV failure according to the steam mass
decrease, as shown in Fig. 5. When the RPV failed, the LCA pressure
rapidly increased by the massive evaporation of the water in the cavity.
For a while, the LCA pressure decreased after the cavity depletion,
however, the pressure increased since the gas generated by the MCCI.
The LCA and UCA pressures of the containment are lower than the
design pressure of 3.5 bars and 1.9 bars, respectively. This means that
the containment integrity is maintained during the SBO sequence for the
SMART.
The mole fraction of the hydrogen was analyzed in the UCA of the Fig. 6. MELCOR results on the gas mole fraction in the UCA of Case 1.
containment during the SBO sequence for the SMART. Fig. 6 shows gas
mole fraction in the UCA of the containment in Case 1. The hydrogen maintained in spite of no PARs at a low level of approximately 4 vol% in
hehavior in the LCA was not considered because of steam rich condition the case of 100% fuel cladding oxidation. The containment volume of
by steam release from the reactor vessel through the SRV and ADS on the SMART per hydrogen mass from 100% fuel cladding oxidation is
upper head of the pressurizer. In the late phase, the carbon oxide gas approximately three times larger than that of OPR1000, which is a
concentration increases by the MCCI. It is thought that flammability of Korean standard pressurized water reactor.
the gas mixture is extremely unlikely even with carbon oxide effect
considered by the method (Kim et al., 2020).
The MELCOR results shows that the hydrogen and oxygen fractions 4.2. Case 2: Success of the ERVC
in the UCA of the containment rapidly increases when valves on the ADS
are opened, and it increases again after RPV fails. Fig. 7 shows the relocated corium mass in the LHV of Case 2 during
When the hydrogen mole fraction reached to 2 vol%, the PARs in the the SBO sequence for the SMART. The MELCOR results shows that the
UCA started to remove the hydrogen until the mole fraction reached to mass of the corium in the LHV rapidly increases at the same time in the
0.5 vol%. Approximately 121.4 kg of the hydrogen were removed by Case 1. However, the corium mass is maintained after this time, because
PAR operation. For this reason, the maximum mole fraction in the UCA the ERVC is successfully performed. The pressure increase rates in the
is 2 vol%, which is much lower than the hydrogen safety criteria of 10 LCA and the UCA of the containment are higher than those in the Case 1,
vol%, because the volume of the UCA is much larger. This meant that the as shown in Fig. 8. The pressure in the bottom of the reactor cavity is
possibility of the hydrogen burn in the UCA of the containment is higher than the pressure in the other volume of the LCA because it in­
negligible. The hydrogen generation mass in the SMART was approxi­ cludes the pressure of the water for the ERVC.
mately 200 kg by 100% fuel cladding oxidation. The SMART contain­ Fig. 9 shows the hydrogen and the oxygen mole fractions in the UCA
ment has a very large free volume as much as approximately 60,000 m3 of the containment in Case 2. The MELCOR results shows that the
so that the averaged hydrogen concentration in the containment can be maximum hydrogen mole fraction in the UCA of the containment is
approximately 1.5 vol%, which is much lower than the hydrogen safety
criteria of 10 vol%. The PARs were not operated because the hydrogen

Fig. 5. MELCOR results on the containment pressure in Case 1. Fig. 7. MELCOR results on the relocated corium mass in the LHV of Case 2.

6
R.-J. Park et al.
Fig. 8. MELCOR results on the containment pressure in Case 2.
Fig. 9. MELCOR results on the hydrogen and the oxygen mole fractions in the
UCA of Case 2.
maximum mole fraction was less than 2 vol%, which is PAR operation
value in MELCOR PAR model. The fraction does not increase after the
peak when the valve on the ADS opens. Also, the hydrogen mole fraction
in the UCA of the containment decreases after the peak because the mass
of steam increases. In this case, the containment integrity is maintained
and the possibility of the hydrogen burn in the UCA of the containment
is negligible.
4.3. Case 3: Success of the ERVC with 100% fuel cladding oxidation
Figs. 10 and 11 shows the relocated corium mass in the LHV and the
containment pressure in Case 3 during the SBO sequence for the SMART,
respectively. The MELCOR results shows that the change of the corium
mass in the LHV and pressures in the LCA and UCA of the containment
are almost similar with the result of the Case 2. The condensation
behavior in all cases was similar, but the condensation rate in Case 1 was
lower than that of others because there was no water injection to LCA in
Case 1. Fig. 12 shows the hydrogen and the oxygen mole fractions in the
UCA of the containment in Case 3. The hydrogen mole fraction in the
UCA of the containment is higher than that in the Case 2, because
7
Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061
Fig. 10. MELCOR results on the relocated corium mass in the LHV of Case 3.
Fig. 11. MELCOR results on the containment pressure in Case 3.
additional hydrogen injection was considered for the consideration of
100% fuel cladding oxidation. However, the maximum hydrogen mole
fraction in the UCA of the containment is approximately 2 vol%, which
is much lower than the hydrogen safety criteria of 10 vol%. PARs in the
UCA started to remove the hydrogen until the mole fraction reached to
0.5 vol%. Approximately 144.6 kg of the hydrogen were removed by the
PAR operation. In this case, the containment integrity is also maintained
and the possibility of the hydrogen burn in the UCA of the containment
is also negligible. The hydrogen mole fraction of the containment in all
cases was much lower than the hydrogen safety criteria of 10 vol%,
which means that the possibility of FA (Flame Acceleration), DDT
(Deflagration to Detonation Transition) is negligible.
5. Conclusions
Severe accident mitigation technology was developed and evaluated
for the SMART. In particular, containment pressure and the hydrogen
behavior during the SBO sequence were analyzed to solve the contain­
ment integrity program and hydrogen safety issue during a severe ac­
cident using the MELCOR computer code in the SMART, respectively.
The severe accident mitigation technology includes reactor vessel
depressurization using the ADS to prevent DCH in case of a reactor vessel
R.-J. Park et al.
Fig. 12. MELCOR results on the hydrogen and the oxygen mole fractions in the
UCA of Case 3.
failure, a reactor cavity flooding using the CFS with the IRWST for the
IVR-ERVC to prevent the reactor vessel failure, and a hydrogen control
system of PARs to remove hazards from hydrogen combustion consid­
ering the amount of hydrogen to be generated by 100% fuel cladding
oxidation. The severe accident sequence analysis results of the SBO for
the SMART using the MELCOR computer code showed that the RPV
integrity was maintained by the ERVC. The LCA and UCA pressures of
the containment were below the design pressures, respectively, whether
IVR-ERVC was available or not, and 100% fuel cladding oxidation was
considered or not when ERVC was available. This means that the
containment integrity is maintained during a severe accident in the
SMART. The hydrogen mole fraction of the UCA was much lower than
the hydrogen safety criteria of 10 vol%, which meant that the possibility
of the hydrogen burn in the UCA of the containment was negligible. For
this reason, it could be concluded that the hydrogen was controlled by
hydrogen moving path and control system of PARs for the representative
accident sequence of the SBO in the SMART.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of
Nuclear Engineering and Design 374 (2021) 111061
Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (Ministry of Sci­
ence, ICT, and Future Planning) (No. NRF-2020M2D7A1079182).
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