Challenges for the Pilotage Industry

in the ‘Age of Big Data’

Re-conceptualisation of Marine Pilotage
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past”*

William Faulkner
The Australasian Marine Pilots Institute (AMPI)
Pilotage and Port Logistics Conference
29 October 2019
* Preview: ‘Steady as she goes’ - Sydney Pilotage
 Selected Incident Reports
For incidents/occurrences below irrefutable evidence was obtained from
recordings (VDR & VTS) and provides a window into present operational
practices.
• CITY OF ROTTERDAM/ PRIMULA SEAWAYS Collision, 03 December 2015
• AZAMARA QUEST - Grounding TORY CHANNEL, 27 January 2016
• MOLLY MANX - Grounding PORT CHALMERS, 19 August 2016
• CMA CGM VASCO DE GAMA – Grounding SOUTHAMPTON, 22 August 2016
• NAVIOS NORTHERN STAR – Contact with Navigation Buoy TORRES STRAIT, 15 March 2016
• L’AUSTRAL - Grounding MILFORD SOUND, 9 February 2017
• AQUA DIVA – Near grounding NEWCASTLE, 12 February 2017
• CMA CGM CENTAURUS - Heavy contact with quay and two shore cranes Jebel Ali, 4 May 2017
• LEDA MAERSK*, grounding, Port Chalmers, 10 June 2018
(Visual Navigation Implicated in Container Ship Grounding – Maritime Executive)
 Preliminary
• Pilotage accidents are Low Probability/High Consequence*events
• In an ‘overwhelmingly’ high percentage of cases the present day systems and
practices in pilotage/shipping are operationally successful
• But when something goes wrong approaches to safety from other hazardous
industries are likely to be used for judging the accident. And it is here that
pilotage/shipping industry does not come out looking good. e.g. Costa
Concordia, CMA CGM Vasco Da Gama, Molly Manx, Navios Northern Star,
Azamara Quest, CGA CGM Centaurus, Leda Maersk etc.
• If the accident involves pollution and/or loss of life the consequences for those
involved can be very serious e.g. Cosco Busan, Costa Concordia, Sewol, Rena,
Jolly Nero, City of Rotterdam, Helge Ingstad/Sola T S? etc.
*Referred to as HiLo (High Impact/Low Frequency) events by the UK Chamber of
Shipping
 Developments – 2017/2018
• Frustration of MAIIF investigators e.g. MAIB Vasco Da Gama MAIB Report 2017
• Prosecution of pilot/master City of Rotterdam November 2017
• Prosecution of fishing boat skipper in the UK December 2017
• VDR analyst job offer to ex-student 24 December 2017 (OCIMF)*
• Wartsila (acquisition of SAM Electronics and TRANSAS) - Jorgen Strandberg
• SMARTPORT Platform - Maritime Digital Information Intranet (e-navigation)
• Marine pilotage placed on SafetyWatch by ATSB 23 October 2017 (Recurring
accidents) https://www.atsb.gov.au/safetywatch/sw_marine-pilotage/
• Meeting with Captain Rob Buck in early January 2018 to discuss sudden
awareness of serious issues related to developments in late 2017.
* Outliers versus large scale surveillance
Applied SWOT analysis to situation for pilots - Discuss
SWOT = Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
 Developments 2018
U.K Launches Big Data Accident Prevention Program 07/02/2018
‘Dr Grahaeme Henderson President UK Chamber of Shipping announced a new data-
driven* initiative to avoid major marine casualties. Its new HiLo system, short for "high
impact, low frequency events” aims to collect records of low-level, nonthreatening
shipboard incidents and use them to predict the likelihood of larger, more dangerous
accidents like groundings, explosions and collisions.’
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6w-0XlLAvaE

Use of ‘Big Data’ to identify ‘Leading Indicators’ - proactive approach to safety. (Captain
Debbie Slade Qantas & Alan Bradbury Air New Zealand)

‘Leading Indicators’ in marine pilotage?

Example of ‘Big Data’ approach in Aviation:

Was it Really a Miracle on the Hudson?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaydVvH7S4E
Dr Grahaeme Henderson
 Developments – 2018
• NAV18 AMSA Sponsored Symposium (01-03 May 2018)
Outcomes:
“People and Technology: The exponential growth in technical capabilities when coupled
with the needs of the millennial generation of seafarers will mean that disruption in the
short to medium term will be enormous. Shipowner’s should see this as an opportunity
not a threat. Fit for purpose intelligent systems is the future. The key message here
seems to be those who will prevail will be the one’s with the best people. Empower people
and use technology to put people at the centre of all endeavours.”
• Recurring accidents – TAIC placed marine pilotage on WatchList by TAIC NZ 11 October 2018
TAIC Site
https://taic.org.nz/sites/default/files/page/documentsWL%202018%20Navigation%20in%20pilotage%20waters.pdf

Media https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/travel/2018/10/nz-could-see-major-maritime-disaster-unless-ship-culture-changes-
taic.html
 From TAIC Watchlist Document
“Because the bridge team was not adequately monitoring its progress using all
available means, they did not realise that the vessel had deviated so far from the
intended track. The Commission also found that: there was no formal shared
understanding between the pilot and the vessel’s crew on what passage plan
would be used, the vessel’s navigation equipment was not correctly configured for
navigating in a narrow channel, and the standard of bridge resource management
on the bridge leading up to the grounding did not meet good industry practice.*
Pilotage is an issue for international agencies as well. Our peer organisation, the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau has placed maritime pilotage on their
SafetyWatch, the equivalent publication to the Watchlist.
The series of recurring incidents involving standards of bridge management that
do not meet industry standards, and the presence of the problem in other
jurisdictions, suggests that this is a safety issue that needs attention from the
regulator, operators, and training providers.”
*Reference: Molly Manx Grounding Otago
https://taic.org.nz/sites/default/files/inquiry/documents/16-204%20Final_0.pdf
 Developments – 2017/2018
Most Critical Conclusion
Evidence from recordings based safety
investigations on cruise/cargo ships (Vasco Da
Gama, Navios Northern Star, Molly Manx,
Azamara Quest, L’Austral, CMA CGM Centaurus,
Leda Maersk etc.) revealed very different
perspectives of pilots and marine accident
investigators on conduct of pilotage
 Conduct of Pilotage – Pilots/Safety Accident
Investigators Perspectives
• Based on ‘irrefutable evidence’ from recordings, visual piloting in combination with local knowledge
and the pilot’s intuition considered sufficient by pilots.

• Maersk Garonne, Vasco Da Gama, Molly Manx, Azamara Quest etc. occurrences only viewed as
misjudgement during a turn by groups of pilots.

• Safety investigators in addition to visual piloting, local knowledge, and pilot’s intuition also expected
use of a passage plan, PPU, utilisation of Bridge Team, and ship’s bridge equipment* (Presentations
by Captains Peter Dann, Peter Liley, Tony Herriott, Mike Drake & Lindsay Cavanagh)

• The use of a ‘system’ as against ‘individual’ approach. (Captain Vik Chaudhri, Captain Jeanine
Drummond)

• Despite two decades of safety accident investigations and recommendations, similar accidents continue
to recur. Evidence obtained from ship’s VDR and VTS recordings consistently shows that little has
changed in the way that pilotage is conducted. Hence the frustration of accident investigators.

*Definition of BRM now incorporates use of all resources (People, Procedures & Equipment)
CMA CGM Vasco Da Gama - MAIB Report
“However, it was also apparent from recent similar
incidents and the findings of previous MAIB reports
that many of the practices evident in this case
were not specific to this single pilotage act, or to
CMA CGM Vasco Da Gama*” – Page 1

*Tone of Exasperation/Frustration
Evolution of Safety
 Modern Maritime Environment
• Zero community tolerance for maritime accidents especially those involving casualties and
or pollution.
• Hence public funding of TAIC, ATSB, NTSB, MAIB etc. to conduct safety investigations and
improve maritime safety by reducing the risk of similar accidents recurring
• Tightening up of maritime law and regulations (Captain Ambrose Rajadurai)
• Prosecution of seafarers including pilots involved in accidents
• Maritime accidents now often unwind in the full glare of publicity generating extreme levels
of emotion and volatility e.g. Prestige, Cosco Busan, Deepwater Horizon, Costa
Concordia, Jolly Nero, Rena, Sewol, City Of Rotterdam etc.
• Increasing demands for efficiency and reduction in safety margins
• Application of increasingly sophisticated technologies
• Advances in safety science and convergence of safety standards in different industries*
• Evidence now routinely obtained from irrefutable recordings
*Exigencies/of the trade less and less accepted. Also referred to as ‘Social Licence’.
 High Quality of Recent Marine Safety
Investigation Reports
• The high quality of recent marine safety investigation reports such as
the Vasco Da Gama, Molly Manx, Navios Northern Star, Azamara
Quest, Leda Maersk etc. is the culmination of 20 years of
developments in Navigation Techniques, Navigation Technology,
Voyage Data Recorders* (VDR’s), Human Factors, BRM and Marine
Accident Investigation Techniques.
• New standard of safety investigation reports is a rejoinder to the
safety scientist Charles Perrow’s observation that “shipping
accidents are not investigated as thoroughly as aviation accidents”.
• Availability of reliable evidence post-event indicates a shift to an
evidence based world where transparency is the best option.
 Recordings and Real-Time Surveillance
• Irrefutable evidence is now being routinely obtained from VDR & VTS recordings.
VDR’s are increasingly being supplemented by CCTV cameras on all types of ships.
(Live streams from the VDR and CCTV cameras are routinely routed to the head
office)
• Large Cruise companies have routinely used VDR’s to improve safety for the last 15
years. (Conversation with cruise ship master about new development regarding.
routine use of VDR data for safety meetings)
• Plans to collect, collate and analyse data from VDR’s and other sources on a large
scale to obtain notoriously scarce safety information for improving safety in
maritime. (HiLo Project etc.)
• Full implications of the use of VDR data and recordings for investigations has
not been understood and therefore not acted upon.
• Evidence of accident’s from the same causes recurring. Hence the frustration
of safety accident investigation bodies.
 Operations Centres for Monitoring Ships
• Carnival Operations Centres in Hamburg, Seattle and Miami for live monitoring and
support of company shipshttps://maritime-executive.com/article/carnival-opens-new-operations-
center-in-miami-1
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4AjgR0WpgZw
• 2017, CMA CGM Group Navigation and Port Operations Centres in Singapore,
Marseille and Miami. Facilities leverages latest navigation assistance tools and
technologies to track and examine wide-ranging nautical, meteorological and geographic
information in real-time, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
• Based on live analytics of the vessels’ operating speeds, ocean currents, weather
forecasts and high traffic areas, each centre’s team of experts are empowered to assess,
anticipate and mitigate any navigation-related risks to the Group’s vessel operations.
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/cma-cgm-links-up-with-ai-startup-for-navigation-safety
• Several other Shipping Organisations have similar operations centres
 Real-time Surveillance
• 19 April 2018 - Bill Gates backs $1bn plan to cover earth in video surveillance satellites.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/04/19/bill-gates-backs-1bn-plan-cover-earth-video-
surveillance-satellites/

• 23 July 2018 - Leonardo’s geospatial maritime security platform SEonSE (Smart Eyes on
the Seas) surveillance system online. It can track ships and boats all over the world in
real-time.
• https://shipinsight.com/articles/leonardo-launches-seonse-to-provides-real-time-maritime-surveillance

• 26 October 2018 – ‘Office Based Situational Awareness’ https://shipinsight.com/articles/tie-up-

promises-enhanced-ship-tracking-and-awareness?mc_cid=aa6a080ab9&mc_eid=d9338200d1

• Low Earth Orbiting Satelliteshttps://insidegnss.com/new-age-satellite-based-navigation-stan-

simultaneous-tracking-and-navigation-with-leo-satellite-signals/
Tracks of Similar Sized Bulk Carriers
Tracks of Similar Sized Container Ships
 Conduct of Pilotage
• When irrefutable evidence is obtained from recordings and available for post-event
analysis, does the saying among pilots:
“Any job you can walk away from is a good job”
need to be replaced by
“Whatever way pilotage is conducted, it has to be able to withstand the scrutiny that
is possible after the event with today’s technology*’

• Present practices and systems in pilotage:

- Are not developed to withstand the level of scrutiny possible today
- Stand comparison with other hazardous industries
- Do not meet community standards in regard to acceptable risk
- Do not meet legal requirement in regard to use of available knowledge on safety and
technology (‘Due Diligence’ - Richard Robinson)

• What does responding to the level of scrutiny possible today entail in regard to
operational practices in pilotage*?
*Captain Rob Buck president Melbourne Pilots “What does it look like in practice?”
 Selected Incident Reports
For incidents/occurrences below irrefutable evidence was obtained from recordings (VDR &
VTS) and provides a window into present operational practices.
• CITY OF ROTTERDAM/ PRIMULA SEAWAYS Collision, 03 December 2015
• AZAMARA QUEST - Grounding TORY CHANNEL, 27 January 2016
• MOLLY MANX - Grounding PORT CHALMERS, 19 August 2016
• CMA CGM VASCO DE GAMA – Grounding SOUTHAMPTON, 22 August 2016
• NAVIOS NORTHERN STAR – Contact with Navigation Buoy TORRES STRAIT, 15 March 2016
• L’AUSTRAL - Grounding MILFORD SOUND, 9 February 2017
• AQUA DIVA – Near grounding NEWCASTLE, 12 February 2017
• CMA CGM CENTAURUS - Heavy contact with quay and two shore cranes Jebel Ali, 4 May 2017
• LEDA MAERSK, grounding, Port Chalmers, 10 June 2018

Similar Accidents implies need for ‘Evidence Based Training’ (Captain Simon Henderson)
Common Features in Accident Reports
• Inadequate passage/pilotage plan*/berthing plan (Turns not planned)
• No ‘shared mental model’ leading to lack of involvement of bridge team
• Portable Piloting Unit (PPU) not used
• Ship’s equipment not used
• Overreliance on visual navigation*, local knowledge and pilots intuition
(*Specifically mentioned in very recent TAIC Leda Maersk Report)
(Not Conning from the Centre line & Line of Sight/Relative
Navigation)
*Fit for purpose passage/pilotage plan – Focus of NZMPA 2018 Post
Conference Seminars
 Pilotage in the Age of Big Data
Establishment and implementation of Good Practice in regard to:
- Visual Piloting techniques
- Passage/Pilotage Plan including turns and swept path
- PPU Usage
- ‘Shared Mental Model’ for involvement of bridge team
- Use of Ship’s Equipment*
- Shiphandling maneuvers (Application of concept of ‘stabilised approach’)
- Integrated approach
- (New Routines - Scanning techniques)
As cooperation from ships bridge to apply BRM is not always available what is
the minimum that can be expected from the pilot?
*Compulsory carriage of ECDIS from 01 July 2018. (Introduction of ENC Usage 6 charts in
Australia)
 Pilotage in the Age of Big Data
• Need for ‘good practice’ to be embedded into ‘fit for
purpose’ Pilotage Operations Safety Management
System (POSMS) with the aim of reducing the risk of
HiLo events and made an integral part of training,
operational practice and checking
(Need for special SMS to reduce risk of HiLo Events in
Pilotage Operations understood and developed
independently in Australia 2012/2013)
 Response to Developments
• What does piloting in a way that will withstand the level of scrutiny
possible with today’s technology look like in practice?
• What needs to be done?
• Comparing the pilot and MAIB approach in regard to Vasco Da Gama/Molly
Manx etc. (‘single person’ versus ‘system’ approach)
• Finnish Study (2004) Practices in Pilotage - Past, Present and Future.
(Captain Larjo member of working group)
• Methods of piloting mentioned in Study - Visual Piloting Day, Visual Piloting
Night, Radar Piloting*, Integrated Bridge System Piloting*, PPU Piloting*
• Why is licensing still mainly based on visual piloting?
• Reappraisal of pilotage (training, operational practices checking etc.)?
• Establishment of good practice etc.
• Advantages of ‘real time navigation’ needs to be understood
• Using cruise ships as test beds? – Offer by P&O Cruises
Captain Kari Larjo (1934-2018)
 Maximum Situational Awareness
• Need for concept of ‘maximum situational awareness’* to be understood and
implemented ( Peter Dann)
Concept incorporates:
• Common ‘Fit for Purpose’ Pilotage Plan on PPU and ships equipment
(Reference for pilot, basis of ‘shared mental model’ & intervention by bridge team)
• Input of Pilot
• Input of Bridge Team
• Monitoring of visual references
• Monitoring of information from PPU & ship’s sensors (Paul Stanley)
• Input of Tugs
• Input of VTS (Captain Wendy Doran)
• Internal and External Scans
Extremely difficult to recognise loss of situational awareness without a reference
(pilotage plan)
*Term used in US Navy Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents Published 26 October
2017. Review includes recommendation for supplying PPU’s to surface fleets ships for increasing situational
awareness.
 Seaworthiness & Passage Planning
• At 0235 on 18 May 2011 CMA CGM Libra grounded at Port of Xiamen China
• 08 March 2019 Justice Teare (Admiralty) Court judged owners had not exercised ‘due
diligence’ and found the ship to be unseaworthy because of a defective passage plan.
• Justice Teare dismissed the argument that there had been no previous ruling that a
ship is unseaworthy as a consequence of having a defective passage plan.
• “Just as the standard of seaworthiness may rise with improved knowledge of
shipbuilding, so may the standard of seaworthiness rise with improved knowledge of
the documents required to be prepared prior to a voyage to ensure, so far as
reasonably possible, that the vessel is safely navigated”
Judgement: “https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5c9073f42c94e007bbae33e1

From 01 July 2018 mandatory carriage of ECDIS

Outsourcing of voyage planning

How does the above impact on marine pilotage?

 Remote Pilotage
Covered by Jorgen Strandberg
 Conclusions
• Pilotage is being put under scrutiny as never before. This is only going to
increase.
• “Whatever way pilotage is conducted, it has to be able to withstand
the scrutiny that is possible post occurrence with today’s
technology”
• In one word what is required is consistency
• In an evidence based environment transparency is the only option
• What are the consequences of not addressing issues related to revealed
deficiencies in present day pilotage practices?
• Need for ‘Reconceptualisation of Pilotage’ to be understood and
implemented*.
*Maximum Situational Awareness
 Options
• Maintain status quo? It is as good as it gets!

• Meet the challenge by:

- doing a gap analysis
- identifying deficiencies in the present system
- develop a programme to address gaps and deficiencies

NZMPA 2018 Conference (26-28 November 2018) devoted to

identifying and working on meeting challenges of ‘Pilotage in the
Age of Big Data’
 Outcomes of NZMPA Seminars
Wellington 29/30 November 2018
Pilot’s response towards Pilotage being placed on WatchList
How did pilotage go on the WatchList? For not implementing BRM
(BRM = People, Procedures and Equipment)
Procedures = Pilotage Plan (Reference for pilot & level of detail to facilitate
intervention)
Equipment = PPU & Ship’s Equipment
(Special Training & Endorsement on licence for PPU)
Integrated Bridge System (sub-section Cruise Ship piloting)
(Special training & Endorsement on licence for Integrated Bridge System
pilotage)
 Outcomes of NZMPA Seminars
Wellington 29/30 November 2018
• Development of ‘Good Practice’ for pilotage operations.
Good Practice to be embedded in a fit for purpose Pilotage Operations Safety Management
System (POSMS) to manage HiLo events and made foundation for training, operational
practice and checking.
• Pilots need to develop understanding of Systems approach to safety used by TAIC -
Special Workshops to be organised by NZMPA & conducted by TAIC for this purpose.
• Reappraisal of Pilot Licencing (Licencing based mainly on visual piloting no longer
sufficient).
• Actions - Immediate, Short, Medium and Long Term
Working Groups – Pilotage Plan & Good Practice
*MODERNISATION/RECONCEPTUALISATION OF MARINE PILOTAGE (Building Blocks/KPI’s)
• Concern over Standards of Pilot Cards (AMPI Working Group – Captain Craig Eastaugh)
Progress Report by Matt Conyers (NZMPA)
 Present Situation
“Every body is on the same road, some are
walking, some are running and some are just
standing around wondering how to get started”
Captain Tony Herriott
 Suggested Reading List
1. Practices in Pilotage – Past Present and Future – Finnish Safety Study* (2004) Captain Kari
Larjo a member of the working group.
https://turvallisuustutkinta.fi/en/index/tutkintaselostukset/vesiliikenneonnettomuuksientutkinta/tutkintaselostuksetvuosittain/ve
siliikenne2004/s12004mbluotsaustyojasenkehitys.html
2. Sharing Mental Models in Confined Waters – Antonio Di Lieto, Hans Hederstrom, Peter
Listrup, Ravi Nijjer (2018)https://www.csmartalmere.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Sharing-Mental-Models-in-
confined-waters-Seaways-June-2018-002.pdf
3. Bathymetric ENC’S in Confined Waters – Antonio Di Lieto, Mike Prince and Alvaro Sanchez
(2018)https://www.csmartalmere.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Bathymetric-ENCs-in-confined-waters-Hydro-
International-June-2018.pdf
4. Reaching Out to the Next Generation (Article Seaways October 2019 - pp 06-08) – Captain
Nick Nash President Nautical Institute http://edition.pagesuite-
professional.co.uk/html5/reader/production/default.aspx?pubname=&edid=31aff897-257a-4f91-a4e2-1171f3c6ec8b&pnum=8
Thank You
End
Ravi Nijjer
Principal Consultant
Marine Consultancy Group Pty Ltd
Mob: +61 (0)419 565 860
Email: ravi.nijjer@marcon.com.au