Duns Scotus' Teaching

on the Distinction Between

Essence and Existence
by Andrew Joseph O'Brien, S. J.

A S EVERY STUDENT of scholastic philosophy is too well

rt a,Yare, one of the principal problems in dispute among the
medieval scholastics was the nature of the distinction between
the esscncc and existence of creatures. In fact, some textbooks
and histories of philosophy tend to classify medieval thinkers
chieily according to the answer they gave to this problem. What
was the position of Duns Scotus on this question? There can
be no doubt about the fact that he emphatically denied the so-
called Thomistic real distinction, but it is difficult to determine
from his extant writings what exactly was his positive position
on the question.
Although Scotus wrote commentaries or treatiscs on dis-
puted questions of his age, his genius was more one of criticism
than of constructive synthesis. Therefore, he left no Summa
Philosophica or Summa Theologica. With relentless logic
Scotus refuted the opinions, or at least the arguments, of his
opponents on thcse questions. While in this fervor of criticizing
the beliefs of others, he sometimcs ncglected to set down his own
V18WS. This is especially true concerning the problem of the
relation between the essence and existence of actual contingent
beings, since in no one paragraph or sentence of his writings
does Scotus explicitly state his own understanding of this
distinction.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the commentators
on Scotus, following his lead, do not consider the question except
to mention the fact that Scotus denied the real distinction, e. g.,
Mingcs, Longpre, Pulzanski, Landry, Grajewski, Beraud de
61
62 Andrew Joseph O'Brien

Saint Maurice, Shircel and Bettoni. However, in view of the

Subtle Doctor's clear denial of the real distinction and because
of the prominence in his system of his peculiar formal distinc-
tion a parte rei, a good number of historians of philosophy have
somewhat hastily assumed that Scotus' answer to the problem
is to be understood in terms of this distinction for which he is
famous. Koone of them, however, has ever advanced any
textual evidence to support this claim. Let me cite but a few
examples.
Fr. Frederick Copleston, S. J. writes:
One of the questions in which Scotus applies his formal distinction is
the question of the distinction which obtains between essence and exis-
tence in the creature. 1

Then in a footnote he remarks:

It must be admitted that Scotus confines himself to denying the real
distinction and does not explicitly apply the formal objective distinction
to the relation of essence and existence in the creature; but the doctrine
of Scotists on this points seems to me to be a reasonable interpretation
of Scotus' meaning.

:Maurice De Wulf has this to say:

La distinctio formalis a parte rei permet d'etaler la richesse de la sub-
stance individuelle, tout en restant fidele a l'individualisme. A un point
de vue elle complique Ie reel, puisqu'elle assure a des entites internes
une valeur independante (a parte rei) que Ie thomisme leur refuse.
A un autre point de vue elle Ie simplifie, puisqu'elle l'interprete suivant
un principe homogene: les di,stinctions reelles entre l'essence et l'exis-
tence entre l'ame et ses facultes disparaissent etc. 2 (italics mine).

According to Paul Geny, S. J.,

Quae distinctio [formalis ex natura rei] ponitur etiam inter diversas
formas substantiales eiusdem individui, inter materiam primo primam
et suam formam, inter essentiam et esse in creatis etc. s

1 History of Philosophy, (London, 1950) II, 510.

2 Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale, (Paris, 1936) p.348.
3 Brevis Oonspectus Historiae Philo80phiae, (Rome, 1928) p. 188. Bishop
 Scotus on Essence and Existence 63

There is only one commentator among the many that we have

consulted \vho explicitly denies that Scotus applied his formal
distinction to the relation of the essence and existence of
creatures. D. E. Sharp remarks:
Scotus does not professedly raise the question of the relation of the
essence of the eompositc to its existence. . . . He leaves the manner
of their distinction undecided, and it can only be added that he does
not think of them as formally distinct, for things formally distinguished
can never be really separated, and hence there eould be no possible
essences and no corruption of existing ones. 4

These remarks betray the author's ignorance of the precise

question at issue, which is the nature of the distinction between
an actually existing individual essence and its existence---or,
in Thomistic terminology, its act of existence-and not between
a potentially existing essence and its actual existence. Scotus,
together with all orthodox scholastics, admits that there is a
real distinction between a merely possible essence, viewed funda-
mentally as identical with the divine essence, and one that is
actually existing.
Some commentators seem to interpret Scotus as teaching only
a purely rational or conceptual distinction between an actually
existing essence and its actual existence, probably basing them-
selves on such texts as Certum est de esse essentiae, quod tantum
William Turner in hiR History of Philosophy, (New York, 1903) p. 390,
states that" between essence and existence there is, according to Scotus, a
, distinetio formalis a parte rei '." In a footnote Turner refers to In IlIum
Sent., Dist. VI, Q. I. He then, with his usual perspicacity, significantly
adds that "sometimes as In Hum Sent., Dist. XVI, Q. I. (OlJe1'a, ed.
Wadding, yol. VI, P. II, p. 7()3), Scotus speaks as if the distinction were
conceptual or, at the most, modal." Cf. S. Curtis, A Short IIistory of Phi-
losophy in the Middle liges, (London, 1950) p. 224, "Therefore, while
denying the real distinction between essence and existence Scotus taught
that there is a distinctio formalis a parte rei." Cf. C. Harris (Duns Scotus,
[Oxford, 1927] I, 367) who asserts that according to Scotus' Opus Oxoniense
"essence and existence are distinct, but not realiter, only forma liter."
• Jlranciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century, (Oxford,
1930) pp.307-8.
64 Andrew Joseph O'Brien

differt ab essentia in modo concipiendi. 5 Here, however, one

must carefully distinguish between the Scotistic doctrine of the
metaphysical or potential esse essentiae and the quite different
teaching concerning the individual actually existing essence or
esse existentiae, which is the only question at issue. Fr.
Timothy Barth, O. F. M., maintains that Scotus held only a
rational distinction between the essence and existence of crea-
tures. 6 However, this contention of Barth must be interpreted
in the context of his argument. He is trying to prove the
absolute simplicity of the Scotistic notion of being. His own
interpretation of Scotus is that being comprehendit et notionem
U quid" et aptitudinem ad existentiarn, that is, an essence
which is capable of existing. When it is objected that this
relation to existence would militate against the absolute sim-
plicity of the notion of being, Barth answers:
Si subtilis inter essentiam et existentiam aetualem non postulat nisi
distinetionem rationis adaequatam,-essentia non includit eoneeptualiter
existentiam et vice versa-, a fortiori pro relatione inter essentiam et
existentiam aptitudinalem non plus statuere potest quam distinetionem
rationis inadaequatam, quia haee relatio intimior est quam illa inter
essentiam et existentiam actualem vigens. 7

'\Vhat is the textual basis for Barth's contention that Scotus

held only an adequate rational distinction between an actually
existing essence and its actual existence? In a footnote to the
above passage Barth refers to Scotus' Commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics. 8 There we find that it is only a question of the
" Opus Omon. 3, d. 6, q. 1, n. 2; XIV, 306 (Vives edition, Paris, 1891-95).
6 T. Barth, "De fundamento univocationis apud Joannem Duns Scotum,"

Antonianum, XIV (1939) 181,206,277-298, 373-392. In the course of his

study Barth remarks that S. Belmond, O. F. M., in his Dieu, Emistence et
Oognoscibilite, speaks of the distinction "tout au moins rationelle de
l'essence et de l'existence." (p. 279) He also categorically asserts (p.
204) that "essentia et existentia, qua principia constitutiva entis, non
differunt nisi ratione."
7 Ibid. pp. 286-287.

SIn Meta. 9, q. 2, n. 7; VII, 535 (Vives edition, Paris, 1891-95).

 Bcotus on Essence and Existence 65

relation of a potential essence and its actual existence, which

is quite irrelevant to the issue at hand, namely the distinction
between an actually existing essence and its supposed act of
existence.
It is possible that some of those who interpret Scotus as
holding a formal distinction between a creature's essence and
existence assume that this is so because the Subtle Doctor clearly
maintains such a distinction between the common nature and
its" haecceity" or principle of individuality.9 However, this
would be to confuse the principle of individuation of an actually
existing individual and the act of existence. The principle of
individuation for Scotus is formally distinct from the common
or specific essence, while the question which we are considering
is the distinction between an actually existing individual essence
and its actual existence.
}\,f uch of the confusion surrounding Scotus' positive doctrine
concerning the nature of the distinction between the essence and
existence of creatures is due to the absence in his writings of a
clear-cut differentiation between the various distinctions that he
mentions. He indicates what he means by his peculiar formal
distinction a pa.rte rei and succeeds in his attempt to explain,
in terms of his univocal concept of being, its difference from a
real and a purely rational distinction. But he then seems to
interpose between this formal and purely rational distinction
another, a modal distinction, the significance of which is some-
·what ambiguous in his system. lO Is this modal distinction
simply a rational distinction or is it a virtual distinction-that
is, a rational distinction with an extrinsic foundation in reality
-or is it a minimal grade of a formal distinction a parte rei
with an intrinsic foundation in reality? Many commentators on
Scotus and historians of philosophy simply disregard this modal
distinction, when they explain the Scotistic doctrine on dis-
• Cf. Harris, op. cit., II, 91-92.
10 Cf. Opus Oxon., I, d. 8, q. 3, n. 27; XI, 626-7.
66 Andrew Joseph OJ Brien

tinctions. l l Other commentators, like Gilson, are careful to

point out that the modal distinction is a distinction made by
the Scotistic school rather than by Scotus himself.12
Among the authors that we have read, Fr. Allan Wolter,
O. F. M., is the only one who makes any attempt to explain
this modal distinction. He observes that
Scotists dispute whether this so-called distinctio formalis modalis is
really a distinction a parte rei or merely a virtual or mental distinction
with an extrinsic foundation in things. While reasons for both inter-
pretations may be found, the author is inclined to believe that Scotus
regarded it as a distinction a parte rei but less than the strict formal
distinction. Even within the limits of the strict formal distinction
Scotus admits of various gradations. The line between the least of the
formal distinctions and this "modal" distinction is easily crossed, if
such a line exists at all. 13

However, in this passage Fr. W oltor is concerned only with

the modal distinction in general; nowhere in this work does
he consider its possible appHcation to the distinction of a crea-
ture's essence and existence. In a later work he makes the
following interesting observation:
Suarez quidem cum suis stant pro distinctione rationis cum funda-
mento in rei. Similiter multi Scotistae; alii autem Scotistae postulant
distinctionem formalem ita ut essentia et existentia sint duae formalitates
eiusdem rei actualis. Utrique assidue laborant ad trahendum Scotum
in suam partem. Haec theoria formalis distinctionis fere eadem est ac
opinio Thomistarum, qui intelligunt nomine res aliquid aliud quam
Scotistae. Existentia et essentia, aiunt, sunt distincte conceptibiles in
illo ente actuali, sed ab invicem separari nequeunt. Sed tales, in lingua
Scotistica, nihil aliud sunt quam formalitates.
Quid ergo sentiendum est'! Breviter possumus dicere distinctionem
inter essentiam et existentiam alicuius actualis rei esse nec realem nee

11 For instance, P. Minges, O. F. M., in his .JO'l·nnis Duns Scoti Doctrinae

Philosophica et Theologica (Olean, N. Y., 1930) II, 75.

12 E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris, 1952) p. 244, n. l.

,. The Transeendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns

Scotus (Olean, N. Y., 1946) p.24.
 Scotus on Essence and Existence 67
formalem, sed rationis tantum. Impossibile est enim concipere exis-
tentiam actualem absque suo subjecto, quod est ipsa quidditas seu
essentia. Hine uistinctio videtur esse mere ccmceptuulis "eu rationis
vel forsan, in lingua Scotistica, formalis modalis.14

Does the author mean to suggest by these last words: " perhaps
in Scotistic terminology, a formal modal" distinction, that this
distinction is simply a virtual distinction, the Thomistic equi-
valent of the Suarezian rational distinction with a foundation
in reality? The question then arises as to whether this founda-
tion is intrinsic or extrinsic to the reality in question. In other
words, is the foundation in reality for the distinction between
a creature's essence and existence the inherent finiteness of the
creature, which is something intrinsic to the very mode of its
existence, or is it merely the extrinsic fact that it is created
and therefore contingent ~ In the latter case, the Scotistic dis-
tinction would not differ at all from that of Suarez and from
the Thomistic virtual distinction; in the former case, the
Scotistic modal distinction between the creature's essence and
existence would be a pade rei, a formal distinction, though not
a strict formal distinction. 15 Referring to modal distinction,
Fr. Wolter remarks:
This is not yet a strict formal distinction because an intrinsic mode
is not a formality in its own right. As will be discussed later, such a
mode is essentially a qualification. It includes both in thought and in
definition the notion of the subject of which it is the mode, even though
the subject enters the definition EK7rporr(}f.O"Ew" as Aristotle put it. The
mode consequently is incapable of terminating a distinct and proper

11 Surnmula J[ etaphY8icae (Milwaukee, 1958) pp. 72-3. It is interesting

to note that in this work Fr. ·Wolter does not explicitly consider the modal
distinction among the kinds of distinction which are metaphysically perti-
nent, though he refers in the index of this book to p. 38, where he says that
there is an "inadequate distinction" between" subjectum et eius modum,
nam modus includit subjectum quod modificat."
15 In this connection it is significant that Suarez refers to the Scotistie

distinction between the creature's essence and existence as "modalis seu

formalis." Cf. Disp1ltationes M etaphysioae, Disp. XXXI, sect. I, n. 11.
68 Andrew Joseph O'Brien
concept. With the perfection which it modifies the case is slightly
different. It can be conceived without including the modality at all.16

This ambiguity surrounding the Scotistic modal distinction

will probably account for Gilson's cautious observations on the
Scotistic distinction between a creature's essence and existence.
At times he speaks of the distinction of a creature's essence from
its existence as only formal, as when he says that "l'essence
d'un homme reste formellement distincte de son existence." 11
But here it is to be noted, he is speaking only of the esse
essentiae. 1S In general, Gilson in his interpretation of Scotus
rightly refers to the actual existence of a creature as a " modality
of essence," which, he implies, is distinguishable from it by a
modal distinction, as when he says that" pour Duns Scot l'exis-
tence est plutot une modalite de l'essence, de sorte que l'etre
reel est l'essence sous Ie mode de l'existant." 19 Scotus, according
to Gilson, always maintained that" l'etre vraiment reel est une
essence a laquelle la modalite ' existence' survient pour en iaire
un etre au sens plein du terme." 20
In an attempt to arrive at an understanding of Scotus' mind
on this question, all conclusions as to what he considered to be
the distinction between the esse and essentia of a finite creature
can be achieved only by determining what would be most con-

,. The Transcendentals and their Ji'unction in the Metaphysics of Duns

Scotus, p. 25.
17 Gilson, op. cit., p. 203.

18 Cf. ibid., p. 204.

19 Ibid., p. :ms.

20 Ibid., p. 204. Cf. p. 235: "En tant qU'ilR sont reels, tous ces (ltres
existent, mais leur existence n'est qu'une modalite de leur essence, ce n'est
donc pas dans une composition reelle d'essence et d'existence qu'on peut
situer la caracteristique du fini comme tel." Cf. p. 549, note 2: "Celle-ci
[I'existence], on Ie sait, n'est pas chez lui [Duns Scot] un acte de l'essence,
mais elle s'en distingue a titre de modalite." Cf. p. 202, note 2: "Duns
Scot n'a jamais admis que la modaliM 'existence' filt, au sein de la sub-
stance actuellcment existante, un acte distinct de l'essence. C'est par son
essentia qU'une chose est un ens, y compris meme cette modalite de l'essence
qu'est l'esse."
 Bcotus on Essence and Existence 69

sistent with the Subtle Doctor's general metaphysical principles.

Likewise, verification of any hypothetical solution of the ques-
tion should be restricted to Duns Scotus' writings. n
There is in the Scotistic metaphysics an univocal concept of
being which is neither a genus nor a category and which
represents something common to all things, God and creatures.
Employing a negative formulation, Duns Scotus defined being
as "that to which to be (esse) is not repugnallt." 22 Let us
assume with Timothy Barth that being, according to Scotus,
expresses primarily a quidditative notion, an essence which has
an aptitude to exist. Of itself, this essence or nature is neither
universal nor singular, but is indifferent to both universality
and singularity. It becomes universal when it is abstracted by
the human intellect, which confers on it universal predicability.
This absolute essence becomes particularized when it is united
with matter, and it becomes a singular individual when it
receives its ultimate determination, the" thisness" (haecceitas)
which, though not of itself a form, is, for Scotus, a " formality"
a parte rei. This metaphysical structure of the Scotistic being
closely follows a framework that is of A vicennian inspiration.
Gilson's commentary on this subject is:
On peut dire, en gros que cette division tripartite des etats de l'essence
m"icenienne prefigure les trois etats scotistes de l'etre: l'essence dans Ie
reel singulier constitue son etat physique; l'essence con~ue par la pensee
comme universelle ou singuliere constitue son etat logique; l'essence
prise en elle-meme et sans aucune autre determination constitue son etat
metaphysique. Si cela est exact, on peut des it present prevoir, au
moins comme hypothece de recherche, que l'etre dont Duns Scot fait

21 Only those works that have the approbation of the Scotistic Institute

are employed in this paper. For an exposition of what is being done by the
Scotistic Institute at Rome and what writings can be accepted, the reader
should confer M. Grajewski's "Duns Scotus in the Light of Modern Re·
search," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,
XVIII (1942) ltlS·IS5.
22 Opus Oxon, 4, d. S, q. 1, n. 2; XVII, 7: "Ens, hoc est cui non repugnat
esse."
70 Andrew Joseph O'Brien
l'object de sa metaphysique, bien qu'il ne soit peut-etre pas exactement
une essence, est neanmoins connu par l'intellect comme s'i1 en etait
une; 1'" etre" pris en tant que tel et sans aucucune diitermination. 23

Because of Scotus' peculiar concept of the univocity of being,

he must posit some element by "\vhich the indetermined univocal
concept of being can be contracted or determined to the various
particular beings. To meet this problem, Scotus introduces
the subtle doctrine of intrinsic modes. 24 His interpreters are
not in agreement on this point. In general all the commentators
mention this doctrine of intrinsic modes or modalities, but it is
significant that Scotus never developed his doctrine of intrinsic
modes in any philosophical detail.
Among the passiones entis or the intrinsic modes of being
Scotus did distinguish between those that arc in themselves
convertible with being-such transcendentals as unity, truth,
and goodness-and those that are passiones disjunctae, that is,
those that are coextensive with being only when they are taken
disjunctively or as correlatives, such as the correlative modes
of finite and infinite, necessary and contingent, actual and
potential, absolute and relative, simple and composed.
We can find occasions where Scotus applies his doctrine of
intrinsic modes; for example, the disjunctive intrinsic modes by
which the univocal concept of being is contracted to God and
creatures are infinity and finitude. 25 In this context infinity
is not an attribute of the Divine Being; for it is to be under-
stood as an intrinsic mode of being. The concept of God's
infinite being is merely the univocal concept of being pure
and simple, determined by the highest degree of perfection.
Furthermore, we know that Scotus taught that these modes do
not imply composition in the being in which they are found. 26
28 Gilson, op. cit., p. 86 .

•• Cf. M. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of DWIS Scotus (Washington,

1944) p. 82.
250xon.1, d. 8, q. 3, n. 17; IX, 597.
26 Ibid., n. 17.
 Scotus on Essence and Existence 71

The mode can never be conceived without the notion of its

quiddity.
It becomes evident that in Scotism there is no room for any
real distinction between the essence and existence of creatures,
because being is univocal and is always determined by the actual
condition of its essence. An essence exists just as much as it is,
and its existence is exactly defined by the mode of being which
belongs to that essence. Scotus himself makes this clear when he
rejects the opinion that material substance is individuated by
its esse. That which is not of itself distinct cannot distinguish
another. :Kow existence is not determined to diverse genera and
species unless by a determination of essences of which it is the
existence; otherwise existences would have their proper genera,
species and differences besides those of their essences. Further-
more, "the predicamental coordination "-identity-of essence
and existence in an actual creature is really a relative coordinac
tion (per se est secundum quid), in so far as the essence of a
creature prescinds from existence; only in God is existence
necessarily included in the essence. 2 '
The actual existence of creatures thus appears inseparable
from the essence when esse is taken in all its determinations.
Scotus does mention that essence is abstracted from existence
to give a coordination secundum quid. ·What, then, is the relation
between the essence and existence of a creature? Strictly
speaking, Duns Scotus, I think, would have dismissed this
question as irrelevant. This is suggested by his rare and
incidental statements on the topic.
Weare certain that Scotus denies the real distinction between
the essence and existence of creatures.
It is simply false, that existence (esse) is something different from
essence. 28
The proposition is false, that just as existence stands to essence, so

27In Meta. 7, q. 13, n. 7; VII, 408.

280won. 4, d. 13, q. 1, n. 38; XVII, 692.
72 Andrew Joseph O'Brien
operation [operariJ stands to potency, for existence is really the same
as the essence and does not proceed from essence, whereas act or opera-
tion proceeds from potency and is not really the same as potency.29

This assertion does appear, at first glance, to be directed against

the real distinction attributed to St. Thomas, but given Scotus'
conception of the real distinction, one recognizes that Scotus is
rcctually refuting the doctrine of Giles of Rome, for whom
essence and existence were physically separable. Among the
Scotistic distinctions a real distinction is one of separability,
i. e., between two beings. "Esse essentiae is never really sep-
arable from esse existentiae." 30 Otherwise creation would be
impossible. 31
Sometimes Scotus speaks of existence as an "accident" of
the essence, a determination of essence not included in its
definition. 32 However, by this he does not mean that existence is
a sort of physical accident entering into a real composition
with the essence or substance, as Avicenna maintained. Rather,
for Scotus actual existence is related to a potential essence as a
logical accident because it is formally outside the definition of
the individual essence. 33 According to Seotus, it is only God's
existenee that is so identical with His essenee that it is distin-
guishable only rationally. Suarez, as we have seen, understood
that Scotus held the distinction between a creature's essence
and existence to be more than a logical one, referring to it as
" modalis seu formalis." On the other hand, the Doctor Eximius
··Omon. 2, d. 16, q. 1, n. 10; XIII, 28.
30 Ibid., d. 1, q. 2, n. 7; XI, 63.

31 All these quotations and more denying the real distinction are taken

from questions where Duns Scotus is discussing creation.

32 Omon. 2, d. 3, q. 3, n. 3; XII, 88: " ... quae distinctio est aliquo modo

accidentalis, licet non sit vere accidentalis."

33 Cf. Rep. Par. 3, d. 22, q. 1, n. 13; XXIII, 426. Cf. Gilson, op. cit.,
p. 388: "Avicenne considere celle-ci [l'existence] un append ice de l'essence,
que l'on convient, chez les Latins, de nommer un 'accident'; pour Duns
Scot l'existence est plutOt une modaliM de l'essence, de sorte que l'etre reel
est l'essence sous Ie mode de l'existant."
 Scotus on Essence and Existence 73

never explains just what he understood by that distinction or

what Scotus meant by it. 34 Hellce, in interpreting Scotus'
doctrine on the <listinction between a creature's essence and
existence, there seems to remain only the possibility of either
a formal distinction a parte rei or a modal distinction.
A part from the notions of haecceitas as the principle of
in<lividuation and of the univocity of the concept of being, no
doctrine is more distinctly Scotistic than the formal distinction
a parte rei. While pondering the mysteries of the Trinity and
the divine attributes, Scotus first postulated the formal dis-
tinction to elucidate these theological problems. The formal
distinction is by no means easy to grasp. Points like this
earned for Scotus the title of Doctor Subtilis. It is also beyond
the scope of this paper to develop the doctrine of the formal
distinction. Maurice Grajewski, after a long inductive analysis,
thus defines the formal distinction:
A formal distinction is a distinction from the nature of the thing
occurring between two or more really identical formalities, of which one,
before the operation of the intellect, is conceivable without the others
though inseparable from them even by divine power. 35

The formal distinction is stronger than a purely rational

distinction, which is purely conceptional "with no real founda-
tion in objective reality; yet is weaker than a real distinction,
because it entails no distinction in actual existence; but it is
also stronger than the modal distinction, because it entails a
distinction between two formally distinct essences or quiddities.
The essence and existence of a creature can never he formally
distinct if we follow the above definition and understand what
a formality means according to Scotus. A creature's actual
34 Suarez did not seem to have understood the Scotistic doctrine on

formalities and the formal distinction; for he argued against the Scotistic
application of this distinction to the divine attributes as though it were
a real distinction. Cf. Suarez, ']'ractatus De Divina SUbstantia Eiusque
Attributis, 1., c. 13, n. 5 .. 6; I, 39 .. 40 (Vives edition).
35 Grajewski, op. cit., p. 93.
74 Andrew Joseph O'Brien

existence IS not a formality since it does not have any proper

quiddity or essence of its own. Only the essence which exists
can be defined. That only an essence can be a formality Scotus
states explicitly in his writings. s6 Therefore, in a creature
there can be no formal distinction between the formality of an
essence and an existence which is not a formality.
To deny that Scotus held the formal distinction between the
essence and existence of creatures might seem somewhat novel
in view of the absence of any explicit statement by Seotus on
this question and the consequent assumption of most commen-
tators that he distinguished them formally. Some commentators
will take time to insert a footnote or, at most, a few lines
assuming that Scotus postulated a formal distinction in this
matter. Most of the commentators ignore the question. Few
cite texts. The texts referred to are generally vague and the
conclusion is that Scotus, 'while still holding more than a logical
distinction, denies a distinction that is real. Either neglecting
the modal distinction or without knovi'ledge of its significance-
which appears to be the casc--, most commentators suppose that
the distinction must be a formal one.
Since there are no works developing this conclusion and
because each formality according to Scotus must be capable of
terminating a distinct and proper essential concept, I submit
that Scotus' distinction between the essence and existence of
a creature was neither a real distinction nor a purely rational
distinction nor a formal distinction a parte rei in the strict
sense but, rather, a modal distinction. An example of this
8. Cf. 011IOn. 1, d. 8, q. 4, n. 18; IX, 665: "Quod autem non includet
formaliter ut in communi, hoc declaro, quia includere formaliter est inelu-
dere aliquid in ratione sua essentiali, ita quod si definitio includentis
assignaretul', inclusum csset definitio vel pars definitionis. Sicut autem
dcfinitio bonita tis in communi non habet sapientiam in se, ita nee infinita
infinitam. Est igitur aliquam non identitas formalis sapicntiac et bonitatis,
inquantum earum essent distinctae definitiones, si essent definibiles: defi-
nitio autem non tantum indieat rationem causatam all intellectu, sed quid-
ditatem rei, ergo non est identitas formalis ex parte reL"
 Scotus on .Essence and Existence 75

distinction would be that which exists between the divine essence

and the modality of infinity in God. This distinction seems to
be a pa,rte rei, for Scotus refers to it as a distinctio in re. 37
Therefore, it is not a type of purely rational distinction. The
formality and its intrinsic moJe are not so identical that ·we
cannot conceive the formality without the mode. Still they are
not separable-the mark of a real distinction-nor is the mode
capable of terminating a distinct and proper essential concept--
the mark of a formal distinction-, since it is a qualification
and includes, both in thought and in definition, the notion of
the subject of which it is the mode. 1£ finite existence can be
understood only aR it modality of essence in Scotus' metaphysics,
then the essence and existence of creatures are distinct by a
modal distinction.
After denying the real distinction between the essence and
existence of creatures, Scotus adds: "It is certain that the
esse essentiae differs from essence only in the mode of con-
ceiving it." 38 What are we to conclude concerning the esse
existenliae of a creature, which is the real question at issue?
In the Seotistic metaphysics actual existence, whether infinite
or finite, is extrinsic to the univocal or purely logical concept
of being, but in the order of reality, finite and/or infinite actual
existence constitute a disjunctive mode of being, one of its
intrinsic modes which is distinguishable from being, viewed as
primarily quidditative or as that to which actual existence is
not repugnant, not really or raticnally but only modally. Finite
actual existence cannot be distillgiushed from an actually exist-
ing essence by the Scotistic formal distinction a parte rei for
the simple reason that an individual actual existence, according
to Scotus, is not an absolute essence and therefore cannot be a

"7 axon, 1, d. 8, q. 3, n. 27; IX, 627a: " ... distinctio in re sicut realitas
ct sui modi intrinseci."
38 axon. 3, d. 6, q. 1, n. 2; XIV, 3'06: "Certum est de esse essentiae, quod

tantuill difIert ab essentia in modo eoncipiendi."

76 Andrew Joseph OJ Brien

" formality." As a matter of fact, Scotus always viewed actual

existence as an intrinsic mode of being or, in other words, as
an intrinsic modality of essence. 59
We examined in the beginning of this paper the metaphysical
structure of the Scotistic being. Essence is identical with being
and actual existence is inseparable from aetual essenee. This is
why, whenever there is an essenee, there is being, and existenee
is simply the definite mode of being. The essenee of creatures
can be abstracted and forms a pl'oper coneept without C'xistence,
but existenee can be thought of only in terms of essenee. All
real perfection is in the line of essence, and existence is nothing
other than a state of actual essence which is opposed to the state
of nothingness or mere possible essence.
In addition one can say that essence and its existence in creatures are
related in the same manner as a quiddity and its mode, and, as such, they
are distinguished. However, in God existence belongs to the concept of
essence. 40

This is one of the more explieit texts from Seotus that con-
firms my belief that he eonsidered the existence of creatures as
only modally distinct from their essence. Such, also, is the
interpretation of the Seotistic metaphysics of being that is put
forward by Lyehetus, one of Scotus' most notable eommentators.
Writing on the above text, he remarks that existence is not really
distinguished from essence. It is an intrinsic mode of essence. 41
In another section this same authoritative eommentator tries to
explain how existence is distinguished from essenee outside of

•• Cf. Omon. 3, d. 6, q. 1, n. 7; XIV, 311: "Esse immediatius se habet ad

essentiam quam velle ad voluntatem." Omon. 2, d. 16, q. 1; XIII; Omon. 4,
d. 11, q. :I, n. 4G; XVII, 429; Omon. 4, d. 13, q. I, n. 38; XVII, 692; Rep.
PM. 3, d. G, q. 1; XXIII, 284·286.
<0 Quodl. q. 1, n. 4, additio; XXV, 9: "Ad secundum dici potest quod

essentia et ejus existentia in creaturis se habent sicut quidditas et modus,

ideo distinguuntur. In divinis autem existentia est de conceptu essentiae."
H Lychetu8, commentary on Questiones Quodlibetales, q. 1 (Vives edition,

Paris, 1893) XXV, 11: " ... secundum vero Doctorem [Scotum] existentia
non distinguitur realiter ab essentia, est enim gradus intrinsecus essentiae."
 Scotus on Essence and Existence 77
the operation of the intellect. After denying the real distinction
between existence and essence in creatures and explaining that
the existence in them is an intrinsic mode, and, therefore, not
distinguished as a formality a parte rei, he gives no answer but
simply tells us that it is the least distinction outside the mind. 42
Lychetus gives no evidence from the writings of Scotus to
support his opinion, but from an exhaustive study of the ques-
tion I believe that Scotus' distinction between the essence and
existence of creatures is neither a real distinction nor merely
a rational distinction but, at least, a modal distinction. Hence,
this modal distinction of a creature's essence and existence
must be, at the very least, a minimal form of the Scotistic formal
distinction a parte rei.

Loyola Seminary,
Shrub Oak, New York .

., Ibid., commentary on Omon. 2, d. 3, q. 1; XII, 52a.