Case 15 Pamatong vs Comelec

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558  dated January
17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to
include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the
power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also
has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates
since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of government.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, 2 and there is no plausible reason for according
a different treatment to the "equal access" provision

source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely
open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations
specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance
Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 10 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated.
Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to
file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.

Issue:

1.won pamatong IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE?

2.WON THE :EQUAL ACCES CLAUSE” AS THE PETITIONERS CLAIM IS VIOILATED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?

RULING Issue 2:

The court ruled equal access clause uinder the constitution is not violated. The court ratiocinated as follows: “As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, 2 and there is no plausible reason for according
a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not
contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. 3 The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. 4

The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and
prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that

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changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He
explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the
opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many
offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening
opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number
one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access
to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)

Ruling:

The Supreme Court rule of remanding the case to comelec and raciocinated as follows ”However valid the law and the COMELEC
issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the
basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered
in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account
the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.”

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible
candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at
this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is
not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.

A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a
cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.

In VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Case 14

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT et al..

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural

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resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: (SECTION 2. All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.)

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

PER CURIAM

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion
sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and
57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

RULING:

Justice Puno Separate Opinion

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences
were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign
in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture
and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators
to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The
Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino
people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task
of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the
country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

Justice Vitug Sepatate Opinion

CONCLUSION

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customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due
process clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it is
permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first
undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.

Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the law. Indeed, the State is
exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail a balancing of
interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national interest.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain."

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not, however, give Congress any
license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving
them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and domains. 41 But to
grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have
chosen to live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating "reverse discrimination." In seeking
to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced
generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national
proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few, however disadvantaged they
may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can
the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open to all and
by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice – empowering and enabling the
poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b),
8 and related provisions of RA 8371.

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Case 13 Opposa vs Factoran

Facts of the case:

The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently,
it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

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It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same
does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by
the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity
as  parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant.
For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with
sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving
a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

ISSUE: WON the petition allege by the petitioner amounts to “impairment of contracts and thus unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The supreme court ruled the petioner does not violate the non impairment clause of the constitution.

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first
place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If
he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.

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 A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between
the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in
cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
— under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to
protect and advance the said right.

Case 11

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to
nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine
Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare
the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:

defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no
legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political
question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one
Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution

ISSUE: WON THE ACT OF PRES ESTRADA OF commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the
Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis IS CONSTITUTIONAL?

The issues raised in the present petition are:

(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;

RULING:

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

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"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. 13 The term "interest" means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.14 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."15

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on
the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. 16 In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.17 Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.18 In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant
threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court
to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

(2) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review;
and,

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed
forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military
personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP
questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency
exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the
factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment."19

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper
for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of
this Court.

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter,  The American
Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that
follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public
order and security.

Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full
discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President’s exercise
of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he
categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in

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Metro Manila..."35 We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public
utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we
hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional
power.

(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in
the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the
Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. 37 Under the LOI, the police forces
are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment
of the Marines.39 It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers.40 In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover,
the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount
to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. 41

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such,
there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in
the Constitution.

RULING:

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy,
and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is
just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the
President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not
inclined to overrule the President’s determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political
or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and
the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when
people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

9|Page
Case 10

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended
Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to
complete the presentation of its evidence.

ISSUES:

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

RULING: We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government
agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG’s power
under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of
this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; 17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other
cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’ case should fall under
the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was
undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.

10 | P a g e
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor
General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan. 32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel. 33

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

RULING: We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had
almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of
its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 34 The motion sought "to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully
acquired by defendant Dimaano alone

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioner’s evidence since petitioner did not state when it would
file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29
September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner
manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on
the matter, to wit:

Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against private
respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the presentation of petitioner’s
evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioner’s case since these properties comprise most of
petitioner’s evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private
respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five
days after the successful EDSA revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by
the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25
March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was
indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution);
and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant")
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
11 | P a g e
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno: 42

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were
valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and
orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioner’s witnesses, the
raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional
provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who
were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In

RULING:

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. 52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of
these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991
and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as
the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of
any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Case 8 BELGICA VS EXEC SECRETARY

Facts of the case:

the cases are two consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System.

Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin. 3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling
out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to
assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master. 4 This practice was later compared to the
actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.

12 | P a g e
In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego
(Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad)
and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the
funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-
sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

ISSUE:

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on

(a) separation of powers;

RULING: The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it means that the "Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, 164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws.

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches
on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2)
ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and
"alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In
other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another department‘s functions.

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor
General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192

(b) non-delegability of legislative power;

RULING: As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same.

13 | P a g e
In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195
This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; 196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to
promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. 201 That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation,

(c) checks and balances;

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment."

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s
identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later
on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of
the President useless."213

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. 215

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of
similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for
future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the
matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. 218

(d) accountability;

RULING: insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

(e) political dynasties; and

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate
funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:

14 | P a g e
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

(f) local autonomy.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by
the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole
credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local
autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the
Presidential Pork Barrel.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases

(a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

RULING

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the
said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a
system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement
and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes
that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the
post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably,
the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used." 243 

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation
to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making,
or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making. 246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate.

The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test."
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To be sufficient, the standard must
15 | P a g e
specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.

Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as
follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers,
and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the phrase "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-
assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As
they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

RULING:WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the
Court hereby declares as

UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

(a) the entire 2013 PDAF(PRIORITY DEVT AND ASSISTACE FUND Article;

(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to
intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the
areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to
the power of congressional oversight;

(c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine;

(d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

(e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No.
1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs)
but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds
covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for
their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking
that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of
these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must,
however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the
same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of
Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the
irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

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This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

Case 7 Pharmaceutical vs duque

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The case is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012
entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant
International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR).

Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to
implement.

Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents
and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding

On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing the questioned RIRR.

Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:

Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material
factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of the law of the land.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the
WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the
need of a law enacted by the legislature.

In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:

1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to "young children" or
those from ages two years old and beyond:

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;

2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

RULING:

On the issue of petitioner's standing

The Supreme Court ruled that

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An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action.
An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents

Hence, petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered as a real party-in-interest which
stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the present action.

On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR

First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to by respondents are part of the law of the land.

Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international
instruments10 regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed
part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR

The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to
diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of
families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said
instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.

The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA
Resolutions.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation.11 The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. 12

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which
provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution
for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. 13

The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the
Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the
Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point that the Code did not adopt
the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products within
the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may
be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied)

embodies the incorporation method.14

Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on
all states,17 i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, 18 a person's right to life,
liberty and due process,19 and pacta sunt servanda,20 among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also
been depicted in this wise:

Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international law because they
have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies." 

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Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk company" the entities defined separately under the
Milk Code as "distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed
by an entity that would qualify it as a "milk company," whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase "products within the
scope of this Code." Those are the only differences between the definitions given in the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in
the RIRR.

Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR providing for just one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk company" in the RIRR and the
definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code are practically the same.

The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would bring about any change in the
treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.

Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of
the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of
the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12,
2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the provisions of Administrative Order
No. 2006-0012 is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

RIRR Section 4f, 11 and 46

f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related products are prohibited.

Section 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes
intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give
subliminal messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes
and/or replacements, as well as related products covered within the scope of this Code.

Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The following administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon any person, juridical or
natural, found to have violated the provisions of the Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations:

a) 1st violation – Warning;

b) 2nd violation – Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, depending
on the gravity and extent of the violation, including the recall of the offending product;

c) 3rd violation – Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00)
Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the offending product, and
suspension of the Certificate of Product Registration (CPR);

d) 4th violation –Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five Hundred (P500,000.00)
Thousand Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation; and in addition thereto, the recall of the product, revocation
of the CPR, suspension of the License to Operate (LTO) for one year;

e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations – Administrative Fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the offending
product, cancellation of the CPR, revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of the company concerned, including the blacklisting of
the company to be furnished the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);

f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be made for every day the violation
continues after having received the order from the IAC or other such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing the company for the
infraction.

For purposes of determining whether or not there is "repeated" violation, each product violation belonging or owned by a company,
including those of their subsidiaries, are deemed to be violations of the concerned milk company and shall not be based on the
specific violating product alone.

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Case 6 Digest IMBONG VS OCHOA

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Facts of the case:

The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by challengers from various sectors of society and consolidated fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention with substantially the same cause of action and prayer. To declare the Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.,TO be unconstitutional.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are
compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43

majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54

WHREAS THE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for
the principal reasons that

1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;

2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and

3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

21 | P a g e
ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

(RULING: Yes because the SC raciocinated as follows: instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line
of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The
reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court
finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This is in
line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

2] Actual Case or Controversy

Ruling: yes there is an actual case of controversy. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty
of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

3] Facial Challenge:

SC yes facial challenge does not apply only tospeech regulating measure. Hence in can be facially challenged.. the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

22 | P a g e
4] Locus Standi..

the petitiuoner has locus standi. Petitioner asserts thetranscendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

RULING: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-
party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116

5] Declaratory Relief:

RULING: Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65.121

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

RULING: RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as
not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

When does life begins? Upon fertilization.. does the IUD a modern contraceptive method has the abortifacient effect? Fact: no.. it
ihas contraceptive effect based on the scientific studies.. the copper in the iud is spermicidal thak kills the sperm and therefore
prevents fertilization.

(Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in
a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in
prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175

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To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be
upheld.

2] Right to Health

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices
are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL
by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the
FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables,
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation
in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in
the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation
of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section
3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and
children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and
24 | P a g e
timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.

4] The Family

To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether
or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

6] Due Process Ruling do not violate due process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does
not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."

The arguments fail to persuade.

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

7] Equal Protection Ruling do not violate equal protection clause

What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

25 | P a g e
The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro
bono services

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed
should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty
to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated
from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to
it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on

inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law
as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written
law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man
where no law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or
form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

RULING

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
26 | P a g e
 or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

27 | P a g e
Case 5 Resident marine mammals vs Sec. Angelo Reyes

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The case is a two consolidated petitions filed under rule 65 concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the
exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between
the islands of Negros and Cebu.2

The case is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-
46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal laws. 3

also seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46;

to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent
documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration Project. 4

Main Issue:

Legality of Service Contract No. 46

Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution

I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and

II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.

RULING: WON the Petitioners has locus standi?

Petitioners argue that Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action
since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.
they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that
the Philippine Government had

Public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons, viz.:

Section 1. Who may be parties, plaintiff and defendant. – Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third
(fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the
cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.

The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons,
albeit some of them were still unborn.45

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that
the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the
habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

RULING ON II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.

From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance,
referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the
new service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the

28 | P a g e
creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively
exercises control and supervision over the entire operation. 68

In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception
to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is
subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of
terms disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the
President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and
can withstand public scrutiny.

(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. 69

Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the
requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The General Law on Oil Exploration

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand
Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or
foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.

2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress

While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void.

As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to
those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. (Italics ours.)

SC RULING

In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in these
consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND
VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.

Case No. 4

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; et al..

FACTS OF THE CASE:

29 | P a g e
The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive.

A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile,
Minister of National Defense

In a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes
devoid(entirely lacking from) clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid (entirely lacking from) of justification .

The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent
Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON THE EWD IN LOI IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GHUARANTREE OF DUE PROCESS AND VIOLATION OF
fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

RULING:

THE COURT RULED IT IS NOT. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. ThE PETITIONER
CONTENDS THAT it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter
point was mentioned only in passing.(THE CLAIM OF VIOLATIONOF DUE PROCESS WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED…
The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme
Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in
the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta  thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into
force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-
settled legal doctrines
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by
the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in
character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34

The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself
quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:

"[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic
safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);

[Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35

 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * *
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character.

It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in
the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of
Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In
no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far
Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially
pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which
a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

30 | P a g e
Case No. 3
Tanada vs angara – WTO Agreement unconstitutional

Facts of the Case:

The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying

(1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and

(2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive
offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994.

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods."cralaw vir

HISTORY

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for
brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).

By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."cralaw virtua1aw library

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the
Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the Philippines 4 likewise
dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby
submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library

On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution
entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5

On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate
concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization." 6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement
as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:jgc:c

Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by
the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.

ISSUES

(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND
12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

(SECTION 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
SECTION 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt
measures that help make them competitive.)

31 | P a g e
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to
the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the
1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are
not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of
the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross"
arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to
strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Case Number 2 Digest

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 178160               February 26, 2009

BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

32 | P a g e
 DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

Facts of the case:

The case is a petition for certiorari1 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
to nullify Decision of COA in ruling that BOD and Consultants must refund the disallowed Year end benefits. (YEB) The members
and ex-officio members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government. The
same goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-employee relationships exist between them and the BCDA. Thus, the
whole amount paid to them totaling ₱342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.

BCDA Board adopted a new compensation and benefit scheme which included a ₱10,000 year-end benefit granted to each
contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum 4 , Board Chairman Victoriano A.
Basco (Chairman Basco) recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) the approval of the new compensation and
benefit scheme. In a memorandum5 dated 9 October 1997, President Ramos approved the new compensation and benefit scheme.

Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees, contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and Board members,
the full-time consultants of the BCDA eceived the year-end benefit.

On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-
0047 stating that the grant of year-end benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002.

In Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 03-001-BCDA-(02) 8 dated 8 January 2004, Director IV Rogelio D. Tablang (Director Tablang), COA,
Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants.
In Decision No. 2004-0139 dated 13 January 2004, Director Tablang "concurred" with AOM No. 2003-004 and ND No. 03-001-
BCDA-(02).

The petitioner BCDA requested the reconsideration of Decision of COA but Director Tablang denied the request. The BCDA filed a
notice of appeal12 dated 8 September 2004 and an appeal memorandum 13 dated 23 December 2004 with the COA. COA denied the
reconsideration hence this petition under SC.

Issue: WON the Board members and full-time consultants should be granted the year-end benefit because the granting of year-
end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution?

RULING:

The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article
II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. 23 In Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions. In that case, the Court held that "Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to
be non self-executing."

Third, the BCDA claims that the denial of year-end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants violates Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution.25 More specifically, the BCDA claims that there is no substantial distinction between regular officials and
employees on one hand, and Board members and full-time consultants on the other. The BCDA states that "there is here only a
distinction, but no difference" because both "have undeniably one common goal as humans, that is x x x ‘to keep body and soul
together’" or, "[d]ifferently put, both have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill."

The Court is not impressed. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden
of proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.26 In Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima,27 the Court held that:

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. To invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition
is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably singled out Board members and full-time consultants in the grant of the
year-end benefit. It did not show any clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The claim that there is no difference
between regular officials and employees, and Board members and full-time consultants because both groups "have mouths to feed
and stomachs to fill" is fatuous. Surely, persons are not automatically similarly situated — thus, automatically deserving of equal
33 | P a g e
protection of the laws — just because they both "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill." Otherwise, the existence of a
substantial distinction would become forever highly improbable.

The Court, however, notes that the Board members and full-time consultants received the year-end benefit in good faith. The Board
members relied on (1) Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme; (2) the
fact that RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit Board members from receiving benefits other than the per diem authorized by law;
and (3) President Ramos’ approval of the new compensation and benefit scheme which included the granting of a year-end benefit
to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. The full-time consultants relied on Section 10 of
RA No. 7227 which authorized the Board to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme. There is no proof that the Board members
and full-time consultants knew that their receipt of the year-end benefit was unlawful. In keeping with Magno,39 De Jesus,40 Molen,
Jr.,41 and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit,42 the Board
members and full-time consultants are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have already received.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Commission on Audit Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Board members and full-time consultants of the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority are not required to refund the year-end benefits they have already received.

SO ORDERED.

Case 1

G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN
ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA,
EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO
III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY
LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE
MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER
VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.

Facts of the case:

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The case is original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA 9522)
adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on

two principal grounds, namely:

(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary treaties,12 and

(2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution,
petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and
its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning

(1) the petition’s compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack
of locus standi and

(2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

ISSUES: The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that

(1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and

(2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522.

(3) On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional

(1) we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of
the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution.

(2) When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of
certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, 19 and indeed, of acts of
other branches of government.

(3) RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
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 to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends
hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along
their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any
clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty
over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because
this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or
other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago."24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III,
and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have
looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing
this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent
an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable
baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is
therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

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