1. FRANCISCO LORENZANA v.

 ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO

462 SCRA 1
Facts: Complainant Lorenzana filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Fajardo for violating the
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Service Law. The respondent while being a
member of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City receiving Php 4,000 honorarium, was
also employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila until his retirement on May 15,
2002. Lonzaga alleged that the respondent was also engaging in the private practice of law receiving
acceptance fees ranging from Php 20,000 to Php 50,000, appearing as a counsel in private cases, while also
being a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches which he receives a monthly
allowance/honoraria.
Respondent countered that he didn’t receive any fixed compensation under his membership in the PLEB,
representing the NGO. He only received per diems and honoraria which, as he contests, is allowed under
section 42 of RA np. 6975. He also emphasized that his involvement in private cases are pro bono. He also
alleged that as regards his designation as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized
under Section 406 of the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly allowance/honorarium is allowed
under Section 393.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Fajardo has engaged in the practice of law.
Ruling: The court ruled that Atty. Fajardo has engaged in the practice of law even being employed with PLEB
and Manila Urban Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind . The
practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been
interpreted as customarily habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services.
Respondent's appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban
Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law office. He also signed pleadings for his clients as a
“counsel”.
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is "not
really strict when it comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to
render service even on holidays without additional compensation." At most, he should have asked written
permission from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that "no
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department.”
Respondent was SUSPENDED for 6 months, REPRIMANDED AND WARNED that any repetition of similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.
2. ROMANA R. MALIGSA vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING
273 SCRA 408

FACTS: Maligsa filed for a disbarment case with conduct unbecoming a lawyer against Atty Cabanting for
certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992 over a piece of property subject of a pending civil
case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.
On May 5, 1992, a deed of Quitclaim was executed by Irene Maligsa in favor of Abaog over a parcel of land
located at Pangasinan which was notarized by respondent on the same date. The quitclaim was used as
evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with
prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus damages.
However, Maligsa alleged that the execution of the quitclaim is impossible since Irene Maligsa, as affiant, died
on April 21, 1992 or 16 days earlier than the execution date. Irene could not have signed the document as the
complainant alleged that she didn’t know how to write and was using her thumb mark in every transaction she
entered.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Cabanting has violated his oaths as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
RULING: Yes, Atty Cabanting has violated his oaths as a lawyer and the Canon of the Professional ethics in
his involvement in acts of malpractice. In the case at bar, it would have been physically and legally impossible
for Irene Maligsa to have executed the deed of quitclaim and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity
and validity before a notary public on May 5, 1992, affiant having died on April 22, 1992. Also, it behooves
respondent as a notary public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to
enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a
member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.

Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is
sacrosanct. 
3. HONORIO MANALANG and FLORENCIO CIRILLO vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO F. ANGELES
398 SCRA 687

FACTS: The petitioners Manalang and Cirilo filed a case against their employer, Philippine Racing Club
Restaurant, for their overtime and separation pay before the NLRC with the respondent, Atty. Francisco
Angeles as their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of Php 6,500. However, without
authority from his clients, respondent Atty. Angeles compromised the award and was only able to collect Php
5,500. Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the amount
collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and offered
to give them only the sum of P2,650.

Complainants then instituted the instant case, with the assistance of the then Citizens Legal Assistance Office
(CLAO)3 of the Department of Justice. The case was then referred to the Office of Solicitor General (OSG).
The OSG conducted several hearings but respondent appeared only at three (3) hearings. The case was then
transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law
because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.

RULING: Yes, Atty Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law. A lawyer must not only maintain a
high standard in legal profienciency, but should also possess the highest standards for honesty, integrity and
fair dealing.
Also, the respondent exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as want of zeal
in the maintenance and defense of their rights (violating Canon 17). Moreover, he consistently failed to appear
at the hearings.

 In the instant case, the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent's receipt of and failure to deliver
upon demand, the amount of P4,550 intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03, 21 Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
4. SALLY D. BONGALONTA vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
FACTS: Complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the
Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a
scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the
Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in
the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal
and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money
based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case
Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default
for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them
followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time,
issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo
and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number. Thus,
complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps.
Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he
filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING:

The Court agreed with the foregoing findings and recommendations. The practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy
that expectation, for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
5. AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR v. ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO
A.C. NO. 5417 : March 31, 2006

FACTS: Complainant Malhabour filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty Alberti Sarmiento for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Complainant hired Atty. Sarmiento to assist him in labor case against HY2LB Shipping Management Services,
Inc., a local manning agency for illegal dismissal. Malhabour was hired by HY2LB for a supposed contract
period of 12 months with a monthly salary of 600 USD and working hours of 48 hours a weeks with 30%
overtime pay. However, the complainant was dismissed after working for only 4 months and 9 nine day in the
reasons of personnel and cost reduction – thus the illegal dismissal complaint filed against HY2LB. POEA
rendered judgment in favor of the complainant.
HY2LB filed an appeal to CA, but it was dismissed and affirming the judgement of POEA. A motion for
reconsideration was then filed by HY2LB, thus CA modified its decision still in favor of the complainant.
Unbeknownst to the complainant, respondent sent a letter to NLRC, stating that the complainant gave him SPA
authorizing him to receive the judgement award. Respondent filed a Motion for execution alleging that
complainant decided to terminate the case and will no longer file a motion for reconsideration. Then NLRC
released the judgement award to the respondent.
Upon the knowledge, the complainant then filed estafa with the NBI against the respondent. During their
confrontation, the respondent partially give P 40,000.00 of P60,000.00 award. Later, respondent give another
P10, 000.00 making him still liable for P10, 000.00 balance. This resulted to the filing of disbarment against the
respondent.
SC then referred the case to IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. IBP in its recommendation
found that respondent is guilty in violation of Canon 1 of CPR.

Issue: WON respondent violation of Canon 1 tantamount to his disbarment.

Ruling:
No, the respondent’s violation of Canon 1 does not tantamount to his disbarment. However, as the court ruled,
the violation of Canon 1, which constitutes the act of misconduct, will be penalized with suspension from the
practice of law for one year is sufficient. Respondent lawyer, which was found guilty of the violation of Canon1
is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. As such, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. SC has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of
the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this
court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw
the privilege. Respondent’s conduct blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of
the legal profession. His conduct fell shot of the exacting standards expected him as guardian of law and
justice.
6. Nakpil vs Valdes
A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998
FACTS:
Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They
agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back.
Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and
renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent’s name.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil died.
Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property
from the inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval
Realty Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the complainant.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate
which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In
the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but
which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest
in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms
from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent
exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
7. RURAL BANK OF SILAY,INC. vs. ATTY. ERNESTO H. PILLA
350 SCRA 138

FACTS:

Respondent executed a REM in favour of the complainant over a parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental, as an
attorney in fact of the registered owners, Pedro Torres and Oscar Granada together with an SPA which was purportedly
authorized by the owners to mortgage the land in favour of the complainant.

The complainant released a loan in the amount of 91,427 Php in favour of the respondent. Later, the complainant found
out that the respondent was not authorized by Oscar Granada to mortgage the land when he was joined as defendant
for removal of cloud on title with preliminary injunction and damages.

Granada specifically denied having executed an SPA to respondent to support the said loan. The trial court decided
against the respondent, and held that the SPA was forged and falsified because the spouses Granada have not signed
the same. The respondent did not appeal from the said judgment. The foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to
the complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his
oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to continue further in the
practice of law.

Respondent refuted the charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him.

Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceit and gross misconduct
against him. Respondent denied employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural
bank. According to respondent, he did not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorney
appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of attorney purportedly authorized
respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent
also claimed that if indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery. IBP recommended he be
suspended for 5 years which was later reduced to 3.

Issue:

WON the respondent is guilty of deceit and gross misconduct.

Held:

SUSPENDED FOR YEARS

Since respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of
the same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no knowledge of
the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondent’s negative assertion that he did not know that the special
power of attorney issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a
public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the same is their own free act and deed.
In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of attorney to be notarized without the
parties appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in
order to obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document
especially considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, “the settled rule is that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty
of falsification.” Further, “if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.”[
Respondent’s acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01
thereof, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The fact
that the conduct pertained to respondent’s private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer may
be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar .[9]

Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years is approved.
8. EMMA T. DANTES vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES
A.C. No. 6486. September 22, 2004

FACTS:

Mrs. Dantes alleged that his husband is a philanderer. Atty. Dantes purportedly engaged in illicit relat
ionships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time 
respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to his wife and their children, thus  
forcing her to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs.

Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with her and the birth of their children, but alleged that the
y have mutually agreed to separate eighteen years before after his wife had abandoned him in their res
idence. He further asserted that Mrs. Dantes filed the case just to force him to remit 70% of his month
ly salary to her.

Mrs. Dantes then presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, 
Darling, and Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of his husband and his paramour 
to prove the fact that he sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different wo
men.

ISSUE:
Whether or not having an illicit relationship during the the subsistence of marriahe warrants the disb
arment of a lawyer. 

RULING:

Yes.The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, im
moral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flag
rant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the com
munity.To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but gros
sly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be re
prehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to sho
ck the common sense of decency.

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during th
e subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the i
mposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentar
y evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality.

Atty. Crispin G. Dantes has been DISBARRED.
9. TUCAY vs. TUCAY
A.C. No. 5170, November 17, 1999
 
FACTS:      Complainant Lilia Tucay and respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay took their vows in 1963. In 1993, while
respondent’s first marriage is still subsisting, respondent lawyer contracted another marriage with one
Tuplano. Respondent left the conjugal dwelling to cohabit with the latter.    Complainant Tucay seeks the
latter’s disbarment.
 
ISSUE:     Should respondent Manuel Tucay be disbarred for carrying on an illicit affair with a married
woman?
 
HELD:       YES. The records of the administrative case against Atty. Tucay indeed show that respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his professional. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
                     A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138,
of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as a n attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so , are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind
of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer at no
time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to,
but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership, in a great and noble profession.
 

Gross Immorality
 10. Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution
provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.

Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
11. MARY MALECDAN vs. PEKAS
421 SCRA 7

FACTS:
Atty Pekas and Kollin substituted Atty. Bustamante as a counsels for the Fanged Spouses. Petitioner
Malecdan bought a parcel of land located in Baguio City from the Fanged spouses. The money was
received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel for
the latter. The complainant later found out, however, that the said lot was the subject of a
controversy between the former owners and the Fanged Spouses.

Then Kollin replaced Bustamante. He filed for a petition for rescission over the contract of sale,
without returning the amount of money to Malecdan. While Malecdan was in the US, the Fanged
spouses, Atty Bustamante and the PCIB (bank) signed a compromised contract, and Malecdan was
not made a signatory to such contract. They caused the transfer of P30K from the account of
Bustamante to a separate account for Kollin and Pekas as attorneys fees.

Now, Malecdan files a case for disbarment against Kollin and Pekas, because not only was she
prejudiced from such withdrawal of money, but they also committed acts against the IBP in
contravention/violation to the lawyers oath that they shall uphold the laws of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Kollin and Pekas should be suspended?

RULING:
The amount of P30K which the respondents took for themselves as attorneys fees belonged to a third
person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse
party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the
complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the
filing of the complaint itself.

Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged, but still he knowingly
withdrew the amount of P30K to serve his interests. Kollin used Pekas inexperience to gain.

By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement, it was the
intention of respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from such pleading and claim no responsibility
or participation therein so that the same would not be tainted by his apparent knowledge of the
defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim the sales proceeds. In this respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and
his client Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have secured the release of the sales proceeds to the
detriment and prejudice of herein complainant.

Pekas knew that there was no valid compromise agreement, as one of the parties in the case was
absent at the time it was entered into. He knew that no valid notice was given to the complainant,
since the signatory to the notice of the manifestation of compromise agreement was a certain
Veronica Buking.
 It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the
practice of law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service. The practice of law is a
profession and not a money-making trade. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with
the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter
towards the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition
but a serious matter of public interest.

Pekas is suspended for 6 months, Kollin for 3 years.

 12. ALBANO vs COLOMA
21 SCRA 411

FACTS:

A proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua
Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. In his letter complaint, complainant alleged that during the Japanese
occupation he and his mother retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in a civil
case. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized,
respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had
themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened
in the case to collect her attorney’s fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when
respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they as well as their co/plaintiffs in the case
promised to pay her a contingent fee of whatever could be recovered in damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a lawyer may be removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as
she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity?

RULING:

No, a lawyer cannot be removed without just cause. The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if
there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case, it is complainant and his co/plaintiffs who, after benefiting
from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment
of the latter’s contingent attorney’s fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them
said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and
genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees

Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With
his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any 8udicial tribunal against any attempt on
the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him
to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. It views with disapproval any
and every effort of those benefited by counsels services to deprive him of his hard/earned honorarium. Such
an attitude deserves condemnation. There is this additional point to consider. The reputation in the legal
profession is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored
 13. Director of Religious Affairs VS. Bayot
74 Phil 579
Facts:
Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the
Sunday Tribune, in direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127 which
imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.
Respondent asks for “the indulgence and mercy”of the Court, promising not to
repeat it and that he published it only once.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice

Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law
is a profession and not a trade. A member of the bar degrades himself or herself in
adopting the practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her services like a
merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to
refrain from repeating the same misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was
merely reprimanded for his violation and he was reminded that the most effective
advertisement possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity as well as fidelity to trust.

That pursuant to section 25 of Rule 127, “the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain constitutes malpractice”. It is settled that it is highly unethical
for lawyers to advertise his talent and skills. LAW PROFESSION IS NOT A TRADE.
*Respondent was only reprimanded.
14. KHAN VS. SIMBILLO
409 SCRA 299
FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number
but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided thecase will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were
also published.An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation
and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the
name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him
but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition
against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:

Yes!The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of
an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond.Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish
in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.
15. Estrada Vs. Sandiganbayan
416 scra 465

FACTS:  Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He

assailed, however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of
its failure to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the
key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to Estrada, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of
his fundamental right to due process. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague 

RULING:

No. The Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will
not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines apply only to free speech cases, but not to penal statutes.