November 22, 1961 sosseener NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 111 TO: The Secretary of State SUBJECT: First Phase of Viet-Nem Program The President has authorized the Secretary of State to instruct our Ambassador to Viet-Nam to inform President Diem as fellows: 1, The U. & Government is prepared to join the Viet-Nam Government in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further eeterioration in the eituation in South Viet-Nam, 2. This joint effort requires undertakings by both Governments as outlined below: &@. On ite part the U. & would immediately undertake the fale lowing actions in support of the GVN: 41) Provide increased air ft to the GVN forces, inclading helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United Statos uniformed personnel and under United Statos operational control. (2) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may bo necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, iActraction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for spectal intelligence, (3) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal watera and inland waterways. (4) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self~efeave corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offeasive operations. DECLASSIFIED mam anne £ 0. 11652, SEC. 3{6}, 50D), 6/€) AND 11 -NSe_ Bik by MEO wars pare_5]13/97PopsEcResr “2. (5) Provide such peraoanel and equfpment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization, (6) Provide such new terme of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military force: are required for increased United States military assistance in the operational collaboration with the GVN and operational direction of U. S. forces and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to the U, S, military authorities ander these recommendations, (7) Provide such increased ecanomic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabiti= tation program, to supply matorial in support of the accuri ty efforts, and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a fall supply of o wide rango of materials such ao food, medicat supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could agsist the GVN in winning the war against the Viet Cong.) (8) Encourage and support (including financtal support) @ request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate inter= national organization for multilateral assistance in the relief and rebabilitation of the flood area. (9) Provide individual administrators and advisora for the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments, QQ Provide personnel for a jolnt survey with the GVN of conditions in cach of the provinces to asseno the eocial, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the countersinsurgency program in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. FePsscRer3. romexenst by On ite part, the GVN would initiate the following actions: (1) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on » wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources, (Thie woald include a decentralization and broadening of the Government oo as to realize the full potential of all non- Communist elemants in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle. } (2) The vitalization of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate euthority to perform their functions effectively. (3) Overhaul of the military establishment and conomand structure co as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war and assure a mobile offensive capability for the Army. MeGeorge Bundy Information Copies to: ‘The Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence General Maxwell D, Taytor ce: Mra, Evelyn Lincoln Mr. Bundy B, Smith/C, Johnson NSC Files