1ST MILITARY REGIME IN PAKISTAN

By
Hadia Ahsan
Roll num 8259
M.sc IV

Supervisor
Sir Dr Abid Abbasi

Department of Pakistan Studies

Abbottabad University of Science and Technology
2021

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 TABLE OF CONTENT
S.NO TITLES PAGE NO
………………………………………………………………………………………
1 ABSTRACT 3
2 INTRODUCTION 4
3 BACKGROUND 4-6
4 DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW 6-7
5 NATURE OF MARTIAL LAW 7-8
6 CAUSES OF MARTIAL LAW 8-10
7 CONTINUOUS IN FORCE ORDER 1958 10-11
8 OUSTER OF ISKANDAR MIRZA 11
9 STEPS AND MEASURES BY G AYUB KHAN 11-13
10 REFORMS BY G. AYUB KHAN 13-17
11 BASIC DEMOCRACY 17-18
12 INDUS WATER TREATY 19-21
13 CONSTITUTION OF 1962 21-23
14 1965 ELECTIONS 23-25
15 WAR OF 1965 25-27
16 DOWNFALL OF REGIME 28-29
17 AYUB KHAN’S BLUNDERS 29-32
18 AYUB AND THE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 32-3
19 ANALYSIS ON REGIME 32-34
20 CONCLUSION 34-36
21 REFERENCES 37-39

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 ABSTRACT
The first military coup of Pakistan in 1958 set up a pattern that continues to show itself four
decades later and dominate the government either directly or indirectly. The first military coup of
Pakistan also created an institutional path for the subsequent three military coups. The first
military coup was due to various factors. The British recruitment policy during the pre-partition
period had as large a role in creating the setting for the coup as did unequal distribution of
resources and geographical location. Pakistani military at the time of partition was professional
while the other institutions were weak, which challenges the notion that professional military do
not cause coups. The Pakistani military also gained prominence because of the all-around
external and internal threats. The powerful military and bureaucratic alliance further delayed the
enactment of a constitution and changed seven prime ministers within first eleven years of
independence by further discrediting the politicians before the people. All these events provided
occasion, opportunity and disposition to the Pakistan army to affect the first coup by General
Ayub Khan in 1958. The thesis also evaluates the effects of the first military coup on the present
civil-military relations in Pakistan.
KEY WORDS
Martial law, Civil-military, Bureaucracy, leadership, civil Bureaucracy, military intervention,
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH
This research will show the causes behind the first military intervention and its impact upon the
pattern of civilian-military relations in Pakistan during the first two decades. I will examine the
setting in 1947 through 1958 when the coup occurred. I will also examine General Ayub Khan’s
regime as it consolidated its power, which then shaped the political institutions for decades to
come.
IMPORTANCE
The first military intervention lays the path for subsequent military interventions. Therefore,
understanding the first coup is not only important for Pakistan, but also for the international
community, which views Pakistan as an unstable political system where the powerful army could
step in at any time. The study gains further significance because there is an assumption that
military coups in Pakistan gave rise to instability in the region and, due to raw sentiments
regarding this concern in Pakistan, no one has so far attempted to study this topic. Especially
avoided are considerations that during a civilian regime, the military continues to play a
dominant role behind the scenes.
RESEARCH QUESTION
(i) What was the political structure of the country before and during the military intervention and
did it contribute to the intervention?

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(ii) What were the roles of external players in shaping the environment in favor of the first
military intervention?
(iii) To what extent did the first military coup shape the environment for subsequent military
interventions in Pakistan?
(iv) What was the level of friction between the civil government and military when the first
military intervention was carried out?
(v) How has the first military coup affected civil-military relations in Pakistan?

INTRODUCTION
Cop d’état in Pakistan in 1958 was the most striking example of how apolitical military could
slowly be drawn into the political field due to failure of the political leaders to run liberal
democratic institutions. The military which had the tradition of aloofness from politics, took no
Part in the attainment of independence, remained loyal to civil authority after independence and
helped every government to maintain law and order, Slowly became an important actor in the
decision-making process and ultimately displaced the civil authority. The coup d’état did not
modify the major objectives of the preceding governments. The goal of modernization,
industrialization and democracy continued to be the objectives of the new Regime; the approach
to these goals was changed.i
Unfortunately, the 1956 Constitution which was framed after nine years of effort did not last
longer than two-and-a-half years. No general election was held under it. Major-General Iskandar
Mirza had taken over as Acting Governor- General in August 1955 when Ghulam Muhammad
became too unwell to continue, Mirza was confirmed as Governor-General in October 1955. On
the adoption of the Constitution on 23 March 1956, he assumed the office of the President under
the new Constitution. He had publically voiced his conviction that religion and politics ought to
be kept quite separate, and that some sort of 'controlled democracy-an executive appointed for a
fixed term and not dependent for it existence on a shifting and uncertain parliamentary majority-
was the best form of polity to aim at.ii

BACKGROUND:
Pakistan, after independence, had experienced nearly 26 years of military rule (1977-85, 1999-
2008). It is mainly due to thee fact that Pakistan could not establish a stable and true democratic
developments in the United Pakistan (1947-71) and 'in the truncated Pakistan (1972-95) Could
hardly be considered as having been based on the democratic values. Military interventions in
politics in Pakistan have given roots to lots of queries and interpretations. It is often asked as to
what have been the causes and reasons of the military being ruled into the politics after regular
intervals. Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister once spoke of the military
intervention in Pakistan, "it is not the inordinate ambitions in a special taste for the politics but
the failure of political classes to govern effectively that the military intervention takes place in

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Pakistan". It is true that there has been a section of powerful Pakistan army who consider itself
the guardian of the national interests and have, therefore, moral obligation to intervene in politics
whenever there occurs any political crisis or the government machinery comes to the verge of
collapse When the first Martial Law was imposed in 1958, Pakistan's political and social
conditions were Simply intolerable. At the center and in West. Pakistan, Republican Party was
put into power as a result of continued manipulations, Conspiracies and Violation of order.
Political 1956 Constitution.iii
The first military coup has set up a pattern in Pakistan where today, most of the policy matters,
such as the foreign or domestic are crafted with the tacit approval of the Pakistani military. The
Pakistani military continues to dominate the government either directly at the center or indirectly
in charge of several institutions. This core imbalance in civil-military affairs is primarily due to
what Pakistan inherited at the time of the independence of Pakistan.iv
INITIAL CRISIS OF PAKISTAN:-
After 11 years of independence, Pakistan was going through experiments in governance, with no
constitution, no democracy. The fallout of this cast deep influences on the years to come. That
Ayub Khan was an ambitious person is evident from his own writings. In his autobiography,
Friends, not masters, he launched a tirade of accusations against politicians. In his diary of May
22, 1958, Ayub Khan claimed that politicians were self-centred and greedy. They wanted to
reach the corridors of power by any means and then begin looting without thinking about the
future of the country; that unscrupulous politicians ‘ would not even hesitate to demolish the
institution of Army.’
AYUB KHAN PLANS
It became obvious in the beginning of 1958 that Ayub Khan had waited for an opportune time to
strike. The political conditions in East Pakistan provided him the appropriate pretext and he
began finalising his plans with his colleague.
Ayub Khan had reached superannuation, and defence minister Ayub Khuhro had to recommend
for extension of his service. Ayub pressed Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon for the
recommendation, although the final authority of granting extension rested with President General
Iskander Mirza. Noon, under pressure from President’s House got the recommendation, and on
June 9, 1958 Ayub Khan was granted the extension. This was all he needed to translate his
designs into reality.
Ayub met his colleagues regularly till Sept ember 25, 1958 to discuss the country’s security and
economic situation. At every meeting he expressed dismay over the politicians’ role and termed
it a conspiracy to derail the economy. He added that there was a feeling among the people that
while witnessing such a situation, he and the army were failing in their duties.

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Ayub Khan continued his visits to garrisons. On September 20, a government order banned
army-like uniforms for political workers. The order became law two days later. Khan Abdul
Qayoom of the Muslim League decided to defy this order on September 23. He arrived at
Karachi city station to show his disregard for the law.
From September 25, 1958 began the movement of army units. President’s House (presently
Governor’s House, Karachi) was the centre of all political manoeuvring, where Iskander Mirza
along with Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon and his cronies were drawing new lines in the sand
as it were.
Karachi had a permanent camp of two brigades ,an infantry and an artillery, but one more
infantry brigade was called in from Quetta to camp at Jungshahi, a short distance from Karachi.
The political situation was hardly conducive due to fierce inter-party differences. The fight was
tri-partite — Krishak Saramak, Awami League and Muslim League. This was what Ayub Khan
wanted.
On October 2, 1958, Prime Minister Noon made a last attempt to bring some kind of
rapprochement but failed. He had already announced the next election for February, 1959. Every
politician was trying his best to book a berth in the caretaker cabinet and many were in Karachi.
The PM wanted resignations of all ministers before a new cabinet was sworn in. They all did so
and a new cabinet was announced on the evening of October 7. This cabinet included Firoz Khan
Noon, Syed Amjad Ali, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, Ayub Khuhro, Sardar Abdur Rasheed, Mir
Ghulam Ali Talpur, Haji Maula Bakhsh Soomro, A. K. Data, Haji Mahfoozul Haq, Mian Jaffar
Shah, Abdul Aleem, Sardar Amir Adam, Besant Kumar Das and Rameezuddin.
But President Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan had already spoken about the future setup of
Pakistan’s administration and arrived at some decisions. Mirza had proposed that assemblies be
prorogued, constitution be abrogated, a ban be imposed on political activities and political
parties, and while Ayub Khan should take over as Chief Martial Law administrator, he (Mirza)
should continue as President.
On October 7, a lavish reception at the President’s House was arranged. While all guests were
enjoying their drinks, Iskander Mirza seemed impatient. At eight o’clock he went inside. The
army units awaiting orders outside Karachi began moving. They captured all sensitive points and
buildings including Radio Pakistan, Telephone and Telegraph building, Karachi Port, airport,
etc., and also blocked important thoroughfares. The guests at the reception knew nothing about
what was happening outside.
After some time Ayub Khan arrived at the President’s House. Both discussed the arrangement
threadbare but Mirza was overwhelmed by Ayub Khan who agreed that while Ayub Khan would
handle all the affairs, Mirza would continue as nominal head of the state.v

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 DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.
Delay in General Elections and Declaration of Martial Law
Due to the political and economic problems stated above, President Mirza was trying to avoid
announcement of the date of the general elections. He kept postponing the elections on one
pretext or the other. It was agreed that the general elections would be held in November 1958.
However, with the help of the members of Republican Party and other parties favourable to him,
he was able to have All Parties Conference to agree on postponement of elections from
November 1958 to February 1959. Qayyum Khan, President of Muslim League, refused to
participate in the Conference and threatened to launch direct action against the government if it
did not announce a firm date for elections. There were clashes between Muslim League workers
and the police in Karachi.
At that point it appeared that Mirza was losing control of the democratic forces in the country
and could not influence the electoral process. General Ayub saw this as an opportunity to fulfill
his political ambitions and tacitly encouraged his generals to demand imposition of martial law
and for taking over the affairs of the country in the summer of 1958.
In September 1958, Prime Minister Noon was again losing grip of situation and his ministry was
likely to fall. In order to avoid that he made a massive expansion of the central cabinet in order to
satisfy Suharwardy's Awami League. After a few days, Awami League ministers resigned and
Noon government fell into disarray. On 6 October 1958 Khan of Kalat announced secession of
Kalat from Pakistan as his reaction to the establishment of the military bases in Balochistan.
However the Army put down this revolt and was projecting himself itself as a saviour of the
country. In early morning hours of8 October 1958 Mirza announced proclamation of martial law
throughout the country. Before doing that he met the American Ambassador and British Hioh
Commissioner and some other envoys and informed them ofhis intention. He assured them that
the new government would be even more pro-west than the earlier ones. ll Mirza in his
proclamation abrogated the constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments,
dissolved the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies of East and West Pakistan,
banned all political parties and postponed the general elections indefinitely. Prime Minister Noon
and members of his cabinet were put under house arrest.vi
This was beginning of recurring periods of martial law in Pakistan.

THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY REGIME:

The Military authorities did not face opposition in consolidating their position. Not a single shot
was fired and not a single person lost his life at the time of the military take-over. The people
were worried about the future, but there were few who shed tears on the replacement' of the
parliamentary system by the military regime except those whose interests Were directly

7
threatened. Tn fact, there was a feeling of relief amongst the general public with the hope that the
Army might succeed in providing clean and stable government. On the first day of Martial Law,
life was normal in all the major cities of Pakistan. Educational institutions, government and
semi-government offices were open. The Army moved in all the major cities and took control of
the key points and the government buildings but tanks and armoured cars did not appear in the
streets. It was due to the reason that the Army was "conspicuously efficient and conspicuously
incorrupt. It was small army—no larger than eight divisions— and this had helped in
maintaining its morale. It was tightly knit and well disciplined. It tock pride in maintaining the
traditions derived from the British Artily. It was competent because „ 17it lived by a time-table,
and nobody else in Pakistan dreamed of doing so . vii

MAJOR CAUSES OF MARTIAL LAW

The main causes of martial law in Pakistan are following:
The Untimely Demise of the Quaid-i-Azam and A Leadership Crisis:
Like many third-world countries, Pakistan was born a fragile nation-state. It was burdened with
ideological and ethnic cleavages, and created amidst administrative chaos. The first year of
Independence was marked by heavy dependence on the charismatic personality of Jinnah; he was
Governor-General and President of the Constituent Assembly. However, he died on 11
September 1948, leaving behind an enduring political vacuum. With Liaquat's death, the faqade
of "parliamentary democracy" began to erode. The bureaucratic elites did not take long to
convert the office of Governor-General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention.
Provincialism
The geographical separation Of East and West Pakistan produced not Only administrative,
physical but social, economic and political problems as well. Distance made communication
irregular and expensive. Misunderstandings arose easily and were difficult to dispel. Since the
capital was in the West wing, East Pakistan felt neglected. Differences in languages and cultures
were obstacles in the way of national integration. viii
The Constitution Making Dilemma 1947-56 (Punjabi/Bengali Controversy)
Constitution making in Pakistan was delayed for about nine years. The two most important
factors which delayed constitution making in Pakistan were the differences between Punjabi
dominated West Pakistani elite, and East Pakistani. East Pakistan demanded maximum
provincial autonomy, whereas the West wing favoured a strong centre. The second most
important issue was the quantum of representation: the East wing demanded universal adult
franchise as Bengal constituted about 54% of the total population.15 Unfortunately, the West
wing elite were not ready to concede this demand. The conflict created a huge political and
constitutional problem in Pakistan.

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Extreme Political Instability
The decline of civilian institutions in Pakistan was set in motion primarily as a result of the
serious crisis of political leadership within a couple of years of Independence. After Quaid-e-
Azam, Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination resulted in the conversion of the office of the Governor
General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention. From 1951 to 1958, Pakistan had only
two Governors-General and one Commander–in-Chief while seven Prime Ministers toppled one
after the other. Bureaucratic intervention, preemption and opposition among the political leaders
made a sham of the parliament and the cabinet government. The façade of “parliamentary
politics” persisted but in reality the focus of power had shifted to the bureaucratic and military
institutions.Liaquat Ali Khan’s mysterious assassination left the ambitious bureaucracy in total
command. A strong nexus was also formed between the civil-bureaucracy and the military. It is
not surprising that in Pakistan’s first two decades, ‘the locus of power centered on the civil
services rather than the political leadership, whom it dominated, or the army with which it
closely collaborated. As the political forces fragmented and political institutions declined, the
bureaucratic elite gained the upper hand and dominated policy making.
Failure of Political Leadership
Theoretically, the test of leadership is to lead the country and the nation out of a crisis situation.
The dynamic leadership of Jinnah is a witness to this reality. Muslims of the sub-continent under
the leadership of Jinnah successfully fought the forces of British imperialism and Hindu
nationalism culminating in the creation of Pakistan. After the death of Jinnah, his political
successors badly failed to create consensus politics. The second line leadership could not
translate the political achievements of Jinnah into a vibrant, moderate and forward-looking
democratic polity. Factionalism, provincialism and power politics marred the first decade of
Independence. Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers and eight cabinets during 1947-58. The ruling
parties maintained power by using state patronage and coercive apparatus in a highly partisan
manner. The situation was not much different at the provincial level where different political
parties and leaders engaged in struggle for power in violation of parliamentary norms.
Interference of the Heads of State
In a parliamentary democracy, the head of state has no room for political maneuvering. The
office of the head of state is nominal and non–partisan. Simply speaking, the head of the state
has no political role to perform as such. In violation of well-established parliamentary theory,
Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza violated this norm and actively maneuvered,politics
notwithstanding legal tradition and the dreadful consequences of their actions. The head of state
(GovernorGeneral 1947-57, President 1956-58) gradually assumed effective power and
manipulated the divided political leaders and weak political parties. He was directly involved in
making and breaking governments at the federal and provincial levels. The active involvement of
the head of state in day-to-day politics further fragmented the political forces and undermined the
democratic process.

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Absence of Land Reforms
Large landholdings or feudalism are medieval hangovers and inherently opposed to democracy.
Landlordism and democracy cannot go together hand in hand because they are the antithesis
ofeach other. Landlords are a privileged class, with vested interests to serve through politics and
are status quo oriented. They are averse to change. Democracy exists for the welfare of all
without discrimination. This is a paradox in the sense that both cannot coexist under one political
system. Europe and North America abolished large landholdings to allow democracy. India
followed suit in the first decade of her independence. Neither Ayub Khan nor Bhutto nor any
other ruler in Pakistan was earnest in the abolition of huge landholdings, as landlords are the
most powerful indigenous class in Pakistan. Electoral politics being highly biased towards rural
areas, landlords predominate in the political landscape of Pakistan. The bureaucracy and the
army also mainly come from that class. By virtue of that class status of bureaucrats and military
officers, the big landlord lobby is directly and deeply entrenched in the Pakistani state
Absence of Independent Election Commission
Another factor which facilitated the army’s rise to power in Pakistan was that the country had no
democratic elections for eleven years after Independence, and democratic values had scarcely
struck roots.68 An independent and powerful election commission is the guarantor of free, fair
and multi-party based elections.ix

CONTINUOUS IN FORCE ORDER OCTOBER 1958

he proclamation of martial law and the abrogation of the Constitution resulted in a complete void
in the legal set-up. Therefore, three days after the imposition of martial law, on 10 October 1958,
the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order was promulgated with a view to bringing about a new
legal order. The general effect of this was the validation of laws, other than the last Constitution,
that were in force before the promulgation of 7 October. It also restored the jurisdiction of all
courts including the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The Order contained further direction
that the government of Pakistan should act as nearly as might be in accordance with the late
Constitution, and that the law declared by the Supreme Court should be binding on all the courts
of Pakistan. The Supreme Court and the High Courts were also given the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor, and certiorari. However, no writ could be
issued against the Chief Martial Law Administrator or anyone exercising powers or jurisdiction
under his authority. It was made clear that no court or person could call or permit to be called in
question
(i) the proclamation of 7 October,
(ii) any order made in pursuance of the proclamation or any martial law order or martial law
regulation,
(iii) any finding, judgment or order of a Special Military Court or a Summary Military Court.

10
It was further provided that the powers of a provincial governor would be those that the
President directed him to assume on his behalf under Article 193 of the late Constitution. The
Governor was required to act under directions given to him by the President or by the Chief
Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) or by person having authority from the Martial Law
Administrator. The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 seemed to have provided a
framework to the state for the continuity of the legal System after the abrogation of the
Constitution. The legal vacuum and the crisis which the country had faced after the dissolution
of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954 were thereby avoided,
The expression used in the Order 'the Republic shall be governed as nearly as may be in
accordance with the late constitution', was open to maneuvers by the martial law government.
The government used it to mean those portions of the late Constitution which were necessary for
the daily running of administration. Other provisions of the late constitution would apply
according to the sweet will of the martial law regime to suit its convenience.x

OUSTER OF ISKANDAR MIRZA

On the imposition of martial law, state power came into the hands of President Mirza and
General Ayub Khan who had been appointed as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). The
logical result of this sharing of power had to be a struggle between the two men, and it ensued
soon thereafter. President Mirza tried to rationalize the power structure and the state framework
by appointing Ayub Prime Minister on 24 October 1958. He formed a new Cabinet consisting
entirely of non-political personalities.
This did not satisfy Ayub who had a stronger claim to power, being the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army. President Mirza, nervous about his own future, tried to enlist the support of the Air
Force and Ayub's rivals within the army. He allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to order Air
Commodore Rabb, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force, to arrest four Generals close to
Ayub, including Major General Yahya Khan.xi
On 27 October 1958, at a meeting with his Generals (Azam Khan, Burki, and Sheikh, all
members of the central Cabinet) Ayub decided to rid himself of Mirza and assume complete
control over the affairs of the state. Mirza was arrested and sent into exile to Great Britain where
he later died, a sad end to an ambitious man who had ultimately fallen prey to his own intrigues.
Ayub quickly set about proving to sceptics that he was not Marely the army’s’ front man' but '
absolute master' in Pakistan. xii
STEPS AND MEASURES Of AYUB KHAN AFTER BECOMING MARTIAL LAW

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 ADMINISTRATOR

1. Action against government servants

Pakistan had always suffered at the hands of corrupt and incompetent public servants. Ayub's
government embarked upon a drive against inefficiency and corruption. A thorough screening
process was adopted against all government servants by conducting a close scrutiny of their
service records. 'Misconduct' included bribery, corruption, jobbery, favoritism, nepotism, wilful
maladministration, and willful misapplication or diversion of public funds. Tribunals consisting
of incumbent or retired judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts were created to try cases of
misconduct against public servants.10 The enquiries under this law were wide enough to include
public servants or holders of public office on or after 15 August 1947. In addition to disciplinary
actions such as dismissal, compulsory retirement or reduction in rank, a public servant could be
disqualified from holding any public office for up to fifteen years and could be made liable to
make good any loss to the public revenue or property and to forfeit any gain for himself or
another, found by the tribunal to have been caused by or to have resulted from his misconduct.
The provisions of this law were in addition to and not in derogation of any law for the time being
in force on the subject.
As a result, disciplinary action was taken by way of dismissal, compulsory retirement, and
reduction in grade against about three thousand government servants, including 138 first class
civil officers, 221 officers of the second class, and 1303 third class employee sell This shake-up
immensely improved the morale of the hardworking officers who found themselves now
empowered to set the tone for their departments.xiii
2. Action against politicians
Corrupt politicians were dealt with firmly. Ayub had watched the political situation of his
country with deep insight and believed that the politicians were mainly responsible for political,
moral and social degradation of the country. He was of the view that if the politicians were left
unchecked, the ML regime would find it difficult to accomplish its target of national
development. Ayub promulgated two ordinances to ban the politicians which were
(1) Public Office Disqualification Order
(2) Elective Bodies Disqualification Order. xiv
EBDO:-
When Ayub Khan took power in 1958 one of his main priorities was the destruction of the
existing political order. In this connection, he abolished political parties on 7 October 1958.
Politicians who were especially targeted and charged under security laws and martial law
regulations were from the National Awami Party and the East Pakistan Awami League since

12
both these parties were opposed to One Unit. In August 1959, Ayub Khan passed the Elected
Bodies Disqualification Order
Under this, 75 leaders were disqualified for participating in political activities for 8 years (until
December 1966). Under the EBDO, Ayub Khan primarily targeted East Pakistani politicians
from the Awami League while leaving the Muslim League largely untouched.
ARTICLE 5 OF EBDO:
a) public servants who had been removed from service on any charge other than inefficiency;
(b) persons who had ever been served with an order under the Security of Pakistan Act or a
similar law relating to an act prejudicial to the defense, external affairs, or the security of
Pakistan;
(c) persons found guilty by the Federal Court or High Court or a tribunal under
PRODA
(d) persons convicted of any offence, and sentenced to more than two years imprisonment stood
debarred from being candidates or members of an elective body, until 31 December 1966 It was
estimated that about 6,000 persons, half of them from East Pakistan, were disqualified under
Article 5 of EBDO.
ARTICLE 7 OR 8
In thia EBDO was used to go after senior party leadership who escaped disqualification via
Article 5
ARTICLE 7
Under this, any person served with a notice could opt to retire from politics until 31 Dec 1966, in
which case further proceedings against him were dropped. In case this option was not exercised
by the respondent, an inquiry would be instituted under Article 8 and if found guilty, he would
be disqualified up to December 1966. (from Separation of East Pakistan)A further 78 politicians
were disqualified under article 7 and 8.xv
ARREST OF POLITICIANS:-
Prominent politicians disqualified under these three articles of EBDO were the top leaders of the
East Pakistan Awami League including Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman and Hussain Shaheed
Suhrawardy. Maulana Bhashani was also arrested. On 30 January 1962 Suhrawardy was arrested
in Karachi under the Security of Pakistan Act which authorized his detention without trial for a
year. It was an irony that a politician who was the Prime Minister of the country was accused of
activities “fraught with such danger to the security and safety of Pakistan that one could fairly
describe them as treasonable”

13
By these ordinances. the corrupt politicians were given a choice of either face the trial under
EBDO for the misdeeds or voluntarily abdicate from all political activities<or the next six years.
A large number of politicians like H.S. Suharwaidy, Makhdoomzada Hassan Mahmood and C.E.
Gibbon chose to step down instead of facing the trials. Similarly corrupt bureaucrats and police
officials were dismissed from service.xvi

REFORMS BY AYUB KHAN

After settling with the corrupt politicians and officers, Ayub now set himself to the task of
introducing reforms in the various spheres of the country, Ayub's reforms are discussed below.
FOREIGN POLICY G. AYUB KHAN:-
Ayub khan tried his best to strengthen the relations with countries which were,
1. SOVIENT UNION
2. CHINA
3. BRATIAN
4. USA
RELATION WITH SOVIENT UNION
relations deteriorated and improved again due to several events.

 In 1961, the Soviets agreed to begin exploring for oil and In 1963, the Soviet government
loaned Pakistan 11 million pounds
 In April 1965 an official visit was paid on trade and oil exploration
 In January 1966 the Soviet Union hosted a peace conference between India and Pakistan
at Tashkent
 In 1968 the Soviet Union began to supply arms to Pakistan against America

RELATION WITH CHINA

Relations with China improved due to all these steps taken by both the countries:-

 In 1963 “talks between China and Pakistan to settle their border dipute’’ “announced a
series of trade agreements’’ and “PIA began regular flights to China’’
 In 1964 China made a statement supporting Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir
 During the 1965 war China supplied military aid and applied diplomatic pressure on
India 3) RELATION WITH BRATIAN
 Relations with Britain got strained due to Relations with Britain got strained
 However Britain played an important role to resolve 1965 war dispute
 Britain had criticized India for crossing the international boundary on 6 September 1965

RELATION WITH USA

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  In 1958, General Ayub Khan stated that we are “the most allied ally” of the United
States”. This shows that during this era Pakistan became more pro-west.
 Ayub Khan believed that Pakistan could not make progress unless the Kashmir problem
was solved, which was not possible without the help of the Western Bloc.
 On the other side the United States aims were to help Pakistan and to maintain her
independence in an area threatened by communism.xvii
AGRICULTURE REFORMS -LAND REFORMS

Land Reform Comission:Appointed in October, 1958 ,A person could not own more than
either 500 acres of canal irrigated land or 1000 acres of unirrigated land. , UTILIZATION
OF RESUMED AREA ,CREATION OF POOLS , ABOLITION OF JAGIRS
,PROTECTION TO TENANTS ، RIGHTS FOR TENANTS , THREE MAJOR DAMS
WERE BUILT,AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT BANK WAS SET UP , LOANS FOR
FARMER
GREEN REVOLUTION (GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE)
The phenomenal increase in growth took place in two phases:-
1. 1960-1965: Main cause of the growth was the increase in irrigation facilities, mainly
tube wells. Between 1960-65, about 25,000 tube wells were installed, each costing R.s.
5000- 12000 and the farm area serviced by tube wells double
2. 1966-1970 : Growth took place mainly because the expanded irrigation facilities were
supplemented by the technology package of High yielding varieties (HYV) seeds,
Chemical fertilizers and Pesticides. , 91%Wheat Production , 141%Rice Productionxviii
TRADE REFORMS
Introduced in 1959. Focus on indirect controls on imports and on domestic prices of other
goods. A number of measures were taken on import licensing that made market forces more
important in determining the ownerships of import licenses.
 EXPORT BONUS SCHEME

Introduced in 1959. .A flexible and fascinating device which was used both to subsidize exports
and to allow a safety valve on imports, while maintaining the basic structure of import controls
and the official exchange rate at its existing level. Over 1959-64, total imports increased much
more rapidly than exports or GNP, and the composition of imports continued to shift towards the
import of capital goods and processed intermediate goods. Export of raw jute 60% in 1958 20%
in 1968 Exports of cotton and jute textiles 8.3% in 1958 35% in 1968
Open General Licensing Scheme :-
Allowed newcomers to enter the trading sector. ,A large amount of foreign exchange was
allocated to the OGL, and the new traders made substantial profits and gains from possessing
import licenses. FREE LIST , Permitted the import of certain goods without any license. The
Free List was extended over time from four items to fifty in 1964.xix

15
SOCIAL REFORMS
Ayub Khan’s government also aimed at reforming some social institutions. Some of the key
areas of social reform reflecting his liberalism were as such:

 The Ayub government set up an Ulema Academy in Lahore. It was an attempt by the
government to modernize the ulama and religious leadership in the country.
 Moreover, religious leaders associated with the Academy were handpicked by the
government, who could extend help to and support the regime in the hour of need.
Population planning program
began in Pakistan in the early fifties. Under Ayub Khan, it was expanded into full-
fledged ministry . To check the inordinate growth of population in 1965 in the Third Five
Year Plan, a sum of Rs. 284 million was allocated for family planning. It was one of the
most ambitious family planning programs in the developing world. Ayub Khan’s personal
interest gave an added impetus to the drive. In addition to Family Planning Boards at
provincial and district levels, a network of paid family planning officers was also
established. An extensive well-directed propaganda was also carried out . Family Planning
Commission was established and Enver Adil was appointed as its head. Ayub Khan also
established a National Research Institute of Family Planning as well.

 Ayub Khan appointed General Burki as the Minister for Heath, Social Welfare and
Labor who gave a new impetus to the social welfare sector. Women organizations like
All Pakistan Women Association felt being ‘helped, consulted, utilized and
encouraged’ . The long-term program of national reconstruction also aimed at the
improvement of the status of women in Pakistani society.xx
ECONOMIC REFORMS:-
Economic Condition of Pakistan:-
The economic condition of Pakistan in the era of G,Ayub khan is as under:-

 Country was in total disarray.

 Had no economic weapon in their armory to fight the battle of its recovery.
 Growth rate of 11 years (1959-70) was high as 6.25%.
 Created an environment where the private sector was discouraged to establish medium
and small-scale industries in Pakistan.
 No job opportunity for people
 There was no Pakistani ruler who attempted to bring in land reforms
 Labor, law and administrative reforms were also not introduced properly.

Monetary Policy (1958-1969)

16
The year 1959-60 marked the beginning of a phase of liberalization and deregulation of the
economy and substantial flow of resources from abroad. This included gradual liberalization of
import policy and introduction of Export Bonus Scheme. From this period, government granted
liberal concessions to the private sector to establish industries in the country resulting an
increase in monetary supply. ▪ First plan (1955-60) - the monetary expansion amounted to Rs.
1.96 Billions. Second plan (1960-65) – the money supply increased by Rs. 2.80 Billions. The
bank credit both in the private and public sector expanded to Rs. 1.62 Billions during the first
and during the second plan period it was equal to Rs. 4.77 Billions.xxi
SPACE PROGRAM
President Ayub Khan, who was very close to Dr. Abdus Salam . Established Pakistan's National
Space Agency, Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) on September
16, 1961. Ayub Khan also appointed dr. Abdus Salam as its head , It was Ayub Khan's
administration when National Aeronautics and Space Administration began training of Pakistani
scientists and engineers in the NASA's headquarters .President Ayub Khan was eager to make
Pakistan as space power, that is why he appointed a noted aeronautical engineer and military
scientist, Air Mar. Gen. W. J. M. Turowicz as Pakistan's Rocket Program head . Gen. W. J. M.
Turowicz efforts led Pakistan to developed ballistic missiles series by its own in the future .
General W. J. M. Turowicz had led a series of Rehbar Sounding Rockets fired from Pakistani
soil. However, after Ayub Khan's removal from office the Space Programed was frozen for
more than 2 decades.xxii

BASIC DEMOCRACY
Ayub Khan issued an ordinance of Basic Democracies on October 27, 1959 and introduced the
system of Local Governments in Pakistan. The Basic democracies system was designed to
accomplish multiple political objectives. It was expected both to mobilize the mass of the
people, especially in rural areas for development activities and to give them a sense of active
participation in local affairs.xxiii
BASIC DEMOCRACIES ORGANIZATION:-
It was a four tiered hierarchical structure consisting of

 The Union Council

 The Tehsil council
 The District Council
 The Divisional Council
1. THE UNION COUNCIL :
This was the lowest but the basic tier of the system. • The Union Council consisted of 5-8
villages of about 8,000- 15,000 population. • There used to be 10-15 electoral wards and from

17
each ward one councilor was to be elected by the adult franchise rule. • A person of 21 year old
can cast vote.
Functions: These councils were given different functions such as


Judicial, Economic ,Agriculture ,Industrial
Communication development

Food production development.
Lastly this union council was converted into Electoral College for the election of
President and the members of assemblies.xxiv
2. THE TEHSIL COUNCIL :
The next higher tier was called Tehsil council. There was no election to this council. It
consisted of some official and some non-official members. The non-official members were the
chairmen of all the Union Councils within the Tehsil and the official members were the heads of
all the nation building departments in the tehsil. The number of official members was equal to
those of non-official members. • This council was headed by the Assistant Commissioner of the
area.
Functions:- • It act as a coordinating body between the union council and district council.
3. THE DISTRICT COUNCIL :
The most important tier was the district council. The head of the council was the Deputy
Commissioner of the district and the Vice-Chairman used to be selected from amongst the
chairmen of the tehsil or Union Councils by the deputy commissioner. This council consisted of
official and non- official members and the number of both officials and non-officials was equal.
Functions:- It performs vast financial and executive powers. In addition to the development
functions, it could impose any tax. The functions and powers of the Deputy Commissioner were
divided into
1. compulsory:- Compulsory functions included,
• The provision and maintenance of schools
• Libraries, Hospitals ,Public roads ,Play grounds,
2. Optional:- • The optional functions include provision of secondary and higher secondary
education, the Culture, social, economic welfare of people.xxv
4. THE DIVISIONAL COUNCIL: The upper most tier was the divisional council. It was
headed by the Divisional commissioner. The members of the divisional councils consisted of
the

 Deputy Commissioner
• the Vice-chairmen of the districts within the division
• the divisional level officers as official members

18
 • some other prominent persons to be selected by the commissioner and some were
recommended by the deputy commissioners.
The number of official and non-official members was equal.
REASONS OF THE FAILURE :
• Common man deprive of their right
• One man Government full of Corruption
• Tashkent Declaration 1966 • Economic instability and disparity
Through this system it was aimed to devolve the power at grass-root level to solve the problems
of the people through their own representatives but this system could not bring any viable
change and nor could solve the problems of the people because limited number of people were
given the opportunity to decide the fate of the country as it was made an electoral college for the
election of the President and members of the central and Provincial Assemblies. It was later on
abolished by the new government as this system lost the popularity and confidence of the
people.xxvi

INDUS WATER TREATY

BACKGROUND
At the time of independence, the boundary line between the two newly created independent
countries i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin, leaving Pakistan as the
lower riparian. Moreover, two important irrigation head works, one at Madhopur
on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej River, on which the irrigation canal supplies
in Punjab (Pakistan) had been completely dependent, were left in the Indian Territory. A dispute
thus arose between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation water from existing
facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices of International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), culminated in the signing of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The
Treaty was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of
Pakistan, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and Mr. W.A.B. Illif of the
World Bank on 19th September, 1960. The Treaty however is effective from1st April, 1960xxvii
ISSUES:-
Sindh/Indus river is strategically vital resource for Pakistan. After Pakistan and India declared
independence the use of the waters and its 5 tributaries became a major dispute between them.
The irrigation canals of the Sutlej valley & the Bari Doab were split, with the canals lying
primarily in Pakistan and the headwork dams in India disrupting supply in some parts of
Pakistan. Some Major Dams on India’s Part of Indus River Basin

19
The concern over India building large dams over various Punjab rivers that could undercut the
supply flowing to Pakistan, as well as the possibility that India could divert rivers in the time of
war, caused political constraints due to inherent mistrust and suspicion. This led to the signing of
Indus Water Treaty in 1960.
TREATY
It is the eastern distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank
(then the International Bank for reconstruction and development). Treaty signed on sept 19’1960
by India Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru and president of Pakistan Ayub Khan. According to
the agreement, control over the 3 eastern rivers ,the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to
India & 3 western rivers , the Indus, the Chenab, the Jhelum to Pakistan.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE WORLD BANK
Initially the bank was reluctant to get involved. World bank refuses loans to both countries even
though they were economically viable. Offered an impartial third party . Offered an option taking
into account both countries’ needs.
ROLE OF WORLD BANK
In 1951, David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of Tennessee Valley Authority, visited India and
Pakistan. Lilienthal wrote an article with suggestions that Indus Basin be treated, exploited, and
developed as a single unit. World Bank mediated from 1952 onwards, and Indus Waters Treaty
(IWT) was signed in September 1960 although Pakistan, not fully convinced ,refused to sign
until 1958. IWT conferred rights over 3 western rivers of Indus river system (Jhelum, Chenab
and Indus) to Pakistan, and over 3 eastern rivers (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) to India.
PROVISIONS

 The treaty under Article 5.1 envisages the sharing of waters of the rivers of the Ravi,
Beas, Sutlej, Jhelum, Chenab which joins the Indus River on its left bank(eastern side) in
Pakistan.

 According to this treaty, Ravi, Sutlej, Beas which constitute the eastern rivers are
allocated for exclusive use by India before they enter Pakistan.

 However a transition period of 10 years was permitted in which India was bound to
supply water to Pakistan from these rivers until Pakistan was able to build the canal
system for utilization of water.
Pakistan has exclusive use of western rivers- the Jhelum, the Chenab & the Indus. Pakistan also
received one time financial compensation for the loss of waters from eastern rivers. Since
march 31,1970, after 10 years moratorium, India secured full rights for use of waters of 3 rivers
allocated to it. The treaty resulted in the partitioning of the rivers rather than sharing of the
waters. It was successful in settling the disagreement over Baglihar dam (Jammu & kashmir).xxviii

20
CLAUSES OF TREATY

 The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and
Chenab and three Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor
exceptions
 the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their
tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan
 Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers- the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab
 The agreement set up a commission to adjudicate any future disputes arising over the
allocation of waters
 The Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as well as
cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin
 Either party must notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works which
would affect the other party and to provide data about such works.
 In cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for mediation and arbitration.
 Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data
continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.xxix
Conclusion
India always want to damage Pakistan economically. The Indus Water Treaty (1960) signed
with India under Stress. It was a result of Pakistan’s fear that since the source rivers of the Indus
basin were in India. No interference was agreed by India and Pakistan in the natural flows of the
western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) and eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej),
respectively. Pakistan strongly object to the designs of such projects for having potential to
change / disrupt flows downstream. It is in the interest of India and Pakistan to follow the treaty
in letter and spirit. Undisturbed flow from the western rivers is must for survival of the country
– no one should be allowed to play with it as it is matter of life and death for Pakistan. We must
have a strategy to ensure so. Absence of such strategy could spell disaster for the entire
region!!!!

CONSTITUTION OF 1962
After the military coup of 1958, Ayub Khan waited for some time intending to pave the path of
public opinion in his favor. A legislative commission was established in the leadership of Justice
Shahaab-ud-din. The commission forwarded the report on 6th May 1961. Justice Manzoor Qadir
designed and drafted the whole constitution. Ayub, bypassing a presidential ordinance, enacted
the new constitution on 8th June 1962.xxx

21
FEATURES

It had the following salient features:-

1. It was in written form and had information about the state institutions and their mutual
relations.
2. The constitution was not passed with the consent of the elected representatives of the
people. It was the creation or brainchild of a single person.
3. The constitution was president-friendly; making amendments was easy only if supported
and endorsed by the president or it was a very lengthy and difficult job. For making any
amendment, the 2/3rd majority of the assembly had to pass the bill and then had to send it
to the president. If the president did not take up any objection for thirty days, the
amendment was considered valid. However, the president might disapprove or send back
the resolution with certain alterations. In that case, it was needed to gain the consent of
the 3/4th majority of the assembly. The president had to give consent in ten days or had to
propagate it for the opinion of Basic Democrats. In that case, the opinion of the B.D’S
was considered final.
4. It was a federal system of government with East Pakistan and West Pakistan as its units.
The constitution contained the list of only federal authorities, the rest were given to the
federating units. The center had the authority to intervene in the provincial matters if
considered necessary.
5. Unlike previous constitutions, the Indian Act 1935 and the constitution of 1956, it was
presidential with all the executive powers resting with the president. He was the
constitutional head of government and state.
6. It was a unicameral system of government with only one house. The members of the
National Assembly were elected by the basic democrats.
7. The judiciary was kept independent to the extent of theory. All the judges of the High
courts had to be selected and appointed by the president with the advice of the chief
justice. But the president was not bound to the opinion or wishes of the Chief Justice.
8. The constitution guaranteed the basic human rights for all the citizens of Pakistan without
any discrimination of caste, creed, and color.
The constitution of 1962 was a one-man show. It was designed for a single man. Apparently, it
gave many rights and securities to the people but actually it deprived the people of all kinds of
political rights and their representation in the legislation
Criticism on constitutionxxxi

MAJOR FAILURE:

 Constitution given by one man

22
The constitution of 1962 was given by one man. In fact, it was framed to legalize undemocratic
military regime. Under its Presidential system, President was granted vast power while power of
national assembly was limited. So, that’s a fact to cause of failure of constitution of 1962.

 Absence of Check and Balance

The system of check and Balance was absent in the constitution of 1962 because the President of
Pakistan made powerful and made National Assembly powerless. President appoints the
ministers and ministers were not answerable to National Assembly, they were accountable to
President.

 Indirect Elections

The method of election of President, members of National Assembly and Provincial Assembly in
the constitution of 1962 was indirect. It was not proper for the country like Pakistan.

 Lack of Provincial Autonomy

Provinces were not given autonomy. The center was more powerful. This clash of power failed
the constitution.

 Political Causes

There were many political causes for the failure of the constitution for example non-existence of
political consciousness as well as negative attitude of political parties.

 Negation of Islamic Ideology

The 1962 constitution promised to propagate an Islamic way of life in Pakistan so that Muslim
could proceed with their lives according to Holy Quran and Sunnah but practically it was failed.

 Increase of Political Crises

The political crises raised their heads, which reflected that people were no longer satisfied with
the Muhammad Ayub Khan’s policies.

 Unpopular Presidential System

Usually constitutions are adopted by parliament, referendum or conventions. Contrary to this,

constitution of 1962 was adopted and enforced in such way. In fact, it was a gift from a dictator,
and it imposed presidential system against norms of democracy. Therefore, its presidential
system remained unpopular and proved a failure.

 Presidential Dictatorship

In constitution of 1962, absence of separation of powers and granting of extensive powers to

President revealed that presidential system of this constitution was just another form of

23
presidential dictatorship. Such presidential dictatorship caused failure of presidential system of
constitution of 1962.

 Policy of Suppression of Fundamental Rights

Although fundamental rights were made part of constitution of 1962 through its first amendment,
yet presidential government practically never recognized and accepted them. In fact, policy of
suppression of fundamental rights was adopted. Such policy finally caused failure of presidential
system of constitution of 1962xxxii

1965 ELECTIONS:-
INTRODUCTION
Pakistan's second Presidential Elections were held on 2 January 1965. The voting was to be
indirect, as the President had to be elected by the 80,000 "basic democrats", who made up the
Electoral College. These basic Democrats were basically democratically elected public
representatives who served in the Divisional, District, Tehsil or Union councils.xxxiii
PARTIES FOR ELECTIONS
There were two major parties contesting the elections: the Convention Muslim League and the
Combined Opposition Parties. The Combined Opposition Parties consisted of five major
opposition parties, and had a nine-point program, which included restoration of parliamentary
democracy and introduction of direct elections and adult franchise. The Combined Opposition
Parties had no single leadership and were therefore, unable to select a presidential candidate
from amongst themselves. Hence, they chose Fatima Jinnah as their candidate who was seen as
an undisputed leader due to her relationship with Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Meanwhile, the
candidate for Convention Muslim League was the incumbent President Mohammed Ayub Khan.
ELECTION CAMPAIGN
There were four candidates: Ayub Khan, Fatima Jinnah and two obscure people with no party
affiliation. There was a short campaigning period of one month, which was further restricted to
nine projection meetings that were organized by the Election Commission and were attended
only by the members of the Electoral College and members of the press. The public was barred
from attending the projection meetings, which would have enhanced Fatima Jinnah's image.
Ayub khan
Ayub Khan had came to power in 1958 following the declaration of the 1958 Pakistani coup
d'etat. Since then, he had been serving as a President. He consolidated his position as a
Constitutional ruler by drafting the 1962 constitution. At the time the elections were held, Ayub
had introduced a number of Economic reforms that had increased the growth rate of the country
and had also pulled it out of the severe economic crisis that had begun after the assassination
of Prime Minister L.A Khan in 1951. This had made Ayub a popular ruler. Moreover, being

24
the Commander in Chief of Army, he took several steps to turn the odds in his favor. He didn't
even hesitate to legislate on electoral matters, giving him an edge over rival candidate, Fatima
Jinnah.
Fatima jinnah
The campaign of Fatima Jinnah suffered from a number of setbacks. An unfair and unequal
election campaign, poor finances, and indirect elections through the Basic Democracy System
were some of the primary problems she faced. However, she had overwhelming support among
the public. Many had sympathies with her as she was the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whilst
others saw her an excellent figure to challenge Ayub Khan's Military Dictatorship. Although
many clerics had denounced her with the view that a woman cannot lead a Muslim state, several
religious leaders also supported her. The Jamaat-e-Islami led by Maududi, was a keen supporter
of Ms. Jinnah's campaign as she was a conservative motivated by religious views, as compared
to secular Ayub Khan.xxxiv
RESULTS
The election results came in favor of the incumbent President Ayub Khan, who, despite losing
the popular vote, won 62.43% of the Electoral vote, thanks to faithless electors. Fatima Jinnah
won 35.86% of the electoral college votes. Ms. Jinnah was however extremely successful in
some areas of the country. She had swept across major urban centers such
as Karachi and Dhaka. Ayub also faced disappointing results in East Pakistan. However, Ayub
had decisively triumphed in rural Pakistan. As majority of the Electoral College consisted of
representatives from the rural setup, Ayub was able to win a clear majority
AFTERMATH
The election results were not accepted by the Combined Opposition Parties, who accused Ayub
Khan of rigging. The COP staged demonstrations and protests, however, didn't gain much public
support as Ms. Jinnah accepted the election results. The Election had an effective result. It
further strengthened the role of Women in politics in Pakistan. Earlier there were only a handful
of women politicians, however since this election women began to enter politics in large
numbers and even started to contest for higher posts.xxxv

WAR OF 1965:-
INTRODUCTION
The number of clashes between the Indian and Pakistani forces on the cease-fire line in Kashmir
had greatly increased during 1964, and increased during the first half of 1965. In April and May
1965, there were serious skirmishes between the armed forces of India and Pakistan in the
region known as the Rann of Kutch. Pakistan's armed forces gave a good account of themselves
which might have given rise to misplaced confidence in the mind of the military leadership that
it could take on India militarily.

25
Finally, a serious crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations precipitated on 5 August 1965 when armed
freedom fighters from Azad Kashmir began entering Indian occupied Kashmir in an
unsuccessful attempt to foment revolt. Further parties of freedom fighters entered on 18 August.
India protested against what it called 'infiltration', but such protestations were rejected by
Pakistan.
The number of skirmishes on the cease-fire line in Kashmir increased in May and June.
However, this number declined after the signing of the Rann of Kutch cease-fire agreement.
Exchanges of fire all along the line once again erupted on 8 August and on 16 August Indian
troops crossed the border and occupied Pakistani border posts. In early September, Pakistani
forces advanced into the Indian sector, capturing a key post on 5 September. On the same day,
the Indian Defense Ministry accused a Pakistani aircraft of attacking an Indian Air Force ground
unit near Amritsar, without causing any damage. This was the first incident reported outside
Kashmir. On the following day Indian troops launched an offensive across the Punjab frontier
into West Pakistan. The Indian Defense Minister claimed as justification for crossing
international borders that the Indian attack had been launched in order to pre-empt an attack by
Pakistan on Indian Punjab.
When India attacked Pakistan, the man most Surprised was Ayub. His surprise was shared by the
Commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army. They had been assured by Bhutto, Foreign Minister,
and Aziz Ahmad, Foreign Secretary, that India would not cross international borders to attack
Pakistan. They had even suppressed a message from the Pakistan High Commissioner in New
Delhi sent through the Turkish Embassy to the Foreign Office in Islamabad, that India was
planning to launch an attack on Pakistani territory on 6 September. Ayub was woken up at four
o'clock in the morning on 6 September and given the news of the Indian advance towards
Lahore. He telephoned General Musa, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, who said he
had also heard the news but was waiting for confirmation. 6 All this badly exposed the military
genius of Ayub and his army chief.xxxvi
In a broadcast on 6 September, Ayub declared 'We are at war', and proclaimed a state of
emergency, although an Indian government spokesman commented: 'India is not at war with
Pakistan or the Pakistani people. India's operations are intended to destroy Pakistan military
bases from where they attacked India.' On 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive ran
aground and with that collapsed Pakistan's entire military strategy. For Pakistan, the war was
over.
Fighting continued on all fronts until 23 September. The UN Security CounciJ adopted a
resolution which stated inter alia:
The Security Council... demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, 22
September 1965 at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both governments to issue orders for a
cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the
positions held by them before 5 August 1965.

26
At Pakistan's request, a special meeting of the Security Council was held in the early hours of 22
September at which Bhutto announced Pakistan's decision to order a cease-fire but warned the
Council that if it did not bring about a settlement of the Kashmir question within a limited period
of time, Pakistan would quit the United Nations.
The cease-fire came into effect as ordered, but was jeopardized by a series of violations by both
sides and by their refusal to withdraw from the positions they held in each other's territories. The
Indian government alleged that after the cease-fire, Pakistani forces had intruded into the Fazilka
area and many border areas of Rajasthan which they had not previously occupied, and a number
of engagements took place in both sectors.
The tone of the Security Council proceedings was characteristic of most, if not all, debates on the
Kashmir question. The parties to the dispute came with different premises, to which they
resolutely adhered. The Indians said that, in conformity with the Security Council resolution,
Pakistan must vacate Azad Kashmir first. Thereafter, the question of the plebiscite could be
considered. Pakistan said that all this was unsatisfactory, in that it offered no assurance that India
would not then occupy Azad Kashmir and retain its grip permanently. All that was necessary,
according to Pakistan, was a plebiscite by the Kashmiris to decide what they wanted to do with
their future.
Not until 6 December 1965 did General Marambio, U Thant's representative, arrive in Pakistan
to arrange troop withdrawals, by which time Ayub and Lal Bahadur Shastri had agreed to meet at
Tashkent in the Soviet Union.xxxvii
TASHKENT DECLARATION

The Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the Pakistan’s President Ayub khan met on
4th January 1966 in Tashkent. Both the leaders signed a pact which is called the Tashkent
Declaration of 1966.

The important clauses of the declaration are

 The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to cultivate good
friendly and neighborly relations according to the Charter of the United Nation. Under
the UN Charter, they will use their energies to resolve their problems in a peaceful way.
 The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to withdraw from the
war.
 They agreed not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.
 Both leaders agreed to discourage all those actions which could be harmful for the other
country and encourage those which could promote the friendly relationship between the
two countries.
 They agree that Higher Commissioners of Pakistan and India should come back to their
posts and make efforts for future developments of both countries.
27
  They agree to make efforts for increasing bilateral trade and strengthening economic ties
between the two countries. They also agreed to enhance communication and cultural
information with each other.
 Both leaders agreed to make some law of repatriation for the prisoners of war.
 They agreed that in future they will discuss the problems of refugees also. They also
agreed for an agreement to return the property taken by the either side because of the
conflict.xxxviii

The President of Pakistan and Prime Minister of India both showed respect  and paid homage to
the efforts of Soviet Union. They admired the efforts of chairman of the council of Ministers of
the USSR for organizing such a pleasant and friendly meeting. Both leaders thought that this
declaration would prove very fruitful for the future of the region.

 CRITICISM

This declaration was made at Ministerial level but the real fact was that all talks became useless
and no result was achieved because there was a huge difference in public and government
opinion on the Kashmir issue. The public perception and euphoria set in the minds of Pakistani
people was that Pakistan was going to won the war. But the Tashkent declaration was a negation
of the same. This declaration shocked them very much and the people started saying that
Pakistan had won the war in the battlefield but lost the war on the table. Tashkent declaration
greatly damaged the Ayub Khan’s personality and it became one of the main reasons of his
downfall. 

In India the people also criticized this agreement because the President of Pakistan and the Prime
Minister of India did not sign any pact on Guerrilla warfare in Kashmir. After the day of this
declaration the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur died because of sudden heart attack. After him no
one accepted this declaration and it was ignored by the next Government.xxxix

THE DOWNFALL OF THE REGIME

Like his rise Ayub's downfall, too, was sudden and confusing. He had to step down in Nov. 1968
in result of a virulent agitation against him. It was a sudden outburst of political activity
generated by the sense of insecurity and frustration usually manifested by the changing societies.
There are multifarious factors responsible for the downfall of a regime which had so deeply,
devotedly and sincerely been involved in the uplift and amelioration of an adversely
downtrodden and impoverished society.
One of the major causes of Ayub’s downfall is attributed to his economic policies which if on the
one side were instrumental in accelerating economic growth were, responsible on the other hand

28
in widening the gap between the two wings of the country. The major defect in Ayub's economic
policies was that they aroused regional and class inequalities. His policy framework concentrated
on diverting resources to industrial capital in West Pakistan.
His political System under the 1962 Constitution deprived the Bengalis of all opportunities of
any participation ' in the decision making process on initial socio- economic as well as political
matters. The political structure which the Constitution of 1962 established demonstrated an acute
allocative bias towards East Pakistan. Deprived of the political control the Bengalis were forced
to view the economic policies of Ayub Khan as another expression of West Pakistan dominance.
Bengalis resentment was deepened by the growing disparity between the two regions. The
preference given to the Western wing by the international developmental institutions such as
World Bank, reinforced regional tensions, because the World Bank tended to pick up those
projects which ensured greater return and which happened to be located in West Pakistan.
Ayub's economic and developmental strategy gave birth 'to the economist elitism which in turn
promoted deep class polarization. The economic elite of twenty two families amassed the
economic benefits by gathering exclusive control of country's developmental institutions of
industry, insurance and banking. On the revealing of country's wealth being concentrated within
a small economic nobility, the public vehemently demanded equal distribution of resources and a
greater amount of equality.
Educational reforms of Ayub Khan even did not produce desired results. In view of the national
resources consumed by education, Pakistan's performance in the educational sector under Ayub
was worst. Similarly the Ayub regime showed little concern for the provisions of basic heä!th
care and sanitation facilities. There was a sharp rise in population growth due to the neglect of
social services. The rise in population growth rate left its adverse impact on the living standard
which apparently fell down in certain sections Of society. A wide scale resentment swiftly
developed against the Martial Law regime. The political parties taking full advantage of the
situation mobilized anti-Ayub sentiments and launched movement for restoration Of democracy
The Central role against Ayub Khan was played by the students and labor unions. In March,
1969 workers strike paralyzed the life in Karachi. Similar actions were taken by the students and
labour unions in other parts of the country. Demands for democratic rule and removal of
censorship were made by the political parties and other anti-Ayub elements.
Tashkent declaration added fuel to the fire and contributed a great deal towards the downfall of
Ayub Khan. The people and some of Ayub's colleagues in his . administration believed that the
Tashként declaration signed under Kosygin's domineering participation, accorded excessive
concessions to India.
The EBDOed politicians, after the completion of the ban on 31st December, 1966, entered
politics and joined hands with the opposition parties. After the Tashkent declaration the
reinforced opposition parties became excessively hostile. The PDM demanded the, restoration of

29
democracy and lifting of emergency. There were strong antigovernment demonstrations in the
major cities of West Pakistan in January, 1966.
Ayub's image received a severe blow with his family's flagrant indulgence in the Plundering of
national wealth. Two of his sons left the army service to enter civil life and Subsequently to roll
up country's resources

On the behest of their father. Gohar Ayub became a big •industrialist within days of his release
from the army. He entered business and industry along with his father in-law Gen.
Habib Ullah who set up a group of industries within a very short time. No one could believe that
Gohar Ayub and his father-in-law progressed so rapidly in industiy ,ahd business on their, own
toil. A general' belief developed that Ayub Khan kept a deaf ear on his sons activities and
allowed them to amass country's wealth at will.
Ayub's regime tried its best to quell the demonstrations. Ayub had a round table conference with
the political leaders. He conceded their demands to abolish the indirect method of elections and
restore the parliamentary system. But the politicians did not agree and demanded that Ayub
should resign. Among the politicians Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, one time the closest ally of Ayub
,became his arch oppositionist. He launched his PPP in Nova 1967 and embarked upon country-
wide tours to mobilize support for his party. He developed •sharp differences with Ayub on
Kashmir and Tashkent declaration and swept the public opinion by announcing that he will
reveal the secret of Tashkent Declaration at some opportune times which, however, he never
revealed till his death. He disassociated with Ayub and the . ruling Convention Muslim League.xl

AYUB KHAN’S BLUNDERS

During Ayub time, a number of significant developments with far-reaching consequences took
place on the positive side. The foundations were laid for the country’s industrial sector, while
the agricultural sector markedly improved. Friendship with China was initiated and nurtured
during this period. Pakistan joined the American sponsored defense pacts SEATO and CENTO,
and as a result a free-flow of economic aid and military hardware poured into the country
improving its economic conditions and equipping its armed forces with modern and
sophisticated weapons. It was all very well, but Ayub had a lot to account for on the negative
side. He committed many blunders, with disastrous and everlasting consequences from which
the country suffered and will continue to suffer till eternity. Here are some of his misadventures.
1. Imposition of martial law:

30
Ayub’s first misadventure was the imposition of the martial law in 1958 that derailed democracy
and destroyed all its allied institutions that were beginning to take root. His assuming of power
through a military coup encouraged military adventurers and showed the way for the use of
military guns to grab power in the future.
2. The Indus Waters Treaty (1960):
The point of reference here is the one-sided Indus Waters Treaty that he signed with Pundit
Nehru when he visited Pakistan in September 1960, ceding to India the water of the three Punjab
rivers just for a song. Whether it was his ignorance or lack of foresight, perhaps both, that these
rivers on the Pakistan side have almost gone dry and millions of acres of once fertile land is now
turning into a desert.
3. Refused to start the nuclear programme:
Bhutto arranged a meeting on December 11, 1965, in the Dorchester Hotel, London, between
President Ayub Khan and Munir Ahmed Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist. In this meeting,
Khan stressed to the President the need to acquire nuclear technology that would give the
country a deterrent capability. He informed the Ayub that India and Israel were moving rapidly
in this direction. Khan estimated that the cost of nuclear technology at that time was not more
than $150 million. But Ayub refused to accept the scientists proposal and said: Pakistan was too
poor to spend so much money. Moreover, if we ever need the bomb, we will buy it off the shelf.
4. 1965 Indo-Pak war:
Wars are fought either to defend a country’s sovereignty in case of an attack or because of
overambitious and ambivalent individuals at the helm, who do so for their personal
aggrandizement and glory. There are many examples: Hitler started World War II in 1940;
Suharto annexed East Timor in 1975; Galeteiri occupied Falkland in 1982; and Bush invaded
Iraq in March 2003 - all for personal glory. General Ayubs act in going for the 1965 Indo-Pak
war may be clubbed in the same category. The 1965 war with India was unplanned, fruitless and
an unfinished affair. The war itself was only a 17-day affair. As soon as it was over the people of
Pakistan woke up to the reality that the nation had not won a single victory, which Ayub Khans
Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar had led them to believe. Field Marshal Ayub Khan and
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India met in Tashkent in January 1966 at the initiative of
the Soviets and agreed to swap the territories seized by both the sides during the recent war. The
Tashkent Agreement reflected the no-win, no-loss situation on the battlefield of the 1965 war,
whereas Pakistan was made to believe by the government that it was a Pakistan victory. The
agreement made no mention of Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Pakistanis failed
to comprehend, as to why Pakistan’s victory did not get them any gain in the shape of a territory.
5. Alienated the East Pakistanis:

31
After independence, Ayub was at one time posted as General Officer Commanding (GOC) East
Pakistan. During his tenure, there he did not treat East Pakistanis well. His attitude towards them
was that of a colonizing army commander. After he became CMLA and President, he did not
change and his attitude towards them was one of casual indifference and disregard to their
genuine and legitimate rights and needs. His remarks to an East Pakistan politician Mushtaq
Khundkar, if East Pakistan is not satisfied, then they may secede, to which the latter promptly
replied, it is always the minority that secedes and in this case West Pakistan being a minority
may secede, if you want to. Ayubs general attitude and such irresponsible remarks not only
distanced the East Wing from the rest of Pakistan, but also sowed the seeds of separation. His
theory that the defense of East Pakistan lay in the West Wing, and then the practical
demonstration of it in the 1965 war when the East wing was virtually left undefended, finally
sealed the fate of relations between the two wings of the country. This was the nature of the
hatred and malaise being created and nurtured by Ayubs mode of thinking and unequal
distribution of development projects in the Eastern Wing, which finally resulted in Bangladesh.
6. Ayub’s long and despotic rule:
Despotic and unbridled one-man rule for a decade is a long time, and the mere presence of some
one for this period in authority is sufficient to generate resentment and even hatred against that
person. In the Field Marshals case, there were many imbroglios that he had to account for. While
the East Wing was already anti-Ayub, he had also lost credibility with the leaders from West
Pakistan, who had no trust in his words and actions. The masses were on the streets protesting
against him and everything connected with his name.
7. Decade of development:
In order to step aside the tide of hatred against Ayub Khan, it was decided to play up the card of
economic development in the country. The inflow of US aid improved the economics of the
country to a large extent. There was visible prosperity in the country. At this time, Altaf Gohar,
the Presidents conscience keeper, advised him to cash in on this development syndrome. It was
decided to celebrate the 'Decade of Development in a big way over a one-year period, thinking
that it will make people forget the ill effects of Ayubs autocratic and oppressive rule. Lot of
public money was spent to make the show a success and to publicize that it was all made
possible because of the efforts and planning of the Field Marshal. Contrary to expectations, this
year-long exercise, extravagance had a severe backlash and it turned out to be Ayubs swan song.
All this personal publicity of Ayub Khan boomeranged and further infuriated the already agitated
public feelings, resulting in an unprecedented uprising of the people of Pakistan against the
General.
8. Friends not masters:
In yet another attempt to glorify his achievements, Ayub got his biography Friends Not Masters
published in 1967, but conspicuously there was no mention of the 1965 Indo-Pak war in it. As all

32
was going anti-Ayub, this book did not cut much ice and was ridiculed. On March 25, 1969, he
admitted his rejection by the people and announced that he was resigning. As the last act of his
imbroglios, he handed over the power to another General in uniform, instead of the speaker of
the National Assembly, as envisaged even in his own person specific Constitution of 1962. n The
writer is former ADC to the Quaid-i-Azam.xli

AYUB AND THE CIVILI MILITARY RELATIONS :-

This part explains that one of the contributory causes of the fall of Ayub’s regime was the lack of
institutional building, an intolerant attitude toward political opponents and lack of political
culture. Ayub’s fall occurred for three reasons:
1) lack of adoption of political culture as he failed to consolidate the democratic institutions,
2) unexpected results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement
with India,
3) the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to class differences in the country and was
successfully exploited by the politicians who were marginalized by Ayub during the eleven years
of his authoritarian rule.
Ayub, who was an authoritarian ruler, suppressed the opposition by making wide use of state
machinery and intelligence agencies. Immediately after taking over, he targeted civil bureaucrats
and punished them for corruption, malpractices and inefficiency. In order to bring democratic
reforms under pressure from the U.S. government, Ayub Khan introduced a concept of electoral
participation, known as the Basic Democracies System (BD), which was a multi-layered political
process in which the chosen representatives were elected at a grass roots level. The BD system,
despite its weaknesses, had one major advantage. It became instrumental in creating a political
culture in Pakistan that eventually caused the resignation of Ayub due to a mass mobilization of
the people.
The BD system also resulted in communication between local government and central
government while bypassing the provincial political system. Each tier was given certain
responsibilities that varied from local administration, agriculture and addressing the problems of
the local community. It mobilized public opinion, generated a political will and encouraged the
people’s participation. The BD system also brought Ayub closer to the people. Many social
scientists, like Wiggins, have praised the BD system adopted by Ayub Khan. However, BD
members remained dependent on bureaucrats for their funds and for the resolution of their
internal disputes. The bureaucrats were firmly controlled by the central government; thus, in
turn; the BD members remained loyal and subservient to Ayub. These BD members remained a
political instrument to further Ayub’s policies and cast votes in favor of Ayub Khan during the
1966 elections, thereby defeating Fatima Jinnah. The media remained under

33
the strict control of the government. A leading newspaper, The Pakistan Times, was banned and
later nationalized by the government. Thus, Ayub Khan exercised tight control over the people
through a centralized administrative infrastructure. Ayub was an authoritarian leader who did not
allow the nurturing of political institutions. He came down hard on politicians by introducing a
“Public Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA),” which rendered them unable to
hold public office for fifteen years, if found guilty. Another ordinance, the Elective Bodies
Disqualification Order (EBDO), authorized special tribunals to try former politicians for
“misconduct,” an infraction not clearly defined. The prosecution of politicians could be avoided
if the accused did not contest elections or be part of an electoral body for a period of seven years.
About 7,000 individuals were tried, including prominent politicians, like Suhrawardy and later
Shiekh Mujib, in conspiracy cases.bThe courts were banned from hearing any case against
martial law orders. Several appeals against the imposition of martial law were dismissed by the
Supreme Court. The much trumpeted, so-called political stability was more personalized than
institutionalized. The joint opposition was divided and continued to serve its own self-interests.
Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Jinnah, was made a unanimous candidate for joint opposition, but
was no match for the powerful Ayub, who had firm control over the state resources. He carried
out massive rigging in the 1966 elections, utilizing all the state machinery,including the
intelligence agencies, at district levels, and the BD members helped him. These events led Ayub
to win the 1966 elections with a large margin. Ayub also adopted a divide and rule policy among
the politicians.
During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto and Shiekh Mujib emerged as three political leaders
from the West and East Pakistan. Notwithstanding the above, Rizvi argues that the graph of
Ayub’s popularity started falling immediately after the 1965 War as he failed to rise up to the
expectations of the people, unable to win the 1965 War, liberate Kashmir from India and then,
finally, by signing the Tashkent agreement, having failed to improve the socio-economic
conditions of the common man. Just forty-eight hours after the signing of the Tashkent
agreement, the enraged students and elements from Islamic parties filled the streets, including
politicians like Maulana Maudadi, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and
Bhutto. Politicians tried to give the impression that Ayub Khan had sold Kashmir to India by
signing a cease-fire politician. Shuja Nawaz argues, regarding the culmination of the climax of
the 1965 War, “What was being portrayed as a magnificent victory over India by Ayub Khan’s
propaganda machine produced only disillusionment and catalyzed his eventual fall from grace.”
Bhutto was an astute politician, who was the foreign minister until 1966, and noticed the changes
in the wind when Ayub’s popularity was falling. He resigned from Ayub’s cabinet because of the
sagging popularity of Ayub and formed his own party as The Pakistan People’s Party.
Bhutto portrayed himself a hero in the eyes of the people as he apparently resigned from Ayub’s
cabinet because Ayub compromised on Kashmir’s cause. Mujib also managed to mobilize public
opinion of the East Pakistanis against the West Pakistani marginalization of the Bengalis. By the
end of 1968, Bhutto managed to successfully exploit the rising socio-economic forces and by
mobilizing public opinion with a strong critique of Ayub Combined opposition also joined
34
Bhutto and the street protests, along with the people, t overthrow Ayub. The situation eventually
grew out of control and the country came to a virtual halt due to almost daily strikes. In January
1968, Ayub was reported to have had a heart attack from the ongoing strikes and the
unproductive results of the 1965 war.
By early 1969, Yahya started taking note of the deteriorating law and order situation and feared
that the armed forces, under the name of Ayub Khan’s army, were being discredited in the eyes
of the people. He was also under pressure from political parties to impose martial law. Under
these conditions, the politicians started switching their center of support toward army leadership
rather than strengthening democratic control. Under the prevailing conditions, Ayub Khan had
no option but to resign. However, instead of holding elections or handing over his powers to the
speaker of assembly, he transferred his powers to his most trusted general, Yahya Khan. Yahya
Khan took over from Ayub Khan in March 1969 and imposed martial law.xlii

ANALYSIS ON AYUB KHAN REGIME:-

Military dictators are slightly more fortunate. An army of repute defenders, in uniform and
civvies, continues singing the praise of the golden era when the ‘General Sahib’ once ruled. They
reminisce about the days when honey and milk flowed in ravines and open drains, and when the
economic growth rivalled that of South Korea or some other Asian tiger or cat.
Political leaders of all stripes and tenor must envy the good repute General Ayub Khan continues
to enjoy almost 50 years after he reluctantly relinquished power.The popular discourse about the
Ayub era (1958 - 1969) is that of economic growth, prosperity, and the growing stature of
Pakistan on the world stage. However, the economic realities of the time are much less
glamorous, if not dismal.An objective review of General Ayub Khan’s policies and actions
suggests that his primary motive was to sustain and prolong his rule as his regime sowed the
seed, and generously watered the plant, for Bangladesh's separation that came years later. He
empowered the religious fundamentalists as he sought their support against Fatima Jinnah.The
economic growth, which many cite as his singular achievement, promoted the income
inequalities resulting in the rise of the 20 influential families who controlled the nation's
resources and amassed ill-gotten wealth, leaving the rest poor, hungry, and resentful.
A Chief Martial Law Administrator is born
General Ayub's dramatic ascent to power in 1958 came after a decade of political turmoil. From
1947 to 1958, Pakistan was governed by four heads of state and seven prime ministers. The
political jostling for power incapacitated the then president, General Iskander Mirza, who
suspended the parliament and appointed a new cabinet with General Ayub Khan as the new
prime minister. However, within days, Ayub Khan turned the tables on General Mirza forcing
him into a pensioned exile in London. General Ayub Khan declared himself the president of
Pakistan on October 27 while he simultaneously held the office of the Chief Martial Law
Administrator. In the General's words: “Major General Iskander Mirza, lately President of

35
Pakistan, has relinquished his office of President and has handed over all powers to me.
Therefore, I have this night assumed the office of President and have taken upon myself the
exercise of the said powers and all other powers appertaining thereto."
Too illiterate to vote, but literate enough to create a homeland From the time he assumed control,
General Ayub resented the public and the democratic process. For him, the public was too
illiterate and poor to be trusted with adult franchise.
So he created an electorate ("basic democracy") of a few thousand of whom 95% elected the
General as their leader. That the same illiterate and poor people of Pakistan were wise enough to
have voted earlier with their hearts, minds, and feet to create a new country that elevated the
same General to the office of the army chief was not sufficient for them to have earned the
General's trust for adult franchise.
General Ayub Khan held the politicians squarely responsible for the "chaotic internal situation"
and accused them of being willing to barter the country "for personal gains”. He was keen to
imprison leading politicians in East and West Pakistan. The military dictators that came after him
have held a similar contempt for politicians.
The economics of inequality
Shahid Javed Burki, a former World Bank economist, rightly identified the fundamental
disconnect between the public and the Ayub Junta that celebrated 10-years of being in power by
highlighting GDP growth and other inflated macroeconomic indicators.The general public,
however, cared less of the aggregate statistics as they struggled without much success against
price inflation and spatial income disparities.
Burki points out that the so-called economic growth was rooted in income inequality, which
worsened over time between regions and among people with the growth in the macroeconomy.
TheThe result was evident: half of the industrial wealth accrued to Chinioties in Punjab and the
immigrant Memons, Bohras, and Khojas.
At the same time, General Ayub opened the door to foreign experts who were ignorant of, and
alien to, the political economy of Pakistan. Yet they came armed with policies that might have
worked elsewhere but were ill-suited for Pakistan's challenges. General Ayub's economic
prowess need not be discounted entirely. His penchant for central planning is evident in the
second five-year plan. The inflow of foreign capital, at twice the rate of that of India, sparked
growth in industries that supported consumer goods. One must also review what drove the
growth and what industrial sectors blossomed as a result.
A close look at what transpired reveals that there was nothing organic about the growth. It was
primarily driven by foreign aid, the same way General Musharraf's rule was buttressed by
American aid after 9/11. By December 1961, foreign aid was more than twice the size of foreign
loans. With the second five-year plan in 1964, foreign aid was responsible for 40% of the total

36
investment. And that's not all. Foreign aid covered 66% of the cost of imports. One must give
credit where it's due, and it's mainly foreign aid.
General Ayub’s global fan base
There was no shortage of the high-profile admirers. From de Gaulle of France to President
Johnson of the United States, Western leaders were singing praise for the economic growth in
Pakistan.
Even Robert McNamara, the then World Bank president, proclaimed that Pakistan under General
Ayub was “one of the greatest successes of development in the world”. However, experts were
quick to point out that de Gaulle, Johnson, McNamara and others focused solely on growth and
ignored the distribution of wealth resulting in income inequalities that sowed the seeds of
discontent, violence, and ultimately caused the splitting of East and West Pakistan.

CONCLUSION
When Ayub took over the country, its overall political and economic conditions were in a poor
state. The country’s treasury was virtually empty. Ayub, using his administrative acumen,
brought about a revolution in the economic policies of the country, which made Pakistan one of
the fastest growing economies in Asia. Pakistan saw the unprecedented growth rate of 7 percent
with an industrial growth of 76 percent, which was better than any other Asian country’s growth
rate (of 55 percent) during that period. Similarly, he improved growth in the agriculture sector
and introduced the modern concept of a green revolution by making use of modern technologies
and building dams. Agricultural growth was raised from 1.3 percent in 1958 to 6.3 percent by the
mid-1960s. However, the high growth and industrialized rate relied on extracting resources from
the rural areas of East Bengal and low wage workers in the West, leading to disparities in the
country, which were not corrected as the country grew. Ayub’s land reforms act was only
partially successful as it lacked implementation.
The large landowners, from whom the land was generally taken, remained unaffected because
only 35 percent of the surrendered land was cultivable. Moreover, the landlords who surrendered
the land were adequately compensated. The results of agricultural reforms could not improve the
financial miseries of the farmers and people living in the rural areas. In addition to economic
disparities, the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan’s economy and to the image of Ayub
Khan. The war had two effects; it not only stopped U.S. aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments
were reduced by 25 percent He failed to provide basic facilities like health care and education to
the common man. Instead, the cost of manufacturing goods and commodity prices increased due
to rapid urbanization and the excessive importation of machinery, while exports remained slow.
Workers’ wages decreased by 12 percent. The population growth remained unchecked, which
brought further difficulties for the poor. The main beneficiaries of Ayub’s policies were twenty-
two families, which included his close associates. These families were virtually controlling the
major businesses of the country. I contend that the rapid growth of industrialization was due to

37
the inflow of aid, profit incentives and high protectionism to local industry. Of these industries,
35 percent were inefficient and a burden on the government. The fall of Ayub Khan can be
attributed to a lack of political culture and institutional building, his discriminatory policies
toward Bangladeshis, the unexpected results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent
cease-fire agreement Ayub’s downfall also occurred due to the unequal distribution of income
that gave rise to regional and class differences in a country that was successfully exploited by the
politicians. These inequalities and treatment with the minorities by the military regime of Ayub
again led to the cause of the second military takeover. I contend that the first coup in Pakistan
continued to weaken the democratic institutions while further politicizing the army. These events
later resulted into affecting the further two coups and ensured the army’s role in future politics in
Pakistan.xliii

REFERENCES :-

38
i i Askari hassan,THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN PAKISTAN,Sang e meel publisher.2000,p82

ii Khan.Hamid. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PAK. Third edition.Oxford University press. Karachi: 2020. P114.

iii Rabbani.Akram, PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, Caravan book house. Lahore:2019.p158

iv Chadury.Nagham, March 2012, ' PAKISTAN 1ST MIKITARY COUP;WHY 1ST MIKITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN AND WHY DOSE IT MATTER?’.

Nawal post graduate school.

v Flash back, The 1st Martial law. Accessed at: www.thedawnnews.com

vi Khan.Hamid.p.118

vii Askari.Hassan. p.88

viii Causes of martial law. Accessed at: www.scribd..com.

ix Hassan.M. Causes of military intervention in Pakistan

x
Khan.Hamid.p121
xi Ibid.p121

xii Flashback. Accessed at : www.thedawnnews.com

xiii Khan, Hamid. Pp 123,124

xiv Rabbani .Akram, p160.

xv Ayub khan action against politicians, Accessed at. Www.grandyrunkroad.com

xvi
Rabbani, Akram.p 160.
xvii Shahzad Amir, Feb7 ,2016. ‘Ayub khan' by group in uet taxila. Accessed at: www.slideshare.com.

xviii Rabbanj Akram.pp.124,125

xix Shahzad Amir. Accessed at. Www.slideshare.com

xx Ansari,Sarfraz,Hassan. ‘ forced modernization and public policy:A case study of ayub erq: “General of political studies” , vol.1 , issue- 1,45,60

xxi Syeda , Jaffari, Laila. Sep 9, 2015. Ayub Economic regime' . Accessed at. Www.slideshare.com.

xxii Shahzad Amir. Accessed at. Www.slideshare.com

xxiii Rabbani Akram. P164

xxiv Ibid.

xxv Abbas, Qamar. April 2019. Local government by ayub.

xxvi Rabbani, Akram. Pp167.168

xxvii Indus water treaty 1960. Accessed at: www.mowr.gov.in

xxviii Tiwari.komal. March 2016.’ Indus water Treaty' . Accessed at: www.slideshare.com

xxix Habib hj. August, 2012. ' Water dispute between India pakistan', . Accessed at: www.slideshare.com

xxx Rabbanj,Akram. Pp153

xxxi khan , Hamid. Pp153

xxxii Failure of the Constitution of 1962. Accessed at: www.studyblogsopot.com

xxxiii Presidential elections. Accessed at: www.pakistanhistory.com

xxxiv Khan Hammid. Pp161-165

xxxv Ibid. P, 167

xxxvi Rabbanj Akram. Pp173

xxxvii Khan,Hammid. Pp171.172

xxxviii Tashkent DECLARATION. Accessed at; www.historypak.com

xxxix Ibid.

xl Rabbani,Akram. Pp 174-175

xli AYUB KHAN’S blunders. Accessed at; www.nation.com.pk.

Chadury.Nagham, March 2012, ' PAKISTAN 1ST MIKITARY COUP;WHY 1ST

xlii

MIKITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN AND WHY DOSE IT MATTER?’. Nawal post

graduate school.
xliii What they never tell us about Ayub regime.Accessed at ; www.thedawnnews.com