R&D Programme: Research Brief
Safety culture at interfaces (T143)
Why was this research required?
An earlier safety culture project under the
International Union of Railways (UIC)
Value Added Safety Strategy was
completed in 2002. It examined methods
to assess and improve safety culture. The
case study team from the project
recommended that UIC carry out further
research on the specific issue of managing
cultural interfaces. They recognised that
organisations will be required more and
more to interface with each other as
European companies strive for increasing
interoperability of their systems, and that
safety could be affected where
organisations with different safety cultures
interact.
UIC therefore commissioned the Safety
Culture at Interfaces (SCAI) project.
The research objectives
The principle objectives of this project
were:
• To understand current approaches to
safety culture and the differences
between those approaches across rail
companies in Europe
• To develop a clear understanding of
the safety issues that could arise when
different cultures are required to
interface with each other
• To devise practical techniques to
enable railway organisations to predict
and counteract any problems that
could arise as a result of new
interfaces being created between
cultures
• To develop a vision and desired
characteristics of a future improved
safety culture and improved cultural
interfaces
• To provide support for addressing
interface problems to the Safety
Directive.
As the work progressed, it became clear to
the steering committee that the interfaces
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of interest to the participating companies
were not just those between companies in
different countries interfacing, but included
interfaces that may exist between or within
companies in the same country,
particularly in the light of deregulation and
fragmentation of the industry.
How was the research performed?
The study gave primary emphasis to the
first three objectives: the latter objectives of
improving safety culture and supporting the
Safety Directive were achieved only
partially through the research carried out
and by applying the SafeCulture toolkit
developed by the research in pilot studies.
The objectives can be fully realised in the
longer term as the industry uses the toolkit
and thereby builds experience on these
specific issues.
UIC selected SINTEF a Norway based
contractor to undertake the work, which
was completed in May 2004.
The steering committee membership
comprised representatives from the
sponsoring companies:
BV (Sweden), Irish Rail (Eire), JBV
(Norway), MAV (Hungary), Network Rail
(UK), ÖBB (Austria), ProRail (Netherlands),
RSSB (UK), SNCB (Belgium), and ZSR
(Slovak Republic).
The research findings
The first part of the study comprised a
literature review and survey of the rail,
aviation, oil and gas industries for
information relevant to the interface issue.
The key findings were:
• Little systematic research has been
carried out into the problem of safety
culture at interfaces.
• A large number of unproven models
and theories of safety culture have
been produced.
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R&D Programme: Research Brief

• Safety culture at interfaces is an conduct of the sessions and how to

important issue (examples of problem assign actions to group members. The
areas found in the literature review protocol is based on actual use of the
concerned inadequate communications method in workshops and pilot studies.
in unplanned situations which occurred • A safety culture questionnaire – to
because of differences in interaction enable the organisations to gain a rapid
patterns in the organisations involved). overview of their key cultural
• Safety culture can be improved and differences before the main analysis
sufficient material is available to commences. This establishes a
produce a working methodology common language for discussion of
• The most successful methods comprise safety culture and can identify potential
elements of interview, observation and safety issues for the analysis
event analysis i.e. a ‘triangulated’ • A checklist of ‘structural differences’
approach rather than a single tool (e.g. that could exist between organisations
a questionnaire). to help identify possible interface
‘scenarios’ of interest:
From the information gathered in the
review and survey and with input from the − Infrastructure (Signalling systems,
project steering committee, SINTEF Communication equipment and
developed a method known as Rolling stock)
‘SafeCulture’. This comprises a number of − Organisation (structure,
tools and checklists to facilitate the responsibilities, management
analysis of safety culture at interfaces. policies and routines to co-operate
cross interfaces)
Performing a SafeCulture analysis − Routines (procedures, rules,
SafeCulture is a toolkit for use in a group manuals and checklists)
setting and focuses on the analysis of − Environment (climate/nature,
typical risk ‘scenarios’. An example is the legislation, authorities and
scenario where a train could enter a inspectorates (structure and
section of track which is already occupied policies), languages)
by another train. − Individual and Team (training,
competencies and collaboration)
Organisations with potential interface
issues will meet to examine such scenarios • Outline descriptions of 9 typical
in detail. In particular, the groups will scenarios – the group can use these
consider whether any ‘safety critical and develop alternative scenarios
functions’ could be compromised in the specific to their own predicted problem
scenarios they envisage. They will ensure areas:
that appropriate strategies are developed
to reduce the impact of cultural differences S1 Initiating emergency stop of train
on these safety critical functions. S2 Approach to level crossing
S3 Events before and after SPAD
SafeCulture provides a number of tools to S4 Detection of errors in track routing
help in the scenario analysis: S5 Depart station
S6 Assisting a failed train as a result of
• An overall protocol for conducting a traction power
SafeCulture analysis with advice on S7 Accident and incident response to a
analysis team composition, an agenda, major train accident
a standard letter of invitation to a 2-day S8 Accident because of differences in
workshop, time estimates for each Infrastructure
analysis activity, general tips about the

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R&D Programme: Research Brief

S9 Maintenance scenarios (work on German and Dutch. The English language

track)
• A description of key safety critical
functions (SCF) that the group can use
within the analysis (a safety critical
function is a function of a system for
which a malfunction would immediately
increase the risk of injury, or damage to
health). SCF are related to:
version can be found on the RSSB website
by following the link provided at the end of
this research brief.
As the methodology is used more widely,
information on best practices adopted by
various rail industry organisations will be
incorporated in the main report and will be
available on the SafeCulture website.

− Normal operation
− Ordinary traffic disturbances
− Technical failures in signalling
system/Central Train Control (CTC)
system
− Degenerated infrastructure
− Work on the track
− Deficiency on rolling stock
− Cross border activity
• The ‘STEP’ method (Sequentially
Timed Events Plotting) – originally
developed as an accident investigation
tool but used here proactively by the
groups to graphically represent the
scenarios they are examining
• A checklist specifically to identify safety
challenges related to collaboration and
communications at interfaces
Contact
Richard Wheldon
Head of management research
Research and Development programme
Rail Safety and Standards Board
richard.wheldon@rssb.co.uk
or
Mr. Gradinariu
Department of Infrastructure
International Union of Railways (UIC)
gradinariu@uic.asso.fr

An example of a STEP analysis is included

on page 4 of this research brief.

Next steps
The methodology has been deployed to
date in workshops in Paris and Oslo and in
three pilot studies in Hungary, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. The feedback has
been very positive and resulted in a few
changes made to the original methodology.
Some of the organisations involved in the
pilot studies have already used the
information generated in these exercises to
implement practical solutions to the safety
culture interface issues identified during
the pilot trials.

The methodology is currently available

from the UIC in English, French and
Hungarian and is to be translated into

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R&D Programme: Research Brief

Example of a STEP Analysis

22/8-2003

SAFETY PROBLEMS
TIME LINE 1 2

ACTORS
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES RTCC ~ RAIL TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTRE
ON TRACK TIMELY TC ~ TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
MAINTENANCE INFORMED TO TCB

TCB RECEIVES REPORT TCB INSTRUCTS

TRAIN CONTROLLER AND INFORMS THAT TRAIN DRIVER B TO CROSS TO
AT RTCC COUNTRY B B WILL CROSS TO TRACK 2 TRACK 2 TOWARDS
FROM STATION 2 STATION 1

DRIVER TRAIN B DRIVER B RECEIVES

INSTRUCTION TO
NORTBOUND
CROSS TO TRACK 2

TRAIN B CROSS TO
TRAIN Y TRACK 2 TOWARDS
NORTHBOUND STATION 1

TCA RECEIVES
INFORMATION AND TCA INSTRUCTS DRIVER
TRAIN CONTROLLER UNDERSTANDS TRAIN B A TO CONTINUE ON
AT RTCC COUNTRY A CROSSING TO TRACK 2 FROM TRACK 2 TOWARDS
STATION 3 STATION 2

DRIVER A RECEIVES COLLISION

DRIVER TRAIN A INSTRUCTION TO
SOUTHBOUND CONTINUE ON TRACK 2
TOWARDS STATION 2

TRAIN A TRAIN A CONTINUES

SOUTHBOUND ROUTE ON TRACK 2
TOWARDS STATION 2

DEVIATIONS / SAFETY PROBLEMS:

1. SAFE CRITICAL FUNCTION SCF 1.1 ENSURING THAT A TRAIN DO NOT ENTER A SECTION WHICH IS OCCUPIED BY ANOTHER TRAIN

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