40PECSON VS CORONEL The foregoing document was executed and declared document Exhibit A above copied contains the
Exhibit A above copied contains the last
G.R. NO. L-20374, OCTOBER 11, 1923
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga probated as the last will and testament of
Dolores Coronel, the document Exhibit A, which
translated is as follows:  and of the testatrix at the foot hereof and on the
In the name of God, Amen: 
I, Dolores Coronel, resident of Betis, Guagua,
Pampanga, Philippine Islands, in the full exercise of
my mental faculties, do hereby make my last will and
testament, and revoke all former wills by me
executed.  that if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to
I direct and order that my body be buried in conformity
with my social standing. 
That having no forced heirs, I will all my properties,
both movable and immovable, to my nephew,
Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to my niece Angela
Coronel, in consideration of the good services with he
has rendered, and is rendering to me with good will
and disinterestedness and to my full satisfaction.  testatrix Dolores Coronel, M. Vergara, Pablo
I name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo
Pecson, executor of all that is willed and ordained in
this my will, without bond. Should he not be able to
discharge his duties as such executor for any reason
whatsoever, I name and appoint as substitute
executor my grandson Victor Pecson, a native and
resident of the town of Betis, without requiring him to
give bond. 1awph!l.net
All my real and paraphernal property as well as my
credits for I declare that I have no debts, are specified
in an inventory. 
In testimony whereof and as I do not know how to
write my name, I have requested Vicente J. Francisco
to write my name at the foot hereof and on the left
margin of each of its sheet before me and all the
undersigned witnesses this July 1, 1918.
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO           
"For the testatrix Dolores Coronel
by Dolores Coronel to be her last will and testament in will of Dolores Coronel, and (b) that the attestation
our presence, and as the testatrix does not know how clause is not in accordance with the provisions of
to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
to sign her name under her express direction in our amended by Act No. 2645. 
presence, at the foot, and on the left margin of each
and every sheet, hereof. In testimony whereof, each These are the two principal questions which are
of us signed these presents in the presence of others debated in this case and which we will now examine
separately. 
margin of each and everyone of the two sheets of
which this document is composed, which are As to the first, which is the one raised in the first
numbered "one" and "two" on the upper part of the assignment of error, the appellants argue: First, that it
face thereof. was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel
should dispose of her estate, as set forth in the
(Sgd.) "MAXIMO VERGARA, SOTERO DUMAUAL, document Exhibit A, her true being that the same be
MARCOS DE LOS SANTOS  distributed among her blood relatives; and second,
MARIANO L. CRISOSTOMO           extraneous illegal influence. 
PABLO BARTOLOME          
MARCOS DE LA CRUZ           Let us examine the first point. 
DAMIAN CRISOSTOMO
The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it
On the left margin of the two sheets of the will the be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural
following signatures also appear:  nor usual that she should completely exclude her
blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the
Mariano L. Crisostomo, Vicente J. Francisco for the same to one who is only a relative by affinity, there
appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion,
Bartolome, Sotero Dumaual Crisostomo, Marcos de inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she
la Cruz, Marcos de los Santos.  maintained very cordial relations with the aforesaid
relatives who had helped her in the management and
The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo direction of her lands. It appears, however, from the
Pecson, husband of Angela Coronel, who is a niece testimony of Attorney Francisco (page 71, transcript
of the deceased Dolores Coronel.  of the stenographic notes) that Dolores Coronel
revealed to him her suspicion against some of her
The opponents are: Eriberto Coronel, Tito Coronel, nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery of
Julian Gozum, Cirila Santiago, widow of the deceased which she had been a victim. 
Macario Gozum, in her own behalf and that of her
three minor children, Hilarion Coronel, Geronimo As to whether or not Lorenzo Pecson rendered
Coronel, Maria Coronel and her husband Eladio services to Dolores Coronel, the opponents admit that
Gongco, Juana Bituin, widow of the deceased Hipolito he rendered them at least from the year 1914,
Coronel, in her own behalf and that of her three although there is proof showing that he rendered such
children, Generosa, Maria, and Jose, all minors, services long before that time. 
Rosario Coronel, Agustin Coronel, Filomeno Coronel,
Casimiro Coronel, Alejo Coronel, Maria Coronel, The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in
Severina Coronel, Serapia Coronel, Maria Juana de this country are very strongly knit and that the
Ocampo, widow of the deceased Manuel Coronel, exclusion of relative one's estate an exceptional case.
Dionisia Coronel, and her husband Pantaleon It is true that ties of relationship in the Philippines are
Gunlao.  very strong, but we understand that cases of
preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not
The probate of this will is impugned on the following rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will
when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by
grounds: (a) That the proof does not that the
the civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It 5. That as to my burial and other things connected determining whether or not such institution in favor of
is so provided in the first paragraph of article in the with the eternal rest of my soul, I leave them to the Pecson was the true will of the testatrix. 
following terms:  sound direction of the aforesaid Lorenzo Pecson; 
We find, therefore, nothing strange in the preterition
Any person who was no forced heirs may dispose by 6. That as I cannot write I requested Martin made by Dolores Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in
will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any Pangilinan, a native and resident of this town, to write the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole
person qualified to acquire it. this will in accordance with my wishes and precise beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of
instructions.  the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual
Even ignoring the precedents of this legal precept, the and customary, still this would not be null per se. 
Code embodying it has been in force in the In testimony whereof I had the said Martin Pangilinan
Philippines for more than a quarter of a century, and write my name and surname, and affixed my mark In the absence of any statutory restriction every
for this reason it is not tenable to say that the between my name and surname, and don Francisco person possesses absolute dominion over his
excercise of the liberty thereby granted is necessarily Dumaual, Don Mariano Sunglao, Don Sotero property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he
exceptional, where it is not shown that the inhabitants Dumaual, Don Marcos de la Cruz and Don Martin pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon
of this country whose customs must have been take Pangilinan signed as witnesses, they having been his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite
into consideration by the legislator in adopting this present at the beginning of, during, and after, the capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his
legal precept, are averse to such a liberty.  execution of this my last will.  property is not affected by fraud of undue influence,
the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is
As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not (Sgd.)          "DOLORES CORONEL            unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can
purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric,
moment. The proof adduced by this appelle, although Witnesses: as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or
contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence revenge can dictate. However, as has already been
that besides the services which the opponents admit (Sgd.)          "MARIANO SUNGLAO shown, the unreasonable or unjustice of a will may be
had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since considered on the question of testamentary capacity.
the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to                     MARCOS DE LA CRUZ (40 Cyc., 1079.) 
that time and was the administrator and manager of
the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life.                     FRANCISCO DUMAUAL The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not
And that this was not a whim of the moment is shown disputed in this case. 
by the fact that six years before the execution of the                     SOTERO DUMAUAL
will in question, said Lorenzo Pecson was named and Passing to the second question, to wit, whether or not
appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in the                     MARTIN PANGILINAN" the true last will of Dolores Coronel was expressed in
document Exhibit B, which, translated, is as follows:  the testament Exhibit A, we will begin with
The appellants find in the testament Exhibit B expounding how the idea of making the aforesaid will
1. That my present property was acquired by me by something to support their contention that the here controverted was borne and carried out. 
inheritance from my parents, but a great part thereof intention of Dolores Coronel was to institute the said
was acquired by me by my own efforts and exertions;  Pecson not as sole beneficiary, but simply as About the year 1916 or 1917, Dolores showed the
executor and distributor of all her estate among her document Exhibit B to Attorney Francisco who was
2. That I have made no inventory of my properties, heirs, for while Lorenzo Pecson's contention that he then her legal adviser and who, considering that in
but they can be seen in the title deeds in my was appointed sold beneficiary is based on the fact order to make the expression of her last will more
possession and in the declarations of ownership;  that he enjoyed the confidence of Dolores Coronel in legally valid, though it necessary that the statement
1918 and administered all her property, he did not be prepared in conformity with the laws in force at
3. That I institute Lorenzo Pecson, married to Angela exclusively have this confidence and administration in time of the death of the testatrix, and observing that
Coronel, and a known resident of the town, my heir to the year 1912. Although such administration and the will Exhibit B lacked the extrinsic formalities
succeed to all my properties;  confidence were enjoyed by Pecson always jointly required by Act No. 2645 enacted after its execution,
with others and never exclusively, this fact does not advised Dolores Coronel that the will be remade. She
4. That I appoint my said heir, Lorenzo Pecson, as show that the will of the testatrix was to appoint followed the advice, and Attorney Francisco, after
executor, and, in his default, Victor Pecson, a resident Pecson only as executor and distributor of her estate receiving her instructions, drew the will Exhibit A in
of the same town;  among the heirs, nor does it prevent her, the testatrix, accordance therewith, and brought it to the house of
from instituting him in 1912 or 1918 as sole Dolores Coronel for its execution. 
beneficiary; nor does it constitute, lastly, a test for
Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores Coronel in
her presence and that of the witnesses and asked her
whether the will was in accordance with her wishes.
Dolores Coronel answer that it was, and requested
her attorney, Mr. Francisco, to sign the will for her,
which the attorney accordingly did in the presence of
the witnesses, who in turn signed it before the
testatrix and in the presence of each other.  and they perceived in this clause the idea which,
Upon the filing of the motion for a rehearing on the
first order allowing the probate of the will, the
opponents presented an affidavit of Pablo Bartolome
to the effect that, following instructions of Lorenzo
Pecson, he had informed the testatrix that the
contents of the will were that she entrusted Pecson
with the distribution of all her property among the
relatives of the said Dolores. But during the new trial
Pablo Bartolome, in spite of being present in the court
room on the day of the trial, was not introduced as a
witness, without such an omission having been
satisfactorily accounted for.  for the preservation, defense, and liquidation of the
While it is true that the petitioner was bound to
present Pablo Bartolome, being one of the witnesses
who signed the will, at the second hearing when the
probate was controverted, yet we cannot consider this
point against the appellee for this was not raised in
any of the assignments of error made by the
appellants. (Art. 20, Rules of the Supreme Court.)  her body be given a burial in accordance with her
On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the
opponents to present Pablo Bartolome to prove
before the court the statement by him in his affidavit,
since it was their duty to prove what they alleged,
which was that Dolores Coronel had not understood
the true contents of the will Exhibit A. Having
suppressed, without explanation, the testimony of
Pablo Bartolome, the presumption is against the
opponents and that is, that such a testimony would
have been adverse had it been produced at the
hearing of the case before the court. (Sec 334,
subsec. 5, Code of Civil Procedure.)  on the part of Dolores Coronel to fulfill the same. In
The opponents call our attention to the fourth clause
of the document which says: "I name and appoint my
aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all
that is willed and ordained in this my will, without
bond. Should he not be able to discharge his duties
as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name
and appoint as a substitute executor my grandson
Victor Pecson, resident of the town of Betis, without
requiring him to give bond," and contend that this
clause is repugnant to the institution of Lorenzo
Pecson as sole beneficiary of all her estate, for if such
was the intention of the testatrix, there would have
been no necessity of appointing an executor, nor any
reason for designating a substitute in case that the
first one should not be able to discharge his duties,
according to them, was not expressed in the
document, and which was that Pecson was simply to
be a mere executor entrusted with the distribution to
the estate among the relatives of the testatrix, and
that should he not be able to do so, this duty would
devolved upon his substitutes.  Francisco at their interviews previous to the
But it is not the sole duty of an executor to distribute
the estate, which in estate succession, such as the
instant case, has to be distributed with the
intervention of the court. All executor has, besides,
other duties and general and special powers intended
estate so long as the same has not reached, by order
of the court, the hands of those entitled thereto.  his deposition.
The fact that Dolores Coronel foresaw the necessity
of an executor does not imply a negation of her desire
to will all her estate to Lorenzo Pecson. It is to be
noted, furthermore, that in the will, it was ordered that
social standing and she had a perfect right to
designate a person who should see to it that this
order was complied with. One of the functions of an
executor is the fulfillment of what is ordained in the
will. 
It is argued that the will of the testatrix was to will her
estate to her blood relatives, for such was the promise
made to Maria Coronel, whom Rosario Coronel tends
to corroborate. We do not find such a promise to have
been sufficiently proven, and much less to have been
seriously made and coupled with a positive intention
the absence of sufficient proof of fraud, or undue
influence, we cannot take such a promise into
account, for even if such a promise was in fact made,
Dolores Coronel could retract or forget it afterwards
and dispose of her estate as she pleased. Wills
themselves, which contain more than mere promises,
are essentially revocable.  The witness Reyes translated from the Pampango
It is said that the true will of Dolores Coronel not
expressed in the will can be inferred from the phrase
used by Jose M. Reyes in his deposition when
speaking of the purpose for which Lorenzo Pecson
was to receive the estate, to wit: 
in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in
the most appropriate manner
Weight is given to this phrase from the circumstance
that its author was requested by Attorney Francisco to
explain the contents of Exhibit B and had acted as
interpreter between Dolores Coronel and Attorney
preparation of Exhibit A, and had translated into the
Pampango dialect this last document, and, lastly, was
present at the execution of the will in question. 
The disputed phrase "in order that the latter might
dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner"
was used by the witness Reyes while sick in a
hospital and testifying in the course of the taking of
 
The appellants interpret the expression "dispose in
the most appropriate manner" as meaning to say
"distribute it among the heirs." Limiting ourselves to its
meaning, the expression is a broad one, for the
disposition may be effected in several and various
ways, which may not necessarily be a "distribution
among the heirs," and still be a "disposition in the
most appropriate manner." "To dispose" is not the
same as "to distribute." 
To judge correctly the import of this phrase, the
circumstances under which it was used must be taken
into account in this particular instance. The witness
Reyes, the author of the phrase, was not expressing
his own original ideas when he used it, but was
translating into Spanish what Dolores Coronel had
told him. According to the facts, the said witness is
not a Spaniard, that is to say, the Spanish language is
not his native tongue, but, perhaps, the Pampango
dialect. It is an admitted fact based on reason and
experience that when a person translates from one
language to another, it is easier for him to express
with precision and accuracy when the version is from
a foreign language to a native one than vice-versa.
dialect, which must be more familiar to him, to the
Spanish language which is not his own tongue. And
judging from the language used by him during his
testimony in this case, it cannot be said that this
witness masters the Spanish language. Thus is
explained the fact that when asked to give the reason
for the appointment of an executor in the will, he
should say at the morning session that "Dolores
Coronel did appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson and in his
default, Victor Pecson, to act during her lifetime, but
not after he death," which was explained at the
afternoon session by saying "that Dolores Coronel did
appoint Don Lorenzo Pecson executor of all her
estate during his lifetime and that in his default, either
through death or incapacity, Mr. Victor Pecson was
appointed executor." Taking into account all the
circumstances of this witness, there is ground to
attribute his inaccuracy as to the discharge of the
duties of an executor, not to ignorance of the
elementary rule of law on the matter, for the practice
of which he was qualified, but to a non-mastery of the
Spanish language. We find in this detail of translation
made by the witness Reyes no sufficient reason to
believe that the will expressed by Dolores Coronel at
the said interview with Attorney Francisco was to
appoint Lorenzo Pecson executor and mere
distributor of her estate among her heirs.  interest in favoring Lorenzo Pecson in the will,
As to whether or not the burden of proof was on the
petitioner to establish that he was the sole legatee to
the exclusion of the relatives of Dolores Coronel, we
understand that it was not his duty to show the
reasons which the testatrix may have had for
excluding her relatives from her estate, giving
preference to him. His duty was to prove that the will
was voluntary and authentic and he, who alleges that
the estate was willed to another, has the burden of
proving his allegation.  from the true one intended by the testatrix should
Attorney Francisco is charged with having employed
improper means of making Lorenzo Pecson appear in
the will as sole beneficiary. However, after an
examination of all the proceedings had, we cannot
find anything in the behavior of this lawyer, relative to
the preparation and execution of the will, that would
justify an unfavorable conclusion as to his personal
and professional conduct, nor that he should harbor
any wrongful or fraudulent purpose.  every possible to the probate of the will, such object is
We find nothing censurable in his conduct in advising
Dolores Coronel to make a new will other than the last
one, Exhibit B (in the drawing of which he does not
appear to her intervened), so that the instrument
might be executed with all the new formalities
required by the laws then in force; nor in the
preparation of the new will substantially in accordance
with the old one; nor in the selection of attesting
witnesses who were persons other than the relatives
of Dolores Coronel. Knowing, as he did, that Dolores
was excluding her blood relatives from the
inheritance, in spite of her having been asked by him
whether their exclusion was due to a mere
inadvertence, there is a satisfactory explanation,
compatible with honorable conduct, why said attorney
should prescind from such relatives in the attesting of
the will, to the end that no obstacle be placed in the
way to the probating thereof.  Lorenzo Pecson employed Attorney Francisco to
The fact that this attorney should presume that
Dolores was to ask him to sign the will for her and that
he should prepare it containing this detail is not in
itself fraudulent. There was in this case reason so to
presume, and it appears that he asked her, through
Pablo Bartolome, whom she wanted to sign the
document in her stead. 
No imputation can be made to this attorney of any
because the latter was already his client at the
execution of said will. Attorney Francisco denied this
fact, which we cannot consider proven after
examining the evidence.  insist on the probative force of the testimony of this
The conduct observed by this attorney after the death
of Dolores Coronel in connection with the attempted
arrangement between Lorenzo Pecson and the
opponents, does not, in our opinion, constitute any
data leading to the conclusion that an heir different
have been fraudulently made to appear instituted in
the will exhibit A. His attitude towards the opponents,
as can be gathered from the proceedings and
especially from his letter Exhibit D, does not show any
perverse or fraudulent intent, but rather a conciliatory
purpose. It is said that such a step was well
calculated to prevent every possible opposition to the
probate of the will. Even admitting that one of his
objects in entering into such negotiations was to avoid
not incompatible with good faith, nor does it
necessarily justify the inference that the heir instituted
in the instrument was not the one whom the testatrix
wanted appointed.  The foregoing document was executed and declared
The appellants find rather suspicious the interest
shown by the said attorney in trying to persuade
Lorenzo Pecson to give them some share of the
estate. These negotiations were not carried out by the
attorney out of his own initiative, but at the instance of
the same opponent, Agustin Coronel, made by the
latter in his own behalf and that of his coopponents. 
As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record
sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried,
through fraud or any undue influence, to frustrate the
alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to
her blood relatives. The opponents insinuate that
carry out his reproachable designs, but such
depraved instrumentality was not proven, nor was it
shown that said lawyer, or Lorenzo Pecson, should
have contrived or put into execution any condemnable
plan, nor that both should have conspired for illegal
purposes at the time of the preparation and execution
of the will Exhibit A. 
Although Norberto Paras testified having heard, when
the will was being read to Dolores Coronel, the
provision whereby the estate was ordered distributed
among the heirs, the preponderance of the evidence
is to the effect that said Norberto Paras was not
present at such reading of the will. Appellant do not
witness, and do not oppose its being stricken out. 
The data furnished by the case do not show, to our
mind, that Dolores Coronel should have had the
intention of giving her estate to her blood relatives
instead of to Lorenzo Pecson at the time of the
execution of the will Exhibit A, nor that fraud or
whatever other illegal cause or undue influence
should have intervened in the execution of said
testament. Neither fraud nor evil is presumed and the
record does not show either. 
Turning to the second assignment of error, which is
made to consist in the will having been probated in
spite of the fact that the attestation clause was not in
conformity with the provision of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, let us examine the tenor of such clause which
literally is as follows: 
by Dolores Coronel to be her last will testament in our
presence, and as testatrix does not know how to write
her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign
her name under her express direction in our presence
at the foot and on the left margin of each and every
sheet hereof. In testimony whereof, each of us signed
these presents in the presence of others of the
testatrix at the foot hereof and on the margin of each
and everyone of the two pages of which this
document is composed. These sheets are numbered
correlatively with the words "one and "two on the
upper part of the face thereof.
(Sgd.)          "Maximo Vergara,          Sotero
Dumaual,          Marcos de los Santos,          Mariano
L. Crisostomo,           Pablo Bartolome,           Marcos
de la Cruz,           Damian Crisostomo."  that the witnesses signed in the presence of other
Appellants remark that it is not stated in this clause
that the will was signed by the witnesses in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other, as
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which on this particular point
provides the following:  the will, who is Attorney Francisco, was an
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of
three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Stress is laid on the phrase used in the attestation
clause above copied, to wit:  their own dialects, but also that such language is not
each of us signed in the presence of others.
Two interpretations can absolutely be given here to
the expression "of others." One, that insinuated by the
appellants, namely, that it is equivalent to "of other
persons," and the other, that contended by the
appellee, to wit, that the phrase should be held to
mean "of the others," the article "the" having
inadvertently been omitted.  authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
Should the first interpretation prevail and "other
persons" be taken to mean persons different from the
attesting witnesses, then one of the solemnities
required by law would be lacking. Should the second
be adopted and "of others" construed as meaning the
other witnesses to the will, then the law would have
been complied with in this respect.  requisite entirely unnecesary, useless and frustrative
Including the concomitant words, the controverted
phrase results thus: "each of us signed these
presents in the presence of others and of the
testatrix."  witnesses," and
If we should omit the words "of others and," the
expression would be reduced to "each of us signed
these presents in the presence of the testatrix," and
the statement that the witnesses signed each in the
presence of the others would be lacking. But as a
matter of fact, these words "of others and" are
present. Then, what for are they there? Is it to say
persons foreign to the execution of the will, which is
completely useless and to no purpose in the case, or
was it for some useful, rational, necessary object,
such as that of making it appear that the witnesses
signed the will each in the presence of the others?
The first theory presupposes that the one who drew
unreasonable man, which is an inadmissible
hypothesis, being repugnant to the facts shown by the
record. The second theory is the most obvious, logical
and reasonable under the circumstances. It is true
that the expression proved to be deficient. The
deficiency may have been caused by the drawer of
the will or by the typist. If by the typist, then it must be
presumed to have been merely accidental. If by the
drawer, it is explainable taking into account that
Spanish is not only not the native language of the
Filipinos, who, in general, still speak until nowadays
even the only official language since several years
ago.  is, as we have said, "in the presence of the other
In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476), this court said:  present case and that of Re Estate of Geronima Uy
The object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
We believe it to be more reasonable to construe the
disputed phrase "of others" as meaning "of the other
that a grammatical or clerical error
was committed consisting in the omission of the
article "the". 
Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually
considered of vital importance when the intention is
manifest in the will. 
The court may correct clerical mistakes in writing, and
disregard technical rules of grammar as to the
construction of the language of the will when it
becomes necessary for it to do so in order to
effectuate the testators manifest intention as
ascertained from the context of the will. But unless a
different construction is so required the ordinary rules
of grammar should be adhered to in construing the
will. (40 Cyc., 1404). 
And we understand that in the present case the
interpretation we adopt is imperative, being the most
adequate and reasonable. 
The case of In the matter of the estate of Geronima
Uy Coque (43 Phil., 405), decided by this court and
invoked by the appellants, refers so far as pertinent to
the point herein at issue, to an attestation clause
wherein the statement that the witnesses signed the
will in the presence of each other is totally absent. In
the case at bar, there is the expression "in the
presence of others" whose reasonable interpretation
witnesses." We do not find any party between the
Coque above cited. 
Finally, we will take up the question submitted by the
opponents as to the alleged insufficiency of the
evidence to show that the attesting witnesses Damian
Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the
execution of the will in controversy. Although this
point is raised in the first assignment of error made by
the appellants, and not in the second, it is discussed
in this place because it refers to the very fact of
attestation. However, we do not believe it necessary
to analyze in detail the evidence of both parties on
this particular point. The evidence leads us to the
conclusion that the two witnesses aforementioned
were present at the execution and signing of the will.
Such is also the conclusion of the trial judge who, in
this respect, states the following, in his decision:  45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set
As to the question of whether or not the testatrix and
witnesses signed the document Exhibit A in
accordance with the provisions of law on the matter,
that is, whether or not the testatrix signed the will, or
caused it to be signed, in the presence of the
witnesses, and the latter in turn signed in her
presence and that of each other, the court, after
observing the demeanor of the witnesses for both
parties, is of the opinion that those for the petitioner
spoke the truth. It is neither probable nor likely that a
man versed in the law, such as Attorney Francisco,
who was present at the execution of the will in
question, and to whose conscientiousness in the
matter of compliance with all the extrinsic formalities
of the execution of a will, and to nothing else, was due
the fact that the testatrix had cancelled her former will
(Exhibit B) and had new one (Exhibit A) prepared and
executed, should have consented the omission of
formality compliance with which would have required
little or no effort; namely, that of seeing to it that the
testatrix and the attesting witnesses were all present
when their respective signatures were affixed to the
will." And the record does not furnish us sufficient
ground for deviating from the line reasoning and
findings of the trial judge.  came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in
In conclusion we hold that the assignments of error
made by the appellants are not supported by the
evidence of record.  names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival
The judgment appealed from if affirmed with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
41ORTEGA VS VALMONTE
G.R. NO. 157451, DECEMBER 16, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who
oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should
not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has
failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this
reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error
on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the
probate of the will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule
aside the December 12, 2002 Decision2 and the
March 7, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the
Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving
and allowing probate to the said last will and
testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the
issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner
Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the
court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision
of the CA, as follows:
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled
and lived for a long time in the United States until he
finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally
the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San
Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common
with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their
from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed
Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony
solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on
February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years
of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a
cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and
dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on
August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation
clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that
page by the testator and on the left hand margin by
the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and
again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body
that:
‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO
VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to
Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200
Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age
and being of sound and disposing mind and memory,
do hereby declare this to be my last will and
testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic
Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church
in accordance with the rites and said Church and that
a suitable monument to be erected and provided my
by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the
minds of my family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife,
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of
the follow-described properties, which belongs to me
as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575,
LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered
jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca
Valmonte), having share and share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described
property, made of strong and mixed materials used as
my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200
Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by
Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-
Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister,
Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and
share alike or equal co-owners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and
personal properties, including my savings account
bank book in USA which is in the possession of my
nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever
found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife,
Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as
sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is
my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a
bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City,
Philippines.’
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by
Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator,
especially those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them
proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by
law and legal solemnities and formalities were not
complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at
the time of the alleged execution he being in an
advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of
fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence
and pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her
agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or
trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should
be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;’
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix
of Josefina alleging her want of understanding and
integrity.
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and
called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro
Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and
the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez,
Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the
opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter
Mary Jane Ortega testified.
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the
testator they lived in her parents house at Salingcob,
Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every
month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed
at the said Makati residence. There were times
though when to shave off on expenses, the testator
would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by
his lonesome self when the notarial will was made.
The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and
Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and
by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will and
testament of her husband, but just serendipitously
found it in his attache case after his death. It was only
then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to
her his properties and she was named the executrix in
the said will. To her estimate, the value of property
both real and personal left by the testator is worth
more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that
the testator never suffered mental infirmity because
despite his old age he went alone to the market which
is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and
cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not
accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to
claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that
her husband was in good health and that he was
hospitalized only because of a cold but which
eventually resulted in his death.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who
notarized the testator’s will, testified that it was in the
first week of June 1983 when the testator together
with the three witnesses of the will went to his house
cum law office and requested him to prepare his last
will and testament. After the testator instructed him on
the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the
notary public told them to come back on June 15,
1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had
prepared the will the notary public kept it safely
hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the appointed date but the
notary public was out of town so they were instructed
by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and
which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses
signed the prepared will, the notary public explained
to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a
dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He
likewise explained that though it appears that the will
was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June
15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed
had he not gone out of town, the formal execution
was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he
no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,
1983 because he did not like the document to appear
dirty. The notary public also testified that to his
observation the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature on the
will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the
testimony of the notary public, and testified that the
testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio
and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and
requested them to accompany him to the house of
Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will;
that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro
Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983;
that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution
of the will but were asked to come back instead on
August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary
public; that the testator executed the will in question in
their presence while he was of sound and disposing
mind and that he was strong and in good health; that
the contents of the will was explained by the notary
public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all
of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other. And
that during the execution, the testator’s wife, Josefina
was not with them.
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should
not inherit alone because aside from her there are
other children from the siblings of Placido who are just
as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the
mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the
time of the execution of the notarial will the testator
was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983
Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked
Leticia’s family to live with him and they took care of
him. During that time, the testator’s physical and
mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations
and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter
Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and
wanted to marry.
"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held
that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the opposition
to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and
formalities in the execution and attestation of the will;
and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the
execution of the will as he was then in an advanced
state of senility
"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and
accordingly disallowed probate."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted
the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA
upheld the credibility of the notary public and the
subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the
due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the
testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will. It added that his "sexual
exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite
ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.7
 Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
"I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are
entitled to great respect.
"II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in
the subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and
that Placido Valmonte never intended that the
instrument should be his last will and testament.
"III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary
capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject
will."8
In short, petitioner assails the CA’s allowance of the
probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue: Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law
may be raised in a Petition for Review under Section
1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception,
however, the evidence presented during the trial may
be examined and the factual matters resolved by this
Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact
of the appellate court differ from those of the trial
court.9
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will
does not necessarily mean that every will presented
for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the
procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for
the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article 839 of the Civil
Code states the instances when a will may be
disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress,
or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of
some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the
time of affixing his signature thereto."
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of
Placido Valmonte’s will by imputing fraud in its
execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind
at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the
formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains
that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of
the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that
respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole
beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the
three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign
it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates
of the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a
woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who
[was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a]
Fil-American pensionado,"11 thus casting doubt on the
intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the
will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason,
logic and common experience"12 for an old man with a
severe psychological condition to have willingly
signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device,
false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it
is cheated. It may be of such character that the
testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it
may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of
the deception regarding which the testator is led to
make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would
not have made."13
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the
burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of
its execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to
the proponent of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of fraud.15 Unfortunately in this
case, other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. 16
That the testator was tricked into signing it was not
sufficiently established by the fact that he had
instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his
junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had
taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in
his twilight years."17
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court,
the conflict between the dates appearing on the will
does not invalidate the document, "because the law
does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be
executed and acknowledged on the same occasion."18
More important, the will must be subscribed by the
testator, as well as by three or more credible
witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of
the testator and of one another.19 Furthermore, the
testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will
before a notary public.20 In any event, we agree with
the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to
its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary
public and the instrumental witnesses."21
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken
on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13,
1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA --
are reproduced respectively as follows:
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the
date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses
were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his
witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was
out of town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August
9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein.
Was this the actual date when the document was
acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the
three witnesses affixed their respective signature on
the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged,
August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on
the date appearing on the body of the document as
well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some
alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9,
1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985,
pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is
dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you
look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in
the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido
Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week
of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the
15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento
was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15,
1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we
signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there
where you signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn,
November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro
Sarmiento, three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that,
the first week of June was out first time. We went
there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte
about the last will and testament. After that what they
have talked what will be placed in the testament, what
Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the
15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty.
Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign
it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went
there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed
our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house
on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be
back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the
house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a
"grand conspiracy" in the commission of a fraud.
There was no showing that the witnesses of the
proponent stood to receive any benefit from the
allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible
evidence of its due execution.23 Their testimony
favoring it and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law
should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill
motives.24
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a
will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that
the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary
that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury
or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will;
but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that
the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the
testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper
objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character
of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the
present case, we find that the appellate court was
correct in holding that Placido had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he
was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them
and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have
stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the
will did not affect its formal validity. There being no
showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is
Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind
and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental
aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there
are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held
that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from
disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded
person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he
is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be
unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person
shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 
 
42. Vaño vs Vda. de Garces (G.R. No. L-6303, June
30, 1954) MATURAN
CASE No. 42 - [No. L-6303. June 30, 1954]
In the matter of the last will and testament of
JOSE VAÑO, deceased. TEODORO VAÑO,
petitioner and appellant, vs. PAZ VAÑO VDA. DE
GARCES, ET AL., oppositors and appellees.
1.  1. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the issue
in contested wills is fixed by the Rules of
 Court, that is, before the probate court can
allow the will it must be satisfied upon proof
taken and filed, that the will was duly
executed, and that the testator at the time
of its execution was of sound and disposing
mind and not acting under duress, menace,
and undue influence, or fraud. This issue
may not be varied by the pleadings.
1.  2.ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; OPPOSITOR MAY
ADD OTHER GROUNDS AND SUBMIT
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF.—An
oppositor objecting to the probate of a will
on one or two specific grounds may, during
the hearing, add other grounds and submit
evidence in support of the same.
1.  3.ID.; ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF OPPOSITION
TO ALL PERSONS INTERESTED,
PURPOSE OF.—The purpose of the law
(section 10, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court
requiring a person contesting probate to
state his ground of opposition and serve
copy thereof to the petitioner and other
residents of the province interested in the
estate, is to appraise said persons of the
reasons in opposing probate so that they
may prepare the necessary evidence to
counteract and disprove said grounds of
opposition, this, in addition to apprising the
court itself of the issue involved in the
proceeding so that it may intelligently direct
the presentation of evidence during the
hearing.
1.  4.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; FACTORS TO BE
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
GENNUINENESS OF SIGNATURE OF
TESTATOR.—When the genuineness of
the testator's signature is put in issue, his
age, infirmity and state of health should be
given due consideration. Where the
testator, at the time the contested will was
made, was 78 years old and suffering from
apparently advanced pulmonary
tuberculosis and rheumatism, it is natural
that his signature should lack the firmness,
rhythm, effort and continuity of motion that
it had before he became quite ill and infirm.
1.  5.ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF of Jose Vaño, and which he attached to his petition,
WITNESSES.—Where the three probated. We reproduce said document—
subscribing witnesses to the will who were
in no way related to the testator, had no  
interest in the execution of the will and
stood to gain nothing by its probate, under "LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
oath assured the court that the testator
voluntarily signed the will, their
IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER, THE SON AND
disinterested testimony can not be taken
THE HOLY GHOST, AMEN:
lightly.
I, Jose Vaño, single, Filipino citizen, of legal age and
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First
resident of Cebu City, being of sound and disposing
Instance of Cebu. Saguin, J.
mind and memory, do hereby make, execute and
publish, this my Last Will and Testament in English,
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. which language is known to me and which I, talk, read
and understand, hereby revoking and cancelling any
Pedro Re. Luspo, Vicente L. Faelnar and Roque and all testamentary provisions heretofore made by
R. Luspo for appellant. me, and the following shall be my Last Will:
Pelaez, Pelaez & Pelaez and Ramon Duterte for  
appellees.
1. I, hereby make known to the world that
MONTEMAYOR, J.: Teodoro Ceblero Vaño is my son.
This is an appeal by petitioner Teodoro Vaño from a 2. That I, hereby bequeath to aforesaid Teodoro
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu Ceblero Vaño all my properties.
denying probate of the document (Exhibit "A"), said to
be the LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOSE In witness whereof, I, have hereunto affixed my
VAÑO. The appeal was first taken to the Court of name at the City of Cebu, Philippines this 11th day of
Appeals where the record on appeal and the brief s of December, 1949.
petitioner and oppositors were filed. Subsequently, (Sgd.) Jose Vaño
however, on joint motion of both parties requesting Testator
that the appeal be elevated to the Supreme Court on  
the ground that the value of the properties involved as
shown by the inventory was more than P50,000, the
We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose
case was ex forwarded to this Tribunal where
residences are stated opposite our respective names,
memoranda were filed in lieu of oral argument.
do hereby certify that the testator whose name is
signed hereinabove, has published unto us the
  foregoing WILL consisting of one page, as his Last
Will and Testament, and has signed the same in our
Jose Vaño died on January 28, 1950, in the City presence, and in witness whereof we have each
of Cebu. According to the certificate of the City Health signed the same in the presence of said testator and
Officer and Local Civil Registrar, Exhibit "C", he was in the presence of each other.\
78 years old and he died of P. T. B. (pulmonary
tuberculosis). He left properties valued at P95,913.05  
as per inventory of the administrator but which
according to the evidence are worth much more. On
Cebu City, Philippines, this 11th day of
February 11, 1950, Teodoro Ceblero Vaño petitioned
December, 1949.
the Court of First Instance of Cebu to have a
document supposed to be the last will and testament
Pedro C. Ceniza—494-B. Junquera, Cebu City
 O. Rama, M. D.—Basak, Sn. Nicolas, Cebu City
Nazario R. Paquiao—553 A. P. del Rosario, St.,
Cebu City"
Teodoro asked that he be appointed administrator of
the estate and that pending his appointment as
regular administrator, he be designated special
administrator.
 
On March 24, 1950, Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces
and the supposed heirs of Jesus Vaño, brother of
Jose Vaño, filed the following opposition—
"OPPOSITION
Comes now Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces, and the heirs
of Jesus Vaño, thru their undersigned attorneys, and
to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1.That the oppositor Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces is the
sister of the deceased Jose Vaño, and Filomena
Vaño, Felicidad Vaño, Angel Vaño, Salvador Vaño,
Norberto Vaño, Teodorico Vaño, and Ireneo Vaño,
are the children and heirs of Jesus (brother of Jose
Vaño), and all of them are entitled to participate in the
said Estate of the deceased Jose Vaño in case of
intestacy;
2.That the instrument now offered for probate as will
of the deceased Jose Vaño was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of
Teodoro Ceblero who is not an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Jose Vaño;
3.That the said Jose Vaño was mentally incapable to
make a will on December 11th, 1949;
4.That the signature of the testator Jose Vaño was
procured by fraud and trick on the part of Teodoro
Ceblero and the said deceased Jose Vaño never
intended that the said document should be his will at
the time of fixing his signature thereto;
5.That the instrument now offered for probate as will
of the deceased Jose Vaño is written in English
language which is not the usual and proper language
of the deceased, and if the deceased would have had
made any will he should have it written in Spanish;
6.That the said deceased Jose Vaño never
recognized Teodoro Ceblero as his acknowledged
natural child, the same being a mere protege of the
deceased, and not an adopted or acknowledged
natural child;
7. .That the deceased Jose Vaño had time and again
told his sister and nephews that he will not execute a
will because he wants to leave all his estate in favor
of his brother and sister, and nephews;
8.That Dolores Garces de Falcon, a niece of the
deceased Jose Vaño, being the nearest of kin, is a
competent person to act as Administratrix of the
estate of the deceased, and she is willing to serve as
such;
PRAYER
For all the foregoing considerations, we respectfully
pray this Honorable Court that the said will of the
deceased Jose Vaño be declared null and void, and
that it be not admitted to probate; That an
administratrix of the said estate be appointed who
shall distribute the same among the legal heirs of the
deceased; That Dolores Garces de Falcon be
appointed as Administratrix of the Estate of the
deceased Jose Vaño.
Cebu City, Philippines, March 23, 1950."
On August 29, 1950, Ireneo Vaño one of the persons
included in the opposition, filed a motion of the
following tenor.
 
"MOTION
Comes now Ireneo Vaño and to this Honorable Court
respectfully states:
1.That he is the son and only heir of Jesus Vaño, now
deceased.
2.That his ex ather Jesus Vaño is a brother of Jose
Vaño, also deceased.
3.That in this case a petition has been presented for
the probate of the last will and testament of Jose
Vaño.
4.That an opposition has been filed against the
probate of said will.
5.That he is named as one of the oppositors, without
his knowledge and consent.
6.That he does not oppose nor intends to oppose the
probate of the will in question, because that document
contains a true expression of the wish and desire of
Jose Vaño as to who shall inherit his property.
7.That he has not authorized anybody to file an
opposition in his name.
PRAYER
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully prays
this Honorable Court to cancel his name from the list
of oppositors mentioned in the opposition to the
petition filed by Teodoro Vaño.
 
Tagbilaran, Bohol (for the City of Cebu), August 8,
1950"
Said motion of Ireneo Vaño was granted by the Court.
In the course of the hearing, he was presented as one
of the witnesses for petitioner Teodoro and he
declared that he was the son of Jesus Vaño, already
dead; that he knew Filomena Falcon, Felicidad
Calibo, Angel Falcon, Salvador Flores, Norberto
Calibo, and Teodorico Falcon, who are sometimes
known by the surname Vaño but that they were not
related to him because he had no brothers or sisters;
that his father Jesus Vaño was a younger brother of
the testator Jose Vaño; that petitioner Teodoro Vaño
was the cousin, son of Jose Vaño, and that he knew
of the blood relationship between the testator and
Teodoro Vaño because he (Ireneo) since childhood
used to go to his uncle's house where Teodoro lived
and he saw that Teodoro was treated as a son by
Jose Vaño, who paid for Teodoro's board at the
Colegio del Niño where the two of them were
students; that he (Ireneo) never authorized anyone to
include him as oppositor to the probate of the will of
Jose Vaño and that he did not oppose its probate.
 
The three attesting witnesses Pedro Ceniza, Dr.
Osmundo Rama and Atty. Nazario Pacquiao testified
for the petitioner and assured the court that Exhibit
"A" was the last will and testament of the late Jose
Vaño; that he signed Exhibit "A" in their presence,
and that each of them signed the same after him, in
his presence and in the presence of each other; that
at the time of the execution of the document in the
afternoon of December 11, 1949, the testator was of
sound and disposing mind and memory and that it
was his voluntary act, no pressure or influence having
been exerted on him; that the blank space after the
letter "I" in the first paragraph of Exhibit "A" was filled
out by the testator himself although they (witnesses)
differ as to who filled out the blank spaces on the
document where the words "11th" and "December"
appear. Atty. Pacquiao told the court that it was he
who prepared the will (Exhibit A) pursuant to the
wishes of the testator.
 
For the opposition Ciriaca Alse who formerly
worked as a servant in the household of Teodoro
Vaño, Dolores Garces de Falcon, a daughter of Paz
Vaño Vda. de Garces and Carmen Vallore testified.
The burden of their testimony is that from November
1949, Jose Vaño was already very sick; that in
December he was in serious if not critical condition;
that he was always in bed, oftentimes unable to move
or open his eyes and he could not maintain any
conversation with anyone; that he had to be fed by
someone; and that he was bed-ridden and already
had bed-sores. The idea sought to be conveyed by
them was that the testator was in no condition to
execute a will.
 
Mr. Edgar Bond, an examiner of questioned
documents and chief of the Questioned Documents
and Ballistics Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation was also presented by the opposition as
a handwriting expert and he told the court that after
examining the supposed signature of Jose Vaño on
Exhibit "A" and comparing them with his accepted
standard signatures, he was convinced that the
signatures on Exhibit "A" were forgeries. His
testimony was vigorously objected to by counsel for
the petitioner on the ground that the genuineness of
the signature of the testator on Exhibit "A" was never
placed in issue because the written opposition of the
opponents virtually admitted said genuineness and
merely claimed that the will was not the testator's
voluntary act because said signature was obtained
thru trickery and that undue pressure and influence
were brought to bear upon him.
 
To counteract the testimony of Bond, the
deposition of Dr. Paul Rodriguez Versoza, another
handwriting expert was taken and introduced in
evidence. Dr. Versoza claims that after examining the
signatures of Jose Vaño on Exhibit "A" and comparing
them with accepted standard signatures of the
testator, he was convinced that the signatures on
Exhibit "A" were genuine and that any difference
noted between them were due to the age, weakness,
and illness of the testator, especially the ex act that
he was suffering from rheumatism. After hearing, the
learned trial court noting discrepancies in the
testimonies of the three attesting witnesses as to the
due execution of Exhibit "A", and accepting the expert
testimony of Mr. Bond over that of Dr. Versoza, came
to the conclusion that the supposed signatures of
Jose Vaño on Exhibit "A" are not genuine but imitated
and held that Exhibit "A" was not the last will and
testament of Jose Vaño.
 
One of the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant
is that the trial court erred in permitting appellees over
the objection of appellant to present evidence which
are contrary to their allegations in their opposition. It is
his contention that the opponents not only failed to
allege as a basis of their opposition that the
signatures of the testator on the supposed will were
forged but that on the contrary, they impliedly
admitted the genuineness of said signatures, merely
claiming that said signatures were obtained through
trickery and ex raud and under undue pressure and
influence. This point brings us to a discussion of what
evidence an opponent to a probate of a will may be
permitted to present at the hearing—whether or not
he is limited to presenting evidence to sustain the
particular objection or ground on which he bases his
opposition to the probate.
In some jurisdictions in the United States the rule
is that the issue in contested wills is made up by the
pleadings or framed ex rom the same, and no
evidence can be introduced except in support of
allegations contained in such pleadings. For instance,
if the only opposition to the probate of a will is lack of
mental capacity of the testator, then the oppositor in
presenting evidence will be confined to that point. In
other jurisdictions, however, it is said that the issue is
fixed by the statute and is practically the old common
law issue "devisavit vel non," is the instrument
presented for probate the last will and testament of
the testator?; that said issue may not be varied by the
pleadings and that every ground of attack on the
validity of the will may be employed.
 
As the law in our jurisdiction on the probate of
wills now stands, we are inclined to adopt the second
view, namely, that the law itself fixes or determines
the issue, because under section 12, Rule 77, of the
Rules of Court, bef ore the probate court can allow
the will it must be satisfied upon proof taken and filed
that the will was duly executed, and that the testator
at the time of its execution was of sound and
disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace,
and undue influence, or ex raud. Also, under section 9
of the same rule, a will may be disallowed (a) if not
executed and attested as required by law; (6) if the
testator was mentally incapable of making a will; (c) if
it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear,
or threats; (d) if it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary; and (e) if the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud and trick. The oppositors in the
present case therefore were not precluded ex rom
attacking the will on the ground of forgery despite the
fact that their opposition was confined to grounds (b),
(c) and (d) of section 12, Rule 77 as stated above.
 
On the other hand, section 10 of the same rule 77
provides that "anyone appearing to contest the will
must file a writing stating his grounds for opposing its
allowance; and serve a copy thereof on the petitioner
and other residents of the province interested in the
estate." The purpose of this legal provision is clear,
and it is to apprise the person or persons seeking the
probate of will, as well as any other person interested
in the estate, of the reasons in opposing probate so
that they may prepare the necessary evidence to
counteract and disprove said ground of opposition,
this, in addition to apprising the court itself of the
issue involved in the proceedings so that it may
intelligently direct the presentation of evidence during
the hearing. Of course, as we have already stated, an
oppositor objecting to the probate of the will on one or
two specific grounds may, during the hearing add to
the grounds and submit evidence in support of the
same, but when this happen as it did in the present
case, one is more or less justified in inferring that the
oppositors were not sure of their ground; that they
were in doubt as to the basis of their opposition, a fact
which naturally and not inconsiderably weakens their
stand.
 
One of the grounds of their opposition was that
the signature of the testator was procured by fraud
and trick, thereby leading one to believe, including the
court and the petitioner that said signature was
genuine but was not valid. At the hearing, said
oppositors completely changed their stand and
claimed that the signature was actually forged. As we
have already said, that conduct and attitude,
changeable and uncertain, does not strengthen their
position.
 
Let us now go to the evidence on the alleged
forgery of the signatures of the testator Jose Vaño.
We have carefully read the testimony of Mr. Bond for
the oppositors and the deposition of Dr, Verzosa ex or
the petitioner. There is no reason for doubting the
qualifications, sincerity, and honesty of these two
witnesses. Their opinions seem to be plausible,
arrived at after an analysis and comparison of the
questioned signatures with the standard and accepted
signatures of the testator; but we fear that the
infirmity, age, and state of health of the testator had
not been given due consideration by the witness of
the opponents and by the court.
 
There is no question that there are differences
and discrepancies between the two signatures
reading "Jose Vaño" on Exhibit "A" and the genuine,
accepted signatures of the testator even as late as
the last part of the year 1949. But we should not
forget that on December 11th of the same year when
he executed Exhibit "A", he was suffering from
apparently advanced pulmonary tuberculosis as well
as rheumatism which according to Dr. Osmundo
Rama who had been treating him until the day he
died, affected his joints.
The testator was then 78 years old, lying in bed
most of the time, so much so that he developed bed-
sores, sitting up in bed only once in a while, and at
those times, his hands trembled. It is natural that his
signatures on Exhibit "A" should lack the firmness,
rhythm, lack of effort and continuity of motion that
they had before he became quite ill and infirm.
Examining the signatures on Exhibit "A", the original
of the will, and those on "3-A", a carbon copy thereof,
it will be readily observed that while the signatures on
the original are already infirm, rough and jagged,
suggesting a hand infirm and trembling, those on the
duplicate (Exhibit "3-A") are still more so, showing the
effects of the concentration of attention, exertion and
effort of the testator in reading and signing the
original.
 
But there are other and equally important
considerations which favor the conclusion that Exhibit
"A" was duly signed and executed by the testator. As
already stated, in their written opposition the
opponents did not question but on the contrary,
assumed if not conceded the genuineness of the
signatures of the testator. Then at the hearing, they
changed their attitude and for the first time put in
issue the genuineness of said signatures; this despite
the fact that the original of the will (Exhibit "A") was
filed in court on February 11, 1950, and the opposition
was filed on March 24th of the same year. In other
words the opponents and their lawyers had almost
one and a half months within which to examine and
scrutinize the signatures on Exhibit "A", after which
examination they did not doubt their genuineness.
Again, the opponents included Ireneo Vaño, a son
of Jesus Vaño, brother of the testator, among the
oppositors. This same Irineo later filed a motion in
court repudiating the action taken by the opponents,
saying that he was included among the oppositors
without his knowledge or consent; that far from
opposing the probate of the will of his uncle, he
believed that said will was a true expression of the
wish and desire of the testator. Not only this, but he
testified for the petitioner and said that the petitioner
Teodoro Vaño was the son of the testator and had
been treated by him as such since childhood.\
The learned trial court lays emphasis on the
uncertainty of the three subscribing witnesses as to
who filled out the blank spaces on the will now
occupied by the words "11th" and "December", while
they are sure that the name Jose Vaño on the space
at the beginning of the first 'paragraph was written by
the testator himself. Said uncertainty on the part of
the said three subscribing witnesses instead of
affecting their veracity, in our opinion, strengthens it,
because it refers to a minor detail and shows that they
had not been rehearsed but on the contrary, testified
to what they remembered. In this connection, there is
every reason to believe that the fact that the space for
the name Jose Vaño on Exhibit "A" was left in blank to
be filled out later by the testator himself argues
against the theory of forgery, because if there had
been forgery, by leaving the blank space for the name
of the testator to be filled out later, including the space
for the date and the month, the forgers would be
laying themselves open and unnecessarily creating
an additional opportunity for the opponents and for
the court to detect the forgery.
 
After all, there was neither necessity nor occasion
for forging the signatures of the testator in the will
because there is every reason to believe that said
testator would leave all his property to petitioner
Teodoro Vaño. The evidence shows that Teodoro
was a natural son of the testator. From childhood he
had been raised by Jose Vaño, treated like a son, and
sent to school, and even after Teodoro had married,
he and his wife and family continued to live with the
old man, or rather, the old man lived with them.
  
Jose Vaño in 1945, in a public instrument entitled
"Special Power of Attorney" (Exhibit "E") referred to
Teodoro Vaño as his son and appointed him as his
attorney-in-fact to lease to the United States of
America any, some or all real properties owned by
him in the City of Cebu, under such terms and
conditions which Teodoro may deem just and
reasonable, and to execute and sign the
corresponding deeds of lease, and to collect and
receive the rents.
 
This was accepted and acted upon by Teodoro
Vaño. In 1946 and 1947 the testator appointed
Teodoro his attorney-in-fact giving him a power of
attorney with extensive powers such as to lease to the
Republic of the Philippines some of his real and
personal properties in the City of Cebu, and to collect
and receive the rentals accruing from the leased
properties; to ask, demand, sue for, recover, and
collect any and all sums of money, debts, dues,
accounts, legacies, bequests, interests, dividends,
etc. which thereafter become due or owing to him and
to make, sign, execute, and deliver contracts,
documents, agreements, and other writings of
whatever nature with any and all third persons upon
terms and conditions acceptable to him (Teodoro),
Exhibits "F" and "G". In 1946 while the testator was in
Bohol, he wrote to Teodoro a note (Exhibit "I")
addressing him as his "dear son" and with the
complimentary clause "your loving Dad", signing the
same, asking Teodoro to send P5,000 to him. It
seems that at least in Cebu and Bohol petitioner
Teodoro Vaño was known by everyone to be the son
of Jose Vaño because the latter had treated and
accepted, even recognized him as such, and shortly
before his death, entrusted him with the complete
management of his business. One of the witnesses
for the opposition, Carmen Vallore, cousin-in-law of
the testator, in her testimony called Milagros Vaño,
wife of Teodoro Vaño, as the daugther-in-law of Jose
Vaño, meaning that Teodoro was the son of the
testator. During the hearing and while Teodoro Vaño
was testifying, counsel for the oppositors repeatedly
referred to the testator as his (Teodoro's) father.
Under all these circumstances, is it any wonder that
Jose Vaño should voluntarily by means of a will, leave
all his properties to his only son, though natural?
 
It is not improbable that one of the reasons
prompting the filing of the opposition to the petition ex
or probate was that Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces, sister
of the testator, could not understand why her brother,
a wealthy man should leave all his wealth to a mere
natural son (Teodoro) and leave nothing to her; but it
was not altogether strange because it seems that the
relations between Paz and the testator, were rather
strained and in 1949, according to the evidence, Paz
had brought a civil action against Jose Vaño and
Irineo Vaño, the nephew of Jose Vaño who ref used
to oppose the probate of the will. And during the last
and prolonged illness of the testator, Paz, living in the
same city of Cebu, did not even once visit her ailing
and bed-ridden brother.
 
The three subscribing witnesses to the will, under
oath assured the court that Jose Vaño voluntarily
signed Exhibit "A", and these three witnesses were in
no way related to Teodoro or to the testator, had no
interest in the execution of the will and stood to gain
nothing by its probate. Pedro Ceniza is a responsible
businessman, Dr. Osmundo Rama, is a practising
physician and Atty. Nazario Pacquio, is a member of
the bar and at the time he prepared Exhibit "A", he
was Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu. Their
disinterested testimony cannot be taken lightly. On
this question of the weight to be given to the
testimony of subscribing witnesses, we held in the
case of Roxas vs. Roxas, et al., 48 Off. Gaz. (6) 2177;
87 Phil. 692, that—
 
"We do not venture to impute bias to the experts
introduced during the trial but we hasten to state that
the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses
ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot
be mathematically precise but which, on the contrary
are 'subject to inherent infirmities.'
 
"The law impliedly recognizes the almost
conclusive weight of the testimony of attesting
witnesses when it provides that 'if the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses present in the
Philippines and not insane, must be produced and
examined, and the death, absence or insanity of any
one of them must be satisfactorily shown to the
Court.' (Section 11, Rule 77, Rules of Court.)"
In the present case, the opinions of the two
handwriting experts presented by the parties are
conflicting and even assuming that there is doubt to
our mind as to which of the two is to be accepted, the
positive and clear testimony of the three subscribing
witnesses should prevail. In the case of In re Will of
Medina, 60 Phil., 391, this Court said:
"In the present case, two of the subscribing witnesses
are lawyers. This fact together with the circumstance
that they were not shown to have any interest in the
subject of the litigation, lead the trial court to consider
their testimony as worthy of credit. The intervention of
professional men specially lawyers, in the preparation
and execution of wills, has been given by this Court
the consideration deserved."
Reiterating the doctrine laid down in the case of
Sotelo vs. Luzan, 59 Phil., 908, we ex urther held in
the same case:
 
"In one case it was said: 'lt is hardly conceivable that
any attorney of any standing would risk his
professional reputation by falsifying a will and then go
before a court and give false testimony.'"
There is no reason to believe that Atty. Pacquio who,
at the time was not only a member of the bar but was
an assistant provincial fiscal, should commit forgery
by drafting Exhibit "A" and take part in forging the
signature of the testator and later falsely testify in
court on the due execution of said will and subject
himself not only to criminal prosecution and dismissal
from his post as assistant provincial fiscal, but also to
disbarment proceedings.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is reversed and Exhibit "A" is hereby allowed
probate as the Last Will and Testament of Jose Vaño,
with costs against appellees.
 Parás, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.
Decision reversed.
 
43. Ozaeta vs Cuartero (GR No. L-5597, May 31,
1956) MIRANDA
ROMAN OZAETA, petitioner and appellee, ROSA
GONZALES, ET AL., co-petitioners and appellees,
vs. MARIA CUARTERO, ET AL., oppositors and
appellees. SEBASTIAN C. PALANCA, MARCIANA
PALANCA and ANGEL C. PALANCA, oppositors and
appellants.
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila allowing the probate of the will
purportedly executed by Carlos Palanca and
appointing the petitioner-appellee Roman Ozaeta
executor. The entire burden of appellants'
contention is that
the will could not have been executed by Palacan on
May 19, 1945, and in the manner described by
petitioner's witnesses, and that, supposing it to have
been so executed, still it should not be allowed
because it was allegedly procured thru fraud and
improper pressure and influence and did not comply
with the requisites of the law. Appellants' case is built
mainly on surmises unsupported by the evidence. As
to the question of whether or not the will was obtained
thru undue influence and improper pressure, it is not
enough that there was an opportunity to exercise
undue influence or a possibility that it might have
been exercised. There must be substantial evidence
that it was actually exercised. (21 A.L.R. 821).
Judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs against
the appellants. Reyes, A., J., ponente.
____________
44. Coso vs Fernandez (G.R. No. L-16763, December
22, 1921) MUANA
45. Cuyugan vs Baron (G.R. No. L-45804, February
7, 1940) RABANES
GR No. L-45804 February 7, 1940
Probate of the late Silvestra Baron. VIVENCIO
CUYUGAN v. FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO
BARON
CONCEPCION, J.
It is about the legalization of the will granted by
Silvestra Baron, an octogenarian who was a neighbor
of MAgalan in the Province of Pampanga. This is the
second time that this Court has been called to
intervene in this matter. The first time, a majority
decided it was confirmed by the resolution of the
Court of First Instance of the aforementioned
province, which denied the legalization of the will in
question, but not on the grounds of the Court, that is,
that undue influence had. However, a minority made
up of four members of this Court, that the appealed
resolution should be revoked and the legalization of
the aforementioned will be ordered.
At the request of the applicant, based on the fact that
the mental capacity of the testator had not been the
issue debated in the Court, which is why no evidence
had been presented on that point, this court by
resolution dated October 31, 1936, expanded by
Another of December 26 of the same year, ordered
the new hearing of the case to give opportunity not
only to the appellant to present evidence on the
testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron, but also to
the appellees to present the retraction of the witness
Zacarias Nuguid.
Returning the case to the Court, the new hearing was
held, and the same Judge who issued the decision
that had been annulled, ruled the matter again, on
August 31, 1937, again denying the probate of the
will, ordering the own time the prosecution of Zacarias
Nuguid for the perjury committed in his first statement.
In its decision the Court said:
. . . The testator's mental incapacity was not
absolute, according to the evidence, but this
does not mean that Exhibit A is the free and
conscious expression of her last will for the
reasons we have already said, conclusions
to which most of the Supreme Court had
arrived and they have not been disturbed by
the new evidence.
He also said that Silvestra Baron did not realize that
what she had signed on December 17, 1932, was a
will, and that said old woman was a person who was
easily willing to sign any document that was put
before her, if no one opposed.
The appellant points out in his argument, among other
errors of the lower court, the first and second that
read as follows:
The Court made an error when declaring in
its decision dated August 31, 1937 that
Exhibit "A" is the conscious and free
expression of his last will.
The court made a mistake when declaring
that Silvestra Baron the testator did not
realize that she had signed it on December
17, 1932, it was a will, that is, Exhibit "A" was
granted by fraud.
We will discuss, therefore, in this appeal two
questions, which are more important: 1. Whether or
not Silvestra Baron had mental capacity at the time of
granting her will; and 2nd whether or not undue
influence had been exercised over her in the act of
granting the will. 
We establish as proven facts that on December 9,
1932, Silvestra Baron had been assaulted and
assaulted in her home, and the thieves stole P7,000
in paper money that she had in bundles tied to her
leg. Her sister Faustina Baron, who lived with her in
the house, reported it to the authorities, and some
Contabularios went to investigate the theft. On the
morning of the aforementioned month of 1932,
Corporal Constabularia Morales, together with Private
Cerrudo, were sent to Silvestra Baron's house to
investigate the robbery. In the same morning,
Silvestra Baron fell on the roof of her house, and her
granddaughter Epifania Sampang, informed of the
accident, by telephone asked a policeman from the
municipality of San Fernando to notify Vivencio
Cuyugan, Silvestra Baron's nephew. , that her aunt
was ill and seemed to have a seizure and that a
doctor was needed. Dr. Rafael Teopaco,
accompanied by thenurse Sofia Echanova, went to
the house of Silvestra Baron in this morning and I
found bedridden "almost to the edge of a shock
nervous', his blood pressure was abnormally low,
which is why he ordered the doctor to the nurse that I
gave her an injection of camphor oil and another of
sodium benzoate with caffeine. Then the patient
reacted and wanted to raise her head. She asked the
nurse: "Who are these people?" His nephew Regino
Cuyugan, who was there, answered: "These are the
doctor and the nurse." The nurseI then asked what
had happened and she, although with some difficulty,
answered coherently and intelligently: "I don't know, it
was the night before or two nights before that I had
been strangled by two individuals, who took the
money that I had tied to my thigh ". The nurse asked
her why she had not put the money in her iron box,
and she replied that she did not believe that anyone
would know that she had it tied to her leg. Dr Teopaco
warned the nurse not to tire the mind of the patient.
As he complained that his side hurt, they put a plaster
and ice on his head; and they told him to shut up and
not speak. Around 11 in the morning the doctor and
nurse left.
Two or three days before December 17, 1932,
Silvestra Baron called the lawyer Quirino Abad
Santos, and having been established in his house, he
asked him to write his will, instructing him to keep his
grant secret so that his relatives would not disturbed.
Said lawyer then took note of the provisions that she
wanted to include in her last will. On the morning of
December 17, said lawyer Quirino Abad Santos, who
was the justice of the peace of San Fernando,
Pampanga, appeared at Silvestra Baron's house,
together with Vivencio Cuyugan, Vicente T. David and
Valeriano Silva, and the chief of police of San
Fernando, Zacarias Nuguid. They all arrived at
Silvestra's house around 11 in the morning, shortly
before Dr. Teopaco and the nurse left.Sofia
Echanova. Quirino Abad Santos went to the bed
where the old woman was lying, and showed her the
draft of the will that she had carried, asking her if she
was satisfied. As she answered in the affirmative, said
draft was put in clean, in razor, writing Vicente D.
David. After copying it, at the request of Mr. Quirino
Abad SAntos, the lawyer Silva read the will in the
presence of the late Silvestra Baron and after having
it in her hands and looking at it for a while, she signed
it in the presence of. The will is Exhibit a, whose
duplicate is Exhibit A-1; It appears written on a single
page, in Pampango dialect.
After carefully examining the evidence and after
reading the argument of the appellants as well as that
of the appealed children of Guillermo Baron, and that
of the appealed Faustina Baron, who withdrew her
appeal, but her argument has been made by the
appealed children of Guillermo Baron. we find:
REGARDING THE TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY
that the evidence shows indisputably that the testator
had such capacity when she executed her will.
A. First, all the instrumental witnesses testified that
when the testator executed and signed her will, she
was in the full use of her mental faculties. The
witnesses were, as has already been said, Vicente T
David, auxiliary justice of the peace of San Fernando,
Pampanga, the lawyer Valeriano Silva, and the chief
of police, Zacarias Nuguid. Presiding over the latter
for now, the first two witnesses and the lawyer Mr.
Quirino Abad Santos who intervened in the
preparation of the will in question were lawyers whose
professional conduct has not been questioned. This
was recognized by the Honorable Judge who ruled
this case, and Judge Malcolm, who in a separate
opinion concurred with the majority, said the following
on this point: ". But from the premise of lack of
testamentary capacity it does not necessarily follow
that anything of unprofessional nature should be
imputed to the lawyer who prepared the will and other
lawyers who acted as attesting witnesses. The first
named is the Justice of the Peace of San Fernando,
Pampanga, and has an excellent reputation, which is
not lessened in the least by his acts in this case, and
the last named are reputable members of the bar.
"(RG No 41927, January 16, 1936).
B. So much so that Silvestra Baron fully enjoyed her
mental faculties on the day I made the will, Exhibit A,
that, although she was ill, I heard, while the will was
being signed, that from the roof of the house,
someone called her "Atsi , Atsi ", nickname with which
she called the testator; And, she asked what
happened to what her granddaughter Epifania
Sampang, who was there present, answered that her
sister Faustina was calling her; Then she asked why
they wouldn't let her in, and going to Epifania, she
sent her to find out what was happening. A very sick
person who was not in the full use of her mental
faculties, as the opponents claim was the condition in
which Silvestra Baron was, is not interested at all in
anything that happens around her.
C. Not only could the testator pay attention or be
interested in what happened near her, but also that
she showed herself, even attentive and obsequious
with the lawyer Quirino Abad Santos and his
colleagues, ordering that they offer them a standing
tent to They shouldn't get hungry, since it was already
12 o'clock in the morning, and then her
granddaughter, Epifania Sampang, looked for eggs in
the neighboring house, while the testator Regino
Cuyugan's nephew went to buy biscuits. Such
attention cannot happen to a person who does not
have a clear and healthy mind.
D. When the lawyer Mr. Quirino Abad Santos
approached the testator to sign the testament, said
Silvestra told her granddaughter Epifania Sampang,
according to this opposition witness, to look at what
was put before her for your signiture. And Epiphany
did indeed see the papers according to her. This
simply shows that the testator knew very well what
she was doing, and that she acted with full knowledge
of what she was doing.
It is true that Epifania Sampang, the main witness of
the opponents, declared that she saw those papers
that told her it was a complaint and she noticed the
words complaint and robbery.
The theory of the opponents is that Vivencia Cuyugan
made her aunt Silvestra Baron sign her will, making
her believe that it was a complaint against Emilio
Lacson, son of the opposition Faustina Baron, who
was suspected of being the one who had stolen the
money. nights before. Well then: Epifania Sampang's
testimony in this part is the most implausible that can
be conceived. She is a woman of about 28 years of
age; He had studied the fourth grade and then studied
for two years at the Colegio de Sta. Catalina in
Manila. So she was not an ignorant person who could
easily be fooled. She was at that time the most
trusted person of the testator, which is why she asked
her to look at the papers that she put at the signature.
Therefore, responding to the confidence of his
grandmother, and when she told him to examine
those papers, Of course, it must be presumed
naturally that she would not have limited herself to
looking at them in passing, but that she would have
noticed and read them, which was extremely easy for
her, since the will was written on a single page and
was written in the Pampango dialect. , which was his
own dialect. In these circumstances, can it be
conceived as a possible thing that what she saw on
the papers was just a robbery complaint?
E. In addition, the applicant's evidence shows that the
will was first prepared and signed; later, Abad Santos
and his companions took biscuits and eggs, and
finally, the complaint for theft was drawn up. This
being the case, what witness Epifania Sampang has
stated could not have happened: that they made
Silvestra Baron sign the will, making her believe it
was the complaint, and that she, Sampang, actually
saw that the papers said complaint and theft; the
signing of the will was one act, and that of the
complaint, another, with a considerable interval of
time between one act and another.
F. That the testament was read before the testator
signed it, is a fact admitted by the Court, since in its
decision it says that Epifania Sampang's testimony
regarding the fact that the will was not read, is
contradicted by the instrumental witnesses.
The question of whether Silvestra understood it or
not, we believe that it is affirmatively resolved by the
considerations that we have made above. She spoke
the Pampango.
G. Now, examining the evidence presented by the
applicant in the new hearing, we find that both Dr.
Rafael Teopaco and nurse Sofia Echanova, have
stated that, having administered some injections to
Silvestra Baron, she reacted about 15 minutes later,
and That he laughed to get up, which was prevented,
and he started a conversation with the nursewhen she
asked what had happened to her. She answered her
questions coherently and intelligently, and said that
one night, her house was broken into, that the thieves
strangled her and stole about P7,000 in paper money
that she had securely tied to her leg. Certainly, a
person who was not in the full use of her mental
faculties could not coordinate her ideas, or give the
reason for what she had done before the robbery, and
remember and relate a similar event.
The opposition tried to prove that Silvestra Baron was
on the verge of death according to Dr. Teopaco, and
that on different occasions he revealed to the
opposition lawyer, Arturo Joven, that the old Silvestra
Baron was unable to execute the will. If such a
revelation had been made, is it conceivable that the
opposition would not have presented such evidence
at the first hearing when all its effort and effort was to
show that the will was made by virtue of fraud,
deception and undue influence? Dr. Teopaco
emphatically denied such fact, and under all
circumstances, the testimony of this witness deserves
full credit.
We have seen that according to the evidence,
Silvestra Baron, when on December 17, 1932, she
executed the will contested by the opposition, she
was fully enjoying her mental faculties. The law does
not even require that much for a will to be valid, since:
In order for judgment and memory to be
qualified as healthy, it is not necessary that
the judgment is intact or without impairment
by illness or otherwise, nor that the testator
is in full possession of his discursive
faculties. The loss of memory is not sufficient
unless it is total or extends to the individuals
closest to the family or assets. Bagtas v.
Paguio, 22 Jur. Fil., 232. Let us now discuss
about:
THE UNDUE INFLUENCE
The reasons on which the Court has been based to
consider that Silvestra Baron granted the autos will
under undue influence are summarized, in the terms
in which the Judge expressed himself in his decision,
as follows:
 
We believe that the presence of her
nephews Vivencio Cuyugan and Regino
Cuyugan during the granting of Exhibit 'A'
had an undue and improper influence on the
already weakened will of Do a Silvestra
Baron due to her advanced age; the
absence of Faustina Baron prevented from
witnessing it by some Constabularia soldiers
and the municipal police chief, Zacarias
Nuguid; Regino Cuyugan's opposition to her
signing the document prepared by the lawyer
Narciso, stating that she had not granted a
will the day before her forced transfer to San
Fernando so that she would not have a
similar document signed, and the presence
of Corporal Morales and some other
soldiers, not only when the will was made,
but when she was moved from home against
her will and when she was made to sign
Exhibit 10, and, therefore, that she did not
enjoy complete freedom to dispose of her
assets in a will, or with full knowledge of the
scope of its content. This is the only way to
explain why she has left all the ownership of
her goods to her nephews, with whom she
had been in a lawsuit, with the preterition of
her brothers, especially the opposition
Faustina Baron, with whom she had been
living for 40 years. "
Regarding the alleged weakened will of the testator
due to her advanced age, we believe that enjoying, as
she did, fully her mental faculties on the date of the
execution of her will, this is a sign that not even her
advanced age, nor the illness from which he suffered,
have in any way weakened his will, as evidenced by
his conduct and firmness of character, on that day
and in the next forty days, until the date of his death.
The presence of her nephews Vivencio Cuyugan and
Regino Cuyugan during the execution of the will does
not prove that said nephews had it under their control,
because if such a thing had happened, Epifania
Sampang, who was there and who declared for the
opposition, would not have ceased to be mentioned in
his testimony.
The fact that the sister of the testator Faustina Baron,
was prevented from entering the house by the
Constabularia soldiers while the will was being made,
is a purely accidental circumstance. There is no proof
that Vivencio and Regino Cuyugan knew that their
aunt would grant a will that day, or that they were the
ones who called the Constabularios to stand guard at
Silvestra Baron's house. The testator had
commissioned Quirino Abad Santos to keep a secret
that she was granting her will. Bearing this in mind,
there was nothing more natural for Abad Santos to
have ordered that no one be allowed into the house
while they were busy making the will, without thinking
that this order could affect Faustina Baron, since she
had gone to his hacienda, and perhaps it was not
known.
It is said that Regino Cuyugan objected the following
day, December 18, to Silvestra Baron signing a
document prepared by attorney Narciso, in which it
was stated that she had not executed a will the day
before. This fact is denied by Regino Cuyugan's
testimony, and, if it were true that Silvestra Baron did
not sign the alleged document because Regino
Cuyugan had told him that if he signed it, he and the
petitioning party's witnesses would go to jail, that is a
powerful circumstance to put the testator on notice;
But there is no justifying explanation why, during the
forty days that she voluntarily lived in the house of her
brother Guillermo Baron, where she had been
transferred on December 20, with her consent, she
had not granted any document of revocation of the
will.
I, Silvestre Baron, of legal age, single and
currently resident in the municipality of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippine Islands,
freely and spontaneously state the following
under oath:
That on December 18 of last year 1932
(December 18, 1932) my sister Faustina
Baron, accompanied by the lawyer Jose A.
Narciso, came to see me at my home in
Magalang, Pampanga, and forced me to sign
a document telling me that its content is that
I cancel and nullify everything that I had
signed the previous day, December 17,
1932, because, according to Faustina and
the lawyer Narciso, I do not know the content
of the documents that I had signed in that
document. day, December 17, 1932.
In view of the fact that I know the content of
the documents that I had signed on that day,
December 17, 1932, I have not signed the
document that Faustina Baron and the
lawyer Jose A. Narciso send me to sign,
because they tell me to declare false facts
like this is that I have not pleased them to
sign this document.
In his testimony, he signed today, January
12, 1933, in San Fernando, Pampanga, in
the presence of the Notary Public Mr. Serafin
de Ocampo and the witnesses.
According to the inserted document, the testator knew
what was the content of the documents that she had
signed on December 17, and not only did she not
know for herself, but from the evidence of the
opposition it appears that her sister Faustina and the
lawyer Narciso They told her on December 18 that
what she had signed could be a will; And because
she knew that what she had signed was indeed a will
and a complaint, she did not want to sign what they
made her sign because Faustina and the lawyer
Narciso forced her to declare false facts; This means
that Faustina and the lawyer Narciso wanted her to
sign a document declaring that it was not a will and
denouncing what she had signed on December 17,
and that therefore she canceled and rendered them
without effect.
Not only did Silvestra Baron not want to revoke the
will that she granted on December 17, 1932, but living
at ease in the house of her brother, Guillermo Baron,
she granted a power of attorney, Exhibit M, on
December 21, 1932, in favor of her nephew Vivencio
Cuyugan, so that she could manage her assets, thus
demonstrating once again the esteem and trust that
her said nephew enjoyed in her.
The Court, by way of conclusion, says that taking into
account the undue influence exerted on the testator, it
is explained that she has left all the property of her
goods to her nephews, with whom she had been in
litigation, with the preterition of her brothers,
especially from the opposition Faustina Baron, with
whom he had been living for 40 years.
In the first place, it is not true that there has been
preterition leaving all the property of their assets to
the testator's nephews, since according to the will,
Faustina Baron and Guillermo Baron would
participate equally with Regino Cuyugan and Vivencio
Cuyugan in the assets of the heritage; only that said
Faustina and Guillermo have to reserve the property
of the goods upon their death, to their nephew
Vivencio Cuyugan. And this is explained because
Faustina Baron, as she has admitted, had already
received several parcels of land from the testator by
public deed in July 1932. She also owed her the sum
of P6,500 since 1925, according to a public
document.
While the will was being prepared, Quirino Abad
Santos asked Silvestra Baron if her sister Faustina
had to be included in the will, to which the testator
answered yes, which shows that Quirino Abad Santos
did not prepare the will, exerting an influence undue
on the testator, but in accordance with its provisions.
It is said that, if the testator wanted to include her
sister Faustina in her will, why was she only a
usufructual heir? It can be presumed that this was the
instruction given to the lawyer Abad Santos when she
was called to her home three days before to entrust
her with the preparation of her will. The testator would
undoubtedly have reasons to do so. Vivencio
Cuyugan enjoyed his greatest trust, as evidenced not
only by the will but also by the fact that he had
granted a general power of administration in his favor
and entrusted him with the secret of the combination
of his iron box and the internal keys of the same. box.
In addition to the fact that, as has already been said,
Silvestra Baron had given her sister several plots of
land and she had an old unpaid debt, which is why,
according to Faustina, her nephews did not like her
well.
Let us now say two words before ending, about the
statement of the instrumental witness Zacarias
Nuguid, who retracted in the new hearing, his
previous statement, and whose testimony the
opponents have presented as additional evidence of
the alleged deception or fraud that They said Silvestra
Baron was a victim, making her believe that it was a
complaint for theft of the papers that she signed, on
December 17, 1932. Nuguid, in our opinion, does not
deserve absolutely any faith in her retraction
testimony, and there we find manifestations that
destroy your second statement.
According to said witness, he testified as one of the
instrumental witnesses in favor of the applicant at the
first hearing, because the lawyer Quirino Abad Santos
had forced him to testify in the manner that he
testified. Quirino Abad Santos, however, flatly denied
him.
In the argument of the appellee Faustina Baron,
which the appealed children of Guillerma Baron made
their own, an extract of the testimony of Zacarias
Nuguid is made, as follows:
 
. . . That in point No. 5 of sketch Exh. 1 there
was a small table and a typewriter, on which
the lawyer David wrote what Abad Santos
dictated to him, while Silvestra Baron was
lying on the bed at point No. 12 (121, nt);
that the lawyer Silva replaced David at the
razor; that, later, Vivencio Cuyugan took out
 the paper (he does not say the papers),
which had just been written, approached the
old Silvestra, followed by the others, and,
upon reaching point 12, said: 'Tia, sign it, this
it is the complaint against Emilio '; and that
lawyers David, Silva and Abad Santos were
behind Vivencio (112, nt)
Relating what happened then, Nuguid said
that the old woman replied: 'Don't go that
you've included Aunt Poste (Faustina)', but
Vivencio replied that no; that Cuyugan then
put a pillow on the old woman's lap, made
her sit down, and handed her a fountain pen,
that as they saw that the signature was not
well done, they brought a small table and the
old woman signed again (123, tn); that, after
she signed, the two lawyers David and Silva
also signed (124, nt); that Exhibits A and A-1
are the same documents that Cuyugan had
the old woman sign, making her believe it
was a complaint (124-125, nt); that he
(Nuguid) also signed because he believed it
was a complaint and that they made him
sign as a witness to Silvestra Baron's
signature; that the alleged complaint was not
read to the old woman before she signed it;
that she did not read it either, nor did he read
it. "(Pages 62-63, argument of the appellee
Faustina Baron.) It underlines it, ours.
According to what is transcribed, the lawyers David
and Silva as well as the witness Nuguid signed a
paper after Silvestra Baron had signed it, whom
Vivencio Cuyugan made believe that such paper was
a complaint. This witness said that he signed that
document because he believed it was a complaint,
but that he did not read it. It is not conceived as a
possible thing, that a whole police chief, like Nuguid,
signed a document without having read it first. For this
reason alone, Nuguid's testimony in the retraction
deserves absolutely no faith.
On the other hand, the circumstance under which the
opponents managed to get Nuguid to retract his
previous statement, obliges us to deny him credibility
in his testimony. The opposition lawyer, Arturo Joven,
declaring how he managed to attract Nuguid to his
side, said the following:
I immediately realized the situation, and I confirming said decision as soon as it orders the
was very sure that without Malaca an's prosecution of Zacarias Nuguid for perjury in her
intervention , Mr. Nuguid would never have second declaration. The costs against the appellees.
signed an affidavit, as he signed it: And So ordered.
having seen that there was a direct
intervention almost from Malaca an, I
realized that it was almost certain that Mr.
Nuguid would sign a retraction; so it interests
me. (We underline). (p. 125, argument of the
appellant.)
It can therefore be seen that said lawyer Arturo
Joven, taking advantage of an informal intervention by
Mr. Nicanor Roxas, one of the officials at that time
from Malaca an, managed to get Nuguid to sign an
affidavit of retraction of his previous testimony, and
that according to that affidavit declared in the new
hearing in favor of the opposition. This circumstance
is of sufficient weight to deny any consideration to
Nuguid's retraction. But this, after all, could not help
but admit certain facts in cross-examination, thus
ratifying himself in his previous statement. I declare in
the new hearing that David, one of the witnesses to
the will, was the one who gave Silvestra Baron his
pen to sign the will.And since David's pen was not
good, Silva, the other witness to the will, gave his for
the same purpose.
Finally, an observation about the testimony of Father
Manoloto. Said priest declared that on December 18,
1932, he visited Silvestra Baron at her home, and that
having asked her if she had made a will the day
before, as he wanted to make sure that the money
needed for the erection of two altars had been left. In
the Church of Magalang, the old woman replied that
she had not made a will. We cannot consider Father
Manoloto's testimony sufficient proof to the effect that
Silvestra Baron did not testify the day before, because
Baron's answer is nothing more than a consequence
of her firm determination not to reveal to anyone that
she had made a will.
After considering all the evidence of the appellees, we
believe that they are nothing more than a set of
circumstances on which the castle of opposition
theories has been raised, whose fragile structure is
easily discovered in the light of sound criticism.
We revoke the appealed decision, ordering the
probate of the will granted by Silvestra Baron on
December 17, 1932, as her legitimate and last will,