Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Delante White Motion For Acquittal
Delante White Motion For Acquittal
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Criminal No.: 08-065 (PLF)
:
v. :
:
DELANTE WHITE : Trial Date September 18, 2008
Defendant. :
:
DEFENDANT WHITE’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
HIS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
COMES NOW the defendant Delante White, by and through counsel, Charles F. Daum,
respectfully asking this Court to grant his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In support of this Motion, this Memorandum of
ISSUE
1. The Government’s evidence has been limited to proving that the defendant was an occasional
occupant at 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2. However, the evidence demonstrates that
multiple people occupied and/or had access to this apartment during the relevant time period. Of
these people, it is clear that at least two people were occupying the bedroom in that apartment on
or around February 23, 2008. Therefore, given the current state of the Government’s evidence
and the presence of multiple occupants, the issue here is whether there is sufficient evidence to
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2008, Officer Abdalla filed an affidavit in support of the Metropolitan
Police Department's request for a warrant to search 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2,
Washington, D.C. The Court granted Officer Abdalla a warrant to search the residence, which is
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 2 of 10
a one bedroom apartment with two beds and three bureaus in the one bedroom. The warrant was
executed on February 23, 2008. According to the Government, the search of the residence
recovered approximately, 124.95 grams of cocaine base (crack); a magazine with .40 caliber
ammunition; a magazine with .9mm ammunition; an empty ammunition box; a digital scale;
gloves; a shoebox containing plates and razors; a bullet; $2,000.00 in United States currency;
mail matter addressed to the defendant; photographs; men's clothing; and a pair of Gucci shoes.
The shoebox and its contents were recovered outside of the apartment on the porch, and the rest
of the items were recovered from the bedroom of 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2. Based on
this evidence, the Government charged the defendant with one count of possession with intent to
distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(A)(iii).
Given that the above listed evidence was not found on the person of any of the occupants
of 637 Hamlin St., NE, the Government alleges that one or more of the occupants constructively
possessed it. The parties agree that Ms. Evelyn Clowney, the defendant’s grandmother, resides
at the home, but they disagree about who else lives at that address. From the outset of this
investigation, the Government has suspected, and now alleges, that the defendant was an
occupant of 637 Hamlin St., NE and that he was the possessor of the cocaine recovered from that
address. The Government’s case began under the theory that the defendant and Ms. Evelyn
Clowney were the only residents in the apartment, and that the defendant was the sole possessor
of the items seized from the apartment. Given the introduction of photographic evidence
suggesting that Jerome White, the defendant’s brother, possessed the cocaine base approximately
forty-eight hours prior the search and seizure, it appears that the Government is now pursuing a
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 3 of 10
theory of joint constructive possession with both the defendant and Jerome White being the
possessors.
During this trial, the Government’s case has focused almost exclusively on establishing
that the defendant was an occupant of 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2 on or around February
23, 2008. To that end, the Government has introduced the following items seized during the
February 23, 2008 search of 637 Hamlin St., NE: 1) mail matter bearing the defendant’s name, 2)
pictures of the defendant and his friends, 3) a pair of Gucci shoes, 4) a plate with what the
Government claims is the defendant’s fingerprint on it, 5) a driver’s license bearing the
defendant’s name and the claim that his address is 637 Hamlin St., NE, 6) a rental application for
a different apartment on which the defendant is listed as an emergency contact with an address of
637 Hamlin St., NE, and 7) the testimony of two officers who claim to have often seen the
defendant in the area of 637 Hamlin St., NE for extended periods of time, late at night and who
also claim that the defendant informed them that he lived at 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2.
The Government has not presented any evidence linking the defendant directly to the seized
cocaine base. Nor have they presented evidence directly linking the defendant to any criminal
ANALYSIS
The argument begins with a brief recitation of the legal standard for adjudicating a
motion for judgment of acquittal. It then recites the Government’s burden of proof with respect
to the elements of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. Next, it explains the
requisite legal standard for proving constructive possession of drugs found in an apartment or
room with multiple occupants, noting that mere proof of residency in that apartment or room is
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 4 of 10
generally insufficient to support a conviction. The next subsection applies this legal standard to
the facts of this case and concludes that, based on the controlling case law, the Government has
failed to provide the jury and the Court with sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for
possession of the cocaine recovered from 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2 based on its theory
of constructive possession. It concludes with the defendant’s request that the Court grant his
A court should only grant a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal “where the
evidence is such that, viewing it in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable trier
of fact could not have found guilt by a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d
1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Stated differently, the trial court should give “full play to the right
of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact.”
United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
To convict the defendant of illegal possession of cocaine base with the intent to
distribute, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
or intentionally possessed the cocaine base and that he had the specific intent to distribute it. See
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
parties essentially agree that that the possessor of the cocaine base intended to distribute it. The
contested issue is whether the defendant was the possessor. Because the drugs were not found
on the defendant’s person or within his immediate reach, the Government has proceeded under
the theory that the defendant constructively possessed them, which is a permissible strategy but
evidence of the defendant’s “ability to exercise knowing dominion and control over the items in
question.” United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Thus, the constructive possession inquiry is broken
down to the following two elements: 1) knowledge of the presence of the contraband, and 2)
demonstrated dominion and control over the contraband. In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460,
1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “In most constructive possession cases, the defendant’s knowledge of
the contraband flows from its being in plain view at the site of the defendant’s arrest.” In re
Sealed Case, 105 F.3d at 1463 (citing United States v. Walker, 99 F.3d 439, 441 (D.C. Cir.
1996); United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). However, when the items in
question are drugs that are hidden and are recovered from an area occupied by multiple people,
the evidence must adequately support the belief that “the accused had a substantial voice vis-à-
vis” those drugs or “some appreciable ability to guide [the drugs’] destiny.” United States v.
Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 883, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In other words, where there are multiple
occupants, the Government cannot satisfy its burden of proof by simply establishing that the
defendant is one of the occupants of the area in which the contraband was found; rather, it must
present evidence that specifically indicates that the defendant knows of the presence of the
contraband and exerts some control over it. Any such inquiry into the sufficiency of the
defendant’s knowledge and control over the seized drugs is necessarily a case-specific factual
inquiry, but the court has provided some general guidance in this area.
First, the court has clearly stated that the fact that the contraband was recovered from the
defendant’s home is not independently sufficient to prove that he knew of its presence and
exercised dominion and control over it. United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376. Second, the
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 6 of 10
court has explained that mere proximity to the contraband to the defendant is insufficient to
establish dominion and control over that contraband. In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d at 1463. To
establish the defendant’s control over the contraband, the court looks for evidence of “some
action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the [contraband] and indicates
that he had some stake in [it], some power over [it].” Id. (quoting United States v. Thorne, 997
F.2d 1504, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). The court will also look to the following additional factors to establish dominion and
control: “proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating
involvement in an enterprise.” Id. (quoting United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir.
1992)) (internal quotes and citations omitted). A brief examination of the relevant case law and
the evidence in the record in this case demonstrates that the Government has failed to establish 1)
that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the drugs in apartment #2 and 2) that the
III. The Government Has Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence Linking the
Defendant to a Criminal Enterprise, Requiring This Court to Grant His Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal.
contraband in question. Id. at 1463-64. The second element of constructive possession is the
ability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. Id. at 1464. The D.C. Circuit has
found the existence of such knowledge and control in several cases for a myriad of reasons,
1
In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
2
United States v. Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
3
Id.
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 7 of 10
the contraband to the defendant at the time of arrest, 4 5) evidence that the defendant “sold the
kind of drug of which the stash [of contraband in question] consisted, and did so in the very
apartment where the stash was located and in the presence of [occupant-]confederates,” 5 6)
evidence that the contraband sold by the defendant came from the same stash that the
of money from the defendant’s person in denominations suggesting that the defendant was
engaged in the sale of contraband, 7 8) recovery of contraband from the defendant’s person that is
identical to the stash of contraband that the Government alleges the defendant constructively
possessed, 8 and 9) officers’ observation of the defendant directing a person to a nearby park
where he sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer. 9 The Government has not presented
evidence showing the presence of any of these factors that could lead to a finding of knowledge
Under either party’s theory of the case, multiple people occupied the bedroom at 637
Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2 on or around February 23, 2008. The Government contends that
the defendant and Evelyn Clowney occupied the apartment, and the defense asserts that Jerome
White and Evelyn Clowney were the occupants. As noted above, the Government’s evidence
has been exclusively dedicated to proving that the defendant occasionally resided in 637 Hamlin
4
Id.
5
United States v. Gomez, No. 04-3063, slip op., at 4 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 2005)
6
Id.
7
See id. at 5.
8
United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding constructive possession where the defendant
had $165 and a distribution quantity of heroin, which was one of the three types of drugs found in the apartment, on
his person).
9
United States v. Thorne, 997 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
conviction based on constructive possession of a stash of crack cocaine located in a bag on the floor of a closet in a
bedroom that was shared with multiple occupants in part because the defendant was observed directing another
individual to a park where he sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer).
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 8 of 10
St., NE., apartment #2 (photographs, shoes, mail matter, etc …) on or around February 23, 2008.
Accepting for purposes of this motion that the Government has sufficiently proven that the
defendant was an occupant of 637 Hamlin St., NE, apartment #2 on or around February 23, 2008
and that Jerome White resided elsewhere, the Government is still left with the fact that the
cocaine base was recovered from the only bedroom in the house, in which there are two beds and
in which Evelyn Clowney is an occupant. Thus, even under its own theory of the case, the
Government is still left with a room with multiple occupants. Furthermore, the drugs were
hidden in the room and were not in plain view, removing the possibility that all occupants of the
room were presumptively aware of their presence and exercised some degree of dominion and
control over them. See Staten 581 F.2d at 884 n.55. Stated differently, it is clear that multiple
people occupied the bedroom in apartment #2 and that cocaine base was hidden in that room, but
if the Government is to prove that one of the occupants knew about the hidden drugs and
exercised dominion and control over them, then it must establish more than the fact that that
person occupied the bedroom. With respect to its case against the defendant, the Government
The Government has failed to directly link the defendant to the cocaine base either
through physical evidence or through eyewitness testimony. The closest it came was when it
introduced evidence that the defendant’s fingerprint was found on a ceramic plate found on the
porch. However, given that the plate did not contain any cocaine base residue or show any signs
of use in the illegal possession and/or distribution of cocaine base, it is merely evidence that the
defendant has handled dishware in the apartment at some time in the past, which at best helps the
Government establish that he was an occupant in the apartment. Whatever probative value it
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 9 of 10
has, it certainly does not even begin to establish the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of
The Government’s next best piece of evidence to establish knowledge is the pair of Gucci
shoes that it believed belonged to Mr. White. First, even if the shoes were the defendant’s, there
presence in the bedroom cannot possibly be sufficient evidence that the defendant knew about
the presence of a hidden stash of cocaine base that was also in the bedroom. Second, the defense
has amply demonstrated that the shoes do not belong to the defendant. The shoes recovered
from apartment #2 are too big to be the defendant’s, and Ms. Robertson, his cohabitating
girlfriend, brought the defendant’s smaller, yet otherwise identical, pair of Gucci shoes from
their apartment in Hyattsville, Maryland and had them admitted into evidence and shown the
jury. Thus, under the defense’s reading of the case law, the Government has failed to present
sufficient evident of the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the cocaine base in the
bedroom, which was occupied by multiple people, to sustain a conviction based on a theory of
constructive possession.
The Government has also failed to present evidence that the defendant exercised
dominion and control over the contraband on or around February 23, 2008. As with its case
establishing knowledge, the Government’s claim that the defendant exercised dominion and
control over the contraband rests exclusively on its belief that the defendant occupied the
bedroom in apartment #2. The Government has not presented evidence of any “action, … word,
or … conduct that links the [defendant] to the [cocaine base] and indicates that he had some
stake in [it], some power over [it].” See Thorne, 997 F.2d at 1510. By comparison, the defense
presented photographic evidence of Jerome White exercising dominion and control over what
appears to be the Government’s main pieces of evidence approximately forty-eight hours prior to
Case 1:08-cr-00065-PLF Document 35 Filed 09/26/08 Page 10 of 10
their seizure. Irrespective of the weight the Court grants the defense’s photos of Jerome White,
the defense’s review of the case law detailed above strongly suggests that mere residency or
occupancy of the area in which the contraband was found is insufficient to establish dominion or
control in a constructive possession case involving multiple occupants for the same reasons as it
is insufficient to establish knowledge in such a case. Consequently, this Court should grant the
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated herein, the defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant
Respectfully Submitted,
_______________________