Macadangdang vs CA

GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang

were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. 
They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City.  Through hard
work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising,
trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. 
Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. 
Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left
for Cebu for good.  When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs
of her estranged husband.  She then decided to take the initial action.  In April 1971, she
instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has
effect on the legal separation.

HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal
separation.  When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete
after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects,
such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal
property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects
of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of
whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article
106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the
decree of legal separation.  These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an
inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG v. CA, GR No. L-49542, 1980-09-12
Facts:
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband
being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for Respondent
[p. 198, rec.]).  She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
sometime in March,... 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in CC No. 109).  She also alleges
that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1972).  On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she
gave birth to a baby boy... who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites
held on December 24, 1967 (Annex "A", List of Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a
complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX.  This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
263 (p. 1,... ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint. 
The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and
authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA)
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint. 
The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and
authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision (p. 47, rec.) and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of
Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
Issues:
The issues boil down to:
Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the
spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without
giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
Ruling:
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in
mind:
"Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation
of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
"Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred
and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
"This physical impossibility may be caused:
"(1) By the impotence of the husband;
"(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
"(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
"Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to
the resolution of the status of the child Rolando.  What should really matter is the fact
that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded
the birth of the... aforenamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented
to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse.
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty [180] days... following the
celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation
between aforenamed spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact
between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of
petitioner since, from all indications, he came out as a normal, full-term baby.
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. 
This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of... the child.  This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and
may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence -- the physical impossibility of access
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth
of the child.  This physical... impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
Impotence of the husband;
Living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and
Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception.  Hence, proof of the physical
impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption
(Tolentino,... Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 513 citing
Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child.  Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal... access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to
the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be
taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic
Relations, pp. 340-341).
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and
purposes of either parent, nor merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual
intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife became
pregnant.  Thus, where... the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the
child was still presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158, 191 N.E. 100).
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife.  He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that... infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved
(Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua, Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only
to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised only by
him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit
brought... for the purpose (La -- Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's
Succ. 10 So. 872, 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; underlining supplied).
Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in
wedlock were held to be admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that they
are inadmissible to bastardize the child, regardless of statutory provisions obviating
incompetency on the... ground of interest, or the fact that the conception was ante-
nuptial.  The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public policy (Wallace
vs. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527, 14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544, 126 Am. St. Rep. 253, 15
Ann. Cas. 761, Am. Jur.
26).
This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her son
Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the
responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband,
her illicit lover and above all -- her own son.  For this Court to allow, much less consent
to, the... bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching
consequences on society.  This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who
would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born
during such immoral... relations by using them to collect from such moneyed
paramours.  This would be the vilest form of wrecking the stability of two families. 
This would be a severe assault on morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the
circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence, the child is
thus given the benefit of legitimacy.
Principles:
specific
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974]), this Court restated
that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on
the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation,... surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the... admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts
set forth in the... petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals 
is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record
[Pioneer Insurance... and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974;
Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company
of the Philippines, L-22533, 19 SCRA 289 (1967); italics supplied].
"Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the
child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as
set forth in article 255, the child is prima  facie presumed to be illegitimate if it... appears
highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband.  For the
purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.
It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the... sacraments on
the dates therein specified -- but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made
therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is
presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. 
First, in a fit of... anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made
this declaration (Powell vs. State, 95 N.E., 660).  Second, the article is established as a
guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the
passions of their... parents.

Digests created by other users

G.R. No. L-38287 October 23, 1981

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS;

HONORABLE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, Sala 1, Tagum, Davao del
Norte; FILOMENA GAVIANA, MACADANGDANG; and ROLANDO
RAMA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, J.:

This petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order presents for review the Court of Appeal's resolution dated December
21, 1973, which dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. No. Sp-02656-R, petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the said resolution having been denied on January 29,
1974.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

From the records, it appears that respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang

(hereinafter referred to as private respondent) and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
contracted marriage in 1946 after having lived together for two years. From a humble
buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation in Davao City, the spouses moved to
Mawab Davao del Norte where, through hard work and good fortune, their small
business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and
corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate and others. They were blessed with six
children, three of whom were already of majority age and the other three were still
minors as of the time this case was initiated in the lower court. With their established
businesses and accumulated wealth, their once simple life became complicated and
their relationship started to suffer setbacks. While the economic or material aspect of
their marriage was stabilized the physical and spiritual aspects became shaky. Both
accused each other of indulging in extramarital relations. Married life for them became
so intolerable that they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for
good. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her
estranged husband. Then and there, she decided to take the initial
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On April 28, 1971, private respondent (plaintiff therein) instituted a complaint for legal
separation in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI I I at Tagum, Davao, which
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 109 and entitled "Filomena Gaviana
Macadangdang vs. Antonio Macadangdang" [P. 156,
rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner (then defendant) filed his answer with counterclaim dated May 31, 1971 [p.
158, rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 9, 1972, private respondent filed a petition for appointment of

administrator, to administer the estate of the conjugal partnership pending the
termination of the case [p. 100, rec.].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid petition in a pleading dated February 21, 1972 [P. 102,
rec] chanrobles virtual law library
On January 4, 1973, the petition for appointment of administrator not having been acted
upon, the trial court handed down its decision, the dispositive portion of which states
thus: chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the legal separation of plaintiff and
the defendant, or what under the old law was separation from bed and board - a mensa
et thoro  - with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal community of property. Since there is no complete list of the
community property which has to be divided, pending the dissolution of the conjugal
property, the defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff P10,000.00 for her support, for any
way he had been disposing some of the properties or mortgaging them without sharing
the plaintiff any part of the fruits or proceeds thereof until the court can appoint an
administrator, as prayed for by plaintiff in a separate petition, who will take over the
administration and management of all the conjugal partnership properties, and act as
guardian of the minor children; to protect said properties from dissipation, and who
will submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just
division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision. ... [pp. 104-115, rec.].

On August 7, 1973, private respondent filed a motion praying that she be allowed to
withdraw P10,000.00 from the lease rental of a portion of their conjugal property
deposited by Francisco Dizon [p. 116, rec.].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Respondent Judge acted on the aforesaid motion by issuing the order of August 13,
1973 which directed the clerk of court "to deliver, under receipt, to plaintiff Filomena
Gaviana Macadangdang and/or to her counsel, Atty. Marcial Fernandez, the amount of
P10,000.00" [p. 118, rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 25, 1973, private respondent filed another motion for the appointment of an
administrator, reiterating her previous petition and urging favorable action thereon "to
impede unlawful sequestration of some conjugal assets and clandestine transfers" by
petitioner [p. 120, rec.]. Petitioner again filed his opposition dated September 6, 1973 [p.
122, rec.].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 20, 1973, respondent Judge issued an order directing plaintiff's counsel
"to submit three (3) names for appointment as administrator, including in the list, if
possible, a banking institution authorized to handle cases of administration of
properties, furnishing a copy of said list to defendant, who shag be given three (3) days
from receipt thereof to present his observations and objections to said recommended
persons or entity, after which the Court will select the administrator as may seem best
suited for the purpose" [pp. 126-127, rec] chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration dated October 3, 1973 of the order of
September 20, 1973 with prayer that he be allowed to continue administering the
conjugal properties in accordance with law [p. 128, rec.]. This motion for
reconsideration was denied in the order of October 13, 1973 [p. 133,
rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On October 13, 1973, herein private respondent filed a motion for appointment of
administrator and submission of complete fist of conjugal assets by defendant,
submitting therein three nominees for administrator [p. 135,
rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On October 23, 1973, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration praying
therein that the orders of September 20, 1973 and October 13, 1973 be reconsidered by
not proceeding with the appointment of an administrator of the conjugal properties of
the parties [p. 137, rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration in his order
of November 19, 1973, reiterating therein his ruling that the decree of legal separation
had become final [p. 141, rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
filed on December 18, 1973. Said petition sought to review, set aside and declare null
and void the orders of September 20, 1973, October 13, 1973 and November 19, 1973 of
respondent Judge; to prohibit respondent Judge from carrying out and executing the
aforecited orders; and to prohibit him from treating, regarding and construing his
decision of January 4, 1973 as being "final and executory" as well as from enforcing the
same in any manner whatsoever [pp. 1, 4, & 5, CA
rec.].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court of Appeals, in its resolution of December 21, 1973, ruled that the questioned
January 4, 1973 decision of the lower court had become final and, consequently, the
appointment of an administrator was valid and that the petition was not sufficient in
substance, since the applicable law and jurisprudence afford the petitioner no valid
cause to impugn the three questioned orders. The appellate court accordingly dismissed
the petition [pp. 70-80, rec].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, this appeal from the resolution of December 21,

1973.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 6, 1980, counsel for petitioner, through a notice of death and motion to
dismiss, informed this Court that petitioner Antonio Macadangdang died on November
30, 1979 and as a consequence thereof, this case and Civil Case No. 109 of the Court of
First Instance of Davao have become moot and academic [p. 516,
rec.].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent, when required to comment on the aforesaid motion, moved for a
resolution of this case although she believes that petitioner's death has posed new
intervening circumstances that would affect the entire purpose in filing the same. In
effect, private respondent agrees with petitioner's counsel that her husband's death has
rendered the instant petition moot and academic [pp. 522, 524,
rec.].chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner had averred that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that
respondent Judge's incomplete decision of January 4, 1973 had become final and
executory and that the same Court committed an error in holding that the appointment
of an administrator in the case below was proper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Private respondent, upon the other hand, has always maintained that - chanrobles
virtual law library

1. the decision of January 4, 1973 had become final and executory when the petitioner
failed to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period of 30 days from receipt
thereof, despite the non-issuance of a supplemental decision regarding the division of
the conjugal properties; and chanrobles virtual law library

2. the appointment of an administrator pending the actual division of said properties is

proper being a must and an exercise of the sound discretion of the Honorable Presiding
Judge in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VIII in Tagum [pp. 193-194, rec].

Did petitioner's death on November 30, 1979 render the case moot and academic? Legal
problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies; the same problems may
come up again in another case of similar magnitude. Considering also the far-reaching
significance and implications of a pronouncement on the very important issues
involved, this Court feels bound to meet said issues frontally and come out with a
decisive resolution of the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Thus, the questions for resolution have been narrowed down to the
following: chanrobles virtual law library

1. Whether the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973 in Civil Case No. 109
finding herein petitioner guilty of concubinage and decreeing legal separation between
him and his wife Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang (private respondent herein) had
already become final and executory long before the herein petition was filed; chanrobles
virtual law library

2. Should the children of both spouses predecease the surviving spouse, whether the
intestate heirs of the deceased could inherit from the innocent surviving spouse,
particularly where the latter's share in the conjugal assets is concerned, in view of
Article 106, No. 4 of the New Civil Code; and chanrobles virtual law library
3. The effect of the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 134 in the Court of First
Instance of Davao for the settlement of the estate of the deceased petitioner herein, on
the decision in Civil Case No. 109 as well as on the instant petition.

In support of his contention that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in holding
that respondent Judge's incomplete decision of January 4, 1973 had become final and
executory, petitioner had consistently asserted the following reasons: chanrobles virtual
law library

1. Private respondent's complaint for legal separation and division of properties was a
single complaint. Thus, she explicitly prayed: chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

3. That upon trial of this action judgment be rendered ordering the legal separation of
the plaintiff and the defendant and the division of all the assets of the conjugal
partnership, ... [p. 157, rec)

In this single action, private respondent asked the trial court to decide if petitioner and
she should be legally separated, and if they should, what properties would form part of
the conjugal regime and which properties would be assigned to each
spouse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Of the aforesaid issues, the lower court resolved only the issue of legal separation and
reserved for supplemental decision the division of the conjugal properties. Petitioner
had further argued that - chanrobles virtual law library

Inasmuch as the Decision failed to dispose of all the issues before the Court, which
necessitated the announcement of a forthcoming supplemental decision, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Decision was an incomplete judgment. In Santos v. de
Guzman, 1 SCRA 1048, is found this very succinct explanation of what an incomplete
judgment is: chanrobles virtual law library

... There was but one case before the lower court. Its first decision (of June 12, 1956) was,
as already stated, incomplete the same not having resolved the issues involved in the
litigation.  For this reason the trial had to be reopened and a supplemental decision had
to be rendered ... (at p. 1053; emphasis supplied).

WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute
community of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
Article 106 of the Civil Code thus reads: chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: chanrobles
virtual law library

1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed; chanrobles virtual law library

2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

[emphasis supplied].

The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property
regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution
and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the
decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of,
the judgment decreeing legal separation-for the purpose of determining the share of
each spouse in the conjugal assets.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Even American courts have made definite pronouncements on the aforestated legal
effect of a divorce (legal separation) decree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Generally speaking, the purpose of a decree in divorce insofar as the disposition of

property is concerned is to fix and make certain the property rights and interests of the
parties (Mich-Westgate vs. Westgate, 288 N.W. 860, 291 Mich. 18, 300 [1] p. 354, C.J.S.
Vol. 27B); and it has been held that the provisions of the decree should definitely and finally
determine the property rights and interests of the parties (Wash.-Shaffer vs. Shaffer, 262 P.
2d. 763, 43 Wash. 2d 629; 300 [11 p. 354 C.J.S. Vol. 27B); and that any attempted reservation
of such questions for future determination is improper and error  (Mich.-Karwowski vs.
Karwowski, 20 N.W. 2d 851, 313 Mich. 167, 300 11] p. 354, C.J.S., Vol. 27B; emphasis
supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Some statutes providing for the division or disposition of the property of the parties to a
divorce have been held mandatory and hence to require the court to decree some
division of their property rights (U.S.-Pearce vs. CIR, 62 S. Ct. 154, 315 U.S. 543, 86 L. ed.
1016, construing Texas statute; 291 [1] p. 263 C.J.S. Vol.
27B).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Likewise, it has been held that the settlement of some pro-property rights between the
parties is an incident of every decree of divorce where there is any property involved
(Utah-Smith vs. Smith, 291 P. 298, 77 Utah 60, 291 [1] p. 264, C.J.S., Vol.
27B).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It has been held that notwithstanding the division of property between the parties, the
subject matter of a divorce action remains the marital status of the parties, the settlement
of the property rights being merely incidental (Wash.-State ex rel. Atkins vs. Superior Court
of King Country, 97 P. 2d. 139, 1 Wash. 2d 677; 291 [1] p. 264 C.J.S., Vol. 27B; emphasis
supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under other authorities, by the very nature of the litigation, all property rights growing
out of marital relations are settled and included in divorce proceedings (Ind.-Novak vs.
Novak, 133 N.E. 2d 578, 126 Ind. App. 428) and a decree of divorce is an adjudication of
all property rights connected with the marriage and precludes the parties as to all
matters which might have been legitimately proved in support of charges or defenses in
the action (U.S.-Spreckles vs. Wakefield, C.C.A. 286 F. 465) and bars any action
thereafter brought by either party to determine the question of property rights (Fla.-
Cooper vs. Cooper, 69 So. 2d 881; Finston vs. Finston, 37 So. 2d 423,160 Fla. 935; p. 751,
C.J.S. Vol. 27A).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An absolute divorce ordinarily terminates all property rights and interests, not actually
vested, of divorced persons in property of each other, which are dependent on the
marriage (U.S.-Cockrill vs. Woodson, D.C. Mo., 70 F. 752), at least where no
proceedings have been taken to vacate or modify the decree by appeal until the
statutory time therefor has expired (Kan.-Roberts vs. Fagan 92 P. 559, 76 Kan. 536).
Accordingly, unless the court granting the decree is without jurisdiction, inchoate rights
of the wife in the husband's property are usually cut off (Ky-Bowling vs. Little, 206 S.W.
1, 182 Ky 86) especially where by the terms of the decree all property obtained by either
spouse from or through the other during the marriage is restored to such spouse (Tex.
Houston, etc., R. Co. vs. Helm, Civ. App. 93 S.W. 697; pp. 752-753, C.J.S. Vol.
27A).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Enunciating with directness and finality, one U.S. court held: "The part of a divorce suit
regarding property is a part of the very divorce action itself" (Tex.-Ex parte Scott 123
S.W. 2d. 306, 313, 133 Tex. 1, answers to certified questions conformed to, Civ. App. 126,
S.W. 2d 525; 291 [1] p. 264, C.J.S. Vol. 27B).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Petitioner erred in invoking the case of Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga which in
turn cited the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, which We have already declared
abrogated in the case of Miranda vs. Court of Appeals (L-33007, 71 SCRA 295, [June 18,
1976]). In this case, this Court explicitly stated: chanrobles virtual law library

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the court declares as abandoned the doctrine of
Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and adopts the opposite rule that judgments for recovery
with accounting are final and appealable (without need of awaiting the accounting) and
would become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period.

In resolving the question of whether or not the judgment directing an accounting in an

action for recovery of properties is final and appealable, this Court further
explained: chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment "directing an accounting is appealable, regardless of whether the

accounting is the principal relief sought or a mere incident or consequence of the
judgment which grants recovery and delivery of absconded properties as the principal
relief and expressly provides that"a judgment or order directing an accounting in an
action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

If a judgment which directs solely an accounting is appealable notwithstanding that it

"does not finally dispose of the action and the accounting has yet to be rendered to
complete the relief sought," much more so is a judgment which orders accounting as a
mere incident appealable, because the judgment which orders the delivery of properties
does finally dispose of the action on its merits, chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

Imperative and controlling considerations of public policy and of sound practice in the

courts to achieve the desideratum of just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action militate against such a novel and unprecedented  situation where a judgment on
the merits for recovery of properties would be left dangling and would be considered as
"interlocutory" and subject to revision and alteration at will for as long as
the accounting ordered as a mere incident and logical consequence has not been
rendered and acted upon by the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now
declare as is clearly indicated from the compelling reasons and considerations herein-
above stated:- that the court considers the better rule to be that stated in H.E. Heacock
Co. vs. American Trading Co. (53 Phil. 481 [19291, to wit, that where the primary
purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who between plaintiff and defendant is
the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property, "the
judgment ... rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits  as to those
questions, and (that) the order of the court for an accounting was based upon and
is incidental to the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment ... (is)
a final  judgment ... ; that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the
judgment; that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgment as
rendered ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

-that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which expressly
reversed the Heacock case and a line of similar decisions (Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934;
Villanueva vs. Capistrano; Prophylactic Brush Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
46254, Nov. 23, 1938 [Unpublished) and ruled that such a decision for recovery of
property with accounting 'is not final but merely interlocutory and therefore not
appealable and subsequent cases Adhering to the same Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1
SCRA 1188) must be now in turn abandoned and set
aside.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and

of sound practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified,
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action can for considering such
judgments for recovery of property with accounting as final  judgments which are duly
appealable (and would therefore become final and executory if not appealed within the
reglementary period)  with the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be
rendered during the course of the appeal as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be
implemented at the execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of the judgment (as
in Court of Industrial Relations unfair labor practice cases ordering reinstatement of the
worker with accounting, computation and payment of his backwages less earnings
elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in Fuentebella for the
contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from throwing the door open
to multiplicity of appeals in a single case is of lesser import and consequence".

Considering the aforestated well-established jurisprudence on the matter, the clear

mandate of Article 106 of the Civil Code and the aforequoted ruling in the Miranda
case, the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973 decreeing the legal separation
between then spouses Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang
had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal property in a
"supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing the spouses' legal
separation as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final
disposition of their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by reason of the
final decree, had been automatically dissolved. The law (Articles 106, 107 and 176 of the
Civil Code) clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the
conjugal property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was declared the guilty
spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected,
poses a new problem which can be resolved simply by the application of the rules on
intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains
under the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4,
1973 when the decree of legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation and
distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal
separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of
whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure
involves details which properly pertain to the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the
liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession in Special Proceedings No.
134.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, THIS PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST

PETITIONER'S ESTATE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur