Journal of European Public Policy 13:6 September 2006: 795– 814

The EU and the new trade politics

Alasdair R. Young and John Peterson

ABSTRACT Over the past twenty years trade politics within the European Union
(EU) have changed in three ways. First, the concerns of traditional trade actors have
shifted to more ‘behind-the-border’ issues, especially regulation and investment.
Second, new actors – parliaments, non-trade agencies, and non-governmental
organizations – have become more engaged. Third, the leadership of the EU (and
the United States) has been challenged by influential developing countries. The
EU has responded to the new trade politics by advocating a ‘deep’ trade agenda:
seeking multilateral agreements on the making of domestic rules. This response
reflects the EU’s own experience of market integration. Where the new trade politics
have affected EU policy it has been through changing views about the purposes and
priority of trade policy at the highest political levels, rather than more directly via
interest group lobbying. While the EU has been unsuccessful in promoting its
agenda within the World Trade Organization, it is pursuing it through other
forums where its influence is greater.
KEY WORDS Deep trade agenda; European Union; trade policy; World Trade
Organization.

Over the past twenty years, and particularly during the last ten, the nature of
international trade has changed in terms of both content and process. The
multilateral trade agenda has broadened, particularly to embrace ‘behind-the-
border’ policies that affect trade, and has begun to address regulatory differences
that obstruct trade. Meanwhile, the international trading system has become
more complex and legalistic. These developments have been prompted partly
by the changing nature of international economic exchange and new concerns
on the part of business interests that have traditionally been engaged in trade
politics. The intrusion of the multilateral trade agenda behind borders and its
increasing legalization have galvanized a range of domestic actors new to
trade politics, including parliaments, non-trade ministries, and a diverse array
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). At the same time, developing
country governments have become more actively engaged in trade diplomacy
Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2006 Taylor & Francis
http:==www.tandf.co.uk=journals
DOI: 10.1080=13501760600837104
796 Journal of European Public Policy
in response to both the more intrusive nature of the multilateral trading system
and their greater participation in international trade. They have shown them-
selves capable of collective action to the point that a multipolar balance of
power has emerged in international trade diplomacy. More generally, while
trade policy has become more technical, the significance of those decisions for
domestic rules has meant that it has become less technocratic. All of this adds
up to a ‘new trade politics’.
The rise of the new trade politics has not been unique to the European Union
(EU). Yet, the EU’s response to them appears to be distinctive. Since the
Uruguay Round the EU has been the most aggressive and persistent advocate
of a broader international trade agenda and the strongest proponent for devel-
oping common multilateral disciplines on the making of domestic rules – what
might be termed a ‘deep’ trade agenda – in areas including competition policy,
environmental standards, labour rights and investment rules. Arguably, the EU
has responded more quickly and energetically than any other major trading
power to the new domestic politics of international trade, if not to the new inter-
national balance of power.
This volume brings together European and American experts on EU trade
policy to examine how the Union is contributing and responding to the new
trade politics. This contribution provides our own overview of the changing
nature of trade and trade politics and the EU’s distinctive response to them.
We argue that the EU’s distinctive trade policy is only partially a response to
the new trade politics and even then not in the way implicitly assumed in the
literature. More precisely, the EU’s own experience of market integration under-
pins its external trade policy. Where the new trade politics have had a tangible
impact on European economic diplomacy it has not been through the direct
engagement of new interest groups – consumer, environmental and development
NGOs – in lobbying trade officials, but rather through a more general shift at the
highest political level in views on the purpose and priorities of trade policy.

THE EU IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The EU’s penetration of the global economy is important for three reasons.
First, it gives the Union a significant stake in its governance. Second, the size
of the EU’s economy and its share of global imports mean that its policies
have important implications for its trading and investment partners. Third,
because its economy is important to other actors, the EU seeks to wield influ-
ence by making access to its large and valuable market conditional on domestic
policy changes elsewhere (what Meunier and Nicolaı̈dis (2006), in this volume,
call ‘power through trade’) or on trade concessions (‘power to trade’).
The EU is the world’s second largest economy, only slightly smaller than the
US in purchasing power parity terms, and slightly larger at official exchange
rates. The EU is the world’s largest merchandise exporter, accounting for
nearly one-fifth of world trade, as well as its largest services exporter, accounting
for over a quarter of world trade. It is the world’s largest importer of commercial
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 797
services and second only to the US as an importer of goods. The EU is also a
major home to and source of foreign direct investment (FDI).
The EU’s economic importance has increased substantially since the early
1980s. Its membership has increased from nine to twenty-five member states
(and counting). Although many of its new member states are small and/or rela-
tively poor, the overall impact has been that the Union’s trade rules govern
access to a much larger market. In addition to embracing more states, the coher-
ence of the EU’s market has been greatly increased by the single market pro-
gramme since its launch in 1985. In considerable measure, as Holmes (2006)
argues in this volume, the EU has succeeded in its goal of going beyond the
customs union on which it was founded to remove regulatory barriers to
trade in goods and services (see also Young 2005a). As a consequence, access
to the EU’s market for goods and services is now affected by a plethora of
common European rules, thus enhancing the EU’s economic importance.
These EU-specific changes, however, have taken place during a period in
which trade politics more generally have been ‘reconfigured’ (Hocking 2004b:
263), with effects that have been felt well beyond Europe.

THE NEW TRADE POLITICS

Beginning in the run-up to the Uruguay Round (1986– 94) of multilateral trade
negotiations and accelerating since, the nature of trade politics has changed in
three distinct ways. First, the preferences of those actors that have traditionally
been actively engaged in trade policy-making within the advanced developed
countries have changed. Second, again particularly within advanced developed
countries, a variety of actors that had not previously been interested in trade
policy – parliaments, non-trade ministries and NGOs – have become con-
cerned about the implications of trade and trade rules. Third, there has been
a shift in the international balance of power as developing country governments
have become more prominent actors in multilateral trade negotiations, challen-
ging the EU– US duopoly.
These developments are distinct, but interrelated. In particular, the changed
concerns of the traditional trade actors led to the pursuit of the deep trade
agenda and the greater legalization of the multilateral trading system. Those
developments in turn contributed significantly to the mobilization both of
developed country NGOs and developing country governments. Together
these developments, explored below, imply a major change to how trade
policy is made and pursued.

New trade politics 1: Traditional actors, new concerns

Traditionally, trade policy-making has been largely insulated from politics.
Often, decision-making was intentionally taken out of the hands of politicians
and delegated to officials (Evans 2003; Hocking 2004b). Only a few govern-
ment officials and relatively few economic interests, firms and to a lesser
798 Journal of European Public Policy
extent trade unions, were involved in the policy-making process. These actors
are still central to trade policy-making. But their concerns and preferences
have changed over the past twenty years or so.
To a significant extent, this shift has been in response to changes in inter-
national economic exchange. First, all forms of international economic exchange
have expanded rapidly, particularly since 1985 (see Figure 1). Second, inter-
national economic exchange has become more diverse, as FDI and trade in ser-
vices have increased rapidly in the wake of governments unilaterally easing
restrictions.
Significantly, domestic rules are the key obstacles to both FDI and trade in
services. Consequently, as these forms of economic exchange have increased
in importance so has the attention given to ‘behind-the-border’ measures. In
effect, efforts to liberalize FDI and trade in services must, by nature, seek to
discipline national rules. Moreover, in part as a result of the success of pre-
vious rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in reducing tariffs and
quotas, national rules (at least of the advanced developed countries) have
emerged as the most significant barriers to trade in goods as well (OECD
2000; USTR 2001; World Bank 2000). In addition, as domestic trade barriers
have fallen in the advanced industrial economies, concern has increased about
‘unfair’ competition from abroad (McGuire 2004). Firms and trade unions
have thus advocated international rules to curb domestic subsidies and to
export costly environmental regulations and labour rights (Gilpin 2001).
Thus, for a variety of reasons, traditional trade actors began to push for multi-
lateral disciplines on the adverse consequences of differences in domestic rules
for international economic exchange (Dymond and Hart 2000; Hocking
2004a).
Domestic rules usually affect trade only as a side-effect of realizing some other
public policy objective. As such, they cannot simply be eased or removed as
part of the process of trade negotiations, as tariffs and quotas can via so-called
‘negative integration’. Rather, ways must be found to address the adverse
trade effects of domestic rules. At the multilateral level this has taken the
form of agreeing disciplines, usually procedural, on domestic rules. We call
such efforts the ‘deep trade agenda’. The term borrows from the notion of
‘deeper’ integration (Lawrence 1996: 17– 18), which captures international
(usually regional) attempts to address the obstacles that different national
rules pose to international economic exchange. It is similar to Dymond and
Hart’s (2000) ‘post-modern’ trade agenda, which, while intended to capture
the concept of the ‘post-modern’ state (Cooper 1996; Sørensen 2001), is
prone to confusion with the philosophical concept of ‘post-modernism’. The
‘deep trade agenda’ also recalls John Pinder’s (1968) ‘positive integration’,
but rather than stressing the adoption of common rules, it acknowledges press-
ures to agree common disciplines on national rules, and it avoids any normative
connotation. In addition, we should note that this agenda is about much more
than trade, at least as commonly understood. This new agenda concerns FDI
and the movement of people, as well as how traded goods are produced.
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 799

Figure 1 Increasing international economic exchange

Sources: FDI outflows www.unctad.org/fdistats; exports: WTO statistics database
http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language¼

This agenda is, however, addressed in the context of multilateral trade nego-
tiations. We, therefore, keep the word trade.
As Holmes (2006) makes clear in this volume, the deep trade agenda really
emerged during the 1980s. Efforts to address the implications of domestic
rules for international trade were at the heart of the EU’s single European
market programme. At the multilateral level the deep trade agenda is part of
what made the Uruguay Round markedly different from those that came
before. It was most evident in the agreements on Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs), Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, but also in the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) (Dymond and Hart 2000).1 The failed attempt to
negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) (1995– 98) in the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) sought
to take the deep trade agenda still further.
As the contributions by De Bièvre (2006) and Shaffer (2006) concur, the
Uruguay Round (and the MAI) also represented a marked increase in the legaliza-
tion of trade policy (see also Abbott and Snidal 2000; Keohane et al. 2000). The
extent of obligatory rules became greater, more precise disciplines were agreed and
the dispute resolution process was strengthened. Bolstering the rule-based system
was in part an attempt to curb US unilateralism (Goldstein 2000). But it was also
a response to the increased focus on ‘behind-the-border’ measures.
In particular, the issue of compliance becomes much more difficult to assess
because the question is whether general disciplines are violated in a particular
instance. Such questions tend to be more readily resolved by third-party adju-
dication than through direct diplomacy (Majone 1996). As a result of the
strengthening of dispute resolution during the Uruguay Round, domestic
rules can be (and are) found to be incompatible with multilateral trade rules
and the failure of a government to modify the offending measure can (and
800 Journal of European Public Policy
has) result in the imposition of trade sanctions. Legalization, therefore, has the
effect of increasing the certainty and hence the economic value of others’ com-
mitments, albeit at the cost of greater restrictions on one’s own policy autonomy
(Goldstein and Martin 2000; Smith 2000).
The intrusion of multilateral trade rules into domestic policy and the
increased legalization of international trade agreements have, therefore,
imposed international constraints on the policy autonomy of states. Thus
trade diplomacy has become even more complex and technical, even as its pol-
itical implications have become more profound. In fact, a number of our con-
tributors note the reluctance of governments other than the EU to undertake
new commitments in a variety of sectors – including services and competition
policy – for fear of the implications.

New trade politics 2: New actors, new concerns

The deep trade agenda and the increased legalization of trade diplomacy have
thus generated significant concerns among a number of groups that had not pre-
viously been engaged in trade politics (see Cunningham et al. 2000; Destler
2005; Williams 2005). More profoundly, the shift in the trade agenda’s focus
to ‘behind-the-border’ issues has transformed the domestic politics of trade
by altering the distribution of costs and benefits from trade liberalization
(Dymond and Hart 2000; Evans 2003). When the focus was on at-the-
border measures, trade liberalization hurt the few (the protected producers)
and benefited the many (consumers and user industries). When national rules
are the focus of liberalization, however, the distribution of costs is quite
different: the benefits of cheaper products compete with benefits from measures
adopted to achieve desired public policy objectives, such as reducing consumer
risk or containing environmental damage.
Such uncomfortable trade-offs were brought home by several high profile
clashes between multilateral trade rules and domestic regulations.2 The first
such development was the 1991 ruling by a General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) panel that the US’s ban on imports of tuna caught using
dolphin-unfriendly methods contravened GATT rules. Although the panel
ruling was not formally adopted, it greatly alarmed environmental groups in
advanced developed countries (Esty 1994; Shrybman 1999; Williams 2005).
Several dispute settlement rulings against environmental measures shortly
after the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established – most notably
the rulings on reformulated gasoline (1996)3 and the (so-called) shrimp-turtle
case (1998)4 – and against the EU’s ban on hormone-treated beef (1998)5
reinforced these concerns.
In addition, there were concerns that the TRIPs Agreement would inhibit
developing countries’ efforts to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. These
worries were fuelled by the US decision to initiate a WTO complaint against
Brazil’s 1997 industrial property law in May 2000 and a domestic suit
by forty-one drug companies against South Africa’s Medicines and Related
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 801
Substances Control Amendment Act in March 2001. Although both legal
actions were subsequently abandoned, they reinforced the view that trade
rules privileged commerce above all other concerns, including development
and public health. These trade disputes, therefore, galvanized consumer,
environmental and development NGOs, which saw trade rules as a threat to
their policy objectives (Scholte 2004; Walter 2001).
The new trade rules were not the only catalyst to the mobilization non-
traditional trade actors, and NGOs were not the only new actors to be
mobilized. The changing nature of international economic exchange, especially
the sharp increase in FDI, provoked two distinct but related politically salient
concerns. The first is that if firms can relocate freely anywhere in the world it
is easy for them to evade the rules (and taxes) of any one state. The second is
that in their efforts to attract ‘foot-loose’ FDI governments might compete
with each other by offering lower taxes or easing environmental or labour regu-
lations. States would thus engage in a ‘race to the bottom’. Evidence that such a
race is occurring, at least with respect to regulation, is weak at best (Vogel and
Kagan 2002). However, whether governments are actually competing for invest-
ment in this way matters less than whether they are believed to be (Hay and
Rosamond 2002). As a consequence, there have been calls for common rules
on investment to clarify the responsibilities of investors. The proposed MAI,
which was perceived to strengthen further FDI at the expense of state power,
spurred these concerns. Thus, rising levels of FDI have contributed to the
mobilization of environmental and developmental NGOs and their growing
involvement in trade politics (Walter 2001; WDM 1997).
Legislators too have been spurred. The fevered reaction of the US Congress in
early 2006 to the sale of American ports to a consortium controlled by the
United Arab Emirates, and the concern of the European Parliament’s Inter-
national Trade Committee with the nexus between FDI and development are
clear cases in point.6 Ministries and regulatory agencies which previously were
mostly unconcerned with trade policy, including those responsible for compe-
tition, environmental and consumer policy, have also become much more
engaged on trade policy. Foreign ministries, which naturally are conscious of
how the EU and others wield what Meunier and Nicolaı̈dis (2006) call
‘power through trade’, have perhaps become particularly sensitized to trade
policy developments.
Once mobilized over trade policy, these new trade actors often become proac-
tive, seeing trade rules not only as a threat to their policy objectives, but also as a
possible tool for realizing them. Thus, as trade has intruded further into the
domestic politics of developed states, so too have their domestic politics increas-
ingly intruded into trade policy (Cable 1996). This intersection occurs in two
ways. The first is that trade itself may be perceived to be the product of activities
that are held to contravene universal standards of behaviour, such as by invol-
ving child labour or being produced in ways that damage the environment.
The second is that trade is perceived as a lever for encouraging desirable or
punishing undesirable behaviour through preferences or sanctions, respectively
802 Journal of European Public Policy
(see Youngs 2001). Thus the engagement of new actors in trade policy has
created additional pressure for the further expansion of the deep trade agenda.

New trade politics 3: The new international balance of power

Even as the domestic politics of trade have been reconfigured in the advanced
developed countries, the international politics of trade have been transformed
by the increasing assertiveness and influence of developing countries within
the WTO. The early signs of this transformation were visible during the
Uruguay Round when Brazil and India, in particular, left their mark by insisting
that liberalization under the GATS would occur only where specified by a gov-
ernment (‘positive-list’ approach), rather than everywhere except where specified
by a government (‘negative-list’ approach) (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001). The
extent of the transformation became clear at the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial
when the developing countries refused to launch a new round. As Baldwin
(2006) explains in this volume, it was to address their concerns that the trade
round launched in 2001 in Doha was given a development focus (see also
Narlikar 2004; Wilkinson 2005).
The increased assertiveness of developing countries in multilateral trade
negotiations has several sources. Some of these were the same as those that
engaged new actors in trade policy – especially NGOs in developed countries –
such as the greater intrusion of multilateral rules into domestic politics and the
introduction of binding dispute settlement. These developments had particular
relevance for developing countries because of the shift in the Uruguay Round
from the use of voluntary, plurilateral agreements to address ‘behind-the-
border’ measures to a single undertaking binding on all (Narlikar 2004).
In addition, many developing country governments felt that the Uruguay
Round was a bad deal for them (Baldwin 2006; Narlikar 2004). They had
accepted new disciplines on investment measures (the TRIMs Agreement)
and new obligations to protect intellectual property rights (TRIPs) in exchange
for greater access to developed countries’ agricultural and clothing and textile
markets. These new obligations proved awkward and painful to implement
and seemed to threaten the capacity of developing countries to pursue domestic
policy objectives, including addressing public health crises. In contrast, the lib-
eralization of developed country agricultural markets was extremely limited and
the liberalization of clothing and textiles was back-loaded to the end of the
implementation period (2005) (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001; Narlikar
2004). Even then, safeguard measures were used extensively to curb imports.
China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 further eroded the benefits
of clothing and textile liberalization as China’s surging exports squeezed out
other countries’ exports.
The broadening of the deep trade agenda to include environmental protec-
tion and labour standards further encouraged developing country engagement
in multilateral trade negotiations. Whatever the intentions of those in developed
countries who seek to address these issues through trade policy, to developing
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 803
countries they look like efforts to erode their competitive advantage by raising
environmental and labour costs, or excuses to exclude products. Consequently,
the extension of the deep trade agenda since the end of the Uruguay Round has
met essentially universal resistance from developing countries.
In addition, some developing countries acquired a greater stake in the multi-
lateral trading system as a result of the development of their domestic industries.
India, for example, is now an important exporter of services. Brazil is a major
agricultural exporter. As McGuire (2006) shows in his contribution to this
volume, China has become a major exporter of manufactured goods. In
addition, these and other developing countries, such as South Africa, have
become more skilled at using WTO mechanisms to defend their interests
(Said and Desai 2003).
The emergence of these developing countries has altered the balance of power
within the multilateral trading system.7 From the end of the Second World War
into the 1970s the US led the multilateral trading system. As the US economy
stagnated and European integration progressed, the EU emerged as an essen-
tially equal partner with the US in the leadership of the multilateral trading
system, as was most evident during the Uruguay Round. The subsequent emer-
gence of a potent coalition of developing countries, the G20, however, means
that although EU and US support is still necessary for progress, it is no
longer sufficient.
Beginning with the 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle, developing countries
have demonstrated co-ordinated and concerted negotiating leverage. They have
successfully held a common line against a number of the issues on the deep trade
agenda: competition policy, environmental standards, labour rights and invest-
ment rules. First at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial and then at the Ministerials in
Doha (2001) and Cancun (2003) they resisted negotiating on these issues. As a
consequence, those issues have fallen off the agenda of the Doha Round.

EU TRADE POLICY-MAKING
Strikingly, the EU has been the most vocal advocate for the inclusion of issues
that most concern developing countries in the current trade round (see Young,
forthcoming). In addition to seeking further disciplines with regard to intellec-
tual property rights and greater liberalization of services, the EU has advocated
addressing the ‘Singapore issues’ – competition policy, investment, government
procurement and trade facilitation – as well as environmental protection and
core labour standards (Table 1). It championed this agenda both in Seattle
and Doha.
While some of these issues – notably environmental protection and core
labour standards – clearly reflected the concerns of new trade actors (Falke
2005a; Hocking and Smith 1997; Woolcock 2000), most clearly do not.
Further, although a number of the other issues – competition policy, govern-
ment procurement and investment – are compatible with the new interests of
traditional trade actors, those actors were not pushing hard for their inclusion
804 Journal of European Public Policy
Table 1 The EU’s deep trade agenda

Issue Negotiating position

Competition policy Basic framework of binding core principles and rules

on domestic competition law and policy and
enforcement.
Investment Framework providing for protection of investments,
while stressing the need to ensure that the
governments of host countries can regulate the
activities of investors and noting the need to
address investors’ responsibilities.
Government Multilateral agreement providing for transparency and
procurement non-discrimination with a broad sectoral coverage.
Trade facilitation Framework of commitments on the simplification of
trade procedures, including simplification and
harmonization of data and documentation and
streamlining of customs and related border-crossing
procedures.
Environmental 1. Clarify the relationship between WTO rules and
protection trade measures taken pursuant to multilateral
environmental agreements. 2. Clarify the
relationship between WTO rules and non-product
related process and production method
requirements. 3. Examine the role of core
environmental principles, notably the precautionary
principle, in WTO rules. 4. Encourage co-operation
between WTO and relevant international bodies.
Core labour standards Enhance co-operation between the WTO and the
International Labour Organization. Encourage
positive measures for enhancing labour rights (i.e.
improved market access). Oppose sanctions-based
approaches and use of labour rights for protectionist
purposes.

Source: Council 1999.

in the round (Woolcock 2005b). Thus, the most compelling explanation for the
shape and direction of the EU’s new trade policy is its own experience as a
market integration project, and specifically four effects of its single market pro-
gramme. First, the single market programme led to common rules and
approaches to regulation that the EU wishes to protect against international dis-
ciplines (Woolcock 2005a; Young 2004). Second, the single market serves as an
example of how regulatory trade barriers might be addressed (Holmes and
Young 2001). Third, the experience of European integration has flagged the
importance of addressing private barriers to trade (competition policy; see
Damro’s (2006) article in this volume) and border procedures (trade facili-
tation). Fourth, the process of European integration has altered how the EU’s
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 805
member governments view the development of rules beyond the EU level
(Woolcock 2005a). Thus the ideas and approaches that have underpinned the
EU’s own experience of market integration inform its approach to multilateral
liberalization.
On the whole, the single market programme has been liberalizing – in some
cases enabling one member state’s rules to be accepted throughout the EU or
by replacing disparate national rules with a common regulation. Yet, in some
instances, particularly where there are important differences among the
member states, the single market programme has led to the creation of ‘regu-
latory peaks’, where common rules make access to the EU market more diffi-
cult than it was before for non-European producers (Young 2004). A particular
problem is that in reaching an internal compromise among the member gov-
ernments and with the European Parliament, there is the strong potential for
EU rules to contravene multilateral trade rules, particularly with regard to
environmental protection and food safety (Vogel 2003; Young and Holmes,
2006). Thus, the EU seeks to clarify the relationship between WTO rules
and non-product related process and production method requirements and
to examine the role of core environmental principles, especially the precaution-
ary principle (Majone 2002; Woolcock 2002). Baldwin (2006), in this collec-
tion, sees these efforts as part of the EU’s more general concern to establish
means of dealing with differences in ‘collective preferences’ (see also Lamy
2004b).
The EU also draws on its own experience of market integration to present
solutions to some of the current challenges confronting international trade lib-
eralization. This has been particularly true with respect to the regulation of
goods and services, although, as Peter Holmes (2006) argues in this issue, the
EU’s own experience has been far from unproblematic. Also writing in this
volume, De Bièvre (2006) and Damro (2006) show how the EU has also pro-
moted its market-making approach to competition policy. Within the European
Commission, the Directorate-General for Trade, especially under Commis-
sioner Pascal Lamy (1999– 2004), has been particularly keen to promote
multilateral rules in the light of EU experience (Lamy 2004a; Woolcock
2005a). Erik Jones (2006), however, argues in his contribution that this objec-
tive is imprudent, while Peter Holmes (2006) highlights in his contribution the
WTO’s limited political capacity to emulate the EU’s approach. For their part,
Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaı̈dis (2006) contend that the EU’s ‘con-
tested’ nature as a trade power undermines the legitimacy of its efforts.
The EU’s member governments, however, even when not terribly enthusias-
tic about the elaboration of multilateral rules, have been willing to give the
Commission a largely free hand because they have no reason to fear such
rules (Woolcock 2005a). Here, the fourth effect of the single market programme
is illustrated. The intrusion into national sovereignty and the liberalization and
legalization that accompanied the single market programme are far greater than
anything that might be agreed in a multilateral forum. As a consequence, new
multilateral rules, at least along EU lines, hold no fears for the Union’s
806 Journal of European Public Policy
member governments because they would not impose stricter disciplines than
they already face from European rules.
Although the impact of the single market is clearly evident in the EU’s new
trade policy, it is not the only influence upon it. This is perhaps most evident
with respect to development, on which the single market exerts no pressure.
Nonetheless, at the Doha Ministerial and subsequently, the EU pressed other
developed countries to eliminate market access barriers on all products except
weapons from the least developed countries, copying its unilateral ‘Everything
But Arms’ initiative.8 It also championed a clarification of the TRIPs Agreement
to permit WTO members to manufacture or import drugs necessary for dealing
with public health crises, such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Panagariya 2002;
Thompson 2001).
Thus, new trade actors – particularly NGOs – have had an influence on EU
trade policy, but not directly. While the literature on the new trade actors
focuses on the engagement of transnational advocacy groups (Said and Desai
2003; Scholte 2004; Walter 2001) or on NGOs lobbying national governments
(Hocking 2004a, 2004b), in the case of EU trade policy it would seem that their
impact has been indirect. This is not to say that interest groups do not actively
lobby the Commission, as well as the member states. In the wake of the failed
MAI negotiations the Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade set up a
consultative ‘Civil Society Dialogue’ (which includes producer interests) to
provide a forum for discussions with societal interests. Although this forum pro-
vides an opportunity for the actors of the new trade politics to consult with the
Commission, it does not appear to have had any discernable impact on policy
(Hocking 2004a; Woolcock 2005b).
Rather, the impact of the new trade politics has been reflected less narrowly
through lobbying and more generally in the purposes and priorities that
member governments, which are the key decision-makers, now assign to EU
trade policy. It is significant that a number of the new trade policy issues –
particularly the environment, labour standards and development – resonate
particularly strongly with European publics (Evans 2003). Certainly, a
number of social democratic member governments have picked up these and
other aspects of the new trade agenda. Post-1997 British governments under
Tony Blair particularly pushed a development agenda (Holmes 2005), even
being cautious in their support for environmental and labour standards lest
they harm developing countries’ competitiveness. The German SPD– Green
government under Gerhard Schröder (1998– 2005) also supported develop-
ment, while being a strong advocate of the deep trade agenda, including
environmental and labour standards (Falke 2005a, 2005b). Other social demo-
cratic governments have also championed environmental rules and labour stan-
dards, but in the form of human rights (Young et al. 2000). In short, as trade
policy has become a concern of far more members of European political and
administrative classes, the new trade politics has presented those at the
highest political levels with opportunities to embrace what can be presented
as a modern, progressive agenda in global politics.
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 807
The deep dimension of the EU’s agenda going into Seattle and sub-
sequently Doha reflected the context of the single market and political prefer-
ences of the member governments. Significantly, however, the concerted
opposition of developing country governments has left much of this agenda
in tatters. In the run-up to and through the Hong Kong Ministerial in
December 2005 the Doha Round negotiations were dominated by the old
trade politics, particularly tariffs on agricultural products, and to a lesser
extent manufactured goods. The services negotiations were floundering.
Almost all of the EU’s deep trade agenda had been abandoned well before
Hong Kong; labour standards and most of the environment agenda were
discarded in Doha; rules on competition policy, investment and public pro-
curement were surrendered after Cancun. Though thwarted in multilateral
negotiations, the EU’s deep trade agenda lives on in unilateral policies, such
as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) ‘plus’,9 under which enhanced
preferential access is granted to those countries that comply with a basket of
international environmental and labour standards. The EU has also sought
to use bi- and pluri-lateral agreements, such as the Contonou, Euro-Med
and various Association Agreements to encourage democratization and
respect for human rights. With the exception of the Association Agreements,
however, it has been slow to exercise the conditionality clauses and bring its
trade power to bear (Smith 2005).
Development remains as the high watermark of the new trade politics, not
surprisingly as it is also supported by the new pivotal players in multilateral
trade negotiations, the developing country governments themselves. Within
the EU, however, new trade actors have clashed with traditional trade actors
in the form of the EU’s agricultural interests. Extensively liberalizing the
common agricultural policy (CAP) would not be an unadulterated boon to
developing countries, not least those that would lose preferential access to the
EU’s market. Nonetheless, it has emerged as one of the key sticking points in
the Doha Development Round. Since mid-2003 the EU’s negotiating position
has been shaped by the 2003 CAP reform, which was undertaken largely for
internal reasons – the then impending enlargement, which threatened to
drive up the cost of the CAP; the budgetary constraints faced by the
members of the euro; and the resistance of some member governments to
being significant net contributors to the EU budget (Dinan and Camhis
2004; Rieger 2005). These pressures were buttressed by external pressures
associated with the end of the ‘peace clause’, under which states agreed not to
challenge each other’s agricultural subsidy regimes under WTO rules, and the
need to move the Doha Round forward, as well as the framing of the CAP as
a development issue. However, the reforms, which still form the basis of the
EU’s negotiating position in the Doha Round, were not far-reaching (Dinan
and Camhis 2004; Rieger 2005; Woolcock 2005b). The obdurate resistance
of a number of member governments defending their agricultural interests
has thus neutralized to a significant extent the developmental dimension of
the new trade politics.
808 Journal of European Public Policy
INTRODUCTION TO THE REST OF THE VOLUME
The other contributions to this volume pick up and develop key features of the
new trade politics and the EU’s distinctive response to them. Steven McGuire
(2006) and Greg Shaffer (2006) address the new concerns of traditional trade
actors. McGuire (2006) concentrates on how the policy preferences of European
firms have changed in response to liberalization and the foreclosure of policy
options due to European integration and, to a lesser extent, the development
of multilateral trade rules. Shaffer (2006) examines how the technical
demands of pursuing trade disputes within a legalized multilateral trading
system are leading to new relationships between the European Commission
and European firms.
Peter Holmes (2006) contrasts the deep multilateral trade agenda and the
legalization of the multilateral trading system with the process of European inte-
gration, particularly the single European market programme. In doing so he
elaborates on a number of the key concerns that have motivated the mobiliz-
ation of the new trade actors and flags some of the limitations, both practical
and in terms of legitimacy, of trying to resolve tensions between international
trade and domestic regulation within the WTO. From a different perspective,
Erik Jones (2006) also challenges the very appropriateness of pursuing a deep
trade agenda at the multilateral level. Rather, he argues that the deep trade
agenda should be left to regional integration arrangements and that the multi-
lateral system should concentrate largely on at-the-border measures. Jones thus
sees scope for deep integration to progress at the multilateral level only through
the dispute settlements system, which is at the heart of Holmes’s concerns about
the legitimacy of the WTO’s involvement in the deep trade agenda.
Dirk De Bièvre (2006) also focuses on the deep trade agenda and legalization,
arguing that it is precisely the legalistic (he prefers judicial) character of the
WTO that makes it the EU’s preferred forum for realizing its deep
trade agenda objectives. Chad Damro (2006), for his part, also highlights the
importance of the degree of legalization in affecting preferences regarding
the appropriate forum (or venue) for pursuing the deep trade agenda. He,
however, disaggregates the Commission, arguing that while the Directorate-
General for Trade (and the EU more generally) may have preferred the more
legalistic framework of the WTO, the Directorate-General for Competition
preferred the much more informal International Competition Network, in
which experts could co-operate without interference from politicians. Thus
while DG Trade’s preferences have been thwarted by developing country
opposition in the Doha Round, DG Competition’s have been encouraged.
Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaı̈dis (2006) address how the EU uses
trade policy to promote desired policy changes in other countries, such as
environmental protection, higher labour standards or greater respect for
human rights. They highlight that the EU is a conflicted trade power not
only as a result of differences among the member states, but also because of a
number of tensions among the priorities and norms it seeks to promote
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 809
through its trade power. These lead to serious questions of the legitimacy of the
EU pursuing such policies. Matthew Baldwin (2006), from a practitioner’s per-
spective, explores how the new trade politics and the demand that trade serve a
variety of political objectives have complicated the process of trade policy-
making within the EU.
Although none of the contributions focuses centrally on the changed inter-
national balance of power, it plays an important part in a number of the contri-
butions. It is most explicit in Baldwin (2006), where the greater influence of
developing countries, although desirable in many ways, further complicates
EU trade policy. It is also an important, albeit largely implicit, component of
Meunier and Nicolaı̈dis (2006), De Bièvre (2006) and Damro (2006) in that
it is the new balance of power that is affecting the EU’s ability to pursue its
objectives through the WTO.
These contributions do not provide comprehensive coverage of the new trade
politics, but they do highlight the key issues. They range from providing broad
overviews of the development of EU trade policy (Baldwin 2006) to detailed
accounts of particular actors’ preferences on specific issues (Damro 2006),
with others in between (Meunier and Nicolaı̈dis 2006; De Bièvre (2006).
They focus on different actors: firms (McGuire 2006; Shaffer 2006) and
policy-makers (Baldwin 2006; De Bièvre 2006; Damro 2006; Shaffer 2006).
They raise questions about legitimacy (Holmes 2006; Jones 2006; Meunier
and Nicolaı̈dis 2006) and effectiveness (Baldwin 2006; Meunier and Nicolaı̈dis
2006). This diversity of focus helps the volume to be more than the sum of its
contributions.

CONCLUSION
We have argued that three distinct but interrelated elements contribute to the
new trade politics: the new concerns of traditional trade actors, the engagement
of new trade actors, and the new balance of power in international trade nego-
tiations. The new preferences of traditional trade actors, which emerged in
response to the changing nature of international economic exchange, led to
the adoption of a deep trade agenda and legalization of the multilateral
trading system, embodied in the WTO. This, in turn, created concerns about
how multilateral trade rules might impinge on states’ ability to pursue a
variety of public policy objectives, from consumer and environmental protec-
tion to development. These concerns contributed to the mobilization of new
actors – NGOs, parliaments and ministries – within developed states and
developing country governments.
Against this backdrop, the EU has pursued a distinctive strategy in the
current round of multilateral trade negotiations. More than any other major
player it has become an enthusiastic advocate of the deep trade agenda.
Moreover, the EU is seeking to pursue these issues through the development
of legally binding multilateral disciplines. Thus the EU’s approach to these
issues in the multilateral trading system seems to strongly reflect its own
810 Journal of European Public Policy
experience of integration through the single market programme. To the extent
that the EU has promoted environmental protection, core labour standards and
development, this has reflected the changing preferences of key member govern-
ments, and concern with trade policy at the highest political levels, rather than
simply the lobbying of trade technocrats.
Yet, the new trade politics divides as much as it unifies. Resistance from some
EU member governments has prevented the pro-development aspect of the new
trade politics having much traction on the crucial issue of agricultural trade lib-
eralization. Moreover, concerted opposition from a number of developing
countries has gradually whittled away the EU’s deep trade agenda, at least
within the multilateral setting. As a consequence of these internal and external
pressures, the EU’s trade agenda, at least in the context of the Doha Develop-
ment Round, no longer looks as distinctive as it did at the turn of the
millennium.
The new trade politics, however, are still there. Aspects of the deep trade
agenda live on elsewhere; in the EU’s bi- and pluri-lateral agreements, where
its negotiating leverage is greater, and in less legalized forums where opposition
is less pronounced. Whether or not the EU succeeds in reviving its deep trade
agenda at the multilateral level, the new trade politics means that trade is
now a concern in a much wider political world than the traditional, obscure,
technocratic policy world where it used to live.
Biographical notes: Alasdair Young is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the
University of Glasgow, UK. John Peterson is Professor of International Politics
at the University of Edinburgh, UK.

Address for correspondence: Alasdair Young, Department of Politics, Adam

Smith Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8RT, UK. email:
a.young@socsci.gla.ac.uk

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Matthew Baldwin, Maurizio Carbone, Dirk De Bièvre,
Brian Hocking, Erik Jones, Steve McGuire, Greg Shaffer and Stephen Wool-
cock for their comments, although all errors remain our own.

NOTES
1 The Tokyo Round began to address domestic rules through the Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) Agreement, but this targeted only the most egregious protectionist
measures (Evans 2003).
2 These clashes arguably were not as hostile to domestic regulations as is often
depicted (Young 2005b).
3 DS2 and DS4 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline. Complaints by Venezuela (24 January 1995) and Brazil (10 April 1995).
 A.R. Young & J. Peterson: The EU and the new trade politics 811
4 DS58 and DS61 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products. Complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (8
October 1996) and the Philippines (25 October 1996).
5 DS26 and DS48 European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones). Complaints by the US (26 January 1996) and Canada (28
June 1996).
6 See J. VandeHei and J. Weisman, ‘Republicans split with Bush on ports’, Washington
Post, 23 February 2006, p. A01; European Parliament, ‘Time for Europe’s partners to
move on trade, says Mandelson’, External/international trade, 23 November 2005
(available from www.europarl.eu.int/news/expert/infopress_page/026-2694-327-
11-47-903-20051121IPR02638-23-11-2005-2005-false/default_en.htm), both sites
accessed 23 April 2006.
7 There are pronounced differences of interest among these developing countries and
between them and other developing countries, especially the least developed
(Baldwin 2006; Meunier and Nicolaı̈dis 2006; Narlikar 2004).
8 The EU adopted ‘Everything But Arms’ in February 2001. It grants duty-free access
to imports from all products except arms and munitions from the least developed
countries, although the full liberalization of certain sensitive products was
delayed –bananas (January 2006), sugar (July 2009) and rice (September 2009).
9 GSP is a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
scheme under which selected products originating in developing countries are
granted preferential access, reduced or zero tariffs, to developed country markets.

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